More verses are brought to raise questions against the different opinions regarding a tanai kaful. One cannot betroth a woman based on something that is not in existence. The Gemara brings different opinions as to what extent we say something is/is not in existence.
Kiddushin
Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married
This week’s learning is sponsored by Audrey Mondrow in loving memory of Bessie “nanny“ Mauskopf, Bashya Leah bat Tzivia Chaya and Meir Yehudah. “A kind and gentle mother, grandmother and great-grandmother. She embraced Torah learning and the love of Torah. May her מeshama have an Aliya.”
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
English
עברית
0:00
0:00
0:00
0:00
Today’s daily daf tools:
Kiddushin
Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married
This week’s learning is sponsored by Audrey Mondrow in loving memory of Bessie “nanny“ Mauskopf, Bashya Leah bat Tzivia Chaya and Meir Yehudah. “A kind and gentle mother, grandmother and great-grandmother. She embraced Torah learning and the love of Torah. May her מeshama have an Aliya.”
Kiddushin 62
״חֶרֶב תְּאֻכְּלוּ״? אָמַר רָבָא: מִילְחָא גְּלָלְנִיתָא, נַהֲמָא דִשְׂעָרֵי אַקּוּשָׁא, וּבֻצְלֵי. דְּאָמַר מָר: פַּת פּוּרְנִי חֲרֵיבָה בְּמֶלַח, וּבְצָלִים – קָשִׁים לַגּוּף כַּחֲרָבוֹת.
“You shall be devoured by the sword” (Isaiah 1:20)? Rava says: This verse should be interpreted as if it states: You shall devour the sword, i.e., you shall eat food that harms the body like a sword, e.g., coarse grains [gelalenita] of salt, hard barley bread, and onions. As the Master said: Dried bakery [purnei] bread eaten with salt and onions harms the body like swords.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״אִם לֹא שָׁכַב אִישׁ אֹתָךְ וְאִם לֹא שָׂטִית טֻמְאָה תַּחַת אִישֵׁךְ הִנָּקִי״, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, ״חִנְקִי״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אָמַר רַבִּי תַּנְחוּם: ״הנקי״ כְּתִיב.
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, this is the reason that it is written with regard to a sota: “If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone aside to uncleanness, being under your husband, you shall be free [hinnaki]” (Numbers 5:19), without specifying the negative side of this condition. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the verse should have stated: And if a man has lain with you, you should choke [ḥinnaki] and die. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the verse should have clarified the other side of the condition and its ensuing punishment. Rabbi Tanḥum said: Indeed, a truncated form of hinnaki without the letter yod is written. This indicates that the word should be interpreted in two ways, as both hinnaki and ḥinnaki.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״הִנָּקִי״, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְמָה לִי? אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״אִם לֹא שָׁכַב אִישׁ״ – הִנָּקִי, ״וְאִם שָׁכַב״ – לֹא הִנָּקִי וְלֹא חִנְקִי, אֶלָּא אִיסּוּרָא בְּעָלְמָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara continues: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, this is the reason that it is written hinnaki without the yod, to allude to the other side of the condition. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, why do I need this word to be written in this way? The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: If no man has lain with you, you shall be free, and if he has lain with you, you should neither be free nor choke; rather, it is merely a prohibition that does not warrant a severe punishment. The unusual form of the term hinnaki teaches us that this is not the case.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״הוּא יִתְחַטָּא בוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי יִטְהָר וְאִם לֹא יִתְחַטָּא וְגוֹ׳״, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְמָה לִי?
Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, this is the reason that it is written, with regard to one being purified with the water of purification from contact with a corpse: “He shall purify himself with it on the third day and on the seventh day, and he shall be pure; but if he does not purify himself on the third day and on the seventh day he shall not be pure” (Numbers 19:11–12). But according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, why do I need this double formulation?
אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: מִצְוַת הַזָּאָה בַּשְּׁלִישִׁי וּבַשְּׁבִיעִי, וְהֵיכָא דַּעֲבַד בְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ עֲבַד – קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: The mitzva of sprinkling the water of purification must be performed on the third and seventh days ab initio, but if he performed it on one of them alone, the ritual is considered performed and he is purified after the fact. The verse therefore teaches us that this is not the case.
״וְהִזָּה הַטָּהֹר עַל הַטָּמֵא בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי״ לְמָה לִי? אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: שְׁלִישִׁי לְמַעוֹטֵי שֵׁנִי, שְׁבִיעִי לְמַעוֹטֵי שִׁשִּׁי, דְּקָא מְמַעֵט בִּימֵי טׇהֳרָה, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דַּעֲבַד בִּשְׁלִישִׁי וּבִשְׁמִינִי, דְּקָא מַפֵּישׁ בִּימֵי טׇהֳרָה – אֵימָא שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks about a later verse in the same chapter: “And the pure shall sprinkle on the impure on the third day and on the seventh day” (Numbers 19:19). Why do I need this repetition of the command? This was already stated earlier. The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that the third day excludes the second, i.e., he cannot receive the sprinkling of the water of purification before the third day, and similarly the seventh excludes the sixth day, because he thereby decreases the days of purity before the sprinkling. But if he performed the sprinkling on the third and on the eighth days, in which case he increases and adds to the days of purity, you might say that this is proper. The verse therefore teaches us that there must be a fixed interval of four days between each sprinkling ritual.
״וְחִטְּאוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי״ לְמָה לִי? אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְקׇדָשִׁים, אֲבָל לִתְרוּמָה – בְּחַד נָמֵי סַגִּיא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara further analyzes this verse: Why do I need the phrase: “And on the seventh day he shall purify him” (Numbers 19:19)? The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: This matter, i.e., the requirement to receive the sprinkling twice, applies only for eating and touching consecrated meat; but for partaking of teruma one sprinkling is also sufficient. The verse therefore teaches us that this is not the case.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאָמַר: כְּסָבוּר הָיִיתִי שֶׁהִיא כֹּהֶנֶת וַהֲרֵי הִיא לְוִיָּה, לְוִיָּה וַהֲרֵי הִיא כֹּהֶנֶת, עֲנִיָּה וַהֲרֵי הִיא עֲשִׁירָה, עֲשִׁירָה וַהֲרֵי הִיא עֲנִיָּה – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הִטְעַתּוּ.
MISHNA: With regard to one who betroths a woman and later says: When I betrothed her I thought that she was the daughter of a priest, and it turned out that she is the daughter of a Levite, or if he claims that he thought she was the daughter of a Levite and she is actually the daughter of a priest, or if he claims that he thought she was poor and she is wealthy; or wealthy and she is poor, in all of these cases she is betrothed, because she did not mislead him, and no explicit condition was stated with regard to these matters.
הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, אוֹ ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, אוֹ ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, אוֹ ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or if he was a Canaanite slave and says: After I am emancipated, or if she was a Canaanite maidservant and he says: After you are emancipated, or if he says to a married woman: After your husband dies, or to his wife’s sister: After your sister dies, or if he says to a woman awaiting levirate marriage or ḥalitza from a brother-in-law [yavam], who in the opinion of this tanna cannot be betrothed by another man: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, in all these cases she is not betrothed. Since he cannot betroth her at the present time, his attempt at betrothal is ineffective.
וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״אִם יָלְדָה אִשְׁתְּךָ נְקֵבָה הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אִם הָיְתָה אֵשֶׁת חֲבֵרוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת וְהוּכַּר עוּבָּרָהּ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין, וְאִם יָלְדָה נְקֵבָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
And similarly, with regard to one who says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female the child is hereby betrothed to me, even if she becomes pregnant, or is pregnant but her pregnancy is not known, if she gives birth to a girl, that child is not betrothed to him. But if he said this when the wife of the other man was pregnant and her fetus was discernible at the time, i.e., her pregnancy was known, his statement is upheld, and therefore if she gives birth to a girl, the child is betrothed to him.
גְּמָ׳ תְּנַן הָתָם: אֵין תּוֹרְמִין מִן הַתָּלוּשׁ עַל הַמְחוּבָּר. וְאִם תָּרַם – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
GEMARA: We learned in a mishna there (Terumot 1:5): One may not separate teruma from produce that has been detached from the ground for, i.e., to render permitted, produce that is attached to the ground. Produce still attached to the ground is not included in the obligation of teruma. And if he separated teruma in this manner, his teruma is not teruma, even after the produce has been detached from the ground.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב אַסִּי מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אָמַר ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁים יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבָּרִים״, ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבָּרִים יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁים לִכְשֶׁיִּתָּלְשׁוּ״ וְנִתְלְשׁוּ, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ לָאו כִּמְחוּסָּר מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי.
Rav Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is the halakha if one said: The detached produce of this garden bed should be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed; or: The attached produce of this garden bed should be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed, not now but when they will be detached; and the produce was subsequently detached? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Anything that is in one’s power to perform is not considered lacking in its action. Since he could theoretically detach the produce at this very moment, teruma can be separated from it.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
Rav Asi raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna. With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or: After I am emancipated, or: After you are emancipated, or: After your husband dies, or: After your sister dies, or: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, in all of these cases she is not betrothed.
בִּשְׁלָמָא כּוּלְּהוּ לָאו בְּיָדוֹ, אֶלָּא גֵּר, הָוֵי בְּיָדוֹ! גֵּר נָמֵי לָאו בְּיָדוֹ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן:
Rav Asi explains his objection: Granted, in all of these cases but one it is not in his power to bring about the situation when he will be able to betroth her, but in the case of a convert, the matter is in his power, as he could convert now if he so chooses. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, any action that could potentially be performed is considered as though it has actually been performed. The Gemara responds: In the case of a convert, it is also not in his power to convert whenever he wants, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says:
גֵּר צָרִיךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה. מַאי טַעְמָא: ״מִשְׁפָּט״ כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ כַּדִּין, מִי יֵימַר דְּמִזְדַּקְּקוּ לֵיהּ הָנֵי תְּלָתָא.
A convert requires the presence of three Jews for his conversion. What is the reason for this requirement? It is written with regard to a convert: “You shall have one manner of law, for the convert as for the homeborn” (Leviticus 24:22), which indicates that a conversion is considered a judgment that requires three judges. And if he requires three judges, who says that those three will be available to him? Since he cannot convert at a time of his choosing, it is not considered within his power to convert.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הַנּוֹתֵן פְּרוּטָה לְשִׁפְחָתוֹ, וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֲשַׁחְרְרִיךְ״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּהָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין? הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם – מֵעִיקָּרָא בְּהֵמָה, הַשְׁתָּא – דַּעַת אַחֶרֶת.
Rabbi Abba bar Memel objects to this: If that is so, and anything that is in one’s power to perform is not considered lacking in its action, one who gives one peruta to his Canaanite maidservant and says: You are hereby betrothed to me after I emancipate you, so too will you say that it is a betrothal because he has the power to emancipate her? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, the Canaanite maidservant initially had the legal status of an animal, i.e., she is not subject to betrothal at all, whereas now she has an independent mind. Once she has been emancipated she has the status of a Jew and is not considered the same person at all. Consequently, the attempted betrothal is certainly considered lacking an action.
וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: הַנּוֹתֵן פְּרוּטָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֲגָרְשִׁיךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, הָכִי נָמֵי לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּהָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין? נְהִי דִּבְיָדוֹ לְגָרְשָׁהּ, בְּיָדוֹ לְקַדְּשָׁהּ?
The Gemara asks: But that which Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to one who gives one peruta to his wife and says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me after I divorce you, she is not betrothed, so too according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan will you say that it is a betrothal because he has the power to divorce her? The Gemara answers: Although he has the power to divorce her, does he have the power to betroth her against her will? It is not in his power to effect the betrothal, as once she has divorced him the matter is no longer exclusively dependent upon him.
תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּבָעֵי רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: הַנּוֹתֵן שְׁתֵּי פְּרוּטוֹת לְאִשָּׁה, בְּאַחַת אָמַר לָהּ: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי הַיּוֹם״, וּבְאַחַת אָמַר לָהּ: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֲגָרְשִׁיךְ״, תִּפְשׁוֹט מִינַּהּ דְּלָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין! דִּלְמָא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּתָפְסִי קִידּוּשִׁין הַשְׁתָּא – תָּפְסִי נָמֵי לְאַחַר כֵּן.
The Gemara comments: Being that it is not in his power to effect the betrothal, you can use this logic to resolve the dilemma raised by Rav Oshaya: What is the halakha with regard to one who gives two perutot to a woman, and with one he says to her: Be betrothed to me today, and with the other one he says to her: Be betrothed to me after I divorce you? What is her status after he divorces her? That dilemma was left unanswered, and the Gemara suggests that you can resolve from here that it is not a betrothal. The Gemara explains that this case is different, and Rav Oshaya’s dilemma was actually as follows: Perhaps in that situation, just as the betrothal is effective now, it is also effective afterward. Since she is currently under her own authority and agrees to betroth herself to him, it is possible that she can now consent to a betrothal that will take effect at a later time.
תַּנְיָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין תּוֹרְמִין מִן הַתָּלוּשׁ עַל הַמְחוּבָּר, וְאִם תָּרַם – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר: ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבֶּרֶת״, ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבֶּרֶת יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. אֲבָל אָמַר ״לִכְשֶׁיִּתָּלְשׁוּ״ וְנִתְלְשׁוּ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.
The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not separate teruma from the detached for the attached, and if he separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. How so? If he said: The detached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed, or: The attached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed, he has not said anything of consequence, as the obligation to separate teruma applies only to detached produce. But if he said that the attached produce will be teruma when they will be detached, and they become detached, his statement is valid, as he has the power to detach them.
יָתֵר עַל כֵּן אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב: אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבֶּרֶת״, ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבֶּרֶת יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין לִכְשֶׁיָּבִיאוּ שְׁלִישׁ וְיִתָּלְשׁוּ״, וְהֵבִיאוּ שְׁלִישׁ וְנִתְלְשׁוּ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.
Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said that even if one said: The detached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed, or: The attached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed when they, i.e., the attached produce, will reach one-third of their growth and are detached, although at the time they had yet to ripen which means that the obligations of terumot and tithes do not apply to them, when they will reach one-third of their growth and are detached, his statement is upheld.
אָמַר רַבָּה: לֹא אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אֶלָּא בְּשַׁחַת, אֲבָל בַּאֲגַם – לֹא. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בַּאֲגַם. מַאי מַשְׁמַע דְּהַאי אֲגַם לִישָּׁנָא דְּבוּצְלָנָא הוּא? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הֲלָכֹף כְּאַגְמֹן רֹאשׁוֹ״.
Rabba says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says this ruling only with regard to fodder, produce that has grown stalks even if it is not yet ripe. But he did not refer to produce that is still completely soft [agam]. Rav Yosef says: He even referred to soft produce. In relation to this dispute, the Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this word agam is a term of growth [butzlana]? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar said that this is as the verse states: “Is it to bow down his head as a bulrush [ke’agmon]” (Isaiah 58:5), i.e., like a soft, drooping plant.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ ״אִם יָלְדָה אִשְׁתְּךָ נְקֵבָה, מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. וְאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת, אֲבָל אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין. כְּמַאן? אִי כְּרַבָּה כְּשֶׁהוּכַּר עוּבָּרָהּ, אִי כְּרַב יוֹסֵף – אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הוּכַּר עוּבָּרָהּ.
§ The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in the following baraita: With regard to one who says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female she is betrothed to me, he has not said anything? And Rabbi Ḥanina says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the other’s wife is not pregnant. But if his wife is pregnant his statement is upheld. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The Gemara answers: The baraita can be explained in accordance with everyone’s opinion. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, it is referring to a situation where her fetus was already noticeable, just as the stalks of fodder are recognizable. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, the halakha of the baraita applies even if her fetus was not yet noticeable.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אָמַר רַבָּה: לָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אֶלָּא בְּשַׁחַת דְּבֵי כִיבְשָׁא, אֲבָל בְּשַׁחַת דְּבֵי שָׁקְיָא – לָא. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בְּשַׁחַת דְּבֵי שָׁקְיָא.
And there are those who say a different version of this dispute. Rabba says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says his ruling only with regard to fodder of a non-irrigated field, which is not watered. But he did not speak about fodder of an irrigated field. Since the produce of this field will not grow on its own if it is not watered, it is not considered as if this produce has entered the world. Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov referred even to fodder of an irrigated field, as this produce too is treated as having entered the world when it reaches the stage of fodder.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״אִם יָלְדָה אִשְׁתְּךָ נְקֵבָה מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. וְאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת, אֲבָל אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִים. כְּמַאן – כְּשֶׁהוּכַּר עוּבָּרָהּ, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
The Gemara asks: According to this version of the dispute, in accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in the following baraita: If one says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female she is betrothed to me, he has not said anything? And Rabbi Ḥanina says: They taught this only when his wife is not pregnant, but if his wife is pregnant his statement is upheld. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The baraita must be referring to a case where her fetus was noticeable, and therefore everyone agrees with this ruling. The baraita is in accordance with the opinions of both Rabba and Rav Yosef, as even Rav Yosef agrees that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov was referring only to fodder whose stalks were already noticeable.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב, וְרַבִּי, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר כּוּלְּהוּ סְבִירָא לְהוּ – אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לְעוֹלָם. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. רַבִּי – דְּתַנְיָא:
Abaye says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Meir all hold the following principle: A person can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world. That is, one can perform an act of acquisition for an item that is not yet in existence. The opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov is referring to that which we just said, that one can separate teruma even for produce not yet included in this mitzva. Where does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi state a similar opinion? As it is taught in a baraita:
Follow 
Today’s daily daf tools:
Delve Deeper
Broaden your understanding of the topics on this daf with classes and podcasts from top women Talmud scholars.
New to Talmud?
Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you.
The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.
Leah Herzog
Givat Zev, Israel
When I was working and taking care of my children, learning was never on the list. Now that I have more time I have two different Gemora classes and the nach yomi as well as the mishna yomi daily.
Shoshana Shinnar
Jerusalem, Israel
A few years back, after reading Ilana Kurshan’s book, “If All The Seas Were Ink,” I began pondering the crazy, outlandish idea of beginning the Daf Yomi cycle. Beginning in December, 2019, a month before the previous cycle ended, I “auditioned” 30 different podcasts in 30 days, and ultimately chose to take the plunge with Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle. Such joy!
Cindy Dolgin
HUNTINGTON, United States
I started learning Dec 2019 after reading “If all the Seas Were Ink”. I found
Daily daf sessions of Rabbanit Michelle in her house teaching, I then heard about the siyum and a new cycle starting wow I am in! Afternoon here in Sydney, my family and friends know this is my sacred time to hide away to live zoom and learn. Often it’s hard to absorb and relate then a gem shines touching my heart.
Dianne Kuchar
Dover Heights, Australia
What a great experience to learn with Rabbanit Michelle Farber. I began with this cycle in January 2020 and have been comforted by the consistency and energy of this process throughout the isolation period of Covid. Week by week, I feel like I am exploring a treasure chest with sparkling gems and puzzling antiquities. The hunt is exhilarating.
Marian Frankston
Pennsylvania, United States
Having never learned Talmud before, I started Daf Yomi in hopes of connecting to the Rabbinic tradition, sharing a daily idea on Instagram (@dafyomiadventures). With Hadran and Sefaria, I slowly gained confidence in my skills and understanding. Now, part of the Pardes Jewish Educators Program, I can’t wait to bring this love of learning with me as I continue to pass it on to my future students.
Hannah Greenberg
Pennsylvania, United States
I started learning on January 5, 2020. When I complete the 7+ year cycle I will be 70 years old. I had been intimidated by those who said that I needed to study Talmud in a traditional way with a chevruta, but I decided the learning was more important to me than the method. Thankful for Daf Yomi for Women helping me catch up when I fall behind, and also being able to celebrate with each Siyum!
Pamela Elisheva
Bakersfield, United States
With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
Sharon Mink
Haifa, Israel
I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!
Harriet Hartman
Tzur Hadassah, Israel
I started to listen to Michelle’s podcasts four years ago. The minute I started I was hooked. I’m so excited to learn the entire Talmud, and think I will continue always. I chose the quote “while a woman is engaged in conversation she also holds the spindle”. (Megillah 14b). It reminds me of all of the amazing women I learn with every day who multi-task, think ahead and accomplish so much.
Julie Mendelsohn
Zichron Yakov, Israel
It has been a pleasure keeping pace with this wonderful and scholarly group of women.
Janice Block
Beit Shemesh, Israel
My Daf journey began in August 2012 after participating in the Siyum Hashas where I was blessed as an “enabler” of others. Galvanized into my own learning I recited the Hadran on Shas in January 2020 with Rabbanit Michelle. That Siyum was a highlight in my life. Now, on round two, Daf has become my spiritual anchor to which I attribute manifold blessings.
Rina Goldberg
Englewood NJ, United States
A few years back, after reading Ilana Kurshan’s book, “If All The Seas Were Ink,” I began pondering the crazy, outlandish idea of beginning the Daf Yomi cycle. Beginning in December, 2019, a month before the previous cycle ended, I “auditioned” 30 different podcasts in 30 days, and ultimately chose to take the plunge with Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle. Such joy!
Cindy Dolgin
HUNTINGTON, United States
After being so inspired by the siyum shas two years ago, I began tentatively learning daf yomi, like Rabbanut Michelle kept saying – taking one daf at a time. I’m still taking it one daf at a time, one masechet at a time, but I’m loving it and am still so inspired by Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran community, and yes – I am proud to be finishing Seder Mo’ed.
Caroline Graham-Ofstein
Bet Shemesh, Israel
When I started studying Hebrew at Brown University’s Hillel, I had no idea that almost 38 years later, I’m doing Daf Yomi. My Shabbat haburah is led by Rabbanit Leah Sarna. The women are a hoot. I’m tracking the completion of each tractate by reading Ilana Kurshan’s memoir, If All the Seas Were Ink.
Hannah Lee
Pennsylvania, United States
I began my journey two years ago at the beginning of this cycle of the daf yomi. It has been an incredible, challenging experience and has given me a new perspective of Torah Sh’baal Peh and the role it plays in our lives
linda kalish-marcus
Efrat, Israel
As Jewish educator and as a woman, I’m mindful that Talmud has been kept from women for many centuries. Now that we are privileged to learn, and learning is so accessible, it’s my intent to complete Daf Yomi. I am so excited to keep learning with my Hadran community.
Sue Parker Gerson
Denver, United States
I started learning Gemara at the Yeshivah of Flatbush. And I resumed ‘ברוך ה decades later with Rabbanit Michele at Hadran. I started from Brachot and have had an exciting, rewarding experience throughout seder Moed!
Anne Mirsky
Maale Adumim, Israel
I started to listen to Michelle’s podcasts four years ago. The minute I started I was hooked. I’m so excited to learn the entire Talmud, and think I will continue always. I chose the quote “while a woman is engaged in conversation she also holds the spindle”. (Megillah 14b). It reminds me of all of the amazing women I learn with every day who multi-task, think ahead and accomplish so much.
Julie Mendelsohn
Zichron Yakov, Israel
While vacationing in San Diego, Rabbi Leah Herz asked if I’d be interested in being in hevruta with her to learn Daf Yomi through Hadran. Why not? I had loved learning Gemara in college in 1971 but hadn’t returned. With the onset of covid, Daf Yomi and Rabbanit Michelle centered me each day. Thank-you for helping me grow and enter this amazing world of learning.
Meryll Page
Minneapolis, MN, United States
Kiddushin 62
״חֶרֶב תְּאֻכְּלוּ״? אָמַר רָבָא: מִילְחָא גְּלָלְנִיתָא, נַהֲמָא דִשְׂעָרֵי אַקּוּשָׁא, וּבֻצְלֵי. דְּאָמַר מָר: פַּת פּוּרְנִי חֲרֵיבָה בְּמֶלַח, וּבְצָלִים – קָשִׁים לַגּוּף כַּחֲרָבוֹת.
“You shall be devoured by the sword” (Isaiah 1:20)? Rava says: This verse should be interpreted as if it states: You shall devour the sword, i.e., you shall eat food that harms the body like a sword, e.g., coarse grains [gelalenita] of salt, hard barley bread, and onions. As the Master said: Dried bakery [purnei] bread eaten with salt and onions harms the body like swords.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״אִם לֹא שָׁכַב אִישׁ אֹתָךְ וְאִם לֹא שָׂטִית טֻמְאָה תַּחַת אִישֵׁךְ הִנָּקִי״, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, ״חִנְקִי״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אָמַר רַבִּי תַּנְחוּם: ״הנקי״ כְּתִיב.
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, this is the reason that it is written with regard to a sota: “If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone aside to uncleanness, being under your husband, you shall be free [hinnaki]” (Numbers 5:19), without specifying the negative side of this condition. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the verse should have stated: And if a man has lain with you, you should choke [ḥinnaki] and die. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the verse should have clarified the other side of the condition and its ensuing punishment. Rabbi Tanḥum said: Indeed, a truncated form of hinnaki without the letter yod is written. This indicates that the word should be interpreted in two ways, as both hinnaki and ḥinnaki.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״הִנָּקִי״, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְמָה לִי? אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״אִם לֹא שָׁכַב אִישׁ״ – הִנָּקִי, ״וְאִם שָׁכַב״ – לֹא הִנָּקִי וְלֹא חִנְקִי, אֶלָּא אִיסּוּרָא בְּעָלְמָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara continues: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, this is the reason that it is written hinnaki without the yod, to allude to the other side of the condition. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, why do I need this word to be written in this way? The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: If no man has lain with you, you shall be free, and if he has lain with you, you should neither be free nor choke; rather, it is merely a prohibition that does not warrant a severe punishment. The unusual form of the term hinnaki teaches us that this is not the case.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״הוּא יִתְחַטָּא בוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי יִטְהָר וְאִם לֹא יִתְחַטָּא וְגוֹ׳״, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְמָה לִי?
Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, this is the reason that it is written, with regard to one being purified with the water of purification from contact with a corpse: “He shall purify himself with it on the third day and on the seventh day, and he shall be pure; but if he does not purify himself on the third day and on the seventh day he shall not be pure” (Numbers 19:11–12). But according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, why do I need this double formulation?
אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: מִצְוַת הַזָּאָה בַּשְּׁלִישִׁי וּבַשְּׁבִיעִי, וְהֵיכָא דַּעֲבַד בְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ עֲבַד – קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: The mitzva of sprinkling the water of purification must be performed on the third and seventh days ab initio, but if he performed it on one of them alone, the ritual is considered performed and he is purified after the fact. The verse therefore teaches us that this is not the case.
״וְהִזָּה הַטָּהֹר עַל הַטָּמֵא בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי״ לְמָה לִי? אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: שְׁלִישִׁי לְמַעוֹטֵי שֵׁנִי, שְׁבִיעִי לְמַעוֹטֵי שִׁשִּׁי, דְּקָא מְמַעֵט בִּימֵי טׇהֳרָה, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דַּעֲבַד בִּשְׁלִישִׁי וּבִשְׁמִינִי, דְּקָא מַפֵּישׁ בִּימֵי טׇהֳרָה – אֵימָא שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks about a later verse in the same chapter: “And the pure shall sprinkle on the impure on the third day and on the seventh day” (Numbers 19:19). Why do I need this repetition of the command? This was already stated earlier. The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that the third day excludes the second, i.e., he cannot receive the sprinkling of the water of purification before the third day, and similarly the seventh excludes the sixth day, because he thereby decreases the days of purity before the sprinkling. But if he performed the sprinkling on the third and on the eighth days, in which case he increases and adds to the days of purity, you might say that this is proper. The verse therefore teaches us that there must be a fixed interval of four days between each sprinkling ritual.
״וְחִטְּאוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי״ לְמָה לִי? אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְקׇדָשִׁים, אֲבָל לִתְרוּמָה – בְּחַד נָמֵי סַגִּיא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara further analyzes this verse: Why do I need the phrase: “And on the seventh day he shall purify him” (Numbers 19:19)? The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: This matter, i.e., the requirement to receive the sprinkling twice, applies only for eating and touching consecrated meat; but for partaking of teruma one sprinkling is also sufficient. The verse therefore teaches us that this is not the case.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאָמַר: כְּסָבוּר הָיִיתִי שֶׁהִיא כֹּהֶנֶת וַהֲרֵי הִיא לְוִיָּה, לְוִיָּה וַהֲרֵי הִיא כֹּהֶנֶת, עֲנִיָּה וַהֲרֵי הִיא עֲשִׁירָה, עֲשִׁירָה וַהֲרֵי הִיא עֲנִיָּה – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הִטְעַתּוּ.
MISHNA: With regard to one who betroths a woman and later says: When I betrothed her I thought that she was the daughter of a priest, and it turned out that she is the daughter of a Levite, or if he claims that he thought she was the daughter of a Levite and she is actually the daughter of a priest, or if he claims that he thought she was poor and she is wealthy; or wealthy and she is poor, in all of these cases she is betrothed, because she did not mislead him, and no explicit condition was stated with regard to these matters.
הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, אוֹ ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, אוֹ ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, אוֹ ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or if he was a Canaanite slave and says: After I am emancipated, or if she was a Canaanite maidservant and he says: After you are emancipated, or if he says to a married woman: After your husband dies, or to his wife’s sister: After your sister dies, or if he says to a woman awaiting levirate marriage or ḥalitza from a brother-in-law [yavam], who in the opinion of this tanna cannot be betrothed by another man: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, in all these cases she is not betrothed. Since he cannot betroth her at the present time, his attempt at betrothal is ineffective.
וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״אִם יָלְדָה אִשְׁתְּךָ נְקֵבָה הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אִם הָיְתָה אֵשֶׁת חֲבֵרוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת וְהוּכַּר עוּבָּרָהּ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין, וְאִם יָלְדָה נְקֵבָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
And similarly, with regard to one who says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female the child is hereby betrothed to me, even if she becomes pregnant, or is pregnant but her pregnancy is not known, if she gives birth to a girl, that child is not betrothed to him. But if he said this when the wife of the other man was pregnant and her fetus was discernible at the time, i.e., her pregnancy was known, his statement is upheld, and therefore if she gives birth to a girl, the child is betrothed to him.
גְּמָ׳ תְּנַן הָתָם: אֵין תּוֹרְמִין מִן הַתָּלוּשׁ עַל הַמְחוּבָּר. וְאִם תָּרַם – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
GEMARA: We learned in a mishna there (Terumot 1:5): One may not separate teruma from produce that has been detached from the ground for, i.e., to render permitted, produce that is attached to the ground. Produce still attached to the ground is not included in the obligation of teruma. And if he separated teruma in this manner, his teruma is not teruma, even after the produce has been detached from the ground.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב אַסִּי מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אָמַר ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁים יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבָּרִים״, ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבָּרִים יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁים לִכְשֶׁיִּתָּלְשׁוּ״ וְנִתְלְשׁוּ, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ לָאו כִּמְחוּסָּר מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי.
Rav Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is the halakha if one said: The detached produce of this garden bed should be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed; or: The attached produce of this garden bed should be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed, not now but when they will be detached; and the produce was subsequently detached? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Anything that is in one’s power to perform is not considered lacking in its action. Since he could theoretically detach the produce at this very moment, teruma can be separated from it.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
Rav Asi raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna. With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or: After I am emancipated, or: After you are emancipated, or: After your husband dies, or: After your sister dies, or: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, in all of these cases she is not betrothed.
בִּשְׁלָמָא כּוּלְּהוּ לָאו בְּיָדוֹ, אֶלָּא גֵּר, הָוֵי בְּיָדוֹ! גֵּר נָמֵי לָאו בְּיָדוֹ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן:
Rav Asi explains his objection: Granted, in all of these cases but one it is not in his power to bring about the situation when he will be able to betroth her, but in the case of a convert, the matter is in his power, as he could convert now if he so chooses. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, any action that could potentially be performed is considered as though it has actually been performed. The Gemara responds: In the case of a convert, it is also not in his power to convert whenever he wants, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says:
גֵּר צָרִיךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה. מַאי טַעְמָא: ״מִשְׁפָּט״ כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ כַּדִּין, מִי יֵימַר דְּמִזְדַּקְּקוּ לֵיהּ הָנֵי תְּלָתָא.
A convert requires the presence of three Jews for his conversion. What is the reason for this requirement? It is written with regard to a convert: “You shall have one manner of law, for the convert as for the homeborn” (Leviticus 24:22), which indicates that a conversion is considered a judgment that requires three judges. And if he requires three judges, who says that those three will be available to him? Since he cannot convert at a time of his choosing, it is not considered within his power to convert.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הַנּוֹתֵן פְּרוּטָה לְשִׁפְחָתוֹ, וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֲשַׁחְרְרִיךְ״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּהָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין? הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם – מֵעִיקָּרָא בְּהֵמָה, הַשְׁתָּא – דַּעַת אַחֶרֶת.
Rabbi Abba bar Memel objects to this: If that is so, and anything that is in one’s power to perform is not considered lacking in its action, one who gives one peruta to his Canaanite maidservant and says: You are hereby betrothed to me after I emancipate you, so too will you say that it is a betrothal because he has the power to emancipate her? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, the Canaanite maidservant initially had the legal status of an animal, i.e., she is not subject to betrothal at all, whereas now she has an independent mind. Once she has been emancipated she has the status of a Jew and is not considered the same person at all. Consequently, the attempted betrothal is certainly considered lacking an action.
וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: הַנּוֹתֵן פְּרוּטָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֲגָרְשִׁיךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, הָכִי נָמֵי לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּהָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין? נְהִי דִּבְיָדוֹ לְגָרְשָׁהּ, בְּיָדוֹ לְקַדְּשָׁהּ?
The Gemara asks: But that which Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to one who gives one peruta to his wife and says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me after I divorce you, she is not betrothed, so too according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan will you say that it is a betrothal because he has the power to divorce her? The Gemara answers: Although he has the power to divorce her, does he have the power to betroth her against her will? It is not in his power to effect the betrothal, as once she has divorced him the matter is no longer exclusively dependent upon him.
תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּבָעֵי רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: הַנּוֹתֵן שְׁתֵּי פְּרוּטוֹת לְאִשָּׁה, בְּאַחַת אָמַר לָהּ: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי הַיּוֹם״, וּבְאַחַת אָמַר לָהּ: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֲגָרְשִׁיךְ״, תִּפְשׁוֹט מִינַּהּ דְּלָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין! דִּלְמָא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּתָפְסִי קִידּוּשִׁין הַשְׁתָּא – תָּפְסִי נָמֵי לְאַחַר כֵּן.
The Gemara comments: Being that it is not in his power to effect the betrothal, you can use this logic to resolve the dilemma raised by Rav Oshaya: What is the halakha with regard to one who gives two perutot to a woman, and with one he says to her: Be betrothed to me today, and with the other one he says to her: Be betrothed to me after I divorce you? What is her status after he divorces her? That dilemma was left unanswered, and the Gemara suggests that you can resolve from here that it is not a betrothal. The Gemara explains that this case is different, and Rav Oshaya’s dilemma was actually as follows: Perhaps in that situation, just as the betrothal is effective now, it is also effective afterward. Since she is currently under her own authority and agrees to betroth herself to him, it is possible that she can now consent to a betrothal that will take effect at a later time.
תַּנְיָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין תּוֹרְמִין מִן הַתָּלוּשׁ עַל הַמְחוּבָּר, וְאִם תָּרַם – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר: ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבֶּרֶת״, ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבֶּרֶת יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. אֲבָל אָמַר ״לִכְשֶׁיִּתָּלְשׁוּ״ וְנִתְלְשׁוּ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.
The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not separate teruma from the detached for the attached, and if he separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. How so? If he said: The detached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed, or: The attached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed, he has not said anything of consequence, as the obligation to separate teruma applies only to detached produce. But if he said that the attached produce will be teruma when they will be detached, and they become detached, his statement is valid, as he has the power to detach them.
יָתֵר עַל כֵּן אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב: אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבֶּרֶת״, ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ מְחוּבֶּרֶת יִהְיוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין לִכְשֶׁיָּבִיאוּ שְׁלִישׁ וְיִתָּלְשׁוּ״, וְהֵבִיאוּ שְׁלִישׁ וְנִתְלְשׁוּ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.
Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said that even if one said: The detached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed, or: The attached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed when they, i.e., the attached produce, will reach one-third of their growth and are detached, although at the time they had yet to ripen which means that the obligations of terumot and tithes do not apply to them, when they will reach one-third of their growth and are detached, his statement is upheld.
אָמַר רַבָּה: לֹא אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אֶלָּא בְּשַׁחַת, אֲבָל בַּאֲגַם – לֹא. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בַּאֲגַם. מַאי מַשְׁמַע דְּהַאי אֲגַם לִישָּׁנָא דְּבוּצְלָנָא הוּא? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הֲלָכֹף כְּאַגְמֹן רֹאשׁוֹ״.
Rabba says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says this ruling only with regard to fodder, produce that has grown stalks even if it is not yet ripe. But he did not refer to produce that is still completely soft [agam]. Rav Yosef says: He even referred to soft produce. In relation to this dispute, the Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this word agam is a term of growth [butzlana]? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar said that this is as the verse states: “Is it to bow down his head as a bulrush [ke’agmon]” (Isaiah 58:5), i.e., like a soft, drooping plant.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ ״אִם יָלְדָה אִשְׁתְּךָ נְקֵבָה, מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. וְאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת, אֲבָל אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין. כְּמַאן? אִי כְּרַבָּה כְּשֶׁהוּכַּר עוּבָּרָהּ, אִי כְּרַב יוֹסֵף – אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הוּכַּר עוּבָּרָהּ.
§ The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in the following baraita: With regard to one who says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female she is betrothed to me, he has not said anything? And Rabbi Ḥanina says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the other’s wife is not pregnant. But if his wife is pregnant his statement is upheld. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The Gemara answers: The baraita can be explained in accordance with everyone’s opinion. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, it is referring to a situation where her fetus was already noticeable, just as the stalks of fodder are recognizable. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, the halakha of the baraita applies even if her fetus was not yet noticeable.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אָמַר רַבָּה: לָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אֶלָּא בְּשַׁחַת דְּבֵי כִיבְשָׁא, אֲבָל בְּשַׁחַת דְּבֵי שָׁקְיָא – לָא. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בְּשַׁחַת דְּבֵי שָׁקְיָא.
And there are those who say a different version of this dispute. Rabba says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says his ruling only with regard to fodder of a non-irrigated field, which is not watered. But he did not speak about fodder of an irrigated field. Since the produce of this field will not grow on its own if it is not watered, it is not considered as if this produce has entered the world. Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov referred even to fodder of an irrigated field, as this produce too is treated as having entered the world when it reaches the stage of fodder.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״אִם יָלְדָה אִשְׁתְּךָ נְקֵבָה מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. וְאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת, אֲבָל אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִים. כְּמַאן – כְּשֶׁהוּכַּר עוּבָּרָהּ, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
The Gemara asks: According to this version of the dispute, in accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in the following baraita: If one says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female she is betrothed to me, he has not said anything? And Rabbi Ḥanina says: They taught this only when his wife is not pregnant, but if his wife is pregnant his statement is upheld. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The baraita must be referring to a case where her fetus was noticeable, and therefore everyone agrees with this ruling. The baraita is in accordance with the opinions of both Rabba and Rav Yosef, as even Rav Yosef agrees that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov was referring only to fodder whose stalks were already noticeable.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב, וְרַבִּי, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר כּוּלְּהוּ סְבִירָא לְהוּ – אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לְעוֹלָם. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. רַבִּי – דְּתַנְיָא:
Abaye says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Meir all hold the following principle: A person can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world. That is, one can perform an act of acquisition for an item that is not yet in existence. The opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov is referring to that which we just said, that one can separate teruma even for produce not yet included in this mitzva. Where does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi state a similar opinion? As it is taught in a baraita:
Follow
