Sanhedrin 5

ואם היה מומחה לרבים דן אפילו יחידי אמר רב נחמן כגון אנא דן דיני ממונות ביחידי וכן אמר רבי חייא כגון אנא דן דיני ממונות ביחידי

But if one was a judge accepted as an expert for the public, then he may judge cases even as the lone judge. Rav Naḥman said: One such as I may judge cases of monetary law as the lone judge. And similarly, Rabbi Ḥiyya said: One such as I may judge cases of monetary law as the lone judge.

איבעיא להו כגון אנא דגמירנא וסבירנא ונקיטנא רשותא אבל לא נקיט רשותא דיניה לא דינא או דילמא אף על גב דלא נקיט רשותא דיניה דינא

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of: Such as I, in the statements of these Rabbis? Did they intend to say: Such as I, in that I have studied and have the skills to extrapolate and derive new rulings on the basis of earlier decisions, and have also received permission to judge as the lone judge? But accordingly, if one has not received permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is not a valid judgment? Or perhaps this is not the correct reading of the statements, and the halakha is that even though he did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is nevertheless a valid judgment?

תא שמע דמר זוטרא בריה דרב נחמן דן דינא וטעה אתא לקמיה דרב יוסף אמר לו אם קיבלוך עלייהו לא תשלם ואי לא זיל שלים שמע מינה כי לא נקיט רשותא דיניה דינא שמע מינה

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following case: Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, once adjudicated a certain case and erred in his ruling. Upon recognizing his error, he came before Rav Yosef to ask what he should do. Rav Yosef said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves as the lone judge, and both had agreed that they would accept your ruling, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who lost the case due to your erroneous ruling. But if they did not accept you on themselves, but were rather compelled to be judged before you, you must go and pay restitution. And learn from it that even in a case where one did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his ruling is a valid judgment. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

אמר רב האי מאן דבעי למידן דינא ואי טעה מיבעי למיפטרא לישקול רשותא מבי ריש גלותא וכן אמר שמואל לשקול רשותא מבי ריש גלותא

§ Rav says: One who wants to adjudicate a case and wants to be exempt from payment of restitution if he errs in his judgment must receive permission from the Exilarch to judge cases. And similarly, Shmuel says: In such a case he must receive permission from the Exilarch. Once he receives permission, even an erroneous decision carries halakhic force and therefore it is as if he did not err.

פשיטא מהכא להכא ומהתם להתם מהני ומהכא להתם נמי מהני דהכא שבט והתם מחוקק

Since the Gemara mentioned the importance of a judge receiving authorization from the Exilarch, it now discusses the scope of this authority. It is obvious that from here to here, meaning relying on permission granted by the Exilarch in Babylonia in order to adjudicate cases within Babylonia, and from there to there, relying on permission granted by the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael in order to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, the authorization is effective. And it is also obvious that from here to there, relying on permission granted by the Exilarch to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, it is also effective, as the authority of the Exilarch is greater than that of the Nasi. This is so since the Exilarch here in Babylonia may be termed a scepter, i.e., a ruler with actual power of governance, and the Nasi there in Eretz Yisrael is only a staff, i.e., a legislator with limited power.

כדתניא לא יסור שבט מיהודה אלו ראשי גליות שבבבל שרודין את ישראל בשבט ומחקק מבין רגליו אלו בני בניו של הלל שמלמדין תורה ברבים

This is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “The scepter shall not depart from Judah nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet until Shiloh comes” (Genesis 49:10). The term “Shiloh” is understood as a reference to the Messiah, and therefore the verse is interpreted as delineating the authority of Jewish rulers during the exile, before the Messiah comes. “The scepter shall not depart from Judah”; these are the Exilarchs in Babylonia, who are empowered by the government and consequently subjugate the Jewish people as with a scepter. “Nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet”; These are the grandchildren of Hillel the Elder who hold the position of Nasi and teach Torah in public, but do not have authority to actually enforce their judgments.

מהתם להכא מאי תא שמע דרבה בר חנה דן דינא וטעה אתא לקמיה דרבי חייא אמר ליה אי קיבלוך עלייהו לא תשלם ואי לא זיל שלים והא רבה בר חנה רשותא הוה נקיט שמע מינה מהתם להכא לא מהני שמע מינה

If one has permission from there, from the Nasi, and wants to adjudicate cases here in Babylonia, what is the halakha? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident that occurred: Rabba bar Ḥana adjudicated a case in Babylonia and erred. He came before Rabbi Ḥiyya to ask what he should do. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who unjustly lost the case, but if not, go and pay. But Rabba bar Ḥana received permission from the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael; therefore, learn from this incident that permission from there to adjudicate cases here is not effective. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

ולא מהני והא רבה בר רב הונא כי הוה מינצי בהדי דבי ריש גלותא אמר לאו מינייכו נקיטנא רשותא נקיטנא רשותא מאבא מרי ואבא מרי מרב ורב מרבי חייא ורבי חייא מרבי במילתא דעלמא הוא דאוקים להו

The Gemara asks: And is this permission not effective? But when Rabba bar Rav Huna was involved in a dispute with the members of the house of the Exilarch he said: It is not from you that I received permission to judge cases. I received permission from my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, and my father, my master, received permission from Rav, and Rav from Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, it seems that permission received in Eretz Yisrael is in fact effective in Babylonia. The Gemara rejects this proof: He was merely standing up to them with words alone, but there was no halakhic validity to his statement.

וכי מאחר דלא מהני רבה בר חנה רשותא דנקט למה לי לעיירות העומדים על הגבולין

The Gemara asks: But since permission to judge received in Eretz Yisrael is not effective in Babylonia, why did Rabba bar Ḥana need to receive permission when he left for Babylonia? What was the value of that permission? The Gemara answers: The permission is effective for the cities that stand on the borders of Babylonia, which are not entirely in the jurisdiction of Babylonia, so permission from Eretz Yisrael is effective there.

מאי רשותא כי הוה נחית רבה בר חנה לבבל אמר ליה רבי חייא לרבי בן אחי יורד לבבל יורה יורה ידין ידין יתיר בכורות יתיר

§ What is the specific nature of this permission? The Gemara relates: When Rabba bar Ḥana descended to Babylonia, his uncle Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: My brother’s son is descending to Babylonia. May he teach people and issue rulings with regard to what is prohibited and what is permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may teach. Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked: May he also adjudicate cases of monetary law, and be absolved from payment if he errs? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may adjudicate. Rabbi Ḥiyya continued: May he declare a firstborn animal permitted? The male firstborn of a kosher animal may not be eaten, as it is supposed to be offered in the Temple. But if it acquires a permanent blemish it is unfit for an offering, and it may be eaten. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may declare such an animal permitted.

כי הוה נחית רב לבבל אמר ליה רבי חייא לרבי בן אחותי יורד לבבל יורה יורה ידין ידין יתיר בכורות אל יתיר

Similarly, when Rav, who was also Rabbi Ḥiyya’s nephew, descended to Babylonia, Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: My sister’s son is descending to Babylonia. May he teach people and issue rulings with regard to what is prohibited and what is permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may teach. Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked: May he also adjudicate cases of monetary law, and be absolved from payment if he errs? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded: He may adjudicate. Rabbi Ḥiyya continued: May he declare a firstborn animal permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may not declare such an animal permitted.

מאי שנא למר דקא קרי בן אחי ומאי שנא למר דקא קרי בן אחותי וכי תימא הכי הוה מעשה והאמר מר איבו וחנה ושילא ומרתא ורבי חייא כולהו בני אבא בר אחא כרסלא מכפרי הוו רב בר אחוה דהוה בר אחתיה רבה בר חנה בר אחוה דלאו בר אחתיה

This incident raises several questions, which the Gemara asks in sequence. What is different concerning this Sage, Rabba bar Ḥana, that Rabbi Ḥiyya called him: My brother’s son, and what is different concerning that Sage, Rav, that Rabbi Ḥiyya called him: My sister’s son? And if you would say that this was the situation: Rabba bar Ḥana was his brother’s son and Rav was his sister’s son, but doesn’t the Master say: Aivu, Rav’s father, and Ḥana, the father of Rabba bar Ḥana, and Sheila, and Marta, and Rabbi Ḥiyya, were all sons of Abba bar Aḥa Karsala from Kafrei? Consequently, Rav would also be Rabbi Ḥiyya’s brother’s son. The Gemara answers: Rav was his brother’s son who was also his sister’s son, as Rabbi Ḥiyya’s half-brother married Rabbi Ḥiyya’s half-sister; while Rabba bar Ḥana was his brother’s son who was not his sister’s son. Therefore, he referred to