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Today's Daf Yomi

March 15, 2016 | 讛壮 讘讗讚专 讘壮 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Kiddushin 4

From where do we derive that a man can marry a woman through money and that if she is a minor or a na’ara the money goes to her father?聽 This discussion continues from yesterday’s daf as conclusive proofs are now brought and examined in light of other sources.

Study Guide Kiddushin 4


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讬爪讬讗讛 讚讻讜讜转讛 拽讗 诪诪注讟

it excludes a departure that is like it, i.e., a departure wherein the two masters are the potential recipients. Just as when no money is paid, the individual who might have received the payment is her master, so too, when money is paid, in a different set of circumstances, the money goes to the one who has authority over her, i.e., her father.

讜讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讛讗讬 讬爪讬讗讛 诇讛讗讬 讬爪讬讗讛 讛转诐 谞驻拽讗 诇讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讚讜谉 诇讙诪专讬 讜讛讻讗 讗讻转讬 诪讬讞住专讗 诪住讬专讛 诇讞讜驻讛 讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬诐 诪讬讛讗 谞驻拽讗 诇讛 诪专砖讜转讬讛 讚转谞谉 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 讗讘讬讛 讜讘注诇讛 诪驻讬专讬谉 谞讚专讬讛

The Gemara asks: But this departure is not similar to that departure, as there, she leaves the authority of the master entirely upon being freed and she no longer retains any connection to him, and here, she still lacks the act of passing her over to the wedding canopy. Until she actually enters the wedding canopy, she has not left her father鈥檚 authority completely. The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a similarity between her departures in both cases, as she leaves her father鈥檚 authority at least as far as the nullification of vows is concerned. As we learned in a mishna (Nedarim 66b): With regard to a betrothed young woman, her father and her husband together nullify her vows, and her father cannot nullify them alone.

讜讛讗讬 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 诇讛讻讬 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讛讗 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讗诇讜 讬诪讬 讘讙专讜转 讗讬谉 讻住祝 讗诇讜 讬诪讬 谞注专讜转

The Gemara asks: But does this verse: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing鈥 (Exodus 21:11), come for that purpose, to teach that there is no money for this master, but there is money for a different master? But it is required for that which is taught in the following baraita. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing, without money鈥 should be understood as follows: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing鈥; these words are referring to the days of adulthood, i.e., a Hebrew maidservant leaves her owner鈥檚 authority once she becomes an adult. 鈥淲ithout money [ein kasef ]鈥; these words are referring to the days of her youth, i.e., when she becomes a young woman she leaves his authority.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讗诐 讻谉 诇讬诪讗 拽专讗 讗谉 讻住祝 诪讗讬 讗讬谉 讻住祝 讗讬谉 讻住祝 诇讗讚讜谉 讝讛 讗讘诇 讬砖 讻住祝 诇讗讚讜谉 讗讞专 讜诪讗谉 谞讬讛讜 讗讘

Ravina said: If so, that the verse is to be used only for this derivation, let the verse say: En kasef, without the letter yod. What is indicated by the full spelling with a yod: Ein kasef? This serves to teach the halakha stated above: There is no money for this master, but there is money for a different master. And who is he? He is her father, who has a right to receive the money when his daughter leaves his authority upon her betrothal.

讜诪诪讗讬 讚讚专砖讬谞谉 讛讻讬 讚转谞讬讗 讜讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛

The Gemara explains: And from where is it derived that one interprets the verse homiletically in this manner? How is it known that the full form of the word ein teaches a halakha? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the daughter of a priest who married a non-priest and was subsequently widowed or divorced: 鈥淎nd she has no child, and is returned to her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father鈥檚 bread鈥 (Leviticus 22:13). This verse indicates that if she has no children from her non-priest husband she may once again partake of teruma.

讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讝专注讛 讝专注 讝专注讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 注讬讬谉 诇讛 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讝专注 讻砖专 讝专注 驻住讜诇 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 注讬讬谉 诇讛

I have derived only that this halakha applies to her actual children. From where do I derive that her children鈥檚 children are equivalent to children with regard to this halakha? The verse states: 鈥淪he has no [ein lah] child,鈥 where ein is spelled with a yod inserted in the middle. This additional letter serves to enable an alternative articulation of the term, specifically, one examines her [ayyein lah] to see if she has any descendants. And I have derived only that this halakha applies to children of unflawed lineage, i.e., her legitimate offspring. From where do I derive that children of flawed lineage, e.g., mamzerim, are also considered her children for the purposes of this halakha? The verse states: 鈥淪he has no child,鈥 which indicates that one examines her, as explained above.

讜讛讗 讗驻讬拽转讬讛 诇讝专注 讝专注讛 讝专注 讝专注讛 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 讚讘谞讬 讘谞讬诐 讛专讬 讛谉 讻讘谞讬诐 讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 诇讝专注 驻住讜诇

With regard to the last derivation, the Gemara asks: But you have already derived one halakha from this word, that her children鈥檚 children are considered like her children in this case. The Gemara answers: In fact, a verse was not necessary to teach about her children鈥檚 children, as there is an established principle that children鈥檚 children are considered like children. And therefore, when the verse was necessary, it was to teach the requirement of examining her for children of unflawed lineage.

讜转谞讗 讙讜驻讬讛 诪谞诇讬讛 讚讚专讬砖 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬 讻转讬讘 诪讗谉 讘诇注诐 讜诪讗谉 讬讘诪讬 讚诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘讛讜 讬讜讚 讜讛讻讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讬讜讚 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讚专砖讗 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗

The Gemara asks: And the tanna himself, from where does he know that one can expound the yod in ein in this manner? The Gemara answers: They say in explanation that it is written: 鈥淏alaam refuses [me鈥檈n]鈥 (Numbers 22:14), and it is similarly written: 鈥淢y yavam refuses [me鈥檈n]鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:7), and in neither case is a yod written. And here the word ein is written with a yod. Learn from it that the yod is superfluous and comes for the sake of an exposition.

讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讻转讘 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 诇讗讘讬讛 讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讻转讘 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇讗讘讬讛 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 诇讗讘讬讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讟专讞讗 讘讛讜 讗讘诇 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讚拽讗 讟专讞讗 讘讛讜 讗讬诪讗 讚讬讚讛 讛讜讜

The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to write a verse that teaches that her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, belongs to her father, and it was necessary to write another verse that teaches that her earnings belong to her father, as one could not derive one halakha from the other. As, if the Merciful One had written only that her betrothal money belongs to her father, I would say that this is because she did not toil for it and therefore is not entitled to this sum. But with regard to her earnings, for which she toiled, say that they are hers. Therefore, it is necessary to state that her earnings also belong to her father.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讚拽讗 诪转讝谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讘诇 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 讚诪注诇诪讗 拽讗转讬 诇讛 讗讬诪讗 讚讬讚讛 讛讜讜 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if the verse had taught us only the halakha of her earnings, one would have said that they belong to her father because his daughter is sustained by him through his property. But with regard to her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, which comes to her from an external source, I would say that it is hers. Therefore, it is necessary for the verse to teach both halakhot.

讙讜驻讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讗诇讜 讬诪讬 讘讙专讜转 讗讬谉 讻住祝 讗诇讜 讬诪讬 谞注专讜转 讜诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 谞注专讜转 讜诇讗 讘注讬 讘讙专讜转

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: The baraita states with regard to a Hebrew maidservant: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing,鈥 these are the days of adulthood; 鈥渨ithout money,鈥 these are the days of her youth. The Gemara asks: And let the Merciful One write that she leaves her master when she reaches her youth, and it would not be necessary to state that she leaves upon reaching adulthood. If she has already left her master when she becomes a young woman, it is not necessary to state that she leaves him upon reaching adulthood.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘讗 讝讛 讜诇诪讚 注诇 讝讛

Rabba says: This phrase comes and teaches about that phrase. In other words, since it is not explicitly stated that this particular verse is referring to her departure when she becomes a young woman, if there was only one superfluous phrase one would conclude that it is referring to adulthood, as the halakha that she leaves the master when she becomes an adult is a lesser novelty. Therefore, two extraneous verses are required.

诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗转讜砖讘 讜砖讻讬专 讚转谞讬讗 转讜砖讘 讝讛 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 注讜诇诐 砖讻讬专 讝讛 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 砖谞讬诐

Rabba cites an analogous case. This is just as it is with regard to a tenant and a hired worker. As it is taught in a baraita concerning teruma: The verse states: 鈥淎 tenant of a priest or a hired worker shall not eat of the consecrated鈥 (Leviticus 22:10). 鈥淎 tenant鈥; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired as a permanent acquisition, i.e., one who said he wishes to stay with his master. This Hebrew slave has his ear pierced and he remains with his master until the Jubilee Year. 鈥淎 hired worker鈥; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired for an acquisition of six years,the standard period of servitude for a Hebrew slave.

讬讗诪专 转讜砖讘 讜诇讗 讬讗诪专 砖讻讬专 讜讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 砖谞讬诐 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The baraita asks: Let the verse say 鈥渢enant鈥 and let it not say 鈥渉ired worker,鈥 and I would say: If one who is acquired as a permanent acquisition does not partake of his owner鈥檚, i.e., the priest鈥檚, teruma, as despite his status as a Hebrew slave he is not considered his owner鈥檚 property, is it not all the more so that one who is acquired for an acquisition of six years should not be permitted to partake of teruma?

讗讬诇讜 讻谉 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 转讜砖讘 讝讛 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讘诇 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 注讜诇诐 讗讜讻诇 讘讗 砖讻讬专 讜诇讬诪讚 注诇 转讜砖讘 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇

The baraita answers: If so, that the verse were stated in this manner, I would say: 鈥淎 tenant鈥; this is one who was acquired for an acquisition of six years, as the term itself is ambiguous. But one who was acquired as a permanent acquisition may partake of teruma. Therefore, the term 鈥渉ired worker,鈥 which is certainly referring to one who is less permanent than a tenant, comes and teaches about the meaning of the term 鈥渢enant,鈥 that even if a Hebrew slave was acquired as a permanent acquisition he may not partake of teruma. A similar line of reasoning applies in the above case of a young woman and an adult.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 转专讬 讙讜驻讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讚讻讬 谞诪讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 转讜砖讘 谞专爪注 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讜讛讚专 讻转讘 讗讬讚讱 讛讜讛 砖讻讬专 诪讬诇转讗 讚讗转讬讗 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讬诇转讗 讚讗转讬讗 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讟专讞 讜讻转讘 诇讛 拽专讗

Abaye said to Rabba: Are these cases really comparable? There, the tenant and the hired worker are two bodies. This is significant, as even if the Merciful One had written explicitly that a pierced tenant may not partake of teruma, from which the halakha of a Hebrew slave for six years could have been inferred, and then the Merciful One wrote the other case of a Hebrew slave acquired temporarily, this would not present a serious difficulty. The reason is that, although the halakha of a hired worker is a matter that could be derived by means of an a fortiori inference, and therefore it does not have to be stated explicitly, there is a principle: Sometimes with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.

讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讞讚 讙讜驻讗 讛讬讗 讻讬 谞驻拽讗 诇讛 讘谞注专讜转 讘讙专讜转 诪讗讬 讘注讬讗 讙讘讬讛

But here, with regard to a woman, she is one body, i.e., it is the same Hebrew maidservant. Once she has left upon the arrival of her youth, what is she doing in his authority as an adult? It is entirely unnecessary for the verse to teach that she leaves her master upon becoming an adult, as she has already left him.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇讘讙专 讚讗讬诇讜谞讬转

Rather, Abaye rejects the previous suggestion that one verse teaches about the other, and said: The claim that the verse 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing鈥 is referring to adulthood is necessary only for the adulthood of a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children [ailonit]. An ailonit will never develop the physical signs of maturity, i.e., two pubic hairs. Consequently, she does not go through the halakhic stage of a young woman. Instead, she remains a minor until the age of twenty, at which point she immediately becomes an adult.

住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讘谞注专讜转 转讬驻讜拽 讘讘讙专讜转 诇讗 转讬驻讜拽 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Consequently, if the Torah did not teach that a Hebrew maidservant leaves her master upon becoming an adult, it might enter your mind to say: She leaves only when entering her youth, but when entering adulthood directly she does not leave. Since an ailonit is never classified as a young woman, she would never leave servitude. Therefore, the verse teaches us that a Hebrew maidservant leaves her master even if she reaches adulthood directly.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讜诇讗讜 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诪专砖讜转 讗讘 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诪专砖讜转 讗讚讜谉 讘讙专讜转 砖诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讘 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讚讜谉

Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this: But is it not an a fortiori inference? And if the signs indicating that a young woman has entered puberty do not fully release a young woman from her father鈥檚 authority, as he can still betroth her, nevertheless, they do release her from the master鈥檚 authority; is it not logical that adulthood, which completely releases her from her father鈥檚 authority, should release her from the master鈥檚 authority? If so, one can derive by this reasoning that an ailonit leaves her master in adulthood, which means the verse is unnecessary.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇注讬拽专 讝讘讬谞讗 讚讗讬诇讜谞讬转 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讚讗转讬讗 住讬诪谞讬 谞注专讜转 讛讜讬 讝讘讬谞讗 讚诇讗 讗转讬讗 住讬诪谞讬 谞注专讜转 诇讗 讛讜讬 讝讘讬谞讛 讝讘讬谞讗

Rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi says: This verse is necessary only with regard to the basic halakha of the sale of an ailonit as a Hebrew maidservant. As it might enter your mind to say that if a female will show the signs of a young woman, i.e., puberty, her sale is a valid sale, whereas in a case where she will not show the signs of a young woman, her sale is not a valid sale. The reason one might think this is the case is that if the maidservant turns out to be an ailonit, one cannot fulfill the requirements of the verse, as she will never become a young woman.

拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讻讜壮

Therefore the superfluous phrase: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing, without money鈥 (Exodus 21:11), teaches us that even an ailonit can be sold as a Hebrew maidservant and is released upon reaching adulthood.

讜诇诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讚讗诪专 讜诇讗讜 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讜讗 讛讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬诇转讗 讚讗转讬讗 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讟专讞 讜讻转讘 诇讛 拽专讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 诇砖谞讜讬讬 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇砖谞讜讬讬 诪砖谞讬谞谉

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi, who said: But is it not an a fortiori inference that adulthood releases a woman from her master鈥檚 authority, how does he respond to the fact that we say in general, with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly? The Gemara answers: That matter applies only where there is no other way to resolve the difficulty of why a halakha is written when it could be derived through an a fortiori inference. But when there is another, more substantial way to resolve the difficulty, one resolves it in that manner.

讜转谞讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讛讻讗 讚转谞讬讗 讻讬 讬拽讞 讗讬砖 讗砖讛 讜讘注诇讛 讜讛讬讛 讗诐 诇讗 转诪爪讗 讞谉 讘注讬谞讬讜 讻讬 诪爪讗 讘讛 讜讙讜壮 讗讬谉 拽讬讞讛 讗诇讗 讘讻住祝 讜讻谉 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 谞转转讬 讻住祝 讛砖讚讛 拽讞 诪诪谞讬

搂 The Gemara notes: And a tanna cites the halakha that a woman can be betrothed with money from here, a different source. As it is taught in a baraita that when the verse states: 鈥淲hen a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), in this verse, the term taking is only with money. And so it says: 鈥淚 will give money for the field; take it from me鈥 (Genesis 23:13).

讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 砖讗讬谞讛 谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 讝讜 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖转拽谞讛 讘讻住祝

The Gemara asks: But is there any need for this derivation? Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if a Hebrew maidservant, who cannot be acquired as a maidservant through intercourse, nevertheless can be acquired through money, is it not logical that this woman, who can be acquired through intercourse for the purpose of betrothal, can likewise be acquired through money?

讬讘诪讛 转讜讻讬讞 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 讜讗讬谞讛 谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 诪讛 诇讬讘诪讛 砖讻谉 讗讬谉 谞拽谞讬转 讘砖讟专 转讗诪专 讘讝讜 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘砖讟专

Nevertheless, this a fortiori inference can be refuted. A yevama proves otherwise, as she is acquired by the yavam through intercourse, and yet she cannot be acquired through money. The Gemara rejects this refutation: What is unique about a yevama is that she cannot be acquired through a document. Will you say that the same applies to this woman, who can be acquired through a document for the purpose of betrothal, and consequently the acquisition of money applies to her as well?

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讬 讬拽讞 讗讬砖 讛讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 讛讗 讗转讬讗 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 诪注讬拽专讗 讚讚讬谞讗 驻讬专讻讗

The Gemara reiterates its question. The verse states: 鈥淲hen a man takes a woman.鈥 Why do I need a verse for this purpose? It was already derived through this a fortiori inference, as the proposed refutation of this inference was rejected. Rav Ashi said: It is needed because one can say that the refutation of the a fortiori inference is present from the outset, i.e., there is a difficulty with the comparison between a woman and a Hebrew maidservant.

诪讛讬讻讗 拽讗 诪讬讬转讬转 诇讛 诪讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 诪讛 诇讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 砖讻谉 讬讜爪讗讛 讘讻住祝 转讗诪专 讘讝讜 砖讗讬谞讛 讬讜爪讗讛 讘讻住祝 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讬 讬拽讞 讗讬砖

Rav Ashi elaborates: From where do you derive that a woman can be betrothed with money? It is derived through an a fortiori inference from the case of a Hebrew maidservant. This derivation can be refuted. What is unique about a Hebrew maidservant is that she can be released with money, i.e., she pays her master her value as a maidservant and she is then freed, and therefore she can likewise be acquired through money. Will you say the same with regard to this woman, who cannot be released, i.e., divorced, through money? Since this a fortiori inference is rejected, one must rely on the source cited in the baraita, that the verse states: 鈥淲hen a man takes.鈥

讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讬讻转讘 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讬讻转讘 讻讬 讬拽讞 讗讬砖 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讻讬 讬拽讞 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚讬讛讘 诇讛 讘注诇 讚讬讚讛 讛讜讜 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐

After mentioning an additional proof for the option of betrothal with money, the Gemara comments: And it was necessary for the Torah to write, with regard to a Hebrew maidservant: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing,鈥 and it was also necessary to write: 鈥淲hen a man takes a woman.鈥 As, if the Merciful One had written only: 鈥淲hen he takes,鈥 I would say: The betrothal money that the husband gives her is invariably hers. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing,鈥 to teach that when she is not an adult her father has the right to her betrothal money.

讜讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讬讛讘讛 诇讬讛 讗讬讛讬 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讜拽讬讚砖转讜 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讻讬 讬拽讞 讜诇讗 讻讬 转拽讞

And conversely, had the Merciful One written only: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing,鈥 I would say that in a case where she gave him money and betrothed him, it is a valid betrothal, as this verse does not specify who gives the money to whom. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: 鈥淲hen he takes,鈥 and not: When she takes, to teach that only a man may betroth a woman, not vice versa.

讜讘注诇讛 诪诇诪讚 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讬讘诪讛 砖讗讬谉 谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 讝讜 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛

The baraita continues to interpret the verse. The phrase: 鈥淎nd engages in sexual intercourse with her鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), teaches that a woman can be acquired through intercourse. Why is it necessary for the verse to state this explicitly? Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: And if a yevama, who cannot be acquired through money, can be acquired through intercourse, is it not logical that this woman, who can be acquired through money, as derived above, can also be acquired through intercourse?

讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 转讜讻讬讞 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 讜讗讬谉 谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 诪讛 诇讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 砖讗讬谉 拽谞讬谞讛 诇砖讜诐 讗讬砖讜转 转讗诪专 讘讝讜 砖拽谞讬谞讛 诇砖讜诐 讗讬砖讜转

The Gemara counters: The case of a Hebrew maidservant proves otherwise, as she is acquired through money and yet she cannot be acquired through intercourse. The Gemara dismisses this refutation: What is distinct about a Hebrew maidservant is that her acquisition is not for the sake of marriage, as she is acquired as a servant. Will you say the same with regard to this woman, whose acquisition is for the sake of marriage? Therefore, it is logical that a woman can be acquired through sexual intercourse.

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讘注诇讛 讜诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 讛讗 讗转讬讗 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 诪注讬拽专讗 讚讚讬谞讗 驻讬专讻讗 诪讛讬讻讗 拽讗 诪讬讬转讬转 诇讛 诪讬讘诪讛

The Gemara reiterates its question. The verse states: 鈥淎nd engages in sexual intercourse with her.鈥 But why do I need a verse for this purpose? It was already derived through the above a fortiori inference. Rav Ashi said: It is needed because it is possible to say that the refutation of the a fortiori inference is present from the outset. From where do you derive that intercourse is a mode of acquisition? From the case of a yevama.

诪讛 诇讬讘诪讛 砖讻谉 讝拽讜拽讛 讜注讜诪讚转 转讗诪专 讘讝讜 砖讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽讛 讜注讜诪讚转 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讘注诇讛

One could say: What is unique about a yevama is that she is bound to the yavam and stands waiting for him to act, and for this reason sexual intercourse is sufficient to render her his wife. Will you say the same with regard to this woman, who is not bound and is not standing waiting for anyone? It is therefore possible that intercourse is not enough to acquire a woman in ordinary circumstances. Consequently, the a fortiori inference does not bear close scrutiny. For this reason an additional proof is required, that the verse states: 鈥淎nd engages in sexual intercourse with her.鈥

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Kiddushin 4

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Kiddushin 4

讬爪讬讗讛 讚讻讜讜转讛 拽讗 诪诪注讟

it excludes a departure that is like it, i.e., a departure wherein the two masters are the potential recipients. Just as when no money is paid, the individual who might have received the payment is her master, so too, when money is paid, in a different set of circumstances, the money goes to the one who has authority over her, i.e., her father.

讜讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讛讗讬 讬爪讬讗讛 诇讛讗讬 讬爪讬讗讛 讛转诐 谞驻拽讗 诇讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讚讜谉 诇讙诪专讬 讜讛讻讗 讗讻转讬 诪讬讞住专讗 诪住讬专讛 诇讞讜驻讛 讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬诐 诪讬讛讗 谞驻拽讗 诇讛 诪专砖讜转讬讛 讚转谞谉 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 讗讘讬讛 讜讘注诇讛 诪驻讬专讬谉 谞讚专讬讛

The Gemara asks: But this departure is not similar to that departure, as there, she leaves the authority of the master entirely upon being freed and she no longer retains any connection to him, and here, she still lacks the act of passing her over to the wedding canopy. Until she actually enters the wedding canopy, she has not left her father鈥檚 authority completely. The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a similarity between her departures in both cases, as she leaves her father鈥檚 authority at least as far as the nullification of vows is concerned. As we learned in a mishna (Nedarim 66b): With regard to a betrothed young woman, her father and her husband together nullify her vows, and her father cannot nullify them alone.

讜讛讗讬 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 诇讛讻讬 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讛讗 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讗诇讜 讬诪讬 讘讙专讜转 讗讬谉 讻住祝 讗诇讜 讬诪讬 谞注专讜转

The Gemara asks: But does this verse: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing鈥 (Exodus 21:11), come for that purpose, to teach that there is no money for this master, but there is money for a different master? But it is required for that which is taught in the following baraita. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing, without money鈥 should be understood as follows: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing鈥; these words are referring to the days of adulthood, i.e., a Hebrew maidservant leaves her owner鈥檚 authority once she becomes an adult. 鈥淲ithout money [ein kasef ]鈥; these words are referring to the days of her youth, i.e., when she becomes a young woman she leaves his authority.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讗诐 讻谉 诇讬诪讗 拽专讗 讗谉 讻住祝 诪讗讬 讗讬谉 讻住祝 讗讬谉 讻住祝 诇讗讚讜谉 讝讛 讗讘诇 讬砖 讻住祝 诇讗讚讜谉 讗讞专 讜诪讗谉 谞讬讛讜 讗讘

Ravina said: If so, that the verse is to be used only for this derivation, let the verse say: En kasef, without the letter yod. What is indicated by the full spelling with a yod: Ein kasef? This serves to teach the halakha stated above: There is no money for this master, but there is money for a different master. And who is he? He is her father, who has a right to receive the money when his daughter leaves his authority upon her betrothal.

讜诪诪讗讬 讚讚专砖讬谞谉 讛讻讬 讚转谞讬讗 讜讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛

The Gemara explains: And from where is it derived that one interprets the verse homiletically in this manner? How is it known that the full form of the word ein teaches a halakha? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the daughter of a priest who married a non-priest and was subsequently widowed or divorced: 鈥淎nd she has no child, and is returned to her father鈥檚 house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father鈥檚 bread鈥 (Leviticus 22:13). This verse indicates that if she has no children from her non-priest husband she may once again partake of teruma.

讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讝专注讛 讝专注 讝专注讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 注讬讬谉 诇讛 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讝专注 讻砖专 讝专注 驻住讜诇 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讝专注 讗讬谉 诇讛 注讬讬谉 诇讛

I have derived only that this halakha applies to her actual children. From where do I derive that her children鈥檚 children are equivalent to children with regard to this halakha? The verse states: 鈥淪he has no [ein lah] child,鈥 where ein is spelled with a yod inserted in the middle. This additional letter serves to enable an alternative articulation of the term, specifically, one examines her [ayyein lah] to see if she has any descendants. And I have derived only that this halakha applies to children of unflawed lineage, i.e., her legitimate offspring. From where do I derive that children of flawed lineage, e.g., mamzerim, are also considered her children for the purposes of this halakha? The verse states: 鈥淪he has no child,鈥 which indicates that one examines her, as explained above.

讜讛讗 讗驻讬拽转讬讛 诇讝专注 讝专注讛 讝专注 讝专注讛 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 讚讘谞讬 讘谞讬诐 讛专讬 讛谉 讻讘谞讬诐 讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 诇讝专注 驻住讜诇

With regard to the last derivation, the Gemara asks: But you have already derived one halakha from this word, that her children鈥檚 children are considered like her children in this case. The Gemara answers: In fact, a verse was not necessary to teach about her children鈥檚 children, as there is an established principle that children鈥檚 children are considered like children. And therefore, when the verse was necessary, it was to teach the requirement of examining her for children of unflawed lineage.

讜转谞讗 讙讜驻讬讛 诪谞诇讬讛 讚讚专讬砖 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬 讻转讬讘 诪讗谉 讘诇注诐 讜诪讗谉 讬讘诪讬 讚诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘讛讜 讬讜讚 讜讛讻讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讬讜讚 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讚专砖讗 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗

The Gemara asks: And the tanna himself, from where does he know that one can expound the yod in ein in this manner? The Gemara answers: They say in explanation that it is written: 鈥淏alaam refuses [me鈥檈n]鈥 (Numbers 22:14), and it is similarly written: 鈥淢y yavam refuses [me鈥檈n]鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:7), and in neither case is a yod written. And here the word ein is written with a yod. Learn from it that the yod is superfluous and comes for the sake of an exposition.

讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讻转讘 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 诇讗讘讬讛 讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讻转讘 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 诇讗讘讬讛 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 诇讗讘讬讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讟专讞讗 讘讛讜 讗讘诇 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讚拽讗 讟专讞讗 讘讛讜 讗讬诪讗 讚讬讚讛 讛讜讜

The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to write a verse that teaches that her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, belongs to her father, and it was necessary to write another verse that teaches that her earnings belong to her father, as one could not derive one halakha from the other. As, if the Merciful One had written only that her betrothal money belongs to her father, I would say that this is because she did not toil for it and therefore is not entitled to this sum. But with regard to her earnings, for which she toiled, say that they are hers. Therefore, it is necessary to state that her earnings also belong to her father.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讚拽讗 诪转讝谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讘诇 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 讚诪注诇诪讗 拽讗转讬 诇讛 讗讬诪讗 讚讬讚讛 讛讜讜 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if the verse had taught us only the halakha of her earnings, one would have said that they belong to her father because his daughter is sustained by him through his property. But with regard to her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, which comes to her from an external source, I would say that it is hers. Therefore, it is necessary for the verse to teach both halakhot.

讙讜驻讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讗诇讜 讬诪讬 讘讙专讜转 讗讬谉 讻住祝 讗诇讜 讬诪讬 谞注专讜转 讜诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 谞注专讜转 讜诇讗 讘注讬 讘讙专讜转

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: The baraita states with regard to a Hebrew maidservant: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing,鈥 these are the days of adulthood; 鈥渨ithout money,鈥 these are the days of her youth. The Gemara asks: And let the Merciful One write that she leaves her master when she reaches her youth, and it would not be necessary to state that she leaves upon reaching adulthood. If she has already left her master when she becomes a young woman, it is not necessary to state that she leaves him upon reaching adulthood.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘讗 讝讛 讜诇诪讚 注诇 讝讛

Rabba says: This phrase comes and teaches about that phrase. In other words, since it is not explicitly stated that this particular verse is referring to her departure when she becomes a young woman, if there was only one superfluous phrase one would conclude that it is referring to adulthood, as the halakha that she leaves the master when she becomes an adult is a lesser novelty. Therefore, two extraneous verses are required.

诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗转讜砖讘 讜砖讻讬专 讚转谞讬讗 转讜砖讘 讝讛 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 注讜诇诐 砖讻讬专 讝讛 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 砖谞讬诐

Rabba cites an analogous case. This is just as it is with regard to a tenant and a hired worker. As it is taught in a baraita concerning teruma: The verse states: 鈥淎 tenant of a priest or a hired worker shall not eat of the consecrated鈥 (Leviticus 22:10). 鈥淎 tenant鈥; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired as a permanent acquisition, i.e., one who said he wishes to stay with his master. This Hebrew slave has his ear pierced and he remains with his master until the Jubilee Year. 鈥淎 hired worker鈥; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired for an acquisition of six years,the standard period of servitude for a Hebrew slave.

讬讗诪专 转讜砖讘 讜诇讗 讬讗诪专 砖讻讬专 讜讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 砖谞讬诐 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The baraita asks: Let the verse say 鈥渢enant鈥 and let it not say 鈥渉ired worker,鈥 and I would say: If one who is acquired as a permanent acquisition does not partake of his owner鈥檚, i.e., the priest鈥檚, teruma, as despite his status as a Hebrew slave he is not considered his owner鈥檚 property, is it not all the more so that one who is acquired for an acquisition of six years should not be permitted to partake of teruma?

讗讬诇讜 讻谉 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 转讜砖讘 讝讛 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讘诇 拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 注讜诇诐 讗讜讻诇 讘讗 砖讻讬专 讜诇讬诪讚 注诇 转讜砖讘 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖拽谞讜讬 拽谞讬谉 注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇

The baraita answers: If so, that the verse were stated in this manner, I would say: 鈥淎 tenant鈥; this is one who was acquired for an acquisition of six years, as the term itself is ambiguous. But one who was acquired as a permanent acquisition may partake of teruma. Therefore, the term 鈥渉ired worker,鈥 which is certainly referring to one who is less permanent than a tenant, comes and teaches about the meaning of the term 鈥渢enant,鈥 that even if a Hebrew slave was acquired as a permanent acquisition he may not partake of teruma. A similar line of reasoning applies in the above case of a young woman and an adult.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 转专讬 讙讜驻讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讚讻讬 谞诪讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 转讜砖讘 谞专爪注 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讜讛讚专 讻转讘 讗讬讚讱 讛讜讛 砖讻讬专 诪讬诇转讗 讚讗转讬讗 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讬诇转讗 讚讗转讬讗 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讟专讞 讜讻转讘 诇讛 拽专讗

Abaye said to Rabba: Are these cases really comparable? There, the tenant and the hired worker are two bodies. This is significant, as even if the Merciful One had written explicitly that a pierced tenant may not partake of teruma, from which the halakha of a Hebrew slave for six years could have been inferred, and then the Merciful One wrote the other case of a Hebrew slave acquired temporarily, this would not present a serious difficulty. The reason is that, although the halakha of a hired worker is a matter that could be derived by means of an a fortiori inference, and therefore it does not have to be stated explicitly, there is a principle: Sometimes with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.

讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讞讚 讙讜驻讗 讛讬讗 讻讬 谞驻拽讗 诇讛 讘谞注专讜转 讘讙专讜转 诪讗讬 讘注讬讗 讙讘讬讛

But here, with regard to a woman, she is one body, i.e., it is the same Hebrew maidservant. Once she has left upon the arrival of her youth, what is she doing in his authority as an adult? It is entirely unnecessary for the verse to teach that she leaves her master upon becoming an adult, as she has already left him.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇讘讙专 讚讗讬诇讜谞讬转

Rather, Abaye rejects the previous suggestion that one verse teaches about the other, and said: The claim that the verse 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing鈥 is referring to adulthood is necessary only for the adulthood of a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children [ailonit]. An ailonit will never develop the physical signs of maturity, i.e., two pubic hairs. Consequently, she does not go through the halakhic stage of a young woman. Instead, she remains a minor until the age of twenty, at which point she immediately becomes an adult.

住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讘谞注专讜转 转讬驻讜拽 讘讘讙专讜转 诇讗 转讬驻讜拽 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Consequently, if the Torah did not teach that a Hebrew maidservant leaves her master upon becoming an adult, it might enter your mind to say: She leaves only when entering her youth, but when entering adulthood directly she does not leave. Since an ailonit is never classified as a young woman, she would never leave servitude. Therefore, the verse teaches us that a Hebrew maidservant leaves her master even if she reaches adulthood directly.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讜诇讗讜 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诪专砖讜转 讗讘 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诪专砖讜转 讗讚讜谉 讘讙专讜转 砖诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讘 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讚讜谉

Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this: But is it not an a fortiori inference? And if the signs indicating that a young woman has entered puberty do not fully release a young woman from her father鈥檚 authority, as he can still betroth her, nevertheless, they do release her from the master鈥檚 authority; is it not logical that adulthood, which completely releases her from her father鈥檚 authority, should release her from the master鈥檚 authority? If so, one can derive by this reasoning that an ailonit leaves her master in adulthood, which means the verse is unnecessary.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇注讬拽专 讝讘讬谞讗 讚讗讬诇讜谞讬转 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讚讗转讬讗 住讬诪谞讬 谞注专讜转 讛讜讬 讝讘讬谞讗 讚诇讗 讗转讬讗 住讬诪谞讬 谞注专讜转 诇讗 讛讜讬 讝讘讬谞讛 讝讘讬谞讗

Rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi says: This verse is necessary only with regard to the basic halakha of the sale of an ailonit as a Hebrew maidservant. As it might enter your mind to say that if a female will show the signs of a young woman, i.e., puberty, her sale is a valid sale, whereas in a case where she will not show the signs of a young woman, her sale is not a valid sale. The reason one might think this is the case is that if the maidservant turns out to be an ailonit, one cannot fulfill the requirements of the verse, as she will never become a young woman.

拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讻讜壮

Therefore the superfluous phrase: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing, without money鈥 (Exodus 21:11), teaches us that even an ailonit can be sold as a Hebrew maidservant and is released upon reaching adulthood.

讜诇诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讚讗诪专 讜诇讗讜 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讜讗 讛讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬诇转讗 讚讗转讬讗 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讟专讞 讜讻转讘 诇讛 拽专讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 诇砖谞讜讬讬 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇砖谞讜讬讬 诪砖谞讬谞谉

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi, who said: But is it not an a fortiori inference that adulthood releases a woman from her master鈥檚 authority, how does he respond to the fact that we say in general, with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly? The Gemara answers: That matter applies only where there is no other way to resolve the difficulty of why a halakha is written when it could be derived through an a fortiori inference. But when there is another, more substantial way to resolve the difficulty, one resolves it in that manner.

讜转谞讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讛讻讗 讚转谞讬讗 讻讬 讬拽讞 讗讬砖 讗砖讛 讜讘注诇讛 讜讛讬讛 讗诐 诇讗 转诪爪讗 讞谉 讘注讬谞讬讜 讻讬 诪爪讗 讘讛 讜讙讜壮 讗讬谉 拽讬讞讛 讗诇讗 讘讻住祝 讜讻谉 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 谞转转讬 讻住祝 讛砖讚讛 拽讞 诪诪谞讬

搂 The Gemara notes: And a tanna cites the halakha that a woman can be betrothed with money from here, a different source. As it is taught in a baraita that when the verse states: 鈥淲hen a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), in this verse, the term taking is only with money. And so it says: 鈥淚 will give money for the field; take it from me鈥 (Genesis 23:13).

讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 砖讗讬谞讛 谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 讝讜 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖转拽谞讛 讘讻住祝

The Gemara asks: But is there any need for this derivation? Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if a Hebrew maidservant, who cannot be acquired as a maidservant through intercourse, nevertheless can be acquired through money, is it not logical that this woman, who can be acquired through intercourse for the purpose of betrothal, can likewise be acquired through money?

讬讘诪讛 转讜讻讬讞 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 讜讗讬谞讛 谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 诪讛 诇讬讘诪讛 砖讻谉 讗讬谉 谞拽谞讬转 讘砖讟专 转讗诪专 讘讝讜 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘砖讟专

Nevertheless, this a fortiori inference can be refuted. A yevama proves otherwise, as she is acquired by the yavam through intercourse, and yet she cannot be acquired through money. The Gemara rejects this refutation: What is unique about a yevama is that she cannot be acquired through a document. Will you say that the same applies to this woman, who can be acquired through a document for the purpose of betrothal, and consequently the acquisition of money applies to her as well?

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讬 讬拽讞 讗讬砖 讛讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 讛讗 讗转讬讗 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 诪注讬拽专讗 讚讚讬谞讗 驻讬专讻讗

The Gemara reiterates its question. The verse states: 鈥淲hen a man takes a woman.鈥 Why do I need a verse for this purpose? It was already derived through this a fortiori inference, as the proposed refutation of this inference was rejected. Rav Ashi said: It is needed because one can say that the refutation of the a fortiori inference is present from the outset, i.e., there is a difficulty with the comparison between a woman and a Hebrew maidservant.

诪讛讬讻讗 拽讗 诪讬讬转讬转 诇讛 诪讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 诪讛 诇讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 砖讻谉 讬讜爪讗讛 讘讻住祝 转讗诪专 讘讝讜 砖讗讬谞讛 讬讜爪讗讛 讘讻住祝 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讬 讬拽讞 讗讬砖

Rav Ashi elaborates: From where do you derive that a woman can be betrothed with money? It is derived through an a fortiori inference from the case of a Hebrew maidservant. This derivation can be refuted. What is unique about a Hebrew maidservant is that she can be released with money, i.e., she pays her master her value as a maidservant and she is then freed, and therefore she can likewise be acquired through money. Will you say the same with regard to this woman, who cannot be released, i.e., divorced, through money? Since this a fortiori inference is rejected, one must rely on the source cited in the baraita, that the verse states: 鈥淲hen a man takes.鈥

讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讬讻转讘 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讜讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讬讻转讘 讻讬 讬拽讞 讗讬砖 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讻讬 讬拽讞 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚讬讛讘 诇讛 讘注诇 讚讬讚讛 讛讜讜 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐

After mentioning an additional proof for the option of betrothal with money, the Gemara comments: And it was necessary for the Torah to write, with regard to a Hebrew maidservant: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing,鈥 and it was also necessary to write: 鈥淲hen a man takes a woman.鈥 As, if the Merciful One had written only: 鈥淲hen he takes,鈥 I would say: The betrothal money that the husband gives her is invariably hers. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing,鈥 to teach that when she is not an adult her father has the right to her betrothal money.

讜讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讞谞诐 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讬讛讘讛 诇讬讛 讗讬讛讬 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讜拽讬讚砖转讜 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讻讬 讬拽讞 讜诇讗 讻讬 转拽讞

And conversely, had the Merciful One written only: 鈥淭hen shall she go out for nothing,鈥 I would say that in a case where she gave him money and betrothed him, it is a valid betrothal, as this verse does not specify who gives the money to whom. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: 鈥淲hen he takes,鈥 and not: When she takes, to teach that only a man may betroth a woman, not vice versa.

讜讘注诇讛 诪诇诪讚 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讬讘诪讛 砖讗讬谉 谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 讝讜 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛

The baraita continues to interpret the verse. The phrase: 鈥淎nd engages in sexual intercourse with her鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), teaches that a woman can be acquired through intercourse. Why is it necessary for the verse to state this explicitly? Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: And if a yevama, who cannot be acquired through money, can be acquired through intercourse, is it not logical that this woman, who can be acquired through money, as derived above, can also be acquired through intercourse?

讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 转讜讻讬讞 砖谞拽谞讬转 讘讻住祝 讜讗讬谉 谞拽谞讬转 讘讘讬讗讛 诪讛 诇讗诪讛 讛注讘专讬讛 砖讗讬谉 拽谞讬谞讛 诇砖讜诐 讗讬砖讜转 转讗诪专 讘讝讜 砖拽谞讬谞讛 诇砖讜诐 讗讬砖讜转

The Gemara counters: The case of a Hebrew maidservant proves otherwise, as she is acquired through money and yet she cannot be acquired through intercourse. The Gemara dismisses this refutation: What is distinct about a Hebrew maidservant is that her acquisition is not for the sake of marriage, as she is acquired as a servant. Will you say the same with regard to this woman, whose acquisition is for the sake of marriage? Therefore, it is logical that a woman can be acquired through sexual intercourse.

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讘注诇讛 讜诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 讛讗 讗转讬讗 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 诪注讬拽专讗 讚讚讬谞讗 驻讬专讻讗 诪讛讬讻讗 拽讗 诪讬讬转讬转 诇讛 诪讬讘诪讛

The Gemara reiterates its question. The verse states: 鈥淎nd engages in sexual intercourse with her.鈥 But why do I need a verse for this purpose? It was already derived through the above a fortiori inference. Rav Ashi said: It is needed because it is possible to say that the refutation of the a fortiori inference is present from the outset. From where do you derive that intercourse is a mode of acquisition? From the case of a yevama.

诪讛 诇讬讘诪讛 砖讻谉 讝拽讜拽讛 讜注讜诪讚转 转讗诪专 讘讝讜 砖讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽讛 讜注讜诪讚转 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讘注诇讛

One could say: What is unique about a yevama is that she is bound to the yavam and stands waiting for him to act, and for this reason sexual intercourse is sufficient to render her his wife. Will you say the same with regard to this woman, who is not bound and is not standing waiting for anyone? It is therefore possible that intercourse is not enough to acquire a woman in ordinary circumstances. Consequently, the a fortiori inference does not bear close scrutiny. For this reason an additional proof is required, that the verse states: 鈥淎nd engages in sexual intercourse with her.鈥

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