Search

Niddah 50

Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:

English
עברית
podcast placeholder

0:00
0:00




podcast placeholder

0:00
0:00




Summary

There are those who can testify but not be judges – this is referring to one who is blind in one eye. However this is a source of debate. Are women able to be judges? There are foods that are suceptible to impurities but not obligated in tithes. There are those obligated in tithes and not in peah (leaving over the corner of the field). The gemara brings a statement of Rabbi Yochanan regarding impurity of foods and from there it’s derived that having intention that one wants to eat something that isn’t normally eaten is only effective once it is detached from the ground. Rava brings a proof for this from the mishna but his proof is rejected. The gemara brings a debate regarding a case of a kosher dead bird regarding the issue of intent to eat and the gemara clarifies in what case is there a debate.

Today’s daily daf tools:

Niddah 50

רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״עַל פִּיהֶם יִהְיֶה כׇּל רִיב וְכׇל נָגַע״? וְכִי מָה עִנְיָן רִיבִים אֵצֶל נְגָעִים? מַקִּישׁ רִיבִים לִנְגָעִים: מָה נְגָעִים בַּיּוֹם, דִּכְתִיב ״וּבְיוֹם הֵרָאוֹת בּוֹ״, אַף רִיבִים בַּיּוֹם.

It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states: “According to their word shall every dispute and every leprous mark be” (Deuteronomy 21:5)? What do disputes have to do with leprous marks? The verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous marks, to teach that just as leprous marks are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written with regard to leprous marks: “And on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure” (Leviticus 13:14), so too, disputes are adjudicated only in the daytime.

וּמָה נְגָעִים שֶׁלֹּא בְּסוֹמֵא, דִּכְתִיב: ״לְכׇל מַרְאֵה עֵינֵי הַכֹּהֵן״, אַף רִיבִים שֶׁלֹּא בְּסוֹמֵא. וּמַקִּישׁ נְגָעִים לְרִיבִים, מָה רִיבִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְרוֹבִים, אַף נְגָעִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְרוֹבִים.

And just as leprous marks are seen by priests who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: “As far as appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12), which teaches that they must be viewed by priests who can see with both eyes, so too, disputes are not adjudicated by blind judges, even if they are blind in only one eye. And the verse juxtaposes leprous marks to disputes to teach that just as disputes may not be judged by relatives of the litigants, so too, leprous marks may not be viewed by a priest who is a relative of the afflicted party.

אִי מָה רִיבִים בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, אַף נְגָעִים בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה? וְדִין הוּא: מָמוֹנוֹ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, גּוּפוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְהוּבָא אֶל אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן אוֹ אֶל אַחַד מִבָּנָיו הַכֹּהֲנִים״, הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ כֹּהֵן אֶחָד רוֹאֶה אֶת הַנְּגָעִים.

The baraita continues: If these two halakhot are compared, one can also say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too, leprous marks must be viewed by three priests. And this suggestion is supported by a logical inference: If a case that only involves one’s money is adjudicated by three judges, all the more so is it not clear that leprous marks, which afflict the person himself, should be viewed by three priests? To counter this notion, the verse states: “And he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). You have learned from this that even one priest may view leprous marks.

הָהוּא סַמְיָא דַּהֲוָה בְּשִׁבָבוּתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דַּהֲוָה קָדָיֵין דִּינָא, וְלָא קָאָמַר לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי. הֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כִּסְתַם מִשְׁנָה!

The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind person who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yoḥanan who would render judgments, and Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Yoḥanan do this? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that the halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna?

וּתְנַן: כׇּל הַכָּשֵׁר לָדוּן — כָּשֵׁר לְהָעִיד, וְיֵשׁ כָּשֵׁר לְהָעִיד וְאֵין כָּשֵׁר לָדוּן, וְאָמְרִינַן: לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְאֵתוֹיֵי סוֹמֵא בְּאַחַת מֵעֵינָיו.

And we learned in the mishna: Any person who is fit to adjudicate a case and serve as a judge is fit to testify as a witness, and there are those who are fit to testify but are not fit to adjudicate. And we said: What is added by this halakha, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It serves to add one who is blind in one of his eyes, as he is fit to testify but unfit to judge. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan evidently maintains that one who is blind even in one of his eyes is not fit to judge, why did he not admonish this judge?

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן סְתָמָא אַחֲרִינָא אַשְׁכַּח, דִּתְנַן: דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם, וְגוֹמְרִין בַּלַּיְלָה.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna which indicates a different conclusion. As we learned in the mishna in tractate Sanhedrin (32a): In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues their ruling even at night. This is not the halakha with regard to leprous marks, which may not be viewed at night at all. Accordingly, one does not compare judging cases of monetary law to viewing leprous marks. Since this comparison was the source for disqualifying a blind judge, one cannot derive from it that a blind judge is disqualified.

וּמַאי אוּלְמֵיהּ דְּהַאי סְתָמָא מֵהַאי סְתָמָא? אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: סְתָמָא דְּרַבִּים עֲדִיף, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּקָתָנֵי לַהּ גַּבֵּי הִלְכְתָא דְּדִינֵי.

The Gemara asks: And in what manner is the strength of that unattributed mishna in tractate Sanhedrin greater than the strength of this unattributed mishna here? Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan accept the ruling of that mishna? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages, as in Sanhedrin, is preferable, whereas the mishna here was established as in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir. And if you wish, say instead that it is because the mishna in Sanhedrin teaches this halakha in the context of the halakhot of judges. Since that chapter is the primary source for all of the halakhot of court matters, its rulings are of greater weight.

מַתְנִי’ כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיב בַּמַּעַשְׂרוֹת — מִטַּמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁמִּטַּמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בַּמַּעַשְׂרוֹת.

MISHNA: Any food from which one is obligated to separate tithes becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food; and there is food that becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food but from which one is not obligated to separate tithes.

גְּמָ’ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי בָּשָׂר וְדָגִים וּבֵיצִים.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of this mishna? The Gemara answers: This serves to add meat, fish, and eggs. Although they are subject to the ritual impurity of food, one is not obligated to separate tithes from them.

מַתְנִי’ כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיב בַּפֵּאָה — חַיָּיב בַּמַּעַשְׂרוֹת, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁחַיָּיב בַּמַּעַשְׂרוֹת וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בַּפֵּאָה.

MISHNA: With regard to any produce from which one is obligated to designate produce in the corner of the field given to the poor [pe’a], as commanded in the Torah (see Leviticus 19:9, 23:22), one is obligated to separate tithes from it; and there is produce from which one is obligated to separate tithes but from which one is not obligated to designate pe’a.

גְּמָ’ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי תְּאֵנָה וְיָרָק, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בַּפֵּאָה. דִּתְנַן: כְּלָל אָמְרוּ בַּפֵּאָה — כֹּל שֶׁהוּא אוֹכֶל, וְנִשְׁמָר, וְגִידּוּלוֹ מִן הָאָרֶץ, וּלְקִיטָתוֹ כְּאֶחָד, וּמַכְנִיסוֹ לְקִיּוּם — חַיָּיב בַּפֵּאָה.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of the mishna? The Gemara answers: It serves to add figs and vegetables, for which one is not obligated to designate pe’a, although the obligation of tithes does apply to them. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 1:4): The Sages stated a principle with regard to the halakhot of pe’a: With regard to anything that is food, and is protected, and that grows from the earth, and is gathered as one, i.e., there is one fixed time for gathering it, and that one brings in to store for preservation, its owner is obligated to designate pe’a.

אוֹכֵל — לְמַעוֹטֵי סְפִיחֵי סְטֵיס וְקוֹצָה, וְנִשְׁמָר — לְמַעוֹטֵי הֶפְקֵר, וְגִידּוּלוֹ מִן הָאָרֶץ — לְמַעוֹטֵי כְּמֵהִים וּפִטְרִיּוֹת, וּלְקִיטָתוֹ כְּאֶחָד — לְמַעוֹטֵי תְּאֵנָה, וּמַכְנִיסוֹ לְקִיּוּם — לְמַעוֹטֵי יָרָק.

The Gemara analyzes each criterion of the mishna. The clause: Anything that is food, serves to exclude the sefiḥin, produce that grew without being intentionally planted, of woad [setim] and safflower [vekotza]. These plants are used as dyes rather than for food. The clause: And is protected, serves to exclude ownerless crops, which no one protects. The clause: And grows from the earth, serves to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which do not draw sustenance from the ground. The clause: And is gathered as one, serves to exclude the fig tree, whose fruit is gathered over an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen at the same time. Finally, the clause: And that one brings in to storage for preservation, serves to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.

וְאִילּוּ גַּבֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר תְּנַן: כֹּל שֶׁהוּא אוֹכֶל, וְנִשְׁמָר, וְגִידּוּלוֹ מִן הָאָרֶץ — חַיָּיב בַּמַּעַשְׂרוֹת, וְאִילּוּ לְקִיטָתוֹ כְּאֶחָד, וּמַכְנִיסוֹ לְקִיּוּם — לָא קָתָנֵי.

And yet in the case of tithe, we learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:1) with regard to the halakhot of tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the earth is obligated in tithes. And whereas some of the conditions overlap, the following criteria are not taught with regard to tithes: Gathered as one, and that one brings in to storage for preservation. Evidently, the obligation of tithes applies to fig trees and vegetables, despite the fact that the obligation of pe’a does not apply.

אִם הָיוּ בָּהֶם שׁוּמִים וּבְצָלִין — חַיָּיבִין, דִּתְנַן: מַלְבְּנוֹת בְּצָלִים שֶׁבֵּין הַיָּרָק, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: פֵּאָה מִכׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מֵאַחַת עַל הַכֹּל.

The Gemara notes that if these vegetables that are exempt from pe’a contained garlic and onions, which are stored for an extended period of time, then they are obligated in pe’a as well. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 3:4): If one has garden beds of onions that are between the vegetables, Rabbi Yosei says that one leaves a separate pe’a from each and every one of the beds. And the Rabbis say one leaves pe’a from one garden bed for all of them.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חַנָּה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עוּלְשִׁין שֶׁזְּרָעָן מִתְּחִילָּה לִבְהֵמָה, וְנִמְלַךְ עֲלֵיהֶן לָאָדָם

§ Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of endives that were initially planted to be fed to animals, and later the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption

צְרִיכוֹת מַחְשָׁבָה לִכְשֶׁיִּתָּלְשׁוּ, קָסָבַר מַחְשֶׁבֶת חִבּוּר לֹא שְׁמָהּ מַחְשָׁבָה.

they require intent to be used for human consumption once they are detached from the ground, in order for them to be susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in this manner because he holds that intent to designate produce while it is attached to the ground is not considered intent.

אָמַר רָבָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, שְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בְּנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר, וְזֶה אֶחָד מֵהֶן: צְרִיכָה מַחְשָׁבָה וְאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר. אַלְמָא מַחְשֶׁבֶת חַיִּים לֹא שְׁמָהּ מַחְשָׁבָה, הָכָא נָמֵי מַחְשֶׁבֶת חִבּוּר לֹא שְׁמָהּ מַחְשָׁבָה.

Rava said: We learn in a mishna (Teharot 1:1) as well: Thirteen matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: In order for such a carcass to be susceptible to impurity and to be capable of imparting impurity to food through contact, it requires a person’s intention to eat it, but it does not require exposure to liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity. Even if one had intent to eat the bird while it was still alive, intent is still required after it became a carcass for it to transmit impurity. Rava concludes: Evidently, intent that the bird be eaten while the bird is alive is not considered intent. Here too, intent to designate produce while it is attached to the ground is not considered intent.

רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר: הָכָא בְּגוֹזָל שֶׁנָּפַל מִן הָרוּם עָסְקִינַן, דְּלָא הֲוָה קַמַּן דְּלַחְשׁוֹב עֲלֵיהּ.

Rabbi Zeira said: Rava’s proof is inconclusive, as here we are dealing with a young bird that fell from a height, where the bird was not before us prior to it becoming a carcass, so that one could have had intent that it is food. Consequently, it requires intent afterward for it to impart impurity, but had there been intent while it was still alive, that would have sufficed.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת שֶׁבְּיַבְנֶה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תַּרְנְגוֹל בָּרָא הֲוָה.

Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: What is there to say about the case of the chicken in Yavne? In that instance the Sages deemed the chicken impure due to intent only after it became a carcass, despite the fact that it was present before them while it was alive. This apparently indicates that intent which occurred while the bird was alive is not considered intent. Rabbi Zeira said to Abaye: That was actually a wild chicken, which was not before them while it was alive, and therefore there was no intent that it should be food while it was alive.

אַחִיכוּ עֲלֵיהּ: תַּרְנְגוֹל בָּרָא עוֹף טָמֵא הוּא, וְעוֹף טָמֵא מִי קָמְטַמֵּא? אֲמַר לְהוּ אַבָּיֵי: גַּבְרָא רַבָּה אֲמַר מִילְּתָא, לָא תְּחִיכוּ עֲלֵיהּ, בְּתַרְנְגוֹלֶת שֶׁמָּרְדָה, וּמַאי ״בָּרָא״? דְּאִיבְּרַאי מִמָּרַהּ.

Those who heard this comment laughed at Rabbi Zeira’s interpretation: A wild chicken is a non-kosher bird, and does a non-kosher bird impart impurity? Abaye said to them: A great man has stated a matter; do not laugh at him. Rabbi Zeira means that this is referring to a chicken that rebelled against its owner, ran away to the wild, and raised its kosher chicks there. One of those chicks subsequently returned from the wild. Consequently, it had not been present before the Sages while it was alive. And what did Rabbi Zeira mean when he mentioned a wild [bara] chicken? He meant one that was created [de’ivrai] from a chicken that rebelled.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: תַּרְנְגוֹלְתָּא דְּאַגְמָא הֲוַאי. רַב פָּפָּא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: תַּרְנְגוֹלָא דְּאַגְמָא אֲסִיר, תַּרְנְגוֹלְתָּא דְּאַגְמָא שַׁרְיָא.

Rav Pappa stated an alternative interpretation: It was a marsh [de’agma] hen. Since no one lives in a marsh, there was no opportunity for intent while it was alive, and therefore intent was necessary afterward. The Gemara adds: Rav Pappa conforms to his standard line of reasoning in this regard, as Rav Pappa said: The animal called the marsh rooster is prohibited, as it is a non-kosher bird, whereas the marsh hen is kosher and permitted.

וְסִימָנָיךְ — ״עַמּוֹנִי וְלֹא עַמּוֹנִית״. דָּרַשׁ מָרִימָר: תַּרְנְגוֹלְתָּא דְּאַגְמָא אֲסִירָא. חַזְיוּהָ רַבָּנַן דְּדָרְסָה וְאָכְלָה, וְהַיְינוּ גֵּירוּתָא.

And your mnemonic to remember which animal is permitted and which is prohibited is the well-known statement of the Sages with regard to the verse: “An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:4). An Ammonite man is unfit to enter the assembly but not an Ammonite woman. Here too, the animal with a female name is permitted, whereas the one with a male name is prohibited. Mareimar taught: The marsh hen is prohibited, contrary to the opinion of Rav Pappa, as the Sages saw that it mauled and ate its prey. And this is the geiruta, a non-kosher bird.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: גּוֹזָל שֶׁנָּפַל לַגַּת, וְחִשַּׁב עָלָיו לְהַעֲלוֹתוֹ לְכוּתִי — טָמֵא, לְכֶלֶב — טָהוֹר. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אַף לְכֶלֶב — טָמֵא.

§ Apropos the case of a young kosher bird that fell and died, the Sages taught in a baraita: A young kosher bird that fell into a winepress and died there, where the owner intended to draw it up from the press for a Samaritan to eat, is ritually impure, like any carcass of a kosher bird. If he intended to draw it up from the press for a dog to eat, it is ritually pure. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: Even if he intended to draw it up from the press for a dog to eat, it is impure, as the bird does not require intent for it to be impure.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר, אִם מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה שֶׁלֹּא בְּמַחְשָׁבָה — לֹא יְטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה קַלָּה שֶׁלֹּא בְּמַחְשָׁבָה?!

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says in explanation of his opinion: This halakha can be derived by the following a fortiori inference: If the carcass of a kosher bird transmits severe ritual impurity, i.e., it renders one’s garments impure when an olive-bulk of it is in the throat, without thought, i.e., even if no one had intent that a person should eat it, should it not transmit a lenient impurity of food, by touch alone, likewise without thought?

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּטוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה, שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ יוֹרֶדֶת לְכָךְ, תֹּאמַר בְּטוּמְאָה קַלָּה, שֶׁכֵּן יוֹרֶדֶת לְכָךְ!

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, this is not a valid a fortiori inference. If you said that there is no requirement of intent with regard to severe ritual impurity, that is because severe ritual impurity does not assume its status with that requirement of thought, i.e., intent is not relevant to that type of impurity. Shall you also say that there is no requirement of thought with regard to lenient impurity, which does assume its status with that requirement of thought? The Gemara will soon explain the precise meaning of this concept of assuming its status with the requirement of thought.

אָמַר לָהֶן: תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת שֶׁבְּיַבְנֶה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁיּוֹרֶדֶת לְכָךְ, וְטִמְּאוּהָ שֶׁלֹּא בְּמַחְשָׁבָה. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: מִשָּׁם רְאָיָה? כּוּתִים הָיוּ שָׁם, וְחִשְּׁבוּ עָלֶיהָ לַאֲכִילָה.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to the Rabbis: The case of the chicken in Yavne can prove that the question of whether or not intent is required does not depend on that factor. The case in Yavne involved an item that does assume its status with that requirement of thought, and yet the Sages declared it impure without intent. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Will you cite proof from there? In that case there were Samaritans there, and the people in Yavne intended that it be eaten by the Samaritans.

בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בִּכְרַכִּים, לְמָה לַהּ מַחְשָׁבָה? וְהָתְנַן: נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, וְנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר וְהַחֵלֶב בַּכְּרַכִּים — אֵין צְרִיכִין לֹא מַחְשָׁבָה וְלֹא הֶכְשֵׁר!

The Gemara analyzes the case of a young kosher bird that fell into a winepress: What type of situation are we dealing with? If we say that we are dealing with cities, where there are many people available to consume all sorts of food, including the carcass of a kosher bird, why does it require intent? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Okatzin 3:3): An unslaughtered carcass of a kosher animal in any location, whether the population is large or small, and the carcass of a kosher bird or the fat of a kosher animal found in cities [bakerakim], require neither intent for human consumption nor contact with liquid for them to be rendered susceptible to impurity?

אֶלָּא בִּכְפָרִים, וּמִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר דְּלָא בָּעֲיָא מַחְשָׁבָה? וְהָתְנַן: נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, וְנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר בַּכְּפָרִים — צְרִיכָה מַחְשָׁבָה וְאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר!

Rather, it must be referring to villages, where the population is small and there are not many people who would eat the carcass. But this too is difficult: Is there anyone who said that intent is not required in the case of a carcass of a non-kosher bird for the impurity of food? Didn’t we learn in the beginning of that same mishna: A carcass of a non-kosher animal found in any location, and an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird in the villages both require intent to consume them, but they do not require contact with a liquid to become susceptible to ritual impurity?

אָמַר רַבִּי זְעֵירָא בַּר חֲנִינָא: לְעוֹלָם בִּכְרַךְ, וְגִתּוֹ מֵאֲסַתּוּ, וַעֲשָׂאַתּוּ כִּכְפָר.

Rabbi Zeira bar Ḥanina says: Actually, the baraita is referring to a case that occurred in a city, and even so intent is required. The reason is that the young bird fell into a winepress, and the winepress rendered it disgusting and thereby rendered it like the carcass of a kosher bird in a village, where there are few people who would eat it.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר, אִם מְטַמְּאָה טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה שֶׁלֹּא בְּמַחְשָׁבָה, לֹא תְּטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה קַלָּה שֶׁלֹּא בְּמַחְשָׁבָה?

The Gemara analyzes the exchange cited above. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says that this halakha can be derived by an a fortiori inference: If the carcass of a kosher bird transmits severe ritual impurity without thought, should it not transmit lenient impurity without thought?

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּטוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ יוֹרֶדֶת לְכָךְ.

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, this is not a valid a fortiori inference. If you said so with regard to severe ritual impurity, that is because it does not assume its status with that requirement of thought.

מַאי ״אֵינָהּ יוֹרֶדֶת לְכָךְ״? אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the clause: It does not assume its status with that requirement of thought? In what manner is thought required for the lenient impurity of food it imparts in the case of a bird carcass but not required for the severe impurity it imparts when it is in the throat? Rava said that this is what the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, if you said that there is no requirement of thought

Today’s daily daf tools:

Delve Deeper

Broaden your understanding of the topics on this daf with classes and podcasts from top women Talmud scholars.

For the Beyond the Daf shiurim offered in Hebrew, see here.

New to Talmud?

Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you. 

The Hadran Women’s Tapestry

Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories. 

I started learning when my brother sent me the news clip of the celebration of the last Daf Yomi cycle. I was so floored to see so many women celebrating that I wanted to be a part of it. It has been an enriching experience studying a text in a language I don’t speak, using background knowledge that I don’t have. It is stretching my learning in unexpected ways, bringing me joy and satisfaction.

Jodi Gladstone
Jodi Gladstone

Warwick, Rhode Island, United States

My family recently made Aliyah, because we believe the next chapter in the story of the Jewish people is being written here, and we want to be a part of it. Daf Yomi, on the other hand, connects me BACK, to those who wrote earlier chapters thousands of years ago. So, I feel like I’m living in the middle of this epic story. I’m learning how it all began, and looking ahead to see where it goes!
Tina Lamm
Tina Lamm

Jerusalem, Israel

In early 2020, I began the process of a stem cell transplant. The required extreme isolation forced me to leave work and normal life but gave me time to delve into Jewish text study. I did not feel isolated. I began Daf Yomi at the start of this cycle, with family members joining me online from my hospital room. I’ve used my newly granted time to to engage, grow and connect through this learning.

Reena Slovin
Reena Slovin

Worcester, United States

In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).

Sara-Averick-photo-scaled
Sara Averick

Jerusalem, Israel

I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!

Harriet Hartman
Harriet Hartman

Tzur Hadassah, Israel

It happened without intent (so am I yotzei?!) – I watched the women’s siyum live and was so moved by it that the next morning, I tuned in to Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur, and here I am, still learning every day, over 2 years later. Some days it all goes over my head, but others I grasp onto an idea or a story, and I ‘get it’ and that’s the best feeling in the world. So proud to be a Hadran learner.

Jeanne Yael Klempner
Jeanne Yael Klempner

Zichron Yaakov, Israel

I started learning with rabbis. I needed to know more than the stories. My first teacher to show me “the way of the Talmud” as well as the stories was Samara Schwartz.
Michelle Farber started the new cycle 2 yrs ago and I jumped on for the ride.
I do not look back.

Jenifer Nech
Jenifer Nech

Houston, United States

After experiences over the years of asking to join gemara shiurim for men and either being refused by the maggid shiur or being the only women there, sometimes behind a mechitza, I found out about Hadran sometime during the tail end of Masechet Shabbat, I think. Life has been much better since then.

Madeline Cohen
Madeline Cohen

London, United Kingdom

What a great experience to learn with Rabbanit Michelle Farber. I began with this cycle in January 2020 and have been comforted by the consistency and energy of this process throughout the isolation period of Covid. Week by week, I feel like I am exploring a treasure chest with sparkling gems and puzzling antiquities. The hunt is exhilarating.

Marian Frankston
Marian Frankston

Pennsylvania, United States

My first Talmud class experience was a weekly group in 1971 studying Taanit. In 2007 I resumed Talmud study with a weekly group I continue learning with. January 2020, I was inspired to try learning Daf Yomi. A friend introduced me to Daf Yomi for Women and Rabbanit Michelle Farber, I have kept with this program and look forward, G- willing, to complete the entire Shas with Hadran.
Lorri Lewis
Lorri Lewis

Palo Alto, CA, United States

I LOVE learning the Daf. I started with Shabbat. I join the morning Zoom with Reb Michelle and it totally grounds my day. When Corona hit us in Israel, I decided that I would use the Daf to keep myself sane, especially during the days when we could not venture out more than 300 m from our home. Now my husband and I have so much new material to talk about! It really is the best part of my day!

Batsheva Pava
Batsheva Pava

Hashmonaim, Israel

My Daf journey began in August 2012 after participating in the Siyum Hashas where I was blessed as an “enabler” of others.  Galvanized into my own learning I recited the Hadran on Shas in January 2020 with Rabbanit Michelle. That Siyum was a highlight in my life.  Now, on round two, Daf has become my spiritual anchor to which I attribute manifold blessings.

Rina Goldberg
Rina Goldberg

Englewood NJ, United States

Robin Zeiger
Robin Zeiger

Tel Aviv, Israel

I’ve been learning since January 2020, and in June I started drawing a phrase from each daf. Sometimes it’s easy (e.g. plants), sometimes it’s very hard (e.g. korbanot), and sometimes it’s loads of fun (e.g. bird racing) to find something to draw. I upload my pictures from each masechet to #DafYomiArt. I am enjoying every step of the journey.

Gila Loike
Gila Loike

Ashdod, Israel

In early 2020, I began the process of a stem cell transplant. The required extreme isolation forced me to leave work and normal life but gave me time to delve into Jewish text study. I did not feel isolated. I began Daf Yomi at the start of this cycle, with family members joining me online from my hospital room. I’ve used my newly granted time to to engage, grow and connect through this learning.

Reena Slovin
Reena Slovin

Worcester, United States

3 years ago, I joined Rabbanit Michelle to organize the unprecedented Siyum HaShas event in Jerusalem for thousands of women. The whole experience was so inspiring that I decided then to start learning the daf and see how I would go…. and I’m still at it. I often listen to the Daf on my bike in mornings, surrounded by both the external & the internal beauty of Eretz Yisrael & Am Yisrael!

Lisa Kolodny
Lisa Kolodny

Raanana, Israel

I started at the beginning of this cycle. No 1 reason, but here’s 5.
In 2019 I read about the upcoming siyum hashas.
There was a sermon at shul about how anyone can learn Talmud.
Talmud references come up when I am studying. I wanted to know more.
Yentl was on telly. Not a great movie but it’s about studying Talmud.
I went to the Hadran website: A new cycle is starting. I’m gonna do this

Denise Neapolitan
Denise Neapolitan

Cambridge, United Kingdom

I learned Talmud as a student in Yeshivat Ramaz and felt at the time that Talmud wasn’t for me. After reading Ilana Kurshan’s book I was intrigued and after watching the great siyum in Yerushalayim it ignited the spark to begin this journey. It has been a transformative life experience for me as a wife, mother, Savta and member of Klal Yisrael.
Elana Storch
Elana Storch

Phoenix, Arizona, United States

After experiences over the years of asking to join gemara shiurim for men and either being refused by the maggid shiur or being the only women there, sometimes behind a mechitza, I found out about Hadran sometime during the tail end of Masechet Shabbat, I think. Life has been much better since then.

Madeline Cohen
Madeline Cohen

London, United Kingdom

Hadran entered my life after the last Siyum Hashaas, January 2020. I was inspired and challenged simultaneously, having never thought of learning Gemara. With my family’s encouragement, I googled “daf yomi for women”. A perfecr fit!
I especially enjoy when Rabbanit Michelle connects the daf to contemporary issues to share at the shabbat table e.g: looking at the Kohen during duchaning. Toda rabba

Marsha Wasserman
Marsha Wasserman

Jerusalem, Israel

Niddah 50

Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ ΧžΦ΅ΧΦ΄Χ™Χ¨ הִיא, Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧͺַנְיָא: Χ”ΦΈΧ™ΦΈΧ” Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ ΧžΦ΅ΧΦ΄Χ™Χ¨ ΧΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ¨, ΧžΦΈΧ” ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧœΦ°ΧžΧ•ΦΌΧ“ ΧœΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ·Χ¨ ״גַל ׀ִּיה֢ם Χ™Φ΄Χ”Φ°Χ™ΦΆΧ” Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ‘ Χ•Φ°Χ›Χ‡Χœ Χ ΦΈΧ’Φ·Χ’Χ΄? Χ•Φ°Χ›Φ΄Χ™ ΧžΦΈΧ” Χ’Φ΄Χ Φ°Χ™ΦΈΧŸ רִיבִים א֡צ֢ל נְגָגִים? ΧžΦ·Χ§Φ΄ΦΌΧ™Χ©Χ רִיבִים ΧœΦ΄Χ Φ°Χ’ΦΈΧ’Φ΄Χ™Χ: ΧžΦΈΧ” נְגָגִים בַּיּוֹם, Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ›Φ°ΧͺΦ΄Χ™Χ‘ ״וּבְיוֹם ה֡רָאוֹΧͺ Χ‘ΦΌΧ•ΦΉΧ΄, אַף רִיבִים בַּיּוֹם.

It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states: β€œAccording to their word shall every dispute and every leprous mark be” (Deuteronomy 21:5)? What do disputes have to do with leprous marks? The verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous marks, to teach that just as leprous marks are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written with regard to leprous marks: β€œAnd on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure” (Leviticus 13:14), so too, disputes are adjudicated only in the daytime.

Χ•ΦΌΧžΦΈΧ” נְגָגִים שׁ֢לֹּא Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ, Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ›Φ°ΧͺΦ΄Χ™Χ‘: Χ΄ΧœΦ°Χ›Χ‡Χœ ΧžΦ·Χ¨Φ°ΧΦ΅Χ” Χ’Φ΅Χ™Χ Φ΅Χ™ Χ”Φ·Χ›ΦΉΦΌΧ”Φ΅ΧŸΧ΄, אַף רִיבִים שׁ֢לֹּא Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ. Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ§Φ΄ΦΌΧ™Χ©Χ נְגָגִים ΧœΦ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ‘Φ΄Χ™Χ, ΧžΦΈΧ” רִיבִים שׁ֢לֹּא בִּקְרוֹבִים, אַף נְגָגִים שׁ֢לֹּא בִּקְרוֹבִים.

And just as leprous marks are seen by priests who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: β€œAs far as appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12), which teaches that they must be viewed by priests who can see with both eyes, so too, disputes are not adjudicated by blind judges, even if they are blind in only one eye. And the verse juxtaposes leprous marks to disputes to teach that just as disputes may not be judged by relatives of the litigants, so too, leprous marks may not be viewed by a priest who is a relative of the afflicted party.

אִי ΧžΦΈΧ” רִיבִים Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΉΧ©ΦΈΧΧ”, אַף נְגָגִים Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΉΧ©ΦΈΧΧ”? Χ•Φ°Χ“Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ הוּא: ΧžΦΈΧžΧ•ΦΉΧ Χ•ΦΉ Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΉΧ©ΦΈΧΧ”, Χ’ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧ€Χ•ΦΉ לֹא Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ Χ©ΦΆΧΧ›Φ΅ΦΌΧŸ? ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧœΦ°ΧžΧ•ΦΌΧ“ ΧœΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ·Χ¨ ״וְהוּבָא א֢ל ΧΦ·Χ”Φ²Χ¨ΦΉΧŸ Χ”Φ·Χ›ΦΉΦΌΧ”Φ΅ΧŸ אוֹ א֢ל אַחַד ΧžΦ΄Χ‘ΦΈΦΌΧ ΦΈΧ™Χ• הַכֹּהֲנִים״, הָא ΧœΦΈΧžΦ·Χ“Φ°ΧͺΦΈΦΌ Χ©ΦΆΧΧΦ²Χ€Φ΄Χ™ΧœΦΌΧ•ΦΌ Χ›ΦΉΦΌΧ”Φ΅ΧŸ א֢חָד רוֹא֢ה א֢Χͺ הַנְּגָגִים.

The baraita continues: If these two halakhot are compared, one can also say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too, leprous marks must be viewed by three priests. And this suggestion is supported by a logical inference: If a case that only involves one’s money is adjudicated by three judges, all the more so is it not clear that leprous marks, which afflict the person himself, should be viewed by three priests? To counter this notion, the verse states: β€œAnd he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). You have learned from this that even one priest may view leprous marks.

הָהוּא Χ‘Φ·ΧžΦ°Χ™ΦΈΧ Χ“Φ·ΦΌΧ”Φ²Χ•ΦΈΧ” בְּשִׁבָבוּΧͺΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ—ΦΈΧ ΦΈΧŸ, Χ“Φ·ΦΌΧ”Φ²Χ•ΦΈΧ” Χ§ΦΈΧ“ΦΈΧ™Φ΅Χ™ΧŸ דִּינָא, Χ•Φ°ΧœΦΈΧ קָאָמַר ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ Χ•Φ°ΧœΦΈΧ ΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ“Φ΅ΦΌΧ™. Χ”Φ΅Χ™Χ›Φ΄Χ™ Χ’ΦΈΧ‘Φ΅Χ™Χ“ Χ”ΦΈΧ›Φ΄Χ™? Χ•Φ°Χ”ΦΈΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨ Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ—ΦΈΧ ΦΈΧŸ: Χ”Φ²ΧœΦΈΧ›ΦΈΧ” Χ›Φ΄ΦΌΧ‘Φ°Χͺַם ΧžΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧ ΦΈΧ”!

The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind person who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan who would render judgments, and Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan do this? But didn’t Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan himself say that the halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna?

Χ•ΦΌΧͺְנַן: Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ הַכָּשׁ֡ר ΧœΦΈΧ“Χ•ΦΌΧŸ β€” כָּשׁ֡ר ΧœΦ°Χ”ΦΈΧ’Φ΄Χ™Χ“, וְי֡שׁ כָּשׁ֡ר ΧœΦ°Χ”ΦΈΧ’Φ΄Χ™Χ“ Χ•Φ°ΧΦ΅Χ™ΧŸ כָּשׁ֡ר ΧœΦΈΧ“Χ•ΦΌΧŸ, Χ•Φ°ΧΦΈΧžΦ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ Φ·ΧŸ: לְא֡ΧͺΧ•ΦΉΧ™Φ΅Χ™ ΧžΦ·ΧΧ™? Χ•Φ°ΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨ Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ—ΦΈΧ ΦΈΧŸ: לְא֡ΧͺΧ•ΦΉΧ™Φ΅Χ™ Χ‘Χ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ בְּאַחַΧͺ ΧžΦ΅Χ’Φ΅Χ™Χ ΦΈΧ™Χ•.

And we learned in the mishna: Any person who is fit to adjudicate a case and serve as a judge is fit to testify as a witness, and there are those who are fit to testify but are not fit to adjudicate. And we said: What is added by this halakha, and Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan said: It serves to add one who is blind in one of his eyes, as he is fit to testify but unfit to judge. Since Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan evidently maintains that one who is blind even in one of his eyes is not fit to judge, why did he not admonish this judge?

Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ—ΦΈΧ ΦΈΧŸ Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא אַחֲרִינָא אַשְׁכַּח, Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧͺְנַן: Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ™Χ Φ΅Χ™ ΧžΦΈΧžΧ•ΦΉΧ Χ•ΦΉΧͺ Χ“ΦΈΦΌΧ Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ בַּיּוֹם, Χ•Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧžΦ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧœΦ·ΦΌΧ™Φ°ΧœΦΈΧ”.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan found another unattributed mishna which indicates a different conclusion. As we learned in the mishna in tractate Sanhedrin (32a): In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues their ruling even at night. This is not the halakha with regard to leprous marks, which may not be viewed at night at all. Accordingly, one does not compare judging cases of monetary law to viewing leprous marks. Since this comparison was the source for disqualifying a blind judge, one cannot derive from it that a blind judge is disqualified.

Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ·ΧΧ™ ΧΧ•ΦΌΧœΦ°ΧžΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ דְּהַאי Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא ΧžΦ΅Χ”Φ·ΧΧ™ Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא? אִיבָּג֡יΧͺ ΧΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ: Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא דְּרַבִּים Χ’Φ²Χ“Φ΄Χ™Χ£, וְאִיבָּג֡יΧͺ ΧΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ: ΧžΦ΄Χ©ΦΌΧΧ•ΦΌΧ Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧ§ΦΈΧͺΦΈΧ Φ΅Χ™ ΧœΦ·Χ”ΦΌ Χ’Φ·ΦΌΧ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™ Χ”Φ΄ΧœΦ°Χ›Φ°Χͺָא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧ“Φ΄Χ™Χ Φ΅Χ™.

The Gemara asks: And in what manner is the strength of that unattributed mishna in tractate Sanhedrin greater than the strength of this unattributed mishna here? Why did Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan accept the ruling of that mishna? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages, as in Sanhedrin, is preferable, whereas the mishna here was established as in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir. And if you wish, say instead that it is because the mishna in Sanhedrin teaches this halakha in the context of the halakhot of judges. Since that chapter is the primary source for all of the halakhot of court matters, its rulings are of greater weight.

מַΧͺΦ°Χ Φ΄Χ™’ Χ›ΦΉΦΌΧœ שׁ֢חַיָּיב Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧžΦ·ΦΌΧ’Φ·Χ©Φ°Χ‚Χ¨Χ•ΦΉΧͺ β€” מִטַּמּ֡א Χ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦ·Χͺ ΧΦ³Χ•Χ›ΦΈΧœΦ΄Χ™ΧŸ, וְי֡שׁ שׁ֢מִּטַּמּ֡א Χ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦ·Χͺ ΧΦ³Χ•Χ›ΦΈΧœΦ΄Χ™ΧŸ וְא֡ינוֹ Χ—Φ·Χ™ΦΈΦΌΧ™Χ‘ Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧžΦ·ΦΌΧ’Φ·Χ©Φ°Χ‚Χ¨Χ•ΦΉΧͺ.

MISHNA: Any food from which one is obligated to separate tithes becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food; and there is food that becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food but from which one is not obligated to separate tithes.

Χ’ΦΌΦ°ΧžΦΈ’ לְא֡ΧͺΧ•ΦΉΧ™Φ΅Χ™ ΧžΦ·ΧΧ™? לְא֡ΧͺΧ•ΦΉΧ™Φ΅Χ™ Χ‘ΦΈΦΌΧ©ΦΈΧ‚Χ¨ וְדָגִים וּב֡יצִים.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of this mishna? The Gemara answers: This serves to add meat, fish, and eggs. Although they are subject to the ritual impurity of food, one is not obligated to separate tithes from them.

מַΧͺΦ°Χ Φ΄Χ™’ Χ›ΦΉΦΌΧœ שׁ֢חַיָּיב בַּ׀ּ֡אָה β€” Χ—Φ·Χ™ΦΈΦΌΧ™Χ‘ Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧžΦ·ΦΌΧ’Φ·Χ©Φ°Χ‚Χ¨Χ•ΦΉΧͺ, וְי֡שׁ שׁ֢חַיָּיב Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧžΦ·ΦΌΧ’Φ·Χ©Φ°Χ‚Χ¨Χ•ΦΉΧͺ וְא֡ינוֹ Χ—Φ·Χ™ΦΈΦΌΧ™Χ‘ בַּ׀ּ֡אָה.

MISHNA: With regard to any produce from which one is obligated to designate produce in the corner of the field given to the poor [pe’a], as commanded in the Torah (see Leviticus 19:9, 23:22), one is obligated to separate tithes from it; and there is produce from which one is obligated to separate tithes but from which one is not obligated to designate pe’a.

Χ’ΦΌΦ°ΧžΦΈ’ לְא֡ΧͺΧ•ΦΉΧ™Φ΅Χ™ ΧžΦ·ΧΧ™? לְא֡ΧͺΧ•ΦΉΧ™Φ΅Χ™ Χͺְּא֡נָה Χ•Φ°Χ™ΦΈΧ¨ΦΈΧ§, שׁ֢א֡ינוֹ Χ—Φ·Χ™ΦΈΦΌΧ™Χ‘ בַּ׀ּ֡אָה. Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧͺְנַן: Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧœΦΈΧœ ΧΦΈΧžΦ°Χ¨Χ•ΦΌ בַּ׀ּ֡אָה β€” Χ›ΦΉΦΌΧœ שׁ֢הוּא ΧΧ•ΦΉΧ›ΦΆΧœ, Χ•Φ°Χ Φ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ¨, Χ•Φ°Χ’Φ΄Χ™Χ“ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧœΧ•ΦΉ מִן הָאָר֢Χ₯, Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™Χ˜ΦΈΧͺΧ•ΦΉ כְּא֢חָד, Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ›Φ°Χ Φ΄Χ™Χ‘Χ•ΦΉ ΧœΦ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧ β€” Χ—Φ·Χ™ΦΈΦΌΧ™Χ‘ בַּ׀ּ֡אָה.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of the mishna? The Gemara answers: It serves to add figs and vegetables, for which one is not obligated to designate pe’a, although the obligation of tithes does apply to them. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 1:4): The Sages stated a principle with regard to the halakhot of pe’a: With regard to anything that is food, and is protected, and that grows from the earth, and is gathered as one, i.e., there is one fixed time for gathering it, and that one brings in to store for preservation, its owner is obligated to designate pe’a.

ΧΧ•ΦΉΧ›Φ΅Χœ β€” ΧœΦ°ΧžΦ·Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ˜Φ΅Χ™ Χ‘Φ°Χ€Φ΄Χ™Χ—Φ΅Χ™ Χ‘Φ°Χ˜Φ΅Χ™Χ‘ Χ•Φ°Χ§Χ•ΦΉΧ¦ΦΈΧ”, Χ•Φ°Χ Φ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ¨ β€” ΧœΦ°ΧžΦ·Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ˜Φ΅Χ™ Χ”ΦΆΧ€Φ°Χ§Φ΅Χ¨, Χ•Φ°Χ’Φ΄Χ™Χ“ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧœΧ•ΦΉ מִן הָאָר֢Χ₯ β€” ΧœΦ°ΧžΦ·Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ˜Φ΅Χ™ Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ΅Χ”Φ΄Χ™Χ Χ•ΦΌΧ€Φ΄Χ˜Φ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™ΦΌΧ•ΦΉΧͺ, Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™Χ˜ΦΈΧͺΧ•ΦΉ כְּא֢חָד β€” ΧœΦ°ΧžΦ·Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ˜Φ΅Χ™ Χͺְּא֡נָה, Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ›Φ°Χ Φ΄Χ™Χ‘Χ•ΦΉ ΧœΦ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧ β€” ΧœΦ°ΧžΦ·Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ˜Φ΅Χ™ Χ™ΦΈΧ¨ΦΈΧ§.

The Gemara analyzes each criterion of the mishna. The clause: Anything that is food, serves to exclude the sefiαΈ₯in, produce that grew without being intentionally planted, of woad [setim] and safflower [vekotza]. These plants are used as dyes rather than for food. The clause: And is protected, serves to exclude ownerless crops, which no one protects. The clause: And grows from the earth, serves to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which do not draw sustenance from the ground. The clause: And is gathered as one, serves to exclude the fig tree, whose fruit is gathered over an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen at the same time. Finally, the clause: And that one brings in to storage for preservation, serves to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.

Χ•Φ°ΧΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦΌΧ•ΦΌ Χ’Φ·ΦΌΧ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™ ΧžΦ·Χ’Φ²Χ©Φ΅Χ‚Χ¨ Χͺְּנַן: Χ›ΦΉΦΌΧœ שׁ֢הוּא ΧΧ•ΦΉΧ›ΦΆΧœ, Χ•Φ°Χ Φ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ¨, Χ•Φ°Χ’Φ΄Χ™Χ“ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧœΧ•ΦΉ מִן הָאָר֢Χ₯ β€” Χ—Φ·Χ™ΦΈΦΌΧ™Χ‘ Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧžΦ·ΦΌΧ’Φ·Χ©Φ°Χ‚Χ¨Χ•ΦΉΧͺ, Χ•Φ°ΧΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦΌΧ•ΦΌ ΧœΦ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™Χ˜ΦΈΧͺΧ•ΦΉ כְּא֢חָד, Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ›Φ°Χ Φ΄Χ™Χ‘Χ•ΦΉ ΧœΦ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧ β€” לָא Χ§ΦΈΧͺΦΈΧ Φ΅Χ™.

And yet in the case of tithe, we learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:1) with regard to the halakhot of tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the earth is obligated in tithes. And whereas some of the conditions overlap, the following criteria are not taught with regard to tithes: Gathered as one, and that one brings in to storage for preservation. Evidently, the obligation of tithes applies to fig trees and vegetables, despite the fact that the obligation of pe’a does not apply.

אִם Χ”ΦΈΧ™Χ•ΦΌ בָּה֢ם Χ©ΧΧ•ΦΌΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ Χ•ΦΌΧ‘Φ°Χ¦ΦΈΧœΦ΄Χ™ΧŸ β€” Χ—Φ·Χ™ΦΈΦΌΧ™Χ‘Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ, Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧͺְנַן: ΧžΦ·ΧœΦ°Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ Χ•ΦΉΧͺ Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ¦ΦΈΧœΦ΄Χ™Χ Χ©ΦΆΧΧ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™ΧŸ Χ”Φ·Χ™ΦΈΦΌΧ¨ΦΈΧ§, Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ™ ΧΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ¨: ׀ּ֡אָה ΧžΦ΄Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ אַחַΧͺ וְא֢חָΧͺ, Χ•Φ·Χ—Φ²Χ›ΦΈΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ ΧΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ: ΧžΦ΅ΧΦ·Χ—Φ·Χͺ גַל Χ”Φ·Χ›ΦΉΦΌΧœ.

The Gemara notes that if these vegetables that are exempt from pe’a contained garlic and onions, which are stored for an extended period of time, then they are obligated in pe’a as well. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 3:4): If one has garden beds of onions that are between the vegetables, Rabbi Yosei says that one leaves a separate pe’a from each and every one of the beds. And the Rabbis say one leaves pe’a from one garden bed for all of them.

אָמַר Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ΦΈΦΌΧ” Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧ¨ Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧ¨ Χ—Φ·Χ ΦΈΦΌΧ” אָמַר Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ—ΦΈΧ ΦΈΧŸ: Χ’Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©Φ΄ΧΧ™ΧŸ Χ©ΦΆΧΧ–Φ°ΦΌΧ¨ΦΈΧ’ΦΈΧŸ מִΧͺΦ°ΦΌΧ—Φ΄Χ™ΧœΦΈΦΌΧ” ΧœΦ΄Χ‘Φ°Χ”Φ΅ΧžΦΈΧ”, Χ•Φ°Χ Φ΄ΧžΦ°ΧœΦ·ΧšΦ° Χ’Φ²ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΆΧŸ ΧœΦΈΧΦΈΧ“ΦΈΧ

Β§ Rabba bar bar αΈ€ana says that Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan says: In the case of endives that were initially planted to be fed to animals, and later the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption

Χ¦Φ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ›Χ•ΦΉΧͺ ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ” ΧœΦ΄Χ›Φ°Χ©ΦΆΧΧ™Φ΄ΦΌΧͺΦΈΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©ΧΧ•ΦΌ, Χ§ΦΈΧ‘ΦΈΧ‘Φ·Χ¨ ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΆΧΧ‘ΦΆΧͺ Χ—Φ΄Χ‘ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧ¨ לֹא Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ”ΦΌ ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”.

they require intent to be used for human consumption once they are detached from the ground, in order for them to be susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan rules in this manner because he holds that intent to designate produce while it is attached to the ground is not considered intent.

אָמַר רָבָא: אַף אֲנַן Χ ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™ Χͺְּנ֡ינָא, Χ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΉΧ©ΦΈΧΧ” Χ’ΦΈΧ©ΦΈΧ‚Χ¨ דְּבָרִים Χ ΦΆΧΦΆΧžΦ°Χ¨Χ•ΦΌ Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ Φ΄Χ‘Φ°ΧœΦ·Χͺ Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ£ Χ˜ΦΈΧ”Χ•ΦΉΧ¨, Χ•Φ°Χ–ΦΆΧ” א֢חָד ΧžΦ΅Χ”ΦΆΧŸ: Χ¦Φ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ›ΦΈΧ” ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ” וְא֡ינָהּ Χ¦Φ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ›ΦΈΧ” ה֢כְשׁ֡ר. אַלְמָא ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΆΧΧ‘ΦΆΧͺ חַיִּים לֹא Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ”ΦΌ ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”, הָכָא Χ ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™ ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΆΧΧ‘ΦΆΧͺ Χ—Φ΄Χ‘ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧ¨ לֹא Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ”ΦΌ ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”.

Rava said: We learn in a mishna (Teharot 1:1) as well: Thirteen matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: In order for such a carcass to be susceptible to impurity and to be capable of imparting impurity to food through contact, it requires a person’s intention to eat it, but it does not require exposure to liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity. Even if one had intent to eat the bird while it was still alive, intent is still required after it became a carcass for it to transmit impurity. Rava concludes: Evidently, intent that the bird be eaten while the bird is alive is not considered intent. Here too, intent to designate produce while it is attached to the ground is not considered intent.

Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ ז֡ירָא אָמַר: הָכָא Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ’Χ•ΦΉΧ–ΦΈΧœ שׁ֢נָּ׀ַל מִן הָרוּם Χ’ΦΈΧ‘Φ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™Χ Φ·ΧŸ, Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧœΦΈΧ Χ”Φ²Χ•ΦΈΧ” קַמַּן Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧœΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΧΧ•ΦΉΧ‘ Χ’Φ²ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ.

Rabbi Zeira said: Rava’s proof is inconclusive, as here we are dealing with a young bird that fell from a height, where the bird was not before us prior to it becoming a carcass, so that one could have had intent that it is food. Consequently, it requires intent afterward for it to impart impurity, but had there been intent while it was still alive, that would have sufficed.

אֲמַר ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ אַבָּי֡י: ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦΆΧͺ שׁ֢בְּיַבְנ֢ה, ΧžΦ·ΧΧ™ אִיכָּא ΧœΦ°ΧžΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦ·Χ¨? אֲמַר ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ: ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœ בָּרָא Χ”Φ²Χ•ΦΈΧ”.

Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: What is there to say about the case of the chicken in Yavne? In that instance the Sages deemed the chicken impure due to intent only after it became a carcass, despite the fact that it was present before them while it was alive. This apparently indicates that intent which occurred while the bird was alive is not considered intent. Rabbi Zeira said to Abaye: That was actually a wild chicken, which was not before them while it was alive, and therefore there was no intent that it should be food while it was alive.

אַחִיכוּ Χ’Φ²ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ: ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœ בָּרָא Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ£ טָמ֡א הוּא, Χ•Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ£ טָמ֡א ΧžΦ΄Χ™ קָמְטַמּ֡א? אֲמַר ΧœΦ°Χ”Χ•ΦΌ אַבָּי֡י: גַּבְרָא Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ΦΈΦΌΧ” אֲמַר ΧžΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦ°ΦΌΧͺָא, לָא ΧͺΦ°ΦΌΧ—Φ΄Χ™Χ›Χ•ΦΌ Χ’Φ²ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ, Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧͺΦ·Χ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦΆΧͺ Χ©ΦΆΧΧžΦΈΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ“ΦΈΧ”, Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ·ΧΧ™ ״בָּרָא״? דְּאִיבְּרַאי ΧžΦ΄ΧžΦΈΦΌΧ¨Φ·Χ”ΦΌ.

Those who heard this comment laughed at Rabbi Zeira’s interpretation: A wild chicken is a non-kosher bird, and does a non-kosher bird impart impurity? Abaye said to them: A great man has stated a matter; do not laugh at him. Rabbi Zeira means that this is referring to a chicken that rebelled against its owner, ran away to the wild, and raised its kosher chicks there. One of those chicks subsequently returned from the wild. Consequently, it had not been present before the Sages while it was alive. And what did Rabbi Zeira mean when he mentioned a wild [bara] chicken? He meant one that was created [de’ivrai] from a chicken that rebelled.

Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ ׀ָּ׀ָּא אָמַר: ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦ°Χͺָּא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦ·Χ’Φ°ΧžΦΈΧ הֲוַאי. Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ ׀ָּ׀ָּא ΧœΦ°Χ˜Φ·Χ’Φ°ΧžΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ, Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨ Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ ׀ָּ׀ָּא: ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦΈΧ Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦ·Χ’Φ°ΧžΦΈΧ אֲבִיר, ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦ°Χͺָּא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦ·Χ’Φ°ΧžΦΈΧ שַׁרְיָא.

Rav Pappa stated an alternative interpretation: It was a marsh [de’agma] hen. Since no one lives in a marsh, there was no opportunity for intent while it was alive, and therefore intent was necessary afterward. The Gemara adds: Rav Pappa conforms to his standard line of reasoning in this regard, as Rav Pappa said: The animal called the marsh rooster is prohibited, as it is a non-kosher bird, whereas the marsh hen is kosher and permitted.

Χ•Φ°Χ‘Φ΄Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ ΦΈΧ™ΧšΦ° β€” Χ΄Χ’Φ·ΧžΦΌΧ•ΦΉΧ Φ΄Χ™ Χ•Φ°ΧœΦΉΧ Χ’Φ·ΧžΦΌΧ•ΦΉΧ Φ΄Χ™ΧͺΧ΄. דָּרַשׁ ΧžΦΈΧ¨Φ΄Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ¨: ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦ°Χͺָּא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦ·Χ’Φ°ΧžΦΈΧ אֲבִירָא. Χ—Φ·Χ–Φ°Χ™Χ•ΦΌΧ”ΦΈ Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ΦΈΦΌΧ Φ·ΧŸ Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧ“ΦΈΧ¨Φ°Χ‘ΦΈΧ” Χ•Φ°ΧΦΈΧ›Φ°ΧœΦΈΧ”, Χ•Φ°Χ”Φ·Χ™Φ°Χ™Χ Χ•ΦΌ Χ’Φ΅ΦΌΧ™Χ¨Χ•ΦΌΧͺָא.

And your mnemonic to remember which animal is permitted and which is prohibited is the well-known statement of the Sages with regard to the verse: β€œAn Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:4). An Ammonite man is unfit to enter the assembly but not an Ammonite woman. Here too, the animal with a female name is permitted, whereas the one with a male name is prohibited. Mareimar taught: The marsh hen is prohibited, contrary to the opinion of Rav Pappa, as the Sages saw that it mauled and ate its prey. And this is the geiruta, a non-kosher bird.

ΧͺΦΈΦΌΧ Χ•ΦΌ Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ΦΈΦΌΧ Φ·ΧŸ: Χ’ΦΌΧ•ΦΉΧ–ΦΈΧœ שׁ֢נָּ׀ַל ΧœΦ·Χ’Φ·ΦΌΧͺ, וְחִשַּׁב Χ’ΦΈΧœΦΈΧ™Χ• ΧœΦ°Χ”Φ·Χ’Φ²ΧœΧ•ΦΉΧͺΧ•ΦΉ ΧœΦ°Χ›Χ•ΦΌΧͺΦ΄Χ™ β€” טָמ֡א, ΧœΦ°Χ›ΦΆΧœΦΆΧ‘ β€” Χ˜ΦΈΧ”Χ•ΦΉΧ¨. Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ—ΦΈΧ ΦΈΧŸ Χ‘ΦΆΦΌΧŸ Χ Χ•ΦΌΧ¨Φ΄Χ™ ΧΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ¨: אַף ΧœΦ°Χ›ΦΆΧœΦΆΧ‘ β€” טָמ֡א.

Β§ Apropos the case of a young kosher bird that fell and died, the Sages taught in a baraita: A young kosher bird that fell into a winepress and died there, where the owner intended to draw it up from the press for a Samaritan to eat, is ritually impure, like any carcass of a kosher bird. If he intended to draw it up from the press for a dog to eat, it is ritually pure. Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri says: Even if he intended to draw it up from the press for a dog to eat, it is impure, as the bird does not require intent for it to be impure.

אָמַר Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ—ΦΈΧ ΦΈΧŸ Χ‘ΦΆΦΌΧŸ Χ Χ•ΦΌΧ¨Φ΄Χ™: קַל Χ•ΦΈΧ—Χ•ΦΉΧžΦΆΧ¨, אִם מְטַמּ֡א Χ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦΈΧ” Χ—Φ²ΧžΧ•ΦΌΧ¨ΦΈΧ” שׁ֢לֹּא Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ” β€” לֹא Χ™Φ°Χ˜Φ·ΧžΦ΅ΦΌΧ Χ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦΈΧ” Χ§Φ·ΧœΦΈΦΌΧ” שׁ֢לֹּא Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”?!

Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri says in explanation of his opinion: This halakha can be derived by the following a fortiori inference: If the carcass of a kosher bird transmits severe ritual impurity, i.e., it renders one’s garments impure when an olive-bulk of it is in the throat, without thought, i.e., even if no one had intent that a person should eat it, should it not transmit a lenient impurity of food, by touch alone, likewise without thought?

ΧΦΈΧžΦ°Χ¨Χ•ΦΌ ΧœΧ•ΦΉ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְΧͺΦΈΦΌ Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦΈΧ” Χ—Φ²ΧžΧ•ΦΌΧ¨ΦΈΧ”, Χ©ΦΆΧΧ›Φ΅ΦΌΧŸ א֡ינָהּ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ΦΆΧ“ΦΆΧͺ ΧœΦ°Χ›ΦΈΧšΦ°, Χͺֹּאמַר Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦΈΧ” Χ§Φ·ΧœΦΈΦΌΧ”, Χ©ΦΆΧΧ›Φ΅ΦΌΧŸ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ΦΆΧ“ΦΆΧͺ ΧœΦ°Χ›ΦΈΧšΦ°!

The Rabbis said to Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri: No, this is not a valid a fortiori inference. If you said that there is no requirement of intent with regard to severe ritual impurity, that is because severe ritual impurity does not assume its status with that requirement of thought, i.e., intent is not relevant to that type of impurity. Shall you also say that there is no requirement of thought with regard to lenient impurity, which does assume its status with that requirement of thought? The Gemara will soon explain the precise meaning of this concept of assuming its status with the requirement of thought.

אָמַר ΧœΦΈΧ”ΦΆΧŸ: ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ¨Φ°Χ Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦΆΧͺ שׁ֢בְּיַבְנ֢ה ΧͺΦΌΧ•ΦΉΧ›Φ΄Χ™Χ—Φ·, שׁ֢יּוֹר֢ד֢Χͺ ΧœΦ°Χ›ΦΈΧšΦ°, Χ•Φ°Χ˜Φ΄ΧžΦ°ΦΌΧΧ•ΦΌΧ”ΦΈ שׁ֢לֹּא Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”. ΧΦΈΧžΦ°Χ¨Χ•ΦΌ ΧœΧ•ΦΉ: מִשָּׁם רְאָיָה? Χ›ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧͺִים Χ”ΦΈΧ™Χ•ΦΌ שָׁם, וְחִשְּׁבוּ Χ’ΦΈΧœΦΆΧ™Χ”ΦΈ ΧœΦ·ΧΦ²Χ›Φ΄Χ™ΧœΦΈΧ”.

Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri said to the Rabbis: The case of the chicken in Yavne can prove that the question of whether or not intent is required does not depend on that factor. The case in Yavne involved an item that does assume its status with that requirement of thought, and yet the Sages declared it impure without intent. The Rabbis said to Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri: Will you cite proof from there? In that case there were Samaritans there, and the people in Yavne intended that it be eaten by the Samaritans.

Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ·ΧΧ™ Χ’ΦΈΧ‘Φ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™Χ Φ·ΧŸ? ΧΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ בִּכְרַכִּים, ΧœΦ°ΧžΦΈΧ” ΧœΦ·Χ”ΦΌ ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”? Χ•Φ°Χ”ΦΈΧͺְנַן: Χ Φ΄Χ‘Φ°ΧœΦ·Χͺ Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ”Φ΅ΧžΦΈΧ” Χ˜Φ°Χ”Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ΦΈΧ” Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ›Χ‡Χœ ΧžΦΈΧ§Χ•ΦΉΧ, Χ•Φ°Χ Φ΄Χ‘Φ°ΧœΦ·Χͺ Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ£ Χ˜ΦΈΧ”Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ Χ•Φ°Χ”Φ·Χ—Φ΅ΧœΦΆΧ‘ בַּכְּרַכִּים β€” ΧΦ΅Χ™ΧŸ Χ¦Φ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ›Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ לֹא ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ” Χ•Φ°ΧœΦΉΧ ה֢כְשׁ֡ר!

The Gemara analyzes the case of a young kosher bird that fell into a winepress: What type of situation are we dealing with? If we say that we are dealing with cities, where there are many people available to consume all sorts of food, including the carcass of a kosher bird, why does it require intent? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Okatzin 3:3): An unslaughtered carcass of a kosher animal in any location, whether the population is large or small, and the carcass of a kosher bird or the fat of a kosher animal found in cities [bakerakim], require neither intent for human consumption nor contact with liquid for them to be rendered susceptible to impurity?

א֢לָּא בִּכְ׀ָרִים, Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ΄Χ™ אִיכָּא לְמַאן Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨ Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧœΦΈΧ בָּגֲיָא ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”? Χ•Φ°Χ”ΦΈΧͺְנַן: Χ Φ΄Χ‘Φ°ΧœΦ·Χͺ Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ”Φ΅ΧžΦΈΧ” Χ˜Φ°ΧžΦ΅ΧΦΈΧ” Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ›Χ‡Χœ ΧžΦΈΧ§Χ•ΦΉΧ, Χ•Φ°Χ Φ΄Χ‘Φ°ΧœΦ·Χͺ Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ£ Χ˜ΦΈΧ”Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ בַּכְּ׀ָרִים β€” Χ¦Φ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ›ΦΈΧ” ΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ” וְא֡ינָהּ Χ¦Φ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™Χ›ΦΈΧ” ה֢כְשׁ֡ר!

Rather, it must be referring to villages, where the population is small and there are not many people who would eat the carcass. But this too is difficult: Is there anyone who said that intent is not required in the case of a carcass of a non-kosher bird for the impurity of food? Didn’t we learn in the beginning of that same mishna: A carcass of a non-kosher animal found in any location, and an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird in the villages both require intent to consume them, but they do not require contact with a liquid to become susceptible to ritual impurity?

אָמַר Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ זְג֡ירָא Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧ¨ חֲנִינָא: ΧœΦ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦΈΧ Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ›Φ°Χ¨Φ·ΧšΦ°, Χ•Φ°Χ’Φ΄ΧͺΦΌΧ•ΦΉ מ֡אֲבַΧͺΦΌΧ•ΦΌ, וַגֲשָׂאַΧͺΦΌΧ•ΦΌ Χ›Φ΄ΦΌΧ›Φ°Χ€ΦΈΧ¨.

Rabbi Zeira bar αΈ€anina says: Actually, the baraita is referring to a case that occurred in a city, and even so intent is required. The reason is that the young bird fell into a winepress, and the winepress rendered it disgusting and thereby rendered it like the carcass of a kosher bird in a village, where there are few people who would eat it.

אָמַר Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ—ΦΈΧ ΦΈΧŸ Χ‘ΦΆΦΌΧŸ Χ Χ•ΦΌΧ¨Φ΄Χ™: קַל Χ•ΦΈΧ—Χ•ΦΉΧžΦΆΧ¨, אִם ΧžΦ°Χ˜Φ·ΧžΦ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧ” Χ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦΈΧ” Χ—Φ²ΧžΧ•ΦΌΧ¨ΦΈΧ” שׁ֢לֹּא Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”, לֹא Χͺְּטַמּ֡א Χ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦΈΧ” Χ§Φ·ΧœΦΈΦΌΧ” שׁ֢לֹּא Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ·Χ—Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧ‘ΦΈΧ”?

The Gemara analyzes the exchange cited above. Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri says that this halakha can be derived by an a fortiori inference: If the carcass of a kosher bird transmits severe ritual impurity without thought, should it not transmit lenient impurity without thought?

ΧΦΈΧžΦ°Χ¨Χ•ΦΌ ΧœΧ•ΦΉ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְΧͺΦΈΦΌ Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ˜Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ°ΧΦΈΧ” Χ—Φ²ΧžΧ•ΦΌΧ¨ΦΈΧ” Χ©ΦΆΧΧ›Φ΅ΦΌΧŸ א֡ינָהּ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ΦΆΧ“ΦΆΧͺ ΧœΦ°Χ›ΦΈΧšΦ°.

The Rabbis said to Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri: No, this is not a valid a fortiori inference. If you said so with regard to severe ritual impurity, that is because it does not assume its status with that requirement of thought.

ΧžΦ·ΧΧ™ ״א֡ינָהּ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ΦΆΧ“ΦΆΧͺ ΧœΦ°Χ›ΦΈΧšΦ°Χ΄? אָמַר רָבָא: Χ”ΦΈΧ›Φ΄Χ™ Χ§ΦΈΧΦΈΧžΦ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™ ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְΧͺΦΈΦΌ

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the clause: It does not assume its status with that requirement of thought? In what manner is thought required for the lenient impurity of food it imparts in the case of a bird carcass but not required for the severe impurity it imparts when it is in the throat? Rava said that this is what the Rabbis said to Rabbi YoαΈ₯anan ben Nuri: No, if you said that there is no requirement of thought

Want to follow content and continue where you left off?

Create an account today to track your progress, mark what you’ve learned, and follow the shiurim that speak to you.

Clear all items from this list?

This will remove ALL the items in this section. You will lose any progress or history connected to them. This is irreversible.

Cancel
Yes, clear all

Are you sure you want to delete this item?

You will lose any progress or history connected to this item.

Cancel
Yes, delete