Kiddushin 21
הָא רַבָּנַן, הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
This second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and that baraita, which teaches that one can borrow money and redeem the house and partially redeem it, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
תָּנֵי חֲדָא: לֹוֶה וְגוֹאֵל וְגוֹאֵל לַחֲצָאִין, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: אֵין לֹוֶה וְגוֹאֵל וְגוֹאֵל לַחֲצָאִין. לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא רַבָּנַן, הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
The Gemara states: It is taught in one baraita with regard to the houses of walled cities: One can borrow money and redeem it, and one can partially redeem it, and it is taught in another baraita: One cannot borrow money and redeem it, nor can one partially redeem. Apparently, there is a contradiction between these two baraitot. The Gemara answers as above: This is not difficult. This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
(סִימָן: חָרַשׁ חָבַשׁ זְמַן)
The Gemara provides a mnemonic device for the names of the Sages who raise the dilemmas cited below and those to whom the questions are addressed: Ḥeresh, ḥavash, zeman. They allude to the following interlocutors: Ḥeresh alludes to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and Rav Ashi; ḥavash alludes to Rav Aḥa Sava and Rav Ashi; and zeman alludes to Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, and Ravina.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְמוֹכֵר בַּיִת בְּבָתֵּי עָרֵי חוֹמָה – שֶׁכֵּן הוֹרַע כֹּחוֹ לִיגָּאֵל לְעוֹלָם, תֹּאמַר בְּמַקְדִּישׁ – שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחוֹ לִיגָּאֵל לְעוֹלָם!
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: The comparison detailed earlier (20b) between one who sells a house and one who consecrates a field, can be refuted as follows: What is unique about one who sells a house among the houses of walled cities is that his power is diminished, in that he is not able to redeem it forever, since he cannot redeem it after a year has passed (see Leviticus 25:30). Shall you say the same with regard to one who consecrates his field, as his power is enhanced in that he is able to redeem forever?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא סָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר נֶיהְדַּר דִּינָא, תֵּיתֵי בְּמָה הַצַּד: מוֹכֵר שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחוֹ לִיגָּאֵל לְעוֹלָם וְאֵין לֹוֶה וְגוֹאֵל וְגוֹאֵל לַחֲצָאִין. מָה לְמוֹכֵר שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה, שֶׁכֵּן הוֹרַע כֹּחוֹ לִיגָּאֵל מִיָּד. מוֹכֵר בַּיִת בְּבָתֵּי עָרֵי חוֹמָה יוֹכִיחַ.
Rav Aḥa Sava said to Rav Ashi: The comparison is valid, because it can be said that the argument returns, as one can learn in a different manner. Let this matter be derived by an analogy derived from the common factor of two sources: The halakha of one who sells an ancestral field can prove it, as his power is enhanced in that he is able to redeem the field forever, and he cannot borrow money and redeem it, and he cannot partially redeem it. And if you say: What is unique about one who sells an ancestral field is that his power is diminished in that he is not able to redeem it immediately, the case of one who sells a house from among houses of walled cities can prove otherwise. Although one can redeem the house immediately, he cannot borrow money and redeem it, nor partially redeem it.
וְחָזַר הַדִּין, לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁנִּגְאָלִין, וְאֵין לֹוֶה וְגוֹאֵל וְגוֹאֵל לַחֲצָאִין, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא מַקְדִּישׁ – שֶׁנִּגְאָל, וְאֵין לֹוֶה וְגוֹאֵל וְגוֹאֵל לַחֲצָאִין.
And the derivation has reverted to its starting point, as one could alternate the explanations for each side with their respective refutations. Ultimately, the aspect of this case, an ancestral field, is not like the aspect of that case, a house from among houses of walled cities. Their common denominator is that they can be redeemed, and one cannot borrow money and redeem them, and likewise, one cannot partially redeem them. I will also bring the case of one who consecrates his field and rule that it may be redeemed, but one cannot borrow money and redeem it, and one cannot partially redeem it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן הוֹרַע כֹּחָם לִיגָּאֵל בְּשָׁנָה שְׁנִיָּה, תֹּאמַר בְּמַקְדִּישׁ שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחוֹ לִיגָּאֵל בְּשָׁנָה שְׁנִיָּה!
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: This derivation, based on the common denominator, can be refuted as follows: What is unique to their common denominator is that their power is diminished in that they are unable to redeem the respective properties during the second year, as in neither case can they be redeemed in the second year. One who sells a house in a walled city cannot redeem it beyond the first year, while one who sells an ancestral field cannot redeem it during the first two years. Shall you say the same with regard to one who consecrated his field, as his power is enhanced in that he is able to redeem the field in the second year?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: עֶבֶד עִבְרִי הַנִּמְכָּר לְנׇכְרִי יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחוֹ לִיגָּאֵל בְּשָׁנָה שְׁנִיָּה וְאֵין לֹוֶה וְגוֹאֵל וְגוֹאֵל לַחֲצָאִין.
Ravina said to him that the derivation is valid because it can be said that the case of a Hebrew slave sold to a gentile can prove otherwise, as his power enhanced in that he is able to redeem himself in the second year, and nevertheless he cannot borrow money and redeem himself, and he cannot partially redeem himself.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הַמּוֹכֵר בַּיִת בְּבָתֵּי עָרֵי חוֹמָה, נִגְאָל לִקְרוֹבִים אוֹ אֵין נִגְאָל לִקְרוֹבִים? ״גְּאֻלָּתוֹ״ ״גְּאֻלָּתוֹ״ מִשְּׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה גָּמַר: מָה שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה אֵינָהּ נִגְאֶלֶת לַחֲצָאִין וְנִגְאֶלֶת לִקְרוֹבִים – אַף הַאי נָמֵי אֵין נִגְאָל לַחֲצָאִין וְנִגְאָל לִקְרוֹבִים.
The Gemara discusses a similar matter. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In the case of one who sells a house from among the houses of walled cities, can it be redeemed by relatives or can it not be redeemed by relatives? Is the ability to redeem a house limited to the seller himself? The Gemara presents the two sides of the dilemma: Does one derive the verbal analogy of “ge’ullato” (Leviticus 25:29) and “ge’ullato” (Leviticus 25:26) from an ancestral field in this manner: Just as an ancestral field cannot be partially redeemed and yet it can be redeemed by relatives, so too, this house also cannot be partially redeemed and yet it can be redeemed by relatives?
אוֹ דִילְמָא: כִּי כְּתִיבָא ״גְּאוּלָּה״ – בַּחֲצָאִין הוּא דִּכְתִיבָ[א], בִּקְרוֹבִים לָא כְּתִיבָ[א]? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ נִגְאָל.
Or perhaps, when the word ge’ula is written in the case of an ancestral field, it is written with regard to partial redemption; but the word redemption is not written with regard to relatives. If so, the verbal analogy does not apply to the halakha of redemption by relatives. Rav Sheshet said to him: The house cannot be redeemed by relatives.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: ״בְּכֹל גְּאֻלָּה תִּתְּנוּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת בָּתִּים וְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי. מַאי לָאו בָּתֵּי עָרֵי חוֹמָה? לָא, בָּתֵּי חֲצֵרִים.
Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana raised an objection to the ruling of Rav Sheshet from a baraita that deals with the verse: “And in all of your ancestral land you shall grant redemption for the land” (Leviticus 25:24). This verse serves to include houses and a Hebrew slave. What, is it not correct to say that the term houses is referring to houses of walled cities, indicating that they can also be redeemed by relatives? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, this is referring to houses in open areas without walls.
בָּתֵּי חֲצֵרִים בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב בְּהוּ: ״עַל שְׂדֵה הָאָרֶץ יֵחָשֵׁב״! הָהוּא לְקוֹבְעוֹ חוֹבָה, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
The Gemara asks: With regard to houses in open areas without walls, it is explicitly written: “Shall be reckoned with the field of the country” (Leviticus 25:31), meaning that they are like ancestral fields. If so, there is no need for another verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara answers: That verse: “And in all of your ancestral land you shall grant redemption for the land” (Leviticus 25:24), serves to establish that redemption by relatives is an obligation, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְגָאַל אֵת מִמְכַּר אָחִיו״ – רְשׁוּת. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר רְשׁוּת, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא חוֹבָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאִישׁ כִּי לֹא יִהְיֶה לּוֹ גֹּאֵל״ – וְכִי יֵשׁ אָדָם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ גּוֹאֲלִים? אֶלָּא זֶה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ וְאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה לִיקַּח, שֶׁהָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.
As it is taught in a baraita, with regard to a verse that deals with one who sells ancestral land: “And he shall redeem that which his brother has sold” (Leviticus 25:25), this redemption is optional, i.e., if he wishes to do so he may redeem the land. Do you say that it is optional or is it nothing other than an obligation? The verse states concerning an ancestral field that was sold: “And if a man has no one to redeem it” (Leviticus 25:26). This verse is puzzling: But is there a man in Israel who does not have redeemers? Every Jew has a relative of some sort, even if he must trace his family tree back all the way to Jacob. Rather, this is referring to one who has a relative who does not want to purchase, i.e., redeem, the land, as he has permission to refrain from doing so, since this redemption is optional. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״וְגָאַל אֵת מִמְכַּר אָחִיו״ – חוֹבָה. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר חוֹבָה אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא רְשׁוּת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּכֹל… גְּאֻלָּה תִּתְּנוּ״ – הַכָּתוּב קְבָעוֹ חוֹבָה.
Rabbi Eliezer says that when the verse states: “And he shall redeem that which his brother has sold,” this redemption is an obligation. Do you say that it is an obligation, or is it only optional? The verse states: “And in all of your ancestral land you shall grant redemption for the land” (Leviticus 25:24). Here the verse established it as obligatory. This is the interpretation of the verses according to Rabbi Eliezer.
אָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְרַבּוֹת בָּתֵּי עָרֵי חוֹמָה – הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב ״בְּכֹל״, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְרַבּוֹת בָּתֵּי חֲצֵרִים – מַאי ״בְּכֹל״? קַשְׁיָא.
The Sages said to Rav Ashi, and some say Ravina said this to Rav Ashi: Granted, according to the one who says that the verse serves to include houses of walled cities, this is as it is written “in all.” “In all” serves to include a case omitted by the phrase “you shall grant a redemption for the land.” But according to the one who says that it serves to include houses in open areas without walls, what is meant by the term “in all”? It was already taught that these houses are included in the category of ancestral fields, and therefore they are referred to by the expression “redemption for the land.” No answer was found to this question and the Gemara states that it is a difficulty.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים? לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל הַגְּאוּלּוֹת שֶׁנִּגְאָלוֹת כַּסֵּדֶר הַזֶּה. מַאי לָאו בָּתֵּי עָרֵי חוֹמָה, וְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי? לָא, בָּתֵּי חֲצֵרִים וּשְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה.
Abaye raised an objection to this opinion that houses in walled cities cannot be redeemed by relatives. It is taught in a baraita: What does it mean when the verse states: “May redeem him,” “may redeem him,” and “may redeem him” (Leviticus 25:48–49), three times? This serves to include all redemptions, and that they are redeemed in this order: In the case of a Hebrew slave sold to a gentile, if he does not redeem himself he can be redeemed by a brother; if he is not redeemed by a brother, then he can be redeemed by an uncle or some other relative. What, is it not correct to say that this inclusion is referring to houses of walled cities and a Hebrew slave, that they too can be redeemed by relatives? The Gemara rejects this interpretation: No, it includes houses in open areas and an ancestral field.
בָּתֵּי חֲצֵרִים וּשְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב: ״עַל שְׂדֵה הָאָרֶץ יֵחָשֵׁב״! כִּדְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לְקָרוֹב קָרוֹב קוֹדֵם, הָכִי נָמֵי לְקָרוֹב קָרוֹב קוֹדֵם.
The Gemara asks: But the cases of houses in open areas and the case of an ancestral field are written explicitly: “Shall be reckoned with the field of the country” (Leviticus 25:31). The Gemara answers: This is as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, that the verse detailing the redemption by relatives stated with regard to an ancestral field teaches that the closer of a relative one is to the seller, the earlier one is in the order of redeeming the ancestral field. The obligation or merit to redeem the field applies first to one who is more closely related to the seller. So too, with regard to houses in open areas, this verse teaches that the closer of a relative one is to the seller, the earlier one is in the order of redeeming the house.
הֵיכָא אִיתְּמַר דְּרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק? אַהָא, דְּאִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: עֶבֶד עִבְרִי הַנִּמְכָּר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל נִגְאָל לִקְרוֹבִים אוֹ אֵינוֹ נִגְאָל לִקְרוֹבִים? אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי לָא תִּבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּאָמַר: מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִגְאָל בְּאֵלֶּה – נִגְאָל בְּשֵׁשׁ, אַלְמָא לָא מִיפְּרֵק.
The Gemara asks: Where was this opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak originally stated? The Gemara answers that it was stated with regard to this issue, as a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Can a Hebrew slave sold to a Jew be redeemed by his relatives or can he not be redeemed by his relatives? The Gemara comments: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, you should not raise the dilemma, as he says: One who is not redeemed by these relatives is redeemed by six years of service. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that a Hebrew slave sold to a gentile cannot be redeemed by his relatives.
כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן מַאי? יָלְפִינַן ״שָׂכִיר״ ״שָׂכִיר״, וְלָא דָּרְשִׁי ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״, אוֹ דִילְמָא ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ – לָזֶה וְלֹא לְאַחֵר?
When you raise the dilemma, it is according to the opinion of the Rabbis. What is the halakha? Does one derive the verbal analogy comparing “hired worker” (Leviticus 25:40) and “hired worker” (Leviticus 25:53) from the case of a Jew sold to a gentile, and say that just as one can be redeemed by one’s relatives if sold to a gentile, so too, one can be redeemed if sold to a Jew? And at the same time one does not interpret homiletically the phrase “may redeem him” (Leviticus 25:48), stated with regard to one sold to a gentile, as a restricting term. Or perhaps the phrase “may redeem him” is in fact a restricting term, which indicates that this halakha applies only to this slave, i.e., only one sold to a gentile can be redeemed by relatives, and it does not apply to another slave, one sold to a Jew.
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״בְּכֹל… גְּאוּלָּה תִּתְּנוּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת בָּתִּים וְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי. מַאי לָאו בָּתֵּי עָרֵי חוֹמָה וְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי הַנִּמְכָּר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל? לָא, עֶבֶד עִבְרִי הַנִּמְכָּר לְנׇכְרִי.
Come and hear a baraita: “And in all of your ancestral land you shall grant redemption for the land” (Leviticus 25:24). The inclusive expression “in all” serves to include houses and a Hebrew slave. What, is it not correct to say that this includes houses of walled cities and a Hebrew slave sold to a Jew? The Gemara rejects this interpretation: No, one can say that this is referring to a Hebrew slave sold to a gentile.
עֶבֶד עִבְרִי הַנִּמְכָּר לְנׇכְרִי בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ: ״אוֹ דֹדוֹ אוֹ בֶן דֹּדוֹ יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״!
The Gemara asks: It is explicitly written with regard to a Hebrew slave sold to a gentile: “Either his uncle or his uncle’s son may redeem him” (Leviticus 25:49). If so, it is unnecessary to derive the option of redemption by a relative from an inclusive expression in a different verse.
הָהוּא לְקוֹבְעוֹ חוֹבָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.
The Gemara answers: That verse serves to establish that redeeming him is an obligation. And even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that there is no requirement to redeem land, this case is different, as it is proper to redeem him to prevent him from being assimilated by gentiles.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ ״יִגְאָלֶנּוּ״ שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים? לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל הַגְּאוּלּוֹת שֶׁנִּגְאָלוֹת כַּסֵּדֶר הַזֶּה. מַאי לָאו בָּתֵּי עָרֵי חוֹמָה וְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי הַנִּמְכָּר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל? לָא, בָּתֵּי חֲצֵרִים וּשְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה. בָּתֵּי חֲצֵרִים בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב בְּהוּ: ״עַל שְׂדֵה הָאָרֶץ יֵחָשֵׁב״! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לְקָרוֹב קָרוֹב קוֹדֵם.
