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Menachot 55
וּבְמַחְשָׁבָה, מָה תְּרוּמָה גְּדוֹלָה בְּעַיִן יָפָה, אַף תְּרוּמַת מַעֲשֵׂר בְּעַיִן יָפָה.
and by thought. And this comparison also teaches that just as in the case of standard teruma one should give generously, so too, with regard to teruma of the tithe one should give generously. Therefore, one who separates teruma of the tithe from fresh figs for dried figs should do so generously, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, as though the volume of the dried figs was as large as that of fresh ones.
וּמִינַּהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַבָּא הָיָה נוֹטֵל עֶשֶׂר גְּרוֹגְרוֹת שֶׁבַּמַּקְצוּעַ עַל תִּשְׁעִים שֶׁבַּכַּלְכַּלָּה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא לִכְמוֹת שֶׁהֵן אָמְרִינַן – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ כְּמוֹת שֶׁהֵן – בָּצַר לְהוּ.
The Gemara suggests: And from this statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, one can cite a proof for the opinion that food is to be measured in accordance with its initial size. As Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: Father would set aside ten dried figs that were in a vessel for ninety fresh figs that were in a basket. Granted, if you say that we say one measures food items as they were initially, it is well, as Rabbi Yosei apparently considers the dried figs set aside as tithes as though they were still fresh figs. But if you say that one measures foods as they are in their current state, then in a case where one separates ten dried figs for ninety fresh figs they are less than the requisite amount, as the volume of ten dried figs is less than the volume of ten fresh figs. This indicates that the measure of the food is determined according to its initial state.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: שָׁאנֵי גְּרוֹגְרוֹת, הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לְשׁוֹלְקָן וּלְהַחְזִירָן לִכְמוֹת שֶׁהֵן.
The Gemara answers that one cannot extrapolate from the example of dried figs to other cases. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says the following reason for that particular halakha: Dried figs are different, since one can boil dried figs in water and return them to their previous state; in other words, as they were when they were fresh. Consequently, one may separate them for fresh figs as though they too were fresh. One cannot extrapolate from here a principle with regard to other items.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: תּוֹרְמִין תְּאֵנִים עַל הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת, בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת, וְלֹא גְּרוֹגְרוֹת עַל תְּאֵנִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת.
§ The Gemara discusses the possibility of separating fresh figs as teruma for dried ones. The Sages taught in a baraita: One may separate teruma from fresh figs for dried figs by number, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs, and therefore the fresh figs can be preserved by processing them into dried figs. But one may not set aside teruma from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs.
אָמַר מָר: תּוֹרְמִין תְּאֵנִים עַל הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת. בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין – אִין, בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין רְגִילִין – לָא.
The Gemara analyzes this baraita. The Master said: One may separate teruma from fresh figs for dried figs in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. This indicates that in a place where they are accustomed to make dried figs, yes, one may set aside teruma in this manner. But in a place where they are not accustomed to make dried figs, one may not separate from fresh figs for dried ones, as the fresh figs are liable to spoil before they can be used.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן, מָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָגִיל – אַמַּאי לָא? וְהָתְנַן: מְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ כֹּהֵן תּוֹרֵם מִן הַיָּפֶה!
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a situation where there is a priest present, and the owner of the produce can give him the teruma without delay, then even in a place where he is not accustomed to make dried figs, why may he not set aside fresh figs for dried ones? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Terumot 2:4): In a place where there is a priest present, the owner of the produce separates teruma from the best-quality produce? In this case, the fresh figs are superior in quality to the dried ones, despite the fact that dried figs last longer.
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וְלֹא גְּרוֹגְרוֹת עַל הַתְּאֵנִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרָגִיל לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת. וְאִי דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, אַמַּאי לָא? וְהָתְנַן: מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כֹּהֵן – תּוֹרֵם מִן הַמִּתְקַיֵּים! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן.
Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, and by the time a priest is found the fresh figs might spoil. If so, say the latter clause of that baraita: But one may not set aside teruma from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. And if this is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, why may one not set aside dried figs, which can be preserved for a lengthy period, for fresh ones? But didn’t we learn in the same mishna (Terumot 2:4): In a place where there is no priest present, the owner of the produce separates teruma from that which will endure, not from the best-quality produce? Rather, it is obvious that this clause is referring to a situation where there is a priest present.
רֵישָׁא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, סֵיפָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן? אִין, רֵישָׁא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, סֵיפָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן.
The Gemara challenges: If so, the first clause of the baraita addresses a case where there is no priest present, whereas the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present. The Gemara explains: Yes, the first clause of the baraita addresses a case where there is no priest present, and the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, דָּחֲקִינַן וּמוֹקְמִינַן מַתְנִיתִין בִּתְרֵי טַעְמֵי, וְלָא מוֹקְמִינַן בִּתְרֵי תַּנָּאֵי.
Rav Pappa said: Learn from this discussion that we exert ourselves and interpret the mishna according to two reasons, i.e., two different situations in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, but we do not interpret it as being in accordance with the opinions of two tanna’im. An interpretation that maintains a single authorship of a mishna is preferable even if it requires explaining the mishna as discussing two different situations.
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת נִילּוֹשׁוֹת בְּפוֹשְׁרִין, וּמְשַׁמְּרָן שֶׁלֹּא יַחְמִיצוּ, וְאִם הֶחְמִיצוּ שְׁיָרֶיהָ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״כׇּל הַמִּנְחָה אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ לַה׳ לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״, וְחַיָּיב עַל לִישָׁתָהּ, וְעַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְעַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ.
MISHNA: All the meal-offerings that come as matza are to be kneaded with lukewarm water so that the dough will bake well, as only a small amount of oil is added. And one must watch over them to ensure that they do not become leaven while kneading and shaping them, and if a meal offering or even only its remainder becomes leaven, one violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ חֶלְקָם״, אֲפִילּוּ חֶלְקָם לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ.
GEMARA: The mishna states that one who allows the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened violates a prohibition. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Reish Lakish said: The verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). This section of the verse can be read as a single sentence, to indicate: Even their portion of meal offerings, i.e., the remainder eaten by priests after the removal of the handful to be burned on the altar, shall not be baked with leaven.
וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא? הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״לֹא
The Gemara asks: And does this verse come for this purpose? It cannot, as it is necessary as the source for a different halakha, for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “It shall not
תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״! לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״, יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה״.
be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? Isn’t this requirement already stated earlier: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11)? Rather, the phrase “it shall not be baked with leaven” serves to teach a different halakha. Since the prohibition concerning leaven is first stated in general terms: Shall not be made with leaven, without specification, one might have thought that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven will be liable to receive only one set of lashes for all of his actions, i.e., kneading, shaping, and baking the dough. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” which teaches that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven is liable separately for baking it, and for each stage of its preparation.
אֲפִיָּיה בַּכְּלָל הָיָתָה, לָמָּה יָצָאת לְהַקִּישׁ אֵלֶיהָ? מָה אֲפִיָּיה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא לִישָׁתָהּ וַעֲרִיכָתָהּ.
The baraita explains this derivation: Baking leaven was included in the general prohibition incorporating all of the stages involved in preparing the meal offering. Why did it emerge from the generalization to be mentioned explicitly? It emerged in order to compare the other stages to it: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single, i.e., separately defined, action, and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself if the dough is leaven, so too, I will include the other stages of the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading it and shaping it, and conclude that one is liable separately for each of these actions if the dough is leavened.
וְכׇל מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי שֶׁבָּהּ, לְאֵיתוֹיֵי קִיטּוּף, שֶׁהוּא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ.
And the same applies to any single action involved in the preparation of a meal offering. This statement serves to include the act of smoothing the surface of the dough with water. The reason this act is included is that although it is not a significant stage in the preparation of the dough, it is a single, independent action, and therefore one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself. This baraita demonstrates that one cannot derive the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened from the verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” as this verse is the source of a different halakha. If so, from where is that prohibition derived?
אֲנַן מֵ״חֶלְקָם״ קָאָמְרִינַן.
The Gemara answers: The verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is required for the principle stated earlier. We say that the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened is derived from the subsequent phrase: “I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). The remainder is the portion of the meal offering eaten by the priests.
וְאֵימָא: כּוּלֵּיהּ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?
The Gemara challenges: But once it has been determined that the term “their portion” teaches the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, one can say this entire section of the verse comes only for this purpose, which would mean that there is no source for the halakha that one is liable separately for each stage of the preparation of a meal offering with leaven.
אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב ״חֶלְקָם לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ״, מַאי ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ חֶלְקָם״? שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
The Gemara answers: One cannot say that this teaches only the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, as if so, let the verse write: Their portion shall not be baked with leaven. What is meant by the fact that the verse stated it in a different order: “Shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion”? This indicates that one should learn from this two halakhot, i.e., that there is a prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering and that one is liable to receive a separate set of lashes for each stage of preparation performed with leavened dough.
וְאֵימָא: אֲפִיָּיה, דִּפְרַט בַּהּ רַחֲמָנָא, לִיחַיַּיב חֲדָא; אִינָךְ לִיחַיַּיב חֲדָא אַכּוּלְּהוּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא מִן הַכְּלָל לְלַמֵּד, לֹא לְלַמֵּד עַל עַצְמוֹ יָצָא, אֶלָּא לְלַמֵּד עַל הַכְּלָל כּוּלּוֹ יָצָא.
The Gemara raises another difficulty: But one can say that the act of baking is different, as the Merciful One specified it in the Torah, and therefore one should be liable to receive one set of lashes for baking the dough. As for the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading, shaping, and smoothing, which are not explicitly stated in the verse, let him be liable to receive one set of lashes for all of them. The Gemara answers that this cannot be the halakha, because baking is something that was included in a generalization but emerged from the generalization in order to teach a halakha. According to a hermeneutic principle, a case of this kind did not emerge to teach a halakha only about itself, but rather it emerged to teach a halakha about the entire generalization, in this case, about all the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering.
וְאֵימָא: ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה״ – כָּלַל, ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה״ – פָּרַט, כְּלָל וּפְרָט – אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט; אֲפִיָּיה – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא.
The Gemara further challenges: But one can say that the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven, is a generalization, as it does not mention any specific acts, and the phrase: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is a detail, as it specifies one particular stage of the preparation; and there is another standard hermeneutic principle: When there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization is referring only to that which is specified in the detail. In this case, that would mean that baking, yes, is included in this prohibition, but other matters, e.g., kneading and shaping, are not included.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי כְּלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה, וְכׇל כְּלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה – אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט.
Rabbi Aptoriki said: That hermeneutic principle is not relevant here, because this is a case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, as the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven (Leviticus 2:11), is far from the expression: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). And for any instance of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail.
מֵתִיב רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי: וּכְלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט הָעֹלָה לִפְנֵי ה׳ חַטָּאת הוּא״ – הֵיכָן עוֹלָה נִשְׁחֶטֶת? בַּצָּפוֹן, אַף זֶה בַּצָּפוֹן.
Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection, and some say that this objection is unattributed [kedi]: And is it correct that in the case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to a goat brought by a king as a sin offering: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? On the northern side of the Temple courtyard, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). This sin offering of a king must consequently also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.
וְכִי אָנוּ מִכָּאן לְמֵידִין? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר תִּשָּׁחֵט הָעֹלָה תִּשָּׁחֵט הַחַטָּאת״! הָא לְמָה זֶה יָצָא? לְקוֹבְעוֹ, שֶׁאִם לֹא שָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן – פְּסָלוֹ.
The baraita asks: And do you learn this halakha from here? But isn’t it already stated: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before God; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why does the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The baraita answers: It is to fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if he did not slaughter it in the north of the Temple courtyard, he has disqualified it even after the fact.
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְכָךְ יָצָאת, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט אֶת הָעֹלָה״, זֶה בָּנָה אָב לְכׇל חַטָּאוֹת שֶׁטְּעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן.
The baraita asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The baraita answers: The verse states elsewhere: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), and this established a paradigm for all sin offerings, that they require slaughter in the north. Therefore, the additional verse stated with regard to the sin offering of a king teaches that if he did not slaughter it in the north it is disqualified.
טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת״, הָא לָאו הָכִי הֲוָה אָמֵינָא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן, וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן. מַאי טַעְמָא?
The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The reason that all sin offerings must be slaughtered in the north is that the Merciful One wrote: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” from which it can be inferred that if not for this verse I would say that only this sin offering, the male goat brought by a king, requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north. What is the reason for this? After all, the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered,” appears to be referring to all types of sin offerings.
לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה כְּלָל וּפְרָט, וְאַף עַל גַּב דִּמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה, דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט.
Isn’t it because this verse is a generalization and a detail, as the verse first generalizes about all sin offerings, and then the verse concerning the sin offering of a king: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering,” is a detail, as it is referring to a specific sin offering? And even though the verse concerning sin offerings and the verse concerning the sin offering of a king are distanced from one another, nevertheless we would derive a halakha from them by means of the principle of a generalization and a detail. This appears to disprove the explanation of Rabbi Aptoriki.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: הַאי כְּלָל וּפְרָט הוּא?! פְּרָט וּכְלָל הוּא, וְנַעֲשָׂה כְּלָל מוֹסִיף עַל הַפְּרָט, (וְאִיתְרַבִּי) [וְאִיתְרַבּוֹ] לְהוּ כֹּל מִילֵּי.
Rav Ashi objects to this claim raised by Rav Adda bar Ahava: Is this a generalization and a detail? It is in fact a detail and a generalization, as the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:24), appears in the Torah earlier than the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered the sin offering shall be slaughtered” (Leviticus 6:18). A hermeneutic principle states that in this case the generalization adds to the detail, and includes all matters.
אֶלָּא תַּנָּא, ״אֹתוֹ״ קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן, דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״אֹתוֹ״.
Rather, the reason that if not for the specific textual derivation we would have thought that only a sin offering brought by a king requires slaughter in the north is that the word “it,” which is an exclusion, is difficult for the tanna of the baraita, as it is unclear what this term serves to exclude. And this is what the baraita is saying: Or perhaps the verse is teaching that only this sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north, as the Merciful One writes “it,” which is an exclusion. Therefore, the additional verse: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” teaches that this halakha applies to all burnt offerings.
וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת״, ״אֹתוֹ״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לְמַעוֹטֵי (נַחְשׁוֹן, וְשָׁחַט, עוֹף, בַּפֶּסַח סִימָן).
The Gemara asks: And now that the tanna of the baraita derives it from the phrase: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” to exclude what does the term “it” serve? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude the case that emerges from the following discussion, summarized by the mnemonic: Nahshon; and slaughter; bird; on Passover.
״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין שָׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן בַּצָּפוֹן.
The Gemara explains the first suggestion: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north, but the goat offered by Nahshon, prince of the tribe of Judah, was not slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (see Numbers, chapter 7). The sin offerings brought at this time were unique because they were not brought to atone for any sin. The term “it” teaches that even though they had some characteristics of a sin offering, the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִיתְרַבִּי לְעִנְיַן סְמִיכָה, לִיתְרַבֵּי נָמֵי לְעִנְיַן צָפוֹן, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement to be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term “it” teaches us that there was no requirement of slaughter in the north for the goats brought as sin offerings by Nahshon and the other princes.
וּסְמִיכָה גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ עַל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׂעִיר״ – לְרַבּוֹת שְׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן לִסְמִיכָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר:
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal itself applies to the goats offered by Nahshon and the other princes? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says:
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Menachot 55
וּבְמַחְשָׁבָה, מָה תְּרוּמָה גְּדוֹלָה בְּעַיִן יָפָה, אַף תְּרוּמַת מַעֲשֵׂר בְּעַיִן יָפָה.
and by thought. And this comparison also teaches that just as in the case of standard teruma one should give generously, so too, with regard to teruma of the tithe one should give generously. Therefore, one who separates teruma of the tithe from fresh figs for dried figs should do so generously, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, as though the volume of the dried figs was as large as that of fresh ones.
וּמִינַּהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַבָּא הָיָה נוֹטֵל עֶשֶׂר גְּרוֹגְרוֹת שֶׁבַּמַּקְצוּעַ עַל תִּשְׁעִים שֶׁבַּכַּלְכַּלָּה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא לִכְמוֹת שֶׁהֵן אָמְרִינַן – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ כְּמוֹת שֶׁהֵן – בָּצַר לְהוּ.
The Gemara suggests: And from this statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, one can cite a proof for the opinion that food is to be measured in accordance with its initial size. As Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: Father would set aside ten dried figs that were in a vessel for ninety fresh figs that were in a basket. Granted, if you say that we say one measures food items as they were initially, it is well, as Rabbi Yosei apparently considers the dried figs set aside as tithes as though they were still fresh figs. But if you say that one measures foods as they are in their current state, then in a case where one separates ten dried figs for ninety fresh figs they are less than the requisite amount, as the volume of ten dried figs is less than the volume of ten fresh figs. This indicates that the measure of the food is determined according to its initial state.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: שָׁאנֵי גְּרוֹגְרוֹת, הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לְשׁוֹלְקָן וּלְהַחְזִירָן לִכְמוֹת שֶׁהֵן.
The Gemara answers that one cannot extrapolate from the example of dried figs to other cases. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says the following reason for that particular halakha: Dried figs are different, since one can boil dried figs in water and return them to their previous state; in other words, as they were when they were fresh. Consequently, one may separate them for fresh figs as though they too were fresh. One cannot extrapolate from here a principle with regard to other items.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: תּוֹרְמִין תְּאֵנִים עַל הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת, בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת, וְלֹא גְּרוֹגְרוֹת עַל תְּאֵנִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת.
§ The Gemara discusses the possibility of separating fresh figs as teruma for dried ones. The Sages taught in a baraita: One may separate teruma from fresh figs for dried figs by number, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs, and therefore the fresh figs can be preserved by processing them into dried figs. But one may not set aside teruma from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs.
אָמַר מָר: תּוֹרְמִין תְּאֵנִים עַל הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת. בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין – אִין, בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין רְגִילִין – לָא.
The Gemara analyzes this baraita. The Master said: One may separate teruma from fresh figs for dried figs in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. This indicates that in a place where they are accustomed to make dried figs, yes, one may set aside teruma in this manner. But in a place where they are not accustomed to make dried figs, one may not separate from fresh figs for dried ones, as the fresh figs are liable to spoil before they can be used.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן, מָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָגִיל – אַמַּאי לָא? וְהָתְנַן: מְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ כֹּהֵן תּוֹרֵם מִן הַיָּפֶה!
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a situation where there is a priest present, and the owner of the produce can give him the teruma without delay, then even in a place where he is not accustomed to make dried figs, why may he not set aside fresh figs for dried ones? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Terumot 2:4): In a place where there is a priest present, the owner of the produce separates teruma from the best-quality produce? In this case, the fresh figs are superior in quality to the dried ones, despite the fact that dried figs last longer.
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וְלֹא גְּרוֹגְרוֹת עַל הַתְּאֵנִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרָגִיל לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת. וְאִי דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, אַמַּאי לָא? וְהָתְנַן: מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כֹּהֵן – תּוֹרֵם מִן הַמִּתְקַיֵּים! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן.
Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, and by the time a priest is found the fresh figs might spoil. If so, say the latter clause of that baraita: But one may not set aside teruma from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. And if this is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, why may one not set aside dried figs, which can be preserved for a lengthy period, for fresh ones? But didn’t we learn in the same mishna (Terumot 2:4): In a place where there is no priest present, the owner of the produce separates teruma from that which will endure, not from the best-quality produce? Rather, it is obvious that this clause is referring to a situation where there is a priest present.
רֵישָׁא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, סֵיפָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן? אִין, רֵישָׁא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, סֵיפָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן.
The Gemara challenges: If so, the first clause of the baraita addresses a case where there is no priest present, whereas the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present. The Gemara explains: Yes, the first clause of the baraita addresses a case where there is no priest present, and the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, דָּחֲקִינַן וּמוֹקְמִינַן מַתְנִיתִין בִּתְרֵי טַעְמֵי, וְלָא מוֹקְמִינַן בִּתְרֵי תַּנָּאֵי.
Rav Pappa said: Learn from this discussion that we exert ourselves and interpret the mishna according to two reasons, i.e., two different situations in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, but we do not interpret it as being in accordance with the opinions of two tanna’im. An interpretation that maintains a single authorship of a mishna is preferable even if it requires explaining the mishna as discussing two different situations.
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת נִילּוֹשׁוֹת בְּפוֹשְׁרִין, וּמְשַׁמְּרָן שֶׁלֹּא יַחְמִיצוּ, וְאִם הֶחְמִיצוּ שְׁיָרֶיהָ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״כׇּל הַמִּנְחָה אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ לַה׳ לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״, וְחַיָּיב עַל לִישָׁתָהּ, וְעַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְעַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ.
MISHNA: All the meal-offerings that come as matza are to be kneaded with lukewarm water so that the dough will bake well, as only a small amount of oil is added. And one must watch over them to ensure that they do not become leaven while kneading and shaping them, and if a meal offering or even only its remainder becomes leaven, one violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ חֶלְקָם״, אֲפִילּוּ חֶלְקָם לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ.
GEMARA: The mishna states that one who allows the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened violates a prohibition. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Reish Lakish said: The verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). This section of the verse can be read as a single sentence, to indicate: Even their portion of meal offerings, i.e., the remainder eaten by priests after the removal of the handful to be burned on the altar, shall not be baked with leaven.
וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא? הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״לֹא
The Gemara asks: And does this verse come for this purpose? It cannot, as it is necessary as the source for a different halakha, for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “It shall not
תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״! לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״, יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה״.
be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? Isn’t this requirement already stated earlier: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11)? Rather, the phrase “it shall not be baked with leaven” serves to teach a different halakha. Since the prohibition concerning leaven is first stated in general terms: Shall not be made with leaven, without specification, one might have thought that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven will be liable to receive only one set of lashes for all of his actions, i.e., kneading, shaping, and baking the dough. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” which teaches that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven is liable separately for baking it, and for each stage of its preparation.
אֲפִיָּיה בַּכְּלָל הָיָתָה, לָמָּה יָצָאת לְהַקִּישׁ אֵלֶיהָ? מָה אֲפִיָּיה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא לִישָׁתָהּ וַעֲרִיכָתָהּ.
The baraita explains this derivation: Baking leaven was included in the general prohibition incorporating all of the stages involved in preparing the meal offering. Why did it emerge from the generalization to be mentioned explicitly? It emerged in order to compare the other stages to it: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single, i.e., separately defined, action, and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself if the dough is leaven, so too, I will include the other stages of the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading it and shaping it, and conclude that one is liable separately for each of these actions if the dough is leavened.
וְכׇל מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי שֶׁבָּהּ, לְאֵיתוֹיֵי קִיטּוּף, שֶׁהוּא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ.
And the same applies to any single action involved in the preparation of a meal offering. This statement serves to include the act of smoothing the surface of the dough with water. The reason this act is included is that although it is not a significant stage in the preparation of the dough, it is a single, independent action, and therefore one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself. This baraita demonstrates that one cannot derive the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened from the verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” as this verse is the source of a different halakha. If so, from where is that prohibition derived?
אֲנַן מֵ״חֶלְקָם״ קָאָמְרִינַן.
The Gemara answers: The verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is required for the principle stated earlier. We say that the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened is derived from the subsequent phrase: “I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). The remainder is the portion of the meal offering eaten by the priests.
וְאֵימָא: כּוּלֵּיהּ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?
The Gemara challenges: But once it has been determined that the term “their portion” teaches the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, one can say this entire section of the verse comes only for this purpose, which would mean that there is no source for the halakha that one is liable separately for each stage of the preparation of a meal offering with leaven.
אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב ״חֶלְקָם לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ״, מַאי ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ חֶלְקָם״? שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
The Gemara answers: One cannot say that this teaches only the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, as if so, let the verse write: Their portion shall not be baked with leaven. What is meant by the fact that the verse stated it in a different order: “Shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion”? This indicates that one should learn from this two halakhot, i.e., that there is a prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering and that one is liable to receive a separate set of lashes for each stage of preparation performed with leavened dough.
וְאֵימָא: אֲפִיָּיה, דִּפְרַט בַּהּ רַחֲמָנָא, לִיחַיַּיב חֲדָא; אִינָךְ לִיחַיַּיב חֲדָא אַכּוּלְּהוּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא מִן הַכְּלָל לְלַמֵּד, לֹא לְלַמֵּד עַל עַצְמוֹ יָצָא, אֶלָּא לְלַמֵּד עַל הַכְּלָל כּוּלּוֹ יָצָא.
The Gemara raises another difficulty: But one can say that the act of baking is different, as the Merciful One specified it in the Torah, and therefore one should be liable to receive one set of lashes for baking the dough. As for the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading, shaping, and smoothing, which are not explicitly stated in the verse, let him be liable to receive one set of lashes for all of them. The Gemara answers that this cannot be the halakha, because baking is something that was included in a generalization but emerged from the generalization in order to teach a halakha. According to a hermeneutic principle, a case of this kind did not emerge to teach a halakha only about itself, but rather it emerged to teach a halakha about the entire generalization, in this case, about all the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering.
וְאֵימָא: ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה״ – כָּלַל, ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה״ – פָּרַט, כְּלָל וּפְרָט – אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט; אֲפִיָּיה – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא.
The Gemara further challenges: But one can say that the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven, is a generalization, as it does not mention any specific acts, and the phrase: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is a detail, as it specifies one particular stage of the preparation; and there is another standard hermeneutic principle: When there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization is referring only to that which is specified in the detail. In this case, that would mean that baking, yes, is included in this prohibition, but other matters, e.g., kneading and shaping, are not included.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי כְּלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה, וְכׇל כְּלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה – אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט.
Rabbi Aptoriki said: That hermeneutic principle is not relevant here, because this is a case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, as the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven (Leviticus 2:11), is far from the expression: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). And for any instance of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail.
מֵתִיב רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי: וּכְלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט הָעֹלָה לִפְנֵי ה׳ חַטָּאת הוּא״ – הֵיכָן עוֹלָה נִשְׁחֶטֶת? בַּצָּפוֹן, אַף זֶה בַּצָּפוֹן.
Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection, and some say that this objection is unattributed [kedi]: And is it correct that in the case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to a goat brought by a king as a sin offering: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? On the northern side of the Temple courtyard, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). This sin offering of a king must consequently also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.
וְכִי אָנוּ מִכָּאן לְמֵידִין? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר תִּשָּׁחֵט הָעֹלָה תִּשָּׁחֵט הַחַטָּאת״! הָא לְמָה זֶה יָצָא? לְקוֹבְעוֹ, שֶׁאִם לֹא שָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן – פְּסָלוֹ.
The baraita asks: And do you learn this halakha from here? But isn’t it already stated: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before God; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why does the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The baraita answers: It is to fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if he did not slaughter it in the north of the Temple courtyard, he has disqualified it even after the fact.
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְכָךְ יָצָאת, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט אֶת הָעֹלָה״, זֶה בָּנָה אָב לְכׇל חַטָּאוֹת שֶׁטְּעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן.
The baraita asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The baraita answers: The verse states elsewhere: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), and this established a paradigm for all sin offerings, that they require slaughter in the north. Therefore, the additional verse stated with regard to the sin offering of a king teaches that if he did not slaughter it in the north it is disqualified.
טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת״, הָא לָאו הָכִי הֲוָה אָמֵינָא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן, וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן. מַאי טַעְמָא?
The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The reason that all sin offerings must be slaughtered in the north is that the Merciful One wrote: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” from which it can be inferred that if not for this verse I would say that only this sin offering, the male goat brought by a king, requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north. What is the reason for this? After all, the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered,” appears to be referring to all types of sin offerings.
לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה כְּלָל וּפְרָט, וְאַף עַל גַּב דִּמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה, דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט.
Isn’t it because this verse is a generalization and a detail, as the verse first generalizes about all sin offerings, and then the verse concerning the sin offering of a king: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering,” is a detail, as it is referring to a specific sin offering? And even though the verse concerning sin offerings and the verse concerning the sin offering of a king are distanced from one another, nevertheless we would derive a halakha from them by means of the principle of a generalization and a detail. This appears to disprove the explanation of Rabbi Aptoriki.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: הַאי כְּלָל וּפְרָט הוּא?! פְּרָט וּכְלָל הוּא, וְנַעֲשָׂה כְּלָל מוֹסִיף עַל הַפְּרָט, (וְאִיתְרַבִּי) [וְאִיתְרַבּוֹ] לְהוּ כֹּל מִילֵּי.
Rav Ashi objects to this claim raised by Rav Adda bar Ahava: Is this a generalization and a detail? It is in fact a detail and a generalization, as the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:24), appears in the Torah earlier than the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered the sin offering shall be slaughtered” (Leviticus 6:18). A hermeneutic principle states that in this case the generalization adds to the detail, and includes all matters.
אֶלָּא תַּנָּא, ״אֹתוֹ״ קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן, דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״אֹתוֹ״.
Rather, the reason that if not for the specific textual derivation we would have thought that only a sin offering brought by a king requires slaughter in the north is that the word “it,” which is an exclusion, is difficult for the tanna of the baraita, as it is unclear what this term serves to exclude. And this is what the baraita is saying: Or perhaps the verse is teaching that only this sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north, as the Merciful One writes “it,” which is an exclusion. Therefore, the additional verse: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” teaches that this halakha applies to all burnt offerings.
וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת״, ״אֹתוֹ״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לְמַעוֹטֵי (נַחְשׁוֹן, וְשָׁחַט, עוֹף, בַּפֶּסַח סִימָן).
The Gemara asks: And now that the tanna of the baraita derives it from the phrase: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” to exclude what does the term “it” serve? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude the case that emerges from the following discussion, summarized by the mnemonic: Nahshon; and slaughter; bird; on Passover.
״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין שָׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן בַּצָּפוֹן.
The Gemara explains the first suggestion: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north, but the goat offered by Nahshon, prince of the tribe of Judah, was not slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (see Numbers, chapter 7). The sin offerings brought at this time were unique because they were not brought to atone for any sin. The term “it” teaches that even though they had some characteristics of a sin offering, the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִיתְרַבִּי לְעִנְיַן סְמִיכָה, לִיתְרַבֵּי נָמֵי לְעִנְיַן צָפוֹן, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement to be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term “it” teaches us that there was no requirement of slaughter in the north for the goats brought as sin offerings by Nahshon and the other princes.
וּסְמִיכָה גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ עַל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׂעִיר״ – לְרַבּוֹת שְׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן לִסְמִיכָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר:
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal itself applies to the goats offered by Nahshon and the other princes? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says:
