Sanhedrin 3

שנאמר משפט אחד יהיה לכם ומה טעם אמרו דיני ממונות לא בעינן דרישה וחקירה כדי שלא תנעול דלת בפני לווין

The source for this is as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), from which it is derived that all judges must judge in the same manner. And since with regard to cases of capital law it is stated: “And you shall inquire and investigate, and ask diligently” (Deuteronomy 13:15), the same should apply to cases of monetary law. And what is the reason that the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not require inquiry and interrogation of witnesses? The Gemara answers: The Sages established this exemption so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses would be required in order to have the court rule that the lender can collect payment of a loan, lenders would be deterred by the difficulty of proving the matter and might cease to lend money to the poor. For the same reason, the Sages also waived the need for expert judges in these cases.

אלא מעתה טעו לא ישלמו כל שכן אתה נועל דלת בפני לווין

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if these laymen err they should not be liable to pay compensation to the party unfairly wronged by their judgment, just as expert judges are not liable. The Gemara responds: If this is the halakha, you are all the more so locking the door in the face of potential borrowers; wealthy people will not want to lend money, as they will fear that a court of laymen will judge the case incorrectly.

אי הכי תרתי קתני דיני ממונות בשלשה הדיוטות גזילות וחבלות בשלשה מומחין

With regard to Rabbi Abbahu’s method of explaining the mishna, the Gemara asks: If that is so, then instead of explaining the mishna employing the style: What are these, Rabbi Abbahu could more easily say that two matters are taught in the mishna, and explain it as follows: Cases of monetary law, meaning cases of admissions and loans, are adjudicated by three judges who could be non-ordained laymen [hedyotot], and cases of robbery and personal injury are adjudicated by three ordained, expert judges.

ועוד שלשה שלשה למה לי

And furthermore, according to Rabbi Abbahu’s explanation that the term: Cases of robbery and personal injury, simply clarifies the meaning of the term: Cases of monetary law, why do I need the repetitive statement that cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges and cases of robbery and injury are adjudicated by three judges? The repetition seems to indicate that these are two separate matters.

אלא אמר רבא תרתי קתני משום דרבי חנינא רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר מדאורייתא חד נמי כשר שנאמר בצדק תשפט עמיתך אלא משום יושבי קרנות

Rather, Rava said: Two matters are in fact taught in the mishna, because of the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina that the Sages instituted leniencies with regard to cases of monetary law so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: By Torah law, the adjudication of one judge is also valid in cases of admissions and loans, as it is stated: “In righteousness shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15), in the singular. But by rabbinic law, three judges are required, due to the concern that a single judge may be one of those who sit idly on street corners, i.e., unlearned people who are not involved in business and are unlikely to judge the case correctly.

אטו בתלתא מי לא הוו יושבי קרנות אי אפשר דלית בהו חד דגמיר אלא מעתה טעו לא ישלמו כל שכן דנפישי יושבי קרנות

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with three judges they will not be among those who sit idly on street corners? How is this concern addressed by increasing the number of judges? The Gemara answers: When there are three judges it is impossible, i.e., highly unlikely, that there is not among them one who is learned. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if they err they should not be liable to pay compensation, since rabbinic law authorizes laymen to judge cases of this nature. The Gemara answers: If the judges will be exempt from paying compensation in the event that they err in their judgment, this lack of accountability will lead all the more so to having many of those who sit idly on street corners assume the role of judges.

מאי איכא בין רבא לרב אחא בריה דרב איקא איכא בינייהו דאמר שמואל שנים שדנו דיניהן דין אלא שנקראו בית דין חצוף לרבא לית ליה דשמואל לרב אחא בריה דרב איקא אית ליה דשמואל

The Gemara asks: What are the implications of the difference between the opinion of Rava, who says that cases of monetary law may be adjudicated by three laymen due to the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, and the opinion of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, who holds that according to the Torah one judge is sufficient? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to that which Shmuel says: If two people adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rava is of the opinion that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as he holds that three judges are required by Torah law. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as he holds that fundamentally, even one judge may judge a case of monetary law.

נזק וחצי נזק וכו׳ נזק היינו חבלות משום דקא בעי למיתנא חצי נזק תני נמי נזק שלם

§ The mishna teaches that cases involving payment for damage and payment for half the damage are adjudicated by three judges. The Gemara challenges: Damage is the same as injury, since the term: Injury, includes various damages one causes another directly or by his property. The Gemara explains: Since he needed to teach the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of the full cost of the damage.

חצי נזק נמי היינו חבלות תנא ממונא וקתני קנסא

The Gemara challenges: Payment of half the damage is also the same as personal injury, so it did not need to be stated separately. The Gemara explains: There is a difference. The tanna taught the halakha with regard to a case of monetary matters, and he also taught the halakha with regard to a case of a fine, such as payment of half the damage in a case where an innocuous ox gored another animal. Consequently, payment of half the cost of the damage needed to be stated separately from payment for injury, and once he needed to teach the halakha with regard to payment for half the cost of the damage, he first mentioned general payments for damages.

הניחא למאן דאמר פלגא ניזקא קנסא אלא למאן דאמר פלגא ניזקא ממונא מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the payment for half the cost of the damage is considered a fine, meaning that according to the standard halakhot of damages the owner of the goring ox should be exempt, and the Torah instituted a payment of half the cost of the damage as a penalty for not being exceedingly careful. But according to the one who says that the payment for half the cost of the damage is an actual monetary payment, meaning that according to the standard halakhot of damages the owner of the goring ox should be fully liable but the Torah exempted him from part of his liability due to the unusual nature of the damage, what can be said? Therefore, this explanation must be rejected.

אלא איידי דקא בעי למיתנא תשלומי כפל ותשלומי ארבעה וחמשה דממון

Rather, since the tanna needed to teach the halakha with regard to cases involving payment of double the principal and payment of four or five times the principal, which are cases of money

שאינו משתלם בראש הוא תנא נמי חצי נזק דממון שאינו משתלם בראש הוא ואיידי דקא בעי למיתנא חצי נזק תנא נמי נזק

that is not paid according to its value, meaning that the payment is not equal to the cost of the damage but is actually more than that amount, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, which is also money that is not paid according to its value, as he pays less than the full cost of the damage. And since he needs to teach the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of the full cost of the damage.

שלשה מנלן דתנו רבנן ׳ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים׳ הרי כאן אחד ׳עד האלהים יבא דבר שניהם׳ הרי כאן שנים ׳אשר ירשיען אלהים׳ הרי כאן שלשה דברי רבי יאשיה

§ The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the fundamental requirement for three judges? The Gemara answers: This is as the Sages taught: The verse states: “The owner of the house shall come near the court, to see whether he has not put his hand upon his neighbor’s property” (Exodus 22:7), so there is one judge here. The following verse states: “The cause of both parties shall come before the court,” so there are two judges here. And that verse concludes: “He whom the court shall condemn shall pay double to his neighbor,” so there are three judges here, corresponding to the three mentions of the term “the court.” This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

רבי יונתן אומר ראשון תחילה נאמר ואין דורשין תחילות אלא ׳עד האלהים יבא דבר שניהם׳ הרי כאן אחד ׳אשר ירשיען אלהים׳ הרי כאן שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחד הרי כאן שלשה

Rabbi Yonatan says: The first instance of the term “the court” is stated first as part of the primary text of the passage, and it is necessary for conveying the straightforward meaning of the verse. And one does not derive tallies for halakhic matters by counting the first mention of a term. Rabbi Yonatan holds that when a tally is derived from the number of instances a certain word appears in the Torah, the first instance is not included in the tally, as it is necessary to teach the mitzva itself; the tally may be counted only from subsequent mentions. Rather, this is how it is derived: “The cause of both parties shall come before the court,” there is one judge here, and the continuation of the verse: “He whom the court shall condemn” teaches that there are two judges here. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they must add an additional one to them, so there are three judges here.

נימא בדורשין תחילות קמיפלגי דמר סבר דורשין תחילות ומר סבר אין דורשין תחילות לא דכולי עלמא אין דורשין תחילות אמר לך רבי יאשיה אם כן נימא קרא ונקרב בעל הבית אל השופט מאי אל האלהים שמע מינה למניינא

Let us say that Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan disagree with regard to whether one derives tallies for halakhic matters from the first mention of a term in the Torah. As one Sage, Rabbi Yoshiya, holds that one derives tallies from the first mention of the term in the Torah, and one Sage, Rabbi Yonatan, holds that one does not derive tallies from the first mention of the term. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually everyone holds that one does not derive tallies from the first mention of the term, but in this case there is a separate source for the derivation, as Rabbi Yoshiya could have said to you: If it is true that no halakha is derived from the first mention, let the verse say: The owner of the house shall come near to the judge [hashofet]. What, then, is the significance of the unique expression: “To the court [haelohim]”? Conclude from it that the term elohim was chosen to count toward the tally.

ורבי יונתן לישנא דעלמא נקט כדאמרי אינשי מאן דאית ליה דינא ליקרב לגבי דיינא

The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Yonatan respond to this analysis? The Gemara answers: He would say that the verse employed the common language of the world, as people say: One who has a case, a claim against another, should approach the regular judge, the one who generally judges cases and can be referred to by the term elohim. Consequently, no unique halakha can be derived from this first usage.

ורבי יאשיה לית ליה בית דין נוטה והתניא רבי אליעזר בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר מה תלמוד לומר ׳לנטת אחרי רבים להטת׳ התורה אמרה עשה לך בית דין נוטה

But doesn’t Rabbi Yoshiya accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges? And isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: What is the meaning when the verse states: “To incline after a multitude to pervert justice” (Exodus 23:2)? The meaning is that the Torah is saying to you: Make for yourself a court that is composed of an odd number of judges, that will perforce incline in one direction, so that there will always be a majority that can be followed.

סבר לה כרבי יהודה דאמר שבעים דתנן סנהדרי גדולה היתה של שבעים ואחד רבי יהודה אומר שבעים

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya does not accept this halakha but instead holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A Great Sanhedrin is composed of seventy judges. As we learned in the mishna: The Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges, and Rabbi Yehuda says: It is composed of seventy judges. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges.

אימר דשמעת ליה לרבי יהודה בסנהדרי גדולה דכתיבי קראי בשאר בי דינא מי שמעת ליה

The Gemara asks: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda said this halakha with regard to the Great Sanhedrin, about which specific verses are written, and he derives from these verses that the Great Sanhedrin must be composed of exactly seventy judges. Have you heard him say with regard to the rest of the courts, those whose composition is not explicitly addressed in the Torah, that these courts can also be composed of an even number of judges?

וכי תימא לא שנא והתנן סמיכת זקנים ועריפת עגלה בשלשה דברי רבי שמעון רבי יהודה אומר בחמשה

And if you would say: There is no difference; Rabbi Yehuda does not differentiate between the Great Sanhedrin and lower courts, but didn’t we learn in the mishna: The laying of hands by the Sages and the breaking of the heifer’s neck are performed in front of a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: These rituals are performed in front of five judges.

ואמרינן מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה וסמכו שנים זקני שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחד הרי כאן חמשה

And we say with regard to this halakha: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse states: “And the Elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock” (Leviticus 4:15). The term: “Shall lay their hands,” which is in the plural, indicates that there are two, and the word “Elders,” which is also plural, indicates another two, meaning a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, we add another one to them, and there are five judges here. Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda does accept the halakha that a court may not be composed of an even number of judges.

דרבי יאשיה עדיפא מדרבי יהודה דאילו רבי יהודה בסנהדרי גדולה הוא דלית ליה הא בשאר בי דינא אית ליה ורבי יאשיה בשאר בי דינא נמי לית ליה ואלא האי לנטת מאי עביד ליה מוקים לה בדיני נפשות

The Gemara answers: It can be explained that Rabbi Yoshiya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda but goes further than he does. This is because Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges in connection with a Great Sanhedrin, but with regard to other courts he does accept it. And Rabbi Yoshiya also does not accept it with regard to other courts. The Gemara asks: And what does he do with this verse: “To incline after a multitude to pervert justice”? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya interprets it in relation to cases of capital law. In such cases he agrees that the court must be composed of an odd number of judges, in order that it will be possible to exonerate the accused on the basis of a majority of one judge.

אבל בדיני ממונות לא אלא הא דתנן שנים אומרים זכאי ואחד אומר חייב זכאי שנים אומרים חייב ואחד אומר זכאי חייב נימא דלא כרבי יאשיה

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yoshiya not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges with regard to cases of monetary law? But there is that which we learned in a mishna (29a): If two judges say the defendant is exempt from payment and one says he is liable, he is exempt; if two say he is liable and one says he is exempt, he is liable. Let us say that this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as Rabbi Yoshiya does not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges concerning cases of monetary law, and therefore perhaps he holds that the verdict must be agreed upon unanimously by all the judges.

אפילו תימא רבי יאשיה מייתי לה בקל וחומר מדיני נפשות ומה דיני נפשות דחמירי אמר רחמנא זיל בתר רובא דיני ממונות לא כל שכן

The Gemara rejects this possibility: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya. Although he does not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges in cases of monetary law, he does allow for a decision on the basis of a majority. He derives this principle based on an a fortiori inference from cases of capital law: If concerning cases of capital law, which are strict, the Merciful One states in the Torah: Follow the majority, and does not require a unanimous ruling, concerning cases of monetary law, which are more lenient, is it not all the more so clear that a majority ruling is sufficient?

תנו רבנן דיני ממונות בשלשה רבי אומר בחמשה כדי שיגמר הדין בשלשה אטו בתלתא מי לא גמר דינא בתרי הכי קאמר מפני שגמר דין בשלשה אלמא קסבר תלתא כי כתיבי בגמר דינא כתיבי

§ The Sages taught: Cases concerning monetary law are adjudicated by three judges. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: They are adjudicated by five judges, so that a verdict can be issued with three judges. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with a court of three judges a verdict cannot be issued by two judges? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by five judges, due to the fact that a verdict must be issued by three. In other words, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the judges who form the majority that decides the verdict must themselves be eligible to constitute a court. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when the requirement for three judges is written in the Torah, it is written with regard to the number of judges necessary to issue the verdict.

מגדף בה רבי אבהו אלא מעתה תהא סנהדרי גדולה צריכה מאה וארבעים ואחד כדי שיגמר הדין בשבעים ואחד ותהא סנהדרי קטנה צריכה ארבעים וחמשה כדי שיגמר הדין בשלשה ועשרים

Rabbi Abbahu would ridicule [megaddef ] this suggestion. If that is so, then the Great Sanhedrin would need to consist of 141 judges, so that the verdict can be issued by seventy-one, and a lesser Sanhedrin would need to consist of forty-five judges, so that the verdict can be issued by twenty-three. But these assertions contradict the halakha as derived from the verses.

אלא אספה לי שבעים איש אמר רחמנא משעת אסיפה שבעים ושפטו העדה והצילו העדה נמי משעת שפיטת העדה הכי נמי ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים משעת קריבה שלשה

Rather, the Merciful One states: “Gather Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel” (Numbers 11:16), and this means that from the time of gathering, there must be seventy. Likewise, the verse states: “And the congregation shall judge…and the congregation shall save” (Numbers 35:24–25), from which it is derived that cases of capital law are adjudicated by twenty-three judges, and this also means that from the time that the congregation judges there must be twenty-three. Similarly, with regard to a case of monetary law, the verse states: “The owner of the house shall come near to the court” (Exodus 22:7), and this means from the time of coming near to judge the cases there must be three judges. Consequently, there is no requirement that the verdict be decided by a majority who could themselves form a court.

אלא היינו טעמא דרבי אשר ירשיען אלהים תרי נאמר אלהים למטה ונאמר אלהים למעלה מה למטה שנים אף למעלה שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהם עוד אחד הרי כאן חמשה

Therefore, the previous explanation must be rejected. Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: It is stated in the next verse: “He whom the court shall condemn” (Exodus 22:8) in the plural, which means there must be two judges. Consequently, it is stated: “The court,” in the verse below and it is stated: “The court,” in the verse above. Just as below it is referring to two judges, as the word: “Shall condemn,” is written in the plural, so too above it is referring to two judges, making a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add another one to them, so there are five judges here.