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Today's Daf Yomi

July 19, 2017 | 讻状讛 讘转诪讜讝 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Sanhedrin 3

Three different reading of the mishna are brought regarding the first 6 words of the mishna – monetary laws are judged by 3, theft and injuries by 3. 聽All conclude the same bottom line law – that for loans and admissions you would need 3 regular people and for theft and injuries you would need 3 judges. 聽However how they read this into the words of the mishna and what the original Torah laws and how the Rabbis changed it and why is a subject of debate. 聽What are damages and half damages listed separately – why isn’t it included in injuries? 聽From where do we derive that courts聽should be 3 judges? 聽There is a debate between Rabbi Yoshia and Rabbi Yonatan – is there debate just about the derivation or do they have a different understanding of how judgments are decided?

砖谞讗诪专 诪砖驻讟 讗讞讚 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转谞注讜诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讜讬谉

The source for this is as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall have one manner of law鈥 (Leviticus 24:22), from which it is derived that all judges must judge in the same manner. And since with regard to cases of capital law it is stated: 鈥淎nd you shall inquire and investigate, and ask diligently鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:15), the same should apply to cases of monetary law. And what is the reason that the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not require inquiry and interrogation of witnesses? The Gemara answers: The Sages established this exemption so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses would be required in order to have the court rule that the lender can collect payment of a loan, lenders would be deterred by the difficulty of proving the matter and might cease to lend money to the poor. For the same reason, the Sages also waived the need for expert judges in these cases.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讟注讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诪讜 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗转讛 谞讜注诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讜讬谉

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if these laymen err they should not be liable to pay compensation to the party unfairly wronged by their judgment, just as expert judges are not liable. The Gemara responds: If this is the halakha, you are all the more so locking the door in the face of potential borrowers; wealthy people will not want to lend money, as they will fear that a court of laymen will judge the case incorrectly.

讗讬 讛讻讬 转专转讬 拽转谞讬 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 讛讚讬讜讟讜转 讙讝讬诇讜转 讜讞讘诇讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 诪讜诪讞讬谉

With regard to Rabbi Abbahu鈥檚 method of explaining the mishna, the Gemara asks: If that is so, then instead of explaining the mishna employing the style: What are these, Rabbi Abbahu could more easily say that two matters are taught in the mishna, and explain it as follows: Cases of monetary law, meaning cases of admissions and loans, are adjudicated by three judges who could be non-ordained laymen [hedyotot], and cases of robbery and personal injury are adjudicated by three ordained, expert judges.

讜注讜讚 砖诇砖讛 砖诇砖讛 诇诪讛 诇讬

And furthermore, according to Rabbi Abbahu鈥檚 explanation that the term: Cases of robbery and personal injury, simply clarifies the meaning of the term: Cases of monetary law, why do I need the repetitive statement that cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges and cases of robbery and injury are adjudicated by three judges? The repetition seems to indicate that these are two separate matters.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 转专转讬 拽转谞讬 诪砖讜诐 讚专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讗诪专 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讞讚 谞诪讬 讻砖专 砖谞讗诪专 讘爪讚拽 转砖驻讟 注诪讬转讱 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讬讜砖讘讬 拽专谞讜转

Rather, Rava said: Two matters are in fact taught in the mishna, because of the statement of Rabbi 岣nina that the Sages instituted leniencies with regard to cases of monetary law so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, said: By Torah law, the adjudication of one judge is also valid in cases of admissions and loans, as it is stated: 鈥淚n righteousness shall you judge your neighbor鈥 (Leviticus 19:15), in the singular. But by rabbinic law, three judges are required, due to the concern that a single judge may be one of those who sit idly on street corners, i.e., unlearned people who are not involved in business and are unlikely to judge the case correctly.

讗讟讜 讘转诇转讗 诪讬 诇讗 讛讜讜 讬讜砖讘讬 拽专谞讜转 讗讬 讗驻砖专 讚诇讬转 讘讛讜 讞讚 讚讙诪讬专 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讟注讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诪讜 讻诇 砖讻谉 讚谞驻讬砖讬 讬讜砖讘讬 拽专谞讜转

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with three judges they will not be among those who sit idly on street corners? How is this concern addressed by increasing the number of judges? The Gemara answers: When there are three judges it is impossible, i.e., highly unlikely, that there is not among them one who is learned. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if they err they should not be liable to pay compensation, since rabbinic law authorizes laymen to judge cases of this nature. The Gemara answers: If the judges will be exempt from paying compensation in the event that they err in their judgment, this lack of accountability will lead all the more so to having many of those who sit idly on street corners assume the role of judges.

诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谉 专讘讗 诇专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 砖谞讬诐 砖讚谞讜 讚讬谞讬讛谉 讚讬谉 讗诇讗 砖谞拽专讗讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞爪讜祝 诇专讘讗 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 诇专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara asks: What are the implications of the difference between the opinion of Rava, who says that cases of monetary law may be adjudicated by three laymen due to the statement of Rabbi 岣nina, and the opinion of Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, who holds that according to the Torah one judge is sufficient? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to that which Shmuel says: If two people adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rava is of the opinion that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as he holds that three judges are required by Torah law. Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as he holds that fundamentally, even one judge may judge a case of monetary law.

谞讝拽 讜讞爪讬 谞讝拽 讜讻讜壮 谞讝拽 讛讬讬谞讜 讞讘诇讜转 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讞爪讬 谞讝拽 转谞讬 谞诪讬 谞讝拽 砖诇诐

搂 The mishna teaches that cases involving payment for damage and payment for half the damage are adjudicated by three judges. The Gemara challenges: Damage is the same as injury, since the term: Injury, includes various damages one causes another directly or by his property. The Gemara explains: Since he needed to teach the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of the full cost of the damage.

讞爪讬 谞讝拽 谞诪讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讞讘诇讜转 转谞讗 诪诪讜谞讗 讜拽转谞讬 拽谞住讗

The Gemara challenges: Payment of half the damage is also the same as personal injury, so it did not need to be stated separately. The Gemara explains: There is a difference. The tanna taught the halakha with regard to a case of monetary matters, and he also taught the halakha with regard to a case of a fine, such as payment of half the damage in a case where an innocuous ox gored another animal. Consequently, payment of half the cost of the damage needed to be stated separately from payment for injury, and once he needed to teach the halakha with regard to payment for half the cost of the damage, he first mentioned general payments for damages.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 驻诇讙讗 谞讬讝拽讗 拽谞住讗 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 驻诇讙讗 谞讬讝拽讗 诪诪讜谞讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the payment for half the cost of the damage is considered a fine, meaning that according to the standard halakhot of damages the owner of the goring ox should be exempt, and the Torah instituted a payment of half the cost of the damage as a penalty for not being exceedingly careful. But according to the one who says that the payment for half the cost of the damage is an actual monetary payment, meaning that according to the standard halakhot of damages the owner of the goring ox should be fully liable but the Torah exempted him from part of his liability due to the unusual nature of the damage, what can be said? Therefore, this explanation must be rejected.

讗诇讗 讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讚诪诪讜谉

Rather, since the tanna needed to teach the halakha with regard to cases involving payment of double the principal and payment of four or five times the principal, which are cases of money

砖讗讬谞讜 诪砖转诇诐 讘专讗砖 讛讜讗 转谞讗 谞诪讬 讞爪讬 谞讝拽 讚诪诪讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诪砖转诇诐 讘专讗砖 讛讜讗 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讞爪讬 谞讝拽 转谞讗 谞诪讬 谞讝拽

that is not paid according to its value, meaning that the payment is not equal to the cost of the damage but is actually more than that amount, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, which is also money that is not paid according to its value, as he pays less than the full cost of the damage. And since he needs to teach the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of the full cost of the damage.

砖诇砖讛 诪谞诇谉 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 壮讜谞拽专讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇 讛讗诇讛讬诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 讗讞讚 壮注讚 讛讗诇讛讬诐 讬讘讗 讚讘专 砖谞讬讛诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 壮讗砖专 讬专砖讬注谉 讗诇讛讬诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖诇砖讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛

搂 The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the fundamental requirement for three judges? The Gemara answers: This is as the Sages taught: The verse states: 鈥淭he owner of the house shall come near the court, to see whether he has not put his hand upon his neighbor鈥檚 property鈥 (Exodus 22:7), so there is one judge here. The following verse states: 鈥淭he cause of both parties shall come before the court,鈥 so there are two judges here. And that verse concludes: 鈥淗e whom the court shall condemn shall pay double to his neighbor,鈥 so there are three judges here, corresponding to the three mentions of the term 鈥渢he court.鈥 This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讗讜诪专 专讗砖讜谉 转讞讬诇讛 谞讗诪专 讜讗讬谉 讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 讗诇讗 壮注讚 讛讗诇讛讬诐 讬讘讗 讚讘专 砖谞讬讛诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 讗讞讚 壮讗砖专 讬专砖讬注谉 讗诇讛讬诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖拽讜诇 诪讜住讬驻讬谉 注诇讬讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖诇砖讛

Rabbi Yonatan says: The first instance of the term 鈥渢he court鈥 is stated first as part of the primary text of the passage, and it is necessary for conveying the straightforward meaning of the verse. And one does not derive tallies for halakhic matters by counting the first mention of a term. Rabbi Yonatan holds that when a tally is derived from the number of instances a certain word appears in the Torah, the first instance is not included in the tally, as it is necessary to teach the mitzva itself; the tally may be counted only from subsequent mentions. Rather, this is how it is derived: 鈥淭he cause of both parties shall come before the court,鈥 there is one judge here, and the continuation of the verse: 鈥淗e whom the court shall condemn鈥 teaches that there are two judges here. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they must add an additional one to them, so there are three judges here.

谞讬诪讗 讘讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 讜诪专 住讘专 讗讬谉 讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗讬谉 讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讗诐 讻谉 谞讬诪讗 拽专讗 讜谞拽专讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇 讛砖讜驻讟 诪讗讬 讗诇 讛讗诇讛讬诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇诪谞讬讬谞讗

Let us say that Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan disagree with regard to whether one derives tallies for halakhic matters from the first mention of a term in the Torah. As one Sage, Rabbi Yoshiya, holds that one derives tallies from the first mention of the term in the Torah, and one Sage, Rabbi Yonatan, holds that one does not derive tallies from the first mention of the term. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually everyone holds that one does not derive tallies from the first mention of the term, but in this case there is a separate source for the derivation, as Rabbi Yoshiya could have said to you: If it is true that no halakha is derived from the first mention, let the verse say: The owner of the house shall come near to the judge [hashofet]. What, then, is the significance of the unique expression: 鈥淭o the court [haelohim]鈥? Conclude from it that the term elohim was chosen to count toward the tally.

讜专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 诇讬砖谞讗 讚注诇诪讗 谞拽讟 讻讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚讬谞讗 诇讬拽专讘 诇讙讘讬 讚讬讬谞讗

The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Yonatan respond to this analysis? The Gemara answers: He would say that the verse employed the common language of the world, as people say: One who has a case, a claim against another, should approach the regular judge, the one who generally judges cases and can be referred to by the term elohim. Consequently, no unique halakha can be derived from this first usage.

讜专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谞讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮诇谞讟转 讗讞专讬 专讘讬诐 诇讛讟转壮 讛转讜专讛 讗诪专讛 注砖讛 诇讱 讘讬转 讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛

But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yoshiya accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges? And isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淭o incline after a multitude to pervert justice鈥 (Exodus 23:2)? The meaning is that the Torah is saying to you: Make for yourself a court that is composed of an odd number of judges, that will perforce incline in one direction, so that there will always be a majority that can be followed.

住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 砖讘注讬诐 讚转谞谉 住谞讛讚专讬 讙讚讜诇讛 讛讬转讛 砖诇 砖讘注讬诐 讜讗讞讚 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 砖讘注讬诐

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya does not accept this halakha but instead holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A Great Sanhedrin is composed of seventy judges. As we learned in the mishna: The Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges, and Rabbi Yehuda says: It is composed of seventy judges. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges.

讗讬诪专 讚砖诪注转 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘住谞讛讚专讬 讙讚讜诇讛 讚讻转讬讘讬 拽专讗讬 讘砖讗专 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 诪讬 砖诪注转 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda said this halakha with regard to the Great Sanhedrin, about which specific verses are written, and he derives from these verses that the Great Sanhedrin must be composed of exactly seventy judges. Have you heard him say with regard to the rest of the courts, those whose composition is not explicitly addressed in the Torah, that these courts can also be composed of an even number of judges?

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇讗 砖谞讗 讜讛转谞谉 住诪讬讻转 讝拽谞讬诐 讜注专讬驻转 注讙诇讛 讘砖诇砖讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘讞诪砖讛

And if you would say: There is no difference; Rabbi Yehuda does not differentiate between the Great Sanhedrin and lower courts, but didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna: The laying of hands by the Sages and the breaking of the heifer鈥檚 neck are performed in front of a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: These rituals are performed in front of five judges.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜住诪讻讜 砖谞讬诐 讝拽谞讬 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖拽讜诇 诪讜住讬驻讬谉 注诇讬讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 讞诪砖讛

And we say with regard to this halakha: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse states: 鈥淎nd the Elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock鈥 (Leviticus 4:15). The term: 鈥淪hall lay their hands,鈥 which is in the plural, indicates that there are two, and the word 鈥淓lders,鈥 which is also plural, indicates another two, meaning a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, we add another one to them, and there are five judges here. Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda does accept the halakha that a court may not be composed of an even number of judges.

讚专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 注讚讬驻讗 诪讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗讬诇讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘住谞讛讚专讬 讙讚讜诇讛 讛讜讗 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讛讗 讘砖讗专 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讜专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讘砖讗专 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 谞诪讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讜讗诇讗 讛讗讬 诇谞讟转 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转

The Gemara answers: It can be explained that Rabbi Yoshiya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda but goes further than he does. This is because Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges in connection with a Great Sanhedrin, but with regard to other courts he does accept it. And Rabbi Yoshiya also does not accept it with regard to other courts. The Gemara asks: And what does he do with this verse: 鈥淭o incline after a multitude to pervert justice鈥? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya interprets it in relation to cases of capital law. In such cases he agrees that the court must be composed of an odd number of judges, in order that it will be possible to exonerate the accused on the basis of a majority of one judge.

讗讘诇 讘讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讗 讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讝讻讗讬 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讞讬讬讘 讝讻讗讬 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讝讻讗讬 讞讬讬讘 谞讬诪讗 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yoshiya not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges with regard to cases of monetary law? But there is that which we learned in a mishna (29a): If two judges say the defendant is exempt from payment and one says he is liable, he is exempt; if two say he is liable and one says he is exempt, he is liable. Let us say that this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as Rabbi Yoshiya does not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges concerning cases of monetary law, and therefore perhaps he holds that the verdict must be agreed upon unanimously by all the judges.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讜诪讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讚讞诪讬专讬 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讝讬诇 讘转专 专讜讘讗 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The Gemara rejects this possibility: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya. Although he does not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges in cases of monetary law, he does allow for a decision on the basis of a majority. He derives this principle based on an a fortiori inference from cases of capital law: If concerning cases of capital law, which are strict, the Merciful One states in the Torah: Follow the majority, and does not require a unanimous ruling, concerning cases of monetary law, which are more lenient, is it not all the more so clear that a majority ruling is sufficient?

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讘讞诪砖讛 讻讚讬 砖讬讙诪专 讛讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讗讟讜 讘转诇转讗 诪讬 诇讗 讙诪专 讚讬谞讗 讘转专讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪驻谞讬 砖讙诪专 讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 转诇转讗 讻讬 讻转讬讘讬 讘讙诪专 讚讬谞讗 讻转讬讘讬

The Sages taught: Cases concerning monetary law are adjudicated by three judges. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: They are adjudicated by five judges, so that a verdict can be issued with three judges. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with a court of three judges a verdict cannot be issued by two judges? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by five judges, due to the fact that a verdict must be issued by three. In other words, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the judges who form the majority that decides the verdict must themselves be eligible to constitute a court. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when the requirement for three judges is written in the Torah, it is written with regard to the number of judges necessary to issue the verdict.

诪讙讚祝 讘讛 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 转讛讗 住谞讛讚专讬 讙讚讜诇讛 爪专讬讻讛 诪讗讛 讜讗专讘注讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讻讚讬 砖讬讙诪专 讛讚讬谉 讘砖讘注讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讜转讛讗 住谞讛讚专讬 拽讟谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讗专讘注讬诐 讜讞诪砖讛 讻讚讬 砖讬讙诪专 讛讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讜注砖专讬诐

Rabbi Abbahu would ridicule [megaddef ] this suggestion. If that is so, then the Great Sanhedrin would need to consist of 141 judges, so that the verdict can be issued by seventy-one, and a lesser Sanhedrin would need to consist of forty-five judges, so that the verdict can be issued by twenty-three. But these assertions contradict the halakha as derived from the verses.

讗诇讗 讗住驻讛 诇讬 砖讘注讬诐 讗讬砖 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 诪砖注转 讗住讬驻讛 砖讘注讬诐 讜砖驻讟讜 讛注讚讛 讜讛爪讬诇讜 讛注讚讛 谞诪讬 诪砖注转 砖驻讬讟转 讛注讚讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讜谞拽专讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇 讛讗诇讛讬诐 诪砖注转 拽专讬讘讛 砖诇砖讛

Rather, the Merciful One states: 鈥淕ather Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel鈥 (Numbers 11:16), and this means that from the time of gathering, there must be seventy. Likewise, the verse states: 鈥淎nd the congregation shall judge鈥nd the congregation shall save鈥 (Numbers 35:24鈥25), from which it is derived that cases of capital law are adjudicated by twenty-three judges, and this also means that from the time that the congregation judges there must be twenty-three. Similarly, with regard to a case of monetary law, the verse states: 鈥淭he owner of the house shall come near to the court鈥 (Exodus 22:7), and this means from the time of coming near to judge the cases there must be three judges. Consequently, there is no requirement that the verdict be decided by a majority who could themselves form a court.

讗诇讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗砖专 讬专砖讬注谉 讗诇讛讬诐 转专讬 谞讗诪专 讗诇讛讬诐 诇诪讟讛 讜谞讗诪专 讗诇讛讬诐 诇诪注诇讛 诪讛 诇诪讟讛 砖谞讬诐 讗祝 诇诪注诇讛 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖拽讜诇 诪讜住讬驻讬谉 注诇讬讛诐 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 讞诪砖讛

Therefore, the previous explanation must be rejected. Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: It is stated in the next verse: 鈥淗e whom the court shall condemn鈥 (Exodus 22:8) in the plural, which means there must be two judges. Consequently, it is stated: 鈥淭he court,鈥 in the verse below and it is stated: 鈥淭he court,鈥 in the verse above. Just as below it is referring to two judges, as the word: 鈥淪hall condemn,鈥 is written in the plural, so too above it is referring to two judges, making a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add another one to them, so there are five judges here.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Sanhedrin 3

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 3

砖谞讗诪专 诪砖驻讟 讗讞讚 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转谞注讜诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讜讬谉

The source for this is as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall have one manner of law鈥 (Leviticus 24:22), from which it is derived that all judges must judge in the same manner. And since with regard to cases of capital law it is stated: 鈥淎nd you shall inquire and investigate, and ask diligently鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:15), the same should apply to cases of monetary law. And what is the reason that the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not require inquiry and interrogation of witnesses? The Gemara answers: The Sages established this exemption so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses would be required in order to have the court rule that the lender can collect payment of a loan, lenders would be deterred by the difficulty of proving the matter and might cease to lend money to the poor. For the same reason, the Sages also waived the need for expert judges in these cases.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讟注讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诪讜 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗转讛 谞讜注诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讜讬谉

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if these laymen err they should not be liable to pay compensation to the party unfairly wronged by their judgment, just as expert judges are not liable. The Gemara responds: If this is the halakha, you are all the more so locking the door in the face of potential borrowers; wealthy people will not want to lend money, as they will fear that a court of laymen will judge the case incorrectly.

讗讬 讛讻讬 转专转讬 拽转谞讬 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 讛讚讬讜讟讜转 讙讝讬诇讜转 讜讞讘诇讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 诪讜诪讞讬谉

With regard to Rabbi Abbahu鈥檚 method of explaining the mishna, the Gemara asks: If that is so, then instead of explaining the mishna employing the style: What are these, Rabbi Abbahu could more easily say that two matters are taught in the mishna, and explain it as follows: Cases of monetary law, meaning cases of admissions and loans, are adjudicated by three judges who could be non-ordained laymen [hedyotot], and cases of robbery and personal injury are adjudicated by three ordained, expert judges.

讜注讜讚 砖诇砖讛 砖诇砖讛 诇诪讛 诇讬

And furthermore, according to Rabbi Abbahu鈥檚 explanation that the term: Cases of robbery and personal injury, simply clarifies the meaning of the term: Cases of monetary law, why do I need the repetitive statement that cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges and cases of robbery and injury are adjudicated by three judges? The repetition seems to indicate that these are two separate matters.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 转专转讬 拽转谞讬 诪砖讜诐 讚专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讗诪专 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讞讚 谞诪讬 讻砖专 砖谞讗诪专 讘爪讚拽 转砖驻讟 注诪讬转讱 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讬讜砖讘讬 拽专谞讜转

Rather, Rava said: Two matters are in fact taught in the mishna, because of the statement of Rabbi 岣nina that the Sages instituted leniencies with regard to cases of monetary law so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, said: By Torah law, the adjudication of one judge is also valid in cases of admissions and loans, as it is stated: 鈥淚n righteousness shall you judge your neighbor鈥 (Leviticus 19:15), in the singular. But by rabbinic law, three judges are required, due to the concern that a single judge may be one of those who sit idly on street corners, i.e., unlearned people who are not involved in business and are unlikely to judge the case correctly.

讗讟讜 讘转诇转讗 诪讬 诇讗 讛讜讜 讬讜砖讘讬 拽专谞讜转 讗讬 讗驻砖专 讚诇讬转 讘讛讜 讞讚 讚讙诪讬专 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讟注讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诪讜 讻诇 砖讻谉 讚谞驻讬砖讬 讬讜砖讘讬 拽专谞讜转

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with three judges they will not be among those who sit idly on street corners? How is this concern addressed by increasing the number of judges? The Gemara answers: When there are three judges it is impossible, i.e., highly unlikely, that there is not among them one who is learned. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if they err they should not be liable to pay compensation, since rabbinic law authorizes laymen to judge cases of this nature. The Gemara answers: If the judges will be exempt from paying compensation in the event that they err in their judgment, this lack of accountability will lead all the more so to having many of those who sit idly on street corners assume the role of judges.

诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谉 专讘讗 诇专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 砖谞讬诐 砖讚谞讜 讚讬谞讬讛谉 讚讬谉 讗诇讗 砖谞拽专讗讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞爪讜祝 诇专讘讗 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 诇专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara asks: What are the implications of the difference between the opinion of Rava, who says that cases of monetary law may be adjudicated by three laymen due to the statement of Rabbi 岣nina, and the opinion of Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, who holds that according to the Torah one judge is sufficient? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to that which Shmuel says: If two people adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rava is of the opinion that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as he holds that three judges are required by Torah law. Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as he holds that fundamentally, even one judge may judge a case of monetary law.

谞讝拽 讜讞爪讬 谞讝拽 讜讻讜壮 谞讝拽 讛讬讬谞讜 讞讘诇讜转 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讞爪讬 谞讝拽 转谞讬 谞诪讬 谞讝拽 砖诇诐

搂 The mishna teaches that cases involving payment for damage and payment for half the damage are adjudicated by three judges. The Gemara challenges: Damage is the same as injury, since the term: Injury, includes various damages one causes another directly or by his property. The Gemara explains: Since he needed to teach the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of the full cost of the damage.

讞爪讬 谞讝拽 谞诪讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讞讘诇讜转 转谞讗 诪诪讜谞讗 讜拽转谞讬 拽谞住讗

The Gemara challenges: Payment of half the damage is also the same as personal injury, so it did not need to be stated separately. The Gemara explains: There is a difference. The tanna taught the halakha with regard to a case of monetary matters, and he also taught the halakha with regard to a case of a fine, such as payment of half the damage in a case where an innocuous ox gored another animal. Consequently, payment of half the cost of the damage needed to be stated separately from payment for injury, and once he needed to teach the halakha with regard to payment for half the cost of the damage, he first mentioned general payments for damages.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 驻诇讙讗 谞讬讝拽讗 拽谞住讗 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 驻诇讙讗 谞讬讝拽讗 诪诪讜谞讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the payment for half the cost of the damage is considered a fine, meaning that according to the standard halakhot of damages the owner of the goring ox should be exempt, and the Torah instituted a payment of half the cost of the damage as a penalty for not being exceedingly careful. But according to the one who says that the payment for half the cost of the damage is an actual monetary payment, meaning that according to the standard halakhot of damages the owner of the goring ox should be fully liable but the Torah exempted him from part of his liability due to the unusual nature of the damage, what can be said? Therefore, this explanation must be rejected.

讗诇讗 讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讚诪诪讜谉

Rather, since the tanna needed to teach the halakha with regard to cases involving payment of double the principal and payment of four or five times the principal, which are cases of money

砖讗讬谞讜 诪砖转诇诐 讘专讗砖 讛讜讗 转谞讗 谞诪讬 讞爪讬 谞讝拽 讚诪诪讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诪砖转诇诐 讘专讗砖 讛讜讗 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讞爪讬 谞讝拽 转谞讗 谞诪讬 谞讝拽

that is not paid according to its value, meaning that the payment is not equal to the cost of the damage but is actually more than that amount, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, which is also money that is not paid according to its value, as he pays less than the full cost of the damage. And since he needs to teach the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of the full cost of the damage.

砖诇砖讛 诪谞诇谉 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 壮讜谞拽专讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇 讛讗诇讛讬诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 讗讞讚 壮注讚 讛讗诇讛讬诐 讬讘讗 讚讘专 砖谞讬讛诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 壮讗砖专 讬专砖讬注谉 讗诇讛讬诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖诇砖讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛

搂 The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the fundamental requirement for three judges? The Gemara answers: This is as the Sages taught: The verse states: 鈥淭he owner of the house shall come near the court, to see whether he has not put his hand upon his neighbor鈥檚 property鈥 (Exodus 22:7), so there is one judge here. The following verse states: 鈥淭he cause of both parties shall come before the court,鈥 so there are two judges here. And that verse concludes: 鈥淗e whom the court shall condemn shall pay double to his neighbor,鈥 so there are three judges here, corresponding to the three mentions of the term 鈥渢he court.鈥 This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讗讜诪专 专讗砖讜谉 转讞讬诇讛 谞讗诪专 讜讗讬谉 讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 讗诇讗 壮注讚 讛讗诇讛讬诐 讬讘讗 讚讘专 砖谞讬讛诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 讗讞讚 壮讗砖专 讬专砖讬注谉 讗诇讛讬诐壮 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖拽讜诇 诪讜住讬驻讬谉 注诇讬讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖诇砖讛

Rabbi Yonatan says: The first instance of the term 鈥渢he court鈥 is stated first as part of the primary text of the passage, and it is necessary for conveying the straightforward meaning of the verse. And one does not derive tallies for halakhic matters by counting the first mention of a term. Rabbi Yonatan holds that when a tally is derived from the number of instances a certain word appears in the Torah, the first instance is not included in the tally, as it is necessary to teach the mitzva itself; the tally may be counted only from subsequent mentions. Rather, this is how it is derived: 鈥淭he cause of both parties shall come before the court,鈥 there is one judge here, and the continuation of the verse: 鈥淗e whom the court shall condemn鈥 teaches that there are two judges here. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they must add an additional one to them, so there are three judges here.

谞讬诪讗 讘讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 讜诪专 住讘专 讗讬谉 讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗讬谉 讚讜专砖讬谉 转讞讬诇讜转 讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讗诐 讻谉 谞讬诪讗 拽专讗 讜谞拽专讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇 讛砖讜驻讟 诪讗讬 讗诇 讛讗诇讛讬诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇诪谞讬讬谞讗

Let us say that Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan disagree with regard to whether one derives tallies for halakhic matters from the first mention of a term in the Torah. As one Sage, Rabbi Yoshiya, holds that one derives tallies from the first mention of the term in the Torah, and one Sage, Rabbi Yonatan, holds that one does not derive tallies from the first mention of the term. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually everyone holds that one does not derive tallies from the first mention of the term, but in this case there is a separate source for the derivation, as Rabbi Yoshiya could have said to you: If it is true that no halakha is derived from the first mention, let the verse say: The owner of the house shall come near to the judge [hashofet]. What, then, is the significance of the unique expression: 鈥淭o the court [haelohim]鈥? Conclude from it that the term elohim was chosen to count toward the tally.

讜专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 诇讬砖谞讗 讚注诇诪讗 谞拽讟 讻讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚讬谞讗 诇讬拽专讘 诇讙讘讬 讚讬讬谞讗

The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Yonatan respond to this analysis? The Gemara answers: He would say that the verse employed the common language of the world, as people say: One who has a case, a claim against another, should approach the regular judge, the one who generally judges cases and can be referred to by the term elohim. Consequently, no unique halakha can be derived from this first usage.

讜专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谞讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮诇谞讟转 讗讞专讬 专讘讬诐 诇讛讟转壮 讛转讜专讛 讗诪专讛 注砖讛 诇讱 讘讬转 讚讬谉 谞讜讟讛

But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yoshiya accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges? And isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淭o incline after a multitude to pervert justice鈥 (Exodus 23:2)? The meaning is that the Torah is saying to you: Make for yourself a court that is composed of an odd number of judges, that will perforce incline in one direction, so that there will always be a majority that can be followed.

住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 砖讘注讬诐 讚转谞谉 住谞讛讚专讬 讙讚讜诇讛 讛讬转讛 砖诇 砖讘注讬诐 讜讗讞讚 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 砖讘注讬诐

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya does not accept this halakha but instead holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A Great Sanhedrin is composed of seventy judges. As we learned in the mishna: The Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges, and Rabbi Yehuda says: It is composed of seventy judges. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges.

讗讬诪专 讚砖诪注转 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘住谞讛讚专讬 讙讚讜诇讛 讚讻转讬讘讬 拽专讗讬 讘砖讗专 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 诪讬 砖诪注转 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda said this halakha with regard to the Great Sanhedrin, about which specific verses are written, and he derives from these verses that the Great Sanhedrin must be composed of exactly seventy judges. Have you heard him say with regard to the rest of the courts, those whose composition is not explicitly addressed in the Torah, that these courts can also be composed of an even number of judges?

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇讗 砖谞讗 讜讛转谞谉 住诪讬讻转 讝拽谞讬诐 讜注专讬驻转 注讙诇讛 讘砖诇砖讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘讞诪砖讛

And if you would say: There is no difference; Rabbi Yehuda does not differentiate between the Great Sanhedrin and lower courts, but didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna: The laying of hands by the Sages and the breaking of the heifer鈥檚 neck are performed in front of a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: These rituals are performed in front of five judges.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜住诪讻讜 砖谞讬诐 讝拽谞讬 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖拽讜诇 诪讜住讬驻讬谉 注诇讬讛谉 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 讞诪砖讛

And we say with regard to this halakha: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse states: 鈥淎nd the Elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock鈥 (Leviticus 4:15). The term: 鈥淪hall lay their hands,鈥 which is in the plural, indicates that there are two, and the word 鈥淓lders,鈥 which is also plural, indicates another two, meaning a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, we add another one to them, and there are five judges here. Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda does accept the halakha that a court may not be composed of an even number of judges.

讚专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 注讚讬驻讗 诪讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗讬诇讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘住谞讛讚专讬 讙讚讜诇讛 讛讜讗 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讛讗 讘砖讗专 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讜专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讘砖讗专 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 谞诪讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讜讗诇讗 讛讗讬 诇谞讟转 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转

The Gemara answers: It can be explained that Rabbi Yoshiya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda but goes further than he does. This is because Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges in connection with a Great Sanhedrin, but with regard to other courts he does accept it. And Rabbi Yoshiya also does not accept it with regard to other courts. The Gemara asks: And what does he do with this verse: 鈥淭o incline after a multitude to pervert justice鈥? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya interprets it in relation to cases of capital law. In such cases he agrees that the court must be composed of an odd number of judges, in order that it will be possible to exonerate the accused on the basis of a majority of one judge.

讗讘诇 讘讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讗 讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讝讻讗讬 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讞讬讬讘 讝讻讗讬 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讝讻讗讬 讞讬讬讘 谞讬诪讗 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yoshiya not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges with regard to cases of monetary law? But there is that which we learned in a mishna (29a): If two judges say the defendant is exempt from payment and one says he is liable, he is exempt; if two say he is liable and one says he is exempt, he is liable. Let us say that this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as Rabbi Yoshiya does not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges concerning cases of monetary law, and therefore perhaps he holds that the verdict must be agreed upon unanimously by all the judges.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讜诪讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讚讞诪讬专讬 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讝讬诇 讘转专 专讜讘讗 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The Gemara rejects this possibility: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya. Although he does not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges in cases of monetary law, he does allow for a decision on the basis of a majority. He derives this principle based on an a fortiori inference from cases of capital law: If concerning cases of capital law, which are strict, the Merciful One states in the Torah: Follow the majority, and does not require a unanimous ruling, concerning cases of monetary law, which are more lenient, is it not all the more so clear that a majority ruling is sufficient?

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讘讞诪砖讛 讻讚讬 砖讬讙诪专 讛讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讗讟讜 讘转诇转讗 诪讬 诇讗 讙诪专 讚讬谞讗 讘转专讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪驻谞讬 砖讙诪专 讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 转诇转讗 讻讬 讻转讬讘讬 讘讙诪专 讚讬谞讗 讻转讬讘讬

The Sages taught: Cases concerning monetary law are adjudicated by three judges. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: They are adjudicated by five judges, so that a verdict can be issued with three judges. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with a court of three judges a verdict cannot be issued by two judges? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by five judges, due to the fact that a verdict must be issued by three. In other words, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the judges who form the majority that decides the verdict must themselves be eligible to constitute a court. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when the requirement for three judges is written in the Torah, it is written with regard to the number of judges necessary to issue the verdict.

诪讙讚祝 讘讛 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 转讛讗 住谞讛讚专讬 讙讚讜诇讛 爪专讬讻讛 诪讗讛 讜讗专讘注讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讻讚讬 砖讬讙诪专 讛讚讬谉 讘砖讘注讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讜转讛讗 住谞讛讚专讬 拽讟谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讗专讘注讬诐 讜讞诪砖讛 讻讚讬 砖讬讙诪专 讛讚讬谉 讘砖诇砖讛 讜注砖专讬诐

Rabbi Abbahu would ridicule [megaddef ] this suggestion. If that is so, then the Great Sanhedrin would need to consist of 141 judges, so that the verdict can be issued by seventy-one, and a lesser Sanhedrin would need to consist of forty-five judges, so that the verdict can be issued by twenty-three. But these assertions contradict the halakha as derived from the verses.

讗诇讗 讗住驻讛 诇讬 砖讘注讬诐 讗讬砖 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 诪砖注转 讗住讬驻讛 砖讘注讬诐 讜砖驻讟讜 讛注讚讛 讜讛爪讬诇讜 讛注讚讛 谞诪讬 诪砖注转 砖驻讬讟转 讛注讚讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讜谞拽专讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇 讛讗诇讛讬诐 诪砖注转 拽专讬讘讛 砖诇砖讛

Rather, the Merciful One states: 鈥淕ather Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel鈥 (Numbers 11:16), and this means that from the time of gathering, there must be seventy. Likewise, the verse states: 鈥淎nd the congregation shall judge鈥nd the congregation shall save鈥 (Numbers 35:24鈥25), from which it is derived that cases of capital law are adjudicated by twenty-three judges, and this also means that from the time that the congregation judges there must be twenty-three. Similarly, with regard to a case of monetary law, the verse states: 鈥淭he owner of the house shall come near to the court鈥 (Exodus 22:7), and this means from the time of coming near to judge the cases there must be three judges. Consequently, there is no requirement that the verdict be decided by a majority who could themselves form a court.

讗诇讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗砖专 讬专砖讬注谉 讗诇讛讬诐 转专讬 谞讗诪专 讗诇讛讬诐 诇诪讟讛 讜谞讗诪专 讗诇讛讬诐 诇诪注诇讛 诪讛 诇诪讟讛 砖谞讬诐 讗祝 诇诪注诇讛 砖谞讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖拽讜诇 诪讜住讬驻讬谉 注诇讬讛诐 注讜讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 讞诪砖讛

Therefore, the previous explanation must be rejected. Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: It is stated in the next verse: 鈥淗e whom the court shall condemn鈥 (Exodus 22:8) in the plural, which means there must be two judges. Consequently, it is stated: 鈥淭he court,鈥 in the verse below and it is stated: 鈥淭he court,鈥 in the verse above. Just as below it is referring to two judges, as the word: 鈥淪hall condemn,鈥 is written in the plural, so too above it is referring to two judges, making a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add another one to them, so there are five judges here.

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