This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
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Summary
The word “oto” (it) in the verse describing the sin offering of the Nasi, “and he slaughters it in the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered” (Vayikra 4:24), is seemingly redundant. The Gemara offers four possible suggestions for what this word is intended to teach.
- The first suggestion is that the word excludes a different goat sin offering from the requirement of being slaughtered in the north – specifically, the goat offerings brought by the tribal leaders during the consecration of the Tabernacle. This is rejected because there is no logical reason to assume those goats would have required slaughter in the north, making an exclusionary verse unnecessary.
- The second suggestion is that the word teaches that while the animal must be in the north during slaughter, the slaughterer does not. However, this is initially rejected because Rabbi Achiya derives this law from a different source.
- The third suggestion is that only animals require slaughter in the north, excluding bird offerings. This is also rejected because birds do not require a knife for their preparation; since their procedure is entirely different, there is no reason to think they would have been subject to the northern requirement.
- The final suggestion is that the Pesach offering does not need to be performed in the north. This is rejected because one would not logically derive rules for lower-level sanctity offerings, such as the Pesach, from higher-level sanctity offerings that require the north.
In conclusion, the Gemara returns to the second answer and explains Rabbi Achiya’s source differently.
Regarding leavening, one is obligated if one continues any part of the leavening process of a meal offering, even if the dough had already leavened. An example of this is baking a dough that was already leavened during the kneading stage. Rav Papa adds that a person who bakes such dough is liable for two sets of lashes because the act of baking also serves as the final stage of shaping the dough. Although a difficulty is raised from a braita, the Gemara provides a resolution.
For the sake of comparison, a braita is brought regarding a firstborn animal that has a blood-related ailment requiring bloodletting. Since this animal is already considered blemished, the question arises whether it is permitted to inflict a further blemish during the procedure. Rabbi Meir, the rabbis, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yehuda each hold different positions on this issue.
The Gemara focuses specifically on the first two opinions regarding whether this is legally defined as inflicting a blemish on an already blemished animal. This topic is compared to the obligation for continuing the leavening process through a new action or to the prohibition of castrating an animal that is already castrated. In those instances, there is no debate because the biblical verses indicate liability for each individual action. However, regarding a blemished animal, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis each derive their opinions from different words in the verse, leading them to their respective conclusions.
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This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
Menachot 56
לְרַבּוֹת שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לִסְמִיכָה.
The term “of the goat” serves to include the goats brought as communal sin offerings for idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבִינָא: תִּינַח לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
Ravina objects to this: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon was included in the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term “it,” since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה נָמֵי, מַאי דְּאִיתְרַבִּי – אִיתְרַבִּי, מַאי דְּלָא אִיתְרַבִּי – לָא אִיתְרַבִּי.
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, why not say that for that which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included; and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included. Why would one think that the obligation to slaughter in the north applies to the offering of Nahshon merely because the requirement of placing hands applies to that offering?
וְכִי תֵּימָא, אִי לָא מַעֲטֵיהּ קְרָא, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא תֵּיתֵי בְּבִנְיַן אָב, סְמִיכָה גּוּפַהּ לִישְׁתּוֹק קְרָא מִינֵּיהּ וְתֵיתֵי בְּבִנְיַן אָב! אֶלָּא, שָׁעָה מִדּוֹרוֹת לָא יָלְפִינַן. הָכָא נָמֵי, שָׁעָה מִדּוֹרוֹת לָא יָלְפִינַן.
And if you would say that had the verse not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirements of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.
אֶלָּא, ״אוֹתוֹ״ טָעוּן צָפוֹן, וְאֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן.
Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters. The offering would be valid even if he were to stand in the south of the courtyard and use a long knife to slaughter the animal that is positioned in the north.
מִדְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה נָפְקָא! דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה אוֹמֵר: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ עַל יֶרֶךְ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ צָפוֹנָה״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר?
The Gemara challenges this: The halakha of the one who slaughters has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Aḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before God” (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term “it”?
לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בִּמְקַבֵּל, שֶׁעוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן וּמְקַבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאִם עָמַד בְּדָרוֹם וְקִיבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן – פָּסוּל, יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֹתוֹ״ – אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְלֹא הַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן!
He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter it,” to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters does not have to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. The question returns: What is derived from the exclusionary term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?
אֶלָּא, אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין בֶּן עוֹף בַּצָּפוֹן. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: לֵיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִבֶּן צֹאן – וּמָה בֶּן צֹאן שֶׁלָּא קָבַע לוֹ כֹּהֵן קָבַע לוֹ צָפוֹן, בֶּן עוֹף שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ כֹּהֵן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנִּקְבַּע לוֹ צָפוֹן?
The Gemara answers: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. It might enter your mind to say: Let it be derived that a bird must be killed in the north by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a sheep, as follows: Just as is the case for a sheep brought as a burnt offering, that the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, yet nevertheless it fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude a bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.
מָה לְבֶן צֹאן, שֶׁכֵּן קָבַע לוֹ כְּלִי.
The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a bird offering from the halakha of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. By contrast, a bird is killed by the priest pinching the nape of its neck with his fingernail, without a utensil. Therefore, the term “it” cannot serve to counter this derivation. If so, there is no reason to think that a bird should also have to be killed in the north, and the term “it” is not necessary to exclude this possibility.
אֶלָּא: ״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין פֶּסַח בַּצָּפוֹן. פֶּסַח מִדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב נָפְקָא.
The Gemara explains: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north. The Gemara raises a difficulty: The halakha that the Paschal offering need not be slaughtered in the north is not derived from the term: “It,” but rather it is derived as stated by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל יְהֵא הַפֶּסַח טָעוּן צָפוֹן? וְדִין הוּא, וּמָה עוֹלָה שֶׁלָּא קָבַע לָהּ זְמַן בִּשְׁחִיטָתָהּ קָבַע לָהּ צָפוֹן, פֶּסַח שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ זְמַן לִשְׁחִיטָתוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ צָפוֹן!
As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter yet fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, i.e., it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.
מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן כָּלִיל!
The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a Paschal offering from the halakha of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.
מֵחַטָּאת – מָה לְחַטָּאת שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!
The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar yet is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it has the power to atone for those sins liable for punishment by excision from the World-to-Come [karet], which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.
מֵאָשָׁם – מָה לְאָשָׁם שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, מִכּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים.
The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, does not atone for those sins liable for punishment by karet, and is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it is an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings the halakha of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them either, since each of them is an offering of the most sacred order.
אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם כִּדְקָאָמְרִינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא, ״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן. וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ מִדְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה נָפְקָא – דְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן הוּא דַּאֲתָא, אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּצָפוֹן, אֲבָל מְקַבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן.
The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Rather, the term “it” teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this halakha from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation of Rabbi Aḥiyya from the term “it” does not come to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that is known already from the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king. Rather, this is what Rabbi Aḥiyya is saying: The one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.
מְקַבֵּל מִ״לָּקַח״ ״וְלָקַח״ נָפְקָא, ״לָקַח״ ״וְלָקַח״ לָא מַשְׁמַע לֵיהּ.
The Gemara questions this inference: The halakha that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: “And the priest shall take” (Leviticus 4:34). The Gemara explains: This tanna does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: “And the priest shall take.” Since he does not agree with this derivation, he must therefore derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.
וְחַיָּיב עַל לִישָׁתָהּ, וְעַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְעַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אֲפָאָהּ – לוֹקֶה שְׁתַּיִם, אַחַת עַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְאַחַת עַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: מָה אֲפִיָּיה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ?
§ The mishna teaches: And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven. Rav Pappa said: If one baked a meal offering as leaven he is flogged with two sets of lashes, one for shaping the dough and one for baking it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But you said in the baraita: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single action and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself; this indicates that one receives one set of lashes for baking a meal offering as leavened bread, not two.
לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דַּעֲרַךָ הוּא וַאֲפָה הוּא, הָא דַּעֲרַךָ חַבְרֵיהּ וִיהַיב לֵיהּ וַאֲפָה.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement of the baraita, i.e., that one receives a single set of lashes for baking, is referring to a case where he shaped the dough and he, the same person, also baked it. Since he already incurred liability to receive lashes for shaping the dough before he baked it, he is not liable again for shaping when he bakes it. That statement of Rav Pappa, that one who bakes the dough is liable to receive two sets of lashes, is referring to a situation where another person shaped the dough and gave the shaped dough to him, and he baked it. Although the one who shaped it is liable to receive lashes for the act of shaping, nevertheless, the one who bakes it is liable to receive two sets of lashes, as his act of baking also completed the shaping of the dough.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בְּכוֹר שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ דָּם, מַקִּיזִין אוֹתוֹ אֶת הַדָּם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, וְאֵין מַקִּיזִין אֶת הַדָּם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
§ The Gemara continues to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bekhorot 3:6): In the case of an unblemished firstborn kosher animal whose blood circulation is constricted, a condition that can be healed only through bloodletting, one may let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision does not cause a permanent blemish. But one may not let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, as it is prohibited to intentionally cause a blemish in a firstborn animal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יַקִּיז, אַף בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁחוֹט עַל אוֹתוֹ מוּם. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר:
And the Rabbis say: One may even let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, provided that he does not slaughter the animal on the basis of that blemish, even though in general, a firstborn animal may be slaughtered once it develops a permanent blemish. The Rabbis maintain that in this case, since he caused the blemish himself, he may not slaughter it until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. Rabbi Shimon says:
אַף נִשְׁחָט עַל אוֹתוֹ מוּם. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ מֵת – אֵין מַקִּיזִין לוֹ אֶת הַדָּם.
The animal may even be slaughtered on the basis of that blemish. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the firstborn would die if its blood is not let, one may not let its blood at all.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּמְחַמֵּץ אַחַר מְחַמֵּץ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״ וְ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ״.
The Gemara discusses similar cases, including examples involving meal offerings. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All of the Sages who disagree as to whether one may let the blood of a firstborn animal whose blood circulation is constricted concede that one who leavens a meal offering after another had already leavened it is liable to receive lashes for the additional leavening, as it is written: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven” (Leviticus 2:11), and it is also stated: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). This indicates that one is liable for every act of leavening performed on a meal offering.
בִּמְסָרֵס אַחֵר מְסָרֵס, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, דִּכְתִיב: ״וּמָעוּךְ וְכָתוּת וְנָתוּק וְכָרוּת״, אִם עַל כּוֹרֵת הוּא חַיָּיב, עַל נוֹתֵק לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא לְהָבִיא נוֹתֵק אַחַר כּוֹרֵת, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב.
Similarly, everyone agrees that one who castrates an animal after one who castrates it is liable, as it is written: “Those whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or detached, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land” (Leviticus 22:24). If one is liable when the seminal vesicles are cut, then when the testicles are detached altogether is he not all the more so liable? Rather, this verse serves to include one who detaches the testicles after one who cuts the seminal vesicles, to indicate that he is liable. Apparently, one is liable for castrating an animal that is already sterilized.
לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּמֵטִיל מוּם בְּבַעַל מוּם, רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: ״כׇּל מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ״, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: ״תָּמִים יִהְיֶה לְרָצוֹן״.
These Sages disagree only with regard to one who inflicts a blemish on an already blemished animal, such as one whose blood circulation is constricted. Rabbi Meir maintains that as the verse states: “It shall be perfect to be accepted; there shall be no blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21), this categorical statement includes even the infliction of a blemish on an offering that is already blemished. And the Rabbis maintain that the phrase “it shall be perfect to be accepted” indicates that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to an animal that is currently perfect, i.e., unblemished, and can therefore be accepted, meaning that it is suitable to be sacrificed upon the altar. If the animal is already blemished, there is no prohibition against inflicting an additional blemish upon it.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר נָמֵי, הָכְתִיב ״תָּמִים יִהְיֶה לְרָצוֹן״? הָהוּא לְמַעוֹטֵי בַּעַל מוּם מֵעִיקָּרָא.
The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who derives the halakha from the phrase “there shall be no blemish in it,” isn’t it written also: “It shall be perfect to be accepted”? The Gemara answers: That verse serves to exclude only an animal that was blemished from the outset, i.e., an animal that was born with a blemish. In such a case, there is no prohibition to inflict an additional blemish on it. But if the animal was initially unblemished and later developed a blemish, it is prohibited to inflict another blemish upon it.
בַּעַל מוּם מֵעִיקָּרָא – דִּיקְלָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There is no need to exclude an animal that was blemished from the outset, as it is merely like a palm tree, i.e., it is an item that can never attain the status of an animal consecrated as an offering. Therefore, it is obvious that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to this animal.
אֶלָּא, לְמַעוֹטֵי פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁים לְאַחַר פִּדְיוֹנָם, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וַאֲסִירִי בְּגִיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה, בְּמוּמָם נָמֵי (לִיתַּסְרִי) [לִיתַּסְרוּ], קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rather, Rabbi Meir maintains that the phrase “it shall be perfect to be accepted” serves to exclude disqualified consecrated animals, to teach that after their redemption, when they become non-sacred, the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to them any longer. This exclusion is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is prohibited to shear disqualified consecrated animals or use them for labor even after they have been redeemed and are non-sacred, perhaps let it also be prohibited to inflict a blemish upon them. Consequently, this verse teaches us that there is no prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon these animals.
וְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי, הָכְתִיב: ״כׇּל מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ״? הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וְכׇל מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא בּוֹ מוּם, מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יִגְרוֹם לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים, שֶׁלֹּא יַנִּיחַ בָּצֵק אוֹ דְבֵילָה עַל גַּבֵּי הָאוֹזֶן כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבֹא הַכֶּלֶב וְיִטְּלֶנּוּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל מוּם״. אָמַר ״מוּם״ וְאָמַר ״כׇּל מוּם״.
The Gemara analyzes the opinion of the Rabbis. And according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, who base their opinion on the phrase: “It shall be perfect to be accepted,” isn’t it written: “There shall not be any blemish in it,” which indicates an expansion of the prohibition against inflicting a blemish? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “There shall not be any blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21). I have derived only that it may not have a blemish caused directly by human action. From where is it derived that one may not cause a blemish to be inflicted upon it indirectly by means of other agents, e.g., that one may not place dough or pressed figs on its ear so that a dog will come and take it, thereby biting off part of the animal’s ear and leaving it blemished? The verse states: “Any blemish.” It says: “Blemish,” and it says “Any blemish”; the word “no” serves to teach that one may not cause a blemish indirectly.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הִנִּיחַ שְׂאוֹר עַל גַּבֵּי עִיסָּה, וְהָלַךְ וְיָשַׁב לוֹ, וְנִתְחַמְּצָה מֵאֵלֶיהָ – חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ כְּמַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת. וּמַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מִי מִיחַיַּיב? וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה
§ The Gemara returns to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. Rabbi Ami says: If one placed leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, on top of the dough of a meal offering, and he went and sat himself down to wait, meaning that he performed no other action, and the dough then leavened of its own accord, he is liable to receive lashes for it. This is similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat. The Gemara questions this comparison: And is one liable for performing a prohibited action on Shabbat in a case like this? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say
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Menachot 56
לְרַבּוֹת שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לִסְמִיכָה.
The term “of the goat” serves to include the goats brought as communal sin offerings for idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבִינָא: תִּינַח לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
Ravina objects to this: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon was included in the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term “it,” since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה נָמֵי, מַאי דְּאִיתְרַבִּי – אִיתְרַבִּי, מַאי דְּלָא אִיתְרַבִּי – לָא אִיתְרַבִּי.
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, why not say that for that which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included; and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included. Why would one think that the obligation to slaughter in the north applies to the offering of Nahshon merely because the requirement of placing hands applies to that offering?
וְכִי תֵּימָא, אִי לָא מַעֲטֵיהּ קְרָא, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא תֵּיתֵי בְּבִנְיַן אָב, סְמִיכָה גּוּפַהּ לִישְׁתּוֹק קְרָא מִינֵּיהּ וְתֵיתֵי בְּבִנְיַן אָב! אֶלָּא, שָׁעָה מִדּוֹרוֹת לָא יָלְפִינַן. הָכָא נָמֵי, שָׁעָה מִדּוֹרוֹת לָא יָלְפִינַן.
And if you would say that had the verse not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirements of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.
אֶלָּא, ״אוֹתוֹ״ טָעוּן צָפוֹן, וְאֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן.
Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters. The offering would be valid even if he were to stand in the south of the courtyard and use a long knife to slaughter the animal that is positioned in the north.
מִדְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה נָפְקָא! דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה אוֹמֵר: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ עַל יֶרֶךְ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ צָפוֹנָה״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר?
The Gemara challenges this: The halakha of the one who slaughters has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Aḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before God” (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term “it”?
לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בִּמְקַבֵּל, שֶׁעוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן וּמְקַבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאִם עָמַד בְּדָרוֹם וְקִיבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן – פָּסוּל, יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֹתוֹ״ – אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְלֹא הַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן!
He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter it,” to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters does not have to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. The question returns: What is derived from the exclusionary term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?
אֶלָּא, אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין בֶּן עוֹף בַּצָּפוֹן. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: לֵיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִבֶּן צֹאן – וּמָה בֶּן צֹאן שֶׁלָּא קָבַע לוֹ כֹּהֵן קָבַע לוֹ צָפוֹן, בֶּן עוֹף שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ כֹּהֵן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנִּקְבַּע לוֹ צָפוֹן?
The Gemara answers: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. It might enter your mind to say: Let it be derived that a bird must be killed in the north by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a sheep, as follows: Just as is the case for a sheep brought as a burnt offering, that the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, yet nevertheless it fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude a bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.
מָה לְבֶן צֹאן, שֶׁכֵּן קָבַע לוֹ כְּלִי.
The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a bird offering from the halakha of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. By contrast, a bird is killed by the priest pinching the nape of its neck with his fingernail, without a utensil. Therefore, the term “it” cannot serve to counter this derivation. If so, there is no reason to think that a bird should also have to be killed in the north, and the term “it” is not necessary to exclude this possibility.
אֶלָּא: ״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין פֶּסַח בַּצָּפוֹן. פֶּסַח מִדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב נָפְקָא.
The Gemara explains: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north. The Gemara raises a difficulty: The halakha that the Paschal offering need not be slaughtered in the north is not derived from the term: “It,” but rather it is derived as stated by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל יְהֵא הַפֶּסַח טָעוּן צָפוֹן? וְדִין הוּא, וּמָה עוֹלָה שֶׁלָּא קָבַע לָהּ זְמַן בִּשְׁחִיטָתָהּ קָבַע לָהּ צָפוֹן, פֶּסַח שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ זְמַן לִשְׁחִיטָתוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ צָפוֹן!
As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter yet fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, i.e., it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.
מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן כָּלִיל!
The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a Paschal offering from the halakha of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.
מֵחַטָּאת – מָה לְחַטָּאת שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!
The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar yet is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it has the power to atone for those sins liable for punishment by excision from the World-to-Come [karet], which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.
מֵאָשָׁם – מָה לְאָשָׁם שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, מִכּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים.
The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, does not atone for those sins liable for punishment by karet, and is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it is an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings the halakha of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them either, since each of them is an offering of the most sacred order.
אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם כִּדְקָאָמְרִינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא, ״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן. וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ מִדְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה נָפְקָא – דְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן הוּא דַּאֲתָא, אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּצָפוֹן, אֲבָל מְקַבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן.
The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Rather, the term “it” teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this halakha from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation of Rabbi Aḥiyya from the term “it” does not come to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that is known already from the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king. Rather, this is what Rabbi Aḥiyya is saying: The one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.
מְקַבֵּל מִ״לָּקַח״ ״וְלָקַח״ נָפְקָא, ״לָקַח״ ״וְלָקַח״ לָא מַשְׁמַע לֵיהּ.
The Gemara questions this inference: The halakha that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: “And the priest shall take” (Leviticus 4:34). The Gemara explains: This tanna does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: “And the priest shall take.” Since he does not agree with this derivation, he must therefore derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.
וְחַיָּיב עַל לִישָׁתָהּ, וְעַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְעַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אֲפָאָהּ – לוֹקֶה שְׁתַּיִם, אַחַת עַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְאַחַת עַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: מָה אֲפִיָּיה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ?
§ The mishna teaches: And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven. Rav Pappa said: If one baked a meal offering as leaven he is flogged with two sets of lashes, one for shaping the dough and one for baking it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But you said in the baraita: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single action and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself; this indicates that one receives one set of lashes for baking a meal offering as leavened bread, not two.
לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דַּעֲרַךָ הוּא וַאֲפָה הוּא, הָא דַּעֲרַךָ חַבְרֵיהּ וִיהַיב לֵיהּ וַאֲפָה.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement of the baraita, i.e., that one receives a single set of lashes for baking, is referring to a case where he shaped the dough and he, the same person, also baked it. Since he already incurred liability to receive lashes for shaping the dough before he baked it, he is not liable again for shaping when he bakes it. That statement of Rav Pappa, that one who bakes the dough is liable to receive two sets of lashes, is referring to a situation where another person shaped the dough and gave the shaped dough to him, and he baked it. Although the one who shaped it is liable to receive lashes for the act of shaping, nevertheless, the one who bakes it is liable to receive two sets of lashes, as his act of baking also completed the shaping of the dough.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בְּכוֹר שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ דָּם, מַקִּיזִין אוֹתוֹ אֶת הַדָּם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, וְאֵין מַקִּיזִין אֶת הַדָּם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
§ The Gemara continues to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bekhorot 3:6): In the case of an unblemished firstborn kosher animal whose blood circulation is constricted, a condition that can be healed only through bloodletting, one may let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision does not cause a permanent blemish. But one may not let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, as it is prohibited to intentionally cause a blemish in a firstborn animal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יַקִּיז, אַף בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁחוֹט עַל אוֹתוֹ מוּם. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר:
And the Rabbis say: One may even let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, provided that he does not slaughter the animal on the basis of that blemish, even though in general, a firstborn animal may be slaughtered once it develops a permanent blemish. The Rabbis maintain that in this case, since he caused the blemish himself, he may not slaughter it until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. Rabbi Shimon says:
אַף נִשְׁחָט עַל אוֹתוֹ מוּם. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ מֵת – אֵין מַקִּיזִין לוֹ אֶת הַדָּם.
The animal may even be slaughtered on the basis of that blemish. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the firstborn would die if its blood is not let, one may not let its blood at all.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּמְחַמֵּץ אַחַר מְחַמֵּץ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״ וְ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ״.
The Gemara discusses similar cases, including examples involving meal offerings. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All of the Sages who disagree as to whether one may let the blood of a firstborn animal whose blood circulation is constricted concede that one who leavens a meal offering after another had already leavened it is liable to receive lashes for the additional leavening, as it is written: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven” (Leviticus 2:11), and it is also stated: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). This indicates that one is liable for every act of leavening performed on a meal offering.
בִּמְסָרֵס אַחֵר מְסָרֵס, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, דִּכְתִיב: ״וּמָעוּךְ וְכָתוּת וְנָתוּק וְכָרוּת״, אִם עַל כּוֹרֵת הוּא חַיָּיב, עַל נוֹתֵק לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא לְהָבִיא נוֹתֵק אַחַר כּוֹרֵת, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב.
Similarly, everyone agrees that one who castrates an animal after one who castrates it is liable, as it is written: “Those whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or detached, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land” (Leviticus 22:24). If one is liable when the seminal vesicles are cut, then when the testicles are detached altogether is he not all the more so liable? Rather, this verse serves to include one who detaches the testicles after one who cuts the seminal vesicles, to indicate that he is liable. Apparently, one is liable for castrating an animal that is already sterilized.
לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּמֵטִיל מוּם בְּבַעַל מוּם, רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: ״כׇּל מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ״, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: ״תָּמִים יִהְיֶה לְרָצוֹן״.
These Sages disagree only with regard to one who inflicts a blemish on an already blemished animal, such as one whose blood circulation is constricted. Rabbi Meir maintains that as the verse states: “It shall be perfect to be accepted; there shall be no blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21), this categorical statement includes even the infliction of a blemish on an offering that is already blemished. And the Rabbis maintain that the phrase “it shall be perfect to be accepted” indicates that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to an animal that is currently perfect, i.e., unblemished, and can therefore be accepted, meaning that it is suitable to be sacrificed upon the altar. If the animal is already blemished, there is no prohibition against inflicting an additional blemish upon it.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר נָמֵי, הָכְתִיב ״תָּמִים יִהְיֶה לְרָצוֹן״? הָהוּא לְמַעוֹטֵי בַּעַל מוּם מֵעִיקָּרָא.
The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who derives the halakha from the phrase “there shall be no blemish in it,” isn’t it written also: “It shall be perfect to be accepted”? The Gemara answers: That verse serves to exclude only an animal that was blemished from the outset, i.e., an animal that was born with a blemish. In such a case, there is no prohibition to inflict an additional blemish on it. But if the animal was initially unblemished and later developed a blemish, it is prohibited to inflict another blemish upon it.
בַּעַל מוּם מֵעִיקָּרָא – דִּיקְלָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There is no need to exclude an animal that was blemished from the outset, as it is merely like a palm tree, i.e., it is an item that can never attain the status of an animal consecrated as an offering. Therefore, it is obvious that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to this animal.
אֶלָּא, לְמַעוֹטֵי פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁים לְאַחַר פִּדְיוֹנָם, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וַאֲסִירִי בְּגִיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה, בְּמוּמָם נָמֵי (לִיתַּסְרִי) [לִיתַּסְרוּ], קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rather, Rabbi Meir maintains that the phrase “it shall be perfect to be accepted” serves to exclude disqualified consecrated animals, to teach that after their redemption, when they become non-sacred, the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to them any longer. This exclusion is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is prohibited to shear disqualified consecrated animals or use them for labor even after they have been redeemed and are non-sacred, perhaps let it also be prohibited to inflict a blemish upon them. Consequently, this verse teaches us that there is no prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon these animals.
וְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי, הָכְתִיב: ״כׇּל מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ״? הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וְכׇל מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא בּוֹ מוּם, מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יִגְרוֹם לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים, שֶׁלֹּא יַנִּיחַ בָּצֵק אוֹ דְבֵילָה עַל גַּבֵּי הָאוֹזֶן כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבֹא הַכֶּלֶב וְיִטְּלֶנּוּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל מוּם״. אָמַר ״מוּם״ וְאָמַר ״כׇּל מוּם״.
The Gemara analyzes the opinion of the Rabbis. And according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, who base their opinion on the phrase: “It shall be perfect to be accepted,” isn’t it written: “There shall not be any blemish in it,” which indicates an expansion of the prohibition against inflicting a blemish? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “There shall not be any blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21). I have derived only that it may not have a blemish caused directly by human action. From where is it derived that one may not cause a blemish to be inflicted upon it indirectly by means of other agents, e.g., that one may not place dough or pressed figs on its ear so that a dog will come and take it, thereby biting off part of the animal’s ear and leaving it blemished? The verse states: “Any blemish.” It says: “Blemish,” and it says “Any blemish”; the word “no” serves to teach that one may not cause a blemish indirectly.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הִנִּיחַ שְׂאוֹר עַל גַּבֵּי עִיסָּה, וְהָלַךְ וְיָשַׁב לוֹ, וְנִתְחַמְּצָה מֵאֵלֶיהָ – חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ כְּמַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת. וּמַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מִי מִיחַיַּיב? וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה
§ The Gemara returns to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. Rabbi Ami says: If one placed leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, on top of the dough of a meal offering, and he went and sat himself down to wait, meaning that he performed no other action, and the dough then leavened of its own accord, he is liable to receive lashes for it. This is similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat. The Gemara questions this comparison: And is one liable for performing a prohibited action on Shabbat in a case like this? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say
