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Today's Daf Yomi

October 23, 2015 | 讬壮 讘诪专讞砖讜谉 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Nazir 62

讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 谞讝讬专讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讛讗讬转诪专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讘谞讝讬专

One might have thought that gentiles cannot be nazirites at all. The verse therefore states: 鈥淢an,鈥 to teach that they can become nazirites. The Gemara answers: Wasn鈥檛 it stated that Rabbi Yo岣nan said that the halakha that a son may use his father鈥檚 nazirite offerings is a halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai with regard to a nazirite? Since this halakha does not appear in the Torah, the verse cannot be coming to exclude it.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 谞讚专 讘注专讻讱 讘注专讻讬谉 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讻讚讬 讛讗讬转拽砖 注专讻讬谉 诇谞讚专讬诐 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 谞讚专 讘注专讻讱 讜讛转谞讬讗 讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬砖 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讙讜讬诐 砖讛谉 谞讜讚专讬诐 谞讚专讬诐 讜谞讚讘讜转 讻讬砖专讗诇

搂 The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need the verse: 鈥淲hen a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation鈥 (Leviticus 27:2), stated with regard to valuations, from which it is derived that gentiles are included in the halakhot of valuations? After all, aren鈥檛 valuations juxtaposed to vows, as the verse states: 鈥淲hen a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation.鈥 And isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita with regard to a verse dealing with vows: 鈥淎ny man [ish] from the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, who sacrifices his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their gift offerings, which are sacrificed to the Lord as a burnt-offering鈥 (Leviticus 22:18), what is the meaning when the verse states the extra emphasis: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish]鈥? The baraita explains: This serves to include the gentiles, that they can take a vow for vow offerings and gift offerings like a Jew. It can be derived from this juxtaposition that gentiles are included in the halakhot of valuations.

讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 讘注专讻讬谉 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗诇讗 讛讗讬 讗讬砖 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讜驻诇讗 住诪讜讱 诇讗讬砖

The Gemara now restates its question: In that case, why do I need the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥 stated with regard to valuations? Rather, this term, 鈥渕an,鈥 does not include gentiles, but is necessary to include a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. If a minor takes a vow one year before coming of age, and shows a clear understanding of his statement, the vow takes effect. This individual is included in the halakhot of valuations as well.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪讜驻诇讗 住诪讜讱 诇讗讬砖 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讚专讘谞谉 讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讜驻诇讗 住诪讜讱 诇讗讬砖 讚讙讜讬

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that a minor one year before he or she reaches majority must fulfill his or her vows by Torah law, because the verse serves as the source for this halakha. However, according to the one who says that this halakha applies by rabbinic law, why do I need the verse 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥? The Gemara answers: The verse serves to include a minor one year before he or she reaches majority who is a gentile, that this halakha applies to gentiles by Torah law.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 谞注专讻讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 谞注专讻讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 诪注专讬讻讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 砖驻讬专

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that it is inferred from the phrase: 鈥淭he children of Israel鈥 (Leviticus 27:2), that Jews can be valuated but gentiles cannot be valuated; and one might have thought that gentiles cannot take a valuation vow. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淢an.鈥 According to this opinion it is fine, as the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥 can teach that if a gentile close to adulthood grasps the meaning of vows, he can take a valuation vow.

讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 诪注专讬讻讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 诪注专讬讻讬诐 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 谞注专讻讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬谞讜拽 讘谉 讞讚砖 讘专 注讬专讜讻讬 讛讜讗 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 诇诪讛 诇讬

However, according to the one who says that the children of Israel can take a valuation vow but gentiles cannot take a valuation vow, one might have thought that gentiles cannot be valuated; therefore, the verse states the additional term: 鈥淢an,鈥 to teach that anyone, even a month-old baby, can be valuated according to the assigned value stated in the Torah. According to this opinion, it is of no importance how old the subject of the vow is, and therefore the verse clearly cannot be including a gentile on the verge of adulthood. Consequently, the question remains: Why do I need the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥?

讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讙讜讬 讙讚讜诇 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讙讚讜诇 讛讜讗 讗讬谞讜 讬讜讚注 诇讛驻诇讜转

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The verse is referring to all vows, and serves to include, i.e., to teach, the halakha of a type of adult gentile, who although he is an adult he does not know how to clearly utter a vow. The verse teaches that his vows are invalid, as derived from the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly vow.鈥 Vows of a gentile are valid only if he can express them clearly.

讗诇讗 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讙讘讬 谞讝讬专讜转 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讻讚讬 讛讗讬转拽砖 谞讝讬专讜转 诇谞讚专讬诐 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 诇诪讛 诇讬

Having clarified the verse concerning valuations, the Gemara asks: However, concerning the verse: 鈥淲hen a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow鈥 (Numbers 6:2), which the Merciful One writes with regard to naziriteship, why do I need it? After all, isn鈥檛 the halakha of naziriteship juxtaposed to vows; why do I need the verse 鈥渨hen a man or woman shall clearly utter鈥?

诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讬讚讬诐 砖讗讬谞谉 诪讜讻讬讞讜转 讚讗讬转诪专 讬讚讬诐 砖讗讬谞谉 诪讜讻讬讞讜转 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬诐 专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬诐 诇讗讘讬讬 谞讬讞讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara answers: This verse serves to include the case of one who vowed by means of ambiguous intimations, i.e., he expressed only part of the formula of the vow, so that his meaning is unclear. As it was stated that amora鈥檌m had a dispute with regard to this issue: With regard to ambiguous intimations, Abaye said that they are considered intimations to vows, and the vows take effect, and Rava said that they are not considered intimations to vows, and the vows do not take effect. According to the opinion of Abaye, this answer works out well, as the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter,鈥 serves to include all pronouncements indicative of vows, even ambiguous intimations. However, according to the opinion of Rava, what is there to say?

讗诇讗 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讬谉 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 谞讝讬专 诇驻讬 砖诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 谞讝讬专讜转 讗诇讗 诇讛驻诇讗讛 讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗诇讗 诇专讘谞谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

Rather, the Gemara explains that the phrase 鈥渨hen a man or woman shall clearly utter鈥 is necessary for that which was stated by Rabbi Tarfon, as it is taught in the Tosefta (3:19) that Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: If several people took a vow of naziriteship as part of a wager with regard to an uncertain occurrence, not one of them is a nazirite, as naziriteship is imposed upon someone only if his vow is explicitly enunciated. That is, one is a nazirite only if he vows in a definitive manner, not if there was any uncertainty involved. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with his ruling, what is there to say?

讗诇讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讛讬转专 谞讚专讬诐 驻讜专讞讬谉 讘讗讜讬专 讜讗讬谉 诇讛谉 注诇 诪讛 砖讬住诪讜讻讜

Rather, the phrase 鈥渨hen a man or woman shall clearly utter鈥 is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The halakhot of dissolution of vows, namely that one may request from a halakhic authority to dissolve them, fly in the air and have nothing to lean upon, i.e., these halakhot are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讬砖 诇讛诐 注诇 诪讛 砖讬住诪讜讻讜 砖谞讗诪专 讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 砖转讬 驻注诪讬诐 讗讞讚 讛驻诇讗讛 诇讗讬住讜专 讜讗讞讚 讛驻诇讗讛 诇讛讬转专

Rabbi Eliezer says: The halakhot of dissolution of vows have a basis upon which to lean, as it is stated: 鈥淲hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥 (Leviticus 27:2) and: 鈥淲hen a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow鈥 (Numbers聽6:2), twice. One explicit utterance is for prohibition, i.e., when one takes a vow, he is bound to keep it, and one explicit utterance is for dissolution, i.e., in the event that he provides a halakhic authority with a reason why the vow should no longer apply, the vow can be dissolved and he will no longer be bound by it. This is an allusion in the Torah for the dissolution of vows.

诪转谞讬壮 讞讜诪专 讘注讘讚讬诐 诪讘谞砖讬诐 砖讛讜讗 诪驻专 谞讚专讬 讗砖转讜 讜讗讬谞讜 诪驻专 谞讚专讬 注讘讚讜 讛驻专 诇讗砖转讜 讛驻专 注讜诇诪讬转 讛驻专 诇注讘讚讜 讬爪讗 诇讞讬专讜转 讜诪砖诇讬诐 谞讝讬专讜转讜

MISHNA: The previous mishna taught that the naziriteship of women includes a stringency that does not apply to slaves. This mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of slaves than in the case of women, as a man can nullify the vows of his wife but he cannot nullify the vows of his slave, despite the fact that he can prevent him from fulfilling them in practice. Similarly, if he nullified the naziriteship of his wife it is permanently nullified, and it remains nullified even if she is later divorced or widowed. Conversely, if he nullified the naziriteship of his slave by forcing him to violate the terms of his vow of naziriteship, when the slave is emancipated he completes his naziriteship.

讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇诪讛 专讘讜 讻讜驻讜 诇谞讝讬专讜转 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇谞讚专讬诐 讜诇注专讻讬谉

GEMARA: The Sages taught (Tosefta 6:4): With regard to what matter can his master force a slave? With regard to naziriteship. However, he cannot force his slave in the case of other vows and valuations. This baraita is apparently saying that a master cannot prevent his slave from fulfilling the terms of a vow.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讙讘讬 谞讝讬专 讚讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗住专 讗住专 注诇 谞驻砖讜 讘诪讬 砖谞驻砖讜 拽谞讜讬讛 诇讜 讬爪讗 注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 谞驻砖讜 拽谞讜讬讛 诇讜 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 谞诪讬

The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to a nazirite that a master can force his slave to transgress his naziriteship, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淭o bind his soul with a bond鈥 (Numbers 30:3), from which it is inferred that the Torah is referring only to one whose soul is in his possession, i.e., who is not owned by another; this excludes a slave, whose soul is not in his possession because he is under his master鈥檚 control. If so, then even with regard to vows that same halakha should apply as well, as that verse is written in the context of vows in general, not specifically vows of naziriteship. Why is a master unable to compel his slave to break a vow?

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 讗砖讻讜诇 砖诇 注谞讘讬诐 诪讜谞讞 诇驻谞讬讜 讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 讚讻讬 诪讬转住专 讘讛讗讬 诇讗 诪讬转住专 讘讗讞专讬谞讬 诇讗 诪爪讬 讻驻讬 诇讬讛

Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? With a case where a cluster of grapes was placed before the slave and he vowed not to derive benefit from it. With regard to vows, when he is prohibited from eating this cluster he is not rendered prohibited from eating others; therefore, the master cannot force him to eat it, as he has no reason to insist that the slave consume this particular cluster of grapes.

讙讘讬 谞讝讬专讜转 讚讻讬 诪讬转住专 讘讛讗讬 讗讬转住专 讘讻讜诇讛讜 诪爪讬 讻驻讬 诇讬讛 讜讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讬讻讗 讗诇讗 讛讗讬 讗砖讻讜诇 讚讗讬 诇讗 讗讻讬诇 诇讬讛 讞诇讬砖

By contrast, with regard to naziriteship, when he is prohibited from eating this cluster he is rendered prohibited from consuming all others; therefore, the master can force him to eat. This is because the lack of food weakens the slave, who is the property of his master. The Gemara asks: And with regard to vows, are we not dealing even with a situation where he has only this cluster before him and he vows not to eat it, in which case if he does not eat it he is weakened? Why can鈥檛 the master compel him to eat the grapes in this case?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 讞专爪谉 诪讜谞讞 诇驻谞讬讜 讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 讘讛讗讬 讛讜讗 讚诪讬转住专 诇讗 诪爪讬 讻驻讬 诇讬讛 讙讘讬 谞讝讬专 讚讗讬转住专 谞诪讬 讘讗讞专讬谞讬 诪爪讬 讻驻讬 诇讬讛

Rather, Rava said that the difference between vows of naziriteship and other vows concerns a case where there was a grape seed, which provides only negligible nourishment, that was placed before the slave, and he vowed not to eat it. With regard to vows, concerning which he is prohibited to eat only this one seed, the master cannot force him to eat it, as refraining from eating a grape seed would not weaken him. With regard to a nazirite, who is prohibited from consuming other grape products as well, the master can force him.

讜讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讬讻讗 讗诇讗 讛讗讬 讞专爪谉 讚讗讬 诇讗 讗讻讬诇 诇讬讛 讞诇讬砖

The Gemara again asks: And with regard to vows, are we not dealing even with a situation where he has only this grape seed in front of him, in which case if he does not eat it he would be weakened? Why, then, can the master compel him to violate only his naziriteship vow but not a regular vow?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇诪讛 专讘讜 爪专讬讱 诇讻驻讜转讜 诇谞讝讬专讜转 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讻驻讜转讜 诇谞讚专讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讻驻讜转讜 诇砖讘讜注讛

Rather, Abaye said that the baraita does not in fact list cases in which a master can compel his slave to violate his vow, but rather means the following: With regard to what situation is a master who wants to negate his slave鈥檚 vow required to force his slave to violate his vow by stating explicitly that he does not want him to fulfill it? It is the case of a vow of naziriteship. But he is not required to force him in the case of other vows and he is not required to force him in the case of an oath, as these do not take effect at all.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 诪讛 讛讟讘讛 专砖讜转 讗祝 讛专注讛 专砖讜转 讬爪讗 诇讛专注 诇讗讞专讬诐 砖讗讬谉 讛专砖讜转 讘讬讚讜

What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states with regard to oaths: 鈥淥r if anyone swear clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4). Just as the 鈥済ood鈥 mentioned in this verse is referring to a voluntary action, so too the 鈥渆vil鈥 is voluntary, e.g., if he takes an oath not to derive benefit from an item. This excludes a slave, whose oath or vow would cause evil to others, as it is not in his power to affect his master adversely. Therefore, his statement is invalid. Here too, as the owner will suffer if his slave鈥檚 diet is restricted, a slave may not accept a vow or an oath upon himself.

诪转谞讬壮 注讘专 诪讻谞讙讚 驻谞讬讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬砖转讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讬砖转讛

MISHNA: In a case where a slave took a vow of naziriteship but was prevented by his master from fulfilling the terms of his vow, the Sages engaged in a dispute what the halakha would be if he permanently left his master鈥檚 presence, i.e., he ran away without being emancipated. Rabbi Meir says: He may not drink wine. Since the slave is free in practice, his vow goes into effect. And Rabbi Yosei says: He may drink wine, as he is not emancipated.

讙诪壮 诇讬诪讗 讘讚砖诪讜讗诇 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诪驻拽讬专 注讘讚讜 讬爪讗 诇讞讬专讜转 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 讙讟 砖讬讞专讜专

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree with regard to the following statement of Shmuel? As Shmuel said: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated, and he does not require a bill of manumission. This halakha indicates that if a slave is free in practice, he no longer requires a bill of manumission but is automatically considered a freeman.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara asks: If so, should one say that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and therefore the slave is obligated in naziriteship as soon as he runs away, like any other freed slave, and Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel?

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗讬转 诇讛讜 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诇讗 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讬砖转讛 住讘专 住讜祝 住讜祝 诪讬讛讚专 讛讚专 讜讗转讬 讙讘讬讛 诇讬砖转讬 讞诪专讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 诇讬讻讞讜砖 讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 讬砖转讛 住讘专 诇讬讛讜讬 诇讬讛 爪注专讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讬讛讚专 讙讘讬讛

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where the master refused to declare the runaway ownerless, and was intent on recovering him. Consequently, the slave is not in fact a freeman at all, and the tanna鈥檌m disagree with regard to the following: Rabbi Yosei, the one who says that he may drink wine, maintains that the slave will ultimately return and come back to his master, and therefore it is preferable for him to drink wine so that he should not be weakened by the time he returns. And according to Rabbi Meir, the one who says that he may not drink wine, he maintains that it is better that the slave should suffer by being deprived of wine, so that he will return to his master, as the desire to drink wine will spur him to return.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Nazir 62

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Nazir 62

讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 谞讝讬专讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讛讗讬转诪专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讘谞讝讬专

One might have thought that gentiles cannot be nazirites at all. The verse therefore states: 鈥淢an,鈥 to teach that they can become nazirites. The Gemara answers: Wasn鈥檛 it stated that Rabbi Yo岣nan said that the halakha that a son may use his father鈥檚 nazirite offerings is a halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai with regard to a nazirite? Since this halakha does not appear in the Torah, the verse cannot be coming to exclude it.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 谞讚专 讘注专讻讱 讘注专讻讬谉 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讻讚讬 讛讗讬转拽砖 注专讻讬谉 诇谞讚专讬诐 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 谞讚专 讘注专讻讱 讜讛转谞讬讗 讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬砖 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讙讜讬诐 砖讛谉 谞讜讚专讬诐 谞讚专讬诐 讜谞讚讘讜转 讻讬砖专讗诇

搂 The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need the verse: 鈥淲hen a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation鈥 (Leviticus 27:2), stated with regard to valuations, from which it is derived that gentiles are included in the halakhot of valuations? After all, aren鈥檛 valuations juxtaposed to vows, as the verse states: 鈥淲hen a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation.鈥 And isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita with regard to a verse dealing with vows: 鈥淎ny man [ish] from the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, who sacrifices his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their gift offerings, which are sacrificed to the Lord as a burnt-offering鈥 (Leviticus 22:18), what is the meaning when the verse states the extra emphasis: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish]鈥? The baraita explains: This serves to include the gentiles, that they can take a vow for vow offerings and gift offerings like a Jew. It can be derived from this juxtaposition that gentiles are included in the halakhot of valuations.

讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 讘注专讻讬谉 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗诇讗 讛讗讬 讗讬砖 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讜驻诇讗 住诪讜讱 诇讗讬砖

The Gemara now restates its question: In that case, why do I need the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥 stated with regard to valuations? Rather, this term, 鈥渕an,鈥 does not include gentiles, but is necessary to include a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. If a minor takes a vow one year before coming of age, and shows a clear understanding of his statement, the vow takes effect. This individual is included in the halakhot of valuations as well.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪讜驻诇讗 住诪讜讱 诇讗讬砖 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讚专讘谞谉 讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讜驻诇讗 住诪讜讱 诇讗讬砖 讚讙讜讬

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that a minor one year before he or she reaches majority must fulfill his or her vows by Torah law, because the verse serves as the source for this halakha. However, according to the one who says that this halakha applies by rabbinic law, why do I need the verse 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥? The Gemara answers: The verse serves to include a minor one year before he or she reaches majority who is a gentile, that this halakha applies to gentiles by Torah law.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 谞注专讻讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 谞注专讻讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 诪注专讬讻讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 砖驻讬专

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that it is inferred from the phrase: 鈥淭he children of Israel鈥 (Leviticus 27:2), that Jews can be valuated but gentiles cannot be valuated; and one might have thought that gentiles cannot take a valuation vow. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淢an.鈥 According to this opinion it is fine, as the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥 can teach that if a gentile close to adulthood grasps the meaning of vows, he can take a valuation vow.

讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 诪注专讬讻讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 诪注专讬讻讬诐 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 谞注专讻讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬谞讜拽 讘谉 讞讚砖 讘专 注讬专讜讻讬 讛讜讗 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 诇诪讛 诇讬

However, according to the one who says that the children of Israel can take a valuation vow but gentiles cannot take a valuation vow, one might have thought that gentiles cannot be valuated; therefore, the verse states the additional term: 鈥淢an,鈥 to teach that anyone, even a month-old baby, can be valuated according to the assigned value stated in the Torah. According to this opinion, it is of no importance how old the subject of the vow is, and therefore the verse clearly cannot be including a gentile on the verge of adulthood. Consequently, the question remains: Why do I need the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥?

讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讙讜讬 讙讚讜诇 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讙讚讜诇 讛讜讗 讗讬谞讜 讬讜讚注 诇讛驻诇讜转

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The verse is referring to all vows, and serves to include, i.e., to teach, the halakha of a type of adult gentile, who although he is an adult he does not know how to clearly utter a vow. The verse teaches that his vows are invalid, as derived from the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly vow.鈥 Vows of a gentile are valid only if he can express them clearly.

讗诇讗 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讙讘讬 谞讝讬专讜转 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讻讚讬 讛讗讬转拽砖 谞讝讬专讜转 诇谞讚专讬诐 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 诇诪讛 诇讬

Having clarified the verse concerning valuations, the Gemara asks: However, concerning the verse: 鈥淲hen a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow鈥 (Numbers 6:2), which the Merciful One writes with regard to naziriteship, why do I need it? After all, isn鈥檛 the halakha of naziriteship juxtaposed to vows; why do I need the verse 鈥渨hen a man or woman shall clearly utter鈥?

诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讬讚讬诐 砖讗讬谞谉 诪讜讻讬讞讜转 讚讗讬转诪专 讬讚讬诐 砖讗讬谞谉 诪讜讻讬讞讜转 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬诐 专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬诐 诇讗讘讬讬 谞讬讞讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara answers: This verse serves to include the case of one who vowed by means of ambiguous intimations, i.e., he expressed only part of the formula of the vow, so that his meaning is unclear. As it was stated that amora鈥檌m had a dispute with regard to this issue: With regard to ambiguous intimations, Abaye said that they are considered intimations to vows, and the vows take effect, and Rava said that they are not considered intimations to vows, and the vows do not take effect. According to the opinion of Abaye, this answer works out well, as the phrase 鈥渨hen a man shall clearly utter,鈥 serves to include all pronouncements indicative of vows, even ambiguous intimations. However, according to the opinion of Rava, what is there to say?

讗诇讗 讻讬 讬驻诇讬讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讬谉 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 谞讝讬专 诇驻讬 砖诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 谞讝讬专讜转 讗诇讗 诇讛驻诇讗讛 讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗诇讗 诇专讘谞谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

Rather, the Gemara explains that the phrase 鈥渨hen a man or woman shall clearly utter鈥 is necessary for that which was stated by Rabbi Tarfon, as it is taught in the Tosefta (3:19) that Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: If several people took a vow of naziriteship as part of a wager with regard to an uncertain occurrence, not one of them is a nazirite, as naziriteship is imposed upon someone only if his vow is explicitly enunciated. That is, one is a nazirite only if he vows in a definitive manner, not if there was any uncertainty involved. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with his ruling, what is there to say?

讗诇讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讛讬转专 谞讚专讬诐 驻讜专讞讬谉 讘讗讜讬专 讜讗讬谉 诇讛谉 注诇 诪讛 砖讬住诪讜讻讜

Rather, the phrase 鈥渨hen a man or woman shall clearly utter鈥 is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The halakhot of dissolution of vows, namely that one may request from a halakhic authority to dissolve them, fly in the air and have nothing to lean upon, i.e., these halakhot are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讬砖 诇讛诐 注诇 诪讛 砖讬住诪讜讻讜 砖谞讗诪专 讗讬砖 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 讻讬 讬驻诇讗 砖转讬 驻注诪讬诐 讗讞讚 讛驻诇讗讛 诇讗讬住讜专 讜讗讞讚 讛驻诇讗讛 诇讛讬转专

Rabbi Eliezer says: The halakhot of dissolution of vows have a basis upon which to lean, as it is stated: 鈥淲hen a man shall clearly utter a vow鈥 (Leviticus 27:2) and: 鈥淲hen a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow鈥 (Numbers聽6:2), twice. One explicit utterance is for prohibition, i.e., when one takes a vow, he is bound to keep it, and one explicit utterance is for dissolution, i.e., in the event that he provides a halakhic authority with a reason why the vow should no longer apply, the vow can be dissolved and he will no longer be bound by it. This is an allusion in the Torah for the dissolution of vows.

诪转谞讬壮 讞讜诪专 讘注讘讚讬诐 诪讘谞砖讬诐 砖讛讜讗 诪驻专 谞讚专讬 讗砖转讜 讜讗讬谞讜 诪驻专 谞讚专讬 注讘讚讜 讛驻专 诇讗砖转讜 讛驻专 注讜诇诪讬转 讛驻专 诇注讘讚讜 讬爪讗 诇讞讬专讜转 讜诪砖诇讬诐 谞讝讬专讜转讜

MISHNA: The previous mishna taught that the naziriteship of women includes a stringency that does not apply to slaves. This mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of slaves than in the case of women, as a man can nullify the vows of his wife but he cannot nullify the vows of his slave, despite the fact that he can prevent him from fulfilling them in practice. Similarly, if he nullified the naziriteship of his wife it is permanently nullified, and it remains nullified even if she is later divorced or widowed. Conversely, if he nullified the naziriteship of his slave by forcing him to violate the terms of his vow of naziriteship, when the slave is emancipated he completes his naziriteship.

讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇诪讛 专讘讜 讻讜驻讜 诇谞讝讬专讜转 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇谞讚专讬诐 讜诇注专讻讬谉

GEMARA: The Sages taught (Tosefta 6:4): With regard to what matter can his master force a slave? With regard to naziriteship. However, he cannot force his slave in the case of other vows and valuations. This baraita is apparently saying that a master cannot prevent his slave from fulfilling the terms of a vow.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讙讘讬 谞讝讬专 讚讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗住专 讗住专 注诇 谞驻砖讜 讘诪讬 砖谞驻砖讜 拽谞讜讬讛 诇讜 讬爪讗 注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 谞驻砖讜 拽谞讜讬讛 诇讜 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 谞诪讬

The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to a nazirite that a master can force his slave to transgress his naziriteship, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淭o bind his soul with a bond鈥 (Numbers 30:3), from which it is inferred that the Torah is referring only to one whose soul is in his possession, i.e., who is not owned by another; this excludes a slave, whose soul is not in his possession because he is under his master鈥檚 control. If so, then even with regard to vows that same halakha should apply as well, as that verse is written in the context of vows in general, not specifically vows of naziriteship. Why is a master unable to compel his slave to break a vow?

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 讗砖讻讜诇 砖诇 注谞讘讬诐 诪讜谞讞 诇驻谞讬讜 讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 讚讻讬 诪讬转住专 讘讛讗讬 诇讗 诪讬转住专 讘讗讞专讬谞讬 诇讗 诪爪讬 讻驻讬 诇讬讛

Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? With a case where a cluster of grapes was placed before the slave and he vowed not to derive benefit from it. With regard to vows, when he is prohibited from eating this cluster he is not rendered prohibited from eating others; therefore, the master cannot force him to eat it, as he has no reason to insist that the slave consume this particular cluster of grapes.

讙讘讬 谞讝讬专讜转 讚讻讬 诪讬转住专 讘讛讗讬 讗讬转住专 讘讻讜诇讛讜 诪爪讬 讻驻讬 诇讬讛 讜讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讬讻讗 讗诇讗 讛讗讬 讗砖讻讜诇 讚讗讬 诇讗 讗讻讬诇 诇讬讛 讞诇讬砖

By contrast, with regard to naziriteship, when he is prohibited from eating this cluster he is rendered prohibited from consuming all others; therefore, the master can force him to eat. This is because the lack of food weakens the slave, who is the property of his master. The Gemara asks: And with regard to vows, are we not dealing even with a situation where he has only this cluster before him and he vows not to eat it, in which case if he does not eat it he is weakened? Why can鈥檛 the master compel him to eat the grapes in this case?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 讞专爪谉 诪讜谞讞 诇驻谞讬讜 讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 讘讛讗讬 讛讜讗 讚诪讬转住专 诇讗 诪爪讬 讻驻讬 诇讬讛 讙讘讬 谞讝讬专 讚讗讬转住专 谞诪讬 讘讗讞专讬谞讬 诪爪讬 讻驻讬 诇讬讛

Rather, Rava said that the difference between vows of naziriteship and other vows concerns a case where there was a grape seed, which provides only negligible nourishment, that was placed before the slave, and he vowed not to eat it. With regard to vows, concerning which he is prohibited to eat only this one seed, the master cannot force him to eat it, as refraining from eating a grape seed would not weaken him. With regard to a nazirite, who is prohibited from consuming other grape products as well, the master can force him.

讜讙讘讬 谞讚专讬诐 诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讬讻讗 讗诇讗 讛讗讬 讞专爪谉 讚讗讬 诇讗 讗讻讬诇 诇讬讛 讞诇讬砖

The Gemara again asks: And with regard to vows, are we not dealing even with a situation where he has only this grape seed in front of him, in which case if he does not eat it he would be weakened? Why, then, can the master compel him to violate only his naziriteship vow but not a regular vow?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇诪讛 专讘讜 爪专讬讱 诇讻驻讜转讜 诇谞讝讬专讜转 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讻驻讜转讜 诇谞讚专讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讻驻讜转讜 诇砖讘讜注讛

Rather, Abaye said that the baraita does not in fact list cases in which a master can compel his slave to violate his vow, but rather means the following: With regard to what situation is a master who wants to negate his slave鈥檚 vow required to force his slave to violate his vow by stating explicitly that he does not want him to fulfill it? It is the case of a vow of naziriteship. But he is not required to force him in the case of other vows and he is not required to force him in the case of an oath, as these do not take effect at all.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 诪讛 讛讟讘讛 专砖讜转 讗祝 讛专注讛 专砖讜转 讬爪讗 诇讛专注 诇讗讞专讬诐 砖讗讬谉 讛专砖讜转 讘讬讚讜

What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states with regard to oaths: 鈥淥r if anyone swear clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4). Just as the 鈥済ood鈥 mentioned in this verse is referring to a voluntary action, so too the 鈥渆vil鈥 is voluntary, e.g., if he takes an oath not to derive benefit from an item. This excludes a slave, whose oath or vow would cause evil to others, as it is not in his power to affect his master adversely. Therefore, his statement is invalid. Here too, as the owner will suffer if his slave鈥檚 diet is restricted, a slave may not accept a vow or an oath upon himself.

诪转谞讬壮 注讘专 诪讻谞讙讚 驻谞讬讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬砖转讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讬砖转讛

MISHNA: In a case where a slave took a vow of naziriteship but was prevented by his master from fulfilling the terms of his vow, the Sages engaged in a dispute what the halakha would be if he permanently left his master鈥檚 presence, i.e., he ran away without being emancipated. Rabbi Meir says: He may not drink wine. Since the slave is free in practice, his vow goes into effect. And Rabbi Yosei says: He may drink wine, as he is not emancipated.

讙诪壮 诇讬诪讗 讘讚砖诪讜讗诇 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诪驻拽讬专 注讘讚讜 讬爪讗 诇讞讬专讜转 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 讙讟 砖讬讞专讜专

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree with regard to the following statement of Shmuel? As Shmuel said: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated, and he does not require a bill of manumission. This halakha indicates that if a slave is free in practice, he no longer requires a bill of manumission but is automatically considered a freeman.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara asks: If so, should one say that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and therefore the slave is obligated in naziriteship as soon as he runs away, like any other freed slave, and Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel?

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗讬转 诇讛讜 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诇讗 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讬砖转讛 住讘专 住讜祝 住讜祝 诪讬讛讚专 讛讚专 讜讗转讬 讙讘讬讛 诇讬砖转讬 讞诪专讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 诇讬讻讞讜砖 讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 讬砖转讛 住讘专 诇讬讛讜讬 诇讬讛 爪注专讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讬讛讚专 讙讘讬讛

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where the master refused to declare the runaway ownerless, and was intent on recovering him. Consequently, the slave is not in fact a freeman at all, and the tanna鈥檌m disagree with regard to the following: Rabbi Yosei, the one who says that he may drink wine, maintains that the slave will ultimately return and come back to his master, and therefore it is preferable for him to drink wine so that he should not be weakened by the time he returns. And according to Rabbi Meir, the one who says that he may not drink wine, he maintains that it is better that the slave should suffer by being deprived of wine, so that he will return to his master, as the desire to drink wine will spur him to return.

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