Kiddushin 13

כי אמרה לא נמי הוו קידושין אמאי והא קאמרה לא אלא לאו רצתה דאמרה אין לא רצתה דאישתיקה משתקה ושמע מינה שתיקה דלאחר מתן מעות ולא כלום היא

that if she said: No, it would also be a betrothal. But why should that be the case? After all, she said: No. Rather, is it not to be explained in this manner, i.e., that the phrase: She wanted, means she said yes, and: She did not want, means that she remained silent. And one can learn from this that silence after the money is given is nothing. Her silence is not interpreted as an agreement to the betrothal.

קשו בה בפום נהרא משמיה דרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע מי דמי התם בתורת פקדון יהבינהו ניהלה סברה אי שדינא להו ומיתברי מחייבנא בהו הכא בתורת קדושין יהבינהו ניהלה ואי איתא דלא ניחא לה לישדינהו

In the city of Pum Nahara they raised a difficulty against Rava’s proof, in the name of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: Is it comparable? There, in the baraita, he gave her the money as a deposit but they are his. She therefore thinks: If I throw them and they break I will be obligated to pay for them, as would anyone who destroys another person’s property. Consequently, her silence is interpreted as consent only to continue in her role of holding it as a deposit. By contrast, here he gives them to her as betrothal money so that they would belong to her. And if it is so, that she is not amenable to being betrothed, let her throw them away.

פריך רב אחאי אטו כולהו נשי דינא גמירי הכי נמי סברה אי שדינא להו ומיתברי מיתחייבנא באחריותייהו שלחה רב אחא בר רב לקמיה דרבינא כהאי גוונא מאי שלח ליה אנן לא שמיע לן הא דרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע אתון דשמיע לכו חושו לה

Rav Aḥai refutes this argument: Is that to say that all women are learned in halakha? In this case also, she thinks: If I throw them and they break I will be responsible for them. Therefore, I will not throw them. One cannot deduce from the fact that she does not throw the coins that she accepted them as betrothal money. Rav Aḥa bar Rav, sent this question to Ravina: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Ravina sent the following response to him: We did not hear this statement of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua. Therefore, we do not need to take it into consideration. You, who heard it, should be concerned about a possible betrothal.

ההיא איתתא דהוה קא מזבנה וורשכי אתא ההוא גברא חטף וורשכא מינה אמרה ליה הבה ניהלי אמר לה אי יהיבנא ליך מיקדשת לי שקלתיה ואישתיקה ואמר רב נחמן יכולה למימר אין שקלי ודידי שקלי

§ The Gemara further relates: There was a certain woman who was selling belts. A certain man came and snatched a belt [varshekha] from her. She said to him: Give it to me. He said to her: If I give it to you will you be betrothed to me? She took it and was silent, and Rav Naḥman said: She could say: Yes, I took it, but I took my property. There is no proof that she agreed to accept it as a betrothal.

איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן קידשה בגזל ובחמס ובגניבה או שחטף סלע מידה וקדשה מקודשת התם בדשדיך

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a baraita: If a man betrothed a woman with property that was taken by robbery; or with property taken by a forced transaction, when the owner was reluctant to sell, or with property that was taken by theft; or if he grabbed a sela from her hand and betrothed her with it, she is betrothed. If so, why does Rav Naḥman say here that when he took it from her and betrothed her she is not betrothed? Rav Naḥman answered: There, it is referring to a case where he had previously arranged to marry her, and therefore if she remained silent she certainly agreed to the betrothal.

ומנא תימרא דשני לן בין שדיך ודלא שדיך דתניא אמר לה כנסי סלע זו שאני חייב ליכי וחזר ואמר לה התקדשי לי בו בשעת מתן מעות רצתה מקודשת לא רצתה אינה מקודשת לאחר מתן מעות אפילו רצתה אינה מקודשת

And from where do you say that there is a difference between a case where he had previously arranged to marry her and where he had not arranged to do so? As it is taught in a baraita that with regard to a man who said to a woman: Take this sela that I owe you, and he went back and said to her: Be betrothed to me with it, if he said this at the time the money was given and she wanted it, she is betrothed; if she did not want it, she is not betrothed. If he issued his statement after the money was given, then even if she wanted it, she is not betrothed.

מאי רצתה ומאי לא רצתה אילימא רצתה דאמרה אין לא רצתה דאמרה לא הא אישתיקה הוו קידושין ונתני מקודשת סתם כי התם

Rav Naḥman clarifies: What is the meaning of: She wanted, and what is the meaning of: She did not want? If we say that: She wanted, means that she said yes, and: She did not want, means that she explicitly said no, it can be inferred that if she was silent it is a valid betrothal. But if so, let the baraita teach simply that she is betrothed, without specification, as it did there in the previous case, with regard to one who said: Take this sela as a deposit. It is obvious that if she explicitly said no, she is not betrothed.

אלא רצתה דאמרה אין לא רצתה דאישתיקה וקא תני דאינה מקודשת מאי טעמא יכולה למימר אין שקלי ודידי שקלי

Rather, the phrase: She wanted, means she said yes, and: She did not want, means that she remained silent. And in this case of silence the baraita taught that she is not betrothed. What is the reason that she is not betrothed if she remained silent? It is that she can say: Yes I took it, but I took my own property and did not intend to become betrothed.

ואלא קשיא הך דקדשה בגזל ובחמס ובגניבה או שחטף סלע מידה וקדשה מקודשת אלא לאו שמע מינה הא דשדיך הא דלא שדיך

But this is difficult with regard to that which we learned, that if a man betrothed her with property that was taken by robbery, or with property taken by a forced transaction, or with property that was taken by theft, or if he grabbed a sela from her hand and betrothed her with it, she is betrothed. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that this ruling, that she is betrothed if she was silent, is referring to a case where he arranged the marriage beforehand, whereas this ruling, that she is not betrothed when she remained silent, is referring to a situation where he did not arrange it beforehand?

כי נח נפשיה דרבי אסי עיילו רבנן לנקוטינהו לשמעתתיה אמר להו ההוא מרבנן ורבי יעקב שמיה הכי אמר רבי אסי אמר רבי מני כשם שאין אשה נקנית בפחות משוה פרוטה כך אין קרקע נקנית בפחות משוה פרוטה אמרו ליה והתניא אף על פי שאין אשה נקנית בפחות משוה פרוטה קרקע נקנית בפחות משוה פרוטה

§ The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Asi died, the Sages assembled to collect his statements, i.e., they wished to review his rulings of halakha lest they be forgotten. A certain member of the Sages, and Rabbi Ya’akov was his name, said to them: This is what Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Mani said: Just as a woman cannot be acquired by less than the value of one peruta, so too land cannot be acquired by less than the value of one peruta. They said to him: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Although a woman cannot be acquired by less than the value of one peruta, land can be acquired by less than the value of one peruta?

אמר להו כי תניא ההיא בחליפין דתניא קונין בכלי ואף על פי שאין בו שוה פרוטה

Rabbi Ya’akov said to them: When that baraita is taught to the effect that land can be acquired by less than the value of one peruta but a woman cannot, it was with regard to acquisition through symbolic exchange, i.e., a legal act of acquisition formalizing the transfer of ownership of an article. As it is taught in a baraita: One can acquire land and movable items through a symbolic exchange by giving a vessel, even though it is not worth one peruta.

הדר יתבי וקאמרי הא דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל כל שאינו יודע בטיב גיטין וקדושין לא יהא לו עסק עמהן אמר רבי אסי אמר רבי יוחנן וקשין לעולם יותר מדור המבול שנאמר אלה וכחש ורצח וגנב ונאף פרצו ודמים בדמים נגעו

They then sat and said additional statements in the name of Rabbi Asi. One statement concerned that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Anyone who does not know the nature of bills of divorce and betrothals should have no dealings in them, as his ignorance might lead people to commit serious sins. In this context, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And those who deal with these issues without proper knowledge are worse for the world than the generation of the flood, as it is stated: “Swearing and lying, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery. They break all bounds, and blood touches blood” (Hosea 4:2).

מאי משמע כדמתרגם רב יוסף מולדין בנין מנשי חבריהון חובין על חובין מוסיפין

The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this verse is referring to individuals of this kind and that they are worse for the world than the generation of the flood? The Gemara explains: As Rav Yosef translated the phrase “and committing adultery, they break all bounds, and blood touches blood,” as: They give birth to children through the wives of others; they add sins upon sins.

וכתיב על כן תאבל הארץ ואמלל כל יושב בה בחית השדה ובעוף השמים וגם דגי הים יאספו וגו׳ ואילו בדור המבול לא נגזרה גזירה על דגים שבים שנאמר מכל אשר בחרבה מתו ולא דגים שבים ואילו הכא אפילו דגים שבים

And it is written in the next verse: “Therefore the land mourns and everyone who dwells there languishes, with the beasts of the field and the fowls of heaven, and the fishes of the sea are also taken away” (Hosea 4:3). This indicates that those who cause illegitimate children to be born lead to such a great tragedy that even the fish of the sea will die, whereas in the generation of the flood the decree was not imposed upon the fish in the sea, as it is stated: “Whatever was on dry land died” (Genesis 7:22). The explicit mention of dry land indicates that the fish in the sea did not die. But here, in the punishment described in the verses in Hosea, even the fish in the sea died.

ואימא עד דעביד לכולהו לא סלקא דעתך דכתיב כי מפני אלה אבלה הארץ

The Gemara asks: But one can say that this punishment is not administered until they perform all of them, i.e., only if they commit all of the sins mentioned in the verse, including taking false oaths, committing murder, and stealing. The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written: “For because of swearing the land mourns” (Jeremiah 23:10). This verse teaches that on account of taking false oaths alone the world can be destroyed, from which it may be inferred that each these acts on its own is enough to warrant destruction.

ואימא אלה לחוד והנך לחודיהון

The Gemara further asks: But one can say that taking a false oath is distinct, as it involves the desecration of God’s name, and these other sins are distinct, i.e., they are less severe offenses that entail a less serious punishment. Therefore, it is possible that this great tragedy will result only if one performs all of them.

מי כתיב ופרצו פרצו כתיב

The Gemara explains: Is it written: And they break all bounds, with the conjunction: And, which would indicate that all the sins are included as one unit? Rather, it is written: “They break all bounds,” from which it may be inferred that this punishment is given separately for each one of these sins.

הדור יתבי וקאמרי הא דתנן האשה שהביאה חטאתה ומתה יביאו יורשין עולתה אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל והוא שהפרישתה מחיים אבל לא הפרישתה מחיים לא

§ They then sat and said additional statements in the name of Rav Asi, one of which concerned that which we learned in a mishna (Kinnim 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin-offering for her ritual purification and died, the heirs bring her burnt-offering to fulfill her remaining sacrificial obligations. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And this is the halakha only when the woman herself had already separated, i.e., designated, the animal for the burnt-offering in her lifetime. But if she had not separated it in her lifetime, no, the heirs are not required to bring a burnt-offering on her behalf.

אלמא קסבר שיעבודא לאו דאורייתא אמר רבי אסי אמר רבי יוחנן אף על גב שלא הפרישה מחיים אלמא קסבר שיעבודא הוה דאורייתא

The Gemara concludes: Apparently, Shmuel maintains that the property of a debtor is not liened by Torah law. In other words, one does not say that because she was required to bring a burnt-offering there is a lien on her property and the debt must be paid even if she did not set aside the animal before her death. Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is the halakha even though she did not separate the burnt-offering in her lifetime. Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the property of a debtor is liened by Torah law.

והא פליגי בה חדא זימנא דרב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו מלוה על פה אינה גובה מן היורשין ולא מן הלקוחות ורבי יוחנן וריש לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו מלוה על פה גובה בין מן היורשין בין מן הלקוחות

The Gemara asks: But these Sages already disagreed about this issue once; why would they engage in the same dispute with regard to multiple applications? As Rav and Shmuel both say: With regard to a loan granted by oral agreement, i.e., without a document that places a lien on the land, if the debtor dies, the creditor cannot collect the loan from the heirs or from those who purchased the land. This is the halakha even if it is clear that there was a loan and the debtors do not dispute this fact. And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: With regard to a loan by oral agreement, the creditor can collect from the heirs and from those who purchased from the debtor. This shows that those same Sages already disagreed as to whether a lien on a property exists by Torah law in the absence of a document.

צריכא דאי איתמר בהא בהך קאמר שמואל משום דלא מלוה כתובה בתורה היא אבל בהך אימא מודה להו לרבי יוחנן ולריש לקיש

The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach both cases as, if it were stated only about this case of a loan, one might say: It is only with regard to this situation that Shmuel says there is no lien on property, because it is a loan that is not written in the Torah. This loan is merely a private agreement between two individuals. But with regard to this obligation of a woman to bring a burnt-offering, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan and to Reish Lakish. Since this woman’s obligation to bring a burnt-offering is written in the Torah, perhaps it creates a lien on her property despite the fact that there is no document to that effect.

ואי אשמעינן בהא בהא קאמר רבי יוחנן דמלוה כתובה בתורה ככתובה בשטר דמיא אבל בהך אימא מודה ליה לשמואל צריכא

And conversely, had the amora’im taught us about their dispute only in this case of the burnt-offering of a woman following childbirth, one might say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the Torah imposes a lien only in this case of the burnt-offering, as a loan written in the Torah is like one written in a document. But with regard to this private loan, one might say that he concedes to Shmuel that the lien does not apply by Torah law. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute in both cases.

אמר רב פפא הילכתא מלוה על פה גובה מן היורשין ואינו גובה מן הלקוחות גובה מן היורשין שיעבודא דאורייתא ואינו גובה מן הלקוחות דלית ליה קלא:

Rav Pappa said that the halakha is as follows: With regard to a loan by oral agreement, the creditor can collect from the heirs but he cannot collect from those who purchased from the debtor. The reason he can collect from the heirs is that the accepted opinion is that the property of a debtor is liened by Torah law. But he cannot collect from those who purchased from the debtor, because a loan by oral agreement does not generate publicity, i.e., people will not have heard about it. Therefore, they are not careful to avoid buying property from the debtor. These purchasers should not suffer due to a lien that was not well known.

וקונה את עצמה בגט ובמיתת הבעל: בשלמא גט דכתיב וכתב לה ספר כריתת

§ The mishna teaches: And a woman acquires herself through a bill of divorce or through the death of the husband. The Gemara asks: Granted, this is the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, as it is written explicitly in the Torah: “And he writes for her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house; and she departs out of his house and she goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:1–2). This indicates that a bill of divorce enables a woman to marry whomever she wishes after the divorce.

אלא מיתת הבעל מנלן סברא הוא הוא אסרה והוא שרתה

But from where do we derive that the death of the husband also enables a woman to remarry? The Gemara answers: This is based on logical reasoning: He, the husband, rendered her forbidden to every man, and he has permitted her. Since the husband is no longer alive, there is no one who renders her forbidden.

והא עריות דאסר להו ולא שרי להו אלא מדאמר רחמנא יבמה שאין לה בנים אסורה הא יש לה בנים מותרת

The Gemara asks: But consider the status of those with whom relations are forbidden, as he renders her forbidden to them, and yet he does not permit her to them when he dies. For example, one may not marry one’s father’s wife even after the father dies. Rather, from the fact that the Merciful One states that a yevama who does not have children from her deceased husband is prohibited from marrying anyone besides the yavam, it may be inferred that a widow who has children from her deceased husband is permitted to remarry.

ודילמא אין לה בנים אסורה לעלמא ושריא ליבם ויש לה בנים לכולי עלמא נמי אסורה אלא מדאמר רחמנא אלמנה לכהן גדול אסורה הא לכהן הדיוט שריא

The Gemara asks: But perhaps one should infer the following from that halakha: A woman who does not have children from her deceased husband is forbidden to everyone and permitted to the yavam, and a woman who has children from her deceased husband is forbidden to everyone also. Rather, the halakha that the death of the husband permits a woman to marry another man is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states that a widow is forbidden to a High Priest. This indicates that it is permitted for her to marry a common priest, and the same certainly applies to a non-priest.

ודילמא לכהן גדול בלאו לכולי עלמא בעשה האי עשה מאי עבידתיה אי דאהניא מיתת הבעל תישתרי לגמרי אי דלא אהניא מיתת הבעל תוקמה במילתא קמייתא

The Gemara asks: But perhaps one can say that she is forbidden to a High Priest by a prohibition, whereas she is forbidden to everyone else only by dint of a positive mitzva. The Gemara asks: This positive mitzva, what is its purpose? If the death of the husband affects her status, she should be entirely permitted, and if the death of the husband does not affect her status she remains in her initial state when her husband was alive, and therefore those who engage in sexual intercourse with her would be liable to receive the death penalty.

אלמה לא אפיקתה ממיתה ואוקימתה על עשה מידי דהוה אפסולי המוקדשים

The Gemara answers: And why is this suggestion not considered reasonable? One could argue that the death of the husband removed her from the class of people with whom one is punished with death for engaging in intercourse, and placed her in the class of people with whom one is prohibited to engage in intercourse due to a positive mitzva, just as it is with consecrated animals that have been disqualified. This is referring to animals that were designated as offerings but became invalid due to some blemish.

דמעיקרא אית בהו מעילה ואסירי בגיזה ועבודה פרקינהו מעילה לית בהו בגיזה ועבודה אסירי

The Gemara explains: The halakha with regard to such animals is that initially, when they are unblemished, they are subject to the halakhot of misuse, i.e., if one benefited from them he has misused consecrated items. And likewise shearing them and performing labor with them is prohibited. Once these animals have developed a blemish and one has redeemed them, the prohibition against misuse of consecrated items does not apply to them, but shearing them and performing labor with them remains prohibited. Based on this example, it is possible that the death of the husband does not render the woman entirely permitted. If so, one cannot derive from here that it is permitted for a wife whose husband has passed away to marry another man.

אלא מדאמר קרא פן ימות במלחמה ואיש אחר יקחנה מתקיף לה רב שישא בריה דרב אידי אימא מאן אחר יבם

Rather, the source that a widow may remarry is from that which the verse states: “Lest he die in battle and another man take her” (Deuteronomy 20:7). This indicates that a man may marry a widow. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: One can say: Who is this other man mentioned by the verse? It is a yavam.

אמר רב אשי שתי תשובות בדבר חדא דיבם לא איקרי אחר ועוד כתיב ושנאה האיש האחרון וכתב לה ספר כריתת או כי ימות האיש האחרון ואיתקש מיתה לגירושין מה גירושין שריא וגומרת אף מיתה שריא וגומרת:

Rav Ashi said that there are two refutations of this statement: First, a yavam is not called “another,” as his relationship with her is not entirely separate from that of the first husband. And furthermore, it is written: “And the latter husband hates her, and writes her a scroll of severance and gives it in her hand and sends her out of his house, or if the latter husband dies” (Deuteronomy 24:3). In this manner the verse juxtaposes death to divorce: Just as divorce permits a woman to everyone and completes the severing of a husband from his wife, thereby allowing her to marry another man, so too, death permits her and completes the severing, allowing her to marry another man.

והיבמה נקנית בביאה כו׳: בביאה מנלן אמר קרא

§ The mishna teaches: And a yevama can be acquired by the deceased husband’s brother, the yavam, only through intercourse. And she acquires herself through ḥalitza or through the death of the yavam. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that she can be acquired through intercourse? The verse states: