Makkot 15
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Makkot
Masechet Makkot is sponsored by Terri Krivosha and Rabbi Hayim Herring in loving memory of Terri’s father Judge Norman Krivosha, Nachum Meir ben David Beer v’Malka “who instilled in us a lifelong love of learning” and in honor of Dr. Judith Hauptman, “our first Talmud teacher, who was one of the pioneers to open the doors of Talmud study to women.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
This month’s learning is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah
This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Chaim Avraham HaKohen ben Alter Gershon HaKohen.
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Summary
Rabba bar Hana quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying that if a positive commandment precedes a negative commandment, one receives lashes and this is not considered a lav hanitak l’ase, a negative commandment that can be corrected/uprooted by a positive commandment for which one does not receive lashes. Rabbi Yochanan denies having said that. Raba doesn’t understand why Rabbi Yochanan would deny it, as a case in our Mishna can prove Rabbi Yochanan’s rule. However, the Gemara bring a case of a rapist, trying to prove why Rabbi Yochanan changed his mind and did not accept the above rule. Ulla (in three different attempts) and Rava each try to explain why the case of a rapist does not fit into the category of the rule (a positive commandment the precedes the negative commandment). All attempts by Ulla are rejected, but Rava’s is accepted.
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Makkot
Masechet Makkot is sponsored by Terri Krivosha and Rabbi Hayim Herring in loving memory of Terri’s father Judge Norman Krivosha, Nachum Meir ben David Beer v’Malka “who instilled in us a lifelong love of learning” and in honor of Dr. Judith Hauptman, “our first Talmud teacher, who was one of the pioneers to open the doors of Talmud study to women.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
This month’s learning is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah
This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Chaim Avraham HaKohen ben Alter Gershon HaKohen.
Makkot 15
אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אָמַרְתָּ? אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא. אָמַר רַבָּה: הָאֱלֹהִים! אַמְרַהּ, וּכְתִיבָא וּתְנֵינָא: כְּתִיבָא – ״וִישַׁלְּחוּ מִן הַמַּחֲנֶה [וְגוֹ׳]״ ״וְלֹא יְטַמְּאוּ אֶת מַחֲנֵיהֶם״. תְּנֵינָא – הַבָּא לַמִּקְדָּשׁ טָמֵא.
They said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Did you say this halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: No. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the form of an oath: By God, he said it, and this halakha is written in the Torah and we learn it in the mishna. It is written: “And they shall send from the camp any man who is leprous, and any zav…and they shall not render their camp impure” (Numbers 5:2–4). There is a prohibition against rendering the camp impure, and there is a positive mitzva to send them out of the camp. Since the positive mitzva precedes and is independent of the prohibition, one is flogged for the violation of that prohibition, as we learn in the mishna among those liable to receive lashes: One who entered the Temple while ritually impure.
אֶלָּא מַאי טַעְמָא קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ? מִשּׁוּם דְּקַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ אוֹנֶס. דְּתַנְיָא: אוֹנֵס שֶׁגֵּירַשׁ, אִם יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא – מַחְזִיר וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. אִם כֹּהֵן הוּא – לוֹקֶה וְאֵינוֹ מַחְזִיר.
The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the reason he retracted his statement and claimed he did not say it? The Gemara answers: It is due to the fact that the halakha concerning one who rapes a virgin young woman, who is required by Torah law to marry her and for whom it is prohibited to divorce her as long as he lives, is difficult for him, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a rapist who divorced the woman he raped, if he is a non-priest, he remarries her, and he is not flogged for violating the prohibition: “He may not send her away all his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29). If he is a priest, he is flogged for violating the prohibition, and he does not remarry her because it is prohibited for him to marry a divorcée.
אִם יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא – מַחְזִיר וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה, אַמַּאי? לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁקְּדָמוֹ עֲשֵׂה הוּא, וְלִילְקֵי!
The Gemara elaborates: If he is a non-priest, he remarries her, and he is not flogged. Why? It is a prohibition that has a positive mitzva which preceded it, as the positive mitzva: “And she shall be his wife” (Deuteronomy 22:29), precedes the prohibition “He may not send her away.” But let him be flogged, since he violated the prohibition by divorcing her. Apparently, one is not flogged even if the positive mitzva precedes the prohibition.
אָמַר עוּלָּא: לֹא יֵאָמֵר ״לוֹ תִּהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״, בְּאוֹנֵס, וְלִיגְמַר מִמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע: וּמָה מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה – אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״וְלוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״, אוֹנֵס לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
Ulla says in response: The positive mitzva in the case of a rapist is not a mitzva that precedes the prohibition. Rather, it follows the prohibition and rectifies it, as it is referring to a case of one who married his victim and then divorced her. Let the verse not state: “And she shall be his wife,” in the case of a rapist, and let us derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of one who defames his bride, claiming that she was not a virgin when he consummated the marriage: If in the case of a defamer, who did not perform an action but sinned through speech, the Merciful One states: “And she shall be his wife” (Deuteronomy 22:19), then in the case of a rapist, who performed an action, is it not all the more so that he is obligated to take her as a wife?
לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְפָנָיו תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאַחֲרָיו, שֶׁאִם גֵּירַשׁ יַחֲזִיר.
Ulla continues: Why, then, is the mitzva stated in the case of the rapist? If it is not relevant to the matter of before the rapist marries the victim, apply it to the matter of after the rapist marries the victim, teaching that if he divorced her he must remarry her. Although in the verse it appears prior to the prohibition “He may not send her away,” it actually serves to rectify that prohibition.
וְאַכַּתִּי, אוֹנֵס מִמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רָע לָא גָּמַר, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, שֶׁכֵּן לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם!
The Gemara asks: But still, this affords no proof, as one cannot derive the case of a rapist from the case of a defamer, as the a fortiori inference can be refuted: What is notable about the case of a defamer, which is more stringent than the case of a rapist? It is notable in that he is flogged and is liable to pay retribution, which is contrary to the principle that in general, two punishments are not administered for one transgression.
אֶלָּא: לֹא יֵאָמֵר ״לוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״ בְּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, וְלִיגְמַר מֵאוֹנֵס: וּמָה אוֹנֵס שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם, אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״וְלוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״, מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? וְלָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לַמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לָאוֹנֵס, אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְפָנָיו – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאַחֲרָיו.
The Gemara suggests: Rather, let the verse not state: “And she shall be his wife,” in the case of the defamer, and let us derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of a rapist: And if in the case of a rapist, who is not both flogged and liable to pay restitution, but is liable to receive only one punishment, the Merciful One states: “And she shall be his wife,” in the case of a defamer, who is flogged and liable to pay retribution, is it not all the more so that he is obligated to take her as a wife? And why, then, is it stated in the case of the defamer? Rather, if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of the defamer, apply it to the matter of the rapist, and if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of before the rapist marries the victim, apply it to the matter of after the rapist marries the victim, teaching that if he divorced her he must remarry her. Although in the verse it appears prior to the prohibition “He may not send her away,” it actually serves to rectify that prohibition.
וּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע מֵאוֹנֵס נָמֵי לָא גָּמַר, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְאוֹנֵס – שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה!
The Gemara asks: But this affords no proof, as one cannot derive the case of a defamer from the case of a rapist either, as the a fortiori inference can be refuted: What is notable about the case of a rapist? It is notable in that he performed an action, while the defamer performed no action.
אֶלָּא: לֹא יֵאָמֵר ״לוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״ בְּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, שֶׁהֲרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ הִיא. לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לַמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לָאוֹנֵס, וְאִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְפָנָיו – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאַחֲרָיו.
The Gemara suggests: Rather, let the verse not state: “And she shall be his wife,” in the case of the defamer because the expression is redundant, as she is already his wife. It would have been sufficient for the verse to state that it is prohibited for him to send her away. Why, then, is it stated in the case of the defamer? Rather, if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of the defamer, apply it to the matter of the rapist, and if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of before the rapist marries the victim, apply it to the matter of after the rapist marries the victim, teaching that if he divorced her he must remarry her. Although the positive mitzva appears in the verse prior to the prohibition “He may not send her away,” it actually serves to rectify that prohibition.
וְאֵימָא, וְאִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְפָנָיו דְּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאַחֲרָיו דִּידֵיהּ, דְּלָא לָקֵי!
The Gemara questions that derivation: And say instead: And if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of the defamer before he marries his bride, as they are married, apply it to the matter of the defamer himself after they are married, teaching that if he divorced her and violated the prohibition against divorcing her, he is obligated to remarry her, and it teaches that he is not flogged, as the positive mitzva rectifies the prohibition. But in the case of a rapist, the mitzva is to marry her after the rape but there is no mitzva to marry her after he divorces her, and nevertheless, he is not flogged.
אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, וְאָתֵי אוֹנֵס וְגָמַר מִינֵּיהּ. בְּמַאי גָּמַר מִינֵּיהּ? אִי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר אִי בְּ״מָה מָצִינוּ״ – אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ כִּדְפָרְכִינַן: מָה לְמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה!
The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so; the halakha is derived with regard to the defamer himself, teaching that if he divorces his bride he is obligated to remarry her. And the case of the rapist comes and is derived from the case of the defamer, and the same halakha applies there as well. The Gemara asks: With what derivation is the case of a rapist derived from the case of a defamer? If it is by means of an a fortiori inference or if it is by means of the inductive hermeneutical principle: What do we find, those derivations can be refuted, as we refuted the derivations earlier in the Gemara: What is notable about the case of a defamer? It is notable in that he did not perform an action.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כׇּל יָמָיו בַּעֲמוֹד וְהַחְזֵר. וְכֵן כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל יָמָיו בַּעֲמוֹד וְהַחְזֵר.
Rather, Rava says: From where is it derived that a rapist must remarry his victim if he divorced her because the positive mitzva rectifies the prohibition “He may not send her away”? It is derived from the superfluous phrase: “All his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29), indicating that all his days, even after he marries and divorces her, he is obligated to arise and remarry her and is consequently not liable to receive lashes. The Gemara adds: And likewise, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All his days he is obligated to arise and remarry her.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: וְהָא לָא דָּמֵי לָאוֵיהּ לְלָאו דַּחֲסִימָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתַב בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא עֲשֵׂה יַתִּירָא מִגְרָע גָּרַע?
Rav Pappa said to Rava that a question arises with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that one is flogged for violating a prohibition preceded by a positive mitzva: But isn’t its prohibition dissimilar to the prohibition of muzzling an ox while it is threshing grain (see Deuteronomy 25:4), which is the paradigm for all prohibitions for whose violation one is flogged, as no positive mitzva is stated in conjunction with the prohibition of muzzling? Rava said to him: Is it reasonable to say that due to the fact that the Merciful One wrote in its regard an additional positive mitzva, the stringency of the prohibition lessens, so that no lashes are administered?
אִי הָכִי, לָאו שֶׁנִּיתָּק לַעֲשֵׂה נָמֵי, לֵימָא: מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתַב בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא עֲשֵׂה יַתִּירָא מִגְרָע גָּרַע? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָהוּא לְנַתּוֹקֵי לָאו הוּא דַּאֲתָא.
Rav Pappa objected to this claim: If so, with regard to a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva as well, let us say: Is it reasonable to say that due to the fact that the Merciful One wrote in its regard an additional positive mitzva, the stringency of the prohibition lessens, so that no lashes are administered? Rava said to him: In that case, the transgressor is not flogged because the mitzva comes to sever the prohibition from the punishment of lashes.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בִּיטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּיטְּלוֹ,
The Gemara returns to the statement of Rava, who said with regard to the rapist: All his days he is obligated to arise and remarry her, and that is why he is not flogged for violating the prohibition “He may not send her away,” and asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the criterion for determining whether one is flogged for violating a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva is whether he nullified the mitzva or did not nullify the mitzva. According to this opinion, one is flogged only if fulfillment of the mitzva is no longer possible, e.g., a priest who divorced the woman whom he raped. By contrast, a non-priest would not be flogged, because the option of remarriage remains viable.
אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר קִיְּימוֹ וְלֹא קִיְּימוֹ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
But according to the one who says that the criterion for determining whether one is flogged in that case is whether he fulfilled the mitzva or did not fulfill the mitzva, and if he did not immediately fulfill the mitzva he is flogged, what can be said? Even in the case of a non-priest who divorced the rape victim, once he fails to remarry her immediately, he is liable to receive lashes.
מִידֵּי הוּא טַעְמָא אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? הָאָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְתַנָּא, תְּנִי: בִּטְּלוֹ – חַיָּיב, וְלֹא בִּטְּלוֹ – פָּטוּר.
The Gemara answers: The only reason Rava stated his explanation, that all his days he is obligated to arise and remarry her and that is why the rapist is not flogged even though it is a prohibition preceded by a positive mitzva, is to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that for any prohibition that has a positive mitzva which preceded it, everyone agrees that one is flogged for its violation. Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say to the tanna who would recite the mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall: Teach that if he nullified the mitzva, he is liable to receive lashes, and if he did not nullify the mitzva, he is exempt from lashes? According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, it works out well.
דְּתָנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ קוּם עֲשֵׂה, קִיֵּים עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבָּהּ – פָּטוּר, בִּיטֵּל עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבָּהּ – חַיָּיב.
What is the dispute to which the Gemara is alluding? The tanna taught a baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to any prohibition that entails a command to arise and perform a mitzva, if he fulfilled the positive mitzva that is entailed therein, he is exempt from lashes, and if he nullified the positive mitzva that is entailed therein, he is liable to receive lashes.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי קָא אָמְרַתְּ? קִיֵּים – פָּטוּר, לֹא קִיֵּים – חַיָּיב, בִּיטֵּל – חַיָּיב, לֹא בִּיטֵּל – פָּטוּר! תְּנִי: בִּיטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּיטְּלוֹ. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: קִיְּימוֹ וְלֹא קִיְּימוֹ.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the tanna: What is it that you are saying? The baraita that you recited is self-contradictory, as based on the first clause: If he fulfilled the mitzva he is exempt, apparently, if he did not fulfill the mitzva he is liable. Yet based on the latter clause: If he nullified the mitzva, he is liable, apparently, if he did not nullify the mitzva he is exempt, even though he failed to fulfill the mitzva. Rather, teach: If he nullified the mitzva, he is liable to receive lashes, and if he did not nullify the mitzva, he is exempt from lashes. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The formulation of the baraita must be consistent; therefore, teach: If he fulfilled the mitzva, he is exempt, and if he did not fulfill the mitzva he is liable.
בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? בְּהַתְרָאַת סָפֵק קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, מָר סָבַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה,
The Gemara inquires: With regard to what matter do they disagree? They disagree with regard to uncertain forewarning, i.e., forewarning concerning a transgression with regard to which it will not be clarified whether or not his action will render him liable to receive lashes. One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds: Uncertain forewarning is characterized as forewarning; therefore, even if it is unclear whether the action that the transgressor is about to perform will render him liable to receive lashes, he can be forewarned, and if he violates the prohibition in a manner that will render him liable, he is flogged.
וּמָר סָבַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
And one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds: Uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the rapist is forewarned when he is about to divorce his wife, even though there is uncertainty whether he will nullify the mitzva. If he nullifies the mitzva, e.g., if he vows that deriving benefit from his ex-wife is forbidden to him, thereby ensuring that he cannot remarry her, he is flogged. Reish Lakish holds that if one’s liability to receive lashes was dependent upon the nullification of the mitzva, the rapist would never be flogged, as in that case the forewarning would of necessity be uncertain. Therefore, he explains that the criterion for determining whether one is flogged is whether he fulfilled the mitzva immediately. Violating the prohibition renders him liable to receive lashes; he may then choose to be flogged or to fulfill the mitzva. Therefore, when he is forewarned that he will be flogged if he divorces her, it is not uncertain forewarning.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאִיתְּמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל כִּכָּר זֶה הַיּוֹם״, וְעָבַר הַיּוֹם וְלֹא אֲכָלָהּ, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה,
And they follow their standard lines of reasoning, as it was stated that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagreed in a case where one said: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not flogged for taking a false oath. They disagree with regard to the reason that he is not flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged,
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After all the hype on the 2020 siyum I became inspired by a friend to begin learning as the new cycle began.with no background in studying Talmud it was a bit daunting in the beginning. my husband began at the same time so we decided to study on shabbat together. The reaction from my 3 daughters has been fantastic. They are very proud. It’s been a great challenge for my brain which is so healthy!
Modi’in, Israel
Los Angeles, United States
I started learning at the beginning of this Daf Yomi cycle because I heard a lot about the previous cycle coming to an end and thought it would be a good thing to start doing. My husband had already bought several of the Koren Talmud Bavli books and they were just sitting on the shelf, not being used, so here was an opportunity to start using them and find out exactly what was in them. Loving it!
Borehamwood, United Kingdom
In January 2020 on a Shabbaton to Baltimore I heard about the new cycle of Daf Yomi after the siyum celebration in NYC stadium. I started to read “ a daily dose of Talmud “ and really enjoyed it . It led me to google “ do Orthodox women study Talmud? “ and found HADRAN! Since then I listen to the podcast every morning, participate in classes and siyum. I love to learn, this is amazing! Thank you
Atlanta, United States
I started my journey on the day I realized that the Siyum was happening in Yerushalayim and I was missing out. What? I told myself. How could I have not known about this? How can I have missed out on this opportunity? I decided that moment, I would start Daf Yomi and Nach Yomi the very next day. I am so grateful to Hadran. I am changed forever because I learn Gemara with women. Thank you.
Mitspe, Israel
Palo Alto, CA, United States
Geri Goldstein got me started learning daf yomi when I was in Israel 2 years ago. It’s been a challenge and I’ve learned a lot though I’m sure I miss a lot. I quilt as I listen and I want to share what I’ve been working on.
Ottawa, Canada
A Gemara shiur previous to the Hadran Siyum, was the impetus to attend it.It was highly inspirational and I was smitten. The message for me was התלמוד בידינו. I had decided along with my Chahsmonaim group to to do the daf and take it one daf at time- without any expectations at all. There has been a wealth of information, insights and halachik ideas. It is truly exercise of the mind, heart & Soul
Hashmonaim, Israel
I started learning when my brother sent me the news clip of the celebration of the last Daf Yomi cycle. I was so floored to see so many women celebrating that I wanted to be a part of it. It has been an enriching experience studying a text in a language I don’t speak, using background knowledge that I don’t have. It is stretching my learning in unexpected ways, bringing me joy and satisfaction.
Warwick, Rhode Island, United States
With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
Haifa, Israel
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Raanana, Israel
Philadelphia, United States
I had dreamed of doing daf yomi since I had my first serious Talmud class 18 years ago at Pardes with Rahel Berkovitz, and then a couple of summers with Leah Rosenthal. There is no way I would be able to do it without another wonderful teacher, Michelle, and the Hadran organization. I wake up and am excited to start each day with the next daf.
Irvine, United States
It happened without intent (so am I yotzei?!) – I watched the women’s siyum live and was so moved by it that the next morning, I tuned in to Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur, and here I am, still learning every day, over 2 years later. Some days it all goes over my head, but others I grasp onto an idea or a story, and I ‘get it’ and that’s the best feeling in the world. So proud to be a Hadran learner.
Zichron Yaakov, Israel
Berlin, Germany
I had no formal learning in Talmud until I began my studies in the Joint Program where in 1976 I was one of the few, if not the only, woman talmud major. It was superior training for law school and enabled me to approach my legal studies with a foundation . In 2018, I began daf yomi listening to Rabbanit MIchelle’s pod cast and my daily talmud studies are one of the highlights of my life.
Minneapolis, United States
I started learning daf yomi at the beginning of this cycle. As the pandemic evolved, it’s been so helpful to me to have this discipline every morning to listen to the daf podcast after I’ve read the daf; learning about the relationships between the rabbis and the ways they were constructing our Jewish religion after the destruction of the Temple. I’m grateful to be on this journey!
Teaneck NJ, United States
I never thought I’d be able to do Daf Yomi till I saw the video of Hadran’s Siyum HaShas. Now, 2 years later, I’m about to participate in Siyum Seder Mo’ed with my Hadran community. It has been an incredible privilege to learn with Rabbanit Michelle and to get to know so many caring, talented and knowledgeable women. I look forward with great anticipation and excitement to learning Seder Nashim.
Karmiel, Israel
I began my journey with Rabbanit Michelle more than five years ago. My friend came up with a great idea for about 15 of us to learn the daf and one of us would summarize weekly what we learned.
It was fun but after 2-3 months people began to leave. I have continued. Since the cycle began Again I have joined the Teaneck women.. I find it most rewarding in so many ways. Thank you
New Jersey, United States
I went to day school in Toronto but really began to learn when I attended Brovenders back in the early 1980’s. Last year after talking to my sister who was learning Daf Yomi, inspired, I looked on the computer and the Hadran site came up. I have been listening to each days shiur in the morning as I work. I emphasis listening since I am not sitting with a Gamara. I listen while I work in my studio.
Tekoa, Israel
Makkot 15
אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אָמַרְתָּ? אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא. אָמַר רַבָּה: הָאֱלֹהִים! אַמְרַהּ, וּכְתִיבָא וּתְנֵינָא: כְּתִיבָא – ״וִישַׁלְּחוּ מִן הַמַּחֲנֶה [וְגוֹ׳]״ ״וְלֹא יְטַמְּאוּ אֶת מַחֲנֵיהֶם״. תְּנֵינָא – הַבָּא לַמִּקְדָּשׁ טָמֵא.
They said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Did you say this halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: No. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the form of an oath: By God, he said it, and this halakha is written in the Torah and we learn it in the mishna. It is written: “And they shall send from the camp any man who is leprous, and any zav…and they shall not render their camp impure” (Numbers 5:2–4). There is a prohibition against rendering the camp impure, and there is a positive mitzva to send them out of the camp. Since the positive mitzva precedes and is independent of the prohibition, one is flogged for the violation of that prohibition, as we learn in the mishna among those liable to receive lashes: One who entered the Temple while ritually impure.
אֶלָּא מַאי טַעְמָא קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ? מִשּׁוּם דְּקַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ אוֹנֶס. דְּתַנְיָא: אוֹנֵס שֶׁגֵּירַשׁ, אִם יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא – מַחְזִיר וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. אִם כֹּהֵן הוּא – לוֹקֶה וְאֵינוֹ מַחְזִיר.
The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the reason he retracted his statement and claimed he did not say it? The Gemara answers: It is due to the fact that the halakha concerning one who rapes a virgin young woman, who is required by Torah law to marry her and for whom it is prohibited to divorce her as long as he lives, is difficult for him, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a rapist who divorced the woman he raped, if he is a non-priest, he remarries her, and he is not flogged for violating the prohibition: “He may not send her away all his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29). If he is a priest, he is flogged for violating the prohibition, and he does not remarry her because it is prohibited for him to marry a divorcée.
אִם יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא – מַחְזִיר וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה, אַמַּאי? לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁקְּדָמוֹ עֲשֵׂה הוּא, וְלִילְקֵי!
The Gemara elaborates: If he is a non-priest, he remarries her, and he is not flogged. Why? It is a prohibition that has a positive mitzva which preceded it, as the positive mitzva: “And she shall be his wife” (Deuteronomy 22:29), precedes the prohibition “He may not send her away.” But let him be flogged, since he violated the prohibition by divorcing her. Apparently, one is not flogged even if the positive mitzva precedes the prohibition.
אָמַר עוּלָּא: לֹא יֵאָמֵר ״לוֹ תִּהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״, בְּאוֹנֵס, וְלִיגְמַר מִמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע: וּמָה מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה – אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״וְלוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״, אוֹנֵס לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
Ulla says in response: The positive mitzva in the case of a rapist is not a mitzva that precedes the prohibition. Rather, it follows the prohibition and rectifies it, as it is referring to a case of one who married his victim and then divorced her. Let the verse not state: “And she shall be his wife,” in the case of a rapist, and let us derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of one who defames his bride, claiming that she was not a virgin when he consummated the marriage: If in the case of a defamer, who did not perform an action but sinned through speech, the Merciful One states: “And she shall be his wife” (Deuteronomy 22:19), then in the case of a rapist, who performed an action, is it not all the more so that he is obligated to take her as a wife?
לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְפָנָיו תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאַחֲרָיו, שֶׁאִם גֵּירַשׁ יַחֲזִיר.
Ulla continues: Why, then, is the mitzva stated in the case of the rapist? If it is not relevant to the matter of before the rapist marries the victim, apply it to the matter of after the rapist marries the victim, teaching that if he divorced her he must remarry her. Although in the verse it appears prior to the prohibition “He may not send her away,” it actually serves to rectify that prohibition.
וְאַכַּתִּי, אוֹנֵס מִמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רָע לָא גָּמַר, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, שֶׁכֵּן לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם!
The Gemara asks: But still, this affords no proof, as one cannot derive the case of a rapist from the case of a defamer, as the a fortiori inference can be refuted: What is notable about the case of a defamer, which is more stringent than the case of a rapist? It is notable in that he is flogged and is liable to pay retribution, which is contrary to the principle that in general, two punishments are not administered for one transgression.
אֶלָּא: לֹא יֵאָמֵר ״לוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״ בְּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, וְלִיגְמַר מֵאוֹנֵס: וּמָה אוֹנֵס שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם, אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״וְלוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״, מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? וְלָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לַמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לָאוֹנֵס, אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְפָנָיו – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאַחֲרָיו.
The Gemara suggests: Rather, let the verse not state: “And she shall be his wife,” in the case of the defamer, and let us derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of a rapist: And if in the case of a rapist, who is not both flogged and liable to pay restitution, but is liable to receive only one punishment, the Merciful One states: “And she shall be his wife,” in the case of a defamer, who is flogged and liable to pay retribution, is it not all the more so that he is obligated to take her as a wife? And why, then, is it stated in the case of the defamer? Rather, if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of the defamer, apply it to the matter of the rapist, and if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of before the rapist marries the victim, apply it to the matter of after the rapist marries the victim, teaching that if he divorced her he must remarry her. Although in the verse it appears prior to the prohibition “He may not send her away,” it actually serves to rectify that prohibition.
וּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע מֵאוֹנֵס נָמֵי לָא גָּמַר, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְאוֹנֵס – שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה!
The Gemara asks: But this affords no proof, as one cannot derive the case of a defamer from the case of a rapist either, as the a fortiori inference can be refuted: What is notable about the case of a rapist? It is notable in that he performed an action, while the defamer performed no action.
אֶלָּא: לֹא יֵאָמֵר ״לוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה״ בְּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, שֶׁהֲרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ הִיא. לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לַמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לָאוֹנֵס, וְאִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְפָנָיו – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאַחֲרָיו.
The Gemara suggests: Rather, let the verse not state: “And she shall be his wife,” in the case of the defamer because the expression is redundant, as she is already his wife. It would have been sufficient for the verse to state that it is prohibited for him to send her away. Why, then, is it stated in the case of the defamer? Rather, if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of the defamer, apply it to the matter of the rapist, and if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of before the rapist marries the victim, apply it to the matter of after the rapist marries the victim, teaching that if he divorced her he must remarry her. Although the positive mitzva appears in the verse prior to the prohibition “He may not send her away,” it actually serves to rectify that prohibition.
וְאֵימָא, וְאִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְפָנָיו דְּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאַחֲרָיו דִּידֵיהּ, דְּלָא לָקֵי!
The Gemara questions that derivation: And say instead: And if the mitzva is not relevant to the matter of the defamer before he marries his bride, as they are married, apply it to the matter of the defamer himself after they are married, teaching that if he divorced her and violated the prohibition against divorcing her, he is obligated to remarry her, and it teaches that he is not flogged, as the positive mitzva rectifies the prohibition. But in the case of a rapist, the mitzva is to marry her after the rape but there is no mitzva to marry her after he divorces her, and nevertheless, he is not flogged.
אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, וְאָתֵי אוֹנֵס וְגָמַר מִינֵּיהּ. בְּמַאי גָּמַר מִינֵּיהּ? אִי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר אִי בְּ״מָה מָצִינוּ״ – אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ כִּדְפָרְכִינַן: מָה לְמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה!
The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so; the halakha is derived with regard to the defamer himself, teaching that if he divorces his bride he is obligated to remarry her. And the case of the rapist comes and is derived from the case of the defamer, and the same halakha applies there as well. The Gemara asks: With what derivation is the case of a rapist derived from the case of a defamer? If it is by means of an a fortiori inference or if it is by means of the inductive hermeneutical principle: What do we find, those derivations can be refuted, as we refuted the derivations earlier in the Gemara: What is notable about the case of a defamer? It is notable in that he did not perform an action.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כׇּל יָמָיו בַּעֲמוֹד וְהַחְזֵר. וְכֵן כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל יָמָיו בַּעֲמוֹד וְהַחְזֵר.
Rather, Rava says: From where is it derived that a rapist must remarry his victim if he divorced her because the positive mitzva rectifies the prohibition “He may not send her away”? It is derived from the superfluous phrase: “All his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29), indicating that all his days, even after he marries and divorces her, he is obligated to arise and remarry her and is consequently not liable to receive lashes. The Gemara adds: And likewise, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All his days he is obligated to arise and remarry her.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: וְהָא לָא דָּמֵי לָאוֵיהּ לְלָאו דַּחֲסִימָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתַב בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא עֲשֵׂה יַתִּירָא מִגְרָע גָּרַע?
Rav Pappa said to Rava that a question arises with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that one is flogged for violating a prohibition preceded by a positive mitzva: But isn’t its prohibition dissimilar to the prohibition of muzzling an ox while it is threshing grain (see Deuteronomy 25:4), which is the paradigm for all prohibitions for whose violation one is flogged, as no positive mitzva is stated in conjunction with the prohibition of muzzling? Rava said to him: Is it reasonable to say that due to the fact that the Merciful One wrote in its regard an additional positive mitzva, the stringency of the prohibition lessens, so that no lashes are administered?
אִי הָכִי, לָאו שֶׁנִּיתָּק לַעֲשֵׂה נָמֵי, לֵימָא: מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתַב בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא עֲשֵׂה יַתִּירָא מִגְרָע גָּרַע? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָהוּא לְנַתּוֹקֵי לָאו הוּא דַּאֲתָא.
Rav Pappa objected to this claim: If so, with regard to a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva as well, let us say: Is it reasonable to say that due to the fact that the Merciful One wrote in its regard an additional positive mitzva, the stringency of the prohibition lessens, so that no lashes are administered? Rava said to him: In that case, the transgressor is not flogged because the mitzva comes to sever the prohibition from the punishment of lashes.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בִּיטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּיטְּלוֹ,
The Gemara returns to the statement of Rava, who said with regard to the rapist: All his days he is obligated to arise and remarry her, and that is why he is not flogged for violating the prohibition “He may not send her away,” and asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the criterion for determining whether one is flogged for violating a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva is whether he nullified the mitzva or did not nullify the mitzva. According to this opinion, one is flogged only if fulfillment of the mitzva is no longer possible, e.g., a priest who divorced the woman whom he raped. By contrast, a non-priest would not be flogged, because the option of remarriage remains viable.
אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר קִיְּימוֹ וְלֹא קִיְּימוֹ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
But according to the one who says that the criterion for determining whether one is flogged in that case is whether he fulfilled the mitzva or did not fulfill the mitzva, and if he did not immediately fulfill the mitzva he is flogged, what can be said? Even in the case of a non-priest who divorced the rape victim, once he fails to remarry her immediately, he is liable to receive lashes.
מִידֵּי הוּא טַעְמָא אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? הָאָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְתַנָּא, תְּנִי: בִּטְּלוֹ – חַיָּיב, וְלֹא בִּטְּלוֹ – פָּטוּר.
The Gemara answers: The only reason Rava stated his explanation, that all his days he is obligated to arise and remarry her and that is why the rapist is not flogged even though it is a prohibition preceded by a positive mitzva, is to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that for any prohibition that has a positive mitzva which preceded it, everyone agrees that one is flogged for its violation. Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say to the tanna who would recite the mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall: Teach that if he nullified the mitzva, he is liable to receive lashes, and if he did not nullify the mitzva, he is exempt from lashes? According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, it works out well.
דְּתָנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ קוּם עֲשֵׂה, קִיֵּים עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבָּהּ – פָּטוּר, בִּיטֵּל עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבָּהּ – חַיָּיב.
What is the dispute to which the Gemara is alluding? The tanna taught a baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to any prohibition that entails a command to arise and perform a mitzva, if he fulfilled the positive mitzva that is entailed therein, he is exempt from lashes, and if he nullified the positive mitzva that is entailed therein, he is liable to receive lashes.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי קָא אָמְרַתְּ? קִיֵּים – פָּטוּר, לֹא קִיֵּים – חַיָּיב, בִּיטֵּל – חַיָּיב, לֹא בִּיטֵּל – פָּטוּר! תְּנִי: בִּיטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּיטְּלוֹ. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: קִיְּימוֹ וְלֹא קִיְּימוֹ.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the tanna: What is it that you are saying? The baraita that you recited is self-contradictory, as based on the first clause: If he fulfilled the mitzva he is exempt, apparently, if he did not fulfill the mitzva he is liable. Yet based on the latter clause: If he nullified the mitzva, he is liable, apparently, if he did not nullify the mitzva he is exempt, even though he failed to fulfill the mitzva. Rather, teach: If he nullified the mitzva, he is liable to receive lashes, and if he did not nullify the mitzva, he is exempt from lashes. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The formulation of the baraita must be consistent; therefore, teach: If he fulfilled the mitzva, he is exempt, and if he did not fulfill the mitzva he is liable.
בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? בְּהַתְרָאַת סָפֵק קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, מָר סָבַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה,
The Gemara inquires: With regard to what matter do they disagree? They disagree with regard to uncertain forewarning, i.e., forewarning concerning a transgression with regard to which it will not be clarified whether or not his action will render him liable to receive lashes. One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds: Uncertain forewarning is characterized as forewarning; therefore, even if it is unclear whether the action that the transgressor is about to perform will render him liable to receive lashes, he can be forewarned, and if he violates the prohibition in a manner that will render him liable, he is flogged.
וּמָר סָבַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
And one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds: Uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the rapist is forewarned when he is about to divorce his wife, even though there is uncertainty whether he will nullify the mitzva. If he nullifies the mitzva, e.g., if he vows that deriving benefit from his ex-wife is forbidden to him, thereby ensuring that he cannot remarry her, he is flogged. Reish Lakish holds that if one’s liability to receive lashes was dependent upon the nullification of the mitzva, the rapist would never be flogged, as in that case the forewarning would of necessity be uncertain. Therefore, he explains that the criterion for determining whether one is flogged is whether he fulfilled the mitzva immediately. Violating the prohibition renders him liable to receive lashes; he may then choose to be flogged or to fulfill the mitzva. Therefore, when he is forewarned that he will be flogged if he divorces her, it is not uncertain forewarning.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאִיתְּמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל כִּכָּר זֶה הַיּוֹם״, וְעָבַר הַיּוֹם וְלֹא אֲכָלָהּ, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה,
And they follow their standard lines of reasoning, as it was stated that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagreed in a case where one said: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not flogged for taking a false oath. They disagree with regard to the reason that he is not flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged,
