Kiddushin 57

Kiddushin 57

״אֶת״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ. כִּדְתַנְיָא: שִׁמְעוֹן הָעַמְסוֹנִי וְאָמְרִי לַהּ נְחֶמְיָה הָעַמְסוֹנִי הָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ כׇּל אֶתִּין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיעַ לְ״אֶת ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ תִּירָא״, פֵּירַשׁ.

The Gemara answers: This Sage does not interpret the word “et” as a means to derive new halakhot. He considers the word “et” to be an ordinary part of the sentence structure and not a source for exegetical exposition. As it is taught in a baraita: Shimon HaAmasoni, and some say that it was Neḥemya HaAmasoni, would interpret all occurrences of the word “et” in the Torah, deriving additional halakhot with regard to the particular subject matter. Once he reached the verse: “You shall fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 6:13), which is written with the added word “et,” he withdrew from this method of exposition, as whose fear could be an extension of the fear of God?

אָמְרוּ לוֹ תַּלְמִידָיו: רַבִּי, כׇּל אֶתִּין שֶׁדָּרַשְׁתָּ מָה תְּהֵא עֲלֵיהֶם? אָמַר לָהֶם: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁקִּבַּלְתִּי שָׂכָר עַל הַדְּרִישָׁה, כָּךְ קִבַּלְתִּי עַל הַפְּרִישָׁה. עַד שֶׁבָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְלִימֵּד: ״אֶת ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ תִּירָא״ – לְרַבּוֹת תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים.

His students said to him: Our teacher, what will be with all the occurrences of the word “et” that you interpreted until now? He said to them: Just as I received reward for the exposition, so I received reward for my withdrawal from using this method of exposition. The word “et” in this verse was not explained until Rabbi Akiva came and expounded: “You shall fear the Lord your God”: The word “et” serves to include Torah scholars, i.e., that one is commanded to fear them just as one fears God. In any event, Shimon HaAmasoni no longer derived additional halakhot from the word et.

בְּעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה: מְנָלַן? אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: ״כַּפָּרָה״ כְּתִיב בַּהּ, כְּקָדָשִׁים.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with a heifer whose neck is broken, she is not betrothed. The Gemara clarifies: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a heifer whose neck is broken? The school of Rabbi Yannai said: An expression of atonement was written with regard to it. The verse: “Atone for Your people Israel” (Deuteronomy 21:8), was written with regard to a heifer whose neck was broken, as was also written with regard to sacrificial animals. Therefore, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from it, just as one may not benefit from an offering.

״צִיפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע״ מְנָלַן? דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: נֶאֱמַר מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר מִבִּפְנִים, וְנֶאֱמַר מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר מִבַּחוּץ.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with the leper’s birds, she is not betrothed. The Gemara clarifies: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a leper’s birds? As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: A mitzva that enables is stated in the verses with regard to a leper, and the Torah also discusses a mitzva that atones, both of which are performed inside the Temple. Here, a mitzva that enables is a reference to the leper’s guilt-offering, which enables him to partake of offerings; and a mitzva that atones is a reference to all other offerings. And a mitzva that enables is stated in the verses with regard to a leper, and the Torah also discusses a mitzva that atones, both of which are performed outside the Temple. Here, a mitzva that enables is a reference to the leper’s birds, which permit him to reenter the camp; and a mitzva that atones is a reference to the heifer whose neck is broken, which atones for the inhabitants of the city nearest to an unsolved murder.

מָה מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר הָאָמוּר בִּפְנִים עָשָׂה בּוֹ מַכְשִׁיר כִּמְכַפֵּר – אַף מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר הָאָמוּר בַּחוּץ עָשָׂה בּוֹ מַכְשִׁיר כִּמְכַפֵּר.

Just as in the case of the enabling and atoning rites stated in the Torah that are performed inside the Temple the Torah made the item of the enabling rite, i.e., the leper’s guilt-offering, from which one is prohibited from deriving benefit, like the item of the atoning rite, i.e., offerings in general, so too, in the case of the enabling and atoning rites stated in the Torah that are performed outside the Temple the Torah made the item of the enabling rite, i.e., the leper’s birds, from which one is prohibited from deriving benefit, like the item of the atoning rite, i.e., the heifer whose neck is broken.

אִיתְּמַר: צִיפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע מֵאֵימָתַי אֲסוּרִים? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת לְקִיחָה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר מִשְּׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה, שְׁחִיטָה הוּא דְּאָסְרָה לַהּ. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת לְקִיחָה, מֵעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה נָפְקָא, מָה עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה מֵחַיִּים – אַף צִיפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע מֵחַיִּים.

It was stated that the amora’im disputed the following issue: From when is one prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From the moment of their slaughter; and Reish Lakish says: From the moment they are taken and designated to be a leper’s birds. The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From the moment of their slaughter, because it is the slaughter that prohibits them, since they are not consecrated beforehand. Reish Lakish says: From the moment they are taken, since this halakha is derived from the heifer whose neck is broken. Just as one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a heifer whose neck is broken during its lifetime, so too, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds during their lifetime.

וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה גּוּפַהּ מֵאֵימָתַי? אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: גְּבוּל שָׁמַעְתִּי בָּהּ וְשָׁכַחְתִּי, וְנָסְבִין חַבְרַיָּא לוֹמַר: יְרִידָתָהּ לְנַחַל אֵיתָן הִיא אוֹסַרְתָּהּ. אִי מָה עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה מִשְּׁעַת לְקִיחָה לָא מִיתַּסְרָא, אַף צִיפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע נָמֵי מִשְּׁעַת לְקִיחָה לָא מִיתַּסְרִי! הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם אִית לֵיהּ גְּבוּל אַחֲרִינָא, הָכָא מִי אִית לֵיהּ גְּבוּל אַחֲרִינָא?!

The Gemara asks: And with regard to it, the heifer whose neck is broken, itself, from when is it a forbidden item? Rabbi Yannai said: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which it is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is. But the group of scholars were inclined to say that its descent to a hard valley, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it forbidden. The Gemara asks: If so, just as with a heifer whose neck is broken, it is not forbidden from the moment it is taken but only afterward, so too, the leper’s birds should also not be forbidden from the moment they are taken. The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the heifer, it has another boundary that can render it forbidden, namely its descent to the valley; here, in the case of the leper’s birds, does it have another boundary? It is taken and immediately slaughtered.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: ״כׇּל צִפּוֹר טְהֹרָה תֹּאכֵלוּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַמְשׁוּלַּחַת, ״וְזֶה אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מֵהֶם״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁחוּטָה. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מֵחַיִּים אֲסוּרָה, לְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה מִיבַּעְיָא?! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַקֳּדָשִׁים, דְּמֵחַיִּים אֲסִירִי, וְאָתְיָא שְׁחִיטָה וּמַכְשְׁרָה לְהוּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a baraita: The verse states: “Of all clean birds you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:11). The superfluous word “all” is stated to include one of the leper’s birds, which is sent away to freedom, while the words: “But these are they of which you shall not eat” (Deuteronomy 14:12), are stated to include in the prohibition the other, slaughtered bird. Rabbi Yoḥanan asks: And if it enters your mind to say that the bird is forbidden from when it is alive, is a verse necessary to teach that it is forbidden after its slaughter? The Gemara answers: The verse is necessary, lest you say: Just as it is in the case of sacrificial animals, where one is prohibited from deriving benefit from them when they are alive, and the act of slaughter comes and renders them fit to be eaten, so too with regard to the bird. The verse teaches us that with regard to the leper’s bird this is not the case, and it remains forbidden even after it has been slaughtered.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: שְׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה – יִקַּח זוּג לַשְּׁנִיָּה, וְהָרִאשׁוֹנָה מוּתֶּרֶת בַּהֲנָאָה. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מֵחַיִּים אֲסוּרָה, הָרִאשׁוֹנָה אַמַּאי מוּתֶּרֶת בַּהֲנָאָה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה בִּבְנֵי מֵעֶיהָ, דְּלָא חָל עֲלַהּ קְדוּשָּׁה כְּלָל.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to Reish Lakish: The mishna (Nega’im 14:5) teaches that if one slaughtered one of the leper’s birds and it was found to be a bird with a condition that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa], a partner is taken for the second, i.e., remaining, bird, while with regard to the first bird, i.e., the tereifa, one is permitted to derive benefit from it. And if it enters your mind that the bird is forbidden from when it is alive, why is one permitted to derive benefit from the first one, if the prohibition took effect before it was slaughtered? Reish Lakish said to him: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the slaughtered bird was found to be a tereifa in its inner organs, so that the consecration did not take effect at all, as the bird was not fit to be used for this purpose.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: שְׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּאֵזוֹב וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּעֵץ אֶרֶז וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁנִי תוֹלַעַת, רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְהוּקְצָה לְמִצְוָתָהּ – אֲסוּרָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְנִשְׁחֲטָה שֶׁלֹּא כְּמִצְוָתָהּ – מוּתֶּרֶת.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to Reish Lakish from a baraita (Tosefta, Nega’im 8:8): If he slaughtered the bird without bringing a hyssop, or without bringing cedar wood, or without bringing a scarlet thread, which were all used in the rite, Rabbi Ya’akov says: Since the bird was set aside for its mitzva, it is forbidden anyway. Rabbi Shimon says: Since it was not slaughtered in accordance with its mitzva, it is permitted.

עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי אֶלָּא מָר סָבַר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה – שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, וּמָר סָבַר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה – לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה. דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִיהָא מֵחַיִּים לָא מִיתַּסְרָא!

Rabbi Yoḥanan infers from this: They disagree only with regard to this issue, that one Sage, Rabbi Ya’akov, holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, and the bird is therefore forbidden; and one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is not considered an act of slaughter at all, and therefore one is permitted to derive benefit from the bird. But everyone agrees at least that one is not prohibited from deriving benefit from it when it is alive, but only after it has been slaughtered.

תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: נֶאֱמַר מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר מִבִּפְנִים, וְנֶאֱמַר מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר בַּחוּץ.

Reish Lakish replied: I concede that this baraita does not accord with my opinion, but this issue is a dispute between the tanna’im. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: A mitzva that enables is stated in the verses with regard to a leper, and the Torah also discusses a mitzva that atones, both of which are performed inside the Temple. And a mitzva that enables is stated in the verses with regard to a leper, and the Torah also discusses a mitzva that atones, both of which are performed outside the Temple.

מָה מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר הָאָמוּר בִּפְנִים – עָשָׂה בּוֹ מַכְשִׁיר כִּמְכַפֵּר, אַף מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר הָאָמוּר בַּחוּץ – עָשָׂה בּוֹ מַכְשִׁיר כִּמְכַפֵּר.

The baraita continues: Just as in the case of the enabling and atoning rites stated in the Torah that are performed inside the Temple the Torah made the item of the enabling rite like the item of the atoning rite, so too, in the case of the enabling and atoning rites stated in the Torah that are performed outside the Temple, the Torah made the item of the enabling rite like the item of the atoning rite. The baraita of the school of Rabbi Yishmael compares the leper’s birds to a heifer whose neck is broken, and therefore would also prohibit one from deriving benefit from the birds before they are slaughtered. The opinion of Reish Lakish is therefore in accordance with that baraita.

גּוּפָא: ״כָּל צִפּוֹר טְהֹרָה תֹּאכֵלוּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַמְשׁוּלַּחַת, ״וְזֶה אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מֵהֶם״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁחוּטָה.

With regard to the matter itself, the baraita teaches: The verse states: “Of all clean birds you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:11). The superfluous word “all” is stated to include one of the leper’s birds, which is sent away to freedom, while the words: “But these are they of which you shall not eat” (Deuteronomy 14:12), are stated to include in the prohibition the other, slaughtered bird.

וְאֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא! אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי: לֹא מָצִינוּ בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים שֶׁאֲסוּרִים. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: וְלָא הֲרֵי

The Gemara questions this interpretation: And I will reverse the exposition, and say that one may derive benefit from the slaughtered bird and not from the one that was sent away. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: The reason to expound the verse as the baraita does is that we have not found kosher living creatures that are permanently forbidden with regard to eating. Therefore, it stands to reason that the slaughtered bird is forbidden, not the living one. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak objects to this explanation: But haven’t we found kosher living animals that are permanently forbidden? But there are

מוּקְצֶה וְנֶעֱבָד, דְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים נִינְהוּ וַאֲסִירִי! כִּי אֲסִירִי – לְגָבוֹהַּ, לְהֶדְיוֹט – מִישְׁרֵא שְׁרֵי.

the cases of an animal set aside as an offering to an idol, and an animal that was itself worshipped as an idol, which are living creatures and yet are permanently forbidden. The Gemara answers: There is a difference, as when they are forbidden, they are forbidden only to be used for the Most High, i.e., to be used as offerings in the Temple service, but it is permitted for a common Jew to derive benefit from them.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הֲרֵי רוֹבֵעַ וְנִרְבָּע בְּעֵדִים, דְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים נִינְהוּ וַאֲסִירִי! אֶלָּא: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי: לֹא מָצִינוּ רוֹב בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים שֶׁאֲסוּרִים.

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan: But an animal that copulated with a woman, and an animal that copulated with a man, in the presence of witnesses, they are living creatures and yet they are permanently forbidden, as the halakha is that these animals are killed, and one is prohibited from deriving benefit from them once they have been sentenced. Rather, the above explanation should be emended to say: Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: We have not found most kosher living creatures that are permanently forbidden while they are still alive, and it can be assumed that the inclusion of the verse is referring to that which is generally forbidden, even if there are exceptions.

דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְשִׁלַּח עַל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה״ – כְּשָׂדֶה, מָה שָׂדֶה מוּתֶּרֶת – אַף הַאי נָמֵי מוּתֶּרֶת. הַאי ״שָׂדֶה״ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא? הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״שָׂדֶה״ – שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲמוֹד בְּיָפוֹ וְיִזְרְקֶנָּה לַיָּם, בִּגְבָת וְיִזְרְקֶנָּה לַמִּדְבָּר, וְשֶׁלֹּא יַעֲמוֹד חוּץ לָעִיר וְיִזְרְקֶנָּה בְּתוֹךְ הָעִיר. אֶלָּא כֹּל שֶׁעוֹמֵד בָּעִיר וְיִזְרְקֶנָּה חוּץ לַחוֹמָה.

The Gemara offers another answer to the question of how the baraita knew which bird the verse is permitting. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states: “And shall let go the living bird into the open field” (Leviticus 14:7), which indicates that the bird is like a field: Just as a field is permitted, so too, this bird is also permitted. The Gemara asks: Is that word “field” coming to teach this? That word is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The word “field” teaches that one may not stand in Jaffa and throw the bird that is set free to the sea, or stand in Gevat and throw it to the desert, and that he may not stand outside the city and throw it inside the city. Rather, any manner in which he is standing in the city and throws it outside the wall to the field is valid. The word “field” teaches that one must set it free only to the field and nowhere else, not to teach that the bird is permitted.

וְאִידַּךְ? אִם כֵּן נִיכְתּוֹב קְרָא: ״שָׂדֶה״, מַאי ״הַשָּׂדֶה״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

And the other tanna, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who derives that one is permitted to derive benefit from the bird based on the word “field,” replies: If so, that this was the only halakha the word is teaching, let the Torah write “field”; what is the significance of “the field”? Conclude two conclusions from it, i.e., both the place to throw the bird and the permission to derive benefit.

רָבָא אָמַר: לֹא אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״שַׁלַּח״ לְתַקָּלָה.

Rava says a different answer to the question of how the baraita knew which bird the verse is permitting: The Torah did not say “let go” for it to serve as a stumbling block. If the bird sent free was forbidden, the Torah would not have commanded him to send it away, since people might eat it unwittingly.

בִּשְׂעַר נָזִיר. מְנָלַן? דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״קָדֹשׁ יִהְיֶה גַּדֵּל פֶּרַע שְׂעַר רֹאשׁוֹ״ – גִּידּוּלוֹ יִהְיֶה קָדוֹשׁ.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with a nazirite’s hair, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a nazirite’s hair? The Gemara answers: As the verse states with regard to a nazirite: “He shall be holy [kadosh], he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long” (Numbers 6:5), which teaches: His hair growth shall be holy.

אִי מָה קֹדֶשׁ תּוֹפֵס אֶת דָּמָיו, וְיוֹצֵא לְחוּלִּין – אַף שְׂעַר נָזִיר תּוֹפֵס אֶת דָּמָיו וְיוֹצֵא לְחוּלִּין! מִי קָרֵינַן ״קוֹדֶשׁ״? ״קָדוֹשׁ״ קָרֵינַן.

The Gemara asks: If the hair of a nazirite can be compared to consecrated property by use of the term “holy,” then just as with regard to consecrated property, it transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and it becomes desacralized, so too, a nazirite’s hair should transfer its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and the hair itself should become desacralized. This is not the halakha. The Gemara answers: Do we read holy [kodesh] in this verse, which is the term the verse uses for a consecrated item (see Leviticus 22:14)? We read “holy [kadosh].” Since a different conjugation of the term is used, the halakhot of the hair of a nazirite are not derived from those of consecrated property.

בְּפֶטֶר חֲמוֹר. נֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּתַנְיָא: פֶּטֶר חֲמוֹר אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey, she is not betrothed. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn donkey, deriving benefit from it is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits it. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: The mishna can be referring to one who betrothed a woman with a firstborn donkey after it has had its neck broken, and everyone agrees that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the donkey once its neck is broken.

בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב. מְנָלַן? דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים: אֶחָד אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה, וְאֶחָד אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה, וְאֶחָד אִיסּוּר בִּישּׁוּל.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with meat cooked in milk, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from meat cooked in milk? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The Torah states three times: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19; Exodus 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21). One verse serves to teach the prohibition against eating meat cooked in milk, and one verse serves to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from meat cooked in milk, and one verse serves to teach the prohibition against cooking meat in milk.

מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״, וּלְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְאַנְשֵׁי קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיוּן לִי״. מָה לְהַלָּן אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה – אַף כָּאן אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה.

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says: It is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk but one is permitted to derive benefit from it, as it is stated: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and it states there with regard to the prohibition of an unslaughtered animal carcass: “And you shall be holy men to Me” (Exodus 22:30). Since both verses employ the term “holy” he derives: Just as there, in the case of an animal carcass, it is prohibited to eat it but one is permitted to derive benefit from it, as the Torah explicitly states that it may be sold to a gentile, so too here, with regard to meat cooked in milk, it is prohibited to eat it but one is permitted to derive benefit from it.

וְחוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: שְׁחוֹט לִי – בְּשֶׁלִּי. וְשֶׁלָּךְ – בְּשֶׁלָּךְ. מַה שֶׁלִּי בְּשֶׁלָּךְ – אָסוּר, אַף שֶׁלָּךְ בְּשֶׁלִּי – אָסוּר.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with the items it enumerated, or with non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, i.e., that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: The Torah said: Slaughter for Me, i.e., for offerings to God, in My place, inside the Temple courtyard, and your non-sacred animals that are intended for eating should be slaughtered in your place, outside the Temple courtyard. Just as one is prohibited from deriving benefit from My consecrated animals if they were slaughtered in your place, as one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a consecrated animal slaughtered outside the Temple, so too, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from your non-sacred animals if they were slaughtered in My place.

אִי מָה שֶׁלִּי בְּשֶׁלָּךְ עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, אַף שֶׁלָּךְ בְּשֶׁלִּי עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ לְהַקְרִיב קׇרְבָּן לַה׳… וְנִכְרַת״, עַל קׇרְבָּן – עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, עַל חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה – אֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת.

The Gemara asks: If so, just as the act of slaughtering My consecrated animals in your place is punishable by karet, so too, to the act of slaughtering your non-sacred animals in My place should be punishable by karet. To counter this logic, the verse states: “If a man from the house of Israel slaughters an ox or lamb…and has not brought it to the door of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering to the Lord…and that man shall be cut off” (Leviticus 17:3–4). This teaches that it is only for an offering that one slaughtered outside the Tent of Meeting of the Tabernacle, or the Temple courtyard, that he is punishable with karet, but for non-sacred animals that one slaughtered in the Temple courtyard he is not punishable with karet.

אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְשֶׁלִּי בְּשֶׁלָּךְ – שֶׁכֵּן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת!

The Gemara asks: In light of the above difference in halakha between these two cases, the entire comparison can be refuted in the following manner: What is an aspect unique to slaughtering My consecrated animals in your place? It is that it is punishable by karet, and is therefore a severe prohibition, which could explain the halakha that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from them. The prohibition against slaughtering a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard, which is not punishable by karet, could be regarded as a less severe prohibition, and perhaps in this case it is permitted to derive benefit from the slaughtered animal. Therefore, the halakha that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard still does not have a source.

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מֵהָכָא: ״וּשְׁחָטוֹ״ ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ״ ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ״. תְּלָתָא קְרָאֵי יַתִּירֵי, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר?

Abaye quotes a lengthy baraita that serves as a source for the halakha that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Rather, Abaye said it is derived from here: The Torah states three verses that have a superfluous element with regard to the various species from which one may bring a peace-offering: The verse “and he slaughters it” (Leviticus 3:2), the verse “and he shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 3:8), and the verse “and he shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 3:13). The Torah could simply have stated: “And he shall slaughter,” without adding: “It.” Why must the verse state the term “it” these three times?

לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם… וְזָבַחְתָּ״, בְּרִחוּק מָקוֹם אַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ וְאִי אַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ בְּמָקוֹם קָרוֹב, פְּרָט לְחוּלִּין שֶׁלֹּא יִשָּׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה.

The baraita continues: The source for the halakha is because it is stated with regard to the ritual slaughter of animals for meat consumption: “If the place which the Lord your God shall choose to put His name there be too far from you, then you shall slaughter of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:21), from which it is derived: When you are far from the place, i.e., the Temple, you may slaughter non-sacred animals for meat consumption, but you may not slaughter non-sacred animals in a near place, i.e., in the Temple. The verse serves to exclude non-sacred animals, thereby teaching that they may not be slaughtered in the Temple courtyard.

וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא תְּמִימִים הָרְאוּיִם לִיקָּרֵב, מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי אֶת בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִים, שֶׁכֵּן: מִין הַמַּכְשִׁיר. מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַחַיָּה? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי אֶת הַחַיָּה, שֶׁהִיא בִּשְׁחִיטָה כִּבְהֵמָה. מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָעוֹפוֹת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּשְׁחָטוֹ״ ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ״ ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ״.

The baraita continues: And I have derived the prohibition against slaughtering a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard only with regard to unblemished animals, which are fit to be sacrificed. From where do I know to include even blemished animals, which are not fit to be sacrificed, in this prohibition? I include blemished animals since they are at least of the type that is fit to be sacrificed. From where do I know to include the undomesticated animal, which is never sacrificed as an offering, in this prohibition? I include the undomesticated animal since it is rendered fit for consumption by means of slaughtering, like a domesticated animal. From where do I know to include fowl, as the Torah does not mention slaughter with regard to fowl, in this prohibition? The verse states: “And he slaughters it,” “and he shall slaughter it,” as well as “and he shall slaughter it,” employing the additional term “it” each time. These three verses teach that one may not slaughter any non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard.

יָכוֹל לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, וְאִם שָׁחַט יְהֵא מוּתָּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם… וְזָבַחְתָּ… וְאָכַלְתָּ״, מַה שֶּׁאַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ בְּרִחוּק מָקוֹם – אַתָּה אוֹכֵל, וְאִי אַתָּה אוֹכֵל מַה שֶּׁאַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ בְּמָקוֹם קָרוֹב, פְּרָט לְחוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that one may not slaughter ab initio but if he did slaughter it would be permitted for him to eat it. Therefore, the verse states: “If the place which the Lord your God shall choose to put His name there be too far from you, then you shall slaughter of your herd and of your flock, which the Lord has given you, as I have commanded you, and you shall eat within your gates, after all the desire of your soul” (Deuteronomy 12:21), which is expounded as follows: That which you slaughter in a far place, outside the Temple, you may eat, but you may not eat that which you slaughter in a near place, which excludes non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is prohibited to eat a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard even after the fact.

וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא תְּמִימִים

The baraita continues: And I have derived only that the prohibition against eating the meat after the fact applies to unblemished animals,