Pesachim 46
לְעִנְיַן צֵירוּף טוּמְאָה בַּפֶּסַח, וּבִשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה אִיכָּא פְּלוּגְתָּא.
with regard to the combination of two pieces vis-à-vis ritual impurity during Passover, when it depends upon their volume. However, during the rest of the year there is a distinction based upon whether the owner is particular about it or not.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי, כְּגוֹן דְּאִיכָּא פָּחוֹת מִכְּבֵיצָה אוֹכָלִין, וְנָגְעוּ בְּהַאי בָּצֵק. בְּפֶסַח, דְּאִיסּוּרוֹ חָשׁוּב — מִצְטָרֵף. בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה, דְּבִקְפֵידָא תַּלְיָא מִילְּתָא, אִם מַקְפִּיד עָלָיו — מִצְטָרֵף, אִם רוֹצֶה בְּקִיּוּמוֹ — הֲרֵי הוּא כַּעֲרֵיבָה.
The Gemara explains: What are the circumstances of the mishna’s case? It is a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of ritually impure food, and it touched this dough in the bowl, and then it came into contact with ritually pure food. During Passover, when the prohibition that applies to the dough causes it to be considered significant although it is a very small quantity, it combines with the first piece of food. Together they are the size of an egg-bulk, which is able to transmit the ritual impurity of foods. However, during the rest of the year, when there is no prohibition that imparts this significance to the dough, the matter is dependent on the owner’s particularity; if he is particular about it, i.e., he does not want the dough to be there, it is considered food rather than part of the bowl, and it combines with the other piece of food. However, if one prefers its continued presence in its current location, it is considered like part of the kneading bowl itself, rather than food.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: מִי קָתָנֵי ״מִצְטָרֵף״? וְהָא ״חוֹצֵץ״ קָתָנֵי. אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: וְכֵן לְהַעֲלוֹת טׇהֳרָה לַעֲרֵיבָה.
Rava strongly objects to this: Was the language taught in the mishna: Combines? Didn’t the mishna teach that it interposes? Abaye’s explanation does not account for this term. Rather, Rava said that the mishna should be understood as saying: And so too with regard to purifying the kneading bowl via immersion.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי, כְּגוֹן דְּאִיטַּמִּי הָךְ עֲרֵיבָה, וּבָעֵי לְאַטְבּוֹלֵי. בְּפֶסַח, דְּאִיסּוּרוֹ חָשׁוּב — חוֹצֵץ, וְלָא סָלְקָא לַהּ טְבִילָה. בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה בִּקְפִידָא תַּלְיָא מִילְּתָא. אִי מַקְפִּיד עָלָיו — חוֹצֵץ, וְאִם רוֹצֶה בְּקִיּוּמוֹ — הֲרֵי הוּא כַּעֲרֵיבָה.
The Gemara explains: What are the circumstances of the mishna’s case? It is a case where the kneading bowl became ritually impure, and one wishes to immerse it. During Passover, when the prohibition of an olive-bulk of leaven causes it to be considered significant, it interposes between the water and the kneading bowl, and the immersion is ineffective. However, during the rest of the year, the matter depends upon whether or not the owner is particular about it. If he is particular about the dough and wishes to remove it, it interposes between the water and the bowl. However, if the owner desires it to be present, it is considered like part of the kneading bowl itself, and it does not interpose between the water and the bowl.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: מִי קָתָנֵי ״וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן טׇהֳרָה״? הָא ״לְעִנְיַן טוּמְאָה״ קָתָנֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן לְהוֹרִיד טוּמְאָה לַעֲרֵיבָה.
Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: Was the language taught in the mishna: And similarly with regard to ritual purity? Didn’t the mishna teach: And similarly with regard to ritual impurity? Rather, Rav Pappa said the mishna should be understood as saying: And similarly with regard to the transfer of ritual impurity to the kneading bowl via this dough.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי, כְּגוֹן דְּנָגַע שֶׁרֶץ בְּהַאי בָּצֵק. בְּפֶסַח דְּאִיסּוּרוֹ חָשׁוּב — חוֹצֵץ, וְלָא נָחֲתָה לַהּ טוּמְאָה. בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה דְּבִקְפִידָא תַּלְיָא, אִם מַקְפִּיד עָלָיו — חוֹצֵץ, אִם רוֹצֶה בְּקִיּוּמוֹ — הֲרֵי הוּא כַּעֲרֵיבָה.
The Gemara explains: What are the circumstances of the mishna’s case? It is a case where the carcass of a creeping animal touched this dough. During Passover, when its prohibition causes the dough to be considered significant, it interposes between the bowl and the creeping animal, and ritual impurity does not descend to the kneading bowl, i.e., the kneading bowl does not become impure. During the rest of the year, when it depends upon whether one is particular about the presence of the dough, if he is particular about it, it interposes between the bowl and the creeping animal and prevents the bowl from becoming impure. However, if he desires it to be present, it is considered like it is part of the kneading bowl itself. Therefore, the entire bowl becomes ritually impure when the carcass of the creeping animal touches the dough.
מַתְנִי׳ בָּצֵק הַחֵרֵשׁ, אִם יֵשׁ כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ שֶׁהֶחְמִיץ — הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר.
MISHNA: Deaf dough is dough for which it is difficult to determine if it has been leavened. It is comparable to a deaf-mute, who cannot communicate. If there is dough similar to it in that water was added to both at the same time, which became leavened, the deaf dough is prohibited. Although it has not shown external signs of becoming leavened, it can be presumed that the deaf dough has also become leavened.
גְּמָ׳ אִם אֵין שָׁם כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ מַהוּ? אֲמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: כְּדֵי שֶׁיֵּלֵךְ אָדָם מִמִּגְדַּל נוּנַיָּא לִטְבֶרְיָא מִיל.
GEMARA: The Gemara seeks to clarify the ruling of the mishna: If there is no dough similar to it, what is the halakha? Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: According to the Sages, leavening occurs in the time it takes a person to walk the distance from Migdal Nunaya to Tiberias, which is a mil, two thousand cubits.
וְנֵימָא מִיל! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּשִׁיעוּרָא דְּמִיל כְּמִמִּגְדַּל נוּנַיָּא וְעַד טְבֶרְיָא.
The Gemara asks about this formulation: Why is it necessary to mention the distance between these two places? Let us say that leavening begins after the time it takes a person to walk a mil. The Gemara answers: This statement incidentally teaches us that the length of a mil is the distance from Migdal Nunaya to Tiberias.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: לְגַבָּל וְלִתְפִלָּה וְלִנְטִילַת יָדַיִם — אַרְבָּעָה מִילִין.
Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: With regard to a kneader, i.e., one who kneads dough for others and should maintain the ritual purity of the dough; and similarly, with regard to washing one’s hands for prayer (Arukh), and with regard to washing hands before eating, one must search either for a ritual bath to immerse the vessel he is using to knead the dough, or for water to purify his hands, provided that water is accessible within the time it takes to walk four mil, eight thousand cubits.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אַיְיבוּ אַמְרַהּ, וְאַרְבְּעָה אֲמַר בַּהּ, וַחֲדָא מִינַּיְיהוּ עִבּוּד. דִּתְנַן: וְכוּלָּן שֶׁעִיבְּדָן, אוֹ שֶׁהִילֵּךְ בָּהֶן כְּדֵי עֲבוֹדָה — טְהוֹרִין, חוּץ מֵעוֹר הָאָדָם. וְכַמָּה כְּדֵי עֲבוֹדָה? אָמַר רַבִּי (אִינְיָיא) אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: כְּדֵי הִילּוּךְ אַרְבָּעָה מִילִין.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Ayvu said this halakha, and he said it about four cases, as opposed to the three cases mentioned previously. And one of them pertained to the tanning of hides, which lasts for the time that it takes a person to walk four mil. As we learned in a mishna: And all types of thin, soft hides, which have the status of flesh with regard to ritual impurity because their texture is similar to flesh, that were tanned in order to be made into leather, or that one trod upon for as long as necessary for the leatherworking process, are ritually pure. They are considered to be leather and are no longer considered like the flesh of the animal, except for the skin of a human corpse, which always remains ritually impure. The Gemara asks: How much time must one tread upon a hide for the leatherworking process? Rabbi Ayvu said that Rabbi Yannai said: It is the amount of time it takes to walk four mil.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְפָנָיו, אֲבָל לְאַחֲרָיו — אֲפִילּוּ מִיל אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר. אָמַר רַב אַחָא, וּמִינַּהּ: מִיל — הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר, הָא פָּחוֹת מִמִּיל — חוֹזֵר.
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: They taught that one must search for water to wash one’s hands before eating or prayer for the amount of time it takes to walk four mil only when the water is before him, in the direction that he is traveling. However, when it is behind him, he need not return even a mil. Rav Aḥa said: From this statement one may infer that he need not return a mil, but he must return less than one mil in order to obtain water.
מַתְנִי׳ כֵּיצַד מַפְרִישִׁין חַלָּה בְּטוּמְאָה בְּיוֹם טוֹב?
MISHNA: How does one separate ḥalla in ritual impurity during the Festival day of Passover? Ordinarily, one may separate ritually pure ḥalla from dough and give it to a priest immediately so that he may eat it. Ritually impure ḥalla is unfit for a priest and must be burned, yet it is prohibited to bake or burn anything that is not fit to be eaten during the Festival day. However, it is also prohibited to wait and burn it after the Festival day, since it will become leavened in the meantime.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: לֹא תִּקְרָא לָהּ שֵׁם עַד שֶׁתֵּאָפֶה. בֶּן בְּתֵירָא אוֹמֵר: תָּטִיל בְּצוֹנֵן. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ:
Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman should not designate it as ḥalla prior to baking; rather, she should refrain from doing so until it is baked. In other words, she should wait until she has baked all of the dough, and there is no risk of it becoming leavened. Only then should she separate ḥalla from it. The portion of ḥalla may then be kept until after the Festival day, when it may be burned. Ben Beteira says: She should separate the ḥalla before it is baked, and place the dough in cold water so that it will not become leavened. Rabbi Yehoshua said:
לֹא זֶה הוּא חָמֵץ שֶׁמּוּזְהָרִין עָלָיו בְּבַל יֵרָאֶה וּבְבַל יִמָּצֵא. אֶלָּא: מַפְרִישָׁתָהּ וּמַנִּיחָתָהּ עַד הָעֶרֶב, וְאִם הֶחְמִיצָה — הֶחְמִיצָה.
This is not the leavened bread about which we are warned with the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found. These prohibitions do not apply because the ḥalla does not actually belong to the owner of the dough; it is instead considered to be consecrated property. Rather, she should separate the ḥalla and leave it until the evening; and if it becomes leavened, then it will become leavened, but this is of no concern.
גְּמָ׳ לֵימָא בְּטוֹבַת הֲנָאָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה מָמוֹן. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ סָבַר: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן.
GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the tanna’im disagree with regard to benefit of discretion, i.e., benefit accrued from the option of giving ḥalla, teruma and tithes to whichever priest or Levite one chooses. The Sages debated whether this benefit has monetary value and would constitute a form of ownership. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value. Therefore, one owns the ḥalla he separates, and he must be careful to prevent it from becoming leavened. However, Rabbi Yehoshua holds: Benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value. One does not own the ḥalla, and therefore he may allow it to become leavened.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא סָבְרִי טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן, וְהָכָא בְּ״הוֹאִיל״ קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן ״הוֹאִיל״, וְאִי בָּעֵי אִיתְּשִׁיל עֲלַהּ — מָמוֹנֵיהּ הוּא. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ סָבַר: לָא אָמְרִינַן ״הוֹאִיל״.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone holds that benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, and here they disagree with regard to the principle of: Since, etc. As Rabbi Eliezer holds: We say that since, if he wants, he can ask to have his separation of the ḥalla voided when he regrets having done so, it is his property. Even if one does not actually revoke the status of the ḥalla, the fact that the potential for such an action exists indicates that he still maintains a form of ownership of this dough. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: We do not say that since he could theoretically revoke the status of the ḥalla, the dough is considered his. Consequently, he may leave it until the end of the Festival day without being concerned that it will become leavened.
אִיתְּמַר: הָאוֹפֶה מִיּוֹם טוֹב לְחוֹל, רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: לוֹקֶה, רַבָּה אָמַר: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה.
Apropos the principle: Since, etc., the Gemara cites a related dispute. It was stated that the amora’im disagree with regard to one who bakes bread on a Festival day for use during the week. Rav Ḥisda said: He is flogged because he has desecrated the Festival. Rabba said: He is not flogged.
רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר לוֹקֶה: לָא אָמְרִינַן ״הוֹאִיל וּמִיקַּלְעִי לֵיהּ אוֹרְחִים — חֲזֵי לֵיהּ״. רַבָּה אָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה: אָמְרִינַן ״הוֹאִיל״.
The Gemara explains the two opinions: Rav Ḥisda said that he is flogged because we do not say that since guests may happen to visit him, the bread is fit for him on the Festival day itself. Rabba said that he is not flogged because we say that since guests may visit him, the bread is considered to have been baked for use on the Festival day itself. Even if guests do not actually come, he has not desecrated the Festival.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה לְרַב חִסְדָּא: לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ לָא אָמְרִינַן ״הוֹאִיל״, הֵיאַךְ אוֹפִין מִיּוֹם טוֹב לְשַׁבָּת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשּׁוּם עֵירוּבֵי תַּבְשִׁילִין.
Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda: According to you, who said that we do not say the principle: Since, etc., how is it permitted to bake on a Festival for Shabbat? He said to him: One is permitted to bake on a Festival for Shabbat due to the joining of cooked foods [eiruv tavshilin] instituted by the Sages.
וּמִשּׁוּם עֵירוּבֵי תַּבְשִׁילִין שָׁרֵינַן אִיסּוּרָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא צוֹרְכֵי שַׁבָּת נַעֲשִׂין בְּיוֹם טוֹב, וְרַבָּנַן הוּא דִּגְזַרוּ בֵּיהּ, גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ אוֹפִין מִיּוֹם טוֹב אַף לְחוֹל. וְכֵיוָן דְּאַצְרְכוּהּ רַבָּנַן עֵירוּבֵי תַּבְשִׁילִין — אִית לֵיהּ הֶיכֵּירָא.
Rabba responded: Due to the practice of the joining of cooked foods, which was instituted by the Sages, may one permit a Torah prohibition? Rav Ḥisda said to him: By Torah law, whatever one needs for Shabbat may be done on a Festival, and the prohibition against performing labor during the Festival does not apply to preparations for Shabbat. It was the Sages who decreed that one may not bake on a Festival for Shabbat, as a decree lest people say that one may bake on the Festival even for use during the week. And since the Sages required a joining of cooked foods, one has a conspicuous marker reminding him that baking on the Festival for Shabbat is permitted but baking on the Festival for a weekday is prohibited.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: בְּהֵמָה הַמְסוּכֶּנֶת, לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לֶאֱכוֹל הֵימֶנָּה כְּזַיִת צָלִי מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם. ״יָכוֹל לֶאֱכוֹל״ — אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא בָּעֵי לְמֵיכַל. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי, דְּאָמְרִי ״הוֹאִיל״: ״הוֹאִיל וְאִי בָּעֵי לְמֵיכַל מָצֵי אָכֵיל״ — מִשּׁוּם הָכִי יִשְׁחוֹט. אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ, דְּאָמְרַתְּ לָא אָמְרִינַן ״הוֹאִיל״, אַמַּאי יִשְׁחוֹט?
Rabba raised an objection to Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from a baraita: If one wishes to slaughter a dangerously ill animal before it dies on its own and becomes prohibited for consumption, he may not slaughter it on a Festival day unless there is enough time so that he can eat an olive-bulk of it roasted while it is still day. Rabba reads this statement precisely: The baraita stipulates that the slaughter is permitted if one can eat the meat while it is still day, although he is not required to actually eat the meat. Granted, according to my position, that I said that one may rely on the principle: Since, etc., this ruling is reasonable. Since if one wants to eat he may eat, due to that reason alone he may slaughter the animal. But according to you, who said that we do not say the principle of: Since, etc., why may he slaughter such an animal?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשּׁוּם הֶפְסֵד מָמוֹנוֹ. וּמִשּׁוּם הֶפְסֵד מָמוֹנוֹ שָׁרֵינַן אִיסּוּרָא דְאוֹרָיְיתָא?!
Rav Ḥisda said to him: He is permitted to slaughter the animal due to the monetary loss that would be incurred by not slaughtering it, and not due to the principle of: Since, etc. Rabba asked rhetorically: Will we permit a Torah prohibition due to monetary loss?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ, אִין: מִשּׁוּם הֶפְסֵד מָמוֹנוֹ — גָּמַר בְּלִבּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת, וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִכְזַיִת בָּשָׂר בְּלֹא שְׁחִיטָה.
Rav Ḥisda said to him: Yes, although this factor on its own does not mitigate the prohibition. Rather, due to the monetary loss that would otherwise be incurred, one decided to eat an olive-bulk of the meat, although he does not need to. And since it is impossible to eat even an olive-bulk of meat without slaughtering the animal, one is permitted to slaughter the animal.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים
Rabba raised another objection to him: The shewbread in the Temple
