Kiddushin 58

Kiddushin 58

הָרְאוּיִם לִיקְרַב, מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, שֶׁכֵּן: מִין הַמַּכְשִׁיר. וּמִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַחַיָּה? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי אֶת הַחַיָּה, שֶׁהִיא בִּשְׁחִיטָה כִּבְהֵמָה. מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָעוֹפוֹת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּשְׁחָטוֹ״ ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ״ ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ״.

which are fit to be sacrificed. From where do I know to include blemished animals in this prohibition? I include blemished animals since they are at least of the type that is fit to be sacrificed. And from where do I know to include the undomesticated animal in this prohibition? I include the undomesticated animal since it is rendered fit for consumption by means of slaughtering, like a domesticated animal. From where do I know to include birds, as the Torah does not mention slaughter with regard to birds, in this prohibition? The verse states: “And he slaughters it,” “and he shall slaughter it,” as well as “and he shall slaughter it,” employing the additional term “it” each time. These three verses teach that one may not eat from a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard

יָכוֹל לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, וְאִם שָׁחַט יַשְׁלִיכֶנּוּ לִפְנֵי כְלָבִים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לַכֶּלֶב תַּשְׁלִכוּן אֹתוֹ״ – אוֹתוֹ אַתָּה מַשְׁלִיךְ לַכֶּלֶב, וְאִי אַתָּה מַשְׁלִיךְ חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that he may not slaughter a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard ab initio, but if he did slaughter it, he may cast it before the dogs, i.e., derive benefit from it. The verse states: “Therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30), which teaches that although one is prohibited from eating the meat of a tereifa, one may derive benefit from it. The word “it” serves to emphasize and exclude: You may cast it, i.e., a tereifa, to the dogs, but you may not cast non-sacred animals that have been slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, as it is prohibited to derive any benefit from them.

אַשְׁכְּחִינְהוּ מָר יְהוּדָה לְרַב יוֹסֵף וּלְרַב שְׁמוּאֵל בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה דַּהֲווֹ קָיְימִי אַפִּיתְחָא דְּבֵי רַבָּה. אֲמַר לְהוּ: תַּנְיָא: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּפֶטֶר חֲמוֹר, בְּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב, וּבְחוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בָּעֲזָרָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אַלְמָא חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

The Gemara relates: Mar Yehuda found Rav Yosef and Rav Shmuel, son of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, standing at the entrance of Rabba’s study hall. He said to them: It is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey, with meat cooked in milk, or with non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says she is betrothed, and the Rabbis say she is not betrothed. Apparently, according to Rabbi Shimon, the prohibition against deriving benefit from non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is not by Torah law, which is why the betrothal takes effect.

וּרְמִינְהוּ: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה – יִשָּׂרְפוּ, וְכֵן חַיָּה שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה בַּעֲזָרָה. אִישְׁתִּיקוּ.

And Mar Yehuda raises a contradiction against this inference from a different baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: Non-sacred, domesticated, animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard must be burned, as well as a non-sacred undomesticated animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. This indicates that it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. They were silent and had no answer.

אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּה. אֲמַר לְהוּ: פָּלְגָאָ[ה] אוֹקְמִינְכוּ, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְטַעְמֵיהּ.

They came before Rabba and told him about this difficulty. He said to them: A quarrelsome person has put you up to asking this question. With what are we dealing here in the first baraita? We are dealing with a case where it was slaughtered and found to be a tereifa, and Rabbi Shimon conforms to his standard line of reasoning that an act of slaughter which does not render the animal permitted to be eaten is not called slaughter, so the animal does not have the status of a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard.

דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵיפָה וְכֵן הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה – זֶה וָזֶה חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר בַּהֲנָאָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים.

As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ḥullin 2:4): With regard to one who slaughters a known tereifa, as well as one who slaughters an animal and it was found to be a tereifa, and this and that were non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon permits one to derive benefit from them, as explained previously. And the Rabbis prohibit one from deriving benefit from them, since they do not distinguish between an act of slaughter that does render the animal permitted to be eaten and one that does not. It is only in a case where the man betrothed her with a tereifa that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard that Rabbi Shimon says she is betrothed, but not when the animal was not a tereifa.

מְכָרָן וְקִידֵּשׁ בִּדְמֵיהֶן – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מְנָלַן? מִדְּגַלִּי רַחֲמָנָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה: ״וְהָיִיתָ חֵרֶם כָּמֹהוּ״, כֹּל שֶׁאַתָּה מְהַיֶּיה הֵימֶנָּה – הֲרֵי הוּא כָּמוֹהוּ, מִכְּלָל דְּכׇל אִיסּוּרִים שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה שְׁרוּ.

§ The mishna teaches that if one sold any of the items from which one is prohibited to derive benefit and betrothed a woman with the money received from their sale, she is betrothed. With regard to the possibility of deriving benefit from money received in exchange for items from which benefit is forbidden, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive that this is permitted? The Gemara answers: It is from the fact that the Merciful One reveals in the Torah with regard to an object of idol worship: “And you shall be banned like it” (Deuteronomy 7:26), which teaches that anything that you cause to come from it, i.e., in exchange for it, is like it. It can be understood by inference that with regard to all the other prohibitions of the Torah, monies received for items from which benefit is forbidden are permitted.

וְנֵילַף מִינַּהּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּשְׁבִיעִית שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד, וְכֹל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.

The Gemara suggests: But let us derive a general principle concerning other prohibitions from the case of idolatry. The Gemara answers: This derivation is not applied, because an object of idol worship and produce of the Sabbatical Year are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, since both prohibitions also extend to the money obtained for them, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases.

עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. שְׁבִיעִית מַאי הִיא? ״יוֹבֵל הִיא קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיֶה לָכֶם״ – מָה קוֹדֶשׁ תּוֹפֵס אֶת דָּמָיו, אַף שְׁבִיעִית תּוֹפֶסֶת דָּמֶיהָ.

The Gemara clarifies: The source indicating that this is true of an object of idol worship is what we said. What is the source indicating that this halakha applies to produce of the Sabbatical Year? The verse states: “It is a Jubilee, it shall be holy to you” (Leviticus 25:12), from which it is derived: Just as consecrated property transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed, so too, produce of the Sabbatical Year, which has the same status as the Jubilee Year, transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed. Consequently, money used to acquire the produce of the Sabbatical Year will be subject to the same halakhot as the produce itself.

אִי מָה קוֹדֶשׁ תּוֹפֵס אֶת דָּמָיו וְיוֹצֵא לְחוּלִּין, אַף שְׁבִיעִית תּוֹפֶסֶת דָּמֶיהָ וְיוֹצְאָה לְחוּלִּין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תִּהְיֶה״ – בַּהֲוָיָיתָהּ תְּהֵא.

If so, one could also say that just as with consecrated property, it transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and becomes desacralized, so too, produce of the Sabbatical Year should transfer its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and becomes desacralized. Nevertheless, the verse states: “Shall be,” meaning: As it is, so it shall be, indicating that the Sabbatical-Year produce does not become desacralized.

כֵּיצַד? לָקַח בְּפֵירוֹת שְׁבִיעִית בָּשָׂר – אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ מִתְבַּעֲרִים בַּשְּׁבִיעִית. בַּבָּשָׂר דָּגִים – יָצָא בָּשָׂר נִכְנְסוּ דָּגִים. בְּדָגִים יַיִן – יָצְאוּ דָּגִים נִכְנַס יַיִן. בְּיַיִן שֶׁמֶן – יָצָא יַיִן נִכְנַס שֶׁמֶן. הָא כֵּיצַד? אַחֲרוֹן אַחֲרוֹן נִתְפָּס בַּשְּׁבִיעִית, וּפְירִי עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר.

The Gemara explains: How so? If one purchased meat with produce of the Sabbatical Year, both these and those, i.e., the meat and the produce, are disposed of in the Sabbatical Year. The sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect with regard to the meat as well. It is treated like the produce, and must be disposed of when the obligation to dispose of the Sabbatical-Year produce goes into effect. If he then purchases fish with this meat, the meat loses its consecrated status, and the fish assumes the consecrated state. If he then purchases wine with these fish, the fish loses its consecrated status and the wine assumes the consecrated state. If he then purchases oil with the wine, the wine loses has its consecrated status and the oil assumes the consecrated state. How so? The final item purchased has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year transferred to it, and the Sabbatical-Year produce itself remains forbidden.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין מְלַמְּדִין, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? [תְּרֵי] מִיעוּטֵי כְּתִיבִי, כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״כִּי חֵרֶם הוּא״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״יוֹבֵל הִיא״ – הִיא אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא לָא.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases. But according to the one who says that they do teach their common aspect to apply to other cases, what can be said? Why is it not learned from these examples that money received from the sale of an item from which benefit is forbidden, is likewise forbidden? The Gemara answers: Expressions of restriction are written in both cases. Here, with regard to idol worship, it is written: “For it is banned” (Deuteronomy 7:26), which indicates only that it is banned, i.e., has its prohibition extend to money received from its sale, while other prohibited items are not. And there, with regard to produce of the Sabbatical Year, it is written: “It is a Jubilee” (Leviticus 25:12), which teaches that with regard to “it,” yes, this halakha applies; but this halakha does not apply to anything else.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בִּתְרוּמוֹת וּבַמַּעַשְׂרוֹת, וּבַמַּתָּנוֹת, וּבְמֵי חַטָּאת, וּבְאֵפֶר חַטָּאת – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל.

MISHNA: With regard to one who betroths a woman with terumot, or with tithes, or with the foreleg, cheeks, and stomach of an animal, which are given as gifts to priests, or with the water of purification, which is sprinkled on an impure person during the purification rite for impurity imparted by a corpse, or with the ashes of purification, which were mixed with the water sprinkled on an impure person during the purification rite for impurity imparted by a corpse, in all of these cases she is betrothed, and this is so even if the man betrothing her is an Israelite, not a priest or a Levite.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר עוּלָּא: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא לְעוּלָּא: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בִּתְרוּמוֹת, וּבְמַעַשְׂרוֹת, וּבַמַּתָּנוֹת בְּמֵי חַטָּאת, וּבְאֵפֶר פָּרָה – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל.

GEMARA: Ulla says: The benefit of discretion, i.e., the benefit accrued from the option of giving teruma and tithes to whichever priest or Levite one chooses, does not have monetary value. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from the mishna: With regard to one who betroths a woman with terumot, or with tithes, or with gifts, with the water of purification, or with the ashes of the red heifer, she is betrothed, and this is so even if the man betrothing her is an Israelite. This indicates that although an Israelite cannot consume the priestly gifts, he may nevertheless betroth a woman with them, since he possesses the option to give them to the priest or Levite of his choice. That benefit has monetary value, and it is that value that he uses to betroth a woman, who can then give them to whichever priest or Levite she chooses.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכָא בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לוֹ טְבָלִים מִבֵּית אֲבִי אִמּוֹ כֹּהֵן. וְקָא סָבַר: מַתָּנוֹת שֶׁלֹּא הוּרְמוּ כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין.

Ulla said to him: You have misunderstood the case of the mishna, since here the case is with an Israelite who came into possession of untithed produce as an inheritance from the household of his mother’s father, who was a priest, and the tanna of the mishna holds that gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they have been separated. The untithed produce is not viewed as one entity, but rather is viewed as a mixture of regular produce, teruma, and tithes. This teruma belonged to his grandfather, who was a priest. Since he has inherited this teruma, he has ownership rights to it in addition to the benefit of discretion. While he cannot consume this produce because he is an Israelite, he can sell it to a priest and keep the money. Since it has actual value, it can be used to betroth a woman.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין מֵרַב הוּנָא: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה מָמוֹן אוֹ אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנֵיתוּהָ: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בִּתְרוּמוֹת וּבְמַעַשְׂרוֹת וּבְמַתָּנוֹת בְּמֵי חַטָּאת וּבְאֵפֶר פָּרָה – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְלָאו אוֹקֵימְנָא בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לוֹ טְבָלִים מִבֵּית אֲבִי אִמּוֹ כֹּהֵן?

With regard to this issue, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin inquired of Rav Huna: Does the benefit of discretion have monetary value, or does it not have monetary value? Rav Huna said to him: You learned it in the mishna: With regard to one who betroths a woman with terumot, or with tithes, or with gifts, or with the water of purification, or with the ashes of the red heifer, she is betrothed, and this is so even if the man betrothing her is an Israelite. This indicates that the benefit of discretion has monetary value. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him: But didn’t we establish it, in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as referring to an Israelite who came into possession of untithed produce as an inheritance from the household of his mother’s father, who was a priest?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוּצָאָה אַתְּ. אִיכְּסִיף, הוּא סָבַר: מִשְּׁמַעְתָּא קָאָמַר לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי קָאָמֵינָא: רַב אַסִּי דְּהוּצָל קָאֵי כְּוָתָיךְ.

Rav Huna said to him: You are out [hotza’a]. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin was embarrassed, as he thought Rav Huna told him he was out, i.e., wrong, due to the halakha he stated. Sensing Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s embarrassment, Rav Huna said to him: This is what I said: You are a Hutzla’a, as Rav Asi, from the town of Huzal, stands in accordance with your opinion.

נֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַגּוֹנֵב טִבְלוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם לוֹ דְּמֵי טִבְלוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא דְּמֵי חוּלִּין שֶׁבּוֹ. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה מָמוֹן, וּמָר סָבַר: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. The baraita (Tosefta, Ma’aser Sheni 3:9) taught: One who steals another’s untithed produce pays him the full value of the other’s untithed produce; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He pays only the value of the non-sacred produce that it contains. What, is it not the case that they disagree about this issue: That one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that the benefit of discretion has monetary value, so he must be compensated beyond the value of the non-sacred produce; and one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and only the non-sacred produce is of value to the owner.

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן, וְהָכָא בִּטְבָלִים שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לוֹ מִבֵּית אֲבִי אִמּוֹ כֹּהֵן וּבְמַתָּנוֹת שֶׁלֹּא הוּרְמוּ כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין קָמִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין. וּמָר סָבַר: לָאו כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין.

The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and here the case is with an Israelite who came into possession of untithed produce as an inheritance from the household of his mother’s father, who was a priest. And they disagree with regard to the question of whether or not gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they have been separated. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that they are considered as though they have been separated, which means that the grandson inherited the teruma itself from his grandfather, so the thief must repay him the value of the terumot and tithes as well. And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that such gifts are not considered as though they have been separated; and the produce is viewed as regular untithed produce, where the Israelite has only the benefit of discretion, which is of no monetary value.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין וְטוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן, וְהָכָא בְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: חִיטָּה אַחַת פּוֹטֶרֶת אֶת הַכְּרִי.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the gifts are considered as though they have been separated, and that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value. The case is not concerning an Israelite who came into possession of untithed produce as an inheritance from the household of his mother’s father; rather, it is concerning regular untithed produce, and here they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: By Torah law, even one grain given as teruma exempts the entire heap, since the Torah does not specify a minimum amount for teruma.

דְּמָר אִית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

As one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, so the thief must pay the value of the untithed produce as well, since the owner can say that he would separate a single grain as teruma for the entire heap and the rest would remain non-sacred produce. And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, which means that when the owner makes his claim he must subtract at least one-sixtieth of the total amount as teruma.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לֵית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי, דְּקַנְסוּהוּ רַבָּנַן לְגַנָּב.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel; and here, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Although the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and by right should not lead to reimbursement, the Sages penalized the thief. If he did not need to pay for the teruma contained in the produce, he would have been able to keep it, as no priest has the legal ability to demand that the teruma be given specifically to him.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּקַנְסוּהוּ רַבָּנַן לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת, דְּלָא אִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְשַׁהוֹיֵהּ לְטִיבְלֵיהּ.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and here, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: The Sages penalized the owner, since he should not have left his untithed produce in that state, and should have separated teruma without delay.

תְּנַן: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בִּתְרוּמוֹת, וּבַמַּעַשְׂרוֹת, וּבַמַּתָּנוֹת, בְּמֵי חַטָּאת, וּבְאֵפֶר פָּרָה – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאַף עַל פִּי יִשְׂרָאֵל. וּרְמִינְהוּ: הַנּוֹטֵל שָׂכָר לָדוּן – דִּינָיו בְּטֵלִים, לְהָעִיד – עֵדוּתוֹ בְּטֵלָה, לְהַזּוֹת וּלְקַדֵּשׁ – מֵימָיו מֵי מְעָרָה, וְאֶפְרוֹ אֵפֶר מִקְלֶה!

We learned in the mishna: With regard to one who betroths a woman with terumot, or with tithes, or with the gifts given to priests, or with the water of purification, or with the ashes of the red heifer, in all of these cases she is betrothed, and this is so even if the man betrothing her is an Israelite. And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this from the following baraita (Tosefta, Bekhorot 3:5): With regard to one who accepts payment to judge, his judgments are nullified. Similarly, with regard to one who accepts payment to testify, his testimony is nullified. With regard to one who accepts payment to sprinkle the purification water on one who was impure from impurity imparted by a corpse, or to sanctify the purification water by placing the ashes of the red heifer in them, his water is considered cave water, which is generally foul, and his ashes are burnt ashes. Using these items to betroth a woman is analogous to being paid for them, so they should be considered as having no monetary value, and the betrothal should not take effect.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בְּשָׂכָר הֲבָאָה וּמִילּוּי, כָּאן בִּשְׂכַר הַזָּאָה וְקִידּוּשׁ.

Abaye said: This is not difficult, since here, the mishna is referring to one who betroths a woman with the value of the payment for bringing and filling the vessel with the purification waters, for which one is permitted to accept payment. Performing this act for the woman is comparable to giving her an item of value, since she will not have to pay someone to bring and fill the vessel for her. There, the baraita dealing with one who accepts payment for sprinkling or sanctifying the water is referring to payment for the actual sprinkling and sanctifying.

דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי הָכָא: ״בְּמֵי חַטָּאת וּבְאֵפֶר פָּרָה״, וְקָתָנֵי הָתָם: ״לְהַזּוֹת וּלְקַדֵּשׁ״. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara comments: According to this answer, the language of the mishna and the baraita is also precise, as it teaches here, in the mishna, that she is betrothed with the water of purification or with the ashes of purification, which indicates that the water and ashes have not yet been mixed together; and it teaches there, in the baraita: To sprinkle or to sanctify, indicating that he receives payment for the actual sprinkling and sanctification. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the correct explanation of the mishna and the baraita.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ

הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה פְּלוֹנִית״, וְהָלַךְ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ לְעַצְמוֹ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי. וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ וּבָא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁה בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִשְׁנֵי. בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן – תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה.

MISHNA: With regard to one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, she is betrothed to the second man. This is a full-fledged betrothal, so that if she is an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest, she may partake of teruma.

״מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ וּבָא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁה בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן, אוֹ בַת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל – לֹא תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה.

If the first man said to the woman: You are hereby betrothed to me from now, and only after thirty days shall the betrothal take effect, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed to each of them. Consequently, if she was the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest, or the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma. Since her betrothal is uncertain, the daughter of a non-priest cannot be considered the wife of a priest, and similarly a priest’s daughter who is doubtfully married to an Israelite loses her right to partake of teruma as the daughter of a priest.

גְּמָ׳ הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ״. תָּנָא: מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי, אֶלָּא שֶׁנָּהַג בּוֹ מִנְהַג רַמָּאוּת. וְתַנָּא דִּידַן, ״הָלַךְ״ נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי – הָלַךְ בְּרַמָּאוּת.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that in the case of one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. A tanna taught concerning this issue: What he did is done; it is effective and the woman is betrothed to the second man, but he has treated him, i.e., the first man, in a deceitful manner, and it is prohibited to act in this fashion. The Gemara explains: And the tanna of our mishna, when he teaches the apparently superfluous term: Went, also indicates that he went and acted deceitfully.

מַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ״,

§ The Gemara asks a question concerning the language of the mishna: What is different here that the mishna teaches: With regard to one man who says to another,