Niddah 23

וילפינן מופנה משני צדדין ולהכי אפניה רחמנא לבהמה משני צדדין כי היכי דלא נגמר מן מופנה מצד אחד

and derive the halakha from the analogy that is free on both sides. And it is for this reason that the Merciful One rendered the verbal analogy between animal and man free on both sides, so that one would not derive the halakha from the verbal analogy between sea monster and man, which is free on only one side.

רב אחא בריה דרבא מתני לה משמיה דרבי אלעזר לקולא כל גזרה שוה שאינה מופנה כל עיקר למדין ומשיבין מופנה מצד אחד לרבי ישמעאל למדין ואין משיבין לרבנן למדין ומשיבין מופנה משני צדדין דברי הכל למדין ואין משיבין

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches in the name of Rabbi Elazar a more lenient version of the aforementioned principle of exegesis of verbal analogy: With regard to any verbal analogy that is not free at all, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it logically. If the verbal analogy is free on one side, according to Rabbi Yishmael one can derive halakhot from it, and one cannot refute it. According to the Rabbis, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it. If the verbal analogy is free on both sides, everyone agrees that one can derive halakhot from it and one cannot refute it.

ולרבנן מאי איכא בין מופנה מצד אחד לשאינה מופנה כל עיקר

The Gemara asks: But if so, according to the Rabbis, what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and one that is not free at all? In both cases, the Rabbis hold that one can derive halakhot from such a verbal analogy but one can also refute it.

נפקא מינה היכא דמשכחת לה מופנה מצד אחד ושאינה מופנה כל עיקר ולאו להאי אית ליה פירכא ולאו להאי אית ליה פירכא שבקינן שאינה מופנה כל עיקר וגמרינן ממופנה מצד אחד

The Gemara answers: The difference is in a case where you find two mutually exclusive verbal analogies, one that is free on one side and one that is not free at all, and neither does this one have a logical refutation nor does that one have a logical refutation. In such a case, we disregard the analogy that is not free at all, and we derive the halakha from the one that is free on one side.

והכא מאי פירכא איכא משום דאיכא למיפרך מה לאדם שכן מטמא מחיים

The Gemara asks: And here, with regard to the verbal analogy between man and sea monster, which was rejected because it is free on only one side, what logical refutation is there on account of which this verbal analogy is rejected? The Gemara answers: The verbal analogy between man and sea monster is rejected because it can be refuted as follows: What is unique about man? Man is unique in that a person can become impure while he is alive, unlike an animal, which can become impure only after it dies, or a sea monster, which cannot become impure at all.

וכן אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן היינו טעמא דרבי מאיר הואיל ונאמרה בו יצירה כאדם

And likewise, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a woman who discharges an item similar to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird is impure: It is because formation is stated with regard to the creation of these animals, just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man.

אמר ליה רבי אמי אלא מעתה המפלת דמות הר אמו טמאה לידה שנאמר כי הנה יוצר הרים ובורא רוח אמר ליה הר מי קא מפלת אבן היא דקא מפלת ההוא גוש איקרי

Rabbi Ami said to him: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the shape of a mountain, its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as it is stated with regard to the creation of mountains: “For He Who forms the mountains and creates the wind” (Amos 4:13). Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Does she discharge a mountain? The discharged item cannot possibly be that large. It is an item with the form of a stone that she discharges, and that is called a clod, not a mountain.

אלא מעתה המפלת רוח תהא אמו טמאה לידה הואיל ונאמרה בו בריאה כאדם דכתיב ובורא רוח וכי תימא לא מופנה מדהוה ליה למכתב יוצר הרים ורוח וכתיב ובורא רוח שמע מינה לאפנויי

Rabbi Ami further inquired: If that is so, in the case of a woman who discharges an item having an amorphous form [ruaḥ], its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since creation is stated with regard to it, just as it is stated with regard to man, as it is written: “And creates the wind [ruaḥ].” And if you would say that no verbal analogy can be drawn here, because the verse is not free, i.e., it is not superfluous, as it is necessary to recount the creation of the wind, that is not so. Rabbi Ami explains: From the fact that the verse could have written: Who forms the mountains and the wind, and instead it is written: “Who forms the mountains and creates the wind,” conclude from it that the superfluous word “creates” serves to render it free for drawing a verbal analogy between ruaḥ and man.

