The gemara brings two different explanations for the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding mikveh. The gemara brings three other explanations for understanding the root of the debate in the mishna between Shamai and Hillel.
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Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah
Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah is dedicated with love and pride to Terri Krivosha from her husband, Rabbi Hayim Herring, her children, Tamar, Avi and Shaina, and her grandchildren, Noam, Liba, and Orly, for completing her first Daf Yomi cycle. You embody the words of Micah 6:8, and “do justice, love goodness, and walk modestly with HaShem.”
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Niddah 3
וּשְׁנֵיהֶם לֹא לְמָדוּהָ אֶלָּא מִסּוֹטָה.
The Gemara explains their reasoning: And both tanna’im derived their respective opinions only from the case of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota], who is forbidden to engage in intercourse with her husband just like a definite adulteress.
רַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: כִּי סוֹטָה, מָה סוֹטָה סָפֵק הִיא, וַעֲשָׂאוּהָ כְּוַדַּאי — הָכָא נָמֵי סָפֵק, וַעֲשָׂאוּהָ כְּוַדַּאי.
The Rabbis hold: This case of a ritual bath is like the case of a sota. Just as in the case of a sota it is uncertain whether she was actually unfaithful, and nevertheless the Torah rendered her like one who definitely committed adultery in that she is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the water of a sota; here too, in the case of a ritual bath, it is uncertain whether it was lacking the requisite measure of water and yet the Torah rendered it as though it was definitely lacking water, to the extent that teruma that touched an item that had been immersed in it must be burned.
אִי מִסּוֹטָה, אֵימָא כִּי סוֹטָה: מָה סוֹטָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים טָהוֹר, הָכָא נָמֵי בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים טָהוֹר!
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the halakhot of the ritual bath are derived from those of a sota, then one can say that it should be like the halakha of a sota in another respect: Just as a sota who is suspected of having been unfaithful in a public domain is considered pure, i.e., she does not undergo to rite of a sota, here too, any impure item that was immersed in a currently deficient ritual bath that is situated in a public domain should be considered pure.
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? הָתָם מִשּׁוּם סְתִירָה הוּא, וּסְתִירָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לֵיכָּא. הָכָא מִשּׁוּם חָסֵר הוּא, מָה לִי חָסֵר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, מָה לִי חָסֵר בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד.
The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? One cannot apply the halakha of a sota in a public domain to any other case. There, the reason why a sota is treated as having definitely been unfaithful is due to her seclusion with another man. And as a proper seclusion in the public domain is not possible, she does not assume the status of a sota. By contrast, here, in the case of the ritual bath, the uncertainty is due to the lack of the requisite measure of water in the ritual bath. If so, what difference is it to me if the ritual bath is lacking in a public domain or if it is lacking in a private domain?
וְכִי תֵּימָא, הָא כׇּל סְפֵק טוּמְאָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים טָהוֹר! כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי לְרֵיעוּתָא — כְּוַדַּאי טוּמְאָה דָּמֵי.
The Gemara comments: And if you would say that the guiding principle in any case of uncertainty involving impurity in a public domain is that it is ritually pure, and therefore all items immersed in a ritual bath situated in the public domain should be pure even if there is uncertainty about its status of purity, that suggestion can be rejected, as follows: Since there are two factors that weaken the possibility that the items are ritually pure: First, the ritual bath is currently lacking, and second, the item has a presumptive status of impurity, it is therefore considered as an item of definite impurity.
וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: כִּי סוֹטָה, מָה סוֹטָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — טָהוֹר, הָכָא נָמֵי בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — טָהוֹר.
After analyzing the reasoning of the Rabbis, the Gemara turns to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Shimon holds: This case of a ritual bath is just like the case of a sota. Just as a sota who is suspected of having been unfaithful in a public domain is considered pure, here too, any impure item that was immersed in a currently deficient ritual bath that is situated in a public domain is considered pure.
אִי מִסּוֹטָה, אֵימָא כִּי סוֹטָה: מָה סוֹטָה בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד — טְמֵאָה וַדַּאי, הָכָא נָמֵי בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד — טְמֵאָה וַדַּאי!
The Gemara asks: If the halakhot of the ritual bath are derived from those of a sota, then one can say that it should be like the halakha of a sota in another respect: Just as a sota who secluded herself with the man in a private domain is deemed definitely impure, i.e., she is forbidden to her husband until she undergoes the rite of the sota, here too, any ritually impure item that was immersed in a currently deficient ritual bath situated in a private domain should be considered definitely impure. If so, any teruma that comes in contact with the immersed vessel should be burned. Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon rule that its status is suspended and it is neither consumed nor burned?
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם יֵשׁ רַגְלַיִם לַדָּבָר, שֶׁהֲרֵי קִינֵּא לָהּ וְנִסְתְּרָה. הָכָא מַאי רַגְלַיִם לַדָּבָר אִיכָּא?
The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a sota, there is a basis for the matter. She is considered definitely impure, as her husband issued a warning to her about this particular man and she then secluded herself with him. By contrast, here, in the case of a ritual bath, what basis for the matter is there? Why should one assume impurity with certainty?
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: גָּמַר סוֹף טוּמְאָה מִתְּחִלַּת טוּמְאָה.
And if you wish, say instead that this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: He does not base his ruling on the case of a sota; rather, he derives the end of impurity from the beginning of impurity, i.e., he derives the halakha of the immersion of an impure item into a ritual bath from the halakha of the initial contraction of ritual impurity.
מָה תְּחִלַּת טוּמְאָה, סָפֵק נָגַע סָפֵק לֹא נָגַע — בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים טָהוֹר, אַף סוֹף טוּמְאָה, סָפֵק טָבַל סָפֵק לֹא טָבַל — בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים טָהוֹר.
The Gemara explains: Just as with regard to the beginning of impurity, if there is uncertainty whether or not a pure item came into contact with a source of impurity, if this occurred in the public domain it is considered ritually pure; so too in the case of the end of impurity, if there is uncertainty whether or not the impure item was immersed in a ritual bath with the requisite amount of water, the halakha is that if the ritual bath is located in the public domain, the item is considered pure.
וְרַבָּנַן? הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם גַּבְרָא בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה קָאֵי, מִסְּפֵקָא לָא מַחֲתִינַן לֵיהּ לְטוּמְאָה. הָכָא גַּבְרָא בְּחֶזְקַת טוּמְאָה קָאֵי, מִסְּפֵקָא לָא מַפְּקִינַן לֵיהּ מִטּוּמְאָתוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And how would the Rabbis respond to this claim? They would respond: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the beginning of impurity, the man who might have touched an impure item remains with the presumptive status of ritual purity. Consequently, we do not lower his status to one who has contracted ritual impurity merely due to uncertainty. Here, in the case of the ritual bath, the man who immerses in that ritual bath has the presumptive status of ritual impurity. Therefore, we do not remove him from his status of ritual impurity due to uncertainty.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא מִמָּבוֹי? דִּתְנַן: הַשֶּׁרֶץ שֶׁנִּמְצָא בַּמָּבוֹי — מְטַמֵּא לְמַפְרֵעַ, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״בָּדַקְתִּי אֶת הַמָּבוֹי הַזֶּה וְלֹא הָיָה בּוֹ שֶׁרֶץ״, אוֹ עַד שְׁעַת הַכִּיבּוּד!
§ The Gemara returns to its analysis of the mishna. Shammai said: For all women, their time is sufficient, i.e., women who discern that menstrual blood emerged do not need to be concerned that perhaps the flow of blood began before they noticed it. The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that of an alleyway? As we learned in a mishna (66a): With regard to the carcass of a creeping animal that is found in an alleyway, it renders any item in the alleyway ritually impure retroactively to the time that a person can say: I examined this alleyway and there was no carcass of a creeping animal in it, or until the time of the last sweeping of the alleyway.
הָתָם נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא שְׁרָצִים דְּגוּפֵיהּ, וּשְׁרָצִים דְּאָתוּ מֵעָלְמָא — כְּתַרְתֵּי לְרֵיעוּתָא דָּמֵי.
The Gemara answers: There too, one can explain: Since there are two types of carcasses of creeping animals that are likely to be found in the alleyway, creeping animals from the alleyway itself and creeping animals that came from the world at large, it is compared to a case where there are two factors that weaken the possibility that the items are ritually pure. Therefore, even Shammai agrees that in such a case the impurity extends retroactively back in time.
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּשַׁמַּאי: הוֹאִיל וְאִשָּׁה מַרְגֶּשֶׁת בְּעַצְמָהּ, וְהִלֵּל — כִּסְבוּרָה הַרְגָּשַׁת מֵי רַגְלַיִם הִיא.
And if you wish, say instead that this is the reason for the opinion of Shammai: Since a women senses within herself if she is experiencing a flow of blood, if she felt the flow only at present, it is certain that she did not experience a flow previously. And Hillel holds that she might have experienced a flow earlier while she was urinating and she thought it was all the sensation of her flow of urine.
וּלְשַׁמַּאי, הָאִיכָּא יְשֵׁנָה? יְשֵׁנָה נָמֵי, אַגַּב צַעֲרַהּ מִיתַּעְרָא, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַהַרְגָּשַׁת מֵי רַגְלַיִם.
The Gemara asks: And according to Shammai, isn’t there the case of a sleeping woman, who would not sense her flow of menstrual blood? The Gemara answers: A sleeping woman would also sense her flow, and due to her discomfort she would awaken, just as it is with the sensation of the need to urinate.
וְהָאִיכָּא שׁוֹטָה! מוֹדֶה שַׁמַּאי בְּשׁוֹטָה. הָא ״כׇּל הַנָּשִׁים״ קָתָנֵי! ״כׇּל הַנָּשִׁים״ — פִּקְּחוֹת.
The Gemara raises another difficulty with regard to the opinion of Shammai: But there is the case of a mentally incompetent woman, who does not properly understand what she is sensing. She might have previously experienced a flow of menstrual blood that she did not notice. The Gemara answers: Shammai concedes in the case of a mentally incompetent woman that she is impure retroactively. The Gemara asks: But the mishna explicitly teaches that Shammai mentioned all women, which apparently includes even the mentally incompetent. The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches: All women, it is referring to all mentally competent women.
וְלִיתְנֵי ״נָשִׁים״! לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: ״אַרְבַּע נָשִׁים״ וְתוּ לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: כׇּל הַנָּשִׁים.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if so, let the mishna teach that Shammai’s opinion applies to: Women, rather than referring to all women. The Gemara answers: The inclusive statement: All women, serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As Rabbi Eliezer said in a mishna (7a): There are four women with regard to whom the halakha is that their time is sufficient. This indicates that there are only four, and no more. Therefore, the mishna teaches us: All women, to include all mentally competent women, not only the four mentioned by Rabbi Eliezer.
וְהָאִיכָּא כְּתָמִים! לֵימָא תְּנַן כְּתָמִים דְּלָא כְּשַׁמַּאי? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹדֶה שַׁמַּאי בִּכְתָמִים. מַאי טַעְמָא? בְּצִפּוֹר לֹא נִתְעַסְּקָה, בְּשׁוּק שֶׁל טַבָּחִים לֹא עָבְרָה, הַאי דָּם מֵהֵיכָא אָתֵי?
The Gemara raises yet another difficulty against the opinion of Shammai: But there is the case of blood stains. The mishna teaches (66a) that a woman who finds a blood stain is impure retroactive to the last time she examined her clothing and found them clean. Shall we say that we learned the mishna with regard to stains not in accordance with the opinion of Shammai? Abaye said: Shammai concedes in the case of stains. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The reason is that she neither engaged in handling a slaughtered bird nor did she pass through a marketplace of butchers. If so, from where could this blood stain on her clothing have come? Since it must be from her last menstrual flow, Shammai agrees that she is impure retroactively.
אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא, הַיְינוּ טַעְמֵיהּ דְּשַׁמַּאי: דְּאִם אִיתָא דַּהֲוָה דָּם מֵעִיקָּרָא — הֲוָה אָתֵי. וְהִלֵּל — כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית הָרֶחֶם הֶעֱמִידוּהוּ, וְשַׁמַּאי — כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית הָרֶחֶם לָא מוֹקְמִי דָּם.
The Gemara suggests another analysis: Or if you wish, say that this is the reason for the opinion of Shammai: She is impure only from that point onward, as, if it is so that there was any menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset, i.e., at the earlier time. The Gemara explains why Hillel maintains that there is ritual impurity retroactively, in light of this analysis: And as for Hillel, he holds that the walls of the womb, i.e., the walls of the vaginal canal, held back the menstrual blood from leaving the body entirely, and therefore there might have been a previous emission from the uterus into the vaginal canal that was not visible on the outside. The Gemara asks: And how does Shammai respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: Shammai maintains that the walls of the womb do not hold back blood.
מְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת בְּמוֹךְ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹדֶה שַׁמַּאי בִּמְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת בְּמוֹךְ.
The Gemara asks: With regard to a woman who engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive absorbent cloth in the form of a wad that she inserts in her vagina at the opening of her womb so as not to become pregnant, what is there to say? In other words, how does Shammai explain why there is no retroactive impurity status in such a case, as it cannot be claimed that any previous menstrual blood would have flowed out earlier. Abaye says: Shammai concedes with regard to a woman who engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive cloth that she is impure retroactively.
רָבָא אָמַר: מוֹךְ נָמֵי, אַגַּב זֵיעָה מִכְוָיץ כָּוֵיץ, וּמוֹדֶה רָבָא בְּמוֹךְ דָּחוּק.
Rava says: Here as well, in a case where a woman engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive absorbent cloth, any previous menstrual blood would have flowed out, as the absorbent cloth does not hermetically seal the womb. The reason is that the cloth wrinkles due to perspiration, leaving space for blood to pass through. The Gemara adds: And nevertheless Rava concedes to Abaye that Shammai agrees that she is retroactively impure in a case where a woman engages in intercourse while using a tightly packed absorbent cloth.
וּמַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין הָנֵי לִישָּׁנֵי לְהַאיְךְ לִישָּׁנָא?
§ The Gemara suggested that the reasoning for Shammai’s opinion is that the woman would have felt any previous menstrual flow, or that any prior menstrual blood would have flowed out previously. Yet, earlier the Gemara suggested that his reason was that the woman retains her presumptive status of ritual purity. With regard to the explanations given for the opinion of Shammai, the Gemara asks: What difference is there between these versions and that version suggested earlier?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ לְמִרְמֵי חָבִית וּמִקְוֶה וּמָבוֹי — לְהַאיְךְ לִישָּׁנָא אִיכָּא לְמִרְמִינְהוּ, לְהָנֵי לִישָּׁנֵי לֵיכָּא לְמִרְמֵי.
The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to the possibility of raising a contradiction between Shammai’s ruling here and the cases of a barrel, a ritual bath, and an alleyway. According to that version, that Shammai’s reasoning is based upon the principle that an item retains its presumptive status, there is room to raise these contradictions, as the Gemara explained. By contrast, according to these other versions, that the woman would have felt any previous menstrual flow or that any prior menstrual blood would have flowed out previously, there is no room to raise such contradictions, as those rulings do not contradict the halakha here, where a unique factor is relevant.
וּמַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין הַאי לִישָּׁנָא לְהַאיְךְ לִישָּׁנָא? לְאַבָּיֵי אִיכָּא מוֹךְ,
The Gemara further asks: And what difference is there between this version, that any prior menstrual blood would have flowed out, and that version, that she would have felt any previous menstrual flow? The Gemara answers: According to Abaye, who maintains that Shammai agrees that a woman who engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive cloth is impure retroactively, there is a difference in a case where the woman engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive cloth. If Shammai’s reasoning is that a woman senses the emission of blood, in this case too it is assumed that she did not emit blood earlier. By contrast, if his reasoning is that any prior menstrual blood would have come out at the outset, it is possible that the cloth blocked the emission of blood, and she already emitted blood. Consequently, she is impure retroactively.
לְרָבָא אִיכָּא מוֹךְ דָּחוּק.
According to Rava, who maintains that blood can emerge even if the woman engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive absorbent cloth, there is a difference between the two interpretations in a case where she engages in intercourse while using a tightly packed absorbent cloth, as such a cloth will prevent the blood from flowing out, but it does not affect her ability to sense an emission.
תַּנְיָא כִּי הַאי לִישָּׁנָא, דְּאִם אִיתָא דַּהֲוָה דָּם מֵעִיקָּרָא הֲוָה אָתֵי. אָמַר לוֹ הִלֵּל לְשַׁמַּאי: אִי אַתָּה מוֹדֶה בְּקוּפָּה שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּמְּשׁוּ בָּהּ טְהָרוֹת בְּזָוִית זוֹ, וְנִמְצָא שֶׁרֶץ בְּזָוִית אַחֶרֶת, שֶׁטְּהָרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת טְמֵאוֹת? אָמַר לוֹ: אֲבָל!
It is taught in a mishna (Teharot 4:4) in accordance with this version, i.e., that Shammai’s reasoning is that if it is so, that there was menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset: Hillel said to Shammai: Don’t you concede to the following halakha: In the case of a basket that was used as a container for ritually pure items, and those items were placed in one corner, and subsequently the carcass of a creeping animal was found in a different corner of the basket, the halakha is that the items initially considered ritually pure are now retroactively considered impure? Shammai said to him: Indeed, that is correct.
וּמָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זוֹ לָזוֹ? לָזוֹ יֵשׁ לָהּ שׁוּלַיִם, לְזוֹ אֵין לָהּ שׁוּלַיִם.
Hillel continues: And if so, what difference is there between this case of the pure items stored in the basket, which are now considered retroactively impure, and that case of the ritually pure woman who experiences a menstrual flow, who is impure only from that point onward? Shammai answers: This one, the basket, has a base on which it rests, and therefore the creeping animal might have been there earlier unseen. That one, the menstruating woman, has no base, i.e., there is nothing to impede her menstrual blood from flowing out. Shammai’s response indicates that she is not retroactively impure because if she had experienced a previous menstruation it would have flowed at that stage.
רָבָא אָמַר: טַעְמָא דְשַׁמַּאי מִשּׁוּם בִּטּוּל פְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: אָמַר לוֹ שַׁמַּאי לְהִלֵּל: אִם כֵּן, בִּטַּלְתָּ בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִפְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה.
§ Rava says: The reason for the opinion of Shammai that a woman who experiences menstruation is not deemed ritually impure retroactively is due to the dereliction of the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. If woman is always deemed retroactively impure, she and her husband might abstain from engaging in sexual intercourse out of fear that she is already impure even if she has not yet experienced bleeding. The Gemara adds that this explanation is also taught in a baraita: Shammai said to Hillel: If it is so, that a woman is rendered retroactively impure as you claim, you will have caused the Jewish women to be derelict in the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply.
וּמַאן דְּתָנֵי הַאי לִישָּׁנָא, הָא תַּנְיָא כִּי הַאיְךְ לִישָּׁנָא, דְּאִם אִיתָא דַּהֲוָה דָּם מֵעִיקָּרָא הֲוָה אָתֵי. הָתָם, הִלֵּל הוּא דְּקָטָעֵי, הוּא סָבַר טַעְמָא דְּשַׁמַּאי דְּאִם אִיתָא דַּהֲוָה דָּם מֵעִיקָּרָא הֲוָה אָתֵי, וְקָא מַקְשֵׁי לֵיהּ קוּפָּה.
The Gemara asks: But according to the one who taught this version, i.e., Rava, there is a difficulty: Isn’t it taught in the aforementioned mishna in accordance with that other version, that Shammai’s reasoning is that if it is so, that there was any menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset? The Gemara answers: There, in that mishna, it is Hillel who erred. He thought the reason of Shammai is that if it is so, that there was any menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset. And therefore, he raises a difficulty against Shammai’s opinion from the case of the basket.
וְאָמַר לֵיהּ שַׁמַּאי: טַעְמָא דִּידִי מִשּׁוּם בִּטּוּל פְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה, וּלְמַאי דְּקָטָעֵית נָמֵי דְּקָמַקְשֵׁית קוּפָּה — לָזוֹ יֵשׁ לָהּ שׁוּלַיִם, וּלָזוֹ אֵין לָהּ שׁוּלַיִם.
And Shammai said to Hillel: You are mistaken. My reasoning is actually due to the dereliction of the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. But even according to your erroneous reasoning that led you to raise a difficulty from the case of the basket, I have an answer for that as well: This basket has a base, and therefore the creeping animal could have been there earlier, unseen; but that menstruating woman has no base.
וּלְמַאן דְּתָנֵי הַאי לִישָּׁנָא, הָא תַּנְיָא כִּי הַאיְךְ לִישָּׁנָא, מִשּׁוּם בִּטּוּל פְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה!
The Gemara asks the reverse question: And according to the one who teaches this other version, that Shammai’s reasoning is that if there was previous menstrual blood it would have come out at the outset, isn’t it taught in a baraita in accordance with that other version, that Shammai’s reasoning is due to the dereliction of the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply?
הָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ הִלֵּל לְשַׁמַּאי: אִין, טַעְמָא קָאָמְרַתְּ, דְּאִם אִיתָא דַּהֲוָה דָּם מֵעִיקָּרָא הֲוָה אָתֵי, וּמִיהוּ עֲשֵׂה סְיָיג לִדְבָרֶיךָ, דְּמַאי שְׁנָא מִכׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ דְּעָבְדִינַן סְיָיג?
The Gemara answers: That baraita was recorded at a later point in their discussion, as this is what Hillel is saying to Shammai: Yes, the reason that you say for your opinion has merit, that if it is so, that there was any menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset. Nevertheless, you should enact a safeguard for your statement and render her retroactively impure, as in what way is this case different from the rest of the entire Torah, where the Sages enact safeguards?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם כֵּן, בִּטַּלְתָּ בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִפְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה! וְהִלֵּל — מִפְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה מִי קָאָמֵינָא? לִטְהָרוֹת הוּא דְּקָאָמֵינָא!
Shammai said to Hillel: If so, i.e., if she is considered impure retroactively as a safeguard, you will have caused the Jewish women to be derelict in the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. The Gemara asks: And how does Hillel respond to Shammai’s reasoning with regard to the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply? The Gemara explains that Hillel would answer: Although I rule that she is retroactively impure, did I say that she is forbidden to her husband and must therefore abstain from the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply? I said only that she renders impure any ritually pure items that she touched.
וְשַׁמַּאי — לִטְהָרוֹת נָמֵי לָא, דְּאִם כֵּן לִבּוֹ נוֹקְפוֹ וּפוֹרֵשׁ.
The Gemara asks: And how would Shammai reply to this? The Gemara answers: Shammai maintains that even a safeguard that renders ritually pure items impure should not be imposed. The reason is that if it were so, the heart of a scrupulous husband might strike him with pangs of conscience over sins that he could transgress and he would separate from his wife, out of fear that she is impure.
(שׁוּלַיִם, בְּדוּקִין, מְכוּסִּין בְּזָוִית — סִימָן). אִיתְּמַר: קוּפָּה שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּמְּשׁוּ בָּהּ טְהָרוֹת בְּזָוִית זוֹ, וְנִמְצָא שֶׁרֶץ בְּזָוִית אַחֶרֶת — חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר: טְהָרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת טְהוֹרוֹת, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: טְהָרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת טְמֵאוֹת. וְהָא (בֵּית) שַׁמַּאי וְהִלֵּל מוֹדוּ בְּקוּפָּה דִּטְהָרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת טְמֵאוֹת!
The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the ensuing discussions: A base; examined; covered; in a corner. It was stated: If one has a basket that was used as a container for holding ritually pure produce, and those items were placed in one corner of the basket, and subsequently the carcass of a creeping animal was found in a different corner of the basket, Ḥizkiyya says: That produce initially considered ritually pure is still pure. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The produce initially considered ritually pure is now retroactively deemed impure. The Gemara asks: But how can Ḥizkiyya rule that it is pure? After all, don’t Shammai and Hillel agree in the case of the basket that the produce initially considered pure is now retroactively impure?
כִּי מוֹדוּ שַׁמַּאי וְהִלֵּל בְּקוּפָּה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ שׁוּלַיִם, כִּי פְּלִיגִי חִזְקִיָּה וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּקוּפָּה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ שׁוּלַיִם.
The Gemara answers: When do Shammai and Hillel agree that all the produce is retroactively impure? With regard to a basket that has a base. In such a case, the carcass of the creeping animal might have previously been in the basket and it went unnoticed when one removed the pure produce items. When Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree, it is with regard to a basket that has no base, i.e., both ends were open and the basket was used while it was lying on its side. In that situation, the contents of the basket are emptied by raising one end, which causes all items inside to fall out. Consequently, any creeping animal that was found subsequently must have entered the basket only after that produce was removed, which is why Ḥizkiyya rules that the produce remains pure.
אֵין לָהּ שׁוּלַיִם, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? אֵין לָהּ שׁוּלַיִם, וְיֵשׁ לָהּ אֳוגָנִים.
The Gemara asks: If this is referring to a case where the basket has no base, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan for ruling that the produce is ritually impure? The Gemara answers: The basket has no base but it does have an inward-curved rim. Therefore, it is possible that the carcass of a small creeping animal might have been held back by the rim and remained inside the basket even after it was turned over. Rabbi Yoḥanan rules that the produce is retroactively impure, due to the possibility that the creeping animal might have been in the basket previously together with the initially pure produce.
וְהָתַנְיָא: הַמַּדְלֶה עֲשָׂרָה דְּלָיִים מַיִם בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וְנִמְצָא שֶׁרֶץ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן — הוּא טָמֵא, וְכוּלָּן טְהוֹרִין. וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין לָהּ אֳוגָנִים, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לָהּ אֳוגָנִים — כּוּלָּן טְמֵאִין.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to one who draws ten pails of water one after another, i.e., he draws out water in one pail and from it he fills another ten pails with water, and the carcass of a creeping animal is found in one of them, that pail of water is ritually impure but all the rest of them are pure. And Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Yannai: This halakha was taught only in a case where the pail has no inward-curved rim. Consequently, its contents are entirely emptied each time it is overturned, which means that the creeping animal must have entered only this pail. But if the pail has a rim, all of the water that had been drawn is impure, as the creeping animal might have entered the pail earlier and the rim held it back each time the pail was overturned.
לֵימָא חִזְקִיָּה לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יַנַּאי? מַיָּא שָׁרְקִי, פֵּירֵי לָא שָׁרְקִי.
The Gemara explains the difficulty: Shall we say that Ḥizkiyya, who is not concerned that the rim of the basket might have held back the creeping animal, does not agree with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai? The Gemara answers that there is a difference between the two cases: Water is slippery, whereas produce is not slippery. In order to pour water out of the pail it is not necessary to turn it over completely. Therefore, the rim might hold back a creeping animal. By contrast, a basket must have one end fully raised in order to empty out all the produce it contains. In such a case Rabbi Yannai would agree that nothing could have been held back, and therefore the emptied produce remains pure.
אִי נָמֵי: מַיָּא לָא קָפֵיד עֲלַיְיהוּ, פֵּירֵי קָפֵיד עֲלַיְיהוּ.
Alternatively, there is a different reason why one does not overturn a pail of water entirely: In the case of water, one is not particular about it, i.e., he does not mind if some is left over. Therefore he does not overturn the pail completely. By contrast, in the case of produce one is particular about it, so he raises one end of the basket entirely to ensure that every last piece of produce is emptied. Consequently, in the case of produce Rabbi Yannai would agree that even if the basket has a rim, all the produce remains pure.
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי מוֹדוּ שַׁמַּאי וְהִלֵּל בְּקוּפָּה שֶׁאֵינָהּ בְּדוּקָה,
As an alternative to its previous resolution that Ḥizkiyya is discussing the case of a rimmed receptacle, the Gemara suggests another resolution of the apparent contradiction between Ḥizkiyya’s ruling and the opinions of Hillel and Shammai. And if you wish, say: When do Shammai and Hillel agree? In the case of a basket that was not examined. Since he did not examine the basket when he placed the pure produce there, a creeping animal might have already been inside. Consequently, they agree that the produce does not retain its presumptive state of purity but is considered retroactively impure.