Come and hear a proof from a baraita: What is the meaning when the verse states: “May redeem him,” “may redeem him,” and “may redeem him” (Leviticus 25:48–49), three times? This serves to include all redemptions, and that they are redeemed in this order. What, is it not correct to say that this inclusion is referring both to houses of walled cities and a Hebrew slave sold to a Jew, that they can be redeemed by relatives? The Gemara rejects this interpretation: No, it includes houses in open areas and an ancestral field. The Gemara asks: Concerning houses in open areas and an ancestral field, it is written explicitly: “Shall be reckoned with the field of the country” (Leviticus 25:31). Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This teaches that the closer of a relative one is to the seller, the earlier one is in the order of redeeming the house or the field. This is the context of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s statement.
וְהַנִּרְצָע נִקְנֶה בִּרְצִיעָה. דִּכְתִיב: ״וְרָצַע אֲדֹנָיו אֶת אׇזְנוֹ בַּמַּרְצֵעַ וְגוֹ׳״
§ The Gemara returns to the mishna, which teaches: And a Hebrew slave who is pierced after serving six years is acquired as a slave for a longer period through piercing his ear with an awl. The Gemara explains that this is as it is written: “And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall serve him forever” (Exodus 21:6).
וְקוֹנֶה אֶת עַצְמוֹ בַּיּוֹבֵל וּבְמִיתַת הָאָדוֹן. דִּכְתִיב: ״וַעֲבָדוֹ״ – וְלֹא אֶת הַבֵּן וְלֹא אֶת הַבַּת. ״לְעֹלָם״ – לְעוֹלָמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹבֵל.
The mishna further teaches that a pierced slave acquires himself through the advent of the Jubilee Year and through the master’s death. The Gemara explains that this is as it is written: “And he shall serve him forever” (Exodus 21:6). This term indicates that he serves only the master, but not the son and not the daughter. The term “forever” is referring to the forever represented by the Jubilee Year. The word “forever” does not mean for eternity, but refers to the end of the cycle of the Jubilee Year.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״מַרְצֵעַ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא מַרְצֵעַ, מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת הַסּוֹל וְהַסִּירָא וְהַמַּחַט וְהַמַּקְדֵּחַ וְהַמַּכְתֵּב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְלָקַחְתָּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁנִּקַּח בַּיָּד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
The Sages taught: From the term “an awl” I have derived only that a master can pierce the ear of a Hebrew slave with an awl. From where do I derive that a sharp thorn [sol], a thorn [sira], a needle, an auger, and a stylus used to engrave in wax may be used? The verse states: “And you shall take the awl” (Deuteronomy 15:17). This term “and you shall take” serves to include any implement that can be taken in the master’s hand. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: מָה מַרְצֵעַ מְיוּחָד שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת – אַף כֹּל שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת. דָּבָר אַחֵר: ״הַמַּרְצֵעַ״ – לְהָבִיא הַמַּרְצֵעַ הַגָּדוֹל.
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Not all of these utensils may be used for piercing. Just as an awl is unique in that it is made of metal, so too any tool made of metal can be used; one may not pierce a slave’s ear with non-metal implements. Alternatively, the verse states: “And you shall take the awl,” to include the large awl for piercing.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: יוּדָן בְּרִיבִּי הָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ: כְּשֶׁהֵן רוֹצְעִים אֵין רוֹצְעִים אֶלָּא בַּמִּילְתָא. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין עֶבֶד עִבְרִי כֹּהֵן נִרְצָע, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה בַּעַל מוּם. וְאִם תֹּאמַר: בְּמִילְּתָא הֵם רוֹצְעִים – הֵיאַךְ עֶבֶד עִבְרִי כֹּהֵן יֵעָשֶׂה בַּעַל מוּם? הָא אֵין נִרְצָע אֶלָּא בְּגוֹבַהּ שֶׁל אֹזֶן. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי?
Rabbi Elazar said: Yudan the Distinguished would teach as follows: When they pierce, they pierce only the earlobe. And the Rabbis say: The piercing is not performed on the earlobe, as the halakha is that a Hebrew slave who is a priest is not pierced at all because the piercing renders him blemished and unfit to serve in the Temple. And if you say that they pierce a slave’s earlobe, how does a Hebrew slave who is a priest become blemished through piercing? A pierced earlobe is not considered a blemish. This indicates that he is pierced only on the upper part of the ear through the cartilage. The Gemara inquires: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagree?
דְּרַבִּי דָּרֵישׁ כְּלָלֵי וּפְרָטֵי: ״וְלָקַחְתָּ״ – כָּלַל. ״מַרְצֵעַ״ – פָּרַט. ״בְּאׇזְנוֹ וּבַדֶּלֶת״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל. כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל, אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט. מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת, אַף כֹּל שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת.
The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi expounds the verses by means of the hermeneutical principle of reading the verse as consisting of generalizations and details. Accordingly, he maintains that the term “and you shall take” is a generalization that indicates piercing may be performed with any implement. “An awl” is a detail, and when the verse states: “Through his ear and into the door” (Deuteronomy 15:17), it then generalized again. When the verse writes a generalization and a detail and a generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail: Just as the explicit detail mentions an awl, which is made of metal, so too, any utensil used for piercing must be made of metal.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי דָּרֵישׁ רִיבּוּיֵי וּמִיעוּטֵי: ״וְלָקַחְתָּ״ – רִיבָּה. ״מַרְצֵעַ״ – מִיעֵט. ״בְּאׇזְנוֹ וּבַדֶּלֶת״ – חָזַר וְרִיבָּה. רִיבָּה וּמִיעֵט וְרִיבָּה, רִיבָּה הַכֹּל.
By contrast, Rabbi Yosei expounds the verses by means of the hermeneutical principle of reading the verse as consisting of amplifications and restrictions. Accordingly, he learns that the term “and you shall take” amplifies, i.e., it includes any item that can be taken in one’s hand. The term “an awl” restricts. When the verse states “through his ear and into the door,” it then amplifies again. When the verse amplifies, restricts, and amplifies, it has amplified the halakha to include everything except one item.
מַאי רַבִּי – רַבִּי כֹּל מִילֵּי, מַאי מַיעֵט – מַיעֵט סַם.
What has it amplified, i.e., included beyond an awl? It has amplified the category to include everything that can pierce an ear. What has it restricted from inclusion in the category? It excludes only the method that is most dissimilar to the use of an awl, which is a corrosive substance. Producing a hole in the slave’s ear with a substance of this kind is not a valid form of piercing.
אָמַר מָר: ״הַמַּרְצֵעַ״ – לְהָבִיא מַרְצֵעַ הַגָּדוֹל. מַאי מַשְׁמַע? כִּדְאָמַר רָבָא: ״הַיָּרֵךְ״ – הַמְיוּמֶּנֶת שֶׁבַּיָּרֵךְ, הָכָא נָמֵי: ״הַמַּרְצֵעַ״ – מְיוּחָד שֶׁבַּמַּרְצְעִין.
The Master said above: “The awl,” this serves to include the large awl for piercing. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this expression is referring to a large awl? The Gemara answers that this is as Rava said with regard to the verse: “The sinew of the thigh vein which is upon the hollow of the thigh” (Genesis 32:33), that this is referring to the most important [meyummenet] part of the thigh. The definite article indicates something clear and obvious. Here too, the term “the awl” is referring to a special awl.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, יוּדָן בְּרִיבִּי הָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ: כְּשֶׁהֵן רוֹצְעִין, אֵין רוֹצְעִין אֶלָּא בְּמִילְתָא, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין עֶבֶד עִבְרִי כֹּהֵן נִרְצָע מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה בַּעַל מוּם. וְיֵעָשֶׂה בַּעַל מוּם! אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב שֵׁילָא: אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְשָׁב אֶל מִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ״ – לְמוּחְזָק שֶׁבְּמִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ.
It was further stated in the above baraita that Rabbi Elazar said: Yudan the Distinguished would teach: When they pierce a slave they pierce only the earlobe. And the Rabbis say: A Hebrew slave who is a priest is not pierced at all, because piercing renders him blemished. The Gemara asks: And let him be pierced and be rendered blemished and disqualified for Temple service. Why is it prohibited to do this? Rabba bar Rav Sheila says: The verse states concerning a Hebrew slave at the end of his servitude: “And he shall return to his own family” (Leviticus 25:41), i.e., to his status in his family. He must be able to return to the position he had as a member of his family. If he was rendered a blemished priest while a slave, once he is emancipated he can no longer return to his status as a priest who can perform the Temple service.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: עֶבֶד עִבְרִי כֹּהֵן, מַהוּ שֶׁיִּמְסוֹר לוֹ רַבּוֹ שִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית? חִידּוּשׁ הוּא, לָא שְׁנָא כֹּהֲנִים וְלָא שְׁנָא יִשְׂרָאֵל,
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a Hebrew slave who is a priest, what is the halakha concerning the permissibility for his master to provide him with a Canaanite maidservant with whom to engage in sexual intercourse? The Gemara analyzes the two sides of the dilemma: Does one say that the halakha permitting a Hebrew slave to engage in intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant is a halakhic novelty, as a Jew is generally prohibited from engaging in intercourse with a gentile, and in light of this novelty, it is no different in the case of priests and no different in the case of an Israelite?
אוֹ דִילְמָא: שָׁאנֵי כֹּהֲנִים הוֹאִיל וְרִיבָּה בָּהֶן הַכָּתוּב מִצְוֹת יְתֵירוֹת? רַב אָמַר: מוּתָּר, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אָסוּר.
Or perhaps the case of priests is different from Israelites, since the Torah includes additional mitzvot for them, which do not apply to all Jews. Therefore, it is prohibited for a priest to engage in sexual intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant, despite the fact she is permitted to a non-priest. The amora’im disagreed with regard to this issue. Rav said: It is permitted for the master to provide him with a Canaanite maidservant, and Shmuel said it is prohibited.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן לְרַב עָנָן: כִּי הֲוֵיתוּ בֵּי מָר שְׁמוּאֵל, בְּאִיסְקוּמְדְּרֵי אִיטַּלְּלִיתוּ? מַאי טַעְמָא לָא תֵּימְרוּ לֵיהּ מֵהָא: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין עֶבֶד עִבְרִי כֹּהֵן נִרְצָע מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה בַּעַל מוּם.
Rav Naḥman said to Rav Anan: When you were studying in the house of Mar Shmuel did you play with tokens [iskumadri]? Didn’t you take your studies seriously? What is the reason that you do not say a proof to him from that which we learned: And the Rabbis say: A Hebrew slave who is a priest is not pierced at all because piercing renders him blemished.
וְאִם תֹּאמַר אֵין רַבּוֹ מוֹסֵר לוֹ שִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית, תִּיפּוֹק לִי דְּבָעֵינָא: ״אָהַבְתִּי אֶת אֲדֹנִי אֶת אִשְׁתִּי וְאֶת בָּנָי״ וְלֵיכָּא, תּוּ לָא מִידִּי.
Rav Naḥman explains the proof: And if you say that if his master cannot provide him with a Canaanite maidservant, it is not even relevant to suggest that a slave of priestly lineage could be pierced, as the fact that he cannot be pierced could be derived from another point, as I require the slave to say: “I love my master, my wife, and my children” (Exodus 21:5), and that declaration cannot be issued by a priest if his master may not provide him with a Canaanite maidservant. And nothing more can be answered to this proof. The reason given by the Rabbis proves that a Canaanite maidservant can be provided even to a priest.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: כֹּהֵן, מַהוּ בִּיפַת תּוֹאַר? חִידּוּשׁ הוּא, לָא שְׁנָא כֹּהֵן וְלָא שְׁנָא יִשְׂרָאֵל, אוֹ דִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי כֹּהֲנִים, הוֹאִיל וְרִיבָּה בָּהֶן מִצְוֹת יְתֵרוֹת? רַב אָמַר: מוּתָּר, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אָסוּר.
Similarly, a dilemma was raised before them: What is the halakha with regard to the permissibility for a priest who goes to war to engage in intercourse with a beautiful woman captured in that war? Does one say that the case of a beautiful woman is a novelty in that the Torah permits a man to engage in intercourse with a gentile woman? Consequently, it is no different in the case of a priest and no different in the case of an Israelite, as both are permitted to engage in intercourse with this woman. Or perhaps the case of priests is different, since the Torah includes additional mitzvot for them? Rav said: It is permitted, and Shmuel said: It is prohibited.
בְּבִיאָה רִאשׁוֹנָה דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי, דְּלֹא דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא כְּנֶגֶד יֵצֶר הָרָע.
The Gemara comments: With regard to the first act of sexual intercourse between the soldier priest and the gentile woman, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as the Torah spoke only in response to the evil inclination, and the evil inclination of a priest is as strong as that of an Israelite. This passage serves to prevent intercourse performed in a prohibited manner, which is relevant to a priest as well.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּבִיאָה שְׁנִיָּה, רַב אָמַר: מוּתָּר, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אָסוּר. רַב אָמַר: מוּתָּר, הוֹאִיל וְאִישְׁתְּרַיא – אִישְׁתְּרַי. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אָסוּר, דְּהָא הָוְיָא לַהּ גִּיּוֹרֶת, וְגִיּוֹרֶת לְכֹהֵן לָא חַזְיָא.
When they disagree it is with regard to the second act of sexual intercourse. Is a priest permitted to bring the captive into his house, convert her, and marry her? Rav said it is permitted, and Shmuel said it is prohibited. Their reasoning is as follows: Rav said it is permitted: Since she was permitted to him once, she remains permitted to him. And Shmuel said it is prohibited, as ultimately she is a convert, and a convert is not fit to marry a priest.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בְּבִיאָה שְׁנִיָּה כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דַּאֲסִירָא, דְּהָוְיָא לַהּ גִּיּוֹרֶת. כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּבִיאָה רִאשׁוֹנָה, רַב אָמַר: מוּתָּר, דְּהָא לֹא דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא כְּנֶגֶד יֵצֶר הָרָע, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אָסוּר, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּקָרֵינָא בַּיהּ: ״וַהֲבֵאתָהּ אֶל תּוֹךְ בֵּיתֶךָ״ – קָרֵינָא בַּיהּ: ״וְרָאִיתָ בַּשִּׁבְיָה״. כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּלָא קָרֵינָא בַּיהּ: ״וַהֲבֵאתָהּ אֶל תּוֹךְ בֵּיתֶךָ״ – לָא קָרֵינָא בַּיהּ: ״וְרָאִיתָ בַּשִּׁבְיָה״.
There are those who say a different version of this dispute. With regard to the second act of intercourse everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as she is a convert, and a priest may not marry a convert. When they disagree it is with regard to the first act of intercourse. Rav said it is permitted, as the Torah spoke only in response to the evil inclination. And Shmuel said it is prohibited, as any situation that one can read with regard to it: “Then you shall bring her home to your house” (Deuteronomy 21:12), one can also read and fulfill with regard to the earlier command of: “And see among the captives a beautiful woman, and you have a desire for her, and would take her to you as a wife” (Deuteronomy 21:11). Conversely, any situation that one cannot read with regard to it: “Then you shall bring her home to your house,” i.e., if the soldier may not marry her, one does not read with regard to it: “And sees among the captives,” and one may not engage in sexual intercourse with her.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְרָאִיתָ בַּשִּׁבְיָה״ – בִּשְׁעַת שִׁבְיָהּ. ״אֵשֶׁת״ – וַאֲפִילּוּ אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ. ״יְפַת תּוֹאַר״ – לֹא דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא כְּנֶגֶד יֵצֶר הָרָע. מוּטָב שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּשַׂר
The Sages taught: With regard to a beautiful captive, the verse states: “And sees among the captives,” teaching that this halakha applies only if he notices her when she is a captive. The expression “a woman” teaches that she is permitted even if she is a married woman. The phrase “a beautiful woman” indicates that the Torah here spoke only in response to the evil inclination, as it is due to her beauty that he desired her. And why does the Torah permit this? It is preferable for Jews to eat the meat
