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Today's Daf Yomi

November 15, 2019 | ื™ืดื– ื‘ืžืจื—ืฉื•ืŸ ืชืฉืดืค

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

  • Masechet Chagigah is lovingly sponsored in honor of Debra Rappaport Rosen by her family, who are in awe at her incredible achievement of finishing all of Shas!

Niddah 23

Three explanatinos are broguht to explain Rabbi Meir’s approach that if a woman miscarries/discharges something looking like an animal or bird, the mother is considered impure as a woman gives birth. Can a woman give birth to something that looks likes an animal? What if an animal gives birth to something human-like? In which case do the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir – is it of most of the face looks human or just part of the face? Does it depend which part?

ืชื•ื›ืŸ ื–ื” ืชื•ืจื’ื ื’ื ืœ: ืขื‘ืจื™ืช

ื•ื™ืœืคื™ื ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฉื ื™ ืฆื“ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืœื”ื›ื™ ืืคื ื™ื” ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื‘ื”ืžื” ืžืฉื ื™ ืฆื“ื“ื™ืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืœื ื ื’ืžืจ ืžืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“

and derive the halakha from the analogy that is free on both sides. And it is for this reason that the Merciful One rendered the verbal analogy between animal and man free on both sides, so that one would not derive the halakha from the verbal analogy between sea monster and man, which is free on only one side.

ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืžืชื ื™ ืœื” ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืœืงื•ืœื ื›ืœ ื’ื–ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ื›ืœ ืขื™ืงืจ ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืžืฉื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžืฉื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืžืฉื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฉื ื™ ืฆื“ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžืฉื™ื‘ื™ืŸ

Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rava, teaches in the name of Rabbi Elazar a more lenient version of the aforementioned principle of exegesis of verbal analogy: With regard to any verbal analogy that is not free at all, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it logically. If the verbal analogy is free on one side, according to Rabbi Yishmael one can derive halakhot from it, and one cannot refute it. According to the Rabbis, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it. If the verbal analogy is free on both sides, everyone agrees that one can derive halakhot from it and one cannot refute it.

ื•ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืžืื™ ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“ ืœืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ื›ืœ ืขื™ืงืจ

The Gemara asks: But if so, according to the Rabbis, what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and one that is not free at all? In both cases, the Rabbis hold that one can derive halakhot from such a verbal analogy but one can also refute it.

ื ืคืงื ืžื™ื ื” ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“ ื•ืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ื›ืœ ืขื™ืงืจ ื•ืœืื• ืœื”ืื™ ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืคื™ืจื›ื ื•ืœืื• ืœื”ืื™ ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืคื™ืจื›ื ืฉื‘ืงื™ื ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ื›ืœ ืขื™ืงืจ ื•ื’ืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“

The Gemara answers: The difference is in a case where you find two mutually exclusive verbal analogies, one that is free on one side and one that is not free at all, and neither does this one have a logical refutation nor does that one have a logical refutation. In such a case, we disregard the analogy that is not free at all, and we derive the halakha from the one that is free on one side.

ื•ื”ื›ื ืžืื™ ืคื™ืจื›ื ืื™ื›ื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืคืจืš ืžื” ืœืื“ื ืฉื›ืŸ ืžื˜ืžื ืžื—ื™ื™ื

The Gemara asks: And here, with regard to the verbal analogy between man and sea monster, which was rejected because it is free on only one side, what logical refutation is there on account of which this verbal analogy is rejected? The Gemara answers: The verbal analogy between man and sea monster is rejected because it can be refuted as follows: What is unique about man? Man is unique in that a person can become impure while he is alive, unlike an animal, which can become impure only after it dies, or a sea monster, which cannot become impure at all.

ื•ื›ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื ืืžืจื” ื‘ื• ื™ืฆื™ืจื” ื›ืื“ื

And likewise, Rabbi แธคiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a woman who discharges an item similar to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird is impure: It is because formation is stated with regard to the creation of these animals, just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื”ืžืคืœืช ื“ืžื•ืช ื”ืจ ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ืœื™ื“ื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ื›ื™ ื”ื ื” ื™ื•ืฆืจ ื”ืจื™ื ื•ื‘ื•ืจื ืจื•ื— ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ืจ ืžื™ ืงื ืžืคืœืช ืื‘ืŸ ื”ื™ื ื“ืงื ืžืคืœืช ื”ื”ื•ื ื’ื•ืฉ ืื™ืงืจื™

Rabbi Ami said to him: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the shape of a mountain, its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as it is stated with regard to the creation of mountains: โ€œFor He Who forms the mountains and creates the windโ€ (Amos 4:13). Rabbi แธคiyya bar Abba said to him: Does she discharge a mountain? The discharged item cannot possibly be that large. It is an item with the form of a stone that she discharges, and that is called a clod, not a mountain.

ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื”ืžืคืœืช ืจื•ื— ืชื”ื ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ืœื™ื“ื” ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื ืืžืจื” ื‘ื• ื‘ืจื™ืื” ื›ืื“ื ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื‘ื•ืจื ืจื•ื— ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ืœื ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžื“ื”ื•ื” ืœื™ื” ืœืžื›ืชื‘ ื™ื•ืฆืจ ื”ืจื™ื ื•ืจื•ื— ื•ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื‘ื•ืจื ืจื•ื— ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืœืืคื ื•ื™ื™

Rabbi Ami further inquired: If that is so, in the case of a woman who discharges an item having an amorphous form [ruaแธฅ], its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since creation is stated with regard to it, just as it is stated with regard to man, as it is written: โ€œAnd creates the wind [ruaแธฅ].โ€ And if you would say that no verbal analogy can be drawn here, because the verse is not free, i.e., it is not superfluous, as it is necessary to recount the creation of the wind, that is not so. Rabbi Ami explains: From the fact that the verse could have written: Who forms the mountains and the wind, and instead it is written: โ€œWho forms the mountains and creates the wind,โ€ conclude from it that the superfluous word โ€œcreatesโ€ serves to render it free for drawing a verbal analogy between ruaแธฅ and man.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื“ื ื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืชื•ืจื” ืžื“ื‘ืจื™ ืชื•ืจื” ื•ืื™ืŸ ื“ื ื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืชื•ืจื” ืžื“ื‘ืจื™ ืงื‘ืœื”

Rabbi แธคiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: One derives matters that are stated in the Torah from matters that are stated in the Torah, i.e., from verses in the Torah, but one does not derive matters that are stated in the Torah from the words of the tradition, i.e., verses in the Prophets or the Writings, such as the verse in Amos.

(ืืžืจ) ืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืขื™ื ื™ื”ื ื“ื•ืžื•ืช ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื

ยง Rabba bar bar แธคana said that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: Since the eyes of these animals are similar to those of a human, a woman who discharges an item of that type is impure.

ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื”ืžืคืœืช ื“ืžื•ืช ื ื—ืฉ ืชื”ื ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ืœื™ื“ื” ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื’ืœื’ืœ ืขื™ื ื• ืขื’ื•ืœื” ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื™ืชื ื™ ื ื—ืฉ

The Gemara objects: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake, its mother should likewise be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since the pupil of a snake is round, like that of a human. And if you would say that indeed, this is the halakha, then let the mishna teach this case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake among the other cases where the woman discharges an item of an unusual form.

ืื™ ืชื ื ื ื—ืฉ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ื‘ื ื—ืฉ ื”ื•ื ื“ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืœื ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ื™ื” ื™ืฆื™ืจื” ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ืœื ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ื ื‘ื™ื” ื™ืฆื™ืจื”

The Gemara explains: If the mishna had taught the case of a snake, I would say that it is only in the case of a woman who discharges an item having the form of a snake that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and rule that the woman is not impure, as a term of formation is not written with regard to the creation of the snake. But with regard to a woman who discharges an item having the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, they do not disagree with Rabbi Meir, as the concept of formation is written with regard to them.

ื•ื”ื ื’ื‘ื™ ืžื•ืžื™ืŸ ืงืชื ื™ ืœื” ืืช ืฉื’ืœื’ืœ ืขื™ื ื• ืขื’ื•ืœ ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื”ื ื‘ืื•ื›ืžื ื”ื ื‘ืฆื™ืจื™ื

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But with regard to the halakhot of blemishes that render the slaughter of a firstborn animal permitted, it is taught in a mishna (Bekhorot 40a) that an animal whose pupil is round like that of a human is considered blemished. Evidently, the eyes of animals are dissimilar to those of humans. The Gemara answers that it is not difficult; this statement, that the eyes of animals are similar to those of humans, is referring to the pupil, and that statement, that the eyes of animals are not similar to those of humans, is referring to the entire eyeball in the socket.

ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ืืžืจ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืขื™ื ื™ื”ื ื”ื•ืœื›ื•ืช ืœืคื ื™ื”ื ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื ื•ื”ืจื™ ืขื•ืฃ ื“ืื™ืŸ ืขื™ื ื™ื• ื”ื•ืœื›ื•ืช ืœืคื ื™ื• ื•ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ื˜ืžื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื‘ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ื•ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

ยง Rabbi Yannai said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: It is because the eyes of these animals are fixed in the front of their heads like those of a human, unlike the eyes of birds and snakes, a woman who discharges an item of that kind is impure. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to a bird, whose eyes are not fixed in the front of its head, and nevertheless Rabbi Meir says that the woman is impure. This apparently contradicts Rabbi Yannaiโ€™s explanation. Abaye said: Rabbi Meir is referring to the little owl [bekarya] and the great owl [vekifofa], whose eyes are fixed in the front of their heads, but in the case of a woman who discharges any of the other species of birds, Rabbi Meir does not deem her impure.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื‘ืŸ ืื ื˜ื™ื’ื ื•ืก ืื•ืžืจ ื ืจืื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื•ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ื‘ืขื•ืคื•ืช

The Gemara raises an objection to this answer from a baraita: Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus says: The statement of Rabbi Meir seems correct in the case of a woman who discharges the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, and the statement of the Rabbis seems correct in the case of birds.

ืžืื™ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื‘ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื“ืขื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ื”ื•ืœื›ื•ืช ืœืคื ื™ื”ืŸ ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ื ืžื™

The Gemara asks: To what birds is Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus referring? If we say he is referring to the little owl and the great owl, what is the difference between this case and the cases of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, with regard to which Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus accepts the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If the key factor is that their eyes are fixed in the front of their heads like those of a human, Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus should accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the case of a little owl or a great owl as well, as their eyes are also fixed in the front of their heads.

ืืœื ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืคืœื™ื’ ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช

Rather, it is obvious that when Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus says that he does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir, he is referring to the other species of birds. From the fact that it is necessary for Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus to reject Rabbi Meirโ€™s opinion in those cases, it may be concluded that Rabbi Meir himself disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to the other species of birds as well, despite the fact that their eyes are not fixed in the front of their heads.

ื—ืกื•ืจื™ ืžื™ื—ืกืจื ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืชื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื‘ืŸ ืื ื˜ื™ื’ื ื•ืก ืื•ืžืจ ื ืจืื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื•ื”ื•ื ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ืœืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ื•ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืฉืืฃ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืœื ื ื—ืœืง ืขืžื”ื ืืœื ื‘ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืื‘ืœ ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืžื•ื“ื™ ืœื”ื•

The Gemara explains that the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus says: The statement of Rabbi Meir seems correct in the case of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, and the same is true with regard to a little owl or a great owl. And the statement of the Rabbis appears correct even to Rabbi Meir with regard to the other species of birds. The reason is that even Rabbi Meir agrees that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of one of the other species of birds, she is not impure, i.e., he disagrees with them only with regard to a little owl or a great owl, but he concedes to their opinion with regard to the other species of birds.

ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ื”ืžืคืœืช ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื•ืœื“ ื•ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื™ื ื• ื•ืœื“ ื‘ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืชื™ื‘ื“ืง

The Gemara cites proof for Abayeโ€™s claim that Rabbi Meir differentiates between an owl and other species of birds, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: In the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a type of domesticated animal or undomesticated animal, according to the statement of Rabbi Meir it has the halakhic status of a full-fledged offspring, and according to the statement of the Rabbis, it does not have the status of a full-fledged offspring. In the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of birds, it must be examined.

ืœืžืืŸ ืชื™ื‘ื“ืง ืœืื• ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืื™ืŸ ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

The Gemara asks: According to whom must it be examined? Is this not referring to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of a little owl or a great owl, yes, she is impure, but if she discharges an item that has the form of other birds, she is not impure? Consequently, the item must be examined to determine what type of bird it resembles.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืื™ืงื ืœื ืชื™ื‘ื“ืง ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจื™ ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืื™ืŸ ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rav Ika, said: No, this baraita does not prove that Rabbi Meir differentiates between owls and other species of birds, as perhaps the statement that the discharged item must be examined applies according to the Rabbis, as they say that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of a little owl or a great owl, yes, she is impure, but if a woman discharges an item that has the form of other birds, she is not impure.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืžื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื™ืฉ ืœื”ืŸ ืœืกืชื•ืช ื›ืื“ื

The Gemara asks: But if the Rabbis hold that a woman who discharges an item similar to a land animal is not impure, why would they hold that if she discharges an item that has the form of owls she is impure? What is the difference between a little owl and a great owl on the one hand, and a domesticated animal and an undomesticated animal on the other? The Gemara answers: Since owls have cheeks like those of a human, therefore a woman who discharges an item similar to an owl is impure, whereas if she discharges an item that has the form of a land animal she is pure, despite the fact that their eyes are fixed in the front of their heads.

ื‘ืขื ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ืžืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื ืœืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื‘ืžืขื™ ืืฉื” ื•ืœื“ ืžืขืœื™ื ื”ื•ื ืงื‘ืœ ื‘ื” ืื‘ื™ื” ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ืžื”ื• ืœืžืื™ ื ืคืงื ืžื™ื ื” ืœืื™ืชืกื•ืจื™ ื‘ืื—ื•ืชื”

ยง Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: According to Rabbi Meir, who said that an animal in the womb of a woman is considered a full-fledged offspring, what is the halakha in a case where it is a female, and her father accepted betrothal for her, i.e., he married her off by accepting betrothal money from a man, or a document of betrothal? Is such a betrothal valid? Rabbi Yirmeya elaborated: What practical difference is there whether it is valid? The difference is with regard to whether it is prohibited for the man to marry her sister. If the betrothal is valid, it is prohibited for the husband to marry her sister, as one may not marry his wifeโ€™s sister.

ืœืžื™ืžืจื ื“ื—ื™ื™ ื•ื”ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืœื ืืžืจื” ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืืœื ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื‘ืžื™ื ื• ืžืชืงื™ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืขื“ ื›ืืŸ ื”ื‘ื™ืื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื ืœื™ื“ื™ ื’ื™ื—ื•ืš ื•ืœื ื’ื—ื™ืš

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that such an offspring can live? This factor is important, as a man is prohibited from marrying his wifeโ€™s sister only during his wifeโ€™s lifetime. But doesnโ€™t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: Rabbi Meir said that a woman who discharges an item that has the form of an animal is impure only since there are other animals of its type that can live, i.e., there are animals similar to the discharged item that do survive, but not that creature itself. Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akov says: Rabbi Yirmeya tried this hard to cause Rabbi Zeira to laugh, but he did not laugh. In other words, Rabbi Yirmeya was not asking his question seriously.

ื’ื•ืคื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืœื ืืžืจื” ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืืœื ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื‘ืžื™ื ื• ืžืชืงื™ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ืžื“ืคืชื™

The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabbi Meir said that a woman who discharges an item that has the form of an animal is impure only since there are animals of its type that can live. Rav Yirmeya of Difti says:

ืืฃ ืื ืŸ ื ืžื™ ืชื ื™ื ื ื”ืžืคืœืช ื›ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื—ื™ื” ื•ืขื•ืฃ (ื•ืœื“ ืžืขืœื™ื ื”ื•ื) ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืขื“ ืฉื™ื”ื ื‘ื• ืžืฆื•ืจืช ืื“ื

We, too, learn in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a) that the fetus of a woman that has the form of an animal cannot survive: In the case of a woman who had previously discharged a fetus with the appearance similar to that of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or bird before giving birth to any children, and subsequently she gives birth to a son, the son is considered a firstborn with regard to the halakhot of inheritance, but he does not require redemption, as the fetus is considered a full-fledged offspring in that regard. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The son is not exempted from the requirement of redemption from a priest unless it follows the birth of a fetus that takes the form of a person; otherwise, it is not considered the offspring that โ€œopens the wombโ€ (Exodus 13:2), and the son requires redemption as a firstborn.

ื•ื”ืžืคืœืช ืกื ื“ืœ ืื• ืฉืœื™ื ืื• ืฉืคื™ืจ ืžืจื•ืงื ื•ื”ื™ื•ืฆื ืžื—ื•ืชืš ื”ื‘ื ืื—ืจื™ื• ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื ื—ืœื” ื•ืื™ื ื• ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื›ื”ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื“ื—ื™ื™ ื”ื‘ื ืื—ืจื™ื• ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื ื—ืœื” ืžื™ ื”ื•ื™

And in the case of a woman who discharges a fetus in the form of a sandal fish, or from whom an afterbirth or a gestational sac in which tissue developed emerged, or who delivered a fetus that emerged in pieces, the son that follows them is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest. The Gemara explains the proof: And if it enters your mind that a fetus that has the form of an animal can survive, is the son that follows it a firstborn with regard to inheritance?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืœืขื•ืœื ื“ื—ื™ื™ ื•ืฉืื ื™ ื”ืชื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืจืืฉื™ืช ืื ื• ืžื™ ืฉืœื‘ื• ื“ื•ื” ืขืœื™ื• ื™ืฆื ื–ื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื‘ื• ื“ื•ื” ืขืœื™ื•

Rava said, in rejection of this proof: Actually, it is possible that a fetus shaped like an animal can survive; but it is different there, with regard to inheritance. The son that follows such a fetus has the status of a firstborn, as the verse states with regard to the inheritance of a firstborn: โ€œBy giving him a double portion of all that he has; for he is the first fruits of his strength [ono]; the right of the firstborn is hisโ€ (Deuteronomy 21:17). It is derived from the verse that the status of a firstborn applies only to a son over whose death a father would mourn. The word ono is interpreted homiletically based on its similarity to the word onen, acute mourner. This offspring that has the form of an animal is therefore excluded, as its father would not mourn over its death.

ื‘ืขื ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืจื‘ ืื“ื ื‘ืจ ืื”ื‘ื” ืžืื‘ื™ื™ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื‘ืžืขื™ ืืฉื” ื•ืœื“ ืžืขืœื™ื ื”ื•ื ืื“ื ื‘ืžืขื™ ื‘ื”ืžื” ืžืื™ ืœืžืื™ ื ืคืงื ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืœืืฉืชืจื•ื™ื™ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื”

ยง Rav Adda bar Ahava asked Abaye: According to Rabbi Meir, who said that an item that is similar to an animal in the womb of a woman is considered a full-fledged offspring, what is the halakha with regard to a human fetus in the womb of an animal? The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference of this inquiry? The difference is with regard to permitting the fetus in consumption. A full-fledged fetus found inside its slaughtered mother is permitted to be eaten, despite the fact that it was not slaughtered itself.

ื•ืชืคืฉื•ื˜ ืœื™ื” ืžื”ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ืฉื•ื—ื˜ ืืช ื”ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ืžืฆื ื‘ื” ื“ืžื•ืช ื™ื•ื ื” ืืกื•ืจื” ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื”

The Gemara suggests: But one can resolve the dilemma from that statement of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, as Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and finds in it an item that has the form of a pigeon, the pigeon is prohibited for consumption. Evidently, the ritual slaughter of a pregnant animal renders its fetus permitted to be eaten only if the fetus is of the same species as the mother. Accordingly, if the fetus has the form of a human, it is prohibited for consumption.

ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื”ืชื ืœื ืคืจืกื•ืช ืื™ื›ื ื•ืœื ืคืจืกื” ืื™ื›ื ื”ื›ื ื ื”ื™ ื“ืคืจืกื•ืช ืœื™ื›ื ืคืจืกื” ืžื™ื”ื ืื™ื›ื

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to a pigeon fetus, there are no split hooves, and there is not even a hoof at all. Since a pigeon is completely different from the slaughtered animal, the fetus is forbidden. By contrast, here, in the case of a human fetus, although there are no split hooves, there is at least a hoof, i.e., solid feet. Therefore, it is possible that the human fetus is permitted for consumption, and the dilemma remains unresolved.

ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ื›ืœ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื”ื›ืœ ืžื•ื“ื™ื ื’ื•ืคื• ืชื™ื™ืฉ ื•ืคื ื™ื• ืื“ื ืื“ื ื’ื•ืคื• ืื“ื ื•ืคื ื™ื• ืชื™ื™ืฉ ื•ืœื ื›ืœื•ื

ยง The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: Any discharged entity that is not of human form does not render the woman impure. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says: All concede that if a woman discharged an entity whose body is that of a goat and whose face is that of a human, it is considered a human offspring, i.e., even the Rabbis rule that the woman is impure in this case. Likewise, if its body is that of a human and its face is that of a goat, Rabbi Meir concedes that it is nothing, and the woman is pure.

ืœื ื ื—ืœืงื• ืืœื ืฉืคื ื™ื• ืื“ื ื•ื ื‘ืจื ื‘ืขื™ืŸ ืื—ืช ื›ื‘ื”ืžื” ืฉืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฆื•ืจืช ืื“ื ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจืช ืื“ื

They disagree only in a case where its face is that of a human, but it was created with one human eye and one eye like that of an animal. As Rabbi Meir says that if the offspring has part of the form of a human face, even if one eye is not like that of a human, it is considered a human offspring, and the woman is impure. And the Rabbis say that it must have the entire form of a human face to be considered a human offspring, and otherwise the woman is not impure.

ืืžืจ ืœื• ืœืจื‘ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ื•ื”ื ืื™ืคื›ื ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจืช ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืžืฆื•ืจืช ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืื™ ืชื ื™ื ืชื ื™ื

One of the Sages said to Rav Yirmeya bar Abba: But isnโ€™t the opposite taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir says that a woman who discharged is impure if the fetus has any part of the form of a human face, and the Rabbis say that the woman is impure only if the fetus has a recognizable part of the form of a human face, e.g., half of a human face? According to this baraita, Rabbi Meir does not even require that a significant part of it must look human. In his opinion, even if it has only one human eye or one human cheek and the rest of the face is like that of an animal, the woman is impure. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said to the Sages: If this baraita is taught, it is taught, and I cannot take issue with it. I have my tradition from Rav, and you should rule in accordance with the baraita that you received.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืžืฆื— ื•ื”ื’ื‘ื™ื ื™ื ื•ื”ืขื™ื ื™ื ื•ื”ืœืกืชื•ืช ื•ื’ื‘ื•ืช ื”ื–ืงืŸ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื”ื• ื›ื•ืœื ื›ืื—ื“ ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ื—ืกื ืžืฆื— ื•ื”ื’ื‘ืŸ ื•ื”ืขื™ืŸ ื•ื”ืœืกืช ื•ื’ื‘ืช ื”ื–ืงืŸ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื”ื• ื›ื•ืœื ื›ืื—ืช

Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: A woman who discharges an entity is impure only if the entire face of the fetus has a human form. This includes its forehead, and the eyebrows, and the eyes, and the cheeks, and its chin. The woman is not impure unless these facial features all as one have the human form. Rava says that แธคasa says: It is sufficient for the fetus to have the appearance of a human on one side of its face; its forehead, and one eyebrow, and one eye, and one cheek, and its chin are enough. The woman is not impure unless these facial features all as one have the human form.

ื•ืœื ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื”ื ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจืช ื”ื ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฆื•ืจืช

And Rabbi Yoแธฅanan and แธคasa do not disagree about whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir or that of the Rabbis, as they both accept the opinion of the Rabbis. The difference between them is that this amora, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, holds like the one who says that the Rabbis require the entire form of the face to be human, and that amora, แธคasa, holds like the one who says that the Rabbis require only a recognizable part of the form of a human face.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ืฆื•ืจืช ืคื ื™ื ืฉืืžืจื• ืืคื™ืœื• ืคืจืฆื•ืฃ ืื—ื“ ืžืŸ ื”ืคืจืฆื•ืคื™ืŸ ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืŸ ื”ืื•ื–ืŸ ืœืžื™ืžืจื ื“ืžื—ื“ ื ืžื™ ืกื’ื™

แธคasa evidently interprets the version of the Rabbisโ€™ statement that only part of a human face is required as referring to half of a human face. The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation from a baraita: The miscarriage of a fetus with the form of a human face, which the Rabbis said renders the woman impure, includes even one of the facial features, apart from the ear. Apparently, that is to say that even if the fetus has only one facial feature of a human, this is also sufficient to render the woman impure.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื›ื™ ืชื ื™ื ื”ื”ื™ื ืœืขื›ื‘ ืชื ื™ื ื•ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจืช ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืœืขื•ืœื ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฆื•ืจืช ื•ืžืื™ ืื—ื“ ืื—ื“ ืื—ื“

Abaye says: When that baraita is taught, it is taught with regard to the halakha of rendering all of the facial features indispensable for the fetus to be defined as human, except for the ear. And this ruling is in accordance with the one who says that the Rabbis require that the entire form of the face must be human. And if you wish, say that actually this ruling is in accordance with the one who says that the Rabbis require only a recognizable part of the form of a human face. And what is the meaning of the claim that it is sufficient for the fetus to have one facial feature of a human? It means one of each facial feature of which a human has two, i.e., one eye, one eyebrow, and so on.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื ื‘ืจื ื‘ืขื™ืŸ ืื—ืช ื•ื‘ื™ืจืš ืื—ื“ ืžืŸ ื”ืฆื“ ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ื‘ืืžืฆืข ืืžื• ื˜ื”ื•ืจื”

Rava says: In a case where a fetus was created with one eye or with one thigh, if the eye is located to the side on the middle of the face, or the thigh is located at the side of the hip, where a human eye or thigh is normally located, the fetus is considered human, and its mother is impure. If it appears in the middle of the face or hip, the fetus is not considered human, and its mother is pure.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื•ืฉื˜ื• ื ืงื•ื‘ ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ื•ืฉื˜ื• ืื˜ื•ื ืืžื• ื˜ื”ื•ืจื”

Rava says: If its esophagus is punctured, although the fetus is considered a tereifa, i.e., one that has a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months, its mother is impure. But if its esophagus is sealed, i.e., it is closed at one end, it does not have the status of a human fetus, and therefore its mother is pure.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ืžืคืœืช ื’ื•ืฃ ืื˜ื•ื ืื™ืŸ ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ืœื™ื“ื” ื•ืื™ื–ื”ื• ื’ื•ืฃ ืื˜ื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ื“ื™ ืฉื™ื ื˜ืœ ืžืŸ ื”ื—ื™ ื•ื™ืžื•ืช

ยง The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a woman who discharges a fetus that has a sealed body, its mother is not impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth. And what is a sealed body? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is a body which is lacking a limb that when removed from a living person would cause him to die.

ื•ื›ืžื” ื™ื ื˜ืœ ืžืŸ ื”ื—ื™ ื•ื™ืžื•ืช ืจื‘ื™ ื–ื›ืื™ ืื•ืžืจ

And how much of the lower part of a personโ€™s body when removed from a living person would cause him to die, because one cannot survive such a wound? Rabbi Zakkai says:

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Niddah 23

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Niddah 23

ื•ื™ืœืคื™ื ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฉื ื™ ืฆื“ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืœื”ื›ื™ ืืคื ื™ื” ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื‘ื”ืžื” ืžืฉื ื™ ืฆื“ื“ื™ืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืœื ื ื’ืžืจ ืžืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“

and derive the halakha from the analogy that is free on both sides. And it is for this reason that the Merciful One rendered the verbal analogy between animal and man free on both sides, so that one would not derive the halakha from the verbal analogy between sea monster and man, which is free on only one side.

ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืžืชื ื™ ืœื” ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืœืงื•ืœื ื›ืœ ื’ื–ืจื” ืฉื•ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ื›ืœ ืขื™ืงืจ ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืžืฉื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžืฉื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืžืฉื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฉื ื™ ืฆื“ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžืฉื™ื‘ื™ืŸ

Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rava, teaches in the name of Rabbi Elazar a more lenient version of the aforementioned principle of exegesis of verbal analogy: With regard to any verbal analogy that is not free at all, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it logically. If the verbal analogy is free on one side, according to Rabbi Yishmael one can derive halakhot from it, and one cannot refute it. According to the Rabbis, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it. If the verbal analogy is free on both sides, everyone agrees that one can derive halakhot from it and one cannot refute it.

ื•ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืžืื™ ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“ ืœืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ื›ืœ ืขื™ืงืจ

The Gemara asks: But if so, according to the Rabbis, what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and one that is not free at all? In both cases, the Rabbis hold that one can derive halakhot from such a verbal analogy but one can also refute it.

ื ืคืงื ืžื™ื ื” ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“ ื•ืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ื›ืœ ืขื™ืงืจ ื•ืœืื• ืœื”ืื™ ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืคื™ืจื›ื ื•ืœืื• ืœื”ืื™ ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืคื™ืจื›ื ืฉื‘ืงื™ื ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื•ืคื ื” ื›ืœ ืขื™ืงืจ ื•ื’ืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืžื•ืคื ื” ืžืฆื“ ืื—ื“

The Gemara answers: The difference is in a case where you find two mutually exclusive verbal analogies, one that is free on one side and one that is not free at all, and neither does this one have a logical refutation nor does that one have a logical refutation. In such a case, we disregard the analogy that is not free at all, and we derive the halakha from the one that is free on one side.

ื•ื”ื›ื ืžืื™ ืคื™ืจื›ื ืื™ื›ื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืคืจืš ืžื” ืœืื“ื ืฉื›ืŸ ืžื˜ืžื ืžื—ื™ื™ื

The Gemara asks: And here, with regard to the verbal analogy between man and sea monster, which was rejected because it is free on only one side, what logical refutation is there on account of which this verbal analogy is rejected? The Gemara answers: The verbal analogy between man and sea monster is rejected because it can be refuted as follows: What is unique about man? Man is unique in that a person can become impure while he is alive, unlike an animal, which can become impure only after it dies, or a sea monster, which cannot become impure at all.

ื•ื›ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื ืืžืจื” ื‘ื• ื™ืฆื™ืจื” ื›ืื“ื

And likewise, Rabbi แธคiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a woman who discharges an item similar to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird is impure: It is because formation is stated with regard to the creation of these animals, just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื”ืžืคืœืช ื“ืžื•ืช ื”ืจ ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ืœื™ื“ื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ื›ื™ ื”ื ื” ื™ื•ืฆืจ ื”ืจื™ื ื•ื‘ื•ืจื ืจื•ื— ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ืจ ืžื™ ืงื ืžืคืœืช ืื‘ืŸ ื”ื™ื ื“ืงื ืžืคืœืช ื”ื”ื•ื ื’ื•ืฉ ืื™ืงืจื™

Rabbi Ami said to him: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the shape of a mountain, its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as it is stated with regard to the creation of mountains: โ€œFor He Who forms the mountains and creates the windโ€ (Amos 4:13). Rabbi แธคiyya bar Abba said to him: Does she discharge a mountain? The discharged item cannot possibly be that large. It is an item with the form of a stone that she discharges, and that is called a clod, not a mountain.

ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื”ืžืคืœืช ืจื•ื— ืชื”ื ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ืœื™ื“ื” ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื ืืžืจื” ื‘ื• ื‘ืจื™ืื” ื›ืื“ื ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื‘ื•ืจื ืจื•ื— ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ืœื ืžื•ืคื ื” ืžื“ื”ื•ื” ืœื™ื” ืœืžื›ืชื‘ ื™ื•ืฆืจ ื”ืจื™ื ื•ืจื•ื— ื•ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื‘ื•ืจื ืจื•ื— ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืœืืคื ื•ื™ื™

Rabbi Ami further inquired: If that is so, in the case of a woman who discharges an item having an amorphous form [ruaแธฅ], its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since creation is stated with regard to it, just as it is stated with regard to man, as it is written: โ€œAnd creates the wind [ruaแธฅ].โ€ And if you would say that no verbal analogy can be drawn here, because the verse is not free, i.e., it is not superfluous, as it is necessary to recount the creation of the wind, that is not so. Rabbi Ami explains: From the fact that the verse could have written: Who forms the mountains and the wind, and instead it is written: โ€œWho forms the mountains and creates the wind,โ€ conclude from it that the superfluous word โ€œcreatesโ€ serves to render it free for drawing a verbal analogy between ruaแธฅ and man.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื“ื ื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืชื•ืจื” ืžื“ื‘ืจื™ ืชื•ืจื” ื•ืื™ืŸ ื“ื ื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืชื•ืจื” ืžื“ื‘ืจื™ ืงื‘ืœื”

Rabbi แธคiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: One derives matters that are stated in the Torah from matters that are stated in the Torah, i.e., from verses in the Torah, but one does not derive matters that are stated in the Torah from the words of the tradition, i.e., verses in the Prophets or the Writings, such as the verse in Amos.

(ืืžืจ) ืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืขื™ื ื™ื”ื ื“ื•ืžื•ืช ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื

ยง Rabba bar bar แธคana said that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: Since the eyes of these animals are similar to those of a human, a woman who discharges an item of that type is impure.

ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื”ืžืคืœืช ื“ืžื•ืช ื ื—ืฉ ืชื”ื ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ืœื™ื“ื” ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื’ืœื’ืœ ืขื™ื ื• ืขื’ื•ืœื” ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื™ืชื ื™ ื ื—ืฉ

The Gemara objects: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake, its mother should likewise be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since the pupil of a snake is round, like that of a human. And if you would say that indeed, this is the halakha, then let the mishna teach this case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake among the other cases where the woman discharges an item of an unusual form.

ืื™ ืชื ื ื ื—ืฉ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ื‘ื ื—ืฉ ื”ื•ื ื“ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืœื ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ื™ื” ื™ืฆื™ืจื” ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ืœื ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ื ื‘ื™ื” ื™ืฆื™ืจื”

The Gemara explains: If the mishna had taught the case of a snake, I would say that it is only in the case of a woman who discharges an item having the form of a snake that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and rule that the woman is not impure, as a term of formation is not written with regard to the creation of the snake. But with regard to a woman who discharges an item having the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, they do not disagree with Rabbi Meir, as the concept of formation is written with regard to them.

ื•ื”ื ื’ื‘ื™ ืžื•ืžื™ืŸ ืงืชื ื™ ืœื” ืืช ืฉื’ืœื’ืœ ืขื™ื ื• ืขื’ื•ืœ ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื”ื ื‘ืื•ื›ืžื ื”ื ื‘ืฆื™ืจื™ื

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But with regard to the halakhot of blemishes that render the slaughter of a firstborn animal permitted, it is taught in a mishna (Bekhorot 40a) that an animal whose pupil is round like that of a human is considered blemished. Evidently, the eyes of animals are dissimilar to those of humans. The Gemara answers that it is not difficult; this statement, that the eyes of animals are similar to those of humans, is referring to the pupil, and that statement, that the eyes of animals are not similar to those of humans, is referring to the entire eyeball in the socket.

ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ืืžืจ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืขื™ื ื™ื”ื ื”ื•ืœื›ื•ืช ืœืคื ื™ื”ื ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื ื•ื”ืจื™ ืขื•ืฃ ื“ืื™ืŸ ืขื™ื ื™ื• ื”ื•ืœื›ื•ืช ืœืคื ื™ื• ื•ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ื˜ืžื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื‘ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ื•ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

ยง Rabbi Yannai said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: It is because the eyes of these animals are fixed in the front of their heads like those of a human, unlike the eyes of birds and snakes, a woman who discharges an item of that kind is impure. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to a bird, whose eyes are not fixed in the front of its head, and nevertheless Rabbi Meir says that the woman is impure. This apparently contradicts Rabbi Yannaiโ€™s explanation. Abaye said: Rabbi Meir is referring to the little owl [bekarya] and the great owl [vekifofa], whose eyes are fixed in the front of their heads, but in the case of a woman who discharges any of the other species of birds, Rabbi Meir does not deem her impure.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื‘ืŸ ืื ื˜ื™ื’ื ื•ืก ืื•ืžืจ ื ืจืื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื•ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ื‘ืขื•ืคื•ืช

The Gemara raises an objection to this answer from a baraita: Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus says: The statement of Rabbi Meir seems correct in the case of a woman who discharges the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, and the statement of the Rabbis seems correct in the case of birds.

ืžืื™ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื‘ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื“ืขื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ื”ื•ืœื›ื•ืช ืœืคื ื™ื”ืŸ ื›ืฉืœ ืื“ื ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ื ืžื™

The Gemara asks: To what birds is Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus referring? If we say he is referring to the little owl and the great owl, what is the difference between this case and the cases of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, with regard to which Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus accepts the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If the key factor is that their eyes are fixed in the front of their heads like those of a human, Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus should accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the case of a little owl or a great owl as well, as their eyes are also fixed in the front of their heads.

ืืœื ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืคืœื™ื’ ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช

Rather, it is obvious that when Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus says that he does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir, he is referring to the other species of birds. From the fact that it is necessary for Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus to reject Rabbi Meirโ€™s opinion in those cases, it may be concluded that Rabbi Meir himself disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to the other species of birds as well, despite the fact that their eyes are not fixed in the front of their heads.

ื—ืกื•ืจื™ ืžื™ื—ืกืจื ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืชื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื‘ืŸ ืื ื˜ื™ื’ื ื•ืก ืื•ืžืจ ื ืจืื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื•ื”ื•ื ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ืœืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ื•ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืฉืืฃ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืœื ื ื—ืœืง ืขืžื”ื ืืœื ื‘ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืื‘ืœ ื‘ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืžื•ื“ื™ ืœื”ื•

The Gemara explains that the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: Rabbi แธคanina ben Antigonus says: The statement of Rabbi Meir seems correct in the case of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, and the same is true with regard to a little owl or a great owl. And the statement of the Rabbis appears correct even to Rabbi Meir with regard to the other species of birds. The reason is that even Rabbi Meir agrees that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of one of the other species of birds, she is not impure, i.e., he disagrees with them only with regard to a little owl or a great owl, but he concedes to their opinion with regard to the other species of birds.

ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ื”ืžืคืœืช ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื•ืœื“ ื•ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื™ื ื• ื•ืœื“ ื‘ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืชื™ื‘ื“ืง

The Gemara cites proof for Abayeโ€™s claim that Rabbi Meir differentiates between an owl and other species of birds, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: In the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a type of domesticated animal or undomesticated animal, according to the statement of Rabbi Meir it has the halakhic status of a full-fledged offspring, and according to the statement of the Rabbis, it does not have the status of a full-fledged offspring. In the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of birds, it must be examined.

ืœืžืืŸ ืชื™ื‘ื“ืง ืœืื• ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืื™ืŸ ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

The Gemara asks: According to whom must it be examined? Is this not referring to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of a little owl or a great owl, yes, she is impure, but if she discharges an item that has the form of other birds, she is not impure? Consequently, the item must be examined to determine what type of bird it resembles.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืื™ืงื ืœื ืชื™ื‘ื“ืง ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจื™ ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืื™ืŸ ืฉืืจ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rav Ika, said: No, this baraita does not prove that Rabbi Meir differentiates between owls and other species of birds, as perhaps the statement that the discharged item must be examined applies according to the Rabbis, as they say that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of a little owl or a great owl, yes, she is impure, but if a woman discharges an item that has the form of other birds, she is not impure.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืงืจื™ื ื•ืงื™ืคื•ืคื ืžื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื™ืฉ ืœื”ืŸ ืœืกืชื•ืช ื›ืื“ื

The Gemara asks: But if the Rabbis hold that a woman who discharges an item similar to a land animal is not impure, why would they hold that if she discharges an item that has the form of owls she is impure? What is the difference between a little owl and a great owl on the one hand, and a domesticated animal and an undomesticated animal on the other? The Gemara answers: Since owls have cheeks like those of a human, therefore a woman who discharges an item similar to an owl is impure, whereas if she discharges an item that has the form of a land animal she is pure, despite the fact that their eyes are fixed in the front of their heads.

ื‘ืขื ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ืžืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื ืœืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื‘ืžืขื™ ืืฉื” ื•ืœื“ ืžืขืœื™ื ื”ื•ื ืงื‘ืœ ื‘ื” ืื‘ื™ื” ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ืžื”ื• ืœืžืื™ ื ืคืงื ืžื™ื ื” ืœืื™ืชืกื•ืจื™ ื‘ืื—ื•ืชื”

ยง Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: According to Rabbi Meir, who said that an animal in the womb of a woman is considered a full-fledged offspring, what is the halakha in a case where it is a female, and her father accepted betrothal for her, i.e., he married her off by accepting betrothal money from a man, or a document of betrothal? Is such a betrothal valid? Rabbi Yirmeya elaborated: What practical difference is there whether it is valid? The difference is with regard to whether it is prohibited for the man to marry her sister. If the betrothal is valid, it is prohibited for the husband to marry her sister, as one may not marry his wifeโ€™s sister.

ืœืžื™ืžืจื ื“ื—ื™ื™ ื•ื”ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืœื ืืžืจื” ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืืœื ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื‘ืžื™ื ื• ืžืชืงื™ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืขื“ ื›ืืŸ ื”ื‘ื™ืื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื ืœื™ื“ื™ ื’ื™ื—ื•ืš ื•ืœื ื’ื—ื™ืš

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that such an offspring can live? This factor is important, as a man is prohibited from marrying his wifeโ€™s sister only during his wifeโ€™s lifetime. But doesnโ€™t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: Rabbi Meir said that a woman who discharges an item that has the form of an animal is impure only since there are other animals of its type that can live, i.e., there are animals similar to the discharged item that do survive, but not that creature itself. Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akov says: Rabbi Yirmeya tried this hard to cause Rabbi Zeira to laugh, but he did not laugh. In other words, Rabbi Yirmeya was not asking his question seriously.

ื’ื•ืคื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืœื ืืžืจื” ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืืœื ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื‘ืžื™ื ื• ืžืชืงื™ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ืžื“ืคืชื™

The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabbi Meir said that a woman who discharges an item that has the form of an animal is impure only since there are animals of its type that can live. Rav Yirmeya of Difti says:

ืืฃ ืื ืŸ ื ืžื™ ืชื ื™ื ื ื”ืžืคืœืช ื›ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื—ื™ื” ื•ืขื•ืฃ (ื•ืœื“ ืžืขืœื™ื ื”ื•ื) ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืขื“ ืฉื™ื”ื ื‘ื• ืžืฆื•ืจืช ืื“ื

We, too, learn in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a) that the fetus of a woman that has the form of an animal cannot survive: In the case of a woman who had previously discharged a fetus with the appearance similar to that of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or bird before giving birth to any children, and subsequently she gives birth to a son, the son is considered a firstborn with regard to the halakhot of inheritance, but he does not require redemption, as the fetus is considered a full-fledged offspring in that regard. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The son is not exempted from the requirement of redemption from a priest unless it follows the birth of a fetus that takes the form of a person; otherwise, it is not considered the offspring that โ€œopens the wombโ€ (Exodus 13:2), and the son requires redemption as a firstborn.

ื•ื”ืžืคืœืช ืกื ื“ืœ ืื• ืฉืœื™ื ืื• ืฉืคื™ืจ ืžืจื•ืงื ื•ื”ื™ื•ืฆื ืžื—ื•ืชืš ื”ื‘ื ืื—ืจื™ื• ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื ื—ืœื” ื•ืื™ื ื• ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื›ื”ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื“ื—ื™ื™ ื”ื‘ื ืื—ืจื™ื• ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืœื ื—ืœื” ืžื™ ื”ื•ื™

And in the case of a woman who discharges a fetus in the form of a sandal fish, or from whom an afterbirth or a gestational sac in which tissue developed emerged, or who delivered a fetus that emerged in pieces, the son that follows them is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest. The Gemara explains the proof: And if it enters your mind that a fetus that has the form of an animal can survive, is the son that follows it a firstborn with regard to inheritance?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืœืขื•ืœื ื“ื—ื™ื™ ื•ืฉืื ื™ ื”ืชื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืจืืฉื™ืช ืื ื• ืžื™ ืฉืœื‘ื• ื“ื•ื” ืขืœื™ื• ื™ืฆื ื–ื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื‘ื• ื“ื•ื” ืขืœื™ื•

Rava said, in rejection of this proof: Actually, it is possible that a fetus shaped like an animal can survive; but it is different there, with regard to inheritance. The son that follows such a fetus has the status of a firstborn, as the verse states with regard to the inheritance of a firstborn: โ€œBy giving him a double portion of all that he has; for he is the first fruits of his strength [ono]; the right of the firstborn is hisโ€ (Deuteronomy 21:17). It is derived from the verse that the status of a firstborn applies only to a son over whose death a father would mourn. The word ono is interpreted homiletically based on its similarity to the word onen, acute mourner. This offspring that has the form of an animal is therefore excluded, as its father would not mourn over its death.

ื‘ืขื ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืจื‘ ืื“ื ื‘ืจ ืื”ื‘ื” ืžืื‘ื™ื™ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื‘ืžืขื™ ืืฉื” ื•ืœื“ ืžืขืœื™ื ื”ื•ื ืื“ื ื‘ืžืขื™ ื‘ื”ืžื” ืžืื™ ืœืžืื™ ื ืคืงื ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืœืืฉืชืจื•ื™ื™ ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื”

ยง Rav Adda bar Ahava asked Abaye: According to Rabbi Meir, who said that an item that is similar to an animal in the womb of a woman is considered a full-fledged offspring, what is the halakha with regard to a human fetus in the womb of an animal? The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference of this inquiry? The difference is with regard to permitting the fetus in consumption. A full-fledged fetus found inside its slaughtered mother is permitted to be eaten, despite the fact that it was not slaughtered itself.

ื•ืชืคืฉื•ื˜ ืœื™ื” ืžื”ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ืฉื•ื—ื˜ ืืช ื”ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ืžืฆื ื‘ื” ื“ืžื•ืช ื™ื•ื ื” ืืกื•ืจื” ื‘ืื›ื™ืœื”

The Gemara suggests: But one can resolve the dilemma from that statement of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, as Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and finds in it an item that has the form of a pigeon, the pigeon is prohibited for consumption. Evidently, the ritual slaughter of a pregnant animal renders its fetus permitted to be eaten only if the fetus is of the same species as the mother. Accordingly, if the fetus has the form of a human, it is prohibited for consumption.

ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื”ืชื ืœื ืคืจืกื•ืช ืื™ื›ื ื•ืœื ืคืจืกื” ืื™ื›ื ื”ื›ื ื ื”ื™ ื“ืคืจืกื•ืช ืœื™ื›ื ืคืจืกื” ืžื™ื”ื ืื™ื›ื

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to a pigeon fetus, there are no split hooves, and there is not even a hoof at all. Since a pigeon is completely different from the slaughtered animal, the fetus is forbidden. By contrast, here, in the case of a human fetus, although there are no split hooves, there is at least a hoof, i.e., solid feet. Therefore, it is possible that the human fetus is permitted for consumption, and the dilemma remains unresolved.

ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ื›ืœ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื”ื›ืœ ืžื•ื“ื™ื ื’ื•ืคื• ืชื™ื™ืฉ ื•ืคื ื™ื• ืื“ื ืื“ื ื’ื•ืคื• ืื“ื ื•ืคื ื™ื• ืชื™ื™ืฉ ื•ืœื ื›ืœื•ื

ยง The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: Any discharged entity that is not of human form does not render the woman impure. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says: All concede that if a woman discharged an entity whose body is that of a goat and whose face is that of a human, it is considered a human offspring, i.e., even the Rabbis rule that the woman is impure in this case. Likewise, if its body is that of a human and its face is that of a goat, Rabbi Meir concedes that it is nothing, and the woman is pure.

ืœื ื ื—ืœืงื• ืืœื ืฉืคื ื™ื• ืื“ื ื•ื ื‘ืจื ื‘ืขื™ืŸ ืื—ืช ื›ื‘ื”ืžื” ืฉืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฆื•ืจืช ืื“ื ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจืช ืื“ื

They disagree only in a case where its face is that of a human, but it was created with one human eye and one eye like that of an animal. As Rabbi Meir says that if the offspring has part of the form of a human face, even if one eye is not like that of a human, it is considered a human offspring, and the woman is impure. And the Rabbis say that it must have the entire form of a human face to be considered a human offspring, and otherwise the woman is not impure.

ืืžืจ ืœื• ืœืจื‘ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ื•ื”ื ืื™ืคื›ื ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจืช ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืžืฆื•ืจืช ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืื™ ืชื ื™ื ืชื ื™ื

One of the Sages said to Rav Yirmeya bar Abba: But isnโ€™t the opposite taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir says that a woman who discharged is impure if the fetus has any part of the form of a human face, and the Rabbis say that the woman is impure only if the fetus has a recognizable part of the form of a human face, e.g., half of a human face? According to this baraita, Rabbi Meir does not even require that a significant part of it must look human. In his opinion, even if it has only one human eye or one human cheek and the rest of the face is like that of an animal, the woman is impure. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said to the Sages: If this baraita is taught, it is taught, and I cannot take issue with it. I have my tradition from Rav, and you should rule in accordance with the baraita that you received.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืžืฆื— ื•ื”ื’ื‘ื™ื ื™ื ื•ื”ืขื™ื ื™ื ื•ื”ืœืกืชื•ืช ื•ื’ื‘ื•ืช ื”ื–ืงืŸ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื”ื• ื›ื•ืœื ื›ืื—ื“ ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ื—ืกื ืžืฆื— ื•ื”ื’ื‘ืŸ ื•ื”ืขื™ืŸ ื•ื”ืœืกืช ื•ื’ื‘ืช ื”ื–ืงืŸ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื”ื• ื›ื•ืœื ื›ืื—ืช

Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: A woman who discharges an entity is impure only if the entire face of the fetus has a human form. This includes its forehead, and the eyebrows, and the eyes, and the cheeks, and its chin. The woman is not impure unless these facial features all as one have the human form. Rava says that แธคasa says: It is sufficient for the fetus to have the appearance of a human on one side of its face; its forehead, and one eyebrow, and one eye, and one cheek, and its chin are enough. The woman is not impure unless these facial features all as one have the human form.

ื•ืœื ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื”ื ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจืช ื”ื ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฆื•ืจืช

And Rabbi Yoแธฅanan and แธคasa do not disagree about whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir or that of the Rabbis, as they both accept the opinion of the Rabbis. The difference between them is that this amora, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, holds like the one who says that the Rabbis require the entire form of the face to be human, and that amora, แธคasa, holds like the one who says that the Rabbis require only a recognizable part of the form of a human face.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ืฆื•ืจืช ืคื ื™ื ืฉืืžืจื• ืืคื™ืœื• ืคืจืฆื•ืฃ ืื—ื“ ืžืŸ ื”ืคืจืฆื•ืคื™ืŸ ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืŸ ื”ืื•ื–ืŸ ืœืžื™ืžืจื ื“ืžื—ื“ ื ืžื™ ืกื’ื™

แธคasa evidently interprets the version of the Rabbisโ€™ statement that only part of a human face is required as referring to half of a human face. The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation from a baraita: The miscarriage of a fetus with the form of a human face, which the Rabbis said renders the woman impure, includes even one of the facial features, apart from the ear. Apparently, that is to say that even if the fetus has only one facial feature of a human, this is also sufficient to render the woman impure.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื›ื™ ืชื ื™ื ื”ื”ื™ื ืœืขื›ื‘ ืชื ื™ื ื•ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจืช ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืœืขื•ืœื ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฆื•ืจืช ื•ืžืื™ ืื—ื“ ืื—ื“ ืื—ื“

Abaye says: When that baraita is taught, it is taught with regard to the halakha of rendering all of the facial features indispensable for the fetus to be defined as human, except for the ear. And this ruling is in accordance with the one who says that the Rabbis require that the entire form of the face must be human. And if you wish, say that actually this ruling is in accordance with the one who says that the Rabbis require only a recognizable part of the form of a human face. And what is the meaning of the claim that it is sufficient for the fetus to have one facial feature of a human? It means one of each facial feature of which a human has two, i.e., one eye, one eyebrow, and so on.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื ื‘ืจื ื‘ืขื™ืŸ ืื—ืช ื•ื‘ื™ืจืš ืื—ื“ ืžืŸ ื”ืฆื“ ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ื‘ืืžืฆืข ืืžื• ื˜ื”ื•ืจื”

Rava says: In a case where a fetus was created with one eye or with one thigh, if the eye is located to the side on the middle of the face, or the thigh is located at the side of the hip, where a human eye or thigh is normally located, the fetus is considered human, and its mother is impure. If it appears in the middle of the face or hip, the fetus is not considered human, and its mother is pure.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื•ืฉื˜ื• ื ืงื•ื‘ ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ื•ืฉื˜ื• ืื˜ื•ื ืืžื• ื˜ื”ื•ืจื”

Rava says: If its esophagus is punctured, although the fetus is considered a tereifa, i.e., one that has a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months, its mother is impure. But if its esophagus is sealed, i.e., it is closed at one end, it does not have the status of a human fetus, and therefore its mother is pure.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ืžืคืœืช ื’ื•ืฃ ืื˜ื•ื ืื™ืŸ ืืžื• ื˜ืžืื” ืœื™ื“ื” ื•ืื™ื–ื”ื• ื’ื•ืฃ ืื˜ื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ื“ื™ ืฉื™ื ื˜ืœ ืžืŸ ื”ื—ื™ ื•ื™ืžื•ืช

ยง The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a woman who discharges a fetus that has a sealed body, its mother is not impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth. And what is a sealed body? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is a body which is lacking a limb that when removed from a living person would cause him to die.

ื•ื›ืžื” ื™ื ื˜ืœ ืžืŸ ื”ื—ื™ ื•ื™ืžื•ืช ืจื‘ื™ ื–ื›ืื™ ืื•ืžืจ

And how much of the lower part of a personโ€™s body when removed from a living person would cause him to die, because one cannot survive such a wound? Rabbi Zakkai says:

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