Kiddushin 59
וּמַאי שְׁנָא הָתָם דְּקָתָנֵי ״הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ״?
and what is different there, in the previous chapter (50a), that the tanna teaches: With regard to one who says to his agent, go and betroth a certain woman for me in such and such a place, and he went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed? Why does the mishna there label him an agent, and here it labels him simply another?
הָכָא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, וְהָתָם רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. הָכָא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דְּאִי תְּנָא ״שְׁלוּחוֹ״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: שְׁלוּחוֹ הוּא דְּהָוֵי רַמַּאי, דְּסָמְכָה דַּעְתֵּיהּ, סָבַר: עָבֵד לִי שְׁלִיחוּתַי, אֲבָל חֲבֵירוֹ, דְּלָא סָמְכָה דַּעְתֵּיהּ, אֵימָא לָא לֶיהֱוֵי רַמַּאי.
The Gemara answers: Here the mishna teaches us a novel element and there it teaches us a novel element, through its use of these terms. The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: His agent, I would say that it is his agent who is considered a scoundrel in that case, as one who sends an agent relies upon him, thinking: He will perform my agency for me, since he was sent for that purpose. But with regard to the use of the term: Another, who was not appointed and upon whom he does not rely, as he is not his agent, you might say that he should not be considered a scoundrel.
הָתָם רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דְּאִי תְּנָא: ״הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חֲבֵירוֹ הוּא דְּכִי קִדְּשָׁהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, דְּסָבַר: לָא טָרַח, אֲבָל שְׁלוּחוֹ דְּטָרַח אֵימָא: מַרְאֶה מָקוֹם הוּא לוֹ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Similarly, the mishna there teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: One who says to another, I would say that it is in the case of another that she is not betrothed if he betrothed her in a different place, as he thinks that this person would not go to the trouble of looking for her elsewhere, and therefore he authorized him to betroth the woman only in that particular place. But with regard to his agent, who is assumed to take special trouble to fulfill his agency, you might say he is merely showing him the place where she is likely to be found, and she is betrothed in any case. The mishna therefore teaches us that even when he appointed an agent she is not betrothed if he does not find her in the place the putative husband specified.
רָבִין חֲסִידָא אֲזַיל לְקַדּוֹשֵׁי לֵיהּ אִיתְּתָא לִבְרֵיהּ, קַידְּשַׁהּ לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ. וְהָתַנְיָא: מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה – עָשׂוּי, אֶלָּא שֶׁנָּהַג בּוֹ מִנְהַג רַמָּאוּת! לָא יַהֲבוּהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ. אִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְאוֹדוֹעֵי! סָבַר: אַדְּהָכִי וְהָכִי אֲתָא אִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא מְקַדֵּשׁ לַהּ.
The Gemara relates: Ravin the Pious was appointed an agent and went to betroth a woman to his son, but in the end he betrothed her to himself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in the aforementioned baraita: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? How could a pious individual act in this fashion? The Gemara answers: The woman’s family would not give her to the son, and agreed only to let her marry the father. The Gemara further asks: Even so, before betrothing her he should have first informed his son that they refuse to let her marry him. The Gemara explains that Ravin thought: In the meantime, while I am busy reporting back to my son, someone else will come and betroth her.
רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה יְהַיב לֵיהּ זוּזֵי לְרַב, אֲמַר: זִבְנַהּ נִיהֲלִי לְהַאי אַרְעָא. אֲזַל זַבְנַהּ לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ. וְהָתַנְיָא: מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה – עָשׂוּי, אֶלָּא שֶׁנָּהַג בּוֹ מִנְהַג רַמָּאוּת! בָּאגָא דְאַלִּימֵי הֲוָה (לֵיהּ), לְרַב – נָהֲגִי בֵּיהּ כָּבוֹד, לְרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה – לָא נָהֲגִי בֵּיהּ כָּבוֹד. אִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְאוֹדוֹעֵי! סְבַר: אַדְּהָכִי וְהָכִי אֲתָא אִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא זַבֵּין לַהּ.
The Gemara relates a similar story: Rabba bar bar Ḥana gave money to Rav and said: Purchase this land for me. Rav went and purchased it for himself. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the baraita with regard to an agent who acts in this manner: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? The Gemara answers: The land was located in a valley inhabited by violent men, who treated Rav with respect and were prepared to sell the land to him, but who did not treat Rabba bar bar Ḥana with respect. As in the case of Ravin, the Gemara questions this behavior: Nevertheless, Rav should have informed him. The Gemara responds that Rav thought: In the meantime someone else will come and purchase the land.
רַב גִּידֵּל הֲוָה מְהַפֵּיךְ בְּהַהִיא אַרְעָא. אֲזַל רַבִּי אַבָּא זַבְנַהּ. אֲזַל רַב גִּידֵּל קַבְלֵיהּ לְרַבִּי זֵירָא. אֲזַל רַבִּי זֵירָא וְקַבְלֵיהּ לְרַב יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא. אָמַר לֵיהּ: הַמְתֵּן עַד שֶׁיַּעֲלֶה אֶצְלֵנוּ לָרֶגֶל. כִּי סְלֵיק, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עָנִי מְהַפֵּךְ בַּחֲרָרָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וּנְטָלָהּ הֵימֶנּוּ, מַאי?
The Gemara further relates: Rav Giddel was engaging in the acquisition of a certain plot of land. In the meantime Rabbi Abba went and purchased it. Rav Giddel went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa. Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to him: Wait until Rabbi Abba ascends to visit us for the pilgrimage Festival, when all come to hear the Festival sermon, on which occasion we can discuss this matter with him. When Rabbi Abba ascended Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa found him and said to him: If a pauper is engaging in the acquisition of a loaf of bread that he found, and another came and took it from him, what is the halakha?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נִקְרָא רָשָׁע. וְאֶלָּא מָר מַאי טַעְמָא עֲבַד הָכִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא הֲוָה יָדַעְנָא. הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי נִיתְּבַהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ מָר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זַבּוֹנֵי לָא מְזַבֵּינְנָא לַהּ, דְּאַרְעָא קַמַּיְיתָא הִיא, וְלָא מְסַמְּנָא מִילְּתָא. אִי בָּעֵי בְּמַתָּנָה – נִישְׁקְלֵיהּ.
Rabbi Abba said to him: The one who took it away is called wicked. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa replied: But if so, what is the reason that the Master acted this way? Rav Giddel was negotiating the purchase of this land and you purchased it. Rabbi Abba said to him: I did not know that Rav Giddel was trying to acquire the land. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa retorted: Now too, the Master should give it to him, since you have been made aware that he submitted the first offer. Rabbi Abba said to him: As for selling, I will not sell it, as it is the first land I have ever purchased, and this matter of selling one’s first acquisition is not a good omen. If he wants to accept it as a gift, let him take it.
רַב גִּידֵּל לָא נָחֵית לַהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשׂוֹנֵא מַתָּנֹת יִחְיֶה״. רַבִּי אַבָּא לָא נָחֵית לַהּ מִשּׁוּם דְּהַפֵּיךְ בַּהּ רַב גִּידֵּל. לָא מָר נָחֵית לַהּ וְלָא מָר נָחֵית לַהּ וּמִיתְקָרְיָא אַרְעָא דְרַבָּנַן.
Rav Giddel did not descend to claim this plot of land, as it is written: “But he who hates gifts shall live” (Proverbs 15:27), and therefore he did not wish to accept the land as a gift. Rabbi Abba also did not descend to it, because Rav Giddel was already engaging in the acquisition of it when he acquired the land. In this manner, this Sage did not descend to take the plot of land, and that Sage did not descend to take care of it, and it was called the land of the Sages.
וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי כּוּ׳. לֹא בָּא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁה בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים, מַהוּ? רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְאַכְּלוּ הַמָּעוֹת.
§ The mishna teaches: And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another came and betrothed her within this period, she is betrothed to the second man. The Gemara asks: In a case where another did not come and betroth her within the thirty days, what is the halakha? Rav and Shmuel both say: She is betrothed after thirty days, even if the money he gave for her betrothal has been used before the end of this period, as the betrothal takes effect from when the money is given.
מַאי טַעְמָא? הָנֵי זוּזֵי לָא לְמִלְוָה דָּמוּ וְלָא לְפִקָּדוֹן דָּמוּ.
The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that she is betrothed despite the lack of money at the end of the thirty days? The Gemara explains that these dinars given for her betrothal are not comparable to a loan, nor are they comparable to a deposit that was transferred into her possession and subsequently lost. In both of these cases she would not be betrothed.
לְפִקָּדוֹן לָא דָּמוּ – פִּקָּדוֹן בִּרְשׁוּתָא דְמָרֵיהּ קָא מִתְאַכְּלִי, וְהָנֵי בִּרְשׁוּתָא דִידַהּ קָא מִתְאַכְּלִי. לְמַלְוֶה נָמֵי לָא דָּמוּ – מִלְוָה לְהוֹצָאָה נִיתְּנָה, הָנֵי בְּתוֹרַת קִידּוּשִׁין יַהֲבִינְהוּ נִיהֲלַהּ.
The Gemara elaborates: They are not comparable to a deposit, as a deposit is used in its owner’s possession, i.e., any loss is incurred by the owner, whereas these are used in her own possession, as he gave her the money to keep. These dinars are also not comparable to a loan; a loan is given for spending and therefore no money remains at the time of the betrothal, whereas these dinars were given to her from the outset for the purpose of betrothal.
לֹא בָּא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁהּ, וְחָזְרָה בָּהּ, מַהוּ? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חוֹזֶרֶת – אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר, וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת – לָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.
The Gemara asks: If another did not come and betroth her, and she retracted her consent to the betrothal within thirty days, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract her consent. Why? This statement, by which she changes her mind, comes and nullifies her previous statement when she agreed to the betrothal. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her consent, as her second statement does not come and nullify her previous statement.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בִּיטֵּל, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא תָּרַם בִּיטֵּל – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. וְהָא הָכָא דְּדִיבּוּר וְדִיבּוּר הוּא, וְקָאָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר! שָׁאנֵי נְתִינַת מָעוֹת לְיַד אִשָּׁה, דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמוּ, וְלָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה.
Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a mishna (Terumot 3:4): In a case where someone appointed an agent to separate teruma from his produce on his behalf, and he subsequently canceled the agency, the halakha depends on the following: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated the teruma, his teruma is not teruma. And here it is a case involving one statement and a second statement, as the owner of the produce appointed the agent and rescinded his appointment by speech. This shows that a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement. Reish Lakish replied: Giving money to a woman is different, as it is considered like an action, and a mere statement does not come and nullify the action of the transfer of money.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהִגִּיעַ בַּשָּׁלִיחַ אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁלַח אַחֲרָיו שָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״גֵּט שֶׁנָּתַתִּי לְךָ בָּטֵל הוּא״ – הֲרֵי זֶה בָּטֵל. וְהָא נְתִינַת גֵּט לְיַד שָׁלִיחַ, דְּכִי נְתִינַת מָעוֹת לְיַד אִשָּׁה דָּמֵי, וְקָתָנֵי הֲרֵי זֶה בָּטֵל!
Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a further objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. And giving a bill of divorce to an agent is considered to be like giving money to a woman, and yet this baraita teaches that it is nullified, which indicates that speech can override even an action.
הָתָם נָמֵי, כֹּל כַּמָּה דְּלָא מְטָא גִּיטָּא לִידַהּ – דִּיבּוּר וְדִיבּוּר הוּא, אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.
Reish Lakish answered: There too, as long as the bill of divorce has not reached the woman’s hand it is considered a case of one statement and a second statement. There is no halakhic significance to the transmitting of a bill of divorce to an agent, as only its delivery to the wife is considered an action. Therefore, the act of transferring the bill of divorce to the agent is of no consequence and in this particular case a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל הַכֵּלִים יוֹרְדִין לִידֵי טוּמְאָתָן בְּמַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין עוֹלִים מִידֵּי טוּמְאָתָן אֶלָּא בְּשִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה.
Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to work on it any further, it immediately assumes the status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure.
מַעֲשֶׂה מוֹצִיא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה, מַחְשָׁבָה אֵין מוֹצִיאָה לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה לָא מַפְּקָה, דְּלָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה מִיהָא תַּפֵּיק!
An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. In that case the vessel cannot contract ritual impurity until the craftsman has finished working on it. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish finds this difficult for the following reason: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought. This halakha indicates that a statement does not nullify a previous statement.
שָׁאנֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דְּטוּמְאָה, דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, וְכִדְרַב פָּפָּא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא רָמֵי: כְּתִיב: ״כִּי יִתֵּן״, וְקָרֵינַן: ״כִּי יוּתַּן״. הָא כֵּיצַד?
The Gemara answers: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: With regard to the halakha that produce must become wet in order for it to contract ritual impurity, the verse states: “But if water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it is impure” (Leviticus 11:38). The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, “ki yuttan,” which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled?
״כִּי יוּתַּן״ דֻּומְיָא ״דְּכִי יִתֵּן״. מָה ״יִתֵּן״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ, אַף ״יוּתַּן״, דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ.
Rav Pappa explains that the standard of “if water is placed [ki yuttan]” is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. This is proof that thought is equivalent to action with regard to ritual impurity, as if one is satisfied with the produce becoming wet it is considered as though he actively placed the water himself. By the same reasoning, thought which renders a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity is powerful enough to require an action to counteract its effect.
רַב זְבִיד מַתְנֵי לְהָא שְׁמַעְתְּתָא אַהָא: וְכֵן הִיא שֶׁנָּתְנָה רְשׁוּת לִשְׁלוּחָהּ לְקַדְּשָׁהּ, וְהָלְכָה הִיא וְקִדְּשָׁהּ אֶת עַצְמָהּ, אִם שֶׁלָּהּ קָדְמוּ – קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין, וְאִם שֶׁל שְׁלוּחָהּ קָדְמוּ – אֵין קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין.
The Gemara presents another version of the discussion: Rav Zevid taught this dispute with regard to this halakha: And similarly, in a case where she gave permission to her agent to accept betrothal for her and she subsequently went and accepted betrothal herself from someone else, if her betrothal came first, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, but if the betrothal of her agent came first, her betrothal is not a betrothal.
לֹא קִדְּשָׁהּ אֶת עַצְמָהּ וְחָזְרָה בָּהּ, מַהוּ? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חוֹזֶרֶת, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חוֹזֶרֶת, אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת, לָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.
The Sages discuss this halakha: If she did not accept betrothal herself and retracted her appointment of the agent, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: She can retract her appointment; and Reish Lakish says: She cannot retract her appointment. The Gemara clarifies their respective opinions. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract her appointment, as a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement, by which she appointed the agent. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her appointment, as a statement does not come and nullify a previous statement.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בִּיטֵּל, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא תָּרַם בִּיטֵּל – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה! אָמַר רָבָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּדַם בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וְתָרַם אֶת כִּרְיוֹ, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה.
Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from the aforementioned mishna (Terumot 3:4) with regard to one who appointed an agent to separate teruma on his behalf and subsequently canceled the agency: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. This shows that a statement nullifies a previous statement. Rava says: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the homeowner preceded the agent and separated teruma from his heap himself, which is an action, and an action certainly nullifies a statement.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כׇּל הַכֵּלִים יוֹרְדִים לִידֵי טוּמְאָתָן בְּמַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין עוֹלִין מִטּוּמְאָתָן אֶלָּא בְּשִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה. מַעֲשֶׂה מוֹצִיא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה, מַחְשָׁבָה אֵינָהּ מוֹצִיאָה לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה לָא מַפְּקָה, לָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה מִיהָא תַּפֵּיק!
Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish explains his objection: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דְּטוּמְאָה דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, וְכִדְרַב פָּפָּא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא רָמֵי: כְּתִיב: ״כִּי יִתֵּן״, וְקָרֵינַן: ״כִּי יוּתַּן״. הָא כֵּיצַד? ״כִּי יוּתַּן״ דֻּומְיָא ״דָּיִתֵּן״, מָה ״יִתֵּן״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ אַף ״יוּתַּן״ נָמֵי דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Yet we read it “ki yuttan.” How so? The standard of “if water is placed [ki yuttan]” is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהִגִּיעַ בַּשָּׁלִיחַ אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁלַח אַחֲרָיו שָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״גֵּט שֶׁנָּתַתִּי לְךָ בָּטֵל הוּא״ – הֲרֵי זֶה בָּטֵל תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, תְּיוּבְתָּא.
Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. This indicates that the appointment of an agent can be nullified even by a statement. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish is in fact a conclusive refutation.
וְהִילְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקַמַּיְיתָא. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: שָׁאנֵי נְתִינַת מָעוֹת לְיַד אִשָּׁה דִּכְמַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.
The Gemara adds: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and this is even according to the first version of their dispute, with regard to a woman who retracts from her betrothal after accepting the money for it. And even though there is room to say that giving money to a woman for betrothal is different, as it is considered like an action, even so, a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement with regard to her consent to the betrothal, provided that the betrothal has yet to take effect.
קַשְׁיָא הִילְכְתָא אַהִילְכְתָא. אָמְרַתְּ: הִילְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְקַיְימָא לַן הִילְכְתָא כְּרַב נַחְמָן, דְּאִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחֲזוֹר וִיגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ?
The Gemara asks: The halakha recorded here is difficult with regard to the halakha recorded elsewhere. You said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and yet we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha in the case of a bill of divorce sent by an agent that the husband nullified before it was received by his wife? Can the husband return and divorce his wife with the very same bill of divorce?
רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: חוֹזֵר וּמְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ, רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ. וְקַיְימָא לַן הִילְכְתָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן! נְהִי דְּבַטְּלֵיהּ מִתּוֹרַת שְׁלִיחַ, מִתּוֹרַת גֵּט לָא בַּטְּלֵיהּ.
Rav Naḥman says: He can return and divorce her with it, and Rav Sheshet says: He cannot return and divorce her with it. And we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman in this case. By contrast, according to the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, since the husband has nullified the bill of divorce it should no longer be valid. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as, although the husband has nullified the agent from his status as an agent, he has not nullified the bill of divorce itself from its status as a bill of divorce.
מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי. אָמַר רַב: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי לְעוֹלָם, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אֲמַר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם פָּקְעִי קִידּוּשֵׁי שֵׁנִי וְגָמְרִי קִידּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן.
§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman and stipulates that the betrothal will take effect in thirty days’ time and another man betroths her within that period, she is betrothed to the second man. Rav says: She is betrothed to the second forever, i.e., the betrothal is fully effective, and Shmuel says: She is betrothed to the second until the thirty days pass. After thirty days have passed, the betrothal of the second lapses, and the earlier betrothal of the first man is completed.
יָתֵיב רַב חִסְדָּא וְקָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: קִידּוּשֵׁי שֵׁנִי בְּמַאי פָּקְעִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: מָר אַרֵישָׁא מַתְנֵי לַהּ וְקַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ, רַב יְהוּדָה אַסֵּיפָא מַתְנֵי לַהּ וְלָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ:
Rav Ḥisda sat and found this difficult: By what means is the betrothal of the second man abrogated? When the second betrothal took effect, the first betrothal was not yet in effect. Why, then, is the second betrothal abrogated? Rav Yosef said to him: The Master teaches this dispute with regard to the first clause of the mishna, and therefore he finds it difficult, whereas Rav Yehuda teaches it with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, and consequently he does not find it difficult.
״מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לְעוֹלָם. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת אֶלָּא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים פָּקְעִי קִידּוּשֵׁי שֵׁנִי וְגָמְרִי קִידּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן.
Rav Yehuda’s version of the dispute is as follows: The mishna teaches that if the first man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after thirty days, and another man betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed. Rav says: This means that there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed forever, and her only option is to receive a bill of divorce from both men. And Shmuel says: There is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed only until thirty days have elapsed, whereas after thirty days the betrothal of the second is abrogated, and the betrothal of the first is completed.
לְרַב מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי תְּנָאָה הֲוַאי, אִי חֲזָרָה הֲוַאי. לִשְׁמוּאֵל פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דִּתְנָאָה הֲוַאי.
The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Rav is uncertain what the first man meant. Is it a condition, i.e., the man is saying: If I do not change my mind within thirty days, you are betrothed to me from now, or is it a retraction, that is, he immediately retracted after he said: From now, in favor of a betrothal that will take effect only after thirty days have elapsed. This uncertainty remains even after the end of the thirty days. It is obvious to Shmuel that it is a condition. Consequently, the uncertainty whether or not she is betrothed to the second man applies during the thirty-day period, as the first man might yet change his mind. After the completion of thirty days, the betrothal from the first man retroactively takes effect from the moment he gave it, and therefore the betrothal of the second man is abrogated.
וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – גֵּט וְאֵינוֹ גֵּט, דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה גֵּט.
The Gemara comments: And Rav and Shmuel disagree in the dispute between these tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: If one says to his wife upon giving her a bill of divorce that it should take effect: From today and after my death, there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. The Rabbis are uncertain whether he meant that the bill of divorce should take effect retroactively from that moment, in which case it is valid; or whether he changed his mind and meant for it to take effect only after his death, which would mean that it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A document like this is a valid bill of divorce. The husband meant his statement as a condition that the bill of divorce should, after his death, take effect retroactively from now, and therefore it is a valid bill of divorce.
וְנֵימָא רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּנַן, וְנֵימָא שְׁמוּאֵל הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי! צְרִיכָא. דְּאִילּוּ אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּנַן, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָתָם דִּלְרַחוֹקַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֲבָל הָכָא, דִּלְקָרוֹבַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל דִּתְנָאָהּ הֲוַאי.
The Gemara asks: And let Rav, instead of explaining his own opinion, say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and let Shmuel say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: It is necessary for Rav and Shmuel to state their disagreement explicitly. As had Rav merely said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, I would say: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, when he comes to distance her from himself, one can say that he has changed his mind with regard to the divorce. But here, in the case of betrothal, when he comes to draw her near, you might say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that it is certainly a condition, as he wants to betroth her as soon as possible.
וְאִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָתָם הוּא דְּאֵין גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה. אֲבָל הָכָא דְּיֵשׁ קִידּוּשִׁין לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב, צְרִיכָא.
And conversely, had Shmuel said only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, I would say: It is in that case there that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said it is a valid bill of divorce, as there is no bill of divorce after death, and therefore it is unlikely that he changed his mind and attempted to give a bill of divorce that will take effect only after the death of the husband. But here, where there is the possibility of betrothal after thirty days, and he might well have intended to retract the betrothal, you might say that Shmuel concedes to Rav. Consequently, it was necessary to state the dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerning betrothal in explicit terms.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: וּלְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַב, בָּא אֶחָד וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״, וּבָא אַחֵר וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר עֶשְׂרִים יוֹם״
Abaye said: And according to the reasoning of Rav, if one man came and said the following ambiguous statement to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after thirty days. And another man came during these thirty days and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after twenty days,
