Kiddushin 49
גֵּט פָּשׁוּט, עֵדָיו מִתּוֹכוֹ. מְקוּשָּׁר, עֵדָיו מֵאֲחוֹרָיו. פָּשׁוּט שֶׁכָּתְבוּ עֵדָיו מֵאֲחוֹרָיו, וּמְקוּשָּׁר שֶׁכָּתְבוּ עֵדָיו מִתּוֹכוֹ – שְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִים. רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: מְקוּשָּׁר שֶׁכָּתְבוּ עֵדָיו מִתּוֹכוֹ – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁיָּכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ פָּשׁוּט. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַכֹּל כְּמִנְהַג הַמְּדִינָה.
In an ordinary document, its witnesses are to sign inside it, i.e., on the written side of the paper. In a folded and tied document, its witnesses are to sign on the back of it. With regard to an ordinary document whose witnesses wrote their signatures on the back of it, or a tied document whose witnesses wrote their signatures inside of it, both of these are not valid. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: A tied document whose witnesses wrote their signatures inside of it is valid, because one can transform it into an ordinary document by untying it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything is in accordance with regional custom. If an ordinary document is generally used and one wrote a bound one, or vice versa, the document is invalid.
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: וְתַנָּא קַמָּא לֵית לֵיהּ מִנְהַג הַמְּדִינָה? וְאָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: בְּאַתְרָא דִּנְהִיגִי בְּפָשׁוּט וַעֲבַד לֵיהּ מְקוּשָּׁר, אִי נָמֵי: בְּאַתְרָא דִּנְהִיגִי בִּמְקוּשָּׁר וַעֲבַד לֵיהּ פָּשׁוּט – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּוַדַּאי קְפִידָא.
And we discussed it: And does the first tanna not accept that one should follow the regional custom? It is not reasonable that he should take issue with such a basic concept. And Rav Ashi says that they have a dispute in a case where one instructed a scribe to write a document for him: If they are in a place where the custom is to write an ordinary document, and he made a tied one for him; alternatively, if they are in a place where the custom is to write a tied document, and he made an ordinary one for him; in both of these cases, everyone agrees that he was certainly particular in his instructions to the agent that he should follow the regional custom, and if the latter deviated from the custom the document is invalid.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי, בְּאַתְרָא דִּנְהִיגִי בֵּין בְּפָשׁוּט בֵּין בִּמְקוּשָּׁר, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״עֲבֵיד לִי פָּשׁוּט״, וַאֲזַל וַעֲבַד לֵיהּ מְקוּשָּׁר. מָר סָבַר: קְפֵידָא, וּמָר סָבַר: מַרְאֶה מָקוֹם הוּא לוֹ.
The situation in which they disagree is where they are in a place where the custom is to use either an ordinary document or a tied one, and the one requesting the document said to the scribe: Make an ordinary document for me, and the scribe went and made a tied document for him. In such a case, one Sage, the first tanna, holds that the one requesting the document was particular about wanting an ordinary document, and since the scribe wrote a tied document, it is considered to have been written without his consent. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the one requesting the document was merely indicating his position to the scribe, stating that if the scribe wanted to save himself the trouble of writing a tied document there would no objection.
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וְקִבֵּל לָהּ גִּיטָּהּ מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר – פָּסוּל, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַכְשִׁיר. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר: מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ.
Rabbi Elazar also holds that when one instructs an agent in such a manner he is merely indicating his position to him, as we learned in a mishna (Gittin 65a): If there was a woman who said to her agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me from my husband in such and such a place, and he received her bill of divorce for her elsewhere, it is invalid. And Rabbi Elazar deems it valid. Apparently, he holds that she is merely indicating a place to him where he can receive the bill of divorce, but she does not insist that he accept it in that particular spot.
אָמַר עוּלָּא: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּשֶׁבַח מָמוֹן, אֲבָל בְּשֶׁבַח יוּחֲסִין, דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מַאי טַעְמָא – ״מְסָאנָא דְּרַב מִכַּרְעַאי לָא בָּעֵינָא״. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, אִם הִטְעָהּ לִשְׁבַח יוּחֲסִים אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
§ Ulla says: The dispute in the mishna between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is only where he misled her with enhanced monetary value, i.e., he gave her something worth more than the item he had stipulated. But where he misled her with enhanced lineage, so that she was under the impression that his genealogy was less impressive than it in fact is, everyone agrees that she is not betrothed. What is the reason for this? A woman says: I do not desire a shoe that is larger than my foot. She does not wish to marry a man whose social standing is far greater than her own. This is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:6): Rabbi Shimon concedes that if he misled her with enhanced lineage, she is not betrothed.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא. דְּקָתָנֵי: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי כֹּהֵן״ וְנִמְצָא לֵוִי, ״לֵוִי״ וְנִמְצָא כֹּהֵן, נָתִין וְנִמְצָא מַמְזֵר, ״מַמְזֵר״ וְנִמְצָא נָתִין. וְלָא פְּלִיג רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
Rav Ashi says: The wording of the mishna is also precise, as the following mishna (49b) teaches: If one betroths a woman and states that the betrothal is: On the condition that I am a priest, and he was found to be a Levite; or: On the condition that I am a Levite, and he was found to be a priest; or: On the condition that I am a Gibeonite, a people prohibited by rabbinic law from marrying into the congregation, i.e., from marrying a Jew of fit lineage, and he was found to be a mamzer, who is prohibited by Torah law from marrying into the congregation; or: On the condition that I am a mamzer, and he was found to be a Gibeonite, in all of these cases she is not betrothed. And Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with these rulings. This indicates that if one misled a woman with regard to his lineage, Rabbi Shimon concedes that she is not betrothed.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: אֶלָּא דְּקָתָנֵי: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בַּת אוֹ שִׁפְחָה מְגוּדֶּלֶת״ וְאֵין לוֹ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ וְיֵשׁ לוֹ, דִּשְׁבַח מָמוֹן הוּא, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא פְּלִיג?!
Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this inference: But what about that which is taught in the same mishna: If one betroths a woman and states that the betrothal is: On the condition that I have a grown daughter or maidservant, and he does not have one; or if one betroths a woman on the condition that he does not have a grown daughter or maidservant and he does have one, the latter of which is an issue of enhanced monetary value, as the difference between one who has a maidservant and one who does not impacts how hard the woman will have to work in the home; in these cases will you also say that Rabbi Shimon does not disagree simply because the mishna does not mention his opinion in that case?
אֶלָּא פְּלִיג בְּרֵישָׁא וְהוּא הַדִּין לְסֵיפָא. הָכָא נָמֵי פְּלִיג בְּרֵישָׁא וְהוּא הַדִּין לְסֵיפָא.
Rather, it must be that he disagrees in the first clause of the mishna with regard to enhanced monetary value, and the same is true with regard to the latter clause, i.e., he also disagrees in that clause, and it was not necessary to state his dispute another time. Here too, with regard to lineage, he disagrees in the first clause, and the same is true with regard to the latter clause.
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? הָתָם, אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי דִּשְׁבַח מָמוֹן, פְּלִיג בְּרֵישָׁא וְהוּא הַדִּין בְּסֵיפָא. הָכָא, דִּשְׁבַח יוּחֲסִים הוּא, אִם אִיתָא דִּפְלִיג, נִתְנֵי!
The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, where both this case and that case involve an inaccuracy of enhanced monetary value, it is possible that he disagreed in the first clause and the same is true in the last clause, and the mishna did not need to restate his opinion. But here, where it is a case of enhanced lineage, which is a different issue, if it is so that Rabbi Shimon disagrees, let him teach that explicitly. The fact that no dispute is recorded in the case of enhanced lineage is proof that he concedes in that case.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָכָא נָמֵי שְׁבַח יוּחֲסִים, מִי סָבְרַתְּ מַאי מְגוּדֶּלֶת – גְּדוֹלָה מַמָּשׁ? מַאי מְגוּדֶּלֶת – גַּדֶּלֶת, דְּאָמְרָה הִיא: לָא נִיחָא לִי דְּשָׁקְלָה מִילֵּי מִינַּאי וְאָזְלָא נָדְיָא קַמֵּי שִׁיבָבוֹתַיי.
If you wish, say instead: Here too, the issue of a daughter or maidservant involves enhanced lineage, not enhanced monetary value. His statement should be understood differently. Do you maintain that what is the meaning of his statement that he has a grown daughter or maidservant; that she is actually grown up, so that she can be of help to his wife? That is not the meaning of his statement. Rather, what is the meaning of: Grown? That she grows and plaits hair, i.e., he has a daughter or maidservant who is a hairdresser. Why might the potential bride view this as a drawback? Because she can say: It is not satisfactory for me to live in the house with a hairdresser, as she will take words she hears from me and will go pass them before my neighbors, meaning she will gossip about me to others. This concern is more akin to a matter of lineage than a matter of monetary value.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי קַרְיָינָא״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁקָּרָא שְׁלֹשָׁה פְּסוּקִים בְּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר עַד שֶׁיִּקְרָא וִיתַרְגֵּם. יְתַרְגֵּם מִדַּעְתֵּיהּ?! וְהָתַנְיָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הַמְתַרְגֵּם פָּסוּק כְּצוּרָתוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה בַּדַּאי. וְהַמּוֹסִיף עָלָיו – הֲרֵי זֶה מְחָרֵף וּמְגַדֵּף. אֶלָּא מַאי תַּרְגּוּם – תַּרְגּוּם דִּידַן.
§ The Sages taught: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am literate with regard to the Torah, once he has read three verses in the synagogue she is betrothed. Rabbi Yehuda says that she is not betrothed until he reads and translates the verses. The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Yehuda mean that one translates according to his own understanding? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Megilla 3:21) that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who translates a verse literally is a liar, since he distorts the meaning of the text, and conversely, one who adds his own translation is tantamount to one who curses and blasphemes God? Rather, to which translation is Rabbi Yehuda referring? He is referring to our accepted translation.
וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: ״קַרְיָינָא״, אֲבָל אָמַר לַהּ: ״קָרָא אֲנָא״ – עַד דְּקָרֵי אוֹרָיְיתָא נְבִיאֵי וּכְתוּבֵי בְּדִיּוּקָא.
And this statement applies only if he said to her: I am literate, but if he said to her: I am a reader, this indicates that he is an expert in the reading of the Torah, and she is not betrothed unless he knows how to read the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings with precision.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי שׁוֹנֶה״, חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר: הֲלָכוֹת, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: תּוֹרָה.
The Gemara discusses a similar case: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I study [shoneh], Ḥizkiyya says it means that he studies halakhot, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says it means that he studies Torah, i.e., the written Torah.
מֵיתִיבִי: אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִשְׁנָה? רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הֲלָכוֹת, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מִדְרָשׁ!
The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: What is the meaning of: Mishna? Rabbi Meir says halakhot, Rabbi Yehuda says homiletics. Neither of them, however, says that it refers to the written Torah.
מַאי תּוֹרָה – מִדְרַשׁ תּוֹרָה. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: ״תָּנֵינָא״, אֲבָל אֲמַר לַהּ: ״תַּנָּא אֲנָא״, עַד דְּתָנֵי הִילְכְתָא, סִפְרָא, וְסִיפְרֵי, וְתוֹסֶפְתָּא.
What is the meaning of: Torah, that Rabbi Yoḥanan said? It is homiletic interpretation of the Torah. And this statement applies only if he said to her: I study [taneina]. But if he says to her: I am a tanna [tanna ana], she is not betrothed unless he studies halakha, i.e., Mishna, Sifra and Sifrei, and Tosefta.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי תַּלְמִיד״ – אֵין אוֹמְרִים כְּשִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי וּכְשִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא, אֶלָּא, כֹּל שֶׁשּׁוֹאֲלִין אוֹתוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם דָּבָר אֶחָד בְּתַלְמוּדוֹ וְאוֹמְרוֹ, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּמַסֶּכְתָּא דְכַלָּה. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי חָכָם״ – אֵין אוֹמְרִים כְּחַכְמֵי יַבְנֶה, כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וַחֲבֵירָיו, אֶלָּא, כֹּל שֶׁשּׁוֹאֲלִים אוֹתוֹ דְּבַר חׇכְמָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם וְאוֹמְרָהּ.
If a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a student of Torah, one does not say that he must be a student who is scholarly like Shimon ben Azzai or like Shimon ben Zoma, who were called students despite their great knowledge, as they were never ordained. Rather, it means anyone who, when he is asked one matter in any topic of his studies, responds appropriately and can say what he has learned, and this suffices even if his statement was in the tractate of Kalla. Similarly, if a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a scholar, one does not say that he must be like the scholars of Yavne, like Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues. Rather, it is referring to anyone who, when he is asked about a matter of wisdom on any topic related to the Torah, responds appropriately and can say what he has learned.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי גִּבּוֹר״ – אֵין אוֹמְרִים כְּאַבְנֵר בֶּן נֵר וּכְיוֹאָב בֶּן צְרוּיָה, אֶלָּא כֹּל שֶׁחֲבֵירָיו מִתְיָרְאִים מִמֶּנּוּ מִפְּנֵי גְבוּרָתוֹ. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי עָשִׁיר״ – אֵין אוֹמְרִים כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן חַרְסוֹם וּכְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה, אֶלָּא כֹּל שֶׁבְּנֵי עִירוֹ מְכַבְּדִים אוֹתוֹ מִפְּנֵי עוֹשְׁרוֹ.
If a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am strong, one does not say that he must be as strong as Abner ben Ner, King Saul’s cousin and general, or as strong as Joab ben Zeruiah, King David’s nephew and general. Rather, it means anyone of whom others are afraid due to his strength. If a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am wealthy, one does not say he must be as wealthy as Rabbi Elazar ben Ḥarsom or as wealthy as Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, but rather it can refer to anyone who is honored by the members of his town due to his wealth.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי צַדִּיק״ – אֲפִילּוּ רָשָׁע גָּמוּר – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, שֶׁמָּא הִרְהֵר תְּשׁוּבָה בְּדַעְתּוֹ. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי רָשָׁע״ – אֲפִילּוּ צַדִּיק גָּמוּר – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, שֶׁמָּא הִרְהֵר דְּבַר עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בְּדַעְתּוֹ.
If one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a righteous man, then even if he was a completely wicked man she is betrothed, as perhaps in the meantime he had thoughts of repentance in his mind and is now righteous. Similarly, if one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a wicked man, then even if he was a completely righteous man she is betrothed, as perhaps he had thoughts of idol worship in his mind, a serious sin that would earn him the label of wicked.
עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים חׇכְמָה יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶחָד כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים יוֹפִי יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה יְרוּשָׁלַיִם וְאֶחָד כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים עֲשִׁירוּת יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה רוֹמִי וְאֶחָד כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים עֲנִיּוּת יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה בָּבֶל וְאֶחָד כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים גַּסּוּת יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה עֵילָם וְאֶחָד כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ.
§ Apropos the discussion with regard to various attributes, the Gemara cites a related statement: Ten kav of wisdom descended to the world; Eretz Yisrael took nine of them and all the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of beauty descended to the world; Jerusalem took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one. Ten kav of wealth descended to the world; Rome took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one. Ten kav of poverty descended to the world; Babylonia took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one. Ten kav of arrogance descended to the world; Eilam took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one.
וְגַסּוּת לְבָבֶל לָא נְחִית? וְהָכְתִיב: ״וָאֶשָּׂא עֵינַי וָאֵרֶא וְהִנֵּה שְׁתַּיִם נָשִׁים יוֹצְאוֹת וְרוּחַ בְּכַנְפֵיהֶם וְלָהֵנָּה כְנָפַיִם כְּכַנְפֵי הַחֲסִידָה וְתִשְׁנֶה אֶת הָאֵיפָה בֵּין הָאָרֶץ וּבֵין הַשָּׁמָיִם. וָאֹמַר אֶל הַמַּלְאָךְ הַדֹּבֵר בִּי אָנָה הֵמָּה מוֹלִכוֹת אֶת הָאֵיפָה. וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלַי לִבְנוֹת לָהֿ בַיִת בְּאֶרֶץ שִׁנְעָר״. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ חֲנוּפָּה וְגַסּוּת הָרוּחַ שֶׁיָּרְדוּ לְבָבֶל!
The Gemara asks: But did arrogance not descend to Babylonia? But isn’t it written: “Then I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then I said to the angel that spoke with me: ‘To where do they take the measure?’ And he said to me: ‘To build her a house in the land of Shinar’” (Zechariah 5:9–11). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This refers to flattery and arrogance that descended to Babylonia, i.e., Shinar. This indicates that arrogance reached Babylonia as well.
אִין, לְהָכָא נְחִית, וְאִשְׁתַּרְבּוֹבֵי הוּא דְּאִשְׁתַּרְבּוּב לְהָתָם. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי: ״לִבְנוֹת לָהּ בַּיִת״, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara answers: Yes, it descended to here, to Babylonia, and it made its way to there, to Eilam. The language of the verse is also precise, as it teaches: “To build her a house,” which indicates that the original intention was to build a house in Babylonia, but it was not built there. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that arrogance did not remain in Babylonia.
אִינִי?! וְהָאָמַר מָר: סִימָן לְגַסּוּת – עֲנִיּוּת, וַעֲנִיּוּת בְּבָבֶל הוּא דְּאִיכָּא! מַאי עֲנִיּוּת – עֲנִיּוּת דְּתוֹרָה. דִּכְתִיב: ״אָחוֹת לָנוּ קְטַנָּה וְשָׁדַיִם אֵין לָהּ״, וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ עֵילָם, שֶׁזָּכְתָה לִלְמוֹד, וְלֹא זָכְתָה לְלַמֵּד.
The Gemara further asks: Is that so? But didn’t the Master say: A sign of arrogance is poverty, and there is poverty in Babylonia, and not in Eilam. The Gemara answers: To what kind of poverty is this referring? It is poverty with regard to Torah, which was characteristic of Eilam. As it is written: “We have a little sister, and she has no breasts” (Song of Songs 8:8), and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This refers to Eilam, whose inhabitants merited to learn but did not merit to teach. They did not produce Torah scholars capable of imparting their wisdom to others.
עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים גְּבוּרָה יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלוּ פָּרְסִיִּים וְכוּ׳. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים כִּנִּים יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה מָדַי כּוּ׳. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים כְּשָׁפִים יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה מִצְרַיִם כּוּ׳. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים נְגָעִים יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלוּ חֲזִירִים כּוּ׳. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים זְנוּת יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה עַרְבִיָּא כּוּ׳.
The Gemara returns to its list of endowments of various groups: Ten kav of strength descended to the world; the Persians took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of lice descended to the world; Media took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of witchcraft descended to the world; Egypt took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of plagues descended to the world; pigs, which carry disease, took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of licentiousness descended to the world; Arabia took nine and the rest of the world took one.
עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים עַזּוּת יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה מֵישָׁן כּוּ׳. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים שִׂיחָה יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלוּ נָשִׁים כּוּ׳. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים שִׁכְרוּת יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלוּ כּוּשִׁים כּוּ׳. עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים שֵׁינָה יָרְדוּ לָעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלוּ עֲבָדִים וְאֶחָד נָטְלוּ כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ.
Ten kav of brazenness descended to the world; Meishan, near Babylonia, took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of conversation descended to the world; women took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of drunkenness descended to the world; the Kushites took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of sleep descended to the world; slaves took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one.
מַתְנִי׳ ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי כֹּהֵן״ וְנִמְצָא לֵוִי, ״לֵוִי״ וְנִמְצָא כֹּהֵן, ״נָתִין״ וְנִמְצָא מַמְזֵר. ״מַמְזֵר״ וְנִמְצָא נָתִין, ״בֶּן עִיר״ וְנִמְצָא בֶּן כְּרַךְ, ״בֶּן כְּרַךְ״ וְנִמְצָא בֶּן עִיר. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁבֵּיתִי קָרוֹב לַמֶּרְחָץ״ וְנִמְצָא רָחוֹק, ״רָחוֹק״ וְנִמְצָא קָרוֹב.
MISHNA: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a priest, and he was found to be a Levite; or if he said: A Levite, and he was found to be a priest; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a Gibeonite, a people prohibited by rabbinic law from marrying into the congregation, i.e., from marrying a Jew of fit lineage, and he was found to be a mamzer, who is prohibited by Torah law to marry into the congregation; or he said: A mamzer, and he was found to be a Gibeonite; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a resident of a small town, and he was found to be a resident of a large city; or he said: A resident of a city, and he was found to be a resident of a town; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that my house is close to the bathhouse, and it was found to be far; or he said: Far from the bathhouse, and it was found to be close, she is not betrothed.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ בַּת אוֹ שִׁפְחָה מְגוּדֶּלֶת״ וְאֵין לוֹ, אוֹ ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ״ וְיֵשׁ לוֹ. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בָּנִים״ וְיֵשׁ לוֹ, אוֹ עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ. וּבְכוּלָּם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״בְּלִבִּי הָיָה לְהִתְקַדֵּשׁ לוֹ״ – אַף עַל פִּי כֵן אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְכֵן הִיא שֶׁהִטְעַתּוּ.
Or if he said that she is betrothed to him on the condition that he has a grown daughter or a maidservant, and he does not have one, or on the condition that he does not have one and he has one; or on the condition that he has no sons, and he has sons, or on the condition that he has sons and he does not have sons, then she is not betrothed. And in all these cases, despite the fact that she later stated: I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless, whether or not he fulfilled the condition, she is not betrothed. And similarly, if it was she who misled him by making the betrothal conditional upon a statement of hers that turned out to be incorrect, the betrothal will not take effect.
גְּמָ׳ הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבֵּין לְנִכְסֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיסַּק לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, וּבְעִידָּנָא דְּזַבֵּין לָא אֲמַר וְלָא מִידֵּי. אָמַר רָבָא: הָוֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב, וּדְבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָם דְּבָרִים. מְנָא לֵיהּ לְרָבָא הָא? אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן:
GEMARA: The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael, but at the time that he sold the property he did not say anything with regard to his intention. Ultimately, he did not ascend to Eretz Yisrael, and he wished to renege on the sale. Rava said: Since he did not explicitly state that he was selling his property on the condition that he ascend to Eretz Yisrael, that is an unspoken matter that remained in the heart, and unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters. The Gemara asks: From where does Rava learn this principle? If we say it is from that which we learn in a baraita:
