A convert’s children, whether or not they converted with him, do not inherit his property as when a person converts, it is as if they are reborn. A braita lists more differences between Jewish male and female slaves and the Gemara explains the cases discussed in the braita as each line is hard to reconcile with other laws relating to slaves. One of the differences mentioned in the braita is that a father cannot sell his daughter more than once. But isn’t that true for a male slave as well – that he can’t be sold twice?! How can this be explained? If the slave is worth more or less than the value of what he stole, can he be sold as a slave? Another difference mentioned in the braita is that a daughter can be redeemed against his will – whose will? The master or the father? It is explained to be against the father’s will and is then explained according to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that a father can’t sell his daughter more than once. If the master performs ye’ud with the female slave, does that change her status to betrothed or married? What is the relevance of this question? The Gemara brings tannaitic sources to try to find an answer to this question.
Kiddushin 18
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Kiddushin
Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Mark Goldstein in honor of his wife, Rena Septee Goldstein, on the occasion of their 44th anniversary.
This week’s learning is sponsored by Fally Klein in memory of her Uncle Shimon Lemmer, Shimon Ben Naftali Menachem z”l. “He found such comfort in his daily daf, especially toward the end of his life. May the Torah that brought him comfort be an aliyah for his neshamah. We’ll miss you terribly.”
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Kiddushin
Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Mark Goldstein in honor of his wife, Rena Septee Goldstein, on the occasion of their 44th anniversary.
This week’s learning is sponsored by Fally Klein in memory of her Uncle Shimon Lemmer, Shimon Ben Naftali Menachem z”l. “He found such comfort in his daily daf, especially toward the end of his life. May the Torah that brought him comfort be an aliyah for his neshamah. We’ll miss you terribly.”
Kiddushin 18
וְכָאן שֶׁהוֹרָתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְדוּשָּׁה, וְלֵידָתוֹ בִּקְדוּשָּׁה.
And here it is referring to a case where he was not conceived in sanctity, i.e., his mother conceived him before she converted, and only his birth was in sanctity, as she converted when pregnant. It is appropriate to return money to this individual.
רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: נׇכְרִי יוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אָבִיו דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי יְרֻשָּׁה לְעֵשָׂו נָתַתִּי אֶת הַר שֵׂעִיר״. וְדִלְמָא יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד שָׁאנֵי? אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: ״כִּי לִבְנֵי לוֹט נָתַתִּי אֶת עָר יְרֻשָּׁה״.
Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: By Torah law a gentile inherits from his father, as it is written: “Because I have given mount Seir to Esau as an inheritance” (Deuteronomy 2:5). The Gemara asks: But perhaps it is different with regard to an apostate Jew? In other words, it is possible that Esau was not considered a gentile but rather Jewish, like the Patriarchs. Consequently, he is categorized as an apostate Jew. Rather, the proof is from here: “Because I have given Ar to the children of Lot as an inheritance” (Deuteronomy 2:9), and the descendants of Lot were certainly gentiles.
וְרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרָבָא? מִי כְּתִיב ״וְחִשַּׁב עִם קֹנֵהוּ וְלֹא עִם יוֹרְשֵׁי קוֹנֵהוּ״?
The Gemara asks: And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin, what is the reason that he did not state his opinion in accordance with the explanation of Rava, who derives the inheritance of gentiles from the verse: “And he shall reckon with his purchaser” (Leviticus 25:50)? The Gemara answers: Is it written explicitly in the Torah: And he shall reckon with his purchaser and not with the heirs of his purchaser? This proof is based on an exposition, not on an explicit source.
וְרָבָא, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין? מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּאַבְרָהָם שָׁאנֵי.
The Gemara further asks: And Rava, what is the reason that he did not state his opinion in accordance with the explanation of Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin? The Gemara answers: Perhaps due to the honor of Abraham it is different. It is possible that for the sake of Abraham an inheritance was given to the members of his family. The same may not apply to gentiles in general.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִי שֶׁאֵין בָּעִבְרִיָּה, וְיֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִיָּה שֶׁאֵין בָּעִבְרִי. יֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִי שֶׁהוּא יוֹצֵא בְּשָׁנִים, וּבַיּוֹבֵל, וּבְמִיתַת הָאָדוֹן – מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בָּעִבְרִיָּה, וְיֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִיָּה, שֶׁהֲרֵי עִבְרִיָּה יוֹצְאָה בְּסִימָנִין וְאֵינָהּ נִמְכֶּרֶת וְנִשְׁנֵית, וּמַפְדִּין אוֹתָהּ, בְּעַל כּוֹרְחוֹ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בָּעִבְרִי.
§ The Sages taught: There are details of the halakhot of a Hebrew slave that do not apply to the case of a Hebrew maidservant and there are details of the halakhot of a Hebrew maidservant that do not apply to a Hebrew slave. The baraita elaborates: There are unique details in the halakhot of emancipating a Hebrew slave, as he leaves through serving a term of six years, and he leaves through the Jubilee Year, and he leaves through the death of the master, which is not the case for a Hebrew maidservant. And there are unique details in the halakhot of emancipating a Hebrew maidservant, as a Hebrew maidservant leaves through signs indicating puberty, and she is not sold for a second time, and one can redeem her against his will, as the Gemara will explain, which is not the case for a Hebrew slave.
אָמַר מָר: יֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִי שֶׁאֵין בָּעִבְרִיָּה. וּרְמִינְהִי: יְתֵירָה עָלָיו אָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה, שֶׁקּוֹנָה עַצְמָהּ בְּסִימָנִין! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּגוֹן שֶׁיְּעָדָה.
The Gemara analyzes this baraita. The Master said above: There are details of the halakhot of emancipating a Hebrew slave that do not apply to the case of a Hebrew maidservant. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the mishna: A Hebrew maidservant has one mode of emancipation more than him, as she acquires herself through signs indicating puberty. The expression: More than him, indicates that all of the modes through which a Hebrew slave can be freed apply to a Hebrew maidservant as well. Rav Sheshet said: This baraita is referring to a case where the master designated her to marry him during the six years. Consequently, she cannot be released from his authority by all of the modes through which a Hebrew slave can be freed, as she is his wife.
יְעָדָה, פְּשִׁיטָא! גִּיטָּא בָּעֲיָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא לָא (לִיבְטְלָה) [לִיבְטְלָן] הִילְכָתָא מִינַּהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי יוֹצְאָה בְּסִימָנִין? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם לֹא יְעָדָה, יוֹצְאָה אַף בְּסִימָנִין.
The Gemara asks: If he designated her, it is obvious that she cannot be released in the manner of a slave, as she is his wife and therefore requires a bill of divorce. The Gemara says: It is necessary to state this explicitly, lest you say that the primary halakha is not nullified with regard to her, i.e., even after she has been designated she can still be freed as a slave would be, without a bill of divorce. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this is not the case. The Gemara asks: If so, that this is referring to a case where he designated her, why does she leave through signs indicating puberty? If he designated her she becomes his wife, and signs indicating the onset of puberty should not affect her status. The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is saying: If he did not designate her, she leaves also through signs indicating puberty.
וְאֵינָהּ נִמְכֶּרֶת וְנִשְׁנֵית. מִכְּלַל דְּעֶבֶד עִבְרִי נִמְכָּר וְנִשְׁנֶה? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״בִּגְנֵבָתוֹ״ – וְלֹא בִּכְפֵילוֹ. ״בִּגְנֵיבָתוֹ״ – וְלֹא בִּזְמָמוֹ. ״בִּגְנֵיבָתוֹ״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּמְכַּר פַּעַם אַחַת שׁוּב אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרוֹ.
§ The baraita teaches: And a Hebrew maidservant is not sold a second time. The Gemara comments: From the fact that the baraita says this about a Hebrew maidservant, it can be inferred that a Hebrew slave can be sold a second time. But isn’t it taught in a baraita that the verse: “And he is sold for his theft” (Exodus 22:2), means that he can be sold to pay for the items that he has stolen but not to pay for his double payment? Although one can be sold into slavery to reimburse the owner for the principal of his theft, he cannot be sold to pay the fine. Furthermore, “for his theft” indicates: But not to pay for his conspiring testimony. If he is a conspiring witness, who is required to pay the value of what he testified that another had stolen but he does not have the money to do so, he is not sold as a slave. Additionally, the phrase “for his theft” teaches that he can be sold for stealing only once, and once he has been sold one time you may not sell him again.
אָמַר רָבָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בִּגְנֵיבָה אַחַת, כָּאן בִּשְׁתֵּי גְּנֵיבוֹת.
Rava said: This is not difficult. Here, in the second baraita, it is referring to one theft, i.e., he stole a large amount but he is not worth enough as a slave for the proceeds of his sale to repay his entire debt. In that case he cannot be sold a second time. There, in the first baraita, it is referring to two thefts, as he may be sold a second time if he stole once, was sold, and subsequently stole again.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: ״בִּגְנֵיבָתוֹ״ – טוּבָא מַשְׁמַע! אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בְּאָדָם אֶחָד, כָּאן בִּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם.
Abaye said to Rava: The expression “for his theft” indicates even many thefts. Rather, Abaye said: This is not difficult. Here, in the second baraita, it is referring to one who stole from one person. This thief cannot be sold a second time even for several thefts. There, in the first baraita, it is referring to thefts from two people.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: גְּנֵיבוֹ אֶלֶף, וְשָׁוֶה חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת – נִמְכָּר וְחוֹזֵר וְנִמְכָּר. גְּנֵיבוֹ חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת, וְשָׁוֶה אֶלֶף – אֵינוֹ נִמְכָּר כְּלָל. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה גְּנֵיבוֹ כְּנֶגֶד מִמְכָּרוֹ – נִמְכָּר, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינוֹ נִמְכָּר.
The Sages taught: If the property he stole was worth one thousand and as a slave he is worth only five hundred, he is sold and sold again. If the property he stole was worth five hundred and he is worth one thousand, he is not sold at all. Rabbi Eliezer says: If the property he stole was exactly equal to his value if he were sold, he is sold; and if not, he is not sold.
אָמַר רָבָא: בְּהָא זְכָנְהוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְרַבָּנַן, דְּמַאי שְׁנָא גְּנֵיבוֹ חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת וְשָׁוֶה אֶלֶף דְּאֵין נִמְכָּר, דְּנִמְכַּר כּוּלּוֹ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא חֶצְיוֹ, הָכִי נָמֵי: נִמְכַּר בִּגְנֵיבָתוֹ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא וְלֹא נִמְכַּר בַּחֲצִי גְנֵיבָתוֹ.
Rava said: In this case Rabbi Eliezer triumphed over the Rabbis, as what is different in a case where the property he stole is worth five hundred and he is worth one thousand that they concede that he is not sold? The reason is that the Merciful One states that he is sold in his entirety, and not part of him. So too, if he is worth less than the value of the property he stole, one can say: The Merciful One states that he is sold for his theft, and he is not sold for part of his theft.
וּמַפְדִּין אוֹתָהּ בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ. סְבַר רָבָא לְמֵימַר בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ דְּאָדוֹן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מַאי נִיהוּ – דְּכָתֵבְנָא לֵיהּ שְׁטָרָא אַדְּמֶיהָ? אַמַּאי? נָקֵיט מַרְגָּנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ, יָהֵיבְנָא לֵיהּ חַסְפָּא?
§ The baraita further teaches: And one can redeem a Hebrew maidservant against his will. Rava thought to say that this means against the will of the master, i.e., she can be redeemed even if he refuses. Abaye said to him: What is the mechanism for emancipating her against the will of her master? Is it that one writes a document to him for her value, and when she has the money she repays this debt? Why should it be possible to force the master to free her in this manner? He is holding a pearl [marganita] in his hand and one gives him a shard instead, as this document is currently useless.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ דְּאָב, מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה. אִי הָכִי, עֶבֶד עִבְרִי נָמֵי, נִכְפִּינְהוּ לִבְנֵי מִשְׁפָּחָה מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה! הָדַר אָזֵיל וּמְזַבֵּין נַפְשֵׁיהּ.
Rather, Abaye said: She can be redeemed against the will of her father, due to the family flaw, i.e., the harm caused to the family name by her status. The court pressures the father as much as possible to redeem her, as it is disgraceful to a family if one of its daughters is a maidservant. The Gemara asks: If so, one should force the family of a Hebrew slave to redeem him also, due to the family flaw. The Gemara answers: There is a concern that he will go back and sell himself and earn money in this manner at his family’s expense.
הָכָא נָמֵי הָדַר אָזֵיל וּמְזַבֵּין לַהּ! הָא קָתָנֵי: אֵינָהּ נִמְכֶּרֶת וְנִשְׁנֵית. וּמַנִּי – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: מוֹכֵר אָדָם אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְאִישׁוּת וְשׁוֹנֶה, לְשִׁפְחוּת וְשׁוֹנֶה, לְאִישׁוּת אַחַר שִׁפְחוּת, אֲבָל לֹא לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת כָּךְ אֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר שִׁפְחוּת.
The Gemara asks: Here too, in the case of a Hebrew maidservant, the father might go back and sell her as a maidservant again and receive money for her a second time. The Gemara answers that it is taught: A maidservant is not sold a second time. And whose opinion is this? It is that of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: One can sell, i.e., transfer, his young daughter in marriage and go back and betroth her again if she was divorced or widowed. Likewise, he can sell her into slavery and transfer her again, this time for marriage, after he sold her into slavery. But one cannot sell his daughter into slavery after marriage. Rabbi Shimon says: Just as a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after marriage, so too, a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after slavery.
וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי דְּתַנְיָא: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ –
The Gemara comments: And this issue is taught in the dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “He shall have no power to sell her to a foreign people, seeing that he has dealt deceitfully with her [bevigdo vah]” (Exodus 21:8).
כֵּיוָן שֶׁפֵּירַשׂ טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ, שׁוּב אֵין רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁבָּגַד בָּהּ, שׁוּב אֵין רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ.
This verse indicates that once the master has spread his garment over her, thereby designating her as his wife, her father may no longer sell her. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who interprets bevigdo as related to beged, meaning garment. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Bevigdo vah” means that since the father dealt deceitfully [bagad] with her and sold her once, he cannot sell her again.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמָּסוֹרֶת, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא וְלַמָּסוֹרֶת.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and one derives halakhot based on the spelling of the words. One relies on the way a word is written, without the traditional vocalization, and therefore it is read as though it were vocalized as bevagdo, which refers to betrayal, not a garment. And Rabbi Akiva maintains that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, meaning that one derives halakhot based on the pronunciation of the words, although it diverges from the spelling, and since one pronounces the term as bevigdo, it is related to the word beged, meaning garment. And Rabbi Shimon maintains that both the vocalization of the Torah and the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written are authoritative. Consequently, she cannot be sold as a slave after she has been taken as a wife, nor can she be sold again after she has already been sold once.
בָּעֵי רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: יִעוּד נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, אוֹ אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה? נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְיוֹרְשָׁהּ, וְלִיטַמֵּא לָהּ, וּלְהָפֵר נְדָרֶיהָ. מַאי?
Rabba bar Avuh raises a dilemma: Does designation of a Hebrew maidservant for betrothal by her master effect marriage or does it effect only betrothal? The practical difference of the outcome of this dilemma is whether he inherits her property, i.e., does her husband inherit her property if she dies as he would if she were married to him; and whether he is obligated to become impure to bury her when she dies, if he is a priest; and whether he can nullify her vows on his own without her father, as is the case with a married woman. What is the halakha?
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁפֵּירַשׂ טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ שׁוּב אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ. זַבּוֹנֵי הוּא דְּלָא מְזַבֵּין לַהּ, הָא יַעוֹדֵי מְיַיעֵד לַהּ, וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, כֵּיוָן דְּנִישֵּׂאת שׁוּב אֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma. “Bevigdo vah” means: Once her master has spread his garment over her, the father may no longer sell her. The Gemara analyzes this statement: This indicates that her father cannot sell her afterward, but he can designate her for another man if the master dies or divorces her. And if you say that designation effects marriage, once she is married her father no longer has authority over her. Rather, is it not correct to learn from this that designation effects only betrothal?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: הָכָא בְּקִידּוּשִׁין דְּעָלְמָא קָאֵי. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁמְּסָרָהּ אָבִיהָ לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּיב בִּשְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ וְעוֹנָתָהּ – שׁוּב אֵין יָכוֹל לְמוֹכְרָהּ.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this argument can be refuted. Here, the baraita is dealing with the ordinary betrothal of one’s daughter, not to one who sells his daughter as a maidservant. And this is what the baraita is saying: Since her father gave her, i.e., betrothed her, to one who is obligated to provide her food, her clothing, and fulfill her conjugal rights, he can no longer sell her. Therefore, this baraita proves nothing with regard to the issue of whether or not designation effects marriage.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין מוֹכְרָהּ לִקְרוֹבִים. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמְרוּ: מוֹכְרָהּ לִקְרוֹבִים. וְשָׁוִין שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט.
The Gemara cites another relevant source. Come and hear: A father cannot sell his daughter as a maidservant to relatives with whom she is prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse, as they cannot fulfill the mitzva of designation. They said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: He can sell her to relatives, because designation is merely an option and its inapplicability does not negate the possibility of a sale. And they agree that he can sell her to a High Priest if she is a widow, or to a common priest if she is a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza]. Although it is prohibited for her to marry these men, their betrothal is effective, and therefore designation is not entirely impossible in these cases.
הַאי אַלְמָנָה הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּקַדִּישׁ נַפְשַׁהּ, אַלְמָנָה קָרֵי לַהּ? וְאֶלָּא דְּקַדְּשַׁהּ אָבִיהָ. מִי מָצֵי מְזַבֵּין לַהּ? וְהָא אֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת.
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this widow? If we say that she betrothed herself when she was a minor and her husband died, is she called a widow? Since the initial betrothal was entirely ineffective, as a minor cannot accept betrothal independently, she would not be considered his wife. Rather, one must say that her father betrothed her and she was subsequently widowed. But if that is the case, can he sell her? But it was taught that a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after marriage.
וְאָמַר רַב עַמְרָם אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: הָכָא בְּקִדּוּשֵׁי יִעוּד, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: מָעוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת לָאו לְקִידּוּשִׁין נִיתְּנוּ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּישֵּׂאת שׁוּב אֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ!
And Rav Amram says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Here, it is referring to a woman widowed from betrothal of designation, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: The original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal but as payment for her work, and if the master wishes to designate her he must give her additional money for that purpose. The relevance of this assertion will be clarified below. The Gemara explains the proof from this baraita: And if you say that designation effects marriage, once she is married her father no longer has authority over her. How can he sell her a second time after the death of her first husband?
וְאֶלָּא מַאי, אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה? – וְשָׁוִין שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ?! הָא אֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת! אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר: שָׁאנֵי אֵירוּסִין דִּידַהּ מֵאֵירוּסִין דְּאָבִיהָ? – אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, שָׁאנֵי נִישּׂוּאִין דִּידַהּ מִנִּישּׂוּאִין דְּאָבִיהָ.
The Gemara asks from the other perspective: Rather, what will you say, that designation effects only betrothal? If so, why does the baraita state: And they agree that he can sell her? After all, a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after matrimony. This baraita also refers to a case where a woman was betrothed but the marriage was not consummated. Rather, what have you to say? Betrothal effected by her is different from betrothal effected by her father. Since the marriage was not performed through her father but by the master giving her additional money, as held by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, the principle that one cannot sell his daughter into slavery after betrothal does not apply. But by the same reasoning, even if you say that designation effects marriage, you can argue that marriage effected by her is different from marriage effected by her father.
הַאי מַאי? בִּשְׁלָמָא אֵירוּסִין מֵאֵירוּסִין שָׁאנֵי, אֶלָּא נִישּׂוּאִין מִנִּישּׂוּאִין,
This challenge is rejected: What is this comparison? Granted, one form of betrothal is different from the other betrothal, i.e., there is a difference between standard betrothal with the father’s consent and betrothal through designation, which is performed upon the master’s initiative. After that type of betrothal the father can, in fact, sell her a second time. But with regard to one mode of effecting marriage in relation to another mode of effecting marriage,
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Kiddushin 18
וְכָאן שֶׁהוֹרָתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְדוּשָּׁה, וְלֵידָתוֹ בִּקְדוּשָּׁה.
And here it is referring to a case where he was not conceived in sanctity, i.e., his mother conceived him before she converted, and only his birth was in sanctity, as she converted when pregnant. It is appropriate to return money to this individual.
רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: נׇכְרִי יוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אָבִיו דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי יְרֻשָּׁה לְעֵשָׂו נָתַתִּי אֶת הַר שֵׂעִיר״. וְדִלְמָא יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד שָׁאנֵי? אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: ״כִּי לִבְנֵי לוֹט נָתַתִּי אֶת עָר יְרֻשָּׁה״.
Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: By Torah law a gentile inherits from his father, as it is written: “Because I have given mount Seir to Esau as an inheritance” (Deuteronomy 2:5). The Gemara asks: But perhaps it is different with regard to an apostate Jew? In other words, it is possible that Esau was not considered a gentile but rather Jewish, like the Patriarchs. Consequently, he is categorized as an apostate Jew. Rather, the proof is from here: “Because I have given Ar to the children of Lot as an inheritance” (Deuteronomy 2:9), and the descendants of Lot were certainly gentiles.
וְרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרָבָא? מִי כְּתִיב ״וְחִשַּׁב עִם קֹנֵהוּ וְלֹא עִם יוֹרְשֵׁי קוֹנֵהוּ״?
The Gemara asks: And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin, what is the reason that he did not state his opinion in accordance with the explanation of Rava, who derives the inheritance of gentiles from the verse: “And he shall reckon with his purchaser” (Leviticus 25:50)? The Gemara answers: Is it written explicitly in the Torah: And he shall reckon with his purchaser and not with the heirs of his purchaser? This proof is based on an exposition, not on an explicit source.
וְרָבָא, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין? מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּאַבְרָהָם שָׁאנֵי.
The Gemara further asks: And Rava, what is the reason that he did not state his opinion in accordance with the explanation of Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin? The Gemara answers: Perhaps due to the honor of Abraham it is different. It is possible that for the sake of Abraham an inheritance was given to the members of his family. The same may not apply to gentiles in general.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִי שֶׁאֵין בָּעִבְרִיָּה, וְיֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִיָּה שֶׁאֵין בָּעִבְרִי. יֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִי שֶׁהוּא יוֹצֵא בְּשָׁנִים, וּבַיּוֹבֵל, וּבְמִיתַת הָאָדוֹן – מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בָּעִבְרִיָּה, וְיֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִיָּה, שֶׁהֲרֵי עִבְרִיָּה יוֹצְאָה בְּסִימָנִין וְאֵינָהּ נִמְכֶּרֶת וְנִשְׁנֵית, וּמַפְדִּין אוֹתָהּ, בְּעַל כּוֹרְחוֹ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בָּעִבְרִי.
§ The Sages taught: There are details of the halakhot of a Hebrew slave that do not apply to the case of a Hebrew maidservant and there are details of the halakhot of a Hebrew maidservant that do not apply to a Hebrew slave. The baraita elaborates: There are unique details in the halakhot of emancipating a Hebrew slave, as he leaves through serving a term of six years, and he leaves through the Jubilee Year, and he leaves through the death of the master, which is not the case for a Hebrew maidservant. And there are unique details in the halakhot of emancipating a Hebrew maidservant, as a Hebrew maidservant leaves through signs indicating puberty, and she is not sold for a second time, and one can redeem her against his will, as the Gemara will explain, which is not the case for a Hebrew slave.
אָמַר מָר: יֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִי שֶׁאֵין בָּעִבְרִיָּה. וּרְמִינְהִי: יְתֵירָה עָלָיו אָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה, שֶׁקּוֹנָה עַצְמָהּ בְּסִימָנִין! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּגוֹן שֶׁיְּעָדָה.
The Gemara analyzes this baraita. The Master said above: There are details of the halakhot of emancipating a Hebrew slave that do not apply to the case of a Hebrew maidservant. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the mishna: A Hebrew maidservant has one mode of emancipation more than him, as she acquires herself through signs indicating puberty. The expression: More than him, indicates that all of the modes through which a Hebrew slave can be freed apply to a Hebrew maidservant as well. Rav Sheshet said: This baraita is referring to a case where the master designated her to marry him during the six years. Consequently, she cannot be released from his authority by all of the modes through which a Hebrew slave can be freed, as she is his wife.
יְעָדָה, פְּשִׁיטָא! גִּיטָּא בָּעֲיָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא לָא (לִיבְטְלָה) [לִיבְטְלָן] הִילְכָתָא מִינַּהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי יוֹצְאָה בְּסִימָנִין? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם לֹא יְעָדָה, יוֹצְאָה אַף בְּסִימָנִין.
The Gemara asks: If he designated her, it is obvious that she cannot be released in the manner of a slave, as she is his wife and therefore requires a bill of divorce. The Gemara says: It is necessary to state this explicitly, lest you say that the primary halakha is not nullified with regard to her, i.e., even after she has been designated she can still be freed as a slave would be, without a bill of divorce. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this is not the case. The Gemara asks: If so, that this is referring to a case where he designated her, why does she leave through signs indicating puberty? If he designated her she becomes his wife, and signs indicating the onset of puberty should not affect her status. The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is saying: If he did not designate her, she leaves also through signs indicating puberty.
וְאֵינָהּ נִמְכֶּרֶת וְנִשְׁנֵית. מִכְּלַל דְּעֶבֶד עִבְרִי נִמְכָּר וְנִשְׁנֶה? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״בִּגְנֵבָתוֹ״ – וְלֹא בִּכְפֵילוֹ. ״בִּגְנֵיבָתוֹ״ – וְלֹא בִּזְמָמוֹ. ״בִּגְנֵיבָתוֹ״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּמְכַּר פַּעַם אַחַת שׁוּב אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרוֹ.
§ The baraita teaches: And a Hebrew maidservant is not sold a second time. The Gemara comments: From the fact that the baraita says this about a Hebrew maidservant, it can be inferred that a Hebrew slave can be sold a second time. But isn’t it taught in a baraita that the verse: “And he is sold for his theft” (Exodus 22:2), means that he can be sold to pay for the items that he has stolen but not to pay for his double payment? Although one can be sold into slavery to reimburse the owner for the principal of his theft, he cannot be sold to pay the fine. Furthermore, “for his theft” indicates: But not to pay for his conspiring testimony. If he is a conspiring witness, who is required to pay the value of what he testified that another had stolen but he does not have the money to do so, he is not sold as a slave. Additionally, the phrase “for his theft” teaches that he can be sold for stealing only once, and once he has been sold one time you may not sell him again.
אָמַר רָבָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בִּגְנֵיבָה אַחַת, כָּאן בִּשְׁתֵּי גְּנֵיבוֹת.
Rava said: This is not difficult. Here, in the second baraita, it is referring to one theft, i.e., he stole a large amount but he is not worth enough as a slave for the proceeds of his sale to repay his entire debt. In that case he cannot be sold a second time. There, in the first baraita, it is referring to two thefts, as he may be sold a second time if he stole once, was sold, and subsequently stole again.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: ״בִּגְנֵיבָתוֹ״ – טוּבָא מַשְׁמַע! אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בְּאָדָם אֶחָד, כָּאן בִּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם.
Abaye said to Rava: The expression “for his theft” indicates even many thefts. Rather, Abaye said: This is not difficult. Here, in the second baraita, it is referring to one who stole from one person. This thief cannot be sold a second time even for several thefts. There, in the first baraita, it is referring to thefts from two people.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: גְּנֵיבוֹ אֶלֶף, וְשָׁוֶה חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת – נִמְכָּר וְחוֹזֵר וְנִמְכָּר. גְּנֵיבוֹ חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת, וְשָׁוֶה אֶלֶף – אֵינוֹ נִמְכָּר כְּלָל. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה גְּנֵיבוֹ כְּנֶגֶד מִמְכָּרוֹ – נִמְכָּר, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינוֹ נִמְכָּר.
The Sages taught: If the property he stole was worth one thousand and as a slave he is worth only five hundred, he is sold and sold again. If the property he stole was worth five hundred and he is worth one thousand, he is not sold at all. Rabbi Eliezer says: If the property he stole was exactly equal to his value if he were sold, he is sold; and if not, he is not sold.
אָמַר רָבָא: בְּהָא זְכָנְהוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְרַבָּנַן, דְּמַאי שְׁנָא גְּנֵיבוֹ חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת וְשָׁוֶה אֶלֶף דְּאֵין נִמְכָּר, דְּנִמְכַּר כּוּלּוֹ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא חֶצְיוֹ, הָכִי נָמֵי: נִמְכַּר בִּגְנֵיבָתוֹ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא וְלֹא נִמְכַּר בַּחֲצִי גְנֵיבָתוֹ.
Rava said: In this case Rabbi Eliezer triumphed over the Rabbis, as what is different in a case where the property he stole is worth five hundred and he is worth one thousand that they concede that he is not sold? The reason is that the Merciful One states that he is sold in his entirety, and not part of him. So too, if he is worth less than the value of the property he stole, one can say: The Merciful One states that he is sold for his theft, and he is not sold for part of his theft.
וּמַפְדִּין אוֹתָהּ בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ. סְבַר רָבָא לְמֵימַר בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ דְּאָדוֹן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מַאי נִיהוּ – דְּכָתֵבְנָא לֵיהּ שְׁטָרָא אַדְּמֶיהָ? אַמַּאי? נָקֵיט מַרְגָּנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ, יָהֵיבְנָא לֵיהּ חַסְפָּא?
§ The baraita further teaches: And one can redeem a Hebrew maidservant against his will. Rava thought to say that this means against the will of the master, i.e., she can be redeemed even if he refuses. Abaye said to him: What is the mechanism for emancipating her against the will of her master? Is it that one writes a document to him for her value, and when she has the money she repays this debt? Why should it be possible to force the master to free her in this manner? He is holding a pearl [marganita] in his hand and one gives him a shard instead, as this document is currently useless.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ דְּאָב, מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה. אִי הָכִי, עֶבֶד עִבְרִי נָמֵי, נִכְפִּינְהוּ לִבְנֵי מִשְׁפָּחָה מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה! הָדַר אָזֵיל וּמְזַבֵּין נַפְשֵׁיהּ.
Rather, Abaye said: She can be redeemed against the will of her father, due to the family flaw, i.e., the harm caused to the family name by her status. The court pressures the father as much as possible to redeem her, as it is disgraceful to a family if one of its daughters is a maidservant. The Gemara asks: If so, one should force the family of a Hebrew slave to redeem him also, due to the family flaw. The Gemara answers: There is a concern that he will go back and sell himself and earn money in this manner at his family’s expense.
הָכָא נָמֵי הָדַר אָזֵיל וּמְזַבֵּין לַהּ! הָא קָתָנֵי: אֵינָהּ נִמְכֶּרֶת וְנִשְׁנֵית. וּמַנִּי – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: מוֹכֵר אָדָם אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְאִישׁוּת וְשׁוֹנֶה, לְשִׁפְחוּת וְשׁוֹנֶה, לְאִישׁוּת אַחַר שִׁפְחוּת, אֲבָל לֹא לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת כָּךְ אֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר שִׁפְחוּת.
The Gemara asks: Here too, in the case of a Hebrew maidservant, the father might go back and sell her as a maidservant again and receive money for her a second time. The Gemara answers that it is taught: A maidservant is not sold a second time. And whose opinion is this? It is that of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: One can sell, i.e., transfer, his young daughter in marriage and go back and betroth her again if she was divorced or widowed. Likewise, he can sell her into slavery and transfer her again, this time for marriage, after he sold her into slavery. But one cannot sell his daughter into slavery after marriage. Rabbi Shimon says: Just as a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after marriage, so too, a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after slavery.
וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי דְּתַנְיָא: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ –
The Gemara comments: And this issue is taught in the dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “He shall have no power to sell her to a foreign people, seeing that he has dealt deceitfully with her [bevigdo vah]” (Exodus 21:8).
כֵּיוָן שֶׁפֵּירַשׂ טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ, שׁוּב אֵין רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁבָּגַד בָּהּ, שׁוּב אֵין רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ.
This verse indicates that once the master has spread his garment over her, thereby designating her as his wife, her father may no longer sell her. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who interprets bevigdo as related to beged, meaning garment. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Bevigdo vah” means that since the father dealt deceitfully [bagad] with her and sold her once, he cannot sell her again.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמָּסוֹרֶת, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא וְלַמָּסוֹרֶת.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and one derives halakhot based on the spelling of the words. One relies on the way a word is written, without the traditional vocalization, and therefore it is read as though it were vocalized as bevagdo, which refers to betrayal, not a garment. And Rabbi Akiva maintains that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, meaning that one derives halakhot based on the pronunciation of the words, although it diverges from the spelling, and since one pronounces the term as bevigdo, it is related to the word beged, meaning garment. And Rabbi Shimon maintains that both the vocalization of the Torah and the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written are authoritative. Consequently, she cannot be sold as a slave after she has been taken as a wife, nor can she be sold again after she has already been sold once.
בָּעֵי רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: יִעוּד נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, אוֹ אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה? נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְיוֹרְשָׁהּ, וְלִיטַמֵּא לָהּ, וּלְהָפֵר נְדָרֶיהָ. מַאי?
Rabba bar Avuh raises a dilemma: Does designation of a Hebrew maidservant for betrothal by her master effect marriage or does it effect only betrothal? The practical difference of the outcome of this dilemma is whether he inherits her property, i.e., does her husband inherit her property if she dies as he would if she were married to him; and whether he is obligated to become impure to bury her when she dies, if he is a priest; and whether he can nullify her vows on his own without her father, as is the case with a married woman. What is the halakha?
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁפֵּירַשׂ טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ שׁוּב אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ. זַבּוֹנֵי הוּא דְּלָא מְזַבֵּין לַהּ, הָא יַעוֹדֵי מְיַיעֵד לַהּ, וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, כֵּיוָן דְּנִישֵּׂאת שׁוּב אֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma. “Bevigdo vah” means: Once her master has spread his garment over her, the father may no longer sell her. The Gemara analyzes this statement: This indicates that her father cannot sell her afterward, but he can designate her for another man if the master dies or divorces her. And if you say that designation effects marriage, once she is married her father no longer has authority over her. Rather, is it not correct to learn from this that designation effects only betrothal?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: הָכָא בְּקִידּוּשִׁין דְּעָלְמָא קָאֵי. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁמְּסָרָהּ אָבִיהָ לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּיב בִּשְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ וְעוֹנָתָהּ – שׁוּב אֵין יָכוֹל לְמוֹכְרָהּ.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this argument can be refuted. Here, the baraita is dealing with the ordinary betrothal of one’s daughter, not to one who sells his daughter as a maidservant. And this is what the baraita is saying: Since her father gave her, i.e., betrothed her, to one who is obligated to provide her food, her clothing, and fulfill her conjugal rights, he can no longer sell her. Therefore, this baraita proves nothing with regard to the issue of whether or not designation effects marriage.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין מוֹכְרָהּ לִקְרוֹבִים. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמְרוּ: מוֹכְרָהּ לִקְרוֹבִים. וְשָׁוִין שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט.
The Gemara cites another relevant source. Come and hear: A father cannot sell his daughter as a maidservant to relatives with whom she is prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse, as they cannot fulfill the mitzva of designation. They said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: He can sell her to relatives, because designation is merely an option and its inapplicability does not negate the possibility of a sale. And they agree that he can sell her to a High Priest if she is a widow, or to a common priest if she is a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza]. Although it is prohibited for her to marry these men, their betrothal is effective, and therefore designation is not entirely impossible in these cases.
הַאי אַלְמָנָה הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּקַדִּישׁ נַפְשַׁהּ, אַלְמָנָה קָרֵי לַהּ? וְאֶלָּא דְּקַדְּשַׁהּ אָבִיהָ. מִי מָצֵי מְזַבֵּין לַהּ? וְהָא אֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת.
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this widow? If we say that she betrothed herself when she was a minor and her husband died, is she called a widow? Since the initial betrothal was entirely ineffective, as a minor cannot accept betrothal independently, she would not be considered his wife. Rather, one must say that her father betrothed her and she was subsequently widowed. But if that is the case, can he sell her? But it was taught that a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after marriage.
וְאָמַר רַב עַמְרָם אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: הָכָא בְּקִדּוּשֵׁי יִעוּד, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: מָעוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת לָאו לְקִידּוּשִׁין נִיתְּנוּ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּישֵּׂאת שׁוּב אֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ!
And Rav Amram says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Here, it is referring to a woman widowed from betrothal of designation, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: The original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal but as payment for her work, and if the master wishes to designate her he must give her additional money for that purpose. The relevance of this assertion will be clarified below. The Gemara explains the proof from this baraita: And if you say that designation effects marriage, once she is married her father no longer has authority over her. How can he sell her a second time after the death of her first husband?
וְאֶלָּא מַאי, אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה? – וְשָׁוִין שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ?! הָא אֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת! אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר: שָׁאנֵי אֵירוּסִין דִּידַהּ מֵאֵירוּסִין דְּאָבִיהָ? – אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, שָׁאנֵי נִישּׂוּאִין דִּידַהּ מִנִּישּׂוּאִין דְּאָבִיהָ.
The Gemara asks from the other perspective: Rather, what will you say, that designation effects only betrothal? If so, why does the baraita state: And they agree that he can sell her? After all, a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after matrimony. This baraita also refers to a case where a woman was betrothed but the marriage was not consummated. Rather, what have you to say? Betrothal effected by her is different from betrothal effected by her father. Since the marriage was not performed through her father but by the master giving her additional money, as held by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, the principle that one cannot sell his daughter into slavery after betrothal does not apply. But by the same reasoning, even if you say that designation effects marriage, you can argue that marriage effected by her is different from marriage effected by her father.
הַאי מַאי? בִּשְׁלָמָא אֵירוּסִין מֵאֵירוּסִין שָׁאנֵי, אֶלָּא נִישּׂוּאִין מִנִּישּׂוּאִין,
This challenge is rejected: What is this comparison? Granted, one form of betrothal is different from the other betrothal, i.e., there is a difference between standard betrothal with the father’s consent and betrothal through designation, which is performed upon the master’s initiative. After that type of betrothal the father can, in fact, sell her a second time. But with regard to one mode of effecting marriage in relation to another mode of effecting marriage,
