Today's Daf Yomi
January 22, 2021 | ืืณ ืืฉืื ืชืฉืคืดื
Masechet Pesachim is sponsored by Sivya Twersky in honor of her daughter, Shoshana Baker, her grandson's upcoming Bar Mitzvah ,and in memory of her father, Harav Pesach Zachariah Halevi ben Reuven and Leah Z'late Z'L. He lived Torah and emunah by example to congregational and biological families. His yahrzeit falls within this masechet.
Pesachim 62
Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on the issue of one who has intent while slaughtering that one will sprinkle the blood for uncircumcised people. Rabbi Ashi explains the source of the dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Chisda. According to him, Rabbi Chisda uses the argument of โhoโil – since” and Raba does not. It contradicts their opinions regarding โhoโilโ in the case of one who bakes on Yom Tov for after Yom Tov. How do they resolve the contradiction? The braita on the previous page took it for granted a sacrifice is valid if it was done for some impurity but not all. What type of impurity is this? And why was it so obvious that it is valid? The gemara raises several possibilities and raises questions against each possibility. Rabbi Simalai is said to have asked Rabbi Yochanan to teach him the book of genealogy (Sefer Yuchsin) and Rabbi Yochanan did not want to teach him. He mentions in this context the greatness of Bruria and how even though she was brilliant, it took her three years to learn Sefer Yuchsin. Rabbi Simlai also asked him about the difference between one who says one is sacrificing the Pesach for its own sake and not for its own sake which is invalid and one who says for those who can eat and those who cannot eat, which is valid.
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ืืืื ืงืจื ืงืืืคืืื ืื ืจืฆื ืื ืืืคืจ ืขืืื ืขืืื ืืื ืขื ืืืืจื ืจืื ืกืืจ ืืืืจื ืืืืื ืืืืื ืื ืืื ืืืจ ืืคืจื ืืฃ ืืืืจื ืืืจ ืืคืจื ืืืคืืงื ืืื ืขืจื ืืืื ืืจ ืืคืจื ืืื
disagree with regard to this verse, which is stated with regard to a different offering: โAnd it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for himโ (Leviticus 1:4). It is inferred: For him and not for his fellow. One cannot achieve atonement through an offering that has been designated for someone else. Rabba and Rav แธคisda disagree with regard to the halakhic conclusions that should be drawn from this law. Rabba holds that the law applies to another who is similar to him: Just as he is eligible for atonement through the sprinkling of the blood of this offering, so the law applies to another who is eligible for atonement. This comes to exclude this uncircumcised person, who is not eligible for atonement. Since an uncircumcised person is not fit for the Paschal lamb, slaughtering it for him does not disqualify the offering.
ืืจื ืืกืื ืกืืจ ืืื ืขืจื ื ืื ืืืื ืืืจ ืืืืื ืืื ืืจ ืืคืจื ืืื [ืืืืื] ืืื ืืขื ืืชืงื ื ืคืฉืื
And Rav แธคisda holds that with regard to this uncircumcised person as well, since he is obligated to bring the Paschal lamb, he is considered eligible for atonement through the Paschal lamb. Why is an uncircumcised person seen as obligated to bring the Paschal lamb? Since if he wants, he can make himself fit through circumcision, and the obligation will automatically apply to him. There is a way for him to include himself among those who eat the offering; therefore, he cannot categorically be considered someone who is not eligible for atonement. Consequently, slaughtering the Paschal lamb for him disqualifies the offering.
ืืื ืืืช ืืื ืืจื ืืกืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืชืืจ ืืืืคื ืืืื ืืื ืืืื ืจื ืืกืื ืืืจ ืืืงื ืจืื ืืืจ ืืื ื ืืืงื
The Gemara challenges this explanation: But does Rav แธคisda accept this argument of since? Does he maintain that one can discuss a situation that does not exist due to the possibility that the present circumstances might change? But it was said that Rabba and Rav แธคisda disagree about this as it pertains to the case of one who bakes on a Festival for use during the week: Rav แธคisda said he is flogged for having violated the Festival by baking in order to eat the food on a weekday; Rabba said he is not flogged.
ืจืื ืืืจ ืืื ื ืืืงื ืืืจืื ื ืืืืื ืืื ืืงืืขื ืืื ืืืจืืื ืืื ืืื ืืฉืชื ื ืื ืืื ืืื ืืื ืืงื ืจื ืืกืื ืืืจ ืืืงื ืื ืืืจืื ื ืืืืื
The Gemara explains: Rabba said he is not flogged for the following reason: Since if guests arrive, whatever he bakes will be fit for him to use on the Festival itself, and he will not be guilty of any transgression, now too, although guests have not yet arrived, the food is considered fit for him, and he is not flogged. At the time of the baking, the act was not unequivocally prohibited. Rav แธคisda said he is flogged; we do not state the principle of since. At first glance, there is an internal contradiction with regard to the opinions of both Rabba and Rav แธคisda.
ืืฉืืื ืืจืื ืืืจืื ืื ืงืฉืื ืืื ืืืืกืจ ืืขืฉื ืืชื ืืื ืืืืกืจ ืืขืฉื ืืื ืืจื ืืกืื ืืืจื ืืกืื ืงืฉืื ืืืจื ืื ืืืช ืืื ืืจื ืืกืื ืืืืื ืืงืืื ืืืืืจื ืืืช ืืื
The Gemara notes: Granted, the apparent contradiction between the first statement of Rabba and the second statement of Rabba is not difficult. Here, in the case of the Paschal lamb whose blood is sprinkled for an uncircumcised person, an action is lacking, as the person must undergo circumcision in order to become eligible to eat from the Paschal lamb. However, there, in the case of one who bakes on a Festival, no action is lacking on the part of the baker. But the first statement of Rav แธคisda and the second statement of Rav แธคisda are difficult to reconcile. They say, in answer to this contradiction: When Rav แธคisda does not accept the principle of since, it is only to be lenient and exempt a person from lashes; however, to be stringent and disqualify the Paschal lamb, he does accept this line of reasoning.
ืืืจ ืืื ืืจ ืืืืจื ืืจืื ืืจื ืืจื ืืจืืื ื ืงืชื ื ืืืืื ืืขืจืื ืคืืกืืช ืืืืืื ืคืืกืืช ืื ืืืืื ืื ืขืฉื ืื ืืงืฆืช ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืฃ ืขืจืื ืื ืขืฉื ืืงืฆืช ืขืจืื ืืื ืขืจืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื ืืืื ืื ืขืฉื ืื ืืงืฆืช ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืื ืืจืืขื ืืืืฉื ืืืจื ืืืืื ืืืจืืขื ืืืืฉื ืืืจื ืืืืจืื ืื ืคืกืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืืจืื
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: The baraita quoted above teaches: Since lack of circumcision disqualifies a Paschal lamb and ritual impurity also disqualifies it, the following comparison applies: Just as in the case of ritual impurity, partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity, so too, in the case of lack of circumcision, partial lack of circumcision was not made to be like full lack of circumcision. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to this ritual impurity, what are the circumstances? If you say that the baraita is referring to the ritual impurity of the people who registered for the offering, then there is a difficulty. For what then is the meaning of the ruling in the baraita that partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity? It means that if there are four or five people who are impure and four or five people who are pure, those who are impure do not disqualify those who are pure.
ืืื ืขืจืื ื ืื ืื ืื ืคืกืื ืืชื ื ืืืืืื ืืืขืจืืื ืืฉืจ ืืื ืฉื ื ืืืืื ืืคืฉืืื ืืื ืืืื ืฉื ื ืขืจืื ืืืกืคืงื ืืื
This, however, is difficult, as with regard to lack of circumcision as well, those who are uncircumcised do not disqualify the offering, as we learned in a mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for both circumcised and uncircumcised people, it is valid. What is different about the halakha with regard to impurity, that there it is obvious to him that those who are ritually impure do not disqualify the members of their group who are pure? And what is different about the halakha with regard to lack of circumcision, that there he is in doubt about the halakha?
ืืื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืื ืขืฉื ืื ืืงืฆืช ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืื ืืืืื ืื ืืืืจืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืฉืจืคืื ื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืื ื ืืื
Rather, the baraita must certainly be explained as referring to the impurity of the meat of the offering. And what is the meaning of the ruling in the baraita that partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity? It means that if one of the limbs became impure, that which became impure we burn and the rest we eat.
ืืืื ืืืงืืืชื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืกืืคื ืื ืื ืืืจ ืฉืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืจ ืฉืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืื ืืืืื ืื ื ืืื ืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื
This conclusion is challenged: How did you establish this baraita? It was established as referring to a case of impurity of the meat. If so, say the latter clause of the same baraita as follows: We derive a matter that does not apply to all offerings, the case of uncircumcised men, from a matter that does not apply to all offerings, namely ritual impurity, and the halakha with regard to intent to eat the offering outside the allotted time, which applies to all offerings, should not be used to prove anything about the case at hand. Now, what type of impurity is being discussed here? If we say that it is impurity of the meat, why do you say that it does not apply to all offerings? This halakha certainly applies to all offerings.
ืืื ืคืฉืืื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื ืืืื ืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืขืจื ืืืื ืืฉืืืื ืงืจืื ืืชืืื ืืืืื ืืคืกื ืขืจื ืืืื ืืื ืืฉืืืื ืคืกืืืื ืจืืฉื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืกืืคื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื
Rather, it is obvious that the clause under discussion relates to impurity of the people who are to eat from the offering. And what is the meaning of the statement that it does not apply to all offerings? It means that with regard to all offerings, an uncircumcised person and one who is ritually impure cannot eat from the offering, but nonetheless they can send their offerings with others who can sacrifice them on their behalf; however, with regard to the Paschal lamb, an uncircumcised person and one who is impure cannot send their offerings. Consequently, the Gemara arrives at the surprising conclusion that the first clause of the baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, while the latter clause of the baraita relates to impurity of the people.
ืืืจ ืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืืืื ืงื ืคืจืื
Ravina said to Mar Zutra: Yes, this explanation can be accepted. The baraita can be understood as arguing from the general category of impurity, which applies in one case and not in another, rather than from a specific type of impurity in both cases.
ืืืืืขืืช ืืืื ืกืืคื ื ืื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืื ืืื ืืืฉืจ ืงืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืื ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืงืืื ืืืจืง ืืช ืืื
And if you wish, say a different answer: The latter clause is also referring to impurity of the meat. And what is the meaning of the statement that it does not apply to all offerings? It means that with regard to all offerings, whether the fats of the offering that are burned on the altar have become impure and the meat of the offering remains, or the meat has become impure and the fats remain, the priest may sprinkle the blood, and the offering is accepted through the burning of the sacrificial parts or through the priestsโ consumption of the meat.
ืืืืื ืืคืกื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืฉืจ ืงืืื ืืืจืง ืืช ืืื ื ืืื ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืงืืื ืืื ื ืืืจืง ืืช ืืื
However, when it comes to the Paschal lamb, if the fats have become impure and the meat remains pure and fit to be eaten, the priest may sprinkle the blood; but if the meat has become impure and the fats remain pure and fit to be burned on the altar, he may not sprinkle the blood, because in the case of the Paschal lamb, the ownerโs obligation to eat the meat is the essence of the offering.
ืืืื ืืืงืืืชื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืกืืคื ืื ืื ืืืจ ืฉืื ืืืชืจ ืืืืื ืืืืจ ืฉืื ืืืชืจ ืืืืื ืืื ืชืืืื ืืืืื ืฉืืจื ืืืชืจื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืืืืื
The Gemara asks: How did you establish this baraita? It was established as referring to a case of impurity of the meat. If so, say the next clause of this same baraita as follows: We derive a matter, i.e., the halakha with regard to uncircumcised people, for which no allowance is made from its rule, from a matter, i.e., improper intent with regard to the time, for which no allowance is made from its rule. And the halakha with regard to ritual impurity should not be used to prove anything, as there are circumstances in which an allowance is made from its rule, since it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb while ritually impure. The Gemara clarifies: What type of impurity is being discussed here? If you say that it is
ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืืืชืจื ืืื ืคืฉืืื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื ืืืืื ืืืชืจื ืืืืื ืืฆืืืืจ
impurity of the meat, where is it permitted to eat impure sacrificial meat? Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is talking here about impurity of the people. And where is an allowance made from its rule? It is made in the community; when the majority of the community is ritually impure, it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb and eat it while impure.
ืจืืฉื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืกืืคื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื ืืื ืฉื ืืืืื ืงืคืจืื
The Gemara expresses surprise again: It turns out then that the first clause of the baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, while the latter clause relates to impurity of the people. The Gemara answers: Yes, and there is no difficulty, as the baraita argues from the general category of impurity without necessarily relating to the same type of impurity.
ืืืืืขืืช ืืืื ืืืื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืืื ืืืชืจื ืืืืืืช ืคืกื ืืชื ื ืคืกื ืืื ืืืืืื ื ืืื ืืืืืื ืฉืื ืื ืืชืืืืชื ืืื ืืืืืื
And if you wish, say a different answer: The entire baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, and where is it permitted to eat impure sacrificial meat? It is permitted in a case of the impurity of the Paschal lamb, as we learned in a mishna: A Paschal lamb that comes in impurity, e.g., when the majority of the community is ritually impure and the offering may be brought in impurity, may also be eaten in impurity, as from the very outset it came only to be eaten. This is unlike the law with regard to other offerings that are brought in impurity; their blood is sprinkled on the altar, but their meat may not be eaten. Consequently, even the prohibition to consume impure sacrificial meat is permitted under certain circumstances.
ืืชืื ืจื ืืื ื ืืจืื ืืจื ืืืืฉืข ืืคืกื ืฉืขืืจื ืฉื ืชื ืืฉืืื ืืืื ื ืืฉืื ืืื ืืฉืืื ืืืจืื ืืฉื ืคืกื ืืืื ื ืจืื ืืืืขืืจ ืคืืกื ืืจืื ืืืืฉืข ืืืฉืืจ
Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection from a baraita that teaches: The Paschal sacrifice may be a young lamb or goat less than one year old. In the case of a Paschal lamb that has passed its first year, so that it has automatically become a peace-offering, if he slaughtered it at its appointed time on Passover eve for its own purpose as a Paschal lamb, and similarly, if he slaughtered another offering, e.g., a lamb that had been sanctified as a peace-offering, for the purpose of a Paschal lamb at its set time, the tannaโim disagree with regard to the status of the offering. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies the offering; and Rabbi Yehoshua validates it, based on the principle that offerings brought for the purpose of other offerings are valid. The only exception is the Paschal lamb, which when brought for another purpose is invalid. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, in both of these cases the animal is not truly a Paschal lamb; rather, it is a peace-offering brought with the intent that it serve as a Paschal lamb.
ืืขืื ืืืื ื ืื ืฉืื ืืืื ื ืืฉืจ ืืืืื ื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืื ื ืคืืกื ืฉืื ืืืื ื ื ืื ืคืืกื
The Gemara infers: The reason that the sacrifice is disqualified is that it was brought at its proper time; it is in this case that the tannaโim disagree. But if it was not brought at its proper time, it is valid according to everyone, as it is like any other peace-offering that was slaughtered for a different purpose. But why is this so? Let us say: Since slaughtering another sacrifice for the purpose of a Paschal lamb disqualifies it at its proper time, this should also disqualify it not at its proper time. Consequently, the ruling quoted above is difficult according to the opinion of Rav แธคisda, who accepts the principle of since for the sake of stringency.
ืืืจ ืจื ืคืคื ืฉืื ื ืืชื ืืืืจ ืงืจื ืืืืจืชื ืืื ืคืกื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืืชื ืื ืืื ืืฉืื ืืืจืื ืืื ืืืจืื ืืฉืื
Rav Pappa said: It is different there in the case of another sacrifice slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal lamb, as the verse said: โAnd you shall say: It is a Passover sacrifice to the Lord, Who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt when He smote Egypt, and delivered our houses. And the people bowed the head and prostrated themselvesโ (Exodus 12:27). The word โitโ indicates that the Paschal lamb must be brought as it is, according to its details, without any change. It, the Paschal lamb, must not be offered for the purpose of other sacrifices; and other sacrifices must not be offered for its purpose, i.e., as a Paschal lamb. In both of these cases, the offering is disqualified.
ืืืื ื ืฉืืื ืคืกืื ืืฉืื ืืืจืื ืืืจืื ืคืกืืืื ืืฉืื ืฉืื ืืืื ื ืฉืืื ืืฉืจ ืืฉืื ืืืจืื ืืืจืื ืืฉืจืื ืืฉืื
It may now be inferred: At its proper time, on Passover eve, when the Paschal lamb is disqualified if it is brought for the purpose of other sacrifices, other sacrifices are disqualified according to Rabbi Eliezer if they are brought for its purpose, i.e., as a Paschal lamb. But not at its proper time, when a Paschal lamb offered for the purpose of other sacrifices is valid, other sacrifices offered for its purpose as a Paschal lamb are also valid. Since the verseโs use of the word โitโ links the disqualifications of a Paschal lamb offered as a different sacrifice and any other sacrifice offered for the purpose of a Paschal lamb, the principle of since does not apply.
ืจืื ืฉืืืื ืืชื ืืงืืื ืืจืื ืืืื ื ืืืจ ืืื ื ืืชื ื ืื ืืจ ืกืคืจ ืืืืกืื ืืืจ ืืื ืืืืื ืืช ืืืจ ืืื ืืืื ืืืืื ืืืชืื ืื ืืจืืขื ืืืจ ืืื ืืื ื ืืืื ืื ืื ืืืืืื ืืื ืื ืืจืืขืื ืืื ืฉืื ืืืช ืืืื ืืืืชืื ืื ืืจืืขื ืืคืืื ืืืจืฆื
There is a fundamental problem in the mishna that was clarified during the course of a particular incident: Rabbi Simlai came before Rabbi Yoแธฅanan. He said to him: Would the Master teach me the Book of Genealogies? The Book of Genealogies was a collection of tannaitic teachings that formed a midrash on the book of Chronicles. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said to him: Where are you from? He said to him: From Lod. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan further asked: And where is your present place of residence? He said to him: In Nehardeโa. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said to him: I have a tradition that we teach these subjects neither to Lodites nor to Nehardeโans, and certainly not to you who comes from Lod and your residence is in Nehardeโa, such that you have both shortcomings. Rabbi Simlai pressured Rabbi Yoแธฅanan until he agreed to teach him.
ืืืจ ืืื ื ืืชื ืืื ืืชืืชื ืืจืื ืฉืงื ืงืื ืคืชืง ืืื ืืืจ ืืื ืืื ืืจืืจืื ืืืืชืื ืืจืื ืืืืจ ืืจืชืื ืืจืื ืื ื ืื ืื ืชืจืืืื ืืชื ืื ืชืืช ืืื ืฉืืขืชืชื ืืืืื ืืชืืช ืืื ืจืืืืชื ืืืคืืื ืืื ืื ืืฆืชื ืืื ืืืืชื ืืชืืช ืฉื ืื ืืืช ืืืจืช ืืชืืชื ืืจืื
Rabbi Simlai said to him: Teach me the Book of Genealogies in three months. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan took a clod of dirt, threw it at him, and said to him: Berurya, wife of Rabbi Meir and daughter of Rabbi แธคananya ben Teradyon, was so sharp and had such a good memory that she learned three hundred halakhot in one day from three hundred Sages, and nonetheless she did not fulfill her responsibility to properly learn the Book of Genealogies in three years because it is especially long and difficult. And you say that I should teach it to you in three months? After your inappropriate request, I am not inclined to teach you at all.
ืื ืฉืงืื ืืืืื ืืืจ ืืื ืจืื ืื ืืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื
When Rabbi Simlai was taking leave to go, he said to Rabbi Yoแธฅanan: Even so, my teacher, as I have already come, let me ask you a question: What is the difference between one who offers a Paschal lamb both for its own purpose and for a different purpose, in which case the offering is disqualified, and one who offers the sacrifice with the intent that it be both for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, in which case the offering is not disqualified?
ืืืจ ืืื ืืืืื ืืฆืืจืื ืืจืื ื ืืช ืชื ืืืืื ืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืคืกืืื ืืืืคื ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืื ืคืกืืื ืืืืคื
He said to him: Since I understand from your question that you are a Torah scholar, come and I will tell you the answer: When one sacrifices an offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose, the disqualification is in the offering itself; that is, the disqualifying intention relates to the sacrifice itself. In contrast, when one sacrifices an offering for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, the disqualification is not in the offering itself, as the disqualifying intent relates to the people who are to eat from it.
ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืื ืืคืฉืจ ืืืจืจ ืืืกืืจื ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืคืฉืจ ืืืจืจ ืืืกืืจื
Furthermore, when one sacrifices an offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose, it is impossible to identify its prohibition; that is, there is no way to differentiate between valid and invalid parts of the offering. In contrast, when one sacrifices an offering for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is possible to identify its prohibition. If some of the people may eat it and some may not, it is possible to distribute the offering to each group and thereby determine which part of the offering is invalid.
ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉื ื ืืืจืืข ืขืืืืืช ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืื ื ืืืจืืข ืขืืืืืช ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉื ื ืืฆืืืืจ ืืืืืื ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืื ื ืืฆืืืืจ ืืืืืื
Furthermore, the intent that the offering be for its own purpose and for a different purpose applies and can disqualify the offering in all four rites, namely: Slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar; however, the intent that it be for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it does not apply during all four rites, as it has no effect during the time of the sprinkling. Moreover, the intent that the offering be for its own purpose and for a different purpose is a disqualification that applies to communal sacrifices as it does to individual sacrifices; in contrast, the intent that it be for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it does not apply to the community as it does to an individual.
ืจื ืืฉื ืืืจ ืคืกืืื ืืืืคื ืืื ืืคืฉืจ ืืืจืจ ืืืกืืจื ืืื ืืืืชื ืืื ืืื ืืขื ืืืจ ืคืกืืื ืืืืคื ืืฉืื ืืื ืืคืฉืจ ืืืจืจ ืืืกืืจื
Rav Ashi said that careful analysis of these answers demonstrates the following: The argument that its disqualification is in the offering itself and the argument that it is impossible to identify its prohibition are one and the same thing; they are not two separate reasons. As, what is the reason that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says that when one brings an offering for a different purpose, its disqualification is in the offering itself? It is because it is impossible to identify its prohibition, and therefore the prohibition applies to the offering itself.
ืืืจ ืจืื ืืจ ืจื ืืืื ืืืจ ืจื ืืืื ืฉื ืื ื ืกืคืจ ืืืืกืื ืชืฉืฉ ืืื ืฉื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืืืจ ืขืื ืืื
Having mentioned the Book of Genealogies, the Gemara notes that Rami bar Rav Yuda said that Rav said the following about it: From the day the Book of Genealogies was hidden and no longer available to the Sages, the strength of the Sages has been weakened, and the light of their eyes has been dimmed, as the book contained the reasons for many Torah laws and lists of genealogies that are now lost.
ืืืจ ืืจ ืืืืจื ืืื ืืฆื ืืืฆื ืืขืื ื ืืจืืข ืืื ืืืื ืืืจืฉื
Mar Zutra said: The Book of Genealogiesโ exposition of Chronicles was so extensive that it was said, in exaggeration, that the verses from the word Azel mentioned in the verse: โAnd Azel had six sons and these are their names: Azrikam, Bocru, and Ishmael and Sheariah and Obadia and Hanan; all these were the sons of Azelโ (I Chronicles 8:38), to the word Azel mentioned in a different verse with the identical wording: โAnd Azel had six sons and these are their names: Azrikam, Bocru, and Ishmael and Sheariah and Obadia and Hanan; these were the sons of Azelโ (I Chronicles 9:44), bore four hundred camels of expositions written about these verses.
ืชื ืื ืืืจืื ืืืืจืื ืืงืืื ืืืืื ืืขืจืืื ืืฉืจ ืขืจืืื ืืืืืื ืคืกืื ืืื ืฉื ื ืืืืื ืืขืจืืื ืืืฉืจ ืืืืื ืขืจืื ืืขืื ื ืืืืื ืขืจืืื ืืืืืื ื ืื ืืืื ืขืจืื ืืขืื ื ืืืืื
It was taught in a baraita that Aแธฅerim say: If one sacrifices a Paschal lamb for both circumcised and uncircumcised people and had in mind first the circumcised people and then the uncircumcised people, the offering is valid. But if he had in mind first the uncircumcised people and then the circumcised people, it is disqualified. The Gemara asks: What is different about having in mind first the circumcised people and then the uncircumcised people, such that the offering is valid? One might say that in order to disqualify the sacrifice, we require that all the people he has in mind be uncircumcised, and this is not the case here, as some of them are circumcised. But if this is so, when he has in mind first the uncircumcised people and then the circumcised people, we should also say that in order to disqualify the sacrifice we require that all the people he has in mind be uncircumcised, and this is not the case here. What, then, is the difference between the two cases?
Masechet Pesachim is sponsored by Sivya Twersky in honor of her daughter, Shoshana Baker, her grandson's upcoming Bar Mitzvah ,and in memory of her father, Harav Pesach Zachariah Halevi ben Reuven and Leah Z'late Z'L. He lived Torah and emunah by example to congregational and biological families. His yahrzeit falls within this masechet.
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Pesachim 60-66 – Daf Yomi: One Week at a Time
Pesachim 62
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
ืืืื ืงืจื ืงืืืคืืื ืื ืจืฆื ืื ืืืคืจ ืขืืื ืขืืื ืืื ืขื ืืืืจื ืจืื ืกืืจ ืืืืจื ืืืืื ืืืืื ืื ืืื ืืืจ ืืคืจื ืืฃ ืืืืจื ืืืจ ืืคืจื ืืืคืืงื ืืื ืขืจื ืืืื ืืจ ืืคืจื ืืื
disagree with regard to this verse, which is stated with regard to a different offering: โAnd it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for himโ (Leviticus 1:4). It is inferred: For him and not for his fellow. One cannot achieve atonement through an offering that has been designated for someone else. Rabba and Rav แธคisda disagree with regard to the halakhic conclusions that should be drawn from this law. Rabba holds that the law applies to another who is similar to him: Just as he is eligible for atonement through the sprinkling of the blood of this offering, so the law applies to another who is eligible for atonement. This comes to exclude this uncircumcised person, who is not eligible for atonement. Since an uncircumcised person is not fit for the Paschal lamb, slaughtering it for him does not disqualify the offering.
ืืจื ืืกืื ืกืืจ ืืื ืขืจื ื ืื ืืืื ืืืจ ืืืืื ืืื ืืจ ืืคืจื ืืื [ืืืืื] ืืื ืืขื ืืชืงื ื ืคืฉืื
And Rav แธคisda holds that with regard to this uncircumcised person as well, since he is obligated to bring the Paschal lamb, he is considered eligible for atonement through the Paschal lamb. Why is an uncircumcised person seen as obligated to bring the Paschal lamb? Since if he wants, he can make himself fit through circumcision, and the obligation will automatically apply to him. There is a way for him to include himself among those who eat the offering; therefore, he cannot categorically be considered someone who is not eligible for atonement. Consequently, slaughtering the Paschal lamb for him disqualifies the offering.
ืืื ืืืช ืืื ืืจื ืืกืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืชืืจ ืืืืคื ืืืื ืืื ืืืื ืจื ืืกืื ืืืจ ืืืงื ืจืื ืืืจ ืืื ื ืืืงื
The Gemara challenges this explanation: But does Rav แธคisda accept this argument of since? Does he maintain that one can discuss a situation that does not exist due to the possibility that the present circumstances might change? But it was said that Rabba and Rav แธคisda disagree about this as it pertains to the case of one who bakes on a Festival for use during the week: Rav แธคisda said he is flogged for having violated the Festival by baking in order to eat the food on a weekday; Rabba said he is not flogged.
ืจืื ืืืจ ืืื ื ืืืงื ืืืจืื ื ืืืืื ืืื ืืงืืขื ืืื ืืืจืืื ืืื ืืื ืืฉืชื ื ืื ืืื ืืื ืืื ืืงื ืจื ืืกืื ืืืจ ืืืงื ืื ืืืจืื ื ืืืืื
The Gemara explains: Rabba said he is not flogged for the following reason: Since if guests arrive, whatever he bakes will be fit for him to use on the Festival itself, and he will not be guilty of any transgression, now too, although guests have not yet arrived, the food is considered fit for him, and he is not flogged. At the time of the baking, the act was not unequivocally prohibited. Rav แธคisda said he is flogged; we do not state the principle of since. At first glance, there is an internal contradiction with regard to the opinions of both Rabba and Rav แธคisda.
ืืฉืืื ืืจืื ืืืจืื ืื ืงืฉืื ืืื ืืืืกืจ ืืขืฉื ืืชื ืืื ืืืืกืจ ืืขืฉื ืืื ืืจื ืืกืื ืืืจื ืืกืื ืงืฉืื ืืืจื ืื ืืืช ืืื ืืจื ืืกืื ืืืืื ืืงืืื ืืืืืจื ืืืช ืืื
The Gemara notes: Granted, the apparent contradiction between the first statement of Rabba and the second statement of Rabba is not difficult. Here, in the case of the Paschal lamb whose blood is sprinkled for an uncircumcised person, an action is lacking, as the person must undergo circumcision in order to become eligible to eat from the Paschal lamb. However, there, in the case of one who bakes on a Festival, no action is lacking on the part of the baker. But the first statement of Rav แธคisda and the second statement of Rav แธคisda are difficult to reconcile. They say, in answer to this contradiction: When Rav แธคisda does not accept the principle of since, it is only to be lenient and exempt a person from lashes; however, to be stringent and disqualify the Paschal lamb, he does accept this line of reasoning.
ืืืจ ืืื ืืจ ืืืืจื ืืจืื ืืจื ืืจื ืืจืืื ื ืงืชื ื ืืืืื ืืขืจืื ืคืืกืืช ืืืืืื ืคืืกืืช ืื ืืืืื ืื ืขืฉื ืื ืืงืฆืช ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืฃ ืขืจืื ืื ืขืฉื ืืงืฆืช ืขืจืื ืืื ืขืจืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื ืืืื ืื ืขืฉื ืื ืืงืฆืช ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืื ืืจืืขื ืืืืฉื ืืืจื ืืืืื ืืืจืืขื ืืืืฉื ืืืจื ืืืืจืื ืื ืคืกืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืืจืื
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: The baraita quoted above teaches: Since lack of circumcision disqualifies a Paschal lamb and ritual impurity also disqualifies it, the following comparison applies: Just as in the case of ritual impurity, partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity, so too, in the case of lack of circumcision, partial lack of circumcision was not made to be like full lack of circumcision. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to this ritual impurity, what are the circumstances? If you say that the baraita is referring to the ritual impurity of the people who registered for the offering, then there is a difficulty. For what then is the meaning of the ruling in the baraita that partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity? It means that if there are four or five people who are impure and four or five people who are pure, those who are impure do not disqualify those who are pure.
ืืื ืขืจืื ื ืื ืื ืื ืคืกืื ืืชื ื ืืืืืื ืืืขืจืืื ืืฉืจ ืืื ืฉื ื ืืืืื ืืคืฉืืื ืืื ืืืื ืฉื ื ืขืจืื ืืืกืคืงื ืืื
This, however, is difficult, as with regard to lack of circumcision as well, those who are uncircumcised do not disqualify the offering, as we learned in a mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for both circumcised and uncircumcised people, it is valid. What is different about the halakha with regard to impurity, that there it is obvious to him that those who are ritually impure do not disqualify the members of their group who are pure? And what is different about the halakha with regard to lack of circumcision, that there he is in doubt about the halakha?
ืืื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืื ืขืฉื ืื ืืงืฆืช ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืื ืืืืื ืื ืืืืจืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืฉืจืคืื ื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืื ื ืืื
Rather, the baraita must certainly be explained as referring to the impurity of the meat of the offering. And what is the meaning of the ruling in the baraita that partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity? It means that if one of the limbs became impure, that which became impure we burn and the rest we eat.
ืืืื ืืืงืืืชื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืกืืคื ืื ืื ืืืจ ืฉืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืจ ืฉืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืื ืืืืื ืื ื ืืื ืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื
This conclusion is challenged: How did you establish this baraita? It was established as referring to a case of impurity of the meat. If so, say the latter clause of the same baraita as follows: We derive a matter that does not apply to all offerings, the case of uncircumcised men, from a matter that does not apply to all offerings, namely ritual impurity, and the halakha with regard to intent to eat the offering outside the allotted time, which applies to all offerings, should not be used to prove anything about the case at hand. Now, what type of impurity is being discussed here? If we say that it is impurity of the meat, why do you say that it does not apply to all offerings? This halakha certainly applies to all offerings.
ืืื ืคืฉืืื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื ืืืื ืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืขืจื ืืืื ืืฉืืืื ืงืจืื ืืชืืื ืืืืื ืืคืกื ืขืจื ืืืื ืืื ืืฉืืืื ืคืกืืืื ืจืืฉื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืกืืคื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื
Rather, it is obvious that the clause under discussion relates to impurity of the people who are to eat from the offering. And what is the meaning of the statement that it does not apply to all offerings? It means that with regard to all offerings, an uncircumcised person and one who is ritually impure cannot eat from the offering, but nonetheless they can send their offerings with others who can sacrifice them on their behalf; however, with regard to the Paschal lamb, an uncircumcised person and one who is impure cannot send their offerings. Consequently, the Gemara arrives at the surprising conclusion that the first clause of the baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, while the latter clause of the baraita relates to impurity of the people.
ืืืจ ืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืืืื ืงื ืคืจืื
Ravina said to Mar Zutra: Yes, this explanation can be accepted. The baraita can be understood as arguing from the general category of impurity, which applies in one case and not in another, rather than from a specific type of impurity in both cases.
ืืืืืขืืช ืืืื ืกืืคื ื ืื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืืื ื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืื ืืื ืืืฉืจ ืงืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืื ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืงืืื ืืืจืง ืืช ืืื
And if you wish, say a different answer: The latter clause is also referring to impurity of the meat. And what is the meaning of the statement that it does not apply to all offerings? It means that with regard to all offerings, whether the fats of the offering that are burned on the altar have become impure and the meat of the offering remains, or the meat has become impure and the fats remain, the priest may sprinkle the blood, and the offering is accepted through the burning of the sacrificial parts or through the priestsโ consumption of the meat.
ืืืืื ืืคืกื ื ืืื ืืื ืืืฉืจ ืงืืื ืืืจืง ืืช ืืื ื ืืื ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืงืืื ืืื ื ืืืจืง ืืช ืืื
However, when it comes to the Paschal lamb, if the fats have become impure and the meat remains pure and fit to be eaten, the priest may sprinkle the blood; but if the meat has become impure and the fats remain pure and fit to be burned on the altar, he may not sprinkle the blood, because in the case of the Paschal lamb, the ownerโs obligation to eat the meat is the essence of the offering.
ืืืื ืืืงืืืชื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืกืืคื ืื ืื ืืืจ ืฉืื ืืืชืจ ืืืืื ืืืืจ ืฉืื ืืืชืจ ืืืืื ืืื ืชืืืื ืืืืื ืฉืืจื ืืืชืจื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืืืืื
The Gemara asks: How did you establish this baraita? It was established as referring to a case of impurity of the meat. If so, say the next clause of this same baraita as follows: We derive a matter, i.e., the halakha with regard to uncircumcised people, for which no allowance is made from its rule, from a matter, i.e., improper intent with regard to the time, for which no allowance is made from its rule. And the halakha with regard to ritual impurity should not be used to prove anything, as there are circumstances in which an allowance is made from its rule, since it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb while ritually impure. The Gemara clarifies: What type of impurity is being discussed here? If you say that it is
ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืื ืืืชืจื ืืื ืคืฉืืื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื ืืืืื ืืืชืจื ืืืืื ืืฆืืืืจ
impurity of the meat, where is it permitted to eat impure sacrificial meat? Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is talking here about impurity of the people. And where is an allowance made from its rule? It is made in the community; when the majority of the community is ritually impure, it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb and eat it while impure.
ืจืืฉื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืกืืคื ืืืืืืช ืืืจื ืืื ืฉื ืืืืื ืงืคืจืื
The Gemara expresses surprise again: It turns out then that the first clause of the baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, while the latter clause relates to impurity of the people. The Gemara answers: Yes, and there is no difficulty, as the baraita argues from the general category of impurity without necessarily relating to the same type of impurity.
ืืืืืขืืช ืืืื ืืืื ืืืืืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืืื ืืืชืจื ืืืืืืช ืคืกื ืืชื ื ืคืกื ืืื ืืืืืื ื ืืื ืืืืืื ืฉืื ืื ืืชืืืืชื ืืื ืืืืืื
And if you wish, say a different answer: The entire baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, and where is it permitted to eat impure sacrificial meat? It is permitted in a case of the impurity of the Paschal lamb, as we learned in a mishna: A Paschal lamb that comes in impurity, e.g., when the majority of the community is ritually impure and the offering may be brought in impurity, may also be eaten in impurity, as from the very outset it came only to be eaten. This is unlike the law with regard to other offerings that are brought in impurity; their blood is sprinkled on the altar, but their meat may not be eaten. Consequently, even the prohibition to consume impure sacrificial meat is permitted under certain circumstances.
ืืชืื ืจื ืืื ื ืืจืื ืืจื ืืืืฉืข ืืคืกื ืฉืขืืจื ืฉื ืชื ืืฉืืื ืืืื ื ืืฉืื ืืื ืืฉืืื ืืืจืื ืืฉื ืคืกื ืืืื ื ืจืื ืืืืขืืจ ืคืืกื ืืจืื ืืืืฉืข ืืืฉืืจ
Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection from a baraita that teaches: The Paschal sacrifice may be a young lamb or goat less than one year old. In the case of a Paschal lamb that has passed its first year, so that it has automatically become a peace-offering, if he slaughtered it at its appointed time on Passover eve for its own purpose as a Paschal lamb, and similarly, if he slaughtered another offering, e.g., a lamb that had been sanctified as a peace-offering, for the purpose of a Paschal lamb at its set time, the tannaโim disagree with regard to the status of the offering. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies the offering; and Rabbi Yehoshua validates it, based on the principle that offerings brought for the purpose of other offerings are valid. The only exception is the Paschal lamb, which when brought for another purpose is invalid. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, in both of these cases the animal is not truly a Paschal lamb; rather, it is a peace-offering brought with the intent that it serve as a Paschal lamb.
ืืขืื ืืืื ื ืื ืฉืื ืืืื ื ืืฉืจ ืืืืื ื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืื ื ืคืืกื ืฉืื ืืืื ื ื ืื ืคืืกื
The Gemara infers: The reason that the sacrifice is disqualified is that it was brought at its proper time; it is in this case that the tannaโim disagree. But if it was not brought at its proper time, it is valid according to everyone, as it is like any other peace-offering that was slaughtered for a different purpose. But why is this so? Let us say: Since slaughtering another sacrifice for the purpose of a Paschal lamb disqualifies it at its proper time, this should also disqualify it not at its proper time. Consequently, the ruling quoted above is difficult according to the opinion of Rav แธคisda, who accepts the principle of since for the sake of stringency.
ืืืจ ืจื ืคืคื ืฉืื ื ืืชื ืืืืจ ืงืจื ืืืืจืชื ืืื ืคืกื ืืื ืืื ืืืืืืชื ืื ืืื ืืฉืื ืืืจืื ืืื ืืืจืื ืืฉืื
Rav Pappa said: It is different there in the case of another sacrifice slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal lamb, as the verse said: โAnd you shall say: It is a Passover sacrifice to the Lord, Who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt when He smote Egypt, and delivered our houses. And the people bowed the head and prostrated themselvesโ (Exodus 12:27). The word โitโ indicates that the Paschal lamb must be brought as it is, according to its details, without any change. It, the Paschal lamb, must not be offered for the purpose of other sacrifices; and other sacrifices must not be offered for its purpose, i.e., as a Paschal lamb. In both of these cases, the offering is disqualified.
ืืืื ื ืฉืืื ืคืกืื ืืฉืื ืืืจืื ืืืจืื ืคืกืืืื ืืฉืื ืฉืื ืืืื ื ืฉืืื ืืฉืจ ืืฉืื ืืืจืื ืืืจืื ืืฉืจืื ืืฉืื
It may now be inferred: At its proper time, on Passover eve, when the Paschal lamb is disqualified if it is brought for the purpose of other sacrifices, other sacrifices are disqualified according to Rabbi Eliezer if they are brought for its purpose, i.e., as a Paschal lamb. But not at its proper time, when a Paschal lamb offered for the purpose of other sacrifices is valid, other sacrifices offered for its purpose as a Paschal lamb are also valid. Since the verseโs use of the word โitโ links the disqualifications of a Paschal lamb offered as a different sacrifice and any other sacrifice offered for the purpose of a Paschal lamb, the principle of since does not apply.
ืจืื ืฉืืืื ืืชื ืืงืืื ืืจืื ืืืื ื ืืืจ ืืื ื ืืชื ื ืื ืืจ ืกืคืจ ืืืืกืื ืืืจ ืืื ืืืืื ืืช ืืืจ ืืื ืืืื ืืืืื ืืืชืื ืื ืืจืืขื ืืืจ ืืื ืืื ื ืืืื ืื ืื ืืืืืื ืืื ืื ืืจืืขืื ืืื ืฉืื ืืืช ืืืื ืืืืชืื ืื ืืจืืขื ืืคืืื ืืืจืฆื
There is a fundamental problem in the mishna that was clarified during the course of a particular incident: Rabbi Simlai came before Rabbi Yoแธฅanan. He said to him: Would the Master teach me the Book of Genealogies? The Book of Genealogies was a collection of tannaitic teachings that formed a midrash on the book of Chronicles. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said to him: Where are you from? He said to him: From Lod. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan further asked: And where is your present place of residence? He said to him: In Nehardeโa. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said to him: I have a tradition that we teach these subjects neither to Lodites nor to Nehardeโans, and certainly not to you who comes from Lod and your residence is in Nehardeโa, such that you have both shortcomings. Rabbi Simlai pressured Rabbi Yoแธฅanan until he agreed to teach him.
ืืืจ ืืื ื ืืชื ืืื ืืชืืชื ืืจืื ืฉืงื ืงืื ืคืชืง ืืื ืืืจ ืืื ืืื ืืจืืจืื ืืืืชืื ืืจืื ืืืืจ ืืจืชืื ืืจืื ืื ื ืื ืื ืชืจืืืื ืืชื ืื ืชืืช ืืื ืฉืืขืชืชื ืืืืื ืืชืืช ืืื ืจืืืืชื ืืืคืืื ืืื ืื ืืฆืชื ืืื ืืืืชื ืืชืืช ืฉื ืื ืืืช ืืืจืช ืืชืืชื ืืจืื
Rabbi Simlai said to him: Teach me the Book of Genealogies in three months. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan took a clod of dirt, threw it at him, and said to him: Berurya, wife of Rabbi Meir and daughter of Rabbi แธคananya ben Teradyon, was so sharp and had such a good memory that she learned three hundred halakhot in one day from three hundred Sages, and nonetheless she did not fulfill her responsibility to properly learn the Book of Genealogies in three years because it is especially long and difficult. And you say that I should teach it to you in three months? After your inappropriate request, I am not inclined to teach you at all.
ืื ืฉืงืื ืืืืื ืืืจ ืืื ืจืื ืื ืืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื
When Rabbi Simlai was taking leave to go, he said to Rabbi Yoแธฅanan: Even so, my teacher, as I have already come, let me ask you a question: What is the difference between one who offers a Paschal lamb both for its own purpose and for a different purpose, in which case the offering is disqualified, and one who offers the sacrifice with the intent that it be both for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, in which case the offering is not disqualified?
ืืืจ ืืื ืืืืื ืืฆืืจืื ืืจืื ื ืืช ืชื ืืืืื ืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืคืกืืื ืืืืคื ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืื ืคืกืืื ืืืืคื
He said to him: Since I understand from your question that you are a Torah scholar, come and I will tell you the answer: When one sacrifices an offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose, the disqualification is in the offering itself; that is, the disqualifying intention relates to the sacrifice itself. In contrast, when one sacrifices an offering for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, the disqualification is not in the offering itself, as the disqualifying intent relates to the people who are to eat from it.
ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืื ืืคืฉืจ ืืืจืจ ืืืกืืจื ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืคืฉืจ ืืืจืจ ืืืกืืจื
Furthermore, when one sacrifices an offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose, it is impossible to identify its prohibition; that is, there is no way to differentiate between valid and invalid parts of the offering. In contrast, when one sacrifices an offering for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is possible to identify its prohibition. If some of the people may eat it and some may not, it is possible to distribute the offering to each group and thereby determine which part of the offering is invalid.
ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉื ื ืืืจืืข ืขืืืืืช ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืื ื ืืืจืืข ืขืืืืืช ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉืื ืืฉื ื ืืฆืืืืจ ืืืืืื ืืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืืืืื ืืื ื ืืฆืืืืจ ืืืืืื
Furthermore, the intent that the offering be for its own purpose and for a different purpose applies and can disqualify the offering in all four rites, namely: Slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar; however, the intent that it be for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it does not apply during all four rites, as it has no effect during the time of the sprinkling. Moreover, the intent that the offering be for its own purpose and for a different purpose is a disqualification that applies to communal sacrifices as it does to individual sacrifices; in contrast, the intent that it be for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it does not apply to the community as it does to an individual.
ืจื ืืฉื ืืืจ ืคืกืืื ืืืืคื ืืื ืืคืฉืจ ืืืจืจ ืืืกืืจื ืืื ืืืืชื ืืื ืืื ืืขื ืืืจ ืคืกืืื ืืืืคื ืืฉืื ืืื ืืคืฉืจ ืืืจืจ ืืืกืืจื
Rav Ashi said that careful analysis of these answers demonstrates the following: The argument that its disqualification is in the offering itself and the argument that it is impossible to identify its prohibition are one and the same thing; they are not two separate reasons. As, what is the reason that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says that when one brings an offering for a different purpose, its disqualification is in the offering itself? It is because it is impossible to identify its prohibition, and therefore the prohibition applies to the offering itself.
ืืืจ ืจืื ืืจ ืจื ืืืื ืืืจ ืจื ืืืื ืฉื ืื ื ืกืคืจ ืืืืกืื ืชืฉืฉ ืืื ืฉื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืืืจ ืขืื ืืื
Having mentioned the Book of Genealogies, the Gemara notes that Rami bar Rav Yuda said that Rav said the following about it: From the day the Book of Genealogies was hidden and no longer available to the Sages, the strength of the Sages has been weakened, and the light of their eyes has been dimmed, as the book contained the reasons for many Torah laws and lists of genealogies that are now lost.
ืืืจ ืืจ ืืืืจื ืืื ืืฆื ืืืฆื ืืขืื ื ืืจืืข ืืื ืืืื ืืืจืฉื
Mar Zutra said: The Book of Genealogiesโ exposition of Chronicles was so extensive that it was said, in exaggeration, that the verses from the word Azel mentioned in the verse: โAnd Azel had six sons and these are their names: Azrikam, Bocru, and Ishmael and Sheariah and Obadia and Hanan; all these were the sons of Azelโ (I Chronicles 8:38), to the word Azel mentioned in a different verse with the identical wording: โAnd Azel had six sons and these are their names: Azrikam, Bocru, and Ishmael and Sheariah and Obadia and Hanan; these were the sons of Azelโ (I Chronicles 9:44), bore four hundred camels of expositions written about these verses.
ืชื ืื ืืืจืื ืืืืจืื ืืงืืื ืืืืื ืืขืจืืื ืืฉืจ ืขืจืืื ืืืืืื ืคืกืื ืืื ืฉื ื ืืืืื ืืขืจืืื ืืืฉืจ ืืืืื ืขืจืื ืืขืื ื ืืืืื ืขืจืืื ืืืืืื ื ืื ืืืื ืขืจืื ืืขืื ื ืืืืื
It was taught in a baraita that Aแธฅerim say: If one sacrifices a Paschal lamb for both circumcised and uncircumcised people and had in mind first the circumcised people and then the uncircumcised people, the offering is valid. But if he had in mind first the uncircumcised people and then the circumcised people, it is disqualified. The Gemara asks: What is different about having in mind first the circumcised people and then the uncircumcised people, such that the offering is valid? One might say that in order to disqualify the sacrifice, we require that all the people he has in mind be uncircumcised, and this is not the case here, as some of them are circumcised. But if this is so, when he has in mind first the uncircumcised people and then the circumcised people, we should also say that in order to disqualify the sacrifice we require that all the people he has in mind be uncircumcised, and this is not the case here. What, then, is the difference between the two cases?
