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Today's Daf Yomi

May 6, 2016 | 讻状讞 讘谞讬住谉 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Kiddushin 56

Study Guide Kiddushin 56. Different contradictory sources relating to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion that a man who betroths a woman and knowingly uses maaser sheni is valid. 聽In the end the contradictions are resolved by assuming that the woman is knowledgeable in the聽halacha and will use the maaser聽money properly as opposed to a seller (in the other cases) who won’t necessarily sue the maaser聽money properly. 聽Anything that is forbidden to benefit from can’t be used to betroth a woman. 聽The mishna lists all those items and the gemara聽outlines the sources for the prohibition for deriving benefit from each item.

讜讗诐 诇拽讞 讘砖讜讙讙 讬讞讝专讜 讚诪讬诐 诇诪拽讜诪诐 讘诪讝讬讚 转注诇讛 讜转讗讻诇 讘诪拽讜诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘诪转讻讜讬谉 讜诇拽讞 转讞讬诇讛 诇砖诐 砖诇诪讬诐 讗讘诇 讘诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讛讜爪讬讗 诪注讜转 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讘讬谉 砖讜讙讙 讘讬谉 诪讝讬讚 讬讞讝专讜 讚诪讬诐 诇诪拽讜诪诐

and if one purchased an animal unwittingly, without realizing he was using second tithe money, the money returns to its place, meaning that it is considered to be an erroneous transaction and is void, because the purchaser would prefer to bring the second tithe money to Jerusalem rather than to travel with an animal to bring as an offering. If he purchased it intentionally, the animal is brought up and eaten in its proper place, i.e., in Jerusalem. Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to one who acted with intent, and purchased the animal from the outset for the sake of a peace-offering, and in any case had to bring the animal to Jerusalem. But with regard to one who acted with intent to withdraw the second-tithe money from its consecrated state to a desacralized state, whether his act was unwitting, in which case it is an erroneous transaction, or intentional, the money returns to its place.

讜讛讗谞谉 转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘诪讝讬讚 拽讬讚砖 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗砖讛 讬讜讚注转 砖讗讬谉 诪注讜转 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 诪转讞诇诇讬谉 注诇 讬讚讛 讜注讜诇讛 讜讗讜讻诇转讜 讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐

The Gemara questions this statement: But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: If the second tithe was used intentionally, he has betrothed the woman with it, and the betrothal, which is a type of acquisition, is effective? Rabbi Elazar said: The halakha in the mishna is based upon the assumption that a woman knows that second-tithe money is not desacralized by her acceptance of the betrothal, and it is as though she has agreed that she would ascend and eat it in Jerusalem.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讜讛专讬 讘讛诪讛 讟诪讗讛 注讘讚讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讚讗讚诐 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 诪注讜转 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 诪转讞诇诇讬谉 注诇讬讛谉 讜转谞谉 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讞讬诐 讘讛诪讛 讟诪讗讛 注讘讚讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讘诪注讜转 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐 讜讗诐 诇拽讞 讬讗讻诇 讻谞讙讚谉

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this: But there are cases of a non-kosher animal, slaves, or land, with regard to which a person knows that second-tithe money is not desacralized by being used to purchase them, and we learned in a mishna (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 1:7): One may not purchase a non-kosher animal, slaves, or land with second-tithe money, even in Jerusalem. And if one did purchase them, he must eat other food corresponding to their value. He must take an equivalent sum of money and use it to desacralize the money in the seller鈥檚 possession, after which he proceeds to bring this money to Jerusalem and use it to buy food, which he will then consume. In this case, the seller is also presumably aware that the money is second tithe and that he himself will need to take it to Jerusalem, as was presumed in the case of the betrothed woman, so why is the halakha not the same?

讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讘讗砖讛 讞讘讬专讛 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讬讚注讛

Rather, it must be that here, in the case of the mishna, we are dealing with a woman devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially the halakhot of ritual purity, teruma, and tithes [岣vera], who knows the laws of tithes, and accepts it for betrothal with the awareness that she must take it to Jerusalem. An ordinary person, however, is not well-versed in these halakhot, so in the case of the purchase of an animal the seller thinks that the second-tithe money has been desacralized through the purchase of the non-kosher animal.

讗诪专 诪专 讗诐 诇拽讞 讬讗讻诇 讻谞讙讚谉 讜讗诪讗讬 讬讞讝专讜 讚诪讬讜 诇诪拽讜诪诐 讻讬 讛转诐

The Master said: If one did purchase them, he must eat other food corresponding to their value. The Gemara asks: But why should he do so? Why not say that the money must return to its place, just as was the ruling there, as Rabbi Yehuda said with regard to one who acted with intent to desacralize the second tithe, where the seller was penalized for acquiescing to the sale?

讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇

Shmuel says:

讻砖讘专讞 讜讟注诪讗 讚讘专讞 讛讗 诇讗 讘专讞 拽谞住讬谞谉 诇诪讜讻专 讜谞拽谞住讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 诇讗讜 注讻讘专讗 讙谞讘 讗诇讗 讞讜专讗 讙谞讘

The case here is where the seller fled with the money, and there is no way of voiding the sale and returning the money to the purchaser. The Gemara comments: And the reason is that he fled, but had he not fled, we would penalize the seller by requiring him to return the money. The Gemara asks: And let us penalize the buyer and require him to take an equivalent sum of money to Jerusalem. The Gemara answers: It is not the mouse that steals, but the hole that steals. In other words, a mouse cannot steal an item unless he has a hole in which to hide it. Here too, the money would not have been desacralized without the help of the seller.

讜讗讬 诇讗 注讻讘专讗 讞讜专讗 诪讗讬 拽注讘讬讚 诪住转讘专讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讗讬住讜专讗 讛转诐 拽谞住讬谞谉

The Gemara questions this logic: But if not for the mouse, what has the hole done? Since they both are integral to the prohibited act, each of them is deserving of a penalty. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that anywhere that the forbidden item is, i.e., anywhere that the money is, and in this case it is with the seller, there we should penalize.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讚砖 讘注专诇讛 讘讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 讘砖讜专 讛谞住拽诇 讜讘注讙诇讛 注专讜驻讛 讘爪驻讜专讬 诪爪讜专注 讜讘砖注专 谞讝讬专 讜驻讟专 讞诪讜专 讜讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 讜讞讜诇讬谉 砖谞砖讞讟讜 讘注讝专讛 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 诪讻专谉 讜拽讬讚砖 讘讚诪讬讛谉 诪拽讜讚砖转

MISHNA: With regard to one who betroths a woman with orla, i.e., fruit grown during a tree鈥檚 first three years, or with diverse kinds in a vineyard, i.e., grain and grapes planted together, or with an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, or with a heifer whose neck is broken, or with the leper鈥檚 birds which are designated for his offering, or with a nazirite鈥檚 hair, or with a firstborn donkey, or with meat cooked in milk, or with non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, if he betroths her with any of these items, the woman is not betrothed, since it is prohibited to derive benefit from any of these items. By contrast, if one sold them and betrothed a woman with the money received from their sale, she is betrothed, as in these cases one may derive benefit from the money he receives in exchange for the forbidden item.

讙诪壮 讘注专诇讛 诪谞诇谉 讚转谞讬讗 注专诇讬诐 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 讛谞讗讛 诪谞讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讛谞讛 诪诪谞讜 讜诇讗 讬爪讘注 讘讜 讜诇讗 讬讚诇讬拽 讘讜 讗转 讛谞专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜注专诇转诐 讗转 注专诇转讜 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讻讜诇诐

GEMARA: The Gemara explains the source of the halakha that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the items mentioned in the mishna. With orla: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from orla? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: 鈥淎nd shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit thereof as forbidden; three years shall it be as forbidden [arelim] to you; it shall not be eaten鈥 (Leviticus 19:23). From this verse, I have derived only a prohibition against eating it. From where do I derive that one may not even derive benefit from it? From where do we derive that one may not derive benefit from it in another manner, and one may not paint with the dye that can be extracted from the fruit, and one may not light a lamp with its oil? The verse states: 鈥淭hen you shall count the fruit thereof [orlato] as forbidden [araltem]鈥 (Leviticus 19:23), to include all these types of benefit in the prohibition.

讘讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 讞讝拽讬讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 驻谉 转拽讚砖 驻谉 转讜拽讚 讗砖

The mishna stated that one may not betroth a woman with diverse kinds in a vineyard. From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from diverse kinds in a vineyard? 岣zkiyya said: The verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds; lest the growth of the seed that you have sown be forbidden [pen tikdash], together with the yield of the vineyard鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:9). 岣zkiyya expounds 鈥渓est the growth of the seed that you have sown be forbidden [pen tikdash]鈥 as: Lest it be burned [pen tukad esh], indicating that the seed of diverse kinds must be destroyed by fire, so that no benefit is derived from it.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 驻谉 讬讛讬讛 拽讚砖 讗讬 诪讛 拽讚砖 转讜驻住 讗转 讚诪讬讜 讜讬讜爪讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讗祝 讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 转讜驻住 讗转 讚诪讬讜 讜讬讜爪讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 讻讚讞讝拽讬讛

Rav Ashi says that the phrase 鈥pen tikdash鈥 indicates that it is comparable to consecrated property, as if it said: Lest it become consecrated [kodesh], and one is therefore prohibited from deriving benefit from it, just as one may not derive benefit from consecrated property. The Gemara questions Rav Ashi鈥檚 interpretation: If diverse kinds in a vineyard is compared to consecrated property, then just as consecrated property transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and becomes desacralized, so too, diverse kinds in a vineyard should transfer their sanctity to the money with which they are redeemed and become desacralized. Contrary to this logic, the mishna taught that if one sells diverse kinds in a vineyard, the proceeds can be used for betrothal, indicating that it is not forbidden to derive benefit from this money. Rather, it is clear that the correct derivation is as that of 岣zkiyya.

砖讜专 讛谞住拽诇 诪谞讬谉 讚转谞讬讗 诪诪砖诪注 砖谞讗诪专 住拽讜诇 讬住拽诇 讛砖讜专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖谞讘讬诇讛 讛讬讗 讜谞讘讬诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讗讻讬诇讛 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗转 讘砖专讜 诪讙讬讚 诇讱 砖讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诇讗讞专 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 讗住讜专 讘讗讻讬诇讛

The Gemara continues its analysis of the mishna: From where is it derived that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from an ox that is sentenced to be stoned? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: It is taught by inference from that which is stated with regard to an ox that killed a person: 鈥淎nd if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be clear鈥 (Exodus 21:28). Don鈥檛 I know from this verse that the stoning makes it an unslaughtered animal carcass, and it is prohibited to eat an unslaughtered animal carcass? What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚ts flesh shall not be eaten鈥? The verse is telling you that even if one slaughtered the ox after its verdict had been reached but before it was stoned, it is still prohibited to eat it.

讘讛谞讗讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讘注诇 讛砖讜专 谞拽讬 诪讗讬 诪砖诪注 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讝讜诪讗 讗讜诪专 讻讗讚诐 砖讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讬爪讗 驻诇讜谞讬 谞拽讬 诪谞讻住讬讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 讘讛诐 讛谞讗讛 砖诇 讻诇讜诐

The baraita continues: From where is it derived that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the ox as well? The verse states: 鈥淏ut the owner of the ox shall be clear.鈥 The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that one may not derive benefit from this ox? Shimon ben Zoma says: This is like a person who says to another: So-and-so was left clear [naki] of his property, and he has no benefit from it at all. Similarly, 鈥淏ut the owner of the ox shall be clear鈥 means that he may not derive any benefit from the ox.

诪诪讗讬 讚讛讗讬 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗转 讘砖专讜 诇讛讬讻讗 讚砖讞讬讟 诇讗讞专 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讚讬诇诪讗 讛讬讻讗 讚砖讞讬讟 诇讗讞专 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 砖专讬 讜讛讗 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚住拽诇讬讛 诪讬住拽诇 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讜讻讚专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专

The Gemara asks: From where is it known that this phrase: 鈥淚ts flesh shall not be eaten,鈥 comes to teach a halakha with regard to a case where he slaughtered the ox after its verdict was reached, but before it was stoned? Perhaps it is permitted to eat the ox if he slaughtered it after its verdict had been reached. And this phrase: 鈥淪hall not be eaten,鈥 comes to teach a halakha with regard to a case where they had already stoned it, but not to teach a prohibition against eating it, as that is already known due to the fact that it was stoned. Rather, it comes to prohibit deriving benefit from the ox, and that would be in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abbahu who says the following, citing Rabbi Elazar.

讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讜诇讗 转讗讻诇讜 讗讞讚 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 讜讗讞讚 讗讬住讜专 讛谞讗讛 注讚 砖讬驻专讟 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讻讚专讱 砖驻专讟 诇讱 讘谞讘讬诇讛

The Gemara continues the question: As Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Elazar says that wherever it is stated: 鈥淚t shall not be eaten鈥; or 鈥測ou,鈥 singular, 鈥渟hall not eat鈥; or 鈥測ou,鈥 plural, 鈥渟hall not eat鈥; both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit are indicated. This is so unless the verse specifies for you that one may derive benefit, in the manner that it specified for you with regard to an animal carcass, from which the verse explicitly permits one to derive benefit, as it states: 鈥淵ou may sell it to a foreigner鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:21). Here, too, with regard to the ox that is stoned, the phrase: 鈥淚ts flesh shall not be eaten,鈥 may serve to teach that one may not derive benefit from the stoned ox.

讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚谞驻拽讗 诇谉 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 诪诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讛讻讗 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 诪住拽讜诇 讬住拽诇 谞驻拽讗 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讗讬住讜专 讛谞讗讛 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 谞讻转讜讘 拽专讗 诇讗 讬讛谞讛

The Gemara answers: This statement of Rabbi Abbahu applies only to a case where we derive the prohibition against eating from the words: 鈥淚t may not be eaten,鈥 which is interpreted to include any manner of consumption. But here, the prohibition against eating is derived from: 鈥淚t shall be stoned,鈥 from which it is understood that since the ox becomes an unslaughtered animal carcass, it may not be eaten. As if it enters your mind that the phrase: 鈥淚ts flesh may not be eaten,鈥 is written to prohibit one from deriving benefit, let the verse state: 鈥淥ne may not derive benefit.鈥 Why does it refer to eating if that prohibition has already been derived?

讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗转 讘砖专讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚砖讞讟讬讛 讻注讬谉 讘砖专 讗住讜专

Alternatively, even if one would say that the phrase: 鈥淚t shall not be eaten,鈥 can be used to indicate that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the ox, why do I need the additional words 鈥渋ts flesh鈥? These words must teach that although he slaughtered the ox like one does with kosher meat, after it was condemned to be stoned, it remains forbidden and cannot be eaten.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讜讗讬诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚讘讚拽 爪讜专 讜砖讞讟 讘讛 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻住拽讬诇讛 讗讘诇 砖讞讟讬讛 讘住讻讬谉 诇讗 诪讬讚讬 住讻讬谉 讘讗讜专讬讬转讗 讻转讬讘 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讘讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讘讬谉 讘爪讜专 讘讬谉 讘讝讻讜讻讬转 讘讬谉 讘拽专讜诪讬转 砖诇 拽谞讛

Mar Zutra objects to this: But say that this prohibition against eating the ox applies only where he examined a sharp stone to ensure that it had no nicks, and slaughtered with it in a halakhically acceptable manner. That action could be considered like stoning, since in any event the ox was killed by a stone. The Torah teaches that even if it was killed in this manner, one is prohibited from eating it. But if he slaughtered it with a knife, he should not be prohibited from eating it. The Gemara expresses surprise at this reasoning: Was a knife written in the Torah? If one slaughters the animal in a halakhically acceptable manner, this is called slaughtering, not stoning. And moreover, it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, 岣llin 1:2): One may slaughter with anything that cuts cleanly, whether with a stone, whether with glass, whether with the stalk of a reed. Consequently, there is no difference in the halakha with regard to using a knife or a sharp stone.

讜讛砖转讗 讚谞驻拽讗 诇谉 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 讜讗讬住讜专 讛谞讗讛 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讛讗讬 讘注诇 讛砖讜专 谞拽讬 诇诪讗讬 讗转讗 诇讛谞讗转 注讜专讜 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗转 讘砖专讜 讻转讬讘 讘砖专讜 讗住讜专 讜注讜专讜 诪讜转专

The Gemara asks: And now that we have derived both the prohibition against eating and the prohibition against benefiting from an ox sentenced to be stoned from: 鈥淚t shall not be eaten,鈥 what halakha does that other phrase: 鈥淏ut the owner of the ox shall be clear,鈥 come to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from its hide after it has been killed. Were it not for this phrase, it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: 鈥淚ts flesh shall not be eaten,鈥 only its flesh is forbidden, but its hide is permitted. Therefore, the words 鈥渁nd the owner of the ox is clean鈥 teach that its hide is forbidden as well.

讜诇讛谞讱 转谞讗讬 讚诪驻拽讬 诇讬讛 讛讗讬 讘注诇 讛砖讜专 谞拽讬 诇讞爪讬 讻讜驻专 讜诇讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讛谞讗转 注讜专讜 诪谞讗 诇讛讜

The Gemara asks: And according to those tanna鈥檌m who expound this phrase: 鈥淭he owner of the ox shall be clear,鈥 to teach that the owner of an innocuous ox, i.e., one that is not known to cause damage with the intent to injure, is exempt from the payment of half of the indemnity incurred if that ox killed a person, or that he is exempt from payment of damages for miscarried offspring if his ox gores a pregnant woman and causes her to miscarry; from where do they derive this prohibition against benefiting from the ox鈥檚 hide?

诪讗转 讘砖专讜 讗转 讛讟驻诇 诇讘砖专讜 讜讗讬讚讱

The Gemara answers: They derive it from the wording: 鈥淚ts flesh may not be eaten [velo ye鈥檃khel et besaro].鈥 The verse could have been formulated: Velo ye鈥檃khel besaro, which already means: And its flesh shall not be eaten. The addition of the word 鈥et鈥 teaches that the prohibition applies also to that which is secondary to the flesh, i.e., the hide. The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, who derives the prohibition against benefiting from the hide from the verse: 鈥淏ut the owner of the ox shall be clear,鈥 what does he learn from the additional word 鈥et鈥?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Kiddushin 56

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Kiddushin 56

讜讗诐 诇拽讞 讘砖讜讙讙 讬讞讝专讜 讚诪讬诐 诇诪拽讜诪诐 讘诪讝讬讚 转注诇讛 讜转讗讻诇 讘诪拽讜诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘诪转讻讜讬谉 讜诇拽讞 转讞讬诇讛 诇砖诐 砖诇诪讬诐 讗讘诇 讘诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讛讜爪讬讗 诪注讜转 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讘讬谉 砖讜讙讙 讘讬谉 诪讝讬讚 讬讞讝专讜 讚诪讬诐 诇诪拽讜诪诐

and if one purchased an animal unwittingly, without realizing he was using second tithe money, the money returns to its place, meaning that it is considered to be an erroneous transaction and is void, because the purchaser would prefer to bring the second tithe money to Jerusalem rather than to travel with an animal to bring as an offering. If he purchased it intentionally, the animal is brought up and eaten in its proper place, i.e., in Jerusalem. Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to one who acted with intent, and purchased the animal from the outset for the sake of a peace-offering, and in any case had to bring the animal to Jerusalem. But with regard to one who acted with intent to withdraw the second-tithe money from its consecrated state to a desacralized state, whether his act was unwitting, in which case it is an erroneous transaction, or intentional, the money returns to its place.

讜讛讗谞谉 转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘诪讝讬讚 拽讬讚砖 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗砖讛 讬讜讚注转 砖讗讬谉 诪注讜转 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 诪转讞诇诇讬谉 注诇 讬讚讛 讜注讜诇讛 讜讗讜讻诇转讜 讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐

The Gemara questions this statement: But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: If the second tithe was used intentionally, he has betrothed the woman with it, and the betrothal, which is a type of acquisition, is effective? Rabbi Elazar said: The halakha in the mishna is based upon the assumption that a woman knows that second-tithe money is not desacralized by her acceptance of the betrothal, and it is as though she has agreed that she would ascend and eat it in Jerusalem.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讜讛专讬 讘讛诪讛 讟诪讗讛 注讘讚讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讚讗讚诐 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 诪注讜转 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 诪转讞诇诇讬谉 注诇讬讛谉 讜转谞谉 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讞讬诐 讘讛诪讛 讟诪讗讛 注讘讚讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讘诪注讜转 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐 讜讗诐 诇拽讞 讬讗讻诇 讻谞讙讚谉

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this: But there are cases of a non-kosher animal, slaves, or land, with regard to which a person knows that second-tithe money is not desacralized by being used to purchase them, and we learned in a mishna (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 1:7): One may not purchase a non-kosher animal, slaves, or land with second-tithe money, even in Jerusalem. And if one did purchase them, he must eat other food corresponding to their value. He must take an equivalent sum of money and use it to desacralize the money in the seller鈥檚 possession, after which he proceeds to bring this money to Jerusalem and use it to buy food, which he will then consume. In this case, the seller is also presumably aware that the money is second tithe and that he himself will need to take it to Jerusalem, as was presumed in the case of the betrothed woman, so why is the halakha not the same?

讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讘讗砖讛 讞讘讬专讛 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讬讚注讛

Rather, it must be that here, in the case of the mishna, we are dealing with a woman devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially the halakhot of ritual purity, teruma, and tithes [岣vera], who knows the laws of tithes, and accepts it for betrothal with the awareness that she must take it to Jerusalem. An ordinary person, however, is not well-versed in these halakhot, so in the case of the purchase of an animal the seller thinks that the second-tithe money has been desacralized through the purchase of the non-kosher animal.

讗诪专 诪专 讗诐 诇拽讞 讬讗讻诇 讻谞讙讚谉 讜讗诪讗讬 讬讞讝专讜 讚诪讬讜 诇诪拽讜诪诐 讻讬 讛转诐

The Master said: If one did purchase them, he must eat other food corresponding to their value. The Gemara asks: But why should he do so? Why not say that the money must return to its place, just as was the ruling there, as Rabbi Yehuda said with regard to one who acted with intent to desacralize the second tithe, where the seller was penalized for acquiescing to the sale?

讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇

Shmuel says:

讻砖讘专讞 讜讟注诪讗 讚讘专讞 讛讗 诇讗 讘专讞 拽谞住讬谞谉 诇诪讜讻专 讜谞拽谞住讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 诇讗讜 注讻讘专讗 讙谞讘 讗诇讗 讞讜专讗 讙谞讘

The case here is where the seller fled with the money, and there is no way of voiding the sale and returning the money to the purchaser. The Gemara comments: And the reason is that he fled, but had he not fled, we would penalize the seller by requiring him to return the money. The Gemara asks: And let us penalize the buyer and require him to take an equivalent sum of money to Jerusalem. The Gemara answers: It is not the mouse that steals, but the hole that steals. In other words, a mouse cannot steal an item unless he has a hole in which to hide it. Here too, the money would not have been desacralized without the help of the seller.

讜讗讬 诇讗 注讻讘专讗 讞讜专讗 诪讗讬 拽注讘讬讚 诪住转讘专讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讗讬住讜专讗 讛转诐 拽谞住讬谞谉

The Gemara questions this logic: But if not for the mouse, what has the hole done? Since they both are integral to the prohibited act, each of them is deserving of a penalty. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that anywhere that the forbidden item is, i.e., anywhere that the money is, and in this case it is with the seller, there we should penalize.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讚砖 讘注专诇讛 讘讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 讘砖讜专 讛谞住拽诇 讜讘注讙诇讛 注专讜驻讛 讘爪驻讜专讬 诪爪讜专注 讜讘砖注专 谞讝讬专 讜驻讟专 讞诪讜专 讜讘砖专 讘讞诇讘 讜讞讜诇讬谉 砖谞砖讞讟讜 讘注讝专讛 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 诪讻专谉 讜拽讬讚砖 讘讚诪讬讛谉 诪拽讜讚砖转

MISHNA: With regard to one who betroths a woman with orla, i.e., fruit grown during a tree鈥檚 first three years, or with diverse kinds in a vineyard, i.e., grain and grapes planted together, or with an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, or with a heifer whose neck is broken, or with the leper鈥檚 birds which are designated for his offering, or with a nazirite鈥檚 hair, or with a firstborn donkey, or with meat cooked in milk, or with non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, if he betroths her with any of these items, the woman is not betrothed, since it is prohibited to derive benefit from any of these items. By contrast, if one sold them and betrothed a woman with the money received from their sale, she is betrothed, as in these cases one may derive benefit from the money he receives in exchange for the forbidden item.

讙诪壮 讘注专诇讛 诪谞诇谉 讚转谞讬讗 注专诇讬诐 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 讛谞讗讛 诪谞讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讛谞讛 诪诪谞讜 讜诇讗 讬爪讘注 讘讜 讜诇讗 讬讚诇讬拽 讘讜 讗转 讛谞专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜注专诇转诐 讗转 注专诇转讜 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讻讜诇诐

GEMARA: The Gemara explains the source of the halakha that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the items mentioned in the mishna. With orla: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from orla? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: 鈥淎nd shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit thereof as forbidden; three years shall it be as forbidden [arelim] to you; it shall not be eaten鈥 (Leviticus 19:23). From this verse, I have derived only a prohibition against eating it. From where do I derive that one may not even derive benefit from it? From where do we derive that one may not derive benefit from it in another manner, and one may not paint with the dye that can be extracted from the fruit, and one may not light a lamp with its oil? The verse states: 鈥淭hen you shall count the fruit thereof [orlato] as forbidden [araltem]鈥 (Leviticus 19:23), to include all these types of benefit in the prohibition.

讘讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 讞讝拽讬讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 驻谉 转拽讚砖 驻谉 转讜拽讚 讗砖

The mishna stated that one may not betroth a woman with diverse kinds in a vineyard. From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from diverse kinds in a vineyard? 岣zkiyya said: The verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds; lest the growth of the seed that you have sown be forbidden [pen tikdash], together with the yield of the vineyard鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:9). 岣zkiyya expounds 鈥渓est the growth of the seed that you have sown be forbidden [pen tikdash]鈥 as: Lest it be burned [pen tukad esh], indicating that the seed of diverse kinds must be destroyed by fire, so that no benefit is derived from it.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 驻谉 讬讛讬讛 拽讚砖 讗讬 诪讛 拽讚砖 转讜驻住 讗转 讚诪讬讜 讜讬讜爪讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讗祝 讻诇讗讬 讛讻专诐 转讜驻住 讗转 讚诪讬讜 讜讬讜爪讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 讻讚讞讝拽讬讛

Rav Ashi says that the phrase 鈥pen tikdash鈥 indicates that it is comparable to consecrated property, as if it said: Lest it become consecrated [kodesh], and one is therefore prohibited from deriving benefit from it, just as one may not derive benefit from consecrated property. The Gemara questions Rav Ashi鈥檚 interpretation: If diverse kinds in a vineyard is compared to consecrated property, then just as consecrated property transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and becomes desacralized, so too, diverse kinds in a vineyard should transfer their sanctity to the money with which they are redeemed and become desacralized. Contrary to this logic, the mishna taught that if one sells diverse kinds in a vineyard, the proceeds can be used for betrothal, indicating that it is not forbidden to derive benefit from this money. Rather, it is clear that the correct derivation is as that of 岣zkiyya.

砖讜专 讛谞住拽诇 诪谞讬谉 讚转谞讬讗 诪诪砖诪注 砖谞讗诪专 住拽讜诇 讬住拽诇 讛砖讜专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖谞讘讬诇讛 讛讬讗 讜谞讘讬诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讗讻讬诇讛 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗转 讘砖专讜 诪讙讬讚 诇讱 砖讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诇讗讞专 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 讗住讜专 讘讗讻讬诇讛

The Gemara continues its analysis of the mishna: From where is it derived that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from an ox that is sentenced to be stoned? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: It is taught by inference from that which is stated with regard to an ox that killed a person: 鈥淎nd if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be clear鈥 (Exodus 21:28). Don鈥檛 I know from this verse that the stoning makes it an unslaughtered animal carcass, and it is prohibited to eat an unslaughtered animal carcass? What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚ts flesh shall not be eaten鈥? The verse is telling you that even if one slaughtered the ox after its verdict had been reached but before it was stoned, it is still prohibited to eat it.

讘讛谞讗讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讘注诇 讛砖讜专 谞拽讬 诪讗讬 诪砖诪注 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讝讜诪讗 讗讜诪专 讻讗讚诐 砖讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讬爪讗 驻诇讜谞讬 谞拽讬 诪谞讻住讬讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 讘讛诐 讛谞讗讛 砖诇 讻诇讜诐

The baraita continues: From where is it derived that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the ox as well? The verse states: 鈥淏ut the owner of the ox shall be clear.鈥 The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that one may not derive benefit from this ox? Shimon ben Zoma says: This is like a person who says to another: So-and-so was left clear [naki] of his property, and he has no benefit from it at all. Similarly, 鈥淏ut the owner of the ox shall be clear鈥 means that he may not derive any benefit from the ox.

诪诪讗讬 讚讛讗讬 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗转 讘砖专讜 诇讛讬讻讗 讚砖讞讬讟 诇讗讞专 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讚讬诇诪讗 讛讬讻讗 讚砖讞讬讟 诇讗讞专 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 砖专讬 讜讛讗 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚住拽诇讬讛 诪讬住拽诇 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讜讻讚专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专

The Gemara asks: From where is it known that this phrase: 鈥淚ts flesh shall not be eaten,鈥 comes to teach a halakha with regard to a case where he slaughtered the ox after its verdict was reached, but before it was stoned? Perhaps it is permitted to eat the ox if he slaughtered it after its verdict had been reached. And this phrase: 鈥淪hall not be eaten,鈥 comes to teach a halakha with regard to a case where they had already stoned it, but not to teach a prohibition against eating it, as that is already known due to the fact that it was stoned. Rather, it comes to prohibit deriving benefit from the ox, and that would be in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abbahu who says the following, citing Rabbi Elazar.

讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 诇讗 转讗讻诇 讜诇讗 转讗讻诇讜 讗讞讚 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 讜讗讞讚 讗讬住讜专 讛谞讗讛 注讚 砖讬驻专讟 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讻讚专讱 砖驻专讟 诇讱 讘谞讘讬诇讛

The Gemara continues the question: As Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Elazar says that wherever it is stated: 鈥淚t shall not be eaten鈥; or 鈥測ou,鈥 singular, 鈥渟hall not eat鈥; or 鈥測ou,鈥 plural, 鈥渟hall not eat鈥; both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit are indicated. This is so unless the verse specifies for you that one may derive benefit, in the manner that it specified for you with regard to an animal carcass, from which the verse explicitly permits one to derive benefit, as it states: 鈥淵ou may sell it to a foreigner鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:21). Here, too, with regard to the ox that is stoned, the phrase: 鈥淚ts flesh shall not be eaten,鈥 may serve to teach that one may not derive benefit from the stoned ox.

讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚谞驻拽讗 诇谉 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 诪诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讛讻讗 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 诪住拽讜诇 讬住拽诇 谞驻拽讗 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讗讬住讜专 讛谞讗讛 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 谞讻转讜讘 拽专讗 诇讗 讬讛谞讛

The Gemara answers: This statement of Rabbi Abbahu applies only to a case where we derive the prohibition against eating from the words: 鈥淚t may not be eaten,鈥 which is interpreted to include any manner of consumption. But here, the prohibition against eating is derived from: 鈥淚t shall be stoned,鈥 from which it is understood that since the ox becomes an unslaughtered animal carcass, it may not be eaten. As if it enters your mind that the phrase: 鈥淚ts flesh may not be eaten,鈥 is written to prohibit one from deriving benefit, let the verse state: 鈥淥ne may not derive benefit.鈥 Why does it refer to eating if that prohibition has already been derived?

讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗转 讘砖专讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚砖讞讟讬讛 讻注讬谉 讘砖专 讗住讜专

Alternatively, even if one would say that the phrase: 鈥淚t shall not be eaten,鈥 can be used to indicate that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the ox, why do I need the additional words 鈥渋ts flesh鈥? These words must teach that although he slaughtered the ox like one does with kosher meat, after it was condemned to be stoned, it remains forbidden and cannot be eaten.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讜讗讬诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚讘讚拽 爪讜专 讜砖讞讟 讘讛 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻住拽讬诇讛 讗讘诇 砖讞讟讬讛 讘住讻讬谉 诇讗 诪讬讚讬 住讻讬谉 讘讗讜专讬讬转讗 讻转讬讘 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讘讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讘讬谉 讘爪讜专 讘讬谉 讘讝讻讜讻讬转 讘讬谉 讘拽专讜诪讬转 砖诇 拽谞讛

Mar Zutra objects to this: But say that this prohibition against eating the ox applies only where he examined a sharp stone to ensure that it had no nicks, and slaughtered with it in a halakhically acceptable manner. That action could be considered like stoning, since in any event the ox was killed by a stone. The Torah teaches that even if it was killed in this manner, one is prohibited from eating it. But if he slaughtered it with a knife, he should not be prohibited from eating it. The Gemara expresses surprise at this reasoning: Was a knife written in the Torah? If one slaughters the animal in a halakhically acceptable manner, this is called slaughtering, not stoning. And moreover, it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, 岣llin 1:2): One may slaughter with anything that cuts cleanly, whether with a stone, whether with glass, whether with the stalk of a reed. Consequently, there is no difference in the halakha with regard to using a knife or a sharp stone.

讜讛砖转讗 讚谞驻拽讗 诇谉 讗讬住讜专 讗讻讬诇讛 讜讗讬住讜专 讛谞讗讛 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讛讗讬 讘注诇 讛砖讜专 谞拽讬 诇诪讗讬 讗转讗 诇讛谞讗转 注讜专讜 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讗转 讘砖专讜 讻转讬讘 讘砖专讜 讗住讜专 讜注讜专讜 诪讜转专

The Gemara asks: And now that we have derived both the prohibition against eating and the prohibition against benefiting from an ox sentenced to be stoned from: 鈥淚t shall not be eaten,鈥 what halakha does that other phrase: 鈥淏ut the owner of the ox shall be clear,鈥 come to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from its hide after it has been killed. Were it not for this phrase, it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: 鈥淚ts flesh shall not be eaten,鈥 only its flesh is forbidden, but its hide is permitted. Therefore, the words 鈥渁nd the owner of the ox is clean鈥 teach that its hide is forbidden as well.

讜诇讛谞讱 转谞讗讬 讚诪驻拽讬 诇讬讛 讛讗讬 讘注诇 讛砖讜专 谞拽讬 诇讞爪讬 讻讜驻专 讜诇讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讛谞讗转 注讜专讜 诪谞讗 诇讛讜

The Gemara asks: And according to those tanna鈥檌m who expound this phrase: 鈥淭he owner of the ox shall be clear,鈥 to teach that the owner of an innocuous ox, i.e., one that is not known to cause damage with the intent to injure, is exempt from the payment of half of the indemnity incurred if that ox killed a person, or that he is exempt from payment of damages for miscarried offspring if his ox gores a pregnant woman and causes her to miscarry; from where do they derive this prohibition against benefiting from the ox鈥檚 hide?

诪讗转 讘砖专讜 讗转 讛讟驻诇 诇讘砖专讜 讜讗讬讚讱

The Gemara answers: They derive it from the wording: 鈥淚ts flesh may not be eaten [velo ye鈥檃khel et besaro].鈥 The verse could have been formulated: Velo ye鈥檃khel besaro, which already means: And its flesh shall not be eaten. The addition of the word 鈥et鈥 teaches that the prohibition applies also to that which is secondary to the flesh, i.e., the hide. The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, who derives the prohibition against benefiting from the hide from the verse: 鈥淏ut the owner of the ox shall be clear,鈥 what does he learn from the additional word 鈥et鈥?

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