Niddah 50

רבי מאיר היא דתניא היה רבי מאיר אומר מה תלמוד לומר על פיהם יהיה כל ריב וכל נגע וכי מה ענין ריבים אצל נגעים מקיש ריבים לנגעים מה נגעים ביום דכתיב וביום הראות בו אף ריבים ביום

It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states: “According to their word shall every dispute and every leprous mark be” (Deuteronomy 21:5)? What do disputes have to do with leprous marks? The verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous marks, to teach that just as leprous marks are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written with regard to leprous marks: “And on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure” (Leviticus 13:14), so too, disputes are adjudicated only in the daytime.

ומה נגעים שלא בסומא דכתיב לכל מראה עיני הכהן אף ריבים שלא בסומא ומקיש נגעים לריבים מה ריבים שלא בקרובים אף נגעים שלא בקרובים

And just as leprous marks are seen by priests who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: “As far as appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12), which teaches that they must be viewed by priests who can see with both eyes, so too, disputes are not adjudicated by blind judges, even if they are blind in only one eye. And the verse juxtaposes leprous marks to disputes to teach that just as disputes may not be judged by relatives of the litigants, so too, leprous marks may not be viewed by a priest who is a relative of the afflicted party.

אי מה ריבים בשלשה אף נגעים בשלשה ודין הוא ממונו בשלשה גופו לא כל שכן תלמוד לומר והובא אל אהרן הכהן או אל אחד מבניו הכהנים הא למדת שאפילו כהן אחד רואה את הנגעים

The baraita continues: If these two halakhot are compared, one can also say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too, leprous marks must be viewed by three priests. And this suggestion is supported by a logical inference: If a case that only involves one’s money is adjudicated by three judges, all the more so is it not clear that leprous marks, which afflict the person himself, should be viewed by three priests? To counter this notion, the verse states: “And he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). You have learned from this that even one priest may view leprous marks.

ההוא סמיא דהוה בשבבותיה דרבי יוחנן דהוה קדיין דינא ולא קאמר ליה ולא מידי היכי עביד הכי והאמר רבי יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה

The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind person who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yoḥanan who would render judgments, and Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Yoḥanan do this? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that the halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna?

ותנן כל הכשר לדון כשר להעיד ויש כשר להעיד ואין כשר לדון ואמרינן לאתויי מאי ואמר רבי יוחנן לאתויי סומא באחת מעיניו

And we learned in the mishna: Any person who is fit to adjudicate a case and serve as a judge is fit to testify as a witness, and there are those who are fit to testify but are not fit to adjudicate. And we said: What is added by this halakha, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It serves to add one who is blind in one of his eyes, as he is fit to testify but unfit to judge. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan evidently maintains that one who is blind even in one of his eyes is not fit to judge, why did he not admonish this judge?

רבי יוחנן סתמא אחרינא אשכח דתנן דיני ממונות דנין ביום וגומרין בלילה

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna which indicates a different conclusion. As we learned in the mishna in tractate Sanhedrin (32a): In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues their ruling even at night. This is not the halakha with regard to leprous marks, which may not be viewed at night at all. Accordingly, one does not compare judging cases of monetary law to viewing leprous marks. Since this comparison was the source for disqualifying a blind judge, one cannot derive from it that a blind judge is disqualified.

ומאי אולמיה דהאי סתמא מהאי סתמא איבעית אימא סתמא דרבים עדיף ואיבעית אימא משום דקתני לה גבי הלכתא דדיני

The Gemara asks: And in what manner is the strength of that unattributed mishna in tractate Sanhedrin greater than the strength of this unattributed mishna here? Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan accept the ruling of that mishna? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages, as in Sanhedrin, is preferable, whereas the mishna here was established as in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir. And if you wish, say instead that it is because the mishna in Sanhedrin teaches this halakha in the context of the halakhot of judges. Since that chapter is the primary source for all of the halakhot of court matters, its rulings are of greater weight.

מתני׳ כל שחייב במעשרות מטמא טומאת אוכלין ויש שמטמא טומאת אוכלין ואינו חייב במעשרות

MISHNA: Any food from which one is obligated to separate tithes becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food; and there is food that becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food but from which one is not obligated to separate tithes.

גמ׳ לאתויי מאי לאתויי בשר ודגים וביצים

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of this mishna? The Gemara answers: This serves to add meat, fish, and eggs. Although they are subject to the ritual impurity of food, one is not obligated to separate tithes from them.

מתני׳ כל שחייב בפאה חייב במעשרות ויש שחייב במעשרות ואינו חייב בפאה

MISHNA: With regard to any produce from which one is obligated to designate produce in the corner of the field given to the poor [pe’a], as commanded in the Torah (see Leviticus 19:9, 23:22), one is obligated to separate tithes from it; and there is produce from which one is obligated to separate tithes but from which one is not obligated to designate pe’a.

גמ׳ לאתויי מאי לאתויי תאנה וירק שאינו חייב בפאה דתנן כלל אמרו בפאה כל שהוא אוכל ונשמר וגידולו מן הארץ ולקיטתו כאחד ומכניסו לקיום חייב בפאה

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of the mishna? The Gemara answers: It serves to add figs and vegetables, for which one is not obligated to designate pe’a, although the obligation of tithes does apply to them. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 1:4): The Sages stated a principle with regard to the halakhot of pe’a: With regard to anything that is food, and is protected, and that grows from the earth, and is gathered as one, i.e., there is one fixed time for gathering it, and that one brings in to store for preservation, its owner is obligated to designate pe’a.

אוכל למעוטי ספיחי סטים וקוצה ונשמר למעוטי הפקר וגידולו מן הארץ למעוטי כמהים ופטריות ולקיטתו כאחד למעוטי תאנה ומכניסו לקיום למעוטי ירק

The Gemara analyzes each criterion of the mishna. The clause: Anything that is food, serves to exclude the sefiḥin, produce that grew without being intentionally planted, of woad [setim] and safflower [vekotza]. These plants are used as dyes rather than for food. The clause: And is protected, serves to exclude ownerless crops, which no one protects. The clause: And grows from the earth, serves to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which do not draw sustenance from the ground. The clause: And is gathered as one, serves to exclude the fig tree, whose fruit is gathered over an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen at the same time. Finally, the clause: And that one brings in to storage for preservation, serves to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.

ואילו גבי מעשר תנן כל שהוא אוכל ונשמר וגידולו מן הארץ חייב במעשרות ואילו לקיטתו כאחד ומכניסו לקיום לא קתני

And yet in the case of tithe, we learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:1) with regard to the halakhot of tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the earth is obligated in tithes. And whereas some of the conditions overlap, the following criteria are not taught with regard to tithes: Gathered as one, and that one brings in to storage for preservation. Evidently, the obligation of tithes applies to fig trees and vegetables, despite the fact that the obligation of pe’a does not apply.

אם היו בהם שומים ובצלין חייבין דתנן מלבנות בצלים שבין הירק רבי יוסי אומר פאה מכל אחת ואחת וחכמים אומרים מאחת על הכל

The Gemara notes that if these vegetables that are exempt from pe’a contained garlic and onions, which are stored for an extended period of time, then they are obligated in pe’a as well. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 3:4): If one has garden beds of onions that are between the vegetables, Rabbi Yosei says that one leaves a separate pe’a from each and every one of the beds. And the Rabbis say one leaves pe’a from one garden bed for all of them.

אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן עולשין שזרען מתחילה לבהמה ונמלך עליהן לאדם

§ Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of endives that were initially planted to be fed to animals, and later the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption

צריכות מחשבה לכשיתלשו קסבר מחשבת חבור לא שמה מחשבה

they require intent to be used for human consumption once they are detached from the ground, in order for them to be susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in this manner because he holds that intent to designate produce while it is attached to the ground is not considered intent.

אמר רבא אף אנן נמי תנינא שלשה עשר דברים נאמרו בנבלת עוף טהור וזה אחד מהן צריכה מחשבה ואינה צריכה הכשר אלמא מחשבת חיים לא שמה מחשבה הכא נמי מחשבת חבור לא שמה מחשבה

Rava said: We learn in a mishna (Teharot 1:1) as well: Thirteen matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: In order for such a carcass to be susceptible to impurity and to be capable of imparting impurity to food through contact, it requires a person’s intention to eat it, but it does not require exposure to liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity. Even if one had intent to eat the bird while it was still alive, intent is still required after it became a carcass for it to transmit impurity. Rava concludes: Evidently, intent that the bird be eaten while the bird is alive is not considered intent. Here too, intent to designate produce while it is attached to the ground is not considered intent.

רבי זירא אמר הכא בגוזל שנפל מן הרום עסקינן דלא הוה קמן דלחשוב עליה

Rabbi Zeira said: Rava’s proof is inconclusive, as here we are dealing with a young bird that fell from a height, where the bird was not before us prior to it becoming a carcass, so that one could have had intent that it is food. Consequently, it requires intent afterward for it to impart impurity, but had there been intent while it was still alive, that would have sufficed.

אמר ליה אביי תרנגולת שביבנה מאי איכא למימר אמר ליה תרנגול ברא הוה

Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: What is there to say about the case of the chicken in Yavne? In that instance the Sages deemed the chicken impure due to intent only after it became a carcass, despite the fact that it was present before them while it was alive. This apparently indicates that intent which occurred while the bird was alive is not considered intent. Rabbi Zeira said to Abaye: That was actually a wild chicken, which was not before them while it was alive, and therefore there was no intent that it should be food while it was alive.

אחיכו עליה תרנגול ברא עוף טמא הוא ועוף טמא מי קמטמא אמר להו אביי גברא רבה אמר מילתא לא תחיכו עליה בתרנגולת שמרדה ומאי ברא דאיבראי ממרה

Those who heard this comment laughed at Rabbi Zeira’s interpretation: A wild chicken is a non-kosher bird, and does a non-kosher bird impart impurity? Abaye said to them: A great man has stated a matter; do not laugh at him. Rabbi Zeira means that this is referring to a chicken that rebelled against its owner, ran away to the wild, and raised its kosher chicks there. One of those chicks subsequently returned from the wild. Consequently, it had not been present before the Sages while it was alive. And what did Rabbi Zeira mean when he mentioned a wild [bara] chicken? He meant one that was created [de’ivrai] from a chicken that rebelled.

רב פפא אמר תרנגולתא דאגמא הואי רב פפא לטעמיה דאמר רב פפא תרנגול דאגמא אסור תרנגולתא דאגמא שריא

Rav Pappa stated an alternative interpretation: It was a marsh [de’agma] hen. Since no one lives in a marsh, there was no opportunity for intent while it was alive, and therefore intent was necessary afterward. The Gemara adds: Rav Pappa conforms to his standard line of reasoning in this regard, as Rav Pappa said: The animal called the marsh rooster is prohibited, as it is a non-kosher bird, whereas the marsh hen is kosher and permitted.

וסימניך עמוני ולא עמונית דרש מרימר תרנגולתא דאגמא אסירא חזיוה רבנן דדרסה ואכלה והיינו גירותא

And your mnemonic to remember which animal is permitted and which is prohibited is the well-known statement of the Sages with regard to the verse: “An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:4). An Ammonite man is unfit to enter the assembly but not an Ammonite woman. Here too, the animal with a female name is permitted, whereas the one with a male name is prohibited. Mareimar taught: The marsh hen is prohibited, contrary to the opinion of Rav Pappa, as the Sages saw that it mauled and ate its prey. And this is the geiruta, a non-kosher bird.

תנו רבנן גוזל שנפל לגת וחשב עליו להעלותו לכותי טמא לכלב טהור רבי יוחנן בן נורי אומר אף לכלב טמא

§ Apropos the case of a young kosher bird that fell and died, the Sages taught in a baraita: A young kosher bird that fell into a winepress and died there, where the owner intended to draw it up from the press for a Samaritan to eat, is ritually impure, like any carcass of a kosher bird. If he intended to draw it up from the press for a dog to eat, it is ritually pure. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: Even if he intended to draw it up from the press for a dog to eat, it is impure, as the bird does not require intent for it to be impure.

אמר רבי יוחנן בן נורי קל וחומר אם מטמא טומאה חמורה שלא במחשבה לא יטמא טומאה קלה שלא במחשבה

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says in explanation of his opinion: This halakha can be derived by the following a fortiori inference: If the carcass of a kosher bird transmits severe ritual impurity, i.e., it renders one’s garments impure when an olive-bulk of it is in the throat, without thought, i.e., even if no one had intent that a person should eat it, should it not transmit a lenient impurity of food, by touch alone, likewise without thought?

אמרו לו לא אם אמרת בטומאה חמורה שכן אינה יורדת לכך תאמר בטומאה קלה שכן יורדת לכך

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, this is not a valid a fortiori inference. If you said that there is no requirement of intent with regard to severe ritual impurity, that is because severe ritual impurity does not assume its status with that requirement of thought, i.e., intent is not relevant to that type of impurity. Shall you also say that there is no requirement of thought with regard to lenient impurity, which does assume its status with that requirement of thought? The Gemara will soon explain the precise meaning of this concept of assuming its status with the requirement of thought.

אמר להן תרנגולת שביבנה תוכיח שיורדת לכך וטמאוה שלא במחשבה אמרו לו משם ראיה כותים היו שם וחשבו עליה לאכילה

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to the Rabbis: The case of the chicken in Yavne can prove that the question of whether or not intent is required does not depend on that factor. The case in Yavne involved an item that does assume its status with that requirement of thought, and yet the Sages declared it impure without intent. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Will you cite proof from there? In that case there were Samaritans there, and the people in Yavne intended that it be eaten by the Samaritans.

במאי עסקינן אילימא בכרכים למה לה מחשבה והתנן נבלת בהמה טהורה בכל מקום ונבלת עוף טהור והחלב בכרכים אין צריכין לא מחשבה ולא הכשר

The Gemara analyzes the case of a young kosher bird that fell into a winepress: What type of situation are we dealing with? If we say that we are dealing with cities, where there are many people available to consume all sorts of food, including the carcass of a kosher bird, why does it require intent? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Okatzin 3:3): An unslaughtered carcass of a kosher animal in any location, whether the population is large or small, and the carcass of a kosher bird or the fat of a kosher animal found in cities [bakerakim], require neither intent for human consumption nor contact with liquid for them to be rendered susceptible to impurity?

אלא בכפרים ומי איכא למאן דאמר דלא בעיא מחשבה והתנן נבלת בהמה טמאה בכל מקום ונבלת עוף טהור בכפרים צריכה מחשבה ואינה צריכה הכשר

Rather, it must be referring to villages, where the population is small and there are not many people who would eat the carcass. But this too is difficult: Is there anyone who said that intent is not required in the case of a carcass of a non-kosher bird for the impurity of food? Didn’t we learn in the beginning of that same mishna: A carcass of a non-kosher animal found in any location, and an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird in the villages both require intent to consume them, but they do not require contact with a liquid to become susceptible to ritual impurity?

אמר רבי זעירא בר חנינא לעולם בכרך וגתו מאסתו ועשאתו ככפר

Rabbi Zeira bar Ḥanina says: Actually, the baraita is referring to a case that occurred in a city, and even so intent is required. The reason is that the young bird fell into a winepress, and the winepress rendered it disgusting and thereby rendered it like the carcass of a kosher bird in a village, where there are few people who would eat it.

אמר רבי יוחנן בן נורי קל וחומר אם מטמאה טומאה חמורה שלא במחשבה לא תטמא טומאה קלה שלא במחשבה

The Gemara analyzes the exchange cited above. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says that this halakha can be derived by an a fortiori inference: If the carcass of a kosher bird transmits severe ritual impurity without thought, should it not transmit lenient impurity without thought?

אמרו לו לא אם אמרת בטומאה חמורה שכן אינה יורדת לכך

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, this is not a valid a fortiori inference. If you said so with regard to severe ritual impurity, that is because it does not assume its status with that requirement of thought.

מאי אינה יורדת לכך אמר רבא הכי קאמרי ליה לא אם אמרת

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the clause: It does not assume its status with that requirement of thought? In what manner is thought required for the lenient impurity of food it imparts in the case of a bird carcass but not required for the severe impurity it imparts when it is in the throat? Rava said that this is what the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, if you said that there is no requirement of thought