Kiddushin 15
וְאִידָּךְ? הָהִיא – לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה הוּא דַּאֲתָא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לִרְצִיעָה שֶׁהִיא בְּאֹזֶן יָמָנִית? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן: ״אֹזֶן״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן: ״אֹזֶן״. מָה לְהַלָּן יָמִין – אַף כָּאן יָמִין.
And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, would say: That term, “his ear,” comes for a verbal analogy. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that the piercing of a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl is performed on the right ear? It is stated: Ear, here, with regard to a Hebrew slave, and it is stated there, with regard to the ritual purification of a leper: “The right ear of he who is to be purified” (Leviticus 14:14). Just as there, with regard to a leper, it specifies the right ear explicitly, so too here, the piercing of a slave must be performed on the right ear.
וְאִידַּךְ? אִם כֵּן לֵימָא קְרָא ״אֹזֶן״, מַאי ״אׇזְנוֹ״?
The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, the first tanna, derive that this piercing can be performed only on the right ear? The Gemara answers: He would argue that if it is so that the word “ear” is stated only for the sake of the verbal analogy, let the verse say merely: Ear, and one would learn the halakha through a verbal analogy from the case of the leper’s ear. What is the reason that it states “his ear”? This serves to teach that one who sells himself may not be pierced.
וְאִידַּךְ? הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: ״אׇזְנוֹ״ – וְלֹא אׇזְנָהּ. וְאִידַּךְ? נָפְקָא לַהּ מִ״וְּאִם יֹאמַר הָעֶבֶד״ – הָעֶבֶד וְלֹא אָמָה.
And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, would answer: That formulation is necessary to teach that the mitzva of piercing applies to “his ear” but not her ear. He learns from the pronoun that piercing may be performed only on a male slave, not a maidservant. The Gemara asks: And from where does the other Sage, the first tanna, derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “But if the slave shall say” (Exodus 21:5). This indicates that piercing applies to the slave but not to a maidservant.
וְאִידַּךְ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר כְּשֶׁהוּא עֶבֶד.
And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, who does not derive this ruling in the same manner as the first tanna, requires this verse for a different halakha: A slave may declare that he wishes to be pierced provided that he says this when he is still a slave. After he has been emancipated, he can no longer say that he wishes to remain with his master.
וְאִידַּךְ? מֵ״עֶבֶד״ ״הָעֶבֶד״ נָפְקָא. וְאִידַּךְ? ״עֶבֶד״ ״הָעֶבֶד״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.
The Gemara asks: And from where does the other Sage, the first tanna, learn this halakha? The Gemara responds: He derives it from the terms: Slave, and “the slave.” If the verse had stated only: Slave, one would have learned that a slave may say this only while still a slave. Since it is actually written “the slave,” this teaches the other halakha as well, that a slave may be pierced but a maidservant may not. The Gemara comments: And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, does not learn a halakha from this slight difference between: Slave, and “the slave.”
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא דְּאָמַר מוֹכֵר עַצְמוֹ אֵין מַעֲנִיקִין לוֹ? מִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי מְכָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין: ״הַעֲנֵיק תַּעֲנִיק לוֹ״ – לוֹ, וְלֹא לְמוֹכֵר עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara clarifies additional details with regard to this dispute: What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that one does not grant a severance gift to one who sells himself? With regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: “You shall give a severance gift to him” (Deuteronomy 15:14). “To him” means to one who is sold by the court, but not to one who sells himself.
וְאִידַּךְ? הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: לוֹ, וְלֹא לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. יוֹרְשָׁיו אַמַּאי לָא? ״שָׂכִיר״ קַרְיֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא, מָה שָׂכִיר פְּעוּלָּתוֹ לְיוֹרְשָׁיו – אַף הַאי פְּעוּלָּתוֹ לְיוֹרְשָׁיו! אֶלָּא: לוֹ, וְלֹא לְבַעַל חוֹבוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, derive from that verse? The Gemara answers: He requires that verse to teach the following: “To him” means that one grants a severance gift only to the slave himself but not to his heirs. The Gemara asks: Why not give this gift to his heirs? After all, the Merciful One calls a Hebrew slave “a hired worker.” Just as payment for the labor of a hired worker is given to his heirs when he dies, so too this severance gift for his labor should be given to his heirs when he dies. Rather, this verse teaches “to him,” but not to the slave’s creditor. One to whom the slave owes money may not collect the slave’s severance gift as repayment of the debt.
מִדִּסְבִירָא לַן בְּעָלְמָא כְּרַבִּי נָתָן, דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן: מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵרוֹ מָנֶה, וַחֲבֵרוֹ בַּחֲבֵרוֹ – מִנַּיִן שֶׁמּוֹצִיאִין מִזֶּה וְנוֹתְנִין לָזֶה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָתַן לַאֲשֶׁר אָשַׁם לוֹ״.
The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to emphasize that a creditor has no rights to the severance gift? That is necessary due to the fact that we generally hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that in the case of one who lends one hundred dinars to another, and the other lends a similar sum to yet another, a third person, from where is it derived that the court appropriates the money from this one, the third person, and gives it to that one, the first creditor, without going through the second person, who owes money to the first and is owed that same amount by the third? The verse states: “And he shall give it to him whom he has wronged” (Numbers 5:7), which indicates that the loan should be repaid to the creditor to whom the money is ultimately owed.
אֲתָא ״לוֹ״ לְאַפּוֹקֵי. וְאִידַּךְ? בְּעָלְמָא נָמֵי לָא סְבִירָא לַן כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
Therefore, the term “to him” comes to exclude this possibility, as the severance gift is given to the slave and not to his creditor. And how does the other Sage, the first tanna, respond to this claim? He maintains that we generally do not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. Consequently, this exposition is unnecessary.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא דְּאָמַר מוֹכֵר עַצְמוֹ אֵין רַבּוֹ מוֹסֵר לוֹ שִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית? מַיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי מְכָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין: ״אִם אֲדֹנָיו יִתֶּן לוֹ אִשָּׁה״ – לוֹ, וְלֹא לְמוֹכֵר עַצְמוֹ. וְאִידַּךְ? לוֹ – בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ.
The Gemara continues to ask: What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that if one sells himself his master does not provide him with a Canaanite maidservant? The Gemara answers: With regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: “If his master give to him a wife” (Exodus 21:4). This serves to emphasize “to him” but not to one who sells himself. And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, explains: “To him” means even against his will.
וְאִידַּךְ? מִ״כִּי מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר״ נָפְקָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״כִּי מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר עֲבָדְךָ״ – שָׂכִיר אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵד אֶלָּא בַּיּוֹם, עֶבֶד עִבְרִי עוֹבֵד בֵּין בַּיּוֹם וּבֵין בַּלַּיְלָה.
And from where does the other Sage, the first tanna, derive that the slave must remain with this maidservant against his will? He derives it from the verse: “For double of the hire of a hired worker he has served you” (Deuteronomy 15:18). As it is taught in a baraita that this verse: “For double of the hire of a hired worker he has served you,” indicates that a hired worker works only during the day, whereas a Hebrew slave works both during the day and at night.
וְכִי תַעֲלֶה עַל דַּעְתְּךָ שֶׁעֶבֶד עִבְרִי עוֹבֵד בֵּין בַּיּוֹם וּבֵין בַּלַּיְלָה? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״כִּי טוֹב לוֹ עִמָּךְ״ – עִמְּךָ בַּמַּאֲכָל, עִמְּךָ בַּמִּשְׁתֶּה. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מִכָּאן שֶׁרַבּוֹ מוֹסֵר לוֹ שִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית.
The Gemara clarifies: And can it enter your mind that a Hebrew slave actually works both during the day and at night? But isn’t it already stated: “Because he fares well with you” (Deuteronomy 15:16), which teaches that he must be with you in food and with you in drink? All of the slave’s needs must be fulfilled, and his living conditions must be equal to those of the master himself. If so, he cannot be forced to work under unreasonable conditions. And Rabbi Yitzḥak says in explanation of this halakha: From here it is derived that his master may provide him with a Canaanite maidservant against his will to produce children for the master. This is the service he performs at night.
וְאִידַּךְ? אִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי מִדַּעְתֵּיהּ, אֲבָל בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ אֵימָא לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, would say that this is no proof, because if it is derived from there alone I would say: This matter applies only with his consent; but as for his master forcing him to live with a maidservant against his will, I would say no, he cannot do this. Therefore, the term “to him” teaches us that the master can even provide him with a Canaanite maidservant against his will.
אֶלָּא, מַאן תַּנָּא דְּלָא יָלֵיף ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״? הַאי תַּנָּא הוּא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְשָׁב אֶל מִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ וְגוֹ׳״ אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב: בַּמָּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר? אִי בְּמוֹכֵר עַצְמוֹ – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר!
§ According to the above explanation, both Rabbi Elazar and the first tanna accept the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker.” Rather, who is the tanna who does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker”? It is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita as follows with regard to the verse: “He shall labor with you until the Jubilee Year, then he shall go out from you, he and his children with him, and shall return to his own family and to the possession of his fathers he shall return” (Leviticus 25:40–41). Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: What is the verse speaking of when it states: “And shall return to his own family”? If it is speaking of one who sold himself and the Jubilee Year arrived during his six years of slavery, this is already stated: “He shall labor with you until the Jubilee Year, then he shall go out from you” (Leviticus 25:40).
אִי בְּנִרְצָע – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר! הָא אֵין הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּמְכָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין שְׁתַּיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים לִפְנֵי הַיּוֹבֵל, שֶׁהַיּוֹבֵל מוֹצִיאוֹ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יָלֵיף ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״, לְמָה לִי? נֵילַף ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״!
If it is speaking of a pierced slave, it is already stated, as will be explained. It must be that the verse is speaking of nothing other than a man sold by the court two or three years before the Jubilee Year, and it teaches that the Jubilee Year releases him from slavery. The Gemara analyzes this opinion: And if it would enter your mind that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov derives the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” why do I need this verse? Let him derive that a man sold by the court is released in the Jubilee Year by the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” from the case of one who sold himself.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לְעוֹלָם יָלֵיף ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, מוֹכֵר עַצְמוֹ הוּא, דְּלָא עֲבַד אִיסּוּרָא, אֲבָל מְכָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין, דַּעֲבַד אִיסּוּרָא, אֵימָא נִיקְנְסֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this claim can be refuted: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov derives the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker” as well, and even so it was necessary for him to learn that halakha from a verse. The reason is that it might enter your mind to say that one who sells himself, who did not commit a transgression, is emancipated at the onset of the Jubilee Year even if six years have not passed, but with regard to one sold by the court, who did commit a transgression, as he was sold because he was unable to repay the value of his theft, one might say that we should penalize him and therefore he should not be emancipated in the Jubilee Year. Consequently, the verse teaches us that even this slave is emancipated in the Jubilee Year.
אָמַר מָר: אִי בְּנִרְצָע – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר. מַאי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְשַׁבְתֶּם אִישׁ אֶל אֲחֻזָּתוֹ וְאִישׁ אֶל מִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ וְגוֹ׳״ בַּמָּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר? אִי בְּמוֹכֵר עַצְמוֹ – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר!
The Master said earlier, in the baraita: If it is speaking about a pierced slave, it is already stated. The Gemara asks: What is the verse that teaches that a pierced slave is released in the Jubilee Year? As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: “And you shall return, each man to his land, and you shall return, each man to his family” (Leviticus 25:10). What is the verse speaking of? If it is speaking of one who sells himself, it is already stated: “He shall labor with you until the Jubilee Year” (Leviticus 25:40).
אִי בִּמְכָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר! הָא אֵין הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בְּנִרְצַע שְׁתַּיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים לִפְנֵי הַיּוֹבֵל, שֶׁהַיּוֹבֵל מוֹצִיאוֹ. מַאי מַשְׁמַע? אָמַר רָבָא בַּר שֵׁילָא: אָמַר קְרָא: ״אִישׁ״, אֵיזֶהוּ דָּבָר שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בָּאִישׁ וְאֵין נוֹהֵג בָּאִשָּׁה – הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר זוֹ רְצִיעָה.
If it is speaking of one who was sold by the court, it is already stated: “Then he shall go out from you, he and his children with him, and shall return to his own family” (Leviticus 25:41). It must be that the verse is speaking of nothing other than a slave who is pierced two or three years before the Jubilee Year, and that the Jubilee Year releases him. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the verse is specifically referring to a pierced slave? Rava bar Sheila said that the verse states “man.” What matter applies to a man and does not apply to a woman? You must say that this is piercing a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl.
וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיכְתַּב מְכָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיכְתַּב נִרְצָע. דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן מְכָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מְטַאי זִמְנֵיהּ, אֲבָל נִרְצָע, דִּמְטַאי זִמְנֵיהּ, אֵימָא נִיקְנְסֵיהּ.
The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for the Torah to write that one sold by the court leaves in the Jubilee Year, and it was also necessary to write the same with regard to a pierced slave, as neither case can be derived from the other. The Gemara elaborates: As, if the Torah had informed us only about one who was sold by the court, one might say that the Jubilee Year releases him because his time had not come to be freed. But with regard to a pierced slave, whose time had come but he did not wish to be freed, one might say that we should penalize him and he should remain a permanent slave.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן נִרְצָע, מִשּׁוּם דַּעֲבַד לֵיהּ שֵׁשׁ, אֲבָל מְכָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין, דְּלָא עֲבַד לֵיהּ שֵׁשׁ, אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
And conversely, if the Torah had informed us only about a pierced slave, one might say that the Jubilee Year releases him because he has served the master for six years, as required, but with regard to one who was sold by the court, who has not yet served his master for six years, one might say that he should not be freed in the Jubilee Year. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to state this halakha with regard to both cases.
וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיכְתַּב ״וְשַׁבְתֶּם״, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיכְתַּב ״לְעוֹלָם״. דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לְעוֹלָם״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לְעוֹלָם מַמָּשׁ, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְשַׁבְתֶּם״.
And likewise, it was necessary for the Torah to write with regard to the release of a pierced slave in the Jubilee Year: “And you shall return, each man to his land” (Leviticus 25:10), and it was necessary to write as well: “And he shall serve him forever” (Exodus 21:6), which is interpreted by the Sages as referring to until the Jubilee Year. As, if the Merciful One had written only “forever,” I would say that this actually means forever, i.e., for his entire life. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And you shall return.”
וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְשַׁבְתֶּם״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלָא עֲבַד שֵׁשׁ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דַּעֲבַד שֵׁשׁ לֹא יְהֵא סוֹפוֹ חָמוּר מִתְּחִלָּתוֹ, מָה תְּחִלָּתוֹ שֵׁשׁ – אַף סוֹפוֹ נָמֵי שֵׁשׁ, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן: ״לְעוֹלָם״ – לְעוֹלָמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹבֵל.
And if the Merciful One had written only “and you shall return,” I would say that this statement applies only where he did not serve six years after being pierced; but in a case where he did serve six years after he was pierced, one might argue as follows: His final stage, after he is pierced, should not be stricter than his initial stage, when he was first sold: Just as after his initial stage he serves only six years, so too in his final stage he serves only six years and no longer. Therefore, the verse teaches us “forever,” which means forever until the Jubilee Year, even if the Jubilee Year arrives many years later. In any case, with regard to the issue at hand there is no proof that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker.”
אֶלָּא מַאן תַּנָּא דְּלָא יָלֵיף ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״? רַבִּי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא:
Rather, who is the tanna who does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker”? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita:
״וְאִם לֹא יִגָּאֵל בְּאֵלֶּה״ רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בְּאֵלֶּה הוּא נִגְאָל, וְאֵין נִגְאָל בְּשֵׁשׁ.
A Hebrew slave sold to a gentile can be redeemed by his relatives, as it is stated: “And if he is not redeemed by any of these, then he shall go out in the Jubilee Year” (Leviticus 25:54). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He can be redeemed only through these, i.e., the assistance of his relatives, and he is not redeemed after six years of labor.
שֶׁיָּכוֹל וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא, וּמָה מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִגְאָל בְּאֵלֶּה – נִגְאָל בְּשֵׁשׁ, זֶה, שֶׁנִּגְאָל בְּאֵלֶּה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנִּגְאָל בְּשֵׁשׁ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּאֵלֶּה״ – בְּאֵלֶּה הוּא נִגְאָל, וְאֵין נִגְאָל בְּשֵׁשׁ.
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi elaborates: As I might have argued that one sold to a gentile should be released after six years. Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: If one who cannot be redeemed by these relatives, i.e., a Hebrew slave who was sold to a Jew, as he cannot be redeemed by his relatives, nevertheless is redeemed after six years of labor, is it not logical that this Hebrew slave sold to a gentile, who can be redeemed by these relatives, can likewise be redeemed after six years of work? Therefore, the verse states “by any of these,” to emphasize that one sold to a gentile can be redeemed only through these relatives, and he cannot be redeemed after six years.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יָלֵיף ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״, אַמַּאי קָאָמַר ״וּמָה מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִגְאָל בְּאֵלֶּה״? נֵילַף ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״!
The Gemara explains the proof: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” why does he say: If one who cannot be redeemed by these, with regard to one who is sold to a Jew? Let him derive that halakha from the case of one sold to a gentile, through the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker.” The term “hired worker” is used in reference to one sold to a gentile as well: “As a hired worker year by year he shall be with him” (Leviticus 25:53), and accordingly one can say that even one sold to a Jew can be redeemed by his relatives. The fact that he does not accept this claim indicates that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rejects the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker.”
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לְעוֹלָם יָלֵיף ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ – לָזֶה, וְלֹא לְאַחֵר.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This proof can be refuted, as one can say that actually Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” and it is different here, with regard to one sold to a gentile, as the verse states: “Either his uncle or his uncle’s son may redeem him” (Leviticus 25:49). This emphasis of “him” teaches that redemption is an option only for this slave and not for another type of slave.
וּמַאן תַּנָּא דִּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי? רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא יִגָּאֵל בְּאֵלֶּה״ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: ״בְּאֵלֶּה״ – לְשִׁחְרוּר, בִּשְׁאָר כׇּל אָדָם – לְשִׁעְבּוּד. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״בְּאֵלֶּה״ – לְשִׁעְבּוּד, בִּשְׁאָר כׇּל אָדָם – לְשִׁחְרוּר.
With regard to the dispute itself the Gemara inquires: And who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with regard to this? It is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva. As it is taught in a baraita concerning the verse: “And if he is not redeemed by any of these” (Leviticus 25:54), that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The expression “by any of these” indicates that redemption by one’s relatives is to freedom, i.e., one becomes an entirely free man. But if a slave is redeemed by anyone else who pays the gentile master, it is to slavery. The redeemed slave becomes indentured to his redeemer until he repays the cost of his redemption through his work. Rabbi Akiva says the opposite: By these relatives he is redeemed to slavery, whereas if he is redeemed by anyone else, it is to freedom.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? אָמַר קְרָא: ״אִם לֹא יִגָּאֵל בְּאֵלֶּה״ – אֶלָּא בְּאַחֵר – ״וְיָצָא בִּשְׁנַת הַיּוֹבֵל״. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״אִם לֹא יִגָּאֵל״ – אֶלָּא – ״בְּאֵלֶּה״, ״וְיָצָא בִּשְׁנַת הַיּוֹבֵל״. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? מִידֵּי ״אֶלָּא בְּאֵלֶּה״ כְּתִיב?
The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? The verse states concerning a redeemed slave who is emancipated: “If he is not redeemed by any of these” relatives; but if he is redeemed by another, “then he shall go out in the Jubilee Year,” not earlier, as he becomes enslaved to him. And Rabbi Akiva says: “If he is not redeemed” in any other manner but only “by any of these,” “then he shall go out in the Jubilee Year,” i.e., if he is redeemed by relatives, he is emancipated only at the close of Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year. By contrast, if he is redeemed by others he is emancipated immediately. And how does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili respond to this claim? He would ask: Is it written: Only by any of these?
אֶלָּא בְּהַאי קְרָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: ״אוֹ דֹדוֹ אוֹ בֶן דֹּדוֹ יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ – זוֹ גְּאוּלַּת קְרוֹבִים, ״אוֹ הִשִּׂיגָה יָדוֹ״ – זוֹ גְּאוּלַּת עַצְמוֹ, ״וְנִגְאָל״ – זוֹ גְּאוּלַּת אֲחֵרִים.
Rather, as this suggested interpretation of the verse by Rabbi Akiva is clearly problematic, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation of the dispute and instead says that they disagree with regard to the precise meaning of this verse: “Either his uncle or his uncle’s son may redeem him, or any that is near of kin unto him of his family may redeem him; or if he becomes rich, and he is redeemed” (Leviticus 25:49). “Either his uncle or his uncle’s son may redeem him”; this is the redemption performed by relatives. “Or if he becomes rich”; this is redemption by himself. “And he is redeemed”; this is redemption by other people.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר: מִקְרָא נִדְרָשׁ לְפָנָיו, שְׁדִי גְּאוּלַּת קְרוֹבִים אַגְּאוּלַּת עַצְמוֹ, מָה גְּאוּלַּת עַצְמוֹ לְשִׁחְרוּר – אַף גְּאוּלַּת קְרוֹבִים לְשִׁחְרוּר. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: מִקְרָא נִדְרָשׁ לְאַחֲרָיו, שְׁדִי גְּאוּלַּת אֲחֵרִים אַגְּאוּלַּת עַצְמוֹ, מָה גְּאוּלַּת עַצְמוֹ לְשִׁחְרוּר – אַף גְּאוּלַּת אֲחֵרִים לְשִׁחְרוּר.
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains: A verse is interpreted homiletically based on its juxtaposition to the verse immediately preceding it. Therefore, one should cast, i.e., compare, the case of redemption performed by relatives to the case of redemption performed by himself: Just as redemption performed by himself leads to complete freedom, so too, redemption performed by relatives leads to freedom. And Rabbi Akiva maintains that a verse is interpreted homiletically based on its juxtaposition to the verse immediately after it. Therefore one should cast the case of redemption performed by others to the case of redemption performed by himself: Just as redemption performed by himself is to freedom, so too, redemption performed by others is to freedom, whereas if he is redeemed by his relatives, he becomes enslaved to them.
אִי הָכִי, ״בְּאֵלֶּה״ לְמָה לִי? אִי לָאו ״בְּאֵלֶּה״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא מִקְרָא נִדְרָשׁ בֵּין לְפָנָיו בֵּין לְאַחֲרָיו, וְהַכֹּל לְשִׁחְרוּר.
The Gemara asks: If so, that this is their dispute, why do I need the phrase “by any of these,” according to both Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: If it were not for the phrase “by any of these,” I would say that a verse is interpreted homiletically based on its juxtaposition to the verse immediately preceding it as well as to the verse immediately after it, and therefore in every manner in which he is redeemed it is to freedom. The phrase “by any of these” limits this freedom either to relatives or other people, according to the respective opinions of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva.
אִי הָכִי, הֲדַר קוּשְׁיָא לְדוּכְתֵּיהּ. אֶלָּא, בִּסְבָרָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי:
The Gemara asks: If so, that the different opinions are based on the phrase “by any of these,” then the difficulty with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that the verse does not say: If he is not redeemed in any other manner but only by any of these, has returned to its place, i.e., it is still valid, as this phrase indicates that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s interpretation of the verse is correct. Rather, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regard to reason. Their dispute is a matter of logic and does not concern textual interpretation.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר: מִסְתַּבְּרָא גְּאוּלַּת אֲחֵרִים לְשִׁיעְבּוּד, דְּאִי אָמְרַתְּ לְשִׁחְרוּר, הֲווֹ מִימַּנְעִי וְלָא פָּרְקִי לֵיהּ. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: מִסְתַּבְּרָא גְּאוּלַּת קְרוֹבִים לְשִׁיעְבּוּד, דְּאִי אָמְרַתְּ לְשִׁחְרוּר, כׇּל יוֹמָא וְיוֹמָא אֲזַל וּמְזַבֵּין נַפְשֵׁיהּ.
The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains: It stands to reason that redemption performed by others is to slavery, as, if you say it is to freedom, they will refrain and will not redeem him. If the slave is required to serve them, and they incur no financial loss, they will redeem him. And Rabbi Akiva maintains: It stands to reason that redemption performed by relatives is to slavery, as, if you say it is to freedom, each and every day he will go and sell himself over and again, relying on his relatives to free him.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הַכֹּל לְשִׁחְרוּר.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva, who hold that a slave is not invariably freed whenever he is redeemed from his gentile master. But the Rabbis say that in every case, when he is emancipated it is to freedom.
מַאן חֲכָמִים? רַבִּי הִיא, דְּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְהַאי ״בְּאֵלֶּה״ לִדְרָשָׁה אַחֲרִינָא, וּמִקְרָא נִדְרָשׁ בֵּין לְפָנָיו וּבֵין לְאַחֲרָיו.
The Gemara inquires: Who are these Rabbis? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who derives another exposition from this term “by any of these,” as stated above. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that a verse is interpreted homiletically based on its juxtaposition to the verse immediately preceding it as well as to the verse immediately after it. Consequently, the Hebrew slave of a gentile is emancipated regardless of whether he is redeemed by relatives or other people.
וְרַבִּי, הַאי ״וְיָצָא בִּשְׁנַת הַיֹּבֵל״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וְיָצָא בִּשְׁנַת הַיּוֹבֵל״
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, what does he do with the verse: “And if he is not redeemed by any of these means, then he shall go out in the Jubilee Year” (Leviticus 25:54)? The Gemara answers: He requires this verse for that which is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Then he shall go out in the Jubilee Year.” If the slave is not redeemed prior to this point in time he leaves his gentile master only in the Jubilee Year.
