Makkot 8

והאמר רב יצחק ברבי יוסף אמר רבי יוחנן רבי ורבי יהודה בן רועץ ובית שמאי ורבי שמעון ורבי עקיבא כולהו סבירי להו יש אם למקרא היינו דקאמר להו ועוד

But doesn’t Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Yosef, say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz, and Beit Shammai, and Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Akiva all hold that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, not the manner in which it is written? How can Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi ascribe Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s ruling to the contrary opinion? The Gemara answers: That is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to the Rabbis: And furthermore. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: If the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, that supports my interpretation of the verse; if not, there is an additional proof.

אמר רב פפא מאן דשדא פיסא לדיקלא ואתר תמרי ואזול תמרי וקטול באנו למחלוקת דרבי ורבנן פשיטא מהו דתימא ככח כחו דמי קא משמע לן

Rav Pappa said: In the case of one who cast a clod of earth onto a palm tree, and he severed dates from the tree, and the dates went upon a person and killed him, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis in a case where one was splitting wood and a wood chip flew through the air and killed a person In that case, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable to be exiled, and the Rabbis deem him exempt from exile. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The cases are identical. What novel element is Rav Pappa introducing? The Gemara answers: The parallel between the cases drawn by Rav Pappa is necessary. Lest you say that these severed dates were not propelled by the force of his action but are like an item propelled by a force generated by the force of his action, and even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would concede that in that case he is exempt from exile, Rav Pappa teaches us that the dates are considered to have been severed by the force of his action.

אלא כח כחו לרבי היכי משכחת לה כגון דשדא פיסא ומחיה לגרמא ואזיל גרמא ומחיה לכבאסא ואתר תמרי ואזול תמרי וקטול

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, how can you find circumstances of a force generated by the force of his action where he would be exempt from exile? The Gemara answers: It can be found in a case where one cast a clod of earth and it struck a branch of the palm tree, and the branch, propelled by the clod, proceeded to strike a cluster of dates [likhevasa] and severed the dates from the branch they were on and the dates proceeded to kill a person.

מתני׳ הזורק אבן לרשות הרבים והרג הרי זה גולה רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר אם מכשיצאתה האבן מידו הוציא הלה את ראשו וקבלה הרי זה פטור

MISHNA: One who threw a stone into the public domain and killed a person is exiled. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: If after the stone left his hand the other person placed his head out into the public domain and received a blow from the stone, he is exempt, as when he cast the stone into the public domain there was no one there.

זרק את האבן לחצרו והרג אם יש רשות לניזק ליכנס לשם גולה ואם לאו אינו גולה שנאמר ואשר יבא את רעהו ביער מה היער רשות לניזק ולמזיק ליכנס לשם אף כל רשות לניזק ולמזיק להכנס לשם יצא חצר בעל הבית שאין רשות לניזק ולמזיק ליכנס לשם

In the case of one who threw the stone into his courtyard and killed a person, if the victim had permission to enter into there, the murderer is exiled, but if not, he is not exiled, as it is stated with regard to the cities of refuge: “And as one who goes with his neighbor into the forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a forest, the victim and the assailant both have equal permission to enter there, so too, with regard to all places that the victim and the assailant have permission to enter there, the killer is liable. This serves to exclude the courtyard of the homeowner, where the victim and the assailant do not both have permission to enter there. Since the victim had no right to enter his courtyard, the unintentional murderer is exempt from exile.

אבא שאול אומר מה חטבת עצים רשות אף כל רשות יצא האב המכה את בנו והרב הרודה את תלמידו ושליח בית דין

Abba Shaul says: Another halakha can be derived from that verse: Just as the cutting of wood that is mentioned in the verse is optional, so too, all those liable to be exiled are examples of cases where the unintentional murderer was engaged in an activity that is optional. This serves to exclude a father who strikes his son, and a teacher who oppresses his student, and an agent of the court deputized to flog transgressors. If, in the course of performing the mitzva with which they are charged, they unintentionally murdered the son, the student, or the person being flogged, respectively, they are exempt.

גמ׳ לרשות הרבים מזיד הוא אמר רב שמואל בר יצחק בסותר את כותלו איבעי ליה לעיוני בסותר את כותלו בלילה בלילה נמי איבעי ליה לעיוני

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One who threw a stone into the public domain and killed a person is exiled. The Gemara asks: If he threw the stone into the public domain, why is he exiled? He is an intentional murderer. He knows that there are generally people in the public domain and is aware that he is likely to harm someone with the stone. Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says: The reference in the mishna is not to one who threw a stone for no reason; rather, it is a case where one is demolishing his wall, and one of the stones struck a person. The Gemara counters: That too is intentional, as he should have examined the other side of the wall to determine if there was anyone there. The Gemara answers: It is a case where one is demolishing his wall at night, when passersby are scarce. The Gemara asks: At night too he is required to examine the other side of the wall to determine if there is anyone there, as although it is uncommon, people are apt to walk through a public domain at all hours.

בסותר את כותלו לאשפה האי אשפה היכי דמי אי שכיחי בה רבים פושע הוא אי לא שכיחי בה רבים אנוס הוא

The Gemara answers: The reference in the mishna is to a case where one demolishes his wall into a scrap heap, where there is no reasonable expectation to find anyone there, as it is located out of the way. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this scrap heap? If it is frequented by the multitudes because it is utilized as a bathroom, he is negligent; if it is not frequented by the multitudes, although it is a public domain in the sense that it is not private property, he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as there was no reason to consider the possibility that someone was there.

אמר רב פפא לא צריכא אלא לאשפה העשויה ליפנות בה בלילה ואין עשויה ליפנות בה ביום ואיכא דמקרי ויתיב פושע לא הוי דהא אינה עשויה ליפנות בה ביום אונס נמי לא הוי דהא איכא דמקרי ויתיב

Rav Pappa said: It is necessary to state this halakha only in the case of a scrap heap that is utilized for people to defecate there at night but is not utilized for people to defecate there during the day, but it happens on occasion that one will sit there and defecate during the day. One who demolishes his wall into the scrap heap during the day is neither negligent, as the scrap heap is not utilized for people to defecate there during the day, nor is he a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as it happens on occasion that one will sit there and defecate during the day, which he should have considered. Therefore, his status is that of an unintentional murderer who is liable to be exiled.

רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר וכו׳ תנו רבנן ומצא פרט לממציא את עצמו מכאן אמר רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אם משיצתה האבן מידו הוציא הלה את ראשו וקבלה פטור

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: If after the stone left his hand the other person placed his head out into the public domain and received a blow from the stone, he is exempt. The Gemara cites a related baraita. The Sages taught that it is written: “And the blade displaces from the wood and finds his neighbor and he dies” (Deuteronomy 19:5), from which it is inferred: “And finds”; this serves to exclude one who presents himself and is thereby killed by the stone. From here Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: If after the stone left his hand the other person placed his head out into the public domain and received a blow from the stone, the murderer is exempt.

למימרא דמצא מעיקרא משמע ורמינהי ומצא פרט למצוי שלא ימכור ברחוק ויגאול בקרוב ברעה ויגאול ביפה

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the term “and finds” indicates an item that was there initially, prior to the incident in question? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from that which is written with regard to one who seeks to redeem an ancestral field that he sold: “And he acquires the means and finds sufficient funds for his redemption” (Leviticus 25:26). The term “and finds” serves to exclude one who, in order to accrue funds to redeem his field, sells a field that was found in his possession when he originally sold the field. It means that he may not sell land that he owns in a distant place and redeem land that he owns in a proximate place, or sell a low-quality tract of land and redeem with the funds accrued from that sale high-quality land. One may not exploit his right to redeem his land for his own advantage. This baraita indicates that the term “and finds” indicates an item that was not there at the time but presents itself later.

