Niddah 8

Niddah 8

מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הַקְּטַנָּה שֶׁתְּמָאֵן בּוֹ, וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר! כִּי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּאַרְבָּעָה בְּסֵדֶר טְהָרוֹת, אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר סְדָרִים אִיכָּא טוּבָא.

We instruct the minor, i.e., the surviving brother’s wife, to refuse to continue to stay married to him so that her marriage is dissolved, and he may then enter into levirate marriage with her adult sister, the widow of his childless brother. And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara explains: When Shmuel says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, what he meant was four cases within Seder Teharot in the Mishna, the order that deals with ritual purity. But in the other orders, there are many instances where the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

וְהָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף הָרוֹדֶה וְנוֹתֵן לַסַּל, הַסַּל מְצָרְפָן לַחַלָּה. וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara adds: This too stands to reason, as we learned in a mishna in the order of Zera’im (Ḥalla 2:4) that Rabbi Eliezer says: Even with regard to one who removes loaves of bread from an oven and places them in a basket, the basket serves to combine them to reach the quantity from which one is required to separate ḥalla, despite the fact that each of the loaves does not contain the necessary measure for ḥalla on its own. And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Conclude from this that Shmuel’s general statement applies only to Seder Teharot.

וּמַאי אוּלְמֵיהּ דְּהַאי מֵהַאי? מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר כְּוָתֵיהּ.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: The case of ḥalla was cited as proof that there is an exception to Shmuel’s principle that there are only four cases where the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, after a difficulty was raised from the case of levirate marriage with the sister of one’s minor wife. But in what way is this case of ḥalla greater proof than that case of the levirate marriage? Neither case appears in Seder Teharot. The Gemara answers: The case of the levirate marriage is different, as there Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הַקְּטַנָּה שֶׁתְּמָאֵן בּוֹ.

As we learned in the mishna (Yevamot 111b): A yavam may perform levirate marriage with only one of his deceased brother’s wives. Once he does so, the other wives are forbidden to him, because they had been married to his brother. If a deceased brother had two wives, an adult and a minor, and the yavam engaged in sexual intercourse with the minor and then engaged in intercourse with the adult, the Rabbis maintain that he disqualifies the minor from staying married to him, as her levirate bond is uncertain, and the adult wife is also prohibited to him, because the levirate marriage with the minor is considered effective by rabbinic law. Rabbi Elazar says: The court instructs the minor to refuse him, thereby annulling her marriage retroactively, and he may then perform levirate marriage with the adult. Accordingly, the case of ḥalla is a stronger example, as there the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer exclusively, as his opinion is not supported by another tanna.

וּמִי קָאֵי? וְהָא אַצְרוֹכֵי מַצְרְכִינַן לְהוּ, וְלָא דָּמְיָין לַהֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בָּבָא כְּוָתֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But doesn’t the Gemara (Yevamot 111b) explain that both the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Elazar are necessary, as they apply to different cases, and therefore they are not comparable to each other? The Gemara suggests a new answer: Rather, the ruling with regard to levirate marriage is a weaker example of a case where the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with his opinion.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בָּבָא הֵעִיד חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים: שֶׁמְּמָאֲנִים אֶת הַקְּטַנּוֹת.

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testified about five matters of halakha: Normally, marriage refusals of girls married off by their mother or brothers are discouraged. Yet, in specific instances where it is clear that if the marriage were to remain in effect it would engender problems related to levirate marriage and ḥalitza, the court persuades minor girls to refuse to continue living with their husbands, thereby resolving the complications involved in the case.

וְשֶׁמַּשִּׂיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד, וְשֶׁנִּסְקַל תַּרְנְגוֹל בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם עַל שֶׁהָרַג אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ, וְעַל יַיִן בֶּן אַרְבָּעִים יוֹם שֶׁנִּתְנַסֵּךְ עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, וְעַל תָּמִיד שֶׁל שַׁחַר שֶׁקָּרַב בְּאַרְבַּע שָׁעוֹת.

And he also testified that one may allow a woman who seeks to remarry after hearing of her husband’s death to marry based on the testimony of one witness, as opposed to the two witnesses required for other matters of testimony. And he further testified that a rooster was stoned to death in Jerusalem for killing a person, in order to teach that the Torah law requiring the stoning of an ox that killed a person (see Exodus 21:28) applies to other animals as well. And he testified about forty-day-old wine that was used for libation on the altar. And finally, he testified about the daily morning offering that was sacrificed at four hours of the day.

מַאי קְטַנּוֹת? לָאו חֲדָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, וְחַד דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? לָא, מַאי קְטַנּוֹת? קְטַנּוֹת דְּעָלְמָא.

The Gemara concludes its proof: When the baraita teaches that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testified that the court persuades minor girls to refuse to continue living with their husbands, what is the significance of the reference to minor girls in the plural? Is this not referring to the one minor girl who is the subject of the ruling of Rabbi Elazar and the other one that is the subject of the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer? Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the minor’s refusal. If so, this ruling is a weaker proof that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in cases outside of Seder Teharot. The Gemara answers: No, what is meant by the plural: Minor girls? It means minor girls in general, i.e., all minor girls in such cases where the ruling of Rabbi Elazar applies.

אִי הָכִי, גַּבֵּי אִשָּׁה נָמֵי, נִתְנֵי ״נָשִׁים״ וְנֵימָא נָשִׁים דְּעָלְמָא! אֶלָּא, מִדְּהָכָא קָתָנֵי ״אִשָּׁה״, וְהָכָא קָתָנֵי ״קְטַנּוֹת״, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דַּוְקָא קָתָנֵי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara challenges: If so, with regard to the halakha listed in the baraita that one may allow a woman to marry based on the testimony of one witness, let it also teach: Women, in the plural, and we will say that it is referring to women in general. Rather, from the fact that here it teaches: A woman, and yet here it teaches: Minor girls, conclude from this discrepancy that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava is teaching his ruling specifically about two minor girls: The one who is the subject of Rabbi Elazar’s ruling and the one who is the subject of Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling. The Gemara comments: Indeed, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּאַרְבָּעָה. וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָתְנַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הַקְּטַנָּה שֶׁתְּמָאֵן בּוֹ, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר! וְכִי תֵימָא: כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּאַרְבָּעָה בְּסֵדֶר טְהָרוֹת, אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר סִדְרֵי אִיכָּא. וּמִי אִיכָּא?

§ And similarly, Rabbi Elazar says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases. The Gemara asks: And are there no more? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: The court instructs the minor to refuse to stay married to him, and Rabbi Elazar said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? The Gemara adds: And if you would say that when Rabbi Elazar said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, he meant four cases within Seder Teharot, but in the other orders of the Mishna there are many cases, are there really other such cases?

וְהָתְנַן: הַוֶּרֶד, וְהַכּוֹפֶר, וְהַלְּטוֹם, וְהַקְּטָף — יֵשׁ לָהֶן שְׁבִיעִית, וְלִדְמֵיהֶן שְׁבִיעִית, יֵשׁ לָהֶן בִּיעוּר, וְלִדְמֵיהֶן בִּיעוּר. וְאָמַר רַבִּי פְּדָת: מַאן תְּנָא קִטְפָא פֵּירָא? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shevi’it 7:6) that the halakha of the following fragrant plants: The rose, the henna, the rockrose, and the balsam, is that they have the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, and money exchanged for them has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Additionally, they have the halakha of eradication and money exchanged for them has the halakha of eradication. And with regard to this mishna, Rabbi Pedat said: Who is the tanna who taught that balsam has the status of a fruit, and is not merely sap, and therefore it has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year? It is Rabbi Eliezer.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: חֲזִי דְּמִינָּךְ וּמֵאֲבוּךְ קָשָׁרֵיתוּ קִטְפָא לְעָלְמָא! אַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ: מַאן תַּנָּא קִטְפָא פֵּירָא? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וַאֲבוּךְ אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּאַרְבָּעָה.

The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Pedat: One can see that from you and from your father, i.e., between the two of you, you have permitted balsam to the world, since the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer is certainly not accepted. As you said: Who is the tanna who taught that balsam has the status of a fruit? It is Rabbi Eliezer. And your father, Rabbi Elazar, said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in only four cases.

וְאִם אִיתָא, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: כִּי אָמַר אַבָּא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּאַרְבָּעָה בְּסֵדֶר טְהָרוֹת, אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר סִדְרֵי אִיכָּא.

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, that Rabbi Elazar was referring only to Seder Teharot, then let Rabbi Pedat say to Rabbi Zeira: When my father said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, he meant only four cases within Seder Teharot, but in the other orders there are other such cases. From the fact that Rabbi Pedat did not reply in this manner, evidently there are no cases in the other orders of the Mishna where, according to Rabbi Elazar, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

אֶלָּא קַשְׁיָא הָהִיא! מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר כְּוָתֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: מְלַמְּדִים אֶת הַקְּטַנָּה שֶׁתְּמָאֵן בּוֹ.

The Gemara asks: But that case, where the amora Rabbi Elazar said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to persuading a minor to refuse to stay married to her husband, is difficult. This apparently conflicts with the statement that there are only four cases in which Rabbi Elazar rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara answers: There the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer only because the tanna Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with his opinion. As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Elazar says: The court instructs the minor to refuse to stay married to him, thereby annulling her marriage retroactively.

וּמִי קָאֵי, וְהָא אַצְרוֹכֵי מַצְרְכִינַן לְהוּ, וְלָא דָּמְיָין לַהֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בָּבָא כְּוָותֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in that case of the minor? But doesn’t the Gemara in Yevamot explain that both the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Elazar are necessary, and therefore they are not comparable to each other? Rather, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in that case because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with his opinion, as explained earlier.

וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָתְנַן: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אוֹמְרָהּ בְּרָכָה רְבִיעִית בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אוֹמְרָהּ בַּהוֹדָאָה, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר!

The Gemara asks: And are there no more cases in which Rabbi Elazar maintains that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Berakhot 33a): One recites the prayer of distinction between the holy and the profane [havdala], said in the evening prayer following Shabbat and festivals, in the fourth blessing of the Amida prayer: Who graciously grants knowledge. Rabbi Akiva says: One recites havdala as a fourth blessing by itself. Rabbi Eliezer says that one recites it in the blessing of thanksgiving. And with regard to this dispute, Rabbi Elazar says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: הָהוּא דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אוֹמְרָהּ בְּרָכָה רְבִיעִית בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ, רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אוֹמְרָהּ בַּהוֹדָאָה.

Rabbi Abba said, in explanation: That case is different, as that is not the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer himself. Rather, he stated that ruling in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: One recites havdala as a fourth blessing by itself; Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: One recites it in the blessing of thanksgiving.

וְהָא קַשִּׁישׁ מִינֵּיהּ טוּבָא! אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּשִׁיטְתֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabbi Eliezer much older than Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel? How could Rabbi Eliezer have cited the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel? The Gemara answers: Rather, the reason Rabbi Elazar ruled that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in that case was because Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel held in accordance with his opinion.

וּמִי קָאֵי? וְהָתַנְיָא: אוֹר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים — מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, שַׁחֲרִית — מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, מוּסָף — מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, מִנְחָה — מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, בִּנְעִילָה — מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, בְּעַרְבִית — מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע מֵעֵין שְׁמֹנֶה עֶשְׂרֵה.

And does Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel really hold in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: On the night of Yom Kippur, one prays seven blessings in the Amida prayer and confesses; in the morning prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; in the additional prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; in the afternoon prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; and in the ne’ila prayer, one also prays seven blessings and confesses. For the evening prayer at the conclusion of Yom Kippur, one prays seven blessings in an abridged version of the eighteen blessings of the weekday Amida prayer. One recites the first three blessings, the final three, and a middle blessing that includes an abbreviated form of the other weekday blessings.

רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִשּׁוּם אֲבוֹתָיו אוֹמֵר: מִתְפַּלֵּל שְׁמֹנֶה עֶשְׂרֵה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לוֹמַר הַבְדָּלָה בְּ״חוֹנֵן הַדָּעַת״. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אִיהוּ אָמַר מִשּׁוּם אֲבוֹתָיו, וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says in the name of his forefathers: One recites the complete eighteen blessings, due to the fact that he is required to recite havdala in the fourth blessing of the Amida: Who graciously grants knowledge. Havdala cannot be inserted into the abridged version. Evidently, Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel does not agree with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling that one recites havdala in the blessing of thanksgiving, one of the final three blessings of the Amida prayer. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says in explanation: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel said this opinion in the name of his forefathers, but he himself does not hold accordingly.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה לְרַבִּי זֵירָא: וְאַתְּ לָא תִּסְבְּרַאּ דְּמַאן תְּנָא קִטְפָא פֵּירָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הוּא? וְהָתְנַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: הַמַּעֲמִיד בִּשְׂרַף עָרְלָה אָסוּר!

§ Earlier, Rabbi Zeira questioned the claim of Rabbi Pedat, son of Rabbi Eliezer, that the Sage who holds that balsam is considered to be fruit and therefore has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year is Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: And you? Do you not hold that the tanna who taught that balsam sap has the status of fruit is Rabbi Eliezer? As, didn’t we learn in a mishna (Orla 1:7) that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who curdles cheese in the sap of orla, the cheese is prohibited, as the sap is considered to be fruit of the tree.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אֶלָּא בְּקִטְפָא דִּגְוָוזָא, אֲבָל בְּקִטְפָא דְּפֵירָא מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: שָׁמַעְתִּי בְּפֵירוּשׁ שֶׁהַמַּעֲמִיד בִּשְׂרַף הֶעָלִין בִּשְׂרַף הָעִיקָּרִין מוּתָּר, בִּשְׂרַף הַפַּגִּין אָסוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא פֶּרִי.

The Gemara answers: You may even say that the mishna that deals with balsam is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. As the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to the sap of the tree, but in the case of the sap of the fruit they agree with him. As we learned in a mishna (Orla 1:7) that Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard explicitly that in the case of one who curdles cheese in the sap of the leaves or the sap of the roots of an orla tree, the cheese is permitted. But if it is curdled in the sap of unripe figs it is prohibited, because that sap is considered to be fruit.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר — בְּאִילָן הָעוֹשֶׂה פֵּירוֹת, אֲבָל בְּאִילָן שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה פֵּירוֹת — מוֹדוּ דִּקְטָפוֹ זֶהוּ פִּרְיוֹ. דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵין לַקְּטָף שְׁבִיעִית, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יֵשׁ לַקְּטָף שְׁבִיעִית, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקְּטָפוֹ זֶהוּ פִּרְיוֹ.

And if you wish, say instead: When the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, it is with regard to a tree that bears fruit. But in the case of a tree that does not bear fruit, they agree that its sap is considered to be its fruit. As we learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 7:6) that Rabbi Shimon says: The sanctity of the Sabbatical Year does not apply to sap. And the Rabbis say: The sanctity of the Sabbatical Year does apply to sap, because its sap is its fruit.

מַאן חֲכָמִים? לָאו רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא סָבָא: הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאן חֲכָמִים? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר: קְטָפוֹ זֶהוּ פִּרְיוֹ.

The Gemara explains the proof: Who are these Rabbis? Are they not the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer? If so, this demonstrates that they agree in the case of a tree that does not bear fruit. The Gemara rejects this proof: A certain elder said to Rabbi Zeira that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Who are the Rabbis in this mishna? It is Rabbi Eliezer, who said that its sap is considered to be its fruit.

אִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, מַאי אִירְיָא אִילָן שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה פְּרִי? אֲפִילּוּ אִילָן הָעוֹשֶׂה פְּרִי — קְטָפוֹ זֶהוּ פִּרְיוֹ! לְדִבְרֵיהֶם דְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי, אֲפִילּוּ אִילָן הָעוֹשֶׂה פֵּירוֹת נָמֵי — קְטָפוֹ זֶהוּ פִּרְיוֹ. לְדִידְכוּ, אוֹדוֹ לִי מִיהַת בְּאִילָן שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה פֵּירוֹת דִּקְטָפוֹ זֶהוּ פִּרְיוֹ. וְרַבָּנַן אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: לָא שְׁנָא.

The Gemara asks: If it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, why are they specifically discussing the case of a tree that does not bear fruit? Even in the case of a tree that does bear fruit, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that its sap is like its fruit. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis themselves, as follows: According to my opinion, even with regard to a tree that bears fruit, its sap is also considered to be its fruit. But according to your opinion, you should at least agree with me in the case of a tree that does not bear fruit, that its sap is considered to be its fruit. And the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Eliezer: It is no different. Sap is not considered fruit whether it comes from a fruit-bearing tree or a barren tree.

אֵיזוֹ הִיא בְּתוּלָה? כֹּל שֶׁלֹּא רָאֲתָה כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: נִשֵּׂאת וְרָאֲתָה דָּם מֵחֲמַת נִישּׂוּאִין, יָלְדָה וְרָאֲתָה דָּם מֵחֲמַת לֵידָה — עֲדַיִין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא לָהּ ״בְּתוּלָה״, שֶׁהֲרֵי ״בְּתוּלָה״ שֶׁאָמְרוּ — בְּתוּלַת דָּמִים, וְלֹא בְּתוּלַת בְּתוּלִים.

§ The mishna teaches: Who is the woman characterized as a virgin in this context? It is any woman who did not see the flow of menstrual blood in all her days, even if she was married and experienced bleeding resulting from intercourse consummating her marriage. The Sages taught: If she was married and she saw a flow of blood due to her marriage, i.e., blood resulting from the tearing of her hymen; or if she gave birth and saw blood due to the birth, I still call her a virgin in this context. The reason is that when they said: Virgin here, they meant a menstrual blood virgin, i.e., one who did not yet see a menstrual flow, and not a hymen-blood virgin, i.e., one who did not experience bleeding from a torn hymen.

אִינִי? וְהָאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: תְּנָא, שָׁלֹשׁ בְּתוּלוֹת הֵן — בְּתוּלַת אָדָם, בְּתוּלַת קַרְקַע, בְּתוּלַת שִׁקְמָה. בְּתוּלַת אָדָם — כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁלֹּא נִבְעֲלָה, נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, אִי נָמֵי לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Kahana say that a Sage taught: There are three types of virgins: A virgin human, virgin ground, and a virgin sycamore. A virgin human is a woman for as long as she has not engaged in intercourse. The relevance of this designation is that only a virgin is permitted to marry a High Priest (see Leviticus 21:13–14). Alternatively, the relevance is that her marriage contract is two hundred dinars, instead of the one hundred dinars in the marriage contract of a non-virgin.

בְּתוּלַת קַרְקַע — כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁלֹּא נֶעֶבְדָה. נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְנַחַל אֵיתָן, אִי נָמֵי לְמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר.

Virgin ground is ground for as long as it has not been worked. The relevance of this designation is with regard to the rough dried-up stream mentioned in the Torah. When the corpse of a murder victim is found between two towns and the murderer is unknown, the Torah states that a heifer’s neck is broken in a place that was not worked. Alternatively, the relevance is with regard to buying and selling. If one stipulates that he is buying virgin land, it is defined as land that has never been worked.

בְּתוּלַת שִׁקְמָה — כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁלֹּא נִקְצְצָה. נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר, אִי נָמֵי לְמִקְצְצַהּ בִּשְׁבִיעִית, כְּדִתְנַן: אֵין קוֹצְצִין בְּתוּלַת שִׁקְמָה בַּשְּׁבִיעִית מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא עֲבוֹדָה. וְאִם אִיתָא, לִיתְנֵי נָמֵי הָא!

Finally, a virgin sycamore is a sycamore for as long as it has not been felled, i.e., cut to promote growth. The relevance of this designation is with regard to buying and selling. If one stipulates that he is buying virgin sycamore, it is defined as one that has never been felled. Alternatively, the relevance is with regard to the prohibition against felling it in the Sabbatical Year, as we learned in a mishna: (Shevi’it 4:5): One may not fell a virgin sycamore in the Sabbatical Year, because it is considered work, as this promotes the growth of the tree. The Gemara explains its question: And if it is so, that there is a concept of a virgin from menstrual blood, let the tanna of this baraita also teach this type of virgin.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: כִּי קָתָנֵי מִידֵּי דְּלֵית לֵיהּ שֵׁם לְוַוי, אֲבָל מִידֵּי דְּאִית לֵיהּ שֵׁם לְוַוי — לָא קָתָנֵי. רַב שֵׁשֶׁת בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי אָמַר: כִּי קָתָנֵי מִידֵּי דִּתְלֵי בְּמַעֲשֶׂה, מִידֵּי דְּלָא תְּלֵי בְּמַעֲשֶׂה — לָא קָתָנֵי.

The Gemara cites several answers. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: When the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item that does not have a modifier, but he does not teach an item that has a modifier. A virgin human, virgin land, and a virgin sycamore can be referred to without another modifier. Conversely, a virgin with regard to menstrual blood cannot be referred to simply by the unmodified term: Virgin. Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, says: When the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item that is dependent upon an outside action, e.g., intercourse in the case of a human virgin or felling in the case of a virgin sycamore. But he does not teach an item that is not dependent upon an outside action, such as a woman’s menstrual flow.

רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא אָמַר: כִּי קָתָנֵי מִידֵּי דְּלָא הָדַר לִבְרִיָּיתוֹ, מִידֵּי דְּהָדַר לִבְרִיָּיתוֹ לָא קָתָנֵי. רָבִינָא אָמַר: כִּי קָתָנֵי מִידֵּי דְּקָפֵיד עֲלֵיהּ זָבוֹנָא, מִידֵּי דְּלָא קָפֵיד עֲלֵיהּ זָבוֹנָא לָא קָתָנֵי.

Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika says: When the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item that will not later revert to its original state. But he does not teach an item that will later revert to its original state, such as a woman’s menstrual flow that ceases when she reaches old age. Ravina says: When the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item about which a buyer is particular, such as one who purchases a virgin sycamore tree. But he does not teach an item about which a buyer is not particular, e.g., a woman’s menstrual blood.

וְלָא קָפְדִי? וְהָתַנְיָא: רַבִּי חִיָּיא אוֹמֵר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַשְּׂאוֹר יָפֶה לָעִיסָּה, כָּךְ דָּמִים יָפִין לָאִשָּׁה. וְתַנְיָא מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: כׇּל אִשָּׁה שֶׁדָּמֶיהָ מְרוּבִּין — בָּנֶיהָ מְרוּבִּין! אֶלָּא, כִּי קָתָנֵי — מִידֵּי דְּקָפֵיץ עֲלֵיהּ זָבוֹנָא, מִידֵּי דְּלָא קָפֵיץ עֲלֵיהּ זָבוֹנָא — לָא קָתָנֵי.

The Gemara asks: And is a buyer, i.e., a potential husband, not particular about her menstrual blood? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya says: Just as leaven is fortuitous for dough, so too, blood is fortuitous for a woman; and it is taught in another baraita in the name of Rabbi Meir: Any woman whose blood is plentiful, her children are plentiful? A potential husband would certainly be particular about this factor. The Gemara provides an alternative answer: Rather, when the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item that buyers are eager to purchase. But he does not teach an item that buyers are not eager to purchase, e.g., a woman without menstrual blood.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵיזוֹהִי ״בְּתוּלַת קַרְקַע״? כֹּל שֶׁמַּעֲלָה רְשׁוּשִׁין, וְאֵין עֲפָרָהּ תִּיחוּחַ. נִמְצָא בָּהּ חֶרֶס — בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁנֶּעֶבְדָה. צוּנְמָא — הֲרֵי זוֹ ״בְּתוּלַת קַרְקַע״.

The Sages taught in a baraita: What is virgin ground? It is any ground that raises up hard clumps of earth and whose dirt is not loose. If one finds a shard of earthenware in the earth, it is thereby known that it was once worked and is not virgin ground. If one finds hard rock, it is virgin ground.

מְעוּבֶּרֶת — מִשֶּׁיִּוָּדַע עוּבָּרָהּ. וְכַמָּה הַכָּרַת הָעוּבָּר? סוֹמְכוֹס אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר, זֵכֶר לַדָּבָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיְהִי כְּמִשְׁלֹשׁ חֳדָשִׁים וְגוֹמֵר״.

§ The mishna teaches: The time of a pregnant woman is sufficient from the point in her pregnancy when the existence of her fetus is known to all who see her. The Gemara asks: And how much time must pass for the fetus to be known? Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: Three months. And although there is no explicit proof for the matter, that a fetus is discernable after three months of pregnancy, there is an allusion to the matter, as it is stated: “And it came to pass about three months after, that it was told to Judah, saying: Tamar your daughter-in-law has played the harlot” (Genesis 38:24).

זֵכֶר לַדָּבָר? קְרָא כְּתִיב, וּרְאָיָה גְּדוֹלָה הִיא! מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא דְּיָלְדָה לְתִשְׁעָה, וְאִיכָּא דְּיָלְדָה לְשִׁבְעָה.

The Gemara asks: Why does Rabbi Meir call this a mere allusion to the matter? An explicit verse is written, and that is a significant proof. The Gemara answers: It is only an allusion because there are some women who give birth after nine months and there are others who give birth after seven months. Although the verse indicates that a fetus is known to all after three months, it is possible that this applies only to a nine-month pregnancy. Since in the case of a nine-month pregnancy the fetus is recognizable after a third of the full term, with regard to a seven-month pregnancy, the fetus would likewise be noticeable after a third of the full pregnancy, i.e., at two and one-third months. Therefore, Rabbi Meir teaches that in all cases the fetus is known only after three months.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיְתָה בְּחֶזְקַת מְעוּבֶּרֶת, וְרָאֲתָה דָּם, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִפִּילָה רוּחַ אוֹ כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁל קְיָימָא — הֲרֵי הִיא בְּחֶזְקָתָהּ, וְדַיָּה שְׁעָתָהּ.

The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a woman who had a presumptive status that she was pregnant and she saw blood, and afterward she miscarried air, or anything that is not a viable fetus, she retains her presumptive status, and therefore her time is sufficient from that flow of blood, i.e., it renders her impure only from then on, not retroactively, as even a non-viable fetus gives her full pregnancy status.

וְאַף עַל גַּב שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר, זֵכֶר לַדָּבָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הָרִינוּ חַלְנוּ כְּמוֹ יָלַדְנוּ רוּחַ״. מַאי זֵכֶר לַדָּבָר? הֲרֵי רְאָיָה גְּדוֹלָה הִיא! כִּי כְּתִיב הַאי קְרָא, בִּזְכָרִים כְּתִיב.

And even though there is no explicit proof for this matter, that even a pregnancy that ends in a miscarriage is like a full-fledged pregnancy, there is an allusion to the matter, as it is stated: “We have been with child, we have been in pain, we have as it were brought forth wind” (Isaiah 26:18). This verse indicates that even one who miscarries wind is considered as having been with child. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that this is called a mere allusion to the matter? This explicit verse is a significant proof. The Gemara answers: When that verse was written, it was written with regard to males as bearing children. The allusion to child-bearing in the verse is symbolic, so halakhic inferences may not be drawn from it.

וּרְמִינְהִי: קִשְּׁתָה שְׁנַיִם, וְלַשְּׁלִישִׁי הִפִּילָה רוּחַ אוֹ כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁל קְיָימָא — הֲרֵי זוֹ יוֹלֶדֶת בְּזוֹב, וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ לֵידָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא,

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: If a woman experienced labor pain for two days, during which she saw a discharge of blood, and on the third day she miscarried air or anything that is not a viable fetus, that woman gives birth as a zava, and the blood is treated as blood of a zava in all regards. The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if you say that miscarrying a non-viable fetus is considered a proper birth, this is problematic,