Menachot 55

ובמחשבה מה תרומה גדולה בעין יפה אף תרומת מעשר בעין יפה

and by thought. And this comparison also teaches that just as in the case of standard teruma one should give generously, so too, with regard to teruma of the tithe one should give generously. Therefore, one who separates teruma of the tithe from fresh figs for dried figs should do so generously, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, as though the volume of the dried figs was as large as that of fresh ones.

ומינה אמר רבי אלעזר בר רבי יוסי אבא היה נוטל עשר גרוגרות שבמקצוע על תשעים שבכלכלה אי אמרת בשלמא לכמות שהן אמרינן שפיר אלא אי אמרת כמות שהן בציר להו

The Gemara suggests: And from this statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, one can cite a proof for the opinion that food is to be measured in accordance with its initial size. As Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: Father would set aside ten dried figs that were in a vessel for ninety fresh figs that were in a basket. Granted, if you say that we say one measures food items as they were initially, it is well, as Rabbi Yosei apparently considers the dried figs set aside as tithes as though they were still fresh figs. But if you say that one measures foods as they are in their current state, then in a case where one separates ten dried figs for ninety fresh figs they are less than the requisite amount, as the volume of ten dried figs is less than the volume of ten fresh figs. This indicates that the measure of the food is determined according to its initial state.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי אלעזר שאני גרוגרות הואיל ויכול לשולקן ולהחזירן לכמות שהן

The Gemara answers that one cannot extrapolate from the example of dried figs to other cases. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says the following reason for that particular halakha: Dried figs are different, since one can boil dried figs in water and return them to their previous state; in other words, as they were when they were fresh. Consequently, one may separate them for fresh figs as though they too were fresh. One cannot extrapolate from here a principle with regard to other items.

תנו רבנן תורמין תאנים על הגרוגרות במקום שרגילין לעשות תאנים גרוגרות ולא גרוגרות על תאנים ואפילו במקום שרגילין לעשות תאנים גרוגרות

§ The Gemara discusses the possibility of separating fresh figs as teruma for dried ones. The Sages taught in a baraita: One may separate teruma from fresh figs for dried figs by number, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs, and therefore the fresh figs can be preserved by processing them into dried figs. But one may not set aside teruma from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs.

אמר מר תורמין תאנים על הגרוגרות במקום שרגילין לעשות תאנים גרוגרות במקום שרגילין אין במקום שאין רגילין לא

The Gemara analyzes this baraita. The Master said: One may separate teruma from fresh figs for dried figs in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. This indicates that in a place where they are accustomed to make dried figs, yes, one may set aside teruma in this manner. But in a place where they are not accustomed to make dried figs, one may not separate from fresh figs for dried ones, as the fresh figs are liable to spoil before they can be used.

היכי דמי אי דאיכא כהן מקום שאינו רגיל אמאי לא והתנן מקום שיש כהן תורם מן היפה

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a situation where there is a priest present, and the owner of the produce can give him the teruma without delay, then even in a place where he is not accustomed to make dried figs, why may he not set aside fresh figs for dried ones? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Terumot 2:4): In a place where there is a priest present, the owner of the produce separates teruma from the best-quality produce? In this case, the fresh figs are superior in quality to the dried ones, despite the fact that dried figs last longer.

אלא פשיטא דליכא כהן אימא סיפא ולא גרוגרות על התאנים ואפילו במקום שרגיל לעשות תאנים גרוגרות ואי דליכא כהן אמאי לא והתנן מקום שאין כהן תורם מן המתקיים אלא פשיטא דאיכא כהן

Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, and by the time a priest is found the fresh figs might spoil. If so, say the latter clause of that baraita: But one may not set aside teruma from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. And if this is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, why may one not set aside dried figs, which can be preserved for a lengthy period, for fresh ones? But didn’t we learn in the same mishna (Terumot 2:4): In a place where there is no priest present, the owner of the produce separates teruma from that which will endure, not from the best-quality produce? Rather, it is obvious that this clause is referring to a situation where there is a priest present.

רישא דליכא כהן סיפא דאיכא כהן אין רישא דליכא כהן סיפא דאיכא כהן

The Gemara challenges: If so, the first clause of the baraita addresses a case where there is no priest present, whereas the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present. The Gemara explains: Yes, the first clause of the baraita addresses a case where there is no priest present, and the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present.

אמר רב פפא שמע מינה דחקינן ומוקמינן מתניתין בתרי טעמי ולא מוקמינן בתרי תנאי

Rav Pappa said: Learn from this discussion that we exert ourselves and interpret the mishna according to two reasons, i.e., two different situations in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, but we do not interpret it as being in accordance with the opinions of two tanna’im. An interpretation that maintains a single authorship of a mishna is preferable even if it requires explaining the mishna as discussing two different situations.

מתני׳ כל המנחות נילושות בפושרין ומשמרן שלא יחמיצו ואם החמיצו שיריה עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר כל המנחה אשר תקריבו לה׳ לא תעשה חמץ וחייב על לישתה ועל עריכתה ועל אפייתה

MISHNA: All the meal-offerings that come as matza are to be kneaded with lukewarm water so that the dough will bake well, as only a small amount of oil is added. And one must watch over them to ensure that they do not become leaven while kneading and shaping them, and if a meal offering or even only its remainder becomes leaven, one violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven.

גמ׳ מנא הני מילי אמר ריש לקיש דאמר קרא לא תאפה חמץ חלקם אפילו חלקם לא תאפה חמץ

GEMARA: The mishna states that one who allows the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened violates a prohibition. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Reish Lakish said: The verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). This section of the verse can be read as a single sentence, to indicate: Even their portion of meal offerings, i.e., the remainder eaten by priests after the removal of the handful to be burned on the altar, shall not be baked with leaven.

והאי להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא לא

The Gemara asks: And does this verse come for this purpose? It cannot, as it is necessary as the source for a different halakha, for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “It shall not

תאפה חמץ מה תלמוד לומר והלא כבר נאמר לא תעשה חמץ לפי שנאמר לא תעשה חמץ יכול לא יהא חייב אלא אחת על כולם תלמוד לומר לא תאפה

be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? Isn’t this requirement already stated earlier: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11)? Rather, the phrase “it shall not be baked with leaven” serves to teach a different halakha. Since the prohibition concerning leaven is first stated in general terms: Shall not be made with leaven, without specification, one might have thought that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven will be liable to receive only one set of lashes for all of his actions, i.e., kneading, shaping, and baking the dough. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” which teaches that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven is liable separately for baking it, and for each stage of its preparation.

אפייה בכלל היתה למה יצאת להקיש אליה מה אפייה מיוחדת שהיא מעשה יחידי וחייבין עליה בפני עצמה אף אני אביא לישתה ועריכתה

The baraita explains this derivation: Baking leaven was included in the general prohibition incorporating all of the stages involved in preparing the meal offering. Why did it emerge from the generalization to be mentioned explicitly? It emerged in order to compare the other stages to it: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single, i.e., separately defined, action, and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself if the dough is leaven, so too, I will include the other stages of the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading it and shaping it, and conclude that one is liable separately for each of these actions if the dough is leavened.

וכל מעשה יחידי שבה לאיתויי קיטוף שהוא מעשה יחידי וחייבין עליה בפני עצמה

And the same applies to any single action involved in the preparation of a meal offering. This statement serves to include the act of smoothing the surface of the dough with water. The reason this act is included is that although it is not a significant stage in the preparation of the dough, it is a single, independent action, and therefore one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself. This baraita demonstrates that one cannot derive the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened from the verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” as this verse is the source of a different halakha. If so, from where is that prohibition derived?

אנן מחלקם קאמרינן

The Gemara answers: The verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is required for the principle stated earlier. We say that the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened is derived from the subsequent phrase: “I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). The remainder is the portion of the meal offering eaten by the priests.

ואימא כוליה להכי הוא דאתא

The Gemara challenges: But once it has been determined that the term “their portion” teaches the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, one can say this entire section of the verse comes only for this purpose, which would mean that there is no source for the halakha that one is liable separately for each stage of the preparation of a meal offering with leaven.

אם כן לכתוב חלקם לא תאפה חמץ מאי לא תאפה חמץ חלקם שמעת מינה תרתי

The Gemara answers: One cannot say that this teaches only the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, as if so, let the verse write: Their portion shall not be baked with leaven. What is meant by the fact that the verse stated it in a different order: “Shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion”? This indicates that one should learn from this two halakhot, i.e., that there is a prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering and that one is liable to receive a separate set of lashes for each stage of preparation performed with leavened dough.

ואימא אפייה דפרט בה רחמנא ליחייב חדא אינך ליחייב חדא אכולהו משום דהוה דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד לא ללמד על עצמו יצא אלא ללמד על הכלל כולו יצא

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But one can say that the act of baking is different, as the Merciful One specified it in the Torah, and therefore one should be liable to receive one set of lashes for baking the dough. As for the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading, shaping, and smoothing, which are not explicitly stated in the verse, let him be liable to receive one set of lashes for all of them. The Gemara answers that this cannot be the halakha, because baking is something that was included in a generalization but emerged from the generalization in order to teach a halakha. According to a hermeneutic principle, a case of this kind did not emerge to teach a halakha only about itself, but rather it emerged to teach a halakha about the entire generalization, in this case, about all the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering.

ואימא לא תעשה כלל לא תאפה פרט כלל ופרט אין בכלל אלא מה שבפרט אפייה אין מידי אחרינא לא

The Gemara further challenges: But one can say that the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven, is a generalization, as it does not mention any specific acts, and the phrase: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is a detail, as it specifies one particular stage of the preparation; and there is another standard hermeneutic principle: When there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization is referring only to that which is specified in the detail. In this case, that would mean that baking, yes, is included in this prohibition, but other matters, e.g., kneading and shaping, are not included.

אמר רבי אפטוריקי משום דהוי כלל ופרט המרוחקין זה מזה וכל כלל ופרט המרוחקין זה מזה אין דנין אותן בכלל ופרט

Rabbi Aptoriki said: That hermeneutic principle is not relevant here, because this is a case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, as the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven (Leviticus 2:11), is far from the expression: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). And for any instance of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail.

מתיב רב אדא בר אהבה ואמרי לה כדי וכלל ופרט המרוחקין זה מזה אין דנין אותן בכלל ופרט והתניא ושחט אתו במקום אשר ישחט העלה לפני ה׳ חטאת הוא היכן עולה נשחטת בצפון אף זה בצפון

Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection, and some say that this objection is unattributed [kedi]: And is it correct that in the case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to a goat brought by a king as a sin offering: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? On the northern side of the Temple courtyard, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). This sin offering of a king must consequently also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.

וכי אנו מכאן למידין והלא כבר נאמר במקום אשר תשחט העלה תשחט החטאת הא למה זה יצא לקובעו שאם לא שחט אותו בצפון פסלו

The baraita asks: And do you learn this halakha from here? But isn’t it already stated: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before God; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why does the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The baraita answers: It is to fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if he did not slaughter it in the north of the Temple courtyard, he has disqualified it even after the fact.

אתה אומר לכך יצאת או אינו אלא שזה טעון צפון ואין אחר טעון צפון תלמוד לומר ושחט את החטאת במקום אשר ישחט את העלה זה בנה אב לכל חטאות שטעונות צפון

The baraita asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The baraita answers: The verse states elsewhere: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), and this established a paradigm for all sin offerings, that they require slaughter in the north. Therefore, the additional verse stated with regard to the sin offering of a king teaches that if he did not slaughter it in the north it is disqualified.

טעמא דכתב רחמנא ושחט את החטאת הא לאו הכי הוה אמינא שזה טעון צפון ואין אחר טעון צפון מאי טעמא

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The reason that all sin offerings must be slaughtered in the north is that the Merciful One wrote: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” from which it can be inferred that if not for this verse I would say that only this sin offering, the male goat brought by a king, requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north. What is the reason for this? After all, the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered,” appears to be referring to all types of sin offerings.

לאו משום דהוה כלל ופרט ואף על גב דמרוחקין זה מזה דנין אותן בכלל ופרט

Isn’t it because this verse is a generalization and a detail, as the verse first generalizes about all sin offerings, and then the verse concerning the sin offering of a king: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering,” is a detail, as it is referring to a specific sin offering? And even though the verse concerning sin offerings and the verse concerning the sin offering of a king are distanced from one another, nevertheless we would derive a halakha from them by means of the principle of a generalization and a detail. This appears to disprove the explanation of Rabbi Aptoriki.

מתקיף לה רב אשי האי כלל ופרט הוא פרט וכלל הוא ונעשה כלל מוסיף על הפרט ואיתרבי להו כל מילי

Rav Ashi objects to this claim raised by Rav Adda bar Ahava: Is this a generalization and a detail? It is in fact a detail and a generalization, as the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:24), appears in the Torah earlier than the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered the sin offering shall be slaughtered” (Leviticus 6:18). A hermeneutic principle states that in this case the generalization adds to the detail, and includes all matters.

אלא תנא אתו קא קשיא ליה והכי קאמר או אינו אלא שזה טעון צפון ואין אחר טעון צפון דכתב רחמנא אתו

Rather, the reason that if not for the specific textual derivation we would have thought that only a sin offering brought by a king requires slaughter in the north is that the word “it,” which is an exclusion, is difficult for the tanna of the baraita, as it is unclear what this term serves to exclude. And this is what the baraita is saying: Or perhaps the verse is teaching that only this sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north, as the Merciful One writes “it,” which is an exclusion. Therefore, the additional verse: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” teaches that this halakha applies to all burnt offerings.

והשתא דנפקא ליה מושחט את החטאת אתו למעוטי מאי למעוטי (נחשון ושחט עוף בפסח סימן)

The Gemara asks: And now that the tanna of the baraita derives it from the phrase: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” to exclude what does the term “it” serve? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude the case that emerges from the following discussion, summarized by the mnemonic: Nahshon; and slaughter; bird; on Passover.

אותו בצפון ואין שעיר נחשון בצפון

The Gemara explains the first suggestion: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north, but the goat offered by Nahshon, prince of the tribe of Judah, was not slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (see Numbers, chapter 7). The sin offerings brought at this time were unique because they were not brought to atone for any sin. The term “it” teaches that even though they had some characteristics of a sin offering, the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.

סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ואיתרבי לענין סמיכה ליתרבי נמי לענין צפון קא משמע לן

The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement to be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term “it” teaches us that there was no requirement of slaughter in the north for the goats brought as sin offerings by Nahshon and the other princes.

וסמיכה גופה מנלן דתניא וסמך ידו על ראש השעיר לרבות שעיר נחשון לסמיכה דברי רבי יהודה רבי שמעון אומר

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal itself applies to the goats offered by Nahshon and the other princes? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: