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Today's Daf Yomi

September 25, 2023 | 讬壮 讘转砖专讬 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married

Kiddushin 43

Today’s daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in loving memory of Meir ben Aryeh Leib HaLevi, Marvin Stokar. “Although his title of Zaidy was an honorary one, he and (lehavdil bein chayim lechayim) Bubby Fran were – and continue to be – an important part of our family. His love of all learning and of Eretz Yisrael were surpassed only by his love and care for our dear Bubby Fran. May he continue to be a meilitz yosher for her and all of us!”

Why do we say that a person who sends a messenger to commit a sin is not punished, but the messenger is? Even though there are some cases where the messenger is liable, we do not build a paradigm from those cases to learn about all other commandments 鈥 why not? Shamai the elder has a different approach. There are three different interpretations explaining his opinion. Can a messenger also function as a witness in a case where he was also the messenger? Rav and Rabbi Shila disagree. What is at the root of their debate? A question is raised against Rav鈥檚 position from a Beit Shamai/Beit Hillel debate but is resolved. The ruling is that the witnesses can function as witnesses. Rav Nachman rules this way in marriage, divorce, and monetary law. Why did each need to be specified? Why was he not concerned in monetary law that the witness is a party to the transaction? How did this change once the rabbis required a heiseit oath? Can a young woman (naara) accept a get for divorce or accept a marriage betrothal or only her father can? In what case is there a disagreement?

谞讬诇祝 诪讬谞讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诪注讬诇讛 讟讘讬讞讛 讜诪讻讬专讛 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讜讻诇 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诪注讬诇讛 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉 讟讘讬讞讛 讜诪讻讬专讛 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讟讘讞讜 讗讜 诪讻专讜 诪讛 诪讻讬专讛 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专 讗祝 讟讘讬讞讛 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专


let us derive a principle from misuse of consecrated property, that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not done, because misuse of consecrated property and the slaughter or sale of a stolen cow or sheep are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases. The Gemara clarifies: The verse pertaining to misuse of consecrated property is that which we said, but what is the verse with regard to slaughter or sale? The verse states: 鈥淎nd he slaughters it or sells it鈥 (Exodus 21:37), juxtaposing selling to slaughtering: Just as a sale is necessarily performed by means of another, since every transaction involves two parties, so too slaughter can likewise be performed by means of another, and the thief is liable even if the act of slaughtering is performed by his agent.


讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 转谞讗 讗讜 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛砖诇讬讞 讚讘讬 讞讝拽讬讛 转谞讗 转讞转 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛砖诇讬讞


The Gemara quotes two other explanations. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the word 鈥渙r鈥 in the verse 鈥渁nd he slaughters it or sells it,鈥 serves to include an agent. The school of 岣zkiyya taught: When the verse states with regard to sale or slaughter: 鈥淗e shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep鈥 (Exodus 21:37), repetition of the word 鈥渇or鈥 is superfluous and serves to include an agent. It teaches that the one who appointed the agent is liable for the action of the agent.


讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讙诇讬 专讞诪谞讗 讘砖讞讜讟讬 讞讜抓 讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诇讗讬砖 讛讛讜讗 讚诐 砖驻讱 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 砖诇讜讞讜


The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent that applies to other cases, but according to the one who said that two verses do teach a precedent, what can be said? Why not derive from the case of misuse of consecrated property and that of slaughter or sale that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression? The Gemara answers: The Merciful One reveals in the Torah that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression in the case of an offering slaughtered outside the Temple, as it states: 鈥淚t shall be considered blood for that [hahu] man; he has spilled blood鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). The emphasis of 鈥渢hat man鈥 teaches that he is liable for his actions, but he is not liable for the actions of his agent.


讗砖讻讞谉 讙讘讬 砖讞讜讟讬 讞讜抓 讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 诪谞诇谉 讚讬诇讬祝 诪砖讞讜讟讬 讞讜抓


The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression with regard to the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside. From where do we derive that this halakha applies to the entire Torah? The Gemara answers: It is derived as a principle from the case of offerings slaughtered outside, by means of analogy.


讗讚讬诇讬祝 诪砖讞讜讟讬 讞讜抓 谞讬诇讬祝 诪讛谞讱 讛讚专 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜谞讻专转 讛讗讬砖 讛讛讜讗 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇讙讜驻讜 转谞讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛


The Gemara asks: But before deriving that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression from the case of offerings slaughtered outside, let us derive the halakha from these other cases, i.e., misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale, where the halakha is that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One again writes in that same verse in connection to the prohibition of slaughtering offerings outside the Temple: 鈥淎nd that [hahu] man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). If the halakha derived from the emphasis of the word hahu written in this part of the verse is not needed for this matter itself, since the verse already taught that he is liable only for his own act and not for that of his agent, apply it to the matter of the entire Torah, so that one is held liable only for one鈥檚 own actions and not for those of an agent.


讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬诐 讛谞讬 讛讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诪讗讬 讚专讬砖 讘讛讜 讞讚 诇诪注讜讟讬 砖谞讬诐 砖讗讜讞讝讬诐 讘住讻讬谉 讜砖讜讞讟讬诐 讜讞讚 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 讗谞讜住 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 砖讜讙讙 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 诪讜讟注讛


The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent, and there is no reason to learn from the misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale that one can appoint an agent to perform a transgression, what does he interpret those terms: 鈥淭hat man鈥 and: 鈥淭hat man鈥 to be teaching? Since he does not need to counter a derivation from the two verses, he should not require them to teach that one cannot appoint an agent to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: One of them serves to exclude from liability the case of two who hold a knife and slaughter an offering outside together. And the other one emphasizes: 鈥淭hat man鈥 is liable, but not one who is compelled to slaughter the animal; 鈥渢hat man鈥 is liable, but not one who does so unwittingly; and 鈥渢hat man鈥 is liable, and not one who was mistaken, e.g., one who did not know that the animal was an offering. In order to be liable one must have acted with full awareness and completely willingly.


讜讗讬讚讱 诪讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 讜讗讬讚讱 讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讚专讬砖


The Gemara asks: And how does the other opinion, i.e., the one who holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, which derives from the word 鈥渢hat [hahu]鈥 that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression, derive these halakhot? The Gemara answers: He derives them from the fact that the pronoun 鈥hahu鈥 is composed of two parts, the article ha, meaning: The, and the pronoun hu, meaning: He. He derives halakhot both from 鈥hu and from the additional article in hahu.鈥 Therefore, he is able to derive both the principle that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression and the halakhot of two that slaughter and one who acts without full awareness. And the other opinion, i.e., the one who holds that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent, which derives these halakhot from the entire word 鈥hahu,鈥 does not interpret the variation from hu to hahu.鈥 He holds that one cannot derive separate halakhot from each part of this word.


讜讛讗 讚转谞讬 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 讛专讜讙 讗转 讛谞驻砖 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讜诇讞讬讜 驻讟讜专 砖诪讗讬 讛讝拽谉 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 讞讙讬 讛谞讘讬讗 砖讜诇讞讬讜 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讗诪专 讗转讜 讛专讙转 讘讞专讘 讘谞讬 注诪讜谉


The Gemara questions the statement that there is no agency for transgressions: But there is that which is taught in a baraita: One who says to his agent: Go kill a person, he, the killer, is liable if he kills, and the one who appointed him is exempt. Shammai the Elder says in the name of Haggai the prophet: The one who appointed him is liable, as it stated with regard to David, who directed Joab to kill Uriah: 鈥淗im you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon鈥 (II聽Samuel 12:9). David was held responsible for the death of Uriah.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚砖诪讗讬 讛讝拽谉 拽住讘专 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讚专讬砖 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚专讬砖 讜诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 讞讬讬讘 讘讚讬谞讬 砖诪讬诐


The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Shammai the Elder? How can he say that there is agency for transgression? The Gemara answers: He holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and therefore he learns from the two cases of misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale that there is agency for transgression. And as for the derivation from one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple, which teaches that there is no agent for transgression, Shammai does not interpret the variation from hu to hahu.鈥 And if you wish, say instead: Actually it is possible that he does interpret the variation, and he agrees that there is no agent for transgression. And what is the meaning of Shammai鈥檚 statement that the one who appoints him is liable? It means he is liable according to the laws of Heaven, although he cannot be punished by a human court.


诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讚讬谞讬 砖诪讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讗诇讗 讚讬谞讗 专讘讛 讜讚讬谞讗 讝讜讟讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜


The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that the first tanna holds that he is exempt even according to the laws of Heaven? The one who appointed him must bear some responsibility. Rather, the first tanna also agrees that the one who appointed the killer is liable according to the laws of Heaven, and the difference between them pertains to a great judgment and a small judgment. According to Shammai, his liability is great, to the extent that Heaven considers him fully responsible, whereas the first tanna holds that his liability is of a lesser degree.


讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讙诇讬 专讞诪谞讗 讗转讜 讛专讙转 讘讞专讘 讘谞讬 注诪讜谉


And if you wish, say instead: Everyone agrees that there is no agent for transgression. Nevertheless, Shammai holds that there, with regard to killing, it is different, since the Merciful One reveals: 鈥淗im you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon,鈥 explicitly rendering David accountable for this transgression and indicating that killing is different from all other transgressions.


讜讗讬讚讱 讛专讬 诇讱 讻讞专讘 讘谞讬 注诪讜谉 诪讛 讞专讘 讘谞讬 注诪讜谉 讗讬谉 讗转讛 谞注谞砖 注诇讬讜 讗祝 讗讜专讬讛 讛讞转讬 讗讬 讗转讛 谞注谞砖 注诇讬讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诪讜专讚 讘诪诇讻讜转 讛讜讛 讚拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讗讚谞讬 讬讜讗讘 讜注讘讚讬 讗讚谞讬 注诇 驻谞讬 讛砖讚讛 讞谞讬诐


And the other opinion, i.e., the first tanna, who holds that the one who appoints the killer is exempt, explains the verse as follows: Behold this killing is for you like the sword of Ammon. Just as you are not punished for those killed by the sword of Ammon in the course of the war, so too you are not punished for the death of Uriah the Hittite, not even according to the laws of Heaven. What is the reason for this? Uriah was a rebel against the monarchy and was consequently liable to the death penalty, as he said to King David: 鈥淎nd my lord Joab, and the servants of my lord, are encamped in the open field鈥 (II聽Samuel 11:11). By referring to Joab as his lord in front of the king, he indicated that he answered to Joab rather than to the king, which is tantamount to rebellion.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 住讘专 砖诪讗讬 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讚专讬砖 诪讜讚讛 讘讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 讘注讜诇 讗转 讛注专讜讛 讜讗讻讜诇 讗转 讛讞诇讘 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讜诇讞讬讜 驻讟讜专 砖诇讗 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诪转讞讬讬讘


Rava said: If you say that Shammai holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and he does not interpret the variation from hu to hahu,鈥 the combination of which would result in him holding that there is agency for transgression in all cases, even he concedes with regard to one who says to his agent: Go and engage in sexual intercourse with a forbidden relative, or: Go and eat forbidden fat, that the agent is liable and the one who appointed him is exempt, as we have not found in the entire Torah a case where this person physically benefits from the transgression but that one becomes liable.


讗讬转诪专 专讘 讗诪专 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖讬诇讗 讗诪专讬 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖讬诇讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讜讬 诇讬 注讚 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 拽讬讚砖 讗砖讛 讘驻谞讬 砖谞讬诐 讜诇讗 讗诪专 诇讛诐 讗转诐 注讚讬讬 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬


It was stated that amora鈥檌m engaged in a dispute concerning the following issue: Rav says: An agent can become a witness. If one was appointed as an agent to perform a certain task, he can then serve as a witness that the action was performed. In the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent cannot become a witness. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the school of Rabbi Sheila? If we say it is because the one who appointed him did not say to the agent: Be a witness for me, and appointed him only as an agent; if that is so, if one betrothed a woman in the presence of two people and did not say to them: You are my witnesses, so too would they hold that it is not a betrothal? It is not necessary to explicitly appoint witnesses.


讗诇讗 专讘 讗诪专 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讗诇讜诪讬 拽讗 诪讗诇讬诪谞讗 诇诪讬诇转讬讛 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖讬诇讗 讗诪专讬 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诪专 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻讙讜驻讬讛


Rather, the dispute is as follows. Rav says: An agent can become a witness, since we strengthen his words of testimony because he attests to a matter of which he is certain, as he is the one that performed the action. In the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent cannot become a witness. Since the Master said that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself, the agent is considered like the one who appointed him himself. Just as one cannot testify with regard to a matter that concerns himself, the same applies to one鈥檚 agent.


诪讬转讬讘讬 讗诪专 诇砖诇砖讛 爪讗讜 讜拽讚砖讜 诇讬 讛讗砖讛 讗讞讚 砖诇讬讞 讜砖谞讬诐 注讚讬诐 讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻讜诇诐 砖诇讜讞讬谉 讛谉 讜讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讗 讘砖诇砖讛 讗讘诇 讘砖谞讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诇讗


The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to the statement of Rav: If one said to three people: Go out and betroth the woman for me, then one of them is the agent for the betrothal and two of them serve as witnesses; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: They are all potential agents, and as an agent cannot become a witness none of them can be witnesses. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree only with regard to a case where one said this to three people. But with regard to two people, all agree that agents are not able to serve as witnesses.


讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 讻讬 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖诇讬讞 讜注讚 讗讞讚 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖诇讬讞 讜砖谞讬 注讚讬诐 讜专讘 讻讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讬驻讜讱 讜专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘讗 诪转谞讬 讗讬驻讻讗 专讘 讗诪专 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖讬诇讗 讗诪专讬 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讜讛讬诇讻转讗 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚


The Gemara answers: It was he, Rav, who said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, i.e., the version of Beit Shammai as presented by Rabbi Natan. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: Beit Shammai say that the agent and one witness are sufficient to carry out the agency and testify, and Beit Hillel say: The agent and two witnesses are needed. The Gemara questions this explanation: And would Rav rule in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions, so that it is Beit Hillel who said that the agent and one witness suffice. And Rav A岣, son of Rava, taught the dispute of the amora鈥檌m in the opposite manner. Rav says: An agent cannot become a witness, and in the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent can become a witness. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that an agent can become a witness.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 诇砖谞讬诐 爪讗讜 讜拽讚砖讜 诇讬 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讛谉 讛谉 砖诇讜讞讬讜 讛谉 讛谉 注讚讬讜 讜讻谉 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉


Rava says that Rav Na岣an says: It follows that if one said to two people: Go and betroth the woman for me, the very same people who are his agents for the betrothal are his witnesses. And a similar halakha is true with regard to divorce: If a man sent a bill of divorce to his wife with two people, they serve both as agents of delivery and as witnesses to the divorce.


讜讻谉 讘讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转


And a similar halakha applies with regard to cases of monetary law. If one appoints agents to perform a transaction for him, e.g., paying a debt to his creditor, they can testify that he has paid.


讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讚诇诪讬住专讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 谞讬讞讜砖 砖诪讗 注讬谞讬讜 谞转谉 讘讛


The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for Rav Na岣an to teach this halakha in each of these legal domains, as had he taught us this halakha only in the case of betrothal one could say that the agents can serve as witnesses because they are coming to render her forbidden to everyone else, and therefore there is no reason to suspect them of lying, as their testimony renders her forbidden to them as well. But with regard to divorce, we should be concerned that perhaps the agent cast his eyes upon her and is testifying falsely so that he can marry her.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬转转讗 诇讘讬 转专讬 诇讗 讞讝讬讗 讗讘诇 诪诪讜谞讗 讗讬诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬驻诇讙 驻诇讙讬 爪专讬讻讬


And had Rav Na岣an taught us this halakha only in the case of divorce, it could have been said that the agents are not suspected of lying because a woman is not fit for marrying two people, and since they testify as a pair there is no concern that they both might have designs upon her. But with regard to money, one might say that these two can divide it between them, and perhaps they never paid the debt but kept the money themselves. Therefore, all the examples are necessary.


诪讗讬 拽住讘专 讗讬 拽住讘专 讛诪诇讜讛 讞讘讬专讜 讘注讚讬诐 爪专讬讱 诇驻讜专注讜 讘注讚讬诐 讛谞讬 谞讜讙注讬诐 讘注讚讜转 谞讬谞讛讜 讚讗讬 讗诪专讬 诇讗 驻专注谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 驻专注讜谞讬


The Gemara asks: What does Rav Na岣an hold? If he holds that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the debtor must repay him in the presence of witnesses, then these agents are affected by their testimony. As, if they say: We did not repay him but returned the money to the one who appointed us, then the one who appointed them will say to them: Pay me back the money I gave you to repay the debt. The agents are considered as the debtors of the one who appointed them, as they took money from him. They would not be deemed credible to state that they returned the money to the one who appointed them, as they do not have witnesses that they did so. Consequently, they have a financial incentive to testify falsely that they fulfilled their agency and repaid the debt.


讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 拽住讘专 讛诪诇讜讛 讗转 讞讘讬专讜 讘注讚讬诐 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇驻讜专注讜 讘注讚讬诐 讜诪讙讜 讚讬讻诇讬 诇诪讬诪专 讗讛讚专讬谞讛讜 诇诇讜讛 讬讻讜诇讬谉 诇诪讬诪专 驻专注谞讬讛 诇诪诇讜讛


Rather, Rav Na岣an actually holds that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the debtor does not need to repay him in the presence of witnesses. And since the agents are able to say: We returned the money to the debtor, even without there being witnesses to substantiate their claim, they can also be deemed credible to say: We repaid the creditor, as they have no financial incentive to lie.


讜讛砖转讗 讚转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 砖讘讜注转 讛讬住转 诪砖转讘注讬 讛谞讬 注讚讬诐 讚讬讛讬讘谞讗 诇讬讛 讜诪砖转讘注 诪诇讜讛 讚诇讗 砖拽讬诇 诇讬讛 讜驻专注 诇讬讛 诇讜讛 诇诪诇讜讛


The Gemara comments: And now, since the time of Rav Na岣an, when the Sages instituted an oath of inducement, an oath instituted by the Sages in a case where a defendant completely denies a claim, these witnesses are affected by their testimony. If they were to claim that they returned the money to the one who appointed them, they would be required to take an oath of inducement to that effect. Consequently, they have an incentive to lie and claim that they fulfilled their agency and repaid the loan. Therefore, their testimony that they fulfilled their agency is not deemed credible. Instead, these witnesses take an oath in court that they gave the money to him, i.e., the lender, and the lender in turn takes an oath that he did not take the money owed to him, and then the debtor pays the lender his debt a second time, as the Sages ruled in similar cases.


讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 转谞谉 讛转诐 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 讛讬讗 讜讗讘讬讛 诪拽讘诇讬谉 讗转 讙讬讟讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬谉 砖转讬 讬讚讬诐 讝讜讻讜转 讻讗讞讚 讗诇讗 讗讘讬讛 诪拽讘诇 讗转 讙讬讟讛 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇讛 诇砖诪讜专 讗转 讙讬讟讛 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇讛 诇讛转讙专砖


搂 The mishna teaches that a man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman. We learned in a mishna there (Gittin 64b): With regard to a betrothed young woman, she and her father are each eligible to receive her bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda said: Two hands do not have the right to acquire an item on behalf of one person as one. If the young woman is able to acquire an item on her own, her father cannot receive her bill of divorce. Conversely, if she is not able to acquire an item on her own, only her father can receive the bill of divorce. Rather, her father alone receives her bill of divorce on her behalf. The mishna states another principle: And any female who is unable to safeguard her bill of divorce, either due to her young age or mental incompetence, is unable to be divorced, since a bill of divorce is effective only for one who understands the severing of ties that a divorce engenders.


讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讻诪讞诇讜拽转 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讗讘诇 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讘讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗


Reish Lakish says: Just as there is a dispute with regard to divorce, as to whether both a young woman and her father can accept her bill of divorce or only the father can do so, so too there is a dispute with regard to betrothal. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The dispute is with regard to divorce, but with regard to betrothal everyone agrees that her father has the right to accept it but not her.


讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚诪讻谞住转 注爪诪讛 诇专砖讜转 讗讘讬讛 讘讬谉 讛讬讗 讜讘讬谉 讗讘讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚诪驻拽注转 注爪诪讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讘讬讛 讗讘讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗


And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yo岣nan, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that there is a distinction between divorce and betrothal? In the case of divorce, when she brings herself back into her father鈥檚 authority by means of the bill of divorce, it is considered as though the father has obtained the bill of divorce via his daughter, and therefore either she or her father can receive it. In the case of betrothal, where she removes herself from her father鈥檚 authority, she cannot do this by herself. Consequently, only her father can accept the betrothal, but not her.


讜讛专讬 诪讗诪专 讚诪驻拽注转 注爪诪讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讘讬讛 讜转谞谉


The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 there the case of levirate betrothal, where the yevama removes herself from her father鈥檚 authority, and yet we learned in a baraita:


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Kiddushin 43

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Kiddushin 43

谞讬诇祝 诪讬谞讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诪注讬诇讛 讟讘讬讞讛 讜诪讻讬专讛 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讜讻诇 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诪注讬诇讛 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉 讟讘讬讞讛 讜诪讻讬专讛 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讟讘讞讜 讗讜 诪讻专讜 诪讛 诪讻讬专讛 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专 讗祝 讟讘讬讞讛 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专


let us derive a principle from misuse of consecrated property, that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not done, because misuse of consecrated property and the slaughter or sale of a stolen cow or sheep are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases. The Gemara clarifies: The verse pertaining to misuse of consecrated property is that which we said, but what is the verse with regard to slaughter or sale? The verse states: 鈥淎nd he slaughters it or sells it鈥 (Exodus 21:37), juxtaposing selling to slaughtering: Just as a sale is necessarily performed by means of another, since every transaction involves two parties, so too slaughter can likewise be performed by means of another, and the thief is liable even if the act of slaughtering is performed by his agent.


讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 转谞讗 讗讜 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛砖诇讬讞 讚讘讬 讞讝拽讬讛 转谞讗 转讞转 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛砖诇讬讞


The Gemara quotes two other explanations. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the word 鈥渙r鈥 in the verse 鈥渁nd he slaughters it or sells it,鈥 serves to include an agent. The school of 岣zkiyya taught: When the verse states with regard to sale or slaughter: 鈥淗e shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep鈥 (Exodus 21:37), repetition of the word 鈥渇or鈥 is superfluous and serves to include an agent. It teaches that the one who appointed the agent is liable for the action of the agent.


讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讙诇讬 专讞诪谞讗 讘砖讞讜讟讬 讞讜抓 讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诇讗讬砖 讛讛讜讗 讚诐 砖驻讱 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 砖诇讜讞讜


The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent that applies to other cases, but according to the one who said that two verses do teach a precedent, what can be said? Why not derive from the case of misuse of consecrated property and that of slaughter or sale that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression? The Gemara answers: The Merciful One reveals in the Torah that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression in the case of an offering slaughtered outside the Temple, as it states: 鈥淚t shall be considered blood for that [hahu] man; he has spilled blood鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). The emphasis of 鈥渢hat man鈥 teaches that he is liable for his actions, but he is not liable for the actions of his agent.


讗砖讻讞谉 讙讘讬 砖讞讜讟讬 讞讜抓 讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 诪谞诇谉 讚讬诇讬祝 诪砖讞讜讟讬 讞讜抓


The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression with regard to the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside. From where do we derive that this halakha applies to the entire Torah? The Gemara answers: It is derived as a principle from the case of offerings slaughtered outside, by means of analogy.


讗讚讬诇讬祝 诪砖讞讜讟讬 讞讜抓 谞讬诇讬祝 诪讛谞讱 讛讚专 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜谞讻专转 讛讗讬砖 讛讛讜讗 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇讙讜驻讜 转谞讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛


The Gemara asks: But before deriving that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression from the case of offerings slaughtered outside, let us derive the halakha from these other cases, i.e., misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale, where the halakha is that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One again writes in that same verse in connection to the prohibition of slaughtering offerings outside the Temple: 鈥淎nd that [hahu] man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). If the halakha derived from the emphasis of the word hahu written in this part of the verse is not needed for this matter itself, since the verse already taught that he is liable only for his own act and not for that of his agent, apply it to the matter of the entire Torah, so that one is held liable only for one鈥檚 own actions and not for those of an agent.


讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬诐 讛谞讬 讛讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诪讗讬 讚专讬砖 讘讛讜 讞讚 诇诪注讜讟讬 砖谞讬诐 砖讗讜讞讝讬诐 讘住讻讬谉 讜砖讜讞讟讬诐 讜讞讚 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 讗谞讜住 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 砖讜讙讙 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 诪讜讟注讛


The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent, and there is no reason to learn from the misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale that one can appoint an agent to perform a transgression, what does he interpret those terms: 鈥淭hat man鈥 and: 鈥淭hat man鈥 to be teaching? Since he does not need to counter a derivation from the two verses, he should not require them to teach that one cannot appoint an agent to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: One of them serves to exclude from liability the case of two who hold a knife and slaughter an offering outside together. And the other one emphasizes: 鈥淭hat man鈥 is liable, but not one who is compelled to slaughter the animal; 鈥渢hat man鈥 is liable, but not one who does so unwittingly; and 鈥渢hat man鈥 is liable, and not one who was mistaken, e.g., one who did not know that the animal was an offering. In order to be liable one must have acted with full awareness and completely willingly.


讜讗讬讚讱 诪讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 讜讗讬讚讱 讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讚专讬砖


The Gemara asks: And how does the other opinion, i.e., the one who holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, which derives from the word 鈥渢hat [hahu]鈥 that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression, derive these halakhot? The Gemara answers: He derives them from the fact that the pronoun 鈥hahu鈥 is composed of two parts, the article ha, meaning: The, and the pronoun hu, meaning: He. He derives halakhot both from 鈥hu and from the additional article in hahu.鈥 Therefore, he is able to derive both the principle that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression and the halakhot of two that slaughter and one who acts without full awareness. And the other opinion, i.e., the one who holds that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent, which derives these halakhot from the entire word 鈥hahu,鈥 does not interpret the variation from hu to hahu.鈥 He holds that one cannot derive separate halakhot from each part of this word.


讜讛讗 讚转谞讬 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 讛专讜讙 讗转 讛谞驻砖 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讜诇讞讬讜 驻讟讜专 砖诪讗讬 讛讝拽谉 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 讞讙讬 讛谞讘讬讗 砖讜诇讞讬讜 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讗诪专 讗转讜 讛专讙转 讘讞专讘 讘谞讬 注诪讜谉


The Gemara questions the statement that there is no agency for transgressions: But there is that which is taught in a baraita: One who says to his agent: Go kill a person, he, the killer, is liable if he kills, and the one who appointed him is exempt. Shammai the Elder says in the name of Haggai the prophet: The one who appointed him is liable, as it stated with regard to David, who directed Joab to kill Uriah: 鈥淗im you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon鈥 (II聽Samuel 12:9). David was held responsible for the death of Uriah.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚砖诪讗讬 讛讝拽谉 拽住讘专 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讚专讬砖 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚专讬砖 讜诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 讞讬讬讘 讘讚讬谞讬 砖诪讬诐


The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Shammai the Elder? How can he say that there is agency for transgression? The Gemara answers: He holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and therefore he learns from the two cases of misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale that there is agency for transgression. And as for the derivation from one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple, which teaches that there is no agent for transgression, Shammai does not interpret the variation from hu to hahu.鈥 And if you wish, say instead: Actually it is possible that he does interpret the variation, and he agrees that there is no agent for transgression. And what is the meaning of Shammai鈥檚 statement that the one who appoints him is liable? It means he is liable according to the laws of Heaven, although he cannot be punished by a human court.


诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讚讬谞讬 砖诪讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讗诇讗 讚讬谞讗 专讘讛 讜讚讬谞讗 讝讜讟讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜


The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that the first tanna holds that he is exempt even according to the laws of Heaven? The one who appointed him must bear some responsibility. Rather, the first tanna also agrees that the one who appointed the killer is liable according to the laws of Heaven, and the difference between them pertains to a great judgment and a small judgment. According to Shammai, his liability is great, to the extent that Heaven considers him fully responsible, whereas the first tanna holds that his liability is of a lesser degree.


讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讙诇讬 专讞诪谞讗 讗转讜 讛专讙转 讘讞专讘 讘谞讬 注诪讜谉


And if you wish, say instead: Everyone agrees that there is no agent for transgression. Nevertheless, Shammai holds that there, with regard to killing, it is different, since the Merciful One reveals: 鈥淗im you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon,鈥 explicitly rendering David accountable for this transgression and indicating that killing is different from all other transgressions.


讜讗讬讚讱 讛专讬 诇讱 讻讞专讘 讘谞讬 注诪讜谉 诪讛 讞专讘 讘谞讬 注诪讜谉 讗讬谉 讗转讛 谞注谞砖 注诇讬讜 讗祝 讗讜专讬讛 讛讞转讬 讗讬 讗转讛 谞注谞砖 注诇讬讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诪讜专讚 讘诪诇讻讜转 讛讜讛 讚拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讗讚谞讬 讬讜讗讘 讜注讘讚讬 讗讚谞讬 注诇 驻谞讬 讛砖讚讛 讞谞讬诐


And the other opinion, i.e., the first tanna, who holds that the one who appoints the killer is exempt, explains the verse as follows: Behold this killing is for you like the sword of Ammon. Just as you are not punished for those killed by the sword of Ammon in the course of the war, so too you are not punished for the death of Uriah the Hittite, not even according to the laws of Heaven. What is the reason for this? Uriah was a rebel against the monarchy and was consequently liable to the death penalty, as he said to King David: 鈥淎nd my lord Joab, and the servants of my lord, are encamped in the open field鈥 (II聽Samuel 11:11). By referring to Joab as his lord in front of the king, he indicated that he answered to Joab rather than to the king, which is tantamount to rebellion.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 住讘专 砖诪讗讬 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬诐 讻讗讞讚 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讚专讬砖 诪讜讚讛 讘讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 讘注讜诇 讗转 讛注专讜讛 讜讗讻讜诇 讗转 讛讞诇讘 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讜诇讞讬讜 驻讟讜专 砖诇讗 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诪转讞讬讬讘


Rava said: If you say that Shammai holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and he does not interpret the variation from hu to hahu,鈥 the combination of which would result in him holding that there is agency for transgression in all cases, even he concedes with regard to one who says to his agent: Go and engage in sexual intercourse with a forbidden relative, or: Go and eat forbidden fat, that the agent is liable and the one who appointed him is exempt, as we have not found in the entire Torah a case where this person physically benefits from the transgression but that one becomes liable.


讗讬转诪专 专讘 讗诪专 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖讬诇讗 讗诪专讬 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖讬诇讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讜讬 诇讬 注讚 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 拽讬讚砖 讗砖讛 讘驻谞讬 砖谞讬诐 讜诇讗 讗诪专 诇讛诐 讗转诐 注讚讬讬 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬


It was stated that amora鈥檌m engaged in a dispute concerning the following issue: Rav says: An agent can become a witness. If one was appointed as an agent to perform a certain task, he can then serve as a witness that the action was performed. In the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent cannot become a witness. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the school of Rabbi Sheila? If we say it is because the one who appointed him did not say to the agent: Be a witness for me, and appointed him only as an agent; if that is so, if one betrothed a woman in the presence of two people and did not say to them: You are my witnesses, so too would they hold that it is not a betrothal? It is not necessary to explicitly appoint witnesses.


讗诇讗 专讘 讗诪专 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讗诇讜诪讬 拽讗 诪讗诇讬诪谞讗 诇诪讬诇转讬讛 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖讬诇讗 讗诪专讬 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诪专 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻讙讜驻讬讛


Rather, the dispute is as follows. Rav says: An agent can become a witness, since we strengthen his words of testimony because he attests to a matter of which he is certain, as he is the one that performed the action. In the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent cannot become a witness. Since the Master said that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself, the agent is considered like the one who appointed him himself. Just as one cannot testify with regard to a matter that concerns himself, the same applies to one鈥檚 agent.


诪讬转讬讘讬 讗诪专 诇砖诇砖讛 爪讗讜 讜拽讚砖讜 诇讬 讛讗砖讛 讗讞讚 砖诇讬讞 讜砖谞讬诐 注讚讬诐 讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻讜诇诐 砖诇讜讞讬谉 讛谉 讜讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讗 讘砖诇砖讛 讗讘诇 讘砖谞讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诇讗


The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to the statement of Rav: If one said to three people: Go out and betroth the woman for me, then one of them is the agent for the betrothal and two of them serve as witnesses; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: They are all potential agents, and as an agent cannot become a witness none of them can be witnesses. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree only with regard to a case where one said this to three people. But with regard to two people, all agree that agents are not able to serve as witnesses.


讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 讻讬 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖诇讬讞 讜注讚 讗讞讚 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖诇讬讞 讜砖谞讬 注讚讬诐 讜专讘 讻讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讬驻讜讱 讜专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘讗 诪转谞讬 讗讬驻讻讗 专讘 讗诪专 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讚讘讬 专讘讬 砖讬诇讗 讗诪专讬 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚 讜讛讬诇讻转讗 砖诇讬讞 谞注砖讛 注讚


The Gemara answers: It was he, Rav, who said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, i.e., the version of Beit Shammai as presented by Rabbi Natan. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: Beit Shammai say that the agent and one witness are sufficient to carry out the agency and testify, and Beit Hillel say: The agent and two witnesses are needed. The Gemara questions this explanation: And would Rav rule in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions, so that it is Beit Hillel who said that the agent and one witness suffice. And Rav A岣, son of Rava, taught the dispute of the amora鈥檌m in the opposite manner. Rav says: An agent cannot become a witness, and in the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent can become a witness. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that an agent can become a witness.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 诇砖谞讬诐 爪讗讜 讜拽讚砖讜 诇讬 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讛谉 讛谉 砖诇讜讞讬讜 讛谉 讛谉 注讚讬讜 讜讻谉 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉


Rava says that Rav Na岣an says: It follows that if one said to two people: Go and betroth the woman for me, the very same people who are his agents for the betrothal are his witnesses. And a similar halakha is true with regard to divorce: If a man sent a bill of divorce to his wife with two people, they serve both as agents of delivery and as witnesses to the divorce.


讜讻谉 讘讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转


And a similar halakha applies with regard to cases of monetary law. If one appoints agents to perform a transaction for him, e.g., paying a debt to his creditor, they can testify that he has paid.


讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讚诇诪讬住专讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 谞讬讞讜砖 砖诪讗 注讬谞讬讜 谞转谉 讘讛


The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for Rav Na岣an to teach this halakha in each of these legal domains, as had he taught us this halakha only in the case of betrothal one could say that the agents can serve as witnesses because they are coming to render her forbidden to everyone else, and therefore there is no reason to suspect them of lying, as their testimony renders her forbidden to them as well. But with regard to divorce, we should be concerned that perhaps the agent cast his eyes upon her and is testifying falsely so that he can marry her.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬转转讗 诇讘讬 转专讬 诇讗 讞讝讬讗 讗讘诇 诪诪讜谞讗 讗讬诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬驻诇讙 驻诇讙讬 爪专讬讻讬


And had Rav Na岣an taught us this halakha only in the case of divorce, it could have been said that the agents are not suspected of lying because a woman is not fit for marrying two people, and since they testify as a pair there is no concern that they both might have designs upon her. But with regard to money, one might say that these two can divide it between them, and perhaps they never paid the debt but kept the money themselves. Therefore, all the examples are necessary.


诪讗讬 拽住讘专 讗讬 拽住讘专 讛诪诇讜讛 讞讘讬专讜 讘注讚讬诐 爪专讬讱 诇驻讜专注讜 讘注讚讬诐 讛谞讬 谞讜讙注讬诐 讘注讚讜转 谞讬谞讛讜 讚讗讬 讗诪专讬 诇讗 驻专注谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 驻专注讜谞讬


The Gemara asks: What does Rav Na岣an hold? If he holds that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the debtor must repay him in the presence of witnesses, then these agents are affected by their testimony. As, if they say: We did not repay him but returned the money to the one who appointed us, then the one who appointed them will say to them: Pay me back the money I gave you to repay the debt. The agents are considered as the debtors of the one who appointed them, as they took money from him. They would not be deemed credible to state that they returned the money to the one who appointed them, as they do not have witnesses that they did so. Consequently, they have a financial incentive to testify falsely that they fulfilled their agency and repaid the debt.


讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 拽住讘专 讛诪诇讜讛 讗转 讞讘讬专讜 讘注讚讬诐 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇驻讜专注讜 讘注讚讬诐 讜诪讙讜 讚讬讻诇讬 诇诪讬诪专 讗讛讚专讬谞讛讜 诇诇讜讛 讬讻讜诇讬谉 诇诪讬诪专 驻专注谞讬讛 诇诪诇讜讛


Rather, Rav Na岣an actually holds that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the debtor does not need to repay him in the presence of witnesses. And since the agents are able to say: We returned the money to the debtor, even without there being witnesses to substantiate their claim, they can also be deemed credible to say: We repaid the creditor, as they have no financial incentive to lie.


讜讛砖转讗 讚转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 砖讘讜注转 讛讬住转 诪砖转讘注讬 讛谞讬 注讚讬诐 讚讬讛讬讘谞讗 诇讬讛 讜诪砖转讘注 诪诇讜讛 讚诇讗 砖拽讬诇 诇讬讛 讜驻专注 诇讬讛 诇讜讛 诇诪诇讜讛


The Gemara comments: And now, since the time of Rav Na岣an, when the Sages instituted an oath of inducement, an oath instituted by the Sages in a case where a defendant completely denies a claim, these witnesses are affected by their testimony. If they were to claim that they returned the money to the one who appointed them, they would be required to take an oath of inducement to that effect. Consequently, they have an incentive to lie and claim that they fulfilled their agency and repaid the loan. Therefore, their testimony that they fulfilled their agency is not deemed credible. Instead, these witnesses take an oath in court that they gave the money to him, i.e., the lender, and the lender in turn takes an oath that he did not take the money owed to him, and then the debtor pays the lender his debt a second time, as the Sages ruled in similar cases.


讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 转谞谉 讛转诐 谞注专讛 讛诪讗讜专住讛 讛讬讗 讜讗讘讬讛 诪拽讘诇讬谉 讗转 讙讬讟讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬谉 砖转讬 讬讚讬诐 讝讜讻讜转 讻讗讞讚 讗诇讗 讗讘讬讛 诪拽讘诇 讗转 讙讬讟讛 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇讛 诇砖诪讜专 讗转 讙讬讟讛 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇讛 诇讛转讙专砖


搂 The mishna teaches that a man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman. We learned in a mishna there (Gittin 64b): With regard to a betrothed young woman, she and her father are each eligible to receive her bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda said: Two hands do not have the right to acquire an item on behalf of one person as one. If the young woman is able to acquire an item on her own, her father cannot receive her bill of divorce. Conversely, if she is not able to acquire an item on her own, only her father can receive the bill of divorce. Rather, her father alone receives her bill of divorce on her behalf. The mishna states another principle: And any female who is unable to safeguard her bill of divorce, either due to her young age or mental incompetence, is unable to be divorced, since a bill of divorce is effective only for one who understands the severing of ties that a divorce engenders.


讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讻诪讞诇讜拽转 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讗讘诇 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讘讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗


Reish Lakish says: Just as there is a dispute with regard to divorce, as to whether both a young woman and her father can accept her bill of divorce or only the father can do so, so too there is a dispute with regard to betrothal. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The dispute is with regard to divorce, but with regard to betrothal everyone agrees that her father has the right to accept it but not her.


讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚诪讻谞住转 注爪诪讛 诇专砖讜转 讗讘讬讛 讘讬谉 讛讬讗 讜讘讬谉 讗讘讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚诪驻拽注转 注爪诪讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讘讬讛 讗讘讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗


And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yo岣nan, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that there is a distinction between divorce and betrothal? In the case of divorce, when she brings herself back into her father鈥檚 authority by means of the bill of divorce, it is considered as though the father has obtained the bill of divorce via his daughter, and therefore either she or her father can receive it. In the case of betrothal, where she removes herself from her father鈥檚 authority, she cannot do this by herself. Consequently, only her father can accept the betrothal, but not her.


讜讛专讬 诪讗诪专 讚诪驻拽注转 注爪诪讛 诪专砖讜转 讗讘讬讛 讜转谞谉


The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 there the case of levirate betrothal, where the yevama removes herself from her father鈥檚 authority, and yet we learned in a baraita:


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