אמר רבא הכא מענייניה דקרא והתם מענייניה דקרא התם מענייניה דקרא ומצא דומיא דוהשיגה ידו מה השיגה ידו מהשתא אף מצא נמי מהשתא הכא מענייניה דקרא ומצא דומיא דיער מה יער מידי דאיתיה מעיקרא אף ומצא נמי מידי דאיתיה מעיקרא

Rava said: This is not difficult, as here, with regard to exile, the term is interpreted in keeping with the context of the verse, and there, with regard to the redemption of land, the term is interpreted in keeping with the context of the verse. There, the term is interpreted in keeping with the context of the verse. The term “and finds” is similar to the phrase that precedes it: “And he acquires the means.” Just as the meaning of the phrase “he acquires the means” is that he acquires the means from now, as had he possessed the means beforehand he would not have sold his ancestral field at all, so too, the meaning of the term “and finds” is also that he finds sufficient funds from now and no earlier. Here, with regard to exile, the term is interpreted in keeping with the context of the verse, as the term “and finds” is similar to a forest: Just as a forest is an entity that is there initially, so too, the term “and finds” also is referring to an entity that is there initially.

הזורק את האבן וכו׳ אמר ליה ההוא מרבנן לרבא ממאי דמחטבת עצים דרשות דלמא מחטבת עצים דסוכה ומחטבת עצים דמערכה ואפילו הכי אמר רחמנא ליגלי אמר ליה כיון דאם מצא חטוב אינו חוטב לאו מצוה השתא נמי לאו מצוה

§ The mishna teaches: One who throws a stone, etc. Abba Shaul derives from the verse: “And as when one goes with his neighbor into the forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5): Just as the cutting of wood mentioned in the verse is optional, so too, all those liable to be exiled are in cases where the unintentional murderer was engaged in an activity that is optional. One of the Sages said to Rava: From where do you know that the derivation is from the cutting of wood for a purpose that is optional? Perhaps the derivation is from the cutting of wood for the purpose of building a sukka or from cutting wood for the arrangement of wood on the altar, both of which are obligatory, since they are mitzvot, and even so the Merciful One states: Let him be exiled. Rava said to him: Since if one found wood already cut he does not cut other wood, as in that case it is not a mitzva to cut, now, when there is no wood cut as well, although he is cutting wood to facilitate fulfillment of a mitzva, the act of cutting the wood itself is not a mitzva.

איתיביה רבינא לרבא יצא האב המכה את בנו והרב הרודה את תלמידו ושליח בית דין לימא כיון דאילו גמיר לאו מצוה השתא נמי לאו מצוה התם אף על גב דגמיר מצוה דכתיב יסר בנך ויניחך ויתן מעדנים לנפשך

Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from clause of the mishna that states that the example of the forest serves to exclude a father who strikes his son, and a teacher who oppresses his student, and an agent of the court. Let us say with regard to a father who strikes his son: Since if the son was learned, it is not a mitzva to strike him, now, in a case where the son is not learned and the father strikes him to facilitate his education too, it is not a mitzva, and therefore he should be exiled. Rava replied: There, even though the son is learned, it is a mitzva to strike him from time to time, as it is written: “Chastise your son, and he will give you rest; and he will give delight to your soul” (Proverbs 29:17).

הדר אמר רבא לאו מילתא היא דאמרי ואשר יבא את רעהו ביער מה יער דאי בעי עייל ואי בעי לא עייל ואי סלקא דעתך מצוה מי סגיא דלא עייל

Rava then said: That which I said is nothing, as there is a different proof that the verse is not referring to cutting wood in fulfillment of a mitzva. It is written: “And as when one [ve’asher] goes with his neighbor into the forest.” Based on the term asher, which indicates that the entering into the forest may or may not occur, what is the nature of the forest mentioned in the verse? It is a place where if one wants to, he enters the forest, and if one wants to, he does not enter. And if it enters your mind that the verse is referring to one who cuts wood to fulfill a mitzva, would it suffice if he did not enter the forest? He must enter the forest to fulfill the mitzva.

אמר ליה רב אדא בר אהבה לרבא כל היכא דכתיב אשר דאי בעי הוא אלא מעתה ואיש אשר יטמא ולא יתחטא אי בעי מיטמא אי בעי לא מיטמא מת מצוה דלא סגי דלא מיטמא הכי נמי דפטור

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: Is it so that wherever the term asher is written in the Torah it is a case where if he wants to he does so, and it is not referring to a mitzva or an obligation? If that is so, that which is written: “And a man who [asher] becomes impure and does not purify himself, and that soul shall be excised…as he has impurified the Sanctuary of God” (Numbers 19:20), can be referring only to a case where if he wants to he becomes impure, and if he wants to, he does not become impure. But in the case of a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva], where it would not suffice for him not to become impure in the process of burying it, would you say: So too, he is exempt from the punishment of karet if he enters the Temple in a state of impurity?

שאני התם דאמר קרא

Rava replied: There it is different, as the verse states with regard to one impure with impurity imparted by a corpse:

טמא יהיה מכל מקום

“He shall be impure” (Numbers 19:13), indicating that the same halakhot apply in any case, unrelated to the manner in which he became impure.

ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדתניא טמא יהיה לרבות טבול יום טומאתו בו לרבות מחוסר כיפורים אמר ליה אנא מעוד טומאתו קא אמינא

The Gemara challenges: He requires that verse for a different derivation, as that which is taught in a baraita: The phrase “He shall be impure” serves to include one who immersed that day and whose purification process will be completed at nightfall. If he enters the Temple before nightfall, he is also liable to receive karet. The phrase later in that verse: “His impurity is upon him,” serves to include one who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, e.g., a leper or a zav. Rava said to Ravina: I said that the halakha that one rendered impure by a met mitzva is liable to receive karet is derived from the extraneous term “yet,” in the phrase later in that same verse: “His impurity is yet upon him,” which indicates that one is liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity regardless of the manner in which he became impure. That is one version of the discussion.

איכא דמתני לה אהא בחריש ובקציר תשבת רבי עקיבא אומר אינו צריך לומר חריש של שביעית וקציר של שביעית שהרי כבר נאמר שדך לא תזרע וכרמך לא תזמר אלא אפילו חריש של ערב שביעית שנכנס לשביעית וקציר של שביעית שיצא למוצאי שביעית

Some teach this exchange with regard to this baraita: “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21). Rabbi Akiva says: This verse is referring to the Sabbatical Year. The Torah does not need to state the prohibition against plowing during the Sabbatical Year or harvesting during the Sabbatical Year, as it is already stated: “You shall neither sow your field, nor prune your vineyard” (Leviticus 25:4). What, then, is derived from this verse? Rather, it is derived that even plowing on the eve of the Sabbatical Year, which facilitates growth of crops when the Sabbatical Year enters, and the harvest of crops that grew during the Sabbatical Year, which emerged and were reaped after the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, are prohibited.

רבי ישמעאל אומר מה חריש רשות אף קציר רשות יצא קציר העומר שהוא מצוה

Rabbi Yishmael says: This verse in Exodus is not referring to the Sabbatical Year; rather, the reference is to plowing and harvesting on Shabbat. Just as plowing is optional, as there is no case where there is a mitzva to plow per se, so too, the harvesting mentioned in the verse is optional. This serves to exclude from the prohibition the harvesting of barley for the omer offering, which is a mitzva, and is therefore permitted on Shabbat.

אמר ליה ההוא מרבנן לרבא ממאי דחרישה דרשות דלמא חרישת עומר דמצוה ואפילו הכי אמר רחמנא תשבת אמר ליה כיון דאם מצא חרוש אינו חורש לאו מצוה

One of the Sages said to Rava: From where does Rabbi Yishmael ascertain that the plowing mentioned in the verse is referring to plowing that is optional? Perhaps the reference is to plowing a field to grow barley for use in the omer offering, which is a mitzva, and even so the Merciful One states: “You shall rest.” Rava said to him: Since if one found the field already plowed, he need not plow the field but he may directly proceed to sow the barley in the plowed field, clearly, even if one plows a field to facilitate fulfillment of a mitzva, plowing is not a mitzva per se.

איתיביה רבינא לרבא יצא האב המכה את בנו והרב הרודה את תלמידו ושליח בית דין ואמאי לימא כיון דאילו גמיר לאו מצוה השתא נמי לאו מצוה התם אף על גב דגמיר נמי מצוה קא עביד דכתיב יסר בנך ויניחך

Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from the clause of the mishna that states that the example of the forest serves to exclude a father who strikes his son, and a teacher who oppresses his student, and an agent of the court. And according to your opinion, why are a father who strikes his son and a teacher who oppresses his student excluded from exile? Let us say with regard to a father who strikes his son: Since if the son was learned, it is not a mitzva to strike him, now, in a case where the son is not learned and he strikes him to facilitate his education too, it is not a mitzva, and therefore he should be exiled. Rava replied: There, even if the son is learned, the father is performing a mitzva by striking him from time to time, as it is written: “Chastise your son, and he will give you rest; and he will give delight to your soul” (Proverbs 29:17).

הדר אמר רבא לאו מילתא היא דאמרי קצירה דומיא דחרישה מה חרישה מצא חרוש אינו חורש אף קצירה נמי מצא קצור אינו קוצר ואי סלקא דעתך מצוה מצא קצור אינו קוצר מצוה לקצור ולהביא

Rava then said: That which I said is nothing, as there is a different proof that the verse is not referring to plowing that is a mitzva. Based on the juxtaposition of the two, it is derived that harvesting is similar to plowing: Just as in the case of plowing, if one found the field already plowed, he need not plow, as there is no case where there is a mitzva to plow per se, so too with regard to harvesting as well, as if one found the barley already harvested, he need not harvest. And if it enters your mind that the reference in the verse is to plowing and harvesting for the purpose of a mitzva, is it so that if one found the barley already harvested, he need not harvest? There is a mitzva to harvest and bring the barley for the omer offering. The prohibition in the verse applies only to harvesting that is optional.

מתני׳ האב גולה על ידי הבן והבן גולה על ידי האב הכל גולין על ידי ישראל וישראל גולין על ידיהן חוץ מגר תושב וגר תושב אינו גולה אלא על ידי גר תושב

MISHNA: The father is exiled to a city of refuge due to his unintentional murder of his son. And the son is exiled due to his unintentional murder of his father. Everyone is exiled due to their unintentional murder of a Jew, and a Jew is exiled due to his unintentional murder of any of them, except for the unintentional murder of a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ger toshav]. And a ger toshav is exiled only due to his unintentional murder of a ger toshav.

גמ׳ האב גולה על ידי הבן והאמרת יצא האב המכה את בנו דגמיר האמרת אף על גב דגמיר מצוה קעביד בשוליא דנגרי

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: The father is exiled to a city of refuge due to his unintentional murder of his son. The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say in the previous mishna: To exclude a father who strikes his son, who is not exiled? The Gemara answers: This mishna is referring to a son who is learned, and there is no mitzva to strike him; therefore, since the striking is optional, the father is exiled. The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say: Even if the son is learned, the father performs a mitzva by striking his son? The Gemara answers: This ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a carpenter’s apprentice [bishevaleya]. Since the father is teaching his son carpentry, not Torah, there is no mitzva to strike him to spur him to study.

שוליא דנגרי חיותא היא דלמדיה דגמיר אומנותא אחריתי

The Gemara challenges: In the case of a carpenter’s apprentice, his father is teaching him a livelihood, which is also a mitzva. The Gemara answers: The reference is to a son who has already learned another craft, and since he is able to earn his livelihood there is no mitzva to teach him a second craft.

והבן גולה על ידי האב כו׳ ורמינהי מכה נפש פרט למכה אביו אמר רב כהנא לא קשיא הא רבי שמעון והא רבנן

§ The mishna teaches: And the son is exiled due to his unintentional murder of his father. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita. It is written: “And a murderer shall flee there, one who strikes a person unintentionally” (Numbers 35:11), from which it is derived that one who strikes a person is exiled. This serves to exclude one who strikes his father, whose punishment for doing so intentionally is more severe than that of the standard intentional murderer, and therefore the son is not subject to exile. Rav Kahana said: This is not difficult; this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree (Sanhedrin 50a) whether a son who kills his father intentionally is executed by strangulation or by the sword.

לרבי שמעון דאמר חנק חמור מסייף שגגת סייף ניתנה לכפרה שגגת חנק לא ניתנה לכפרה

According to Rabbi Shimon, who says: Strangulation is more severe than execution by the sword, which is why a son who kills his father is liable to be executed by strangulation, one who commits the unwitting violation of a prohibition generally punishable by execution by the sword, i.e., intentional murder of one who is not a parent, is eligible for atonement by means of exile; one who commits the unwitting violation of a prohibition generally punishable by the more severe death of strangulation, i.e., intentional murder of a parent, is not eligible for atonement by means of exile.

לרבנן דאמרי סייף חמור מחנק הורג אביו [בשוגג] שגגת סייף הוא ושגגת סייף ניתנה לכפרה

By contrast, according to the Rabbis, who say: Execution by the sword is more severe than strangulation, which is why a son who kills his father is liable to be executed by the sword, a son who unintentionally kills his father has performed an unwitting violation of a prohibition generally punishable by execution by the sword. And one who commits an unwitting violation of a prohibition generally punishable by execution by the sword, i.e., intentional murder of one who is not a parent, is eligible for atonement by means of exile.

רבא אמר פרט לעושה חבורה באביו בשוגג סלקא דעתך אמינא כיון דבמזיד בר קטלא הוא בשוגג נמי ליגלי קא משמע לן

Rava says: That which was derived in the baraita that one who strikes a person is exiled, to exclude one who strikes his father, who is not exiled, is not referring to a son who unintentionally kills his father, as in that case the son is certainly exiled. Rather, it is to exclude one who inflicts a wound on his father unwittingly. The novel element of this derivation is that it enters your mind to say: Since in a case where he wounded his father intentionally, he is liable to be executed like a murderer (see Exodus 21:15), if he did so unwittingly, let him also be exiled like an unintentional murderer. Therefore, this derivation teaches us that exile is administered specifically to an unintentional murderer, but it is not administered to the unwitting performer of any other transgression.

הכל גולין על ידי ישראל וכו׳ הכל גולין על ידי ישראל לאיתויי מאי לאיתויי עבד וכותי תנינא להא דתנו רבנן עבד וכותי גולה ולוקה על ידי ישראל וישראל גולה ולוקה על ידי כותי ועבד

§ The mishna teaches: Everyone is exiled due to their unintentional murder of a Jew, and a Jew is exiled due to his unintentional murder of any of them. The Gemara asks: Everyone is exiled due to their unintentional murder of a Jew: What case that was not already specified does this phrase serve to add? The Gemara answers: It serves to add a Canaanite slave and a Samaritan. The Gemara notes: We learn by inference from this mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: A Canaanite slave and a Samaritan are exiled and flogged due to a Jew, and a Jew is exiled and flogged due to a Samaritan and a Canaanite slave.

בשלמא עבד וכותי גולה על ידי ישראל ולוקה גולה דקטליה ולוקה דלטייה אלא ישראל גולה ולוקה על ידי כותי בשלמא גולה דקטליה אלא לוקה אמאי דלטייה ונשיא בעמך לא תאר בעושה מעשה עמך

The Gemara analyzes the baraita: Granted, a slave and a Samaritan are exiled and flogged due to a Jew; either of them is exiled in a case where he killed a Jew unintentionally, and flogged in a case where he cursed the Jew, thereby violating a Torah prohibition. But with regard to the halakha that a Jew is exiled and flogged due to a Samaritan, granted, the Jew is exiled in a case where he killed the Samaritan unintentionally, but the Jew is flogged for violating what prohibition? For cursing the Samaritan? Isn’t that prohibition derived from the verse: “And a leader in your people you may not curse” (Exodus 22:27), from which it is inferred that the prohibition is in effect only with regard to one who performs an action characteristic of your people, who comports himself as an observant, God-fearing Jew? Even if the conversion of the Samaritans was valid, they regularly violate numerous prohibitions, and they do not comport themselves as observant Jews.

אלא אמר רב אחא בר יעקב כגון שהעיד בו והוזם דכוותיה גבי עבד שהעיד בו והוזם עבד בר עדות הוא אלא אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהכהו הכאה

Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: This baraita is not referring to lashes administered for cursing; rather, one is flogged in a case where a Jew testified against a Samaritan and a Samaritan testified against a Jew and he was rendered a conspiring witness. The Gemara asks: Does that mean that in the corresponding situation with regard to a Canaanite slave, a slave is flogged in a case where he testified against a Jew and was rendered a conspiring witness? Is a slave eligible to give testimony? Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: What are we dealing with here? The Jew is flogged due to a slave and a Samaritan, and the slave and the Samaritan are flogged due to the Jew in a case where one struck the other with a blow