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Today's Daf Yomi

March 25, 2016 | ื˜ืดื• ื‘ืื“ืจ ื‘ืณ ืชืฉืขืดื•

  • This monthโ€™s learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. โ€œAnd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.โ€

Kiddushin 14

What are the sources for the ways in which a yevama is acquired and freed from her first husband’s brother? ย How is a Jewish slave acquired and freed? ย Are there differences between a Jewish slave who is sold into slavery by the court (if he stole and can’t pay it back) or if he was poor and sold himself into slavery?

Study Guide Kiddushin 14


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ื™ื‘ืžื” ื™ื‘ื ืขืœื™ื” ื•ืœืงื—ื” ืœื• ืœืืฉื” ื•ืื™ืžื ืœื›ื•ืœื” ืžื™ืœืชื ื›ืืฉื” ืœื ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื“ืชื ื™ื ื™ื›ื•ืœ ื™ื”ื• ื›ืกืฃ ื•ืฉื˜ืจ ื’ื•ืžืจื™ื ื‘ื” ื›ื“ืจืš ืฉื”ื‘ื™ืื” ื’ื•ืžืจืช ื‘ื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ื™ื‘ืžื” ื‘ื™ืื” ื’ื•ืžืจืช ื‘ื” ื•ืื™ืŸ ื›ืกืฃ ื•ืฉื˜ืจ ื’ื•ืžืจื™ื ื‘ื”

โ€œHer brother-in-law will engage in sexual intercourse with her and take her to him as a wife, and perform levirate marriage with herโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that intercourse renders her his wife. The Gemara asks: But one can say that with regard to all matters she is like a wife, and therefore she can also be acquired with money or a document like any other woman. The Gemara answers: It could not enter your mind to say this, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that money and a document can complete the acquisition of a yevama and cause her to be married, in the manner that intercourse completes her acquisition. Therefore, the verse states: โ€œAnd perform levirate marriage with herโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that only intercourse completes her acquisition, but money or a document do not complete her acquisition.

ื•ืื™ืžื ืžืื™ ื•ื™ื‘ืžื” ื“ื‘ืขืœ ื›ืจื—ื” ืžื™ื‘ื ืื ื›ืŸ ืœื™ืžื ืงืจื ื•ื™ื‘ื ืžืื™ ื•ื™ื‘ืžื” ืฉืžืขืช ืžื™ื ื” ืชืจืชื™

The Gemara asks: But one can say: What is the meaning of: โ€œAnd perform levirate marriage with herโ€? It teaches that he can perform levirate marriage without her consent, as unlike an ordinary marriage, a levirate marriage does not require the womanโ€™s agreement. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse say: And perform levirate marriage, and one would understand that the matter depends entirely on him. What is the meaning of: โ€œAnd perform levirate marriage with herโ€? Learn two conclusions from this: First, that a levirate marriage can be performed against her will, and second, that the only way to acquire a yevama is through sexual intercourse.

ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื ืงืจื ืฉืžื• ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื™ืช ื—ืœื•ืฅ ื”ื ืขืœ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ืฉื—ืœืฅ ื‘ื” ื ืขืœ ื”ื•ืชืจื” ืœื›ืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ

ยง The mishna teaches that the yevama acquires herself through แธฅalitza. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: As it is written with regard to levirate marriage, after the yavam has performed แธฅalitza: โ€œAnd his name shall be called in Israel: The house of him who had his shoe removedโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:10). This indicates: Once his shoe is removed by her, she is permitted to all of Israel.

ื”ืื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืœื”ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ืืชื ื”ืื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื›ื“ืชื ื™ ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ืœื ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืœ ื ื›ืจื™ื ืชืจื™ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื›ืชื™ื‘ื™

The Gemara asks: This term โ€œIsrael,โ€ does it come to teach this halakha? It is required for that which is taught by Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda: The verse says โ€œin Israelโ€ to teach that แธฅalitza may be performed only in a Jewish court, but not in a gentile court. The Gemara answers that the phrase โ€œin Israelโ€ is written twice in that chapter: โ€œAnd his name shall be called in Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:10), and: โ€œTo establish a name for his brother in Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:7). A different halakha is derived from each of these instances.

ื•ืื›ืชื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืคืขื ืื—ืช ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื™ื•ืฉื‘ื™ื ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื•ื‘ืืชื” ื™ื‘ืžื” ืœื—ืœื•ืฅ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื ื• ืขื ื• ื›ื•ืœื›ื ื•ืืžืจื• ื—ืœื•ืฅ ื”ื ืขืœ ื—ืœื•ืฅ ื”ื ืขืœ ื”ื”ื•ื ืžื•ื ืงืจื ืฉืžื• ื ืคืงื

The Gemara asks: But still, we also require the additional term โ€œin Israelโ€ for that which is taught in a baraita, that Rabbi Yehuda said: Once we were sitting before Rabbi Tarfon and a yevama came to perform แธฅalitza. And Rabbi Tarfon said to us after the แธฅalitza: All of you should answer and say: The one whose shoe was removed, the one whose shoe was removed. This indicates that the phrase: โ€œAnd his name shall be called in Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:10), teaches that the matter must be announced and publicized throughout the nation. The Gemara answers: That halakha is not derived from the phrase โ€œin Israel.โ€ Rather, it is derived from: โ€œAnd his name shall be called,โ€ which indicates that it must be announced that this is his name.

ื•ื‘ืžื™ืชืช ื”ื™ื‘ื ืžื ืœืŸ ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืฉื”ื™ื ื‘ื—ื ืง ืžื™ืชืช ื”ื‘ืขืœ ืžืชื™ืจืชื” ื™ื‘ืžื” ืฉื”ื™ื ื‘ืœืื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

ยง The mishna further teaches that a yevama is released from levirate marriage and may remarry through the death of the yavam. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that it is an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to a married woman, who is forbidden to other men by a prohibition punished with strangulation, and yet the death of her husband renders her permitted, is it not all the more so that with regard to a yevama, who is forbidden to other men while the yavam is alive by only a mere prohibition, that the death of the yavam should render her permitted?

ืžื” ืœืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืฉื›ืŸ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ืชืืžืจ ื‘ื–ื• ืฉืื™ื ื” ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื”ื ื ืžื™ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื”

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this a fortiori inference: What is unique about a married woman is that she can leave through a bill of divorce as well. Will you say the same with regard to this yevama, who does not leave through a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: This is an insufficient refutation of the a fortiori inference, as this yevama also leaves through แธฅalitza, which serves the same function as a bill of divorce.

ืืœื ืžื” ืœืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืฉื›ืŸ ืื•ืกืจื” ืžืชื™ืจื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื ื ืžื™ ืื•ืกืจื” ืžืชื™ืจื” ื™ื‘ื ืื•ืกืจื” ื™ื‘ื ืฉืจื™ ืœื”

Rather, one can challenge this a fortiori inference in the following manner. What is unique about a married woman is that the one who renders her forbidden to everyone else, i.e., her husband, also renders her permitted when he dies. This is not so with regard to a yevama, as she is rendered forbidden upon the death of her husband. Rav Ashi said: With regard to this yevama as well, he who renders her forbidden is also the one who renders her permitted: The yavam renders her forbidden, because if he was not alive she would automatically be permitted to other men. Likewise, the yavam renders her permitted through แธฅalitza.

ื•ืชื”ื ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืžืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ื™ื‘ืžื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื–ื• ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืกืคืจ ื›ืจื™ืชืช ืกืคืจ ื›ื•ืจืชื” ื•ืื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจ ืื—ืจ ื›ื•ืจืชื”

The Gemara asks: And let a married woman leave a marriage through แธฅalitza, as derived by an a fortiori inference: If a yevama, who cannot leave through a bill of divorce, can leave through แธฅalitza, is it not logical that this married woman, who can leave through a bill of divorce, can likewise leave through แธฅalitza? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to a married woman: โ€œA scroll of severanceโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:3), which indicates that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him. While the husband is alive only a bill of divorce can dissolve a marriage.

ื•ืชื”ื ื™ื‘ืžื” ื™ื•ืฆืืช ื‘ื’ื˜ ืžืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื–ื• ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืื™ืŸ ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื›ื” ื•ื›ื›ื” ืขื™ื›ื•ื‘ื

The Gemara further asks: And let a yevama leave through a bill of divorce, as derived by an a fortiori inference: If a married woman, who cannot leave through แธฅalitza, can leave through a bill of divorce, is it not logical that this yevama, who can leave through แธฅalitza, can also leave through a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: The verse states: โ€œSo shall it be done to the manโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:9), with regard to the แธฅalitza of a yevama, and โ€œsoโ€ precludes another option.

ื•ื›ืœ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขื™ื›ื•ื‘ื ืœื ื“ืจืฉื™ ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ื”ื ื™ื•ื ื”ื›ืคื•ืจื™ื ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื’ื•ืจืœ ื•ื—ื•ืงื”

The Gemara asks: And is it true that anywhere that there is a term that precludes another option one cannot learn an a fortiori inference? But there is the case of the designation of the goats on Yom Kippur, as it is written: โ€œThe goat upon which the lot came up for the Lordโ€ (Leviticus 16:9), and: โ€œThis shall be an everlasting statute to youโ€ (Leviticus 16:34), which indicates that everything stated with regard to the mitzvot of Yom Kippur is critical to the performance of the service of the day.

ื•ืชื ื™ื ื•ืขืฉื”ื• ื—ื˜ืืช ื”ื’ื•ืจืœ ืขื•ืฉื” ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ื”ืฉื ืขื•ืฉื” ื—ื˜ืืช

And it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: โ€œAaron shall bring forward the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord, and he shall offer it for a sin-offeringโ€ (Leviticus 16:9). The verse indicates that the lottery renders it a sin-offering, but a verbal designation of the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not render it a sin-offering.

ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœ ื•ื”ืœื ื“ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื•ืžื” ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืฉืœื ืงื™ื“ืฉ ื”ื’ื•ืจืœ ืงื™ื“ืฉ ื”ืฉื ืžืงื•ื ืฉืงื™ื“ืฉ ื”ื’ื•ืจืœ ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ืงื“ืฉ ื”ืฉื

The baraita continues: A verse is necessary to teach this halakha, as one might have thought that the opposite conclusion is correct: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: Just as in a case in which the use of a lottery does not effect the consecration of the animals with a specific designation, e.g., with regard to a woman who has given birth and must bring two birds, one as a sin-offering and one as a burnt-offering, and nevertheless a verbal designation of the animals with the required status does effect the consecration of them, so too, in a case in which the use of a lottery does effect the consecration of the animals, is it not logically right that a verbal designation of the animals with the required status should effect the consecration of them?

ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ืขืฉื”ื• ื—ื˜ืืช ื”ื’ื•ืจืœ ืขื•ืฉื” ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ื”ืฉื ืขื•ืฉื” ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืžืขื˜ื™ื” ืงืจื ื”ื ืœืื• ื”ื›ื™ ื“ืจืฉื™ื ืŸ ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ื™ื” ื—ื•ืงื”

To counter this reasoning, the verse states with regard to the goat: โ€œHe shall offer it for a sin-offeringโ€ (Leviticus 16:9), to indicate that the lottery renders it a sin-offering, but a verbal designation of the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not render it a sin-offering. And the reason that a verbal designation is ineffective is that the verse excluded this possibility, from which it may be inferred that if it were not so, one would learn an a fortiori inference, even though it is written with regard to it โ€œstatute.โ€ The same logic should apply in the case of แธฅalitza, i.e., the term โ€œsoโ€ should not prevent one from learning an a fortiori inference, and therefore it might be argued that a yevama can be released through a bill of divorce.

ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœื” ืœื” ื•ืœื ืœื™ื‘ืžื” ื•ืื™ืžื ืœื” ืœืฉืžื”

Rather, the Gemara explains that here too, there is a limitation derived from a verse. The verse states with regard to a bill of divorce: โ€œAnd write for her a scroll of severanceโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:3). โ€œFor herโ€ is a limitation, which teaches: A bill of divorce is effective for a regular woman but not for a yevama. The Gemara asks: But one can say that the phrase โ€œfor herโ€ indicates that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake.

ืชืจื™ ืœื” ื›ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื•ืื›ืชื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ื—ื“ ืœื” ืœืฉืžื” ื•ืื™ื“ืš ืœื” ื•ืœื ืœื” ื•ืœื—ื‘ื™ืจืชื”

The Gemara answers: โ€œFor herโ€ is written twice (Deuteronomy 24:1, 3), and therefore both halakhot can be derived. The Gemara asks: And still, one instance of: โ€œFor herโ€ is required to teach that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake, and the other โ€œfor herโ€ is needed to teach: For her and not both for her and for another, i.e., her rival wife. One bill of divorce cannot be used for two women.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื ืขืœ ื ืขืœ ืื™ืŸ ืžื™ื“ื™ ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืœื

Rather, the Gemara suggests a different explanation as to why a bill of divorce is ineffective for a yevama. With regard to a yevama the verse states: โ€œThe house of him who had his shoe removedโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:10), which teaches: If she is released by the แธฅalitza of the shoe, yes, she is released from the yavam, but if she was released by means of something else, no, she is not released.

ื•ื”ืื™ ื ืขืœ ืœื”ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ืืชื ื”ืื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ื ืขืœื• ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ื ืขืœื• ื ืขืœ ืฉืœ ื›ืœ ืื“ื ืžื ื ืœื™ื”

The Gemara asks: But this term โ€œshoe,โ€ does it come to teach this? It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse said: โ€œAnd remove his shoeโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:9). I have derived only that his shoe may be used. From where do I derive that the shoe of any person may also be used for แธฅalitza?

ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื ืขืœ ื ืขืœ ืจื™ื‘ื” ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื ืขืœื• ื ืขืœื• ื”ืจืื•ื™ ืœื• ืคืจื˜ ืœื’ื“ื•ืœ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ืœืš ื‘ื• ืคืจื˜ ืœืงื˜ืŸ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื—ื•ืคื” ืืช ืจื•ื‘ ืจื’ืœื• ืคืจื˜

The verse states โ€œshoe,โ€ and states again in the next verse โ€œshoe,โ€ which includes any other shoe. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states โ€œhis shoe,โ€ which is apparently referring to the shoe of that particular man? This teaches that it must be his shoe that is fit for him, excluding a shoe so large that he cannot walk in it, and excluding a shoe so small that it does not cover most of his foot, and excluding

ืœืžืกื•ืœื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืขืงื‘ ืื ื›ืŸ ื ื™ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืงืจื ื ืขืœ ืžืื™ ื”ื ืขืœ ืฉืžืขืช ืžื™ื ื” ืชืจืชื™

sandals [mesulayim] that have no heels, which do not qualify as shoes. The Gemara answers: If so, that the term is stated only for that purpose, let the verse write โ€œshoe.โ€ What is the meaning of โ€œthe shoeโ€? Learn the two previously stated conclusions from it.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืขื‘ื“ ืขื‘ืจื™ ื ืงื ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ื•ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ื•ืงื•ื ื” ืขืฆืžื• ื‘ืฉื ื™ื ื•ื‘ื™ื•ื‘ืœ ื•ื‘ื’ืจืขื•ืŸ ื›ืกืฃ ื™ืชื™ืจื” ืขืœื™ื• ืืžื” ื”ืขื‘ืจื™ื” ืฉืงื•ื ื” ืืช ืขืฆืžื” ื‘ืกื™ืžื ื™ืŸ ื”ื ืจืฆืข ื ืงื ื” ื‘ืจืฆื™ืขื” ื•ืงื•ื ื” ืืช ืขืฆืžื• ื‘ื™ื•ื‘ืœ ื•ื‘ืžื™ืชืช ื”ืื“ื•ืŸ

MISHNA: A Hebrew slave can be acquired by his master through money or through a document, and he can acquire himself, i.e., he is emancipated, through years, i.e., when he completes his six years of labor, or through the advent of the Jubilee Year, or through the deduction of money. The slave can redeem himself during the six years by paying for his remaining years of slavery. A Hebrew maidservant has one mode of emancipation more than him, as she acquires herself through signs indicating puberty. A slave who is pierced after serving six years is acquired as a slave for a longer period through piercing his ear with an awl, and he acquires himself through the advent of the Jubilee Year or through the death of the master.

ื’ืžืณ ืขื‘ื“ ืขื‘ืจื™ ื ืงื ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžื ืœืŸ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืžื›ืกืฃ ืžืงื ืชื• ืžืœืžื“ ืฉื ืงื ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืืฉื›ื—ืŸ ืขื‘ื“ ืขื‘ืจื™ ื”ื ืžื›ืจ ืœื ื›ืจื™ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื›ืœ ืงื ื™ื ื• ื‘ื›ืกืฃ

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a Hebrew slave can be acquired through money. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that the verse states: โ€œOut of the money that he was bought forโ€ (Leviticus 25:51), which teaches that he can be acquired through money. The Gemara asks: We found that a Hebrew slave who is sold to a gentile is acquired with money, which is the case discussed in that verse, but this proves nothing with regard to a Jew sold to a Jew. One could argue that since all of the acquisitions of a gentile are performed only with money, he can likewise purchase a Hebrew slave with money.

ื ืžื›ืจ ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื ืœืŸ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื”ืคื“ื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืžื’ืจืขืช ืคื“ื™ื•ื ื” ื•ื™ื•ืฆืื”

But from where do we derive that a Hebrew slave can be sold to a Jew with money? The Gemara explains that with regard to a Hebrew maidservant, the verse states: โ€œThen he shall let her be redeemedโ€ (Exodus 21:8), which teaches that if she acquires money and wishes to be emancipated before her time is complete, she deducts a sum from her redemption. The maidservant can deduct the value of time served from her purchase price and pay the remaining amount, and she then is emancipated. This teaches that a Hebrew maidservant is acquired through money, a halakha that applies to a male slave as well.

ืืฉื›ื—ืŸ ืืžื” ื”ืขื‘ืจื™ื” ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืžื™ืงื“ืฉื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžื™ืงื ื™ื ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืขื‘ื“ ืขื‘ืจื™ ืžื ืœืŸ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื™ ื™ืžื›ืจ ืœืš ืื—ื™ืš ื”ืขื‘ืจื™ ืื• ื”ืขื‘ืจื™ื” ื•ืขื‘ื“ืš ืฉืฉ ืฉื ื™ื ืžืงื™ืฉ ืขื‘ืจื™ ืœืขื‘ืจื™ื”

The Gemara asks: Although we found this halakha with regard to a Hebrew maidservant, one cannot extrapolate from there to this case, as it is possible that it applies only to a female. The reason for this is that since she is ordinarily betrothed through money, she can also be acquired as a maidservant through money. From where do we derive that a Hebrew slave can likewise be acquired through money? The Gemara answers that the verse states: โ€œIf your brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman is sold to you, and he shall serve you six yearsโ€ (Deuteronomy 15:12). This verse juxtaposes a Hebrew man to a Hebrew woman, indicating that the modes through which they are acquired are the same.

ืืฉื›ื—ืŸ ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื ืžื›ืจ ื‘ืขืœ ื›ื•ืจื—ื• ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืžื ืœืŸ

The Gemara further asks: We found a source in this verse for a slave who is sold by the court. This verse is referring to a thief who is unable to repay the value of his theft and is sold as a slave so that he can repay his debt. One can therefore argue that this case is unique, since he is sold against his will. From where do we derive that one who sells himself can be sold through money?

ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ื”ื ื™ื—ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืืœื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืœื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืžืื™ ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ

The Gemara answers: One derives this through a verbal analogy between the terms โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker.โ€ This term appears both with regard to one who sells himself: โ€œAs a hired worker and as a settler he shall be with youโ€ (Leviticus 25:40), and with regard to one who is sold by the court: โ€œFor double of the hire of a hired worker he has served youโ€ (Deuteronomy 15:18). The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who derives this verbal analogy between the terms โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker.โ€ But according to the one who does not derive the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker,โ€ what can be said? From where does he derive that one who sells himself may be purchased with money?

ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื›ื™ ืชืฉื™ื’ ืžื•ืกืฃ ืขืœ ืขื ื™ืŸ ืจืืฉื•ืŸ ื•ื™ืœืžื“ ืขืœื™ื•ืŸ ืžืชื—ืชื•ืŸ

The Gemara answers: The verse states at the start of the passage dealing with one sold to a gentile: โ€œAnd if a stranger who is a settler with you becomes richโ€ (Leviticus 25:47). The conjunction โ€œandโ€ serves to add to the first matter, i.e., the passage discussing one who sells himself to a Jew, as it joins the two issues. And therefore let the above case of one who sells himself to a Jew be derived from the case below of one who is sold to a gentile: Just as one who is sold to a gentile can be acquired with money, so too, one who sells himself to a Jew can be acquired with money.

ื•ืžืืŸ ืชื ื ื“ืœื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ื ืžื›ืจ ืœืฉืฉ ื•ื™ืชืจ ืขืœ ืฉืฉ ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ื ืžื›ืจ ืืœื ืœืฉืฉ

The Gemara comments: And who is the tanna who does not derive the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired workerโ€? It is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: One who sells himself as a slave is sold for six years, and if he wishes he can be sold for more than six years, whereas one who is sold by the court is sold only for six years, but no more.

ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ื ื• ื ืจืฆืข ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื ืจืฆืข ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ืŸ ืžืขื ื™ืงื™ื ืœื• ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืžืขื ื™ืงื™ื ืœื• ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื• ืžื•ืกืจ ืœื• ืฉืคื—ื” ื›ื ืขื ื™ืช ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื• ืžื•ืกืจ ืœื• ืฉืคื—ื” ื›ื ืขื ื™ืช

The baraita adds that there are additional differences between these two slaves: One who sells himself may not be pierced with an awl, whereas one who is sold by the court may be pierced with an awl. One who sells himself is not granted a severance gift by his master when he is emancipated, whereas one who is sold by the court is granted a severance gift. With regard to one who sells himself, his master may not provide him with a Canaanite maidservant as a wife to produce slave children, whereas with regard to one sold by the court, his master may provide him with a Canaanite maidservant.

ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื–ื” ื•ื–ื” ืื™ื ื• ื ืžื›ืจ ืืœื ืœืฉืฉ ื–ื” ื•ื–ื” ื ืจืฆืข ื•ื–ื” ื•ื–ื” ืžืขื ื™ืงื™ื ืœื• ื•ื–ื” ื•ื–ื” ืจื‘ื• ืžื•ืกืจ ืœื• ืฉืคื—ื” ื›ื ืขื ื™ืช ืžืื™ ืœืื• ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ืœื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ

Rabbi Elazar says that there is no difference between these two types of slaves. Rather, both this slave and that slave may be sold for only six years; both this and that one may be pierced with an awl, both this and that one are granted a severance gift, and in both this case and that case his master may provide him with a Canaanite maidservant. What, is it not the case that they disagree with regard to this, that the first tanna does not derive the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker,โ€ and Rabbi Elazar derives the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired workerโ€? If one holds that the two cases are juxtaposed, one will equate the halakhot of both slaves. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, in contrast to the opinion of the first tanna, who holds that the halakhot of each type of slave are discrete.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื˜ื‘ื™ื•ืžื™ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืื‘ื™ื™ ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ื•ื”ื›ื ื‘ื”ืื™ ืงืจื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ื ืžื›ืจ ืœืฉืฉ ื•ื™ืชืจ ืขืœ ืฉืฉ ืžื™ืขื˜ ืจื—ืžื ื ื’ื‘ื™ ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืขื‘ื“ืš ืฉืฉ ืฉื ื™ื ื–ื” ื•ืœื ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื•

Rav Tavyumei said in the name of Abaye: That is not so; rather, everyone derives the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker,โ€ and here, in the dispute in the baraita, they disagree about this following verse. What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that one who sells himself is sold for six years and more than six years? He maintains that with regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: โ€œIf your brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman, is sold to you, and he shall serve you six yearsโ€ (Deuteronomy 15:12). That teaches that only this type of slave serves for six years and no more, but the same does not apply to one who sells himself. If he so stipulates, he may serve for more than six years.

ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื•ืขื‘ื“ืš ืœืš ื•ืœื ืœื™ื•ืจืฉ

The Gemara explains: And the other, Rabbi Elazar, learns a different halakha from this verse. โ€œAnd he shall serve youโ€ means that he works for you and not for an heir other than a son. If a master has no sons, his slave is not transferred as an inheritance to a daughter or to a brother like his other property. If he does have sons, they inherit a Hebrew slave.

ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื•ืขื‘ื“ืš ืื—ืจื™ื ื ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื”ื”ื•ื ืœื”ืจืฆืืช ืื“ื•ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื“ืืชื

The Gemara asks: And the other, the first tanna, from where does he derive that a slave is not transferred as an inheritance? The Gemara answers that the phrase, โ€œAnd he shall serve you,โ€ is written another time, and he derives this halakha from there. The Gemara asks: And the other, Rabbi Elazar, what does he do with that other verse? The Gemara answers: In his opinion that verse comes to appease the master. The verse emphasizes that the servitude is of limited duration to encourage the master to free the slave without hesitation.

ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ื ื• ื ืจืฆืข ืžื“ืžื™ืขื˜ ืจื—ืžื ื ื’ื‘ื™ ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืจืฆืข ืื“ื ื™ื• ืืช ืื–ื ื• ื‘ืžืจืฆืข ืื–ื ื• ืฉืœื• ื•ืœื ืื–ื ื• ืฉืœ ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื•

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that one who sells himself is not pierced with an awl? The Gemara answers: He derives this from the fact that with regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: โ€œAnd his master shall pierce his ear with an awlโ€ (Exodus 21:6), which teaches: His ear, of this slave, and not the ear of a slave who sells himself.

  • This monthโ€™s learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. โ€œAnd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.โ€

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Kiddushin 14

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Kiddushin 14

ื™ื‘ืžื” ื™ื‘ื ืขืœื™ื” ื•ืœืงื—ื” ืœื• ืœืืฉื” ื•ืื™ืžื ืœื›ื•ืœื” ืžื™ืœืชื ื›ืืฉื” ืœื ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื“ืชื ื™ื ื™ื›ื•ืœ ื™ื”ื• ื›ืกืฃ ื•ืฉื˜ืจ ื’ื•ืžืจื™ื ื‘ื” ื›ื“ืจืš ืฉื”ื‘ื™ืื” ื’ื•ืžืจืช ื‘ื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ื™ื‘ืžื” ื‘ื™ืื” ื’ื•ืžืจืช ื‘ื” ื•ืื™ืŸ ื›ืกืฃ ื•ืฉื˜ืจ ื’ื•ืžืจื™ื ื‘ื”

โ€œHer brother-in-law will engage in sexual intercourse with her and take her to him as a wife, and perform levirate marriage with herโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that intercourse renders her his wife. The Gemara asks: But one can say that with regard to all matters she is like a wife, and therefore she can also be acquired with money or a document like any other woman. The Gemara answers: It could not enter your mind to say this, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that money and a document can complete the acquisition of a yevama and cause her to be married, in the manner that intercourse completes her acquisition. Therefore, the verse states: โ€œAnd perform levirate marriage with herโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that only intercourse completes her acquisition, but money or a document do not complete her acquisition.

ื•ืื™ืžื ืžืื™ ื•ื™ื‘ืžื” ื“ื‘ืขืœ ื›ืจื—ื” ืžื™ื‘ื ืื ื›ืŸ ืœื™ืžื ืงืจื ื•ื™ื‘ื ืžืื™ ื•ื™ื‘ืžื” ืฉืžืขืช ืžื™ื ื” ืชืจืชื™

The Gemara asks: But one can say: What is the meaning of: โ€œAnd perform levirate marriage with herโ€? It teaches that he can perform levirate marriage without her consent, as unlike an ordinary marriage, a levirate marriage does not require the womanโ€™s agreement. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse say: And perform levirate marriage, and one would understand that the matter depends entirely on him. What is the meaning of: โ€œAnd perform levirate marriage with herโ€? Learn two conclusions from this: First, that a levirate marriage can be performed against her will, and second, that the only way to acquire a yevama is through sexual intercourse.

ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื ืงืจื ืฉืžื• ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื™ืช ื—ืœื•ืฅ ื”ื ืขืœ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ืฉื—ืœืฅ ื‘ื” ื ืขืœ ื”ื•ืชืจื” ืœื›ืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ

ยง The mishna teaches that the yevama acquires herself through แธฅalitza. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: As it is written with regard to levirate marriage, after the yavam has performed แธฅalitza: โ€œAnd his name shall be called in Israel: The house of him who had his shoe removedโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:10). This indicates: Once his shoe is removed by her, she is permitted to all of Israel.

ื”ืื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืœื”ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ืืชื ื”ืื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื›ื“ืชื ื™ ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ืœื ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืœ ื ื›ืจื™ื ืชืจื™ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื›ืชื™ื‘ื™

The Gemara asks: This term โ€œIsrael,โ€ does it come to teach this halakha? It is required for that which is taught by Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda: The verse says โ€œin Israelโ€ to teach that แธฅalitza may be performed only in a Jewish court, but not in a gentile court. The Gemara answers that the phrase โ€œin Israelโ€ is written twice in that chapter: โ€œAnd his name shall be called in Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:10), and: โ€œTo establish a name for his brother in Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:7). A different halakha is derived from each of these instances.

ื•ืื›ืชื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืคืขื ืื—ืช ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื™ื•ืฉื‘ื™ื ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื•ื‘ืืชื” ื™ื‘ืžื” ืœื—ืœื•ืฅ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื ื• ืขื ื• ื›ื•ืœื›ื ื•ืืžืจื• ื—ืœื•ืฅ ื”ื ืขืœ ื—ืœื•ืฅ ื”ื ืขืœ ื”ื”ื•ื ืžื•ื ืงืจื ืฉืžื• ื ืคืงื

The Gemara asks: But still, we also require the additional term โ€œin Israelโ€ for that which is taught in a baraita, that Rabbi Yehuda said: Once we were sitting before Rabbi Tarfon and a yevama came to perform แธฅalitza. And Rabbi Tarfon said to us after the แธฅalitza: All of you should answer and say: The one whose shoe was removed, the one whose shoe was removed. This indicates that the phrase: โ€œAnd his name shall be called in Israelโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:10), teaches that the matter must be announced and publicized throughout the nation. The Gemara answers: That halakha is not derived from the phrase โ€œin Israel.โ€ Rather, it is derived from: โ€œAnd his name shall be called,โ€ which indicates that it must be announced that this is his name.

ื•ื‘ืžื™ืชืช ื”ื™ื‘ื ืžื ืœืŸ ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืฉื”ื™ื ื‘ื—ื ืง ืžื™ืชืช ื”ื‘ืขืœ ืžืชื™ืจืชื” ื™ื‘ืžื” ืฉื”ื™ื ื‘ืœืื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

ยง The mishna further teaches that a yevama is released from levirate marriage and may remarry through the death of the yavam. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that it is an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to a married woman, who is forbidden to other men by a prohibition punished with strangulation, and yet the death of her husband renders her permitted, is it not all the more so that with regard to a yevama, who is forbidden to other men while the yavam is alive by only a mere prohibition, that the death of the yavam should render her permitted?

ืžื” ืœืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืฉื›ืŸ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ืชืืžืจ ื‘ื–ื• ืฉืื™ื ื” ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื”ื ื ืžื™ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื”

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this a fortiori inference: What is unique about a married woman is that she can leave through a bill of divorce as well. Will you say the same with regard to this yevama, who does not leave through a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: This is an insufficient refutation of the a fortiori inference, as this yevama also leaves through แธฅalitza, which serves the same function as a bill of divorce.

ืืœื ืžื” ืœืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืฉื›ืŸ ืื•ืกืจื” ืžืชื™ืจื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื ื ืžื™ ืื•ืกืจื” ืžืชื™ืจื” ื™ื‘ื ืื•ืกืจื” ื™ื‘ื ืฉืจื™ ืœื”

Rather, one can challenge this a fortiori inference in the following manner. What is unique about a married woman is that the one who renders her forbidden to everyone else, i.e., her husband, also renders her permitted when he dies. This is not so with regard to a yevama, as she is rendered forbidden upon the death of her husband. Rav Ashi said: With regard to this yevama as well, he who renders her forbidden is also the one who renders her permitted: The yavam renders her forbidden, because if he was not alive she would automatically be permitted to other men. Likewise, the yavam renders her permitted through แธฅalitza.

ื•ืชื”ื ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืžืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ื™ื‘ืžื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื–ื• ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืกืคืจ ื›ืจื™ืชืช ืกืคืจ ื›ื•ืจืชื” ื•ืื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจ ืื—ืจ ื›ื•ืจืชื”

The Gemara asks: And let a married woman leave a marriage through แธฅalitza, as derived by an a fortiori inference: If a yevama, who cannot leave through a bill of divorce, can leave through แธฅalitza, is it not logical that this married woman, who can leave through a bill of divorce, can likewise leave through แธฅalitza? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to a married woman: โ€œA scroll of severanceโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:3), which indicates that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him. While the husband is alive only a bill of divorce can dissolve a marriage.

ื•ืชื”ื ื™ื‘ืžื” ื™ื•ืฆืืช ื‘ื’ื˜ ืžืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื–ื• ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืื™ืŸ ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื›ื” ื•ื›ื›ื” ืขื™ื›ื•ื‘ื

The Gemara further asks: And let a yevama leave through a bill of divorce, as derived by an a fortiori inference: If a married woman, who cannot leave through แธฅalitza, can leave through a bill of divorce, is it not logical that this yevama, who can leave through แธฅalitza, can also leave through a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: The verse states: โ€œSo shall it be done to the manโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:9), with regard to the แธฅalitza of a yevama, and โ€œsoโ€ precludes another option.

ื•ื›ืœ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขื™ื›ื•ื‘ื ืœื ื“ืจืฉื™ ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ื”ื ื™ื•ื ื”ื›ืคื•ืจื™ื ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื’ื•ืจืœ ื•ื—ื•ืงื”

The Gemara asks: And is it true that anywhere that there is a term that precludes another option one cannot learn an a fortiori inference? But there is the case of the designation of the goats on Yom Kippur, as it is written: โ€œThe goat upon which the lot came up for the Lordโ€ (Leviticus 16:9), and: โ€œThis shall be an everlasting statute to youโ€ (Leviticus 16:34), which indicates that everything stated with regard to the mitzvot of Yom Kippur is critical to the performance of the service of the day.

ื•ืชื ื™ื ื•ืขืฉื”ื• ื—ื˜ืืช ื”ื’ื•ืจืœ ืขื•ืฉื” ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ื”ืฉื ืขื•ืฉื” ื—ื˜ืืช

And it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: โ€œAaron shall bring forward the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord, and he shall offer it for a sin-offeringโ€ (Leviticus 16:9). The verse indicates that the lottery renders it a sin-offering, but a verbal designation of the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not render it a sin-offering.

ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœ ื•ื”ืœื ื“ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื•ืžื” ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืฉืœื ืงื™ื“ืฉ ื”ื’ื•ืจืœ ืงื™ื“ืฉ ื”ืฉื ืžืงื•ื ืฉืงื™ื“ืฉ ื”ื’ื•ืจืœ ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ืงื“ืฉ ื”ืฉื

The baraita continues: A verse is necessary to teach this halakha, as one might have thought that the opposite conclusion is correct: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: Just as in a case in which the use of a lottery does not effect the consecration of the animals with a specific designation, e.g., with regard to a woman who has given birth and must bring two birds, one as a sin-offering and one as a burnt-offering, and nevertheless a verbal designation of the animals with the required status does effect the consecration of them, so too, in a case in which the use of a lottery does effect the consecration of the animals, is it not logically right that a verbal designation of the animals with the required status should effect the consecration of them?

ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ืขืฉื”ื• ื—ื˜ืืช ื”ื’ื•ืจืœ ืขื•ืฉื” ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ื”ืฉื ืขื•ืฉื” ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืžืขื˜ื™ื” ืงืจื ื”ื ืœืื• ื”ื›ื™ ื“ืจืฉื™ื ืŸ ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ื™ื” ื—ื•ืงื”

To counter this reasoning, the verse states with regard to the goat: โ€œHe shall offer it for a sin-offeringโ€ (Leviticus 16:9), to indicate that the lottery renders it a sin-offering, but a verbal designation of the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not render it a sin-offering. And the reason that a verbal designation is ineffective is that the verse excluded this possibility, from which it may be inferred that if it were not so, one would learn an a fortiori inference, even though it is written with regard to it โ€œstatute.โ€ The same logic should apply in the case of แธฅalitza, i.e., the term โ€œsoโ€ should not prevent one from learning an a fortiori inference, and therefore it might be argued that a yevama can be released through a bill of divorce.

ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœื” ืœื” ื•ืœื ืœื™ื‘ืžื” ื•ืื™ืžื ืœื” ืœืฉืžื”

Rather, the Gemara explains that here too, there is a limitation derived from a verse. The verse states with regard to a bill of divorce: โ€œAnd write for her a scroll of severanceโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:3). โ€œFor herโ€ is a limitation, which teaches: A bill of divorce is effective for a regular woman but not for a yevama. The Gemara asks: But one can say that the phrase โ€œfor herโ€ indicates that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake.

ืชืจื™ ืœื” ื›ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื•ืื›ืชื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ื—ื“ ืœื” ืœืฉืžื” ื•ืื™ื“ืš ืœื” ื•ืœื ืœื” ื•ืœื—ื‘ื™ืจืชื”

The Gemara answers: โ€œFor herโ€ is written twice (Deuteronomy 24:1, 3), and therefore both halakhot can be derived. The Gemara asks: And still, one instance of: โ€œFor herโ€ is required to teach that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake, and the other โ€œfor herโ€ is needed to teach: For her and not both for her and for another, i.e., her rival wife. One bill of divorce cannot be used for two women.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื ืขืœ ื ืขืœ ืื™ืŸ ืžื™ื“ื™ ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืœื

Rather, the Gemara suggests a different explanation as to why a bill of divorce is ineffective for a yevama. With regard to a yevama the verse states: โ€œThe house of him who had his shoe removedโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:10), which teaches: If she is released by the แธฅalitza of the shoe, yes, she is released from the yavam, but if she was released by means of something else, no, she is not released.

ื•ื”ืื™ ื ืขืœ ืœื”ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ืืชื ื”ืื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ื ืขืœื• ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ื ืขืœื• ื ืขืœ ืฉืœ ื›ืœ ืื“ื ืžื ื ืœื™ื”

The Gemara asks: But this term โ€œshoe,โ€ does it come to teach this? It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse said: โ€œAnd remove his shoeโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:9). I have derived only that his shoe may be used. From where do I derive that the shoe of any person may also be used for แธฅalitza?

ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื ืขืœ ื ืขืœ ืจื™ื‘ื” ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื ืขืœื• ื ืขืœื• ื”ืจืื•ื™ ืœื• ืคืจื˜ ืœื’ื“ื•ืœ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื”ืœืš ื‘ื• ืคืจื˜ ืœืงื˜ืŸ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื—ื•ืคื” ืืช ืจื•ื‘ ืจื’ืœื• ืคืจื˜

The verse states โ€œshoe,โ€ and states again in the next verse โ€œshoe,โ€ which includes any other shoe. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states โ€œhis shoe,โ€ which is apparently referring to the shoe of that particular man? This teaches that it must be his shoe that is fit for him, excluding a shoe so large that he cannot walk in it, and excluding a shoe so small that it does not cover most of his foot, and excluding

ืœืžืกื•ืœื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืขืงื‘ ืื ื›ืŸ ื ื™ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืงืจื ื ืขืœ ืžืื™ ื”ื ืขืœ ืฉืžืขืช ืžื™ื ื” ืชืจืชื™

sandals [mesulayim] that have no heels, which do not qualify as shoes. The Gemara answers: If so, that the term is stated only for that purpose, let the verse write โ€œshoe.โ€ What is the meaning of โ€œthe shoeโ€? Learn the two previously stated conclusions from it.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืขื‘ื“ ืขื‘ืจื™ ื ืงื ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ื•ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ื•ืงื•ื ื” ืขืฆืžื• ื‘ืฉื ื™ื ื•ื‘ื™ื•ื‘ืœ ื•ื‘ื’ืจืขื•ืŸ ื›ืกืฃ ื™ืชื™ืจื” ืขืœื™ื• ืืžื” ื”ืขื‘ืจื™ื” ืฉืงื•ื ื” ืืช ืขืฆืžื” ื‘ืกื™ืžื ื™ืŸ ื”ื ืจืฆืข ื ืงื ื” ื‘ืจืฆื™ืขื” ื•ืงื•ื ื” ืืช ืขืฆืžื• ื‘ื™ื•ื‘ืœ ื•ื‘ืžื™ืชืช ื”ืื“ื•ืŸ

MISHNA: A Hebrew slave can be acquired by his master through money or through a document, and he can acquire himself, i.e., he is emancipated, through years, i.e., when he completes his six years of labor, or through the advent of the Jubilee Year, or through the deduction of money. The slave can redeem himself during the six years by paying for his remaining years of slavery. A Hebrew maidservant has one mode of emancipation more than him, as she acquires herself through signs indicating puberty. A slave who is pierced after serving six years is acquired as a slave for a longer period through piercing his ear with an awl, and he acquires himself through the advent of the Jubilee Year or through the death of the master.

ื’ืžืณ ืขื‘ื“ ืขื‘ืจื™ ื ืงื ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžื ืœืŸ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืžื›ืกืฃ ืžืงื ืชื• ืžืœืžื“ ืฉื ืงื ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืืฉื›ื—ืŸ ืขื‘ื“ ืขื‘ืจื™ ื”ื ืžื›ืจ ืœื ื›ืจื™ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื›ืœ ืงื ื™ื ื• ื‘ื›ืกืฃ

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a Hebrew slave can be acquired through money. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that the verse states: โ€œOut of the money that he was bought forโ€ (Leviticus 25:51), which teaches that he can be acquired through money. The Gemara asks: We found that a Hebrew slave who is sold to a gentile is acquired with money, which is the case discussed in that verse, but this proves nothing with regard to a Jew sold to a Jew. One could argue that since all of the acquisitions of a gentile are performed only with money, he can likewise purchase a Hebrew slave with money.

ื ืžื›ืจ ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื ืœืŸ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื”ืคื“ื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืžื’ืจืขืช ืคื“ื™ื•ื ื” ื•ื™ื•ืฆืื”

But from where do we derive that a Hebrew slave can be sold to a Jew with money? The Gemara explains that with regard to a Hebrew maidservant, the verse states: โ€œThen he shall let her be redeemedโ€ (Exodus 21:8), which teaches that if she acquires money and wishes to be emancipated before her time is complete, she deducts a sum from her redemption. The maidservant can deduct the value of time served from her purchase price and pay the remaining amount, and she then is emancipated. This teaches that a Hebrew maidservant is acquired through money, a halakha that applies to a male slave as well.

ืืฉื›ื—ืŸ ืืžื” ื”ืขื‘ืจื™ื” ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืžื™ืงื“ืฉื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžื™ืงื ื™ื ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืขื‘ื“ ืขื‘ืจื™ ืžื ืœืŸ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื™ ื™ืžื›ืจ ืœืš ืื—ื™ืš ื”ืขื‘ืจื™ ืื• ื”ืขื‘ืจื™ื” ื•ืขื‘ื“ืš ืฉืฉ ืฉื ื™ื ืžืงื™ืฉ ืขื‘ืจื™ ืœืขื‘ืจื™ื”

The Gemara asks: Although we found this halakha with regard to a Hebrew maidservant, one cannot extrapolate from there to this case, as it is possible that it applies only to a female. The reason for this is that since she is ordinarily betrothed through money, she can also be acquired as a maidservant through money. From where do we derive that a Hebrew slave can likewise be acquired through money? The Gemara answers that the verse states: โ€œIf your brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman is sold to you, and he shall serve you six yearsโ€ (Deuteronomy 15:12). This verse juxtaposes a Hebrew man to a Hebrew woman, indicating that the modes through which they are acquired are the same.

ืืฉื›ื—ืŸ ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื ืžื›ืจ ื‘ืขืœ ื›ื•ืจื—ื• ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืžื ืœืŸ

The Gemara further asks: We found a source in this verse for a slave who is sold by the court. This verse is referring to a thief who is unable to repay the value of his theft and is sold as a slave so that he can repay his debt. One can therefore argue that this case is unique, since he is sold against his will. From where do we derive that one who sells himself can be sold through money?

ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ื”ื ื™ื—ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืืœื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืœื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืžืื™ ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ

The Gemara answers: One derives this through a verbal analogy between the terms โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker.โ€ This term appears both with regard to one who sells himself: โ€œAs a hired worker and as a settler he shall be with youโ€ (Leviticus 25:40), and with regard to one who is sold by the court: โ€œFor double of the hire of a hired worker he has served youโ€ (Deuteronomy 15:18). The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who derives this verbal analogy between the terms โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker.โ€ But according to the one who does not derive the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker,โ€ what can be said? From where does he derive that one who sells himself may be purchased with money?

ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื›ื™ ืชืฉื™ื’ ืžื•ืกืฃ ืขืœ ืขื ื™ืŸ ืจืืฉื•ืŸ ื•ื™ืœืžื“ ืขืœื™ื•ืŸ ืžืชื—ืชื•ืŸ

The Gemara answers: The verse states at the start of the passage dealing with one sold to a gentile: โ€œAnd if a stranger who is a settler with you becomes richโ€ (Leviticus 25:47). The conjunction โ€œandโ€ serves to add to the first matter, i.e., the passage discussing one who sells himself to a Jew, as it joins the two issues. And therefore let the above case of one who sells himself to a Jew be derived from the case below of one who is sold to a gentile: Just as one who is sold to a gentile can be acquired with money, so too, one who sells himself to a Jew can be acquired with money.

ื•ืžืืŸ ืชื ื ื“ืœื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ื ืžื›ืจ ืœืฉืฉ ื•ื™ืชืจ ืขืœ ืฉืฉ ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ื ืžื›ืจ ืืœื ืœืฉืฉ

The Gemara comments: And who is the tanna who does not derive the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired workerโ€? It is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: One who sells himself as a slave is sold for six years, and if he wishes he can be sold for more than six years, whereas one who is sold by the court is sold only for six years, but no more.

ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ื ื• ื ืจืฆืข ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื ืจืฆืข ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ืŸ ืžืขื ื™ืงื™ื ืœื• ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืžืขื ื™ืงื™ื ืœื• ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื• ืžื•ืกืจ ืœื• ืฉืคื—ื” ื›ื ืขื ื™ืช ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื• ืžื•ืกืจ ืœื• ืฉืคื—ื” ื›ื ืขื ื™ืช

The baraita adds that there are additional differences between these two slaves: One who sells himself may not be pierced with an awl, whereas one who is sold by the court may be pierced with an awl. One who sells himself is not granted a severance gift by his master when he is emancipated, whereas one who is sold by the court is granted a severance gift. With regard to one who sells himself, his master may not provide him with a Canaanite maidservant as a wife to produce slave children, whereas with regard to one sold by the court, his master may provide him with a Canaanite maidservant.

ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื–ื” ื•ื–ื” ืื™ื ื• ื ืžื›ืจ ืืœื ืœืฉืฉ ื–ื” ื•ื–ื” ื ืจืฆืข ื•ื–ื” ื•ื–ื” ืžืขื ื™ืงื™ื ืœื• ื•ื–ื” ื•ื–ื” ืจื‘ื• ืžื•ืกืจ ืœื• ืฉืคื—ื” ื›ื ืขื ื™ืช ืžืื™ ืœืื• ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ืœื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ

Rabbi Elazar says that there is no difference between these two types of slaves. Rather, both this slave and that slave may be sold for only six years; both this and that one may be pierced with an awl, both this and that one are granted a severance gift, and in both this case and that case his master may provide him with a Canaanite maidservant. What, is it not the case that they disagree with regard to this, that the first tanna does not derive the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker,โ€ and Rabbi Elazar derives the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired workerโ€? If one holds that the two cases are juxtaposed, one will equate the halakhot of both slaves. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, in contrast to the opinion of the first tanna, who holds that the halakhot of each type of slave are discrete.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื˜ื‘ื™ื•ืžื™ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืื‘ื™ื™ ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ืฉื›ื™ืจ ื•ื”ื›ื ื‘ื”ืื™ ืงืจื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ื ืžื›ืจ ืœืฉืฉ ื•ื™ืชืจ ืขืœ ืฉืฉ ืžื™ืขื˜ ืจื—ืžื ื ื’ื‘ื™ ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืขื‘ื“ืš ืฉืฉ ืฉื ื™ื ื–ื” ื•ืœื ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื•

Rav Tavyumei said in the name of Abaye: That is not so; rather, everyone derives the verbal analogy between โ€œhired workerโ€ and โ€œhired worker,โ€ and here, in the dispute in the baraita, they disagree about this following verse. What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that one who sells himself is sold for six years and more than six years? He maintains that with regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: โ€œIf your brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman, is sold to you, and he shall serve you six yearsโ€ (Deuteronomy 15:12). That teaches that only this type of slave serves for six years and no more, but the same does not apply to one who sells himself. If he so stipulates, he may serve for more than six years.

ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื•ืขื‘ื“ืš ืœืš ื•ืœื ืœื™ื•ืจืฉ

The Gemara explains: And the other, Rabbi Elazar, learns a different halakha from this verse. โ€œAnd he shall serve youโ€ means that he works for you and not for an heir other than a son. If a master has no sons, his slave is not transferred as an inheritance to a daughter or to a brother like his other property. If he does have sons, they inherit a Hebrew slave.

ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื•ืขื‘ื“ืš ืื—ืจื™ื ื ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื”ื”ื•ื ืœื”ืจืฆืืช ืื“ื•ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื“ืืชื

The Gemara asks: And the other, the first tanna, from where does he derive that a slave is not transferred as an inheritance? The Gemara answers that the phrase, โ€œAnd he shall serve you,โ€ is written another time, and he derives this halakha from there. The Gemara asks: And the other, Rabbi Elazar, what does he do with that other verse? The Gemara answers: In his opinion that verse comes to appease the master. The verse emphasizes that the servitude is of limited duration to encourage the master to free the slave without hesitation.

ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ื ื• ื ืจืฆืข ืžื“ืžื™ืขื˜ ืจื—ืžื ื ื’ื‘ื™ ืžื›ืจื•ื”ื• ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืจืฆืข ืื“ื ื™ื• ืืช ืื–ื ื• ื‘ืžืจืฆืข ืื–ื ื• ืฉืœื• ื•ืœื ืื–ื ื• ืฉืœ ืžื•ื›ืจ ืขืฆืžื•

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that one who sells himself is not pierced with an awl? The Gemara answers: He derives this from the fact that with regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: โ€œAnd his master shall pierce his ear with an awlโ€ (Exodus 21:6), which teaches: His ear, of this slave, and not the ear of a slave who sells himself.

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