אמר ליה דנין דברי תורה מדברי תורה ואין דנין דברי תורה מדברי קבלה

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: One derives matters that are stated in the Torah from matters that are stated in the Torah, i.e., from verses in the Torah, but one does not derive matters that are stated in the Torah from the words of the tradition, i.e., verses in the Prophets or the Writings, such as the verse in Amos.

(אמר) רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן היינו טעמא דרבי מאיר הואיל ועיניהם דומות כשל אדם

§ Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: Since the eyes of these animals are similar to those of a human, a woman who discharges an item of that type is impure.

אלא מעתה המפלת דמות נחש תהא אמו טמאה לידה הואיל וגלגל עינו עגולה כשל אדם וכי תימא הכי נמי ליתני נחש

The Gemara objects: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake, its mother should likewise be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since the pupil of a snake is round, like that of a human. And if you would say that indeed, this is the halakha, then let the mishna teach this case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake among the other cases where the woman discharges an item of an unusual form.

אי תנא נחש הוה אמינא בנחש הוא דפליגי רבנן עליה דרבי מאיר דלא כתיב ביה יצירה אבל בהמה וחיה לא פליגי דכתיבא ביה יצירה

The Gemara explains: If the mishna had taught the case of a snake, I would say that it is only in the case of a woman who discharges an item having the form of a snake that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and rule that the woman is not impure, as a term of formation is not written with regard to the creation of the snake. But with regard to a woman who discharges an item having the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, they do not disagree with Rabbi Meir, as the concept of formation is written with regard to them.

והא גבי מומין קתני לה את שגלגל עינו עגול כשל אדם לא קשיא הא באוכמא הא בציריא

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But with regard to the halakhot of blemishes that render the slaughter of a firstborn animal permitted, it is taught in a mishna (Bekhorot 40a) that an animal whose pupil is round like that of a human is considered blemished. Evidently, the eyes of animals are dissimilar to those of humans. The Gemara answers that it is not difficult; this statement, that the eyes of animals are similar to those of humans, is referring to the pupil, and that statement, that the eyes of animals are not similar to those of humans, is referring to the entire eyeball in the socket.

רבי ינאי אמר היינו טעמא דרבי מאיר הואיל ועיניהם הולכות לפניהם כשל אדם והרי עוף דאין עיניו הולכות לפניו וקאמר רבי מאיר דטמא אמר אביי בקריא וקיפופא ובשאר עופות לא

§ Rabbi Yannai said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: It is because the eyes of these animals are fixed in the front of their heads like those of a human, unlike the eyes of birds and snakes, a woman who discharges an item of that kind is impure. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to a bird, whose eyes are not fixed in the front of its head, and nevertheless Rabbi Meir says that the woman is impure. This apparently contradicts Rabbi Yannai’s explanation. Abaye said: Rabbi Meir is referring to the little owl [bekarya] and the great owl [vekifofa], whose eyes are fixed in the front of their heads, but in the case of a woman who discharges any of the other species of birds, Rabbi Meir does not deem her impure.

מיתיבי רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר נראין דברי רבי מאיר בבהמה וחיה ודברי חכמים בעופות

The Gemara raises an objection to this answer from a baraita: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: The statement of Rabbi Meir seems correct in the case of a woman who discharges the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, and the statement of the Rabbis seems correct in the case of birds.

מאי עופות אילימא בקריא וקיפופא מאי שנא בהמה וחיה דעיניהן הולכות לפניהן כשל אדם קריא וקיפופא נמי

The Gemara asks: To what birds is Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus referring? If we say he is referring to the little owl and the great owl, what is the difference between this case and the cases of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, with regard to which Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus accepts the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If the key factor is that their eyes are fixed in the front of their heads like those of a human, Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus should accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the case of a little owl or a great owl as well, as their eyes are also fixed in the front of their heads.

אלא פשיטא בשאר עופות מכלל דרבי מאיר פליג בשאר עופות

Rather, it is obvious that when Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says that he does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir, he is referring to the other species of birds. From the fact that it is necessary for Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus to reject Rabbi Meir’s opinion in those cases, it may be concluded that Rabbi Meir himself disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to the other species of birds as well, despite the fact that their eyes are not fixed in the front of their heads.

חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר נראין דברי רבי מאיר בבהמה וחיה והוא הדין לקריא וקיפופא ודברי חכמים בשאר עופות שאף רבי מאיר לא נחלק עמהם אלא בקריא וקיפופא אבל בשאר עופות מודי להו

The Gemara explains that the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: The statement of Rabbi Meir seems correct in the case of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, and the same is true with regard to a little owl or a great owl. And the statement of the Rabbis appears correct even to Rabbi Meir with regard to the other species of birds. The reason is that even Rabbi Meir agrees that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of one of the other species of birds, she is not impure, i.e., he disagrees with them only with regard to a little owl or a great owl, but he concedes to their opinion with regard to the other species of birds.

והתניא אמר רבי אלעזר ברבי צדוק המפלת מין בהמה וחיה לדברי רבי מאיר ולד ולדברי חכמים אינו ולד בעופות תיבדק

The Gemara cites proof for Abaye’s claim that Rabbi Meir differentiates between an owl and other species of birds, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: In the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a type of domesticated animal or undomesticated animal, according to the statement of Rabbi Meir it has the halakhic status of a full-fledged offspring, and according to the statement of the Rabbis, it does not have the status of a full-fledged offspring. In the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of birds, it must be examined.

למאן תיבדק לאו לדברי רבי מאיר דאמר קריא וקיפופא אין שאר עופות לא

The Gemara asks: According to whom must it be examined? Is this not referring to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of a little owl or a great owl, yes, she is impure, but if she discharges an item that has the form of other birds, she is not impure? Consequently, the item must be examined to determine what type of bird it resembles.

אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא לא תיבדק לרבנן דאמרי קריא וקיפופא אין שאר עופות לא

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: No, this baraita does not prove that Rabbi Meir differentiates between owls and other species of birds, as perhaps the statement that the discharged item must be examined applies according to the Rabbis, as they say that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of a little owl or a great owl, yes, she is impure, but if a woman discharges an item that has the form of other birds, she is not impure.

ומאי שנא קריא וקיפופא מבהמה וחיה הואיל ויש להן לסתות כאדם

The Gemara asks: But if the Rabbis hold that a woman who discharges an item similar to a land animal is not impure, why would they hold that if she discharges an item that has the form of owls she is impure? What is the difference between a little owl and a great owl on the one hand, and a domesticated animal and an undomesticated animal on the other? The Gemara answers: Since owls have cheeks like those of a human, therefore a woman who discharges an item similar to an owl is impure, whereas if she discharges an item that has the form of a land animal she is pure, despite the fact that their eyes are fixed in the front of their heads.

בעא מיניה רבי ירמיה מרבי זירא לרבי מאיר דאמר בהמה במעי אשה ולד מעליא הוא קבל בה אביה קידושין מהו למאי נפקא מינה לאיתסורי באחותה

§ Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: According to Rabbi Meir, who said that an animal in the womb of a woman is considered a full-fledged offspring, what is the halakha in a case where it is a female, and her father accepted betrothal for her, i.e., he married her off by accepting betrothal money from a man, or a document of betrothal? Is such a betrothal valid? Rabbi Yirmeya elaborated: What practical difference is there whether it is valid? The difference is with regard to whether it is prohibited for the man to marry her sister. If the betrothal is valid, it is prohibited for the husband to marry her sister, as one may not marry his wife’s sister.

למימרא דחיי והאמר רב יהודה אמר רב לא אמרה רבי מאיר אלא הואיל ובמינו מתקיים אמר רב אחא בר יעקב עד כאן הביאו רבי ירמיה לרבי זירא לידי גיחוך ולא גחיך

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that such an offspring can live? This factor is important, as a man is prohibited from marrying his wife’s sister only during his wife’s lifetime. But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: Rabbi Meir said that a woman who discharges an item that has the form of an animal is impure only since there are other animals of its type that can live, i.e., there are animals similar to the discharged item that do survive, but not that creature itself. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: Rabbi Yirmeya tried this hard to cause Rabbi Zeira to laugh, but he did not laugh. In other words, Rabbi Yirmeya was not asking his question seriously.

גופא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב לא אמרה רבי מאיר אלא הואיל ובמינו מתקיים אמר רב ירמיה מדפתי

The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabbi Meir said that a woman who discharges an item that has the form of an animal is impure only since there are animals of its type that can live. Rav Yirmeya of Difti says:

אף אנן נמי תנינא המפלת כמין בהמה חיה ועוף (ולד מעליא הוא) דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים עד שיהא בו מצורת אדם

We, too, learn in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a) that the fetus of a woman that has the form of an animal cannot survive: In the case of a woman who had previously discharged a fetus with the appearance similar to that of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or bird before giving birth to any children, and subsequently she gives birth to a son, the son is considered a firstborn with regard to the halakhot of inheritance, but he does not require redemption, as the fetus is considered a full-fledged offspring in that regard. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The son is not exempted from the requirement of redemption from a priest unless it follows the birth of a fetus that takes the form of a person; otherwise, it is not considered the offspring that “opens the womb” (Exodus 13:2), and the son requires redemption as a firstborn.

והמפלת סנדל או שליא או שפיר מרוקם והיוצא מחותך הבא אחריו בכור לנחלה ואינו בכור לכהן ואי סלקא דעתך דחיי הבא אחריו בכור לנחלה מי הוי

And in the case of a woman who discharges a fetus in the form of a sandal fish, or from whom an afterbirth or a gestational sac in which tissue developed emerged, or who delivered a fetus that emerged in pieces, the son that follows them is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest. The Gemara explains the proof: And if it enters your mind that a fetus that has the form of an animal can survive, is the son that follows it a firstborn with regard to inheritance?

אמר רבא לעולם דחיי ושאני התם דאמר קרא ראשית אנו מי שלבו דוה עליו יצא זה שאין לבו דוה עליו

Rava said, in rejection of this proof: Actually, it is possible that a fetus shaped like an animal can survive; but it is different there, with regard to inheritance. The son that follows such a fetus has the status of a firstborn, as the verse states with regard to the inheritance of a firstborn: “By giving him a double portion of all that he has; for he is the first fruits of his strength [ono]; the right of the firstborn is his” (Deuteronomy 21:17). It is derived from the verse that the status of a firstborn applies only to a son over whose death a father would mourn. The word ono is interpreted homiletically based on its similarity to the word onen, acute mourner. This offspring that has the form of an animal is therefore excluded, as its father would not mourn over its death.

בעא מיניה רב אדא בר אהבה מאביי לרבי מאיר דאמר בהמה במעי אשה ולד מעליא הוא אדם במעי בהמה מאי למאי נפקא מיניה לאשתרויי באכילה

§ Rav Adda bar Ahava asked Abaye: According to Rabbi Meir, who said that an item that is similar to an animal in the womb of a woman is considered a full-fledged offspring, what is the halakha with regard to a human fetus in the womb of an animal? The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference of this inquiry? The difference is with regard to permitting the fetus in consumption. A full-fledged fetus found inside its slaughtered mother is permitted to be eaten, despite the fact that it was not slaughtered itself.

ותפשוט ליה מהא דרבי יוחנן דאמר רבי יוחנן השוחט את הבהמה ומצא בה דמות יונה אסורה באכילה

The Gemara suggests: But one can resolve the dilemma from that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and finds in it an item that has the form of a pigeon, the pigeon is prohibited for consumption. Evidently, the ritual slaughter of a pregnant animal renders its fetus permitted to be eaten only if the fetus is of the same species as the mother. Accordingly, if the fetus has the form of a human, it is prohibited for consumption.

הכי השתא התם לא פרסות איכא ולא פרסה איכא הכא נהי דפרסות ליכא פרסה מיהא איכא

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to a pigeon fetus, there are no split hooves, and there is not even a hoof at all. Since a pigeon is completely different from the slaughtered animal, the fetus is forbidden. By contrast, here, in the case of a human fetus, although there are no split hooves, there is at least a hoof, i.e., solid feet. Therefore, it is possible that the human fetus is permitted for consumption, and the dilemma remains unresolved.

וחכמים אומרים כל שאין בו כו׳ אמר רב ירמיה בר אבא אמר רב הכל מודים גופו תייש ופניו אדם אדם גופו אדם ופניו תייש ולא כלום

§ The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: Any discharged entity that is not of human form does not render the woman impure. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says: All concede that if a woman discharged an entity whose body is that of a goat and whose face is that of a human, it is considered a human offspring, i.e., even the Rabbis rule that the woman is impure in this case. Likewise, if its body is that of a human and its face is that of a goat, Rabbi Meir concedes that it is nothing, and the woman is pure.

לא נחלקו אלא שפניו אדם ונברא בעין אחת כבהמה שרבי מאיר אומר מצורת אדם וחכמים אומרים כל צורת אדם

They disagree only in a case where its face is that of a human, but it was created with one human eye and one eye like that of an animal. As Rabbi Meir says that if the offspring has part of the form of a human face, even if one eye is not like that of a human, it is considered a human offspring, and the woman is impure. And the Rabbis say that it must have the entire form of a human face to be considered a human offspring, and otherwise the woman is not impure.

אמר לו לרב ירמיה בר אבא והא איפכא תניא רבי מאיר אומר כל צורת וחכמים אומרים מצורת אמר להו אי תניא תניא

One of the Sages said to Rav Yirmeya bar Abba: But isn’t the opposite taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir says that a woman who discharged is impure if the fetus has any part of the form of a human face, and the Rabbis say that the woman is impure only if the fetus has a recognizable part of the form of a human face, e.g., half of a human face? According to this baraita, Rabbi Meir does not even require that a significant part of it must look human. In his opinion, even if it has only one human eye or one human cheek and the rest of the face is like that of an animal, the woman is impure. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said to the Sages: If this baraita is taught, it is taught, and I cannot take issue with it. I have my tradition from Rav, and you should rule in accordance with the baraita that you received.

אמר רבי ירמיה בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן מצח והגבינים והעינים והלסתות וגבות הזקן עד שיהו כולם כאחד רבא אמר חסא מצח והגבן והעין והלסת וגבת הזקן עד שיהו כולם כאחת

Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A woman who discharges an entity is impure only if the entire face of the fetus has a human form. This includes its forehead, and the eyebrows, and the eyes, and the cheeks, and its chin. The woman is not impure unless these facial features all as one have the human form. Rava says that Ḥasa says: It is sufficient for the fetus to have the appearance of a human on one side of its face; its forehead, and one eyebrow, and one eye, and one cheek, and its chin are enough. The woman is not impure unless these facial features all as one have the human form.

ולא פליגי הא כמאן דאמר כל צורת הא כמאן דאמר מצורת

And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Ḥasa do not disagree about whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir or that of the Rabbis, as they both accept the opinion of the Rabbis. The difference between them is that this amora, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds like the one who says that the Rabbis require the entire form of the face to be human, and that amora, Ḥasa, holds like the one who says that the Rabbis require only a recognizable part of the form of a human face.

מיתיבי צורת פנים שאמרו אפילו פרצוף אחד מן הפרצופין חוץ מן האוזן למימרא דמחד נמי סגי

Ḥasa evidently interprets the version of the Rabbis’ statement that only part of a human face is required as referring to half of a human face. The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation from a baraita: The miscarriage of a fetus with the form of a human face, which the Rabbis said renders the woman impure, includes even one of the facial features, apart from the ear. Apparently, that is to say that even if the fetus has only one facial feature of a human, this is also sufficient to render the woman impure.

אמר אביי כי תניא ההיא לעכב תניא וכמאן דאמר כל צורת ואיבעית אימא לעולם כמאן דאמר מצורת ומאי אחד אחד אחד

Abaye says: When that baraita is taught, it is taught with regard to the halakha of rendering all of the facial features indispensable for the fetus to be defined as human, except for the ear. And this ruling is in accordance with the one who says that the Rabbis require that the entire form of the face must be human. And if you wish, say that actually this ruling is in accordance with the one who says that the Rabbis require only a recognizable part of the form of a human face. And what is the meaning of the claim that it is sufficient for the fetus to have one facial feature of a human? It means one of each facial feature of which a human has two, i.e., one eye, one eyebrow, and so on.

אמר רבא נברא בעין אחת ובירך אחד מן הצד אמו טמאה באמצע אמו טהורה

Rava says: In a case where a fetus was created with one eye or with one thigh, if the eye is located to the side on the middle of the face, or the thigh is located at the side of the hip, where a human eye or thigh is normally located, the fetus is considered human, and its mother is impure. If it appears in the middle of the face or hip, the fetus is not considered human, and its mother is pure.

אמר רבא ושטו נקוב אמו טמאה ושטו אטום אמו טהורה

Rava says: If its esophagus is punctured, although the fetus is considered a tereifa, i.e., one that has a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months, its mother is impure. But if its esophagus is sealed, i.e., it is closed at one end, it does not have the status of a human fetus, and therefore its mother is pure.

תנו רבנן המפלת גוף אטום אין אמו טמאה לידה ואיזהו גוף אטום רבי אומר כדי שינטל מן החי וימות

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a woman who discharges a fetus that has a sealed body, its mother is not impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth. And what is a sealed body? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is a body which is lacking a limb that when removed from a living person would cause him to die.

וכמה ינטל מן החי וימות רבי זכאי אומר

And how much of the lower part of a person’s body when removed from a living person would cause him to die, because one cannot survive such a wound? Rabbi Zakkai says: