Pesachim 69

Pesachim 69

וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, שְׁבוּת דְּמִצְוָה עֲדִיף לֵיהּ.

And Rabbi Eliezer rejects this refutation because, in his opinion, permitting a rabbinic decree for the sake of a mitzva is preferable. We cannot derive through an a fortiori inference that since rabbinic decrees were not permitted for optional activities associated with rejoicing on festivals, they must not be permitted for the purpose of a mitzva on Shabbat. This is because it is possible that they permitted rabbinic decrees for mitzva purposes due to the importance of the mitzva.

תַּנְיָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: וּמָה לִי אִם דָּחוּ מַכְשִׁירֵי מִצְוָה שֶׁלְּאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת, דְּאִיתְעֲבִיד לֵיהּ מִצְוָה — לֹא יִדְחוּ מַכְשִׁירֵי מִצְוָה שֶׁלִּפְנֵי שְׁחִיטָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת!

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: What reason do I have? If actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva and are done after the slaughter, such as cleaning the intestines which is permitted according all opinions, override Shabbat even though the mitzva has already been done, is it possible to say that actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva and must be done before the slaughter do not also override Shabbat?

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: דְּמָה לִי אִם דָּחוּ מַכְשִׁירֵי מִצְוָה שֶׁלְּאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁהֲרֵי דָּחֲתָה שְׁחִיטָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת, תֹּאמַר יִדְחוּ מַכְשִׁירֵי מִצְוָה שֶׁלִּפְנֵי שְׁחִיטָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת — שֶׁלֹּא דָּחֲתָה שְׁחִיטָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. דָּבָר אַחֵר: שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא זֶבַח פָּסוּל, וְנִמְצָא מְחַלֵּל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת לְמַפְרֵעַ.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: What reason do I have to reject this comparison? If actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva that are done after the slaughter override Shabbat, that is because slaughter has already overridden Shabbat and therefore an action that violates a rabbinic decree is performed, after Shabbat has already been overridden; can you say that actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva and are done before the slaughter should override Shabbat even though slaughter has not yet overridden Shabbat? Alternatively, Rabbi Akiva has another reason: Perhaps the offering will be found to be disqualified due to a blemish and the person will be found to have violated Shabbat retroactively when he slaughtered the animal without fulfilling a mitzva.

אִי הָכִי — מִשְׁחָט נָמֵי לָא נִשְׁחֹט, שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא זֶבַח פָּסוּל, וְנִמְצָא מְחַלֵּל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת לְמַפְרֵעַ. אֶלָּא: הָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ בְּרֵישָׁא וּפַרְכֵיהּ, וַהֲדַר אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָךְ דְּמָה לִי אִם דָּחוּ.

Rabbi Eliezer rejects this argument: If so, if you are concerned about this possibility, it should also not be slaughtered; for perhaps the offering will be found to be invalid and the person will be found to have violated Shabbat retroactively. Rather, the course of the discussion must have gone as follows: Rabbi Akiva said this last reason to Rabbi Eliezer at the beginning and he refuted it as explained above; and then Rabbi Akiva said to him this other reason of: What reason do I have to reject this comparison? If actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva override, etc.

הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְאָמַר: הַזָּאָה תּוֹכִיחַ וְכוּ׳. תַּנְיָא, אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: עֲקִיבָא, בִּשְׁחִיטָה הֱשַׁבְתַּנִי, בִּשְׁחִיטָה תְּהֵא מִיתָתוֹ. אָמַר לוֹ: רַבִּי, אַל תַּכְפִּירֵנִי בִּשְׁעַת הַדִּין, כָּךְ מְקוּבְּלַנִי מִמְּךָ: הַזָּאָה שְׁבוּת הִיא, וְאֵינָהּ דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת.

We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva responded and said to Rabbi Eliezer that the law governing the sprinkling of the purifying water of a red heifer proves that actions prohibited by a rabbinic decree, even when they are performed for the sake of a mitzva, do not override Shabbat. He then goes on to argue that we can reverse the order of the argument and conclude by way of an a fortiori inference that even slaughter does not override Shabbat. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said to him about this: Akiva, you have lightheartedly responded to me with a faulty a fortiori inference with regard to slaughter. His death will be with slaughter; meaning, as punishment for this disrespect you will be slaughtered by other people. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, do not deny my contention at the time we are discussing this inference, for this is the tradition I received from you: Sprinkling is forbidden by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat.

וְכִי מֵאַחַר דְּהוּא אַגְמְרֵיהּ, מַאי טַעְמָא קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ? אָמַר עוּלָּא: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כִּי אַגְמְרֵיהּ, הַזָּאָה דִתְרוּמָה אַגְמְרֵיהּ — דִּתְרוּמָה גּוּפַהּ לָא דָּחֲיָא שַׁבָּת.

The Gemara asks: Seeing that Rabbi Eliezer taught Rabbi Akiva this halakha that sprinkling purifying water does not override Shabbat, what is the reason he retracted his opinion? Ulla said: When Rabbi Eliezer taught him this halakha, he taught it to him with respect to sprinkling that is performed in order to enable a ritually impure priest to partake of teruma. This sprinkling does not override Shabbat because even separating teruma itself does not override Shabbat. But he never taught Rabbi Akiva this halakha with respect to sprinkling that is performed in order enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי כִּי אוֹתְבֵיהּ — הַזָּאָה דִּתְרוּמָה אוֹתְבֵיהּ, שֶׁהִיא מִצְוָה וְהִיא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּת! וְהוּא סָבַר: הַזָּאָה דְּפֶסַח קָא מוֹתֵיב לֵיהּ.

The Gemara notes that Rabbi Akiva as well, when he challenged Rabbi Eliezer, challenged him with regard to the halakha of sprinkling for teruma, and his objection should be understood as follows: Eating teruma is a mitzva, and sprinkling purifying water on someone who is ritually impure is only prohibited due to a rabbinic decree; nevertheless, sprinkling purifying water on a ritually impure priest, in order to enable him to eat teruma, is prohibited on Shabbat. Thus it follows by a fortiori inference that slaughter, which is a biblically prohibited labor, should certainly be forbidden on Shabbat, even when performed for the sake of a mitzva. And Rabbi Eliezer thought Rabbi Akiva was challenging him with regard to the halakha of sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb; that is why he said that he disagreed about sprinkling as well.

מֵתִיב רַבָּה: הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְאָמַר: הַזָּאַת טְמֵא מֵת תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁחָל שְׁבִיעִי שֶׁלּוֹ לִהְיוֹת בַּשַּׁבָּת, וּבְעֶרֶב הַפֶּסַח שֶׁהִיא מִצְוָה, וְהִיא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּת — וְאֵינָהּ דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת.

Rabba raised an objection to Ulla’s explanation, based on a different baraita which states: Rabbi Akiva responded and said: The sprinkling of purifying water on someone who is ritually impure due to contact with a corpse proves the matter when his seventh day of impurity occurs on Shabbat and it is also the eve of Passover, for it is done for the sake of a mitzva, in order to allow the person to eat of the Paschal lamb, and it is prohibited only due to a rabbinic decree, and nonetheless it does not override Shabbat. From this baraita it is clear that Rabbi Akiva challenged Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the halakha of sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat the Paschal lamb.

אֶלָּא, וַודַּאי הַזָּאָה דְפֶסַח אַגְמְרֵיהּ. וְכִי מֵאַחַר דְּאַגְמְרֵיהּ, מַאי טַעְמָא קָא פָּרֵיךְ לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר גְּמָרֵיהּ אִיתְעֲקַר לֵיהּ, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְאַדְכּוֹרֵי גְּמָרֵיהּ. וְנֵימָא לֵיהּ בְּהֶדְיָה! סָבַר, לָאו אוֹרַח אַרְעָא.

Rather, we must reject Ulla’s explanation and say instead that Rabbi Eliezer certainly taught Rabbi Akiva about sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb. And with regard to the question that seeing that Rabbi Eliezer himself taught him this halakha, what is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer refutes it, the Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer forgot his own teaching and Rabbi Akiva came to remind him of his teaching by drawing an a fortiori inference that would cause Rabbi Eliezer to remember what he himself had taught. The Gemara asks: If so, then let Rabbi Akiva say explicitly that this is what Rabbi Eliezer himself had taught him. The Gemara answers: He thought that it would not be proper to tell his teacher that he had forgotten his teaching, and therefore his initial attempt was to remind him indirectly.

וְהַזָּאָה מַאי טַעְמָא לָא דָּחֲיָא שַׁבָּת? מִכְּדֵי טַלְטוֹלֵי בְּעָלְמָא הוּא, תִּדְּחֵי שַׁבָּת מִשּׁוּם פֶּסַח! אָמַר רַבָּה: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִטְּלֶנָּה וְיַעֲבִירֶנָּה אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

The Gemara questions the reason for the halakha under discussion. What is the reason that the sprinkling of purifying water does not override Shabbat? Since it involves the mere moving of the liquid from the utensil in his hand to the body of the person seeking purification, why should it be forbidden on Shabbat? Let it at least override Shabbat on account of the mitzva of the Paschal lamb. Rabba said: The prohibition against sprinkling is a rabbinic decree that was instituted lest one take the utensil containing the purifying water and carry it a distance of four cubits in the public domain, thus violating an actual Torah prohibition. This is consistent with Rabba’s opinion in several other places in the Talmud that the Sages forbade the fulfillment of certain mitzvot due to a similar concern about carrying in the public domain.

וּלְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר נַיעְבְּרֵיהּ! דְּהָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: מַכְשִׁירֵי מִצְוָה דּוֹחִין אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת! אָמְרִי: הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּגַבְרָא גּוּפֵיהּ חֲזֵי וּרְמֵי חִיּוּבָא עֲלֵיהּ. אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּגַבְרָא גּוּפֵיהּ לָא חֲזֵי — לָא רְמֵי חִיּוּבָא עֲלֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: At least according to Rabbi Eliezer, let us carry the purifying water even in the public domain, for Rabbi Eliezer said as a general rule that actions that facilitate the performance of a mitzva override Shabbat, even if they are not mitzvot themselves and involve transgression of Torah prohibitions. They say that there is room to distinguish between different situations: The rule that actions necessary to facilitate a mitzva override Shabbat only applies when the person himself is fit to fulfill the mitzva and the obligation to fulfill it is incumbent upon him. But here where the person himself is not fit to eat the Paschal lamb, as he is presently ritually impure, the obligation to fulfill the mitzva is not incumbent upon him, and therefore actions that would enable him to fulfill the mitzva do not override Shabbat.

אָמַר רַבָּה: לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, קָטָן בָּרִיא — מְחַמִּין לוֹ חַמִּין לְהַבְרוֹתוֹ וּלְמוּלוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת, דְּהָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ. קָטָן חוֹלֶה — אֵין מְחַמִּין לוֹ חַמִּין לְהַבְרוֹתוֹ וּלְמוּלוֹ, דְּהָא לָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ.

Rabba said: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer that when a person is unfit no obligation is incumbent upon him, in the case of a healthy baby, one may heat water for him to strengthen him even further in order to circumcise him on Shabbat, as he is already now fit to be circumcised. But in the case of a sickly baby, one may not heat water for him to strengthen him in order to circumcise him, for owing to his sickliness he is not presently fit for the mitzva, and acts that facilitate a mitzva do not override Shabbat if the person is not currently fit for the mitzva.

אָמַר רָבָא: וְאִי בָּרִיא הוּא לְמָה לֵיהּ חַמִּין לְהַבְרוֹתוֹ? אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: הַכֹּל חוֹלִין הֵן אֵצֶל מִילָּה, אֶחָד קָטָן בָּרִיא וְאֶחָד קָטָן חוֹלֶה אֵין מְחַמִּין לוֹ חַמִּין לְהַבְרוֹתוֹ וּלְמוּלוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת, דְּהָא לָא חֲזֵי.

Rava said: But if the baby is healthy, why does he need hot water to strengthen him? Rather, Rava said: All babies are considered sickly with respect to circumcision, as they all need to be washed with hot water. Therefore, both in the case of a healthy baby and in the case of a sickly baby, one may not heat water for him to strengthen him in order to circumcise him on Shabbat, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, as he is not presently fit for the mitzva.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: עָרֵל שֶׁלֹּא מָל עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וְהָא הָכָא דְּגַבְרָא גּוּפֵיהּ לָא חֲזֵי, וְקָתָנֵי עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, אַלְמָא: רְמֵי חִיּוּבָא עֲלֵיהּ!

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s distinction between someone who is currently fit for the mitzva and someone who is not, based on what was taught elsewhere in a baraita: An uncircumcised adult who did not circumcise himself before Passover is liable to the punishment of karet for having intentionally violated the mitzva to bring the Paschal lamb, as an uncircumcised person may not eat of the offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. But here the person himself is not fit, for as long as he is uncircumcised he is not obligated to bring the Paschal lamb, and nonetheless the baraita is teaching that he is punished with karet. Apparently, the obligation is incumbent upon him even though he is presently unfit to perform the mitzva.

אָמַר רַבָּה: קָסָבַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין וְזוֹרְקִין עַל טְמֵא שֶׁרֶץ.

Rabba said in answer to this objection: Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may not slaughter the Paschal lamb or sprinkle its blood for someone who is ritually impure due to contact with a creeping animal because he is currently impure, even though he can immerse in a ritual bath and become pure by the night of Passover.

וְכׇל שֶׁאִילּוּ בְּיָחִיד נִדְחֶה, בְּצִיבּוּר עָבְדִי בְּטוּמְאָה. וְכׇל מִילְּתָא דְּאִיתָא בְּצִיבּוּר, אִיתָא בְּיָחִיד. וְכׇל מִילְּתָא דְּלֵיתָא בְּצִיבּוּר, לֵיתָא בְּיָחִיד.

And Rabbi Eliezer further maintains with regard to any form of impurity due to which an individual is deferred to the second Pesaḥ, that if the entire community is afflicted with it, they observe the first Pesaḥ in a state of ritual impurity. And he accepts yet another principle: Anything that applies to the community applies to an individual, and anything that does not apply to the community does not apply to an individual.

עֲרֵילוּת, דְּאִי כּוּלֵּיהּ צִיבּוּר עֲרֵלִים נִינְהוּ, אָמְרִינַן לְהוּ: קוּמוּ מְהוּלוּ נַפְשַׁיְיכוּ וַעֲבִידֵי פִּסְחָא. יָחִיד נָמֵי, אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: קוּם מְהוֹל וַעֲבֵיד פִּסְחָא. וְאִי לָא מָהֵיל וְעָבֵיד — עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת.

On the basis of these principles, we can say as follows: With regard to lack of circumcision, if the entire community is uncircumcised we say to them: Arise, and circumcise yourselves, and offer the Paschal lamb, and we do not allow them to offer the sacrifice while uncircumcised. Therefore, with regard to an individual as well, we say to him: Arise, and circumcise yourself, and offer the Paschal lamb; and if he does not circumcise himself and offer the Paschal lamb, he is liable to the punishment of karet.

טוּמְאָה, דְּאִי כּוּלֵּיהּ צִיבּוּרָא טְמֵאִין נִינְהוּ — לָא מַדֵּינַן עֲלַיְיהוּ, אֶלָּא עָבְדִי בְּטוּמְאָה, יָחִיד נָמֵי פָּטוּר.

With regard to impurity, however, if the whole community is impure we do not sprinkle the purifying water on them; rather, they offer the Paschal lamb in a state of ritual impurity. Therefore, an individual, as well, is exempt from sprinkling; and since he is exempt, sprinkling does not override Shabbat. A distinction may be drawn between the two cases: An uncircumcised person must circumcise himself, but a person who is ritually impure need not undergo purification.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרָבָא: וַהֲרֵי פֶּסַח שֵׁנִי, דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּצִיבּוּר וְאִיתֵיהּ בְּיָחִיד! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּהָא עֲבַד לֵיהּ צִיבּוּרָא בְּרִאשׁוֹן.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: Are these principles really correct? But there is the second Pesaḥ, which does not apply to the community and yet it applies to an individual. Rava said to Rav Huna: It is different there, as the community already offered the Paschal lamb on the first Pesaḥ in a state of ritual impurity, and therefore the second Pesaḥ can apply to individuals although it does not apply to the community.

מֵיתִיבִי: יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת אֶלָּא שֶׁהָיָה טָהוֹר וְשֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּדֶרֶךְ רְחוֹקָה. עָרֵל וּטְמֵא שֶׁרֶץ וּשְׁאָר כׇּל הַטְּמֵאִים מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהָאִישׁ״.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita in which it was taught: One might have thought that only one who was pure and not on a distant journey is punishable by karet for having neglected to offer the Paschal lamb, as the Torah explicitly states that a person who was ritually impure or on a distant journey is exempt from the first Pesaḥ and obligated in the second Pesaḥ. But as for one who was uncircumcised or ritually impure from a creeping animal and all the others who are ritually impure not from a corpse, and they did not undergo circumcision or purification before Passover, from where do we know that they are also liable to receive karet? The verse states: “But the man that is clean, and is not on a journey, and fails to keep the Passover, then that person shall be cut off from his people” (Numbers 9:13); the expression “but the man” comes to include anyone who can become pure and fit to participate in the Paschal lamb, but fails to do so.

מִדְּקָא מְהַדַּר אַטְּמֵא שֶׁרֶץ, קָסָבַר: אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין וְזוֹרְקִין עַל טְמֵא שֶׁרֶץ, דְּאִי שׁוֹחֲטִין וְזוֹרְקִין עַל טְמֵא שֶׁרֶץ — לְמָה לֵיהּ לְאַהֲדוֹרֵי עֲלֵיהּ, הַיְינוּ טָהוֹר. אַלְמָא: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא חֲזֵי — חִיּוּבָא עֲלֵיהּ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּצִיבּוּר — אִיתֵיהּ בְּיָחִיד.

The Gemara infers from this baraita: From the fact that he searches for a source to include one who is ritually impure from a creeping animal, it is clear that he holds that one may not slaughter the Paschal lamb or sprinkle its blood for someone who is ritually impure from a creeping animal. For if one may slaughter and sprinkle for someone impure from a creeping animal, why did he search for a source to include it? He is the same as anyone who is pure and did not offer the Paschal lamb, for he could have sent his offering with someone else and eaten from it in the evening after having undergone ritual immersion. Rather, it is clear that one may not slaughter or sprinkle for him; and, nonetheless, if he neglected the mitzva of the Paschal lamb, he is liable to receive karet. Apparently then, although he was not fit at that time to offer the Paschal lamb, the obligation is nonetheless incumbent upon him to render himself fit. And although this does not apply to the community, for a community that is impure with the impurity of a creeping animal brings the Paschal lamb in a state of impurity, it does apply to an individual.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: קָסָבַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר שׁוֹחֲטִין וְזוֹרְקִין עַל טְמֵא שֶׁרֶץ, וְהוּא הַדִּין לִטְמֵא מֵת בִּשְׁבִיעִי שֶׁלּוֹ. הַזָּאָה לְמַאי? לַאֲכִילָה אֲכִילַת פְּסָחִים לָא מְעַכְּבָא!

Rather, Rava said that we should reject the previous statement and say instead that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may slaughter the Paschal lamb and sprinkle its blood for someone who is ritually impure from a creeping animal, and the same is true with regard to someone who is ritually impure from a corpse on his seventh day of impurity. If so, for what purpose is the sprinkling of the purifying water? If it is possible to slaughter the Paschal lamb and sprinkle its blood on this person’s behalf even when he is impure, the only reason to sprinkle the purifying water is for the purpose of eating the Paschal lamb. However, eating of the Paschal lamb is not essential for the fulfillment of the mitzva, for if the blood of the sacrifice is sprinkled in a permitted fashion on someone’s behalf and afterward he is unable to eat the meat of the sacrifice, e.g., it became impure or was lost, he has fulfilled his obligation and is not liable to receive karet. This being the case, sprinkling the purifying waters is not an act that is necessary to facilitate a mitzva and does not override Shabbat even according to Rabbi Eliezer.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַבָּא לְרָבָא: אִם כֵּן, נִמְצָא פֶּסַח נִשְׁחָט שֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו — לְחוֹלֶה וּלְזָקֵן, דְּלָא חֲזֵי. אֲבָל הַאי — מִיחְזֵא חֲזֵי, תַּקּוֹנֵי הוּא דְּלָא מְתַקַּן.

Rav Adda bar Abba said to Rava: If it is so, that one may slaughter the Paschal lamb for someone who is ritually impure from a creeping animal, it turns out that the Paschal lamb is slaughtered for people who cannot eat it, and it is stated elsewhere that such a sacrifice is disqualified. Rava said to him: When it says that a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered for people who cannot eat is disqualified, this refers to a case where it is slaughtered for a sick or elderly person who is not at all fit to eat the sacrifice. But this person is essentially fit to eat the sacrifice but has not yet been made ready to actually eat it. He himself is regarded as fit to eat the sacrifice, and it is only some external factor that prevents him from doing so.

כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי מִילָה כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא, כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: כׇּל מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת — אֵינָהּ דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת, מִילָה שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת — דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva stated a principle that any prohibited labor required for the offering of the sacrifice that can be performed before Shabbat does not override Shabbat; whereas slaughter, which cannot be performed on the eve of Shabbat, overrides Shabbat.Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to the Paschal lamb. The Gemara points out that we also learned something similar to this in another mishna with regard to circumcision: Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any prohibited labor required for circumcision that can be performed on the eve of Shabbat because it need not be done specifically on the day of the circumcision does not override Shabbat; the circumcision itself, which cannot be performed on the eve of Shabbat, since it is not yet time to perform the circumcision, overrides Shabbat. And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to circumcision.

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי פֶסַח: הָתָם (דְּהוּא מַכְשִׁירֵי) מִצְוָה לָא דָּחוּ שַׁבָּת, מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא נִכְרְתוּ עָלֶיהָ שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה בְּרִיתוֹת. אֲבָל מִילָה, דְּנִכְרְתוּ עָלֶיהָ שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה בְּרִיתוֹת, אֵימָא לִידְחֵי.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this ruling in both cases, for had Rav taught us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva only with regard to the Paschal lamb, the conclusion would have been: It is specifically there that the facilitators of a mitzva that can be performed the day before do not override Shabbat because thirteen covenants were not established upon the Paschal lamb, and it is therefore not so significant. But with regard to circumcision, upon which thirteen covenants were established, as is evidenced by the fact that the word covenant appears thirteen times in the chapter relating to circumcision (Genesis 17), which serves as a covenant between God and the Jewish nation, I would say that even facilitating actions that could have been performed on Shabbat eve should override Shabbat.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן מִילָה: הָתָם הוּא דְּמַכְשִׁירֵי מִצְוָה לָא דָּחוּ שַׁבָּת, דְּלֵיכָּא כָּרֵת, אֲבָל פֶּסַח דְּאִיכָּא כָּרֵת, אֵימָא לִידְחֵי. צְרִיכָא.

And had Rav taught us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva only with regard to circumcision, the conclusion would have been: It is specifically there that the facilitators of a mitzva that can be performed before Shabbat do not override Shabbat, as there is no punishment of karet if the circumcision is delayed, since liability for karet only applies when the child becomes obligated in mitzvot and chooses not to circumcise himself. But with regard to the Paschal lamb, where there is karet for one who fails to offer the sacrifice at its proper time, I would say that such facilitators should override Shabbat. It is therefore necessary to teach that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in both cases.

מַתְנִי׳ אֵימָתַי מֵבִיא חֲגִיגָה עִמּוֹ? בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא בָּא בַּחוֹל, בְּטָהֳרָה וּבְמוּעָט. וּבִזְמַן שֶׁהוּא בָּא בְּשַׁבָּת, בִּמְרוּבֶּה וּבְטוּמְאָה — אֵין מְבִיאִין עִמּוֹ חֲגִיגָה.

MISHNA: When does one bring a Festival peace-offering with the Paschal lamb? A special offering is brought on the fourteenth of Nisan together with the Paschal lamb when the Paschal lamb comes on a weekday rather than on Shabbat, and when it comes in a state of ritual purity as opposed to when it is brought in a state of impurity because most of the community is impure, and when many people are registered for the Paschal lamb so that each person will receive only a small portion from it. When these three conditions are met, the Festival peace-offering is eaten first and the Paschal lamb is eaten afterward. When, however, the Paschal lamb comes on Shabbat, or when few people are registered for it so that each person will receive a large portion, or when it is brought in a state of ritual impurity, one does not bring a Festival peace-offering with it.

חֲגִיגָה הָיְתָה בָּאָה מִן הַצֹּאן מִן הַבָּקָר, מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים וּמִן הָעִזִּים, מִן הַזְּכָרִים וּמִן הַנְּקֵבוֹת, וְנֶאֱכֶלֶת לִשְׁנֵי יָמִים וְלַיְלָה אֶחָד.

With regard to the extra offering itself, the Festival peace-offering would come from the flock, from the herd, from sheep or from goats, from males or from females, as the Festival peace-offering is not bound by the limitations governing the Paschal offering, which must be specifically a young male sheep or goat. And the Festival peace-offering is eaten for two days and one night like other peace-offerings.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי תַּנָּא דְּקָתָנֵי חֲגִיגָה? תָּנָא הַרְכָּבָתוֹ וַהֲבָאָתוֹ דְּלָא דָּחֵי שַׁבָּת, וְקָתָנֵי נָמֵי חֲגִיגָה דְּלָא דָּחֲיָא שַׁבָּת. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵימָתַי מְבִיאִין עִמּוֹ חֲגִיגָה — בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא בָּא בְּחוֹל, בְּטׇהֳרָה וּבְמוּעָט.

GEMARA: The Gemara questions why this halakha is recorded here: What did the mishna previously teach that made it relevant to teach this halakha with regard to a Festival peace-offering despite the fact that it seems to be unconnected to the previous mishnayot? The Gemara answers: Since it taught that carrying the Paschal lamb through a public domain and bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit do not override Shabbat, it also taught with regard to the halakha of a Festival peace-offering, that it does not override Shabbat. And this is what the mishna is saying: When does one bring a Festival peace-offering with the Paschal lamb? When it comes on a weekday, in a state of ritual purity, and when each person’s portion is small.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ חֲגִיגַת אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר

Rav Ashi said: Learn from this that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth of Nisan, which comes with the Paschal lamb and is the subject of our mishna, as opposed to the Festival peace-offering that is brought on the first day of Passover and is called the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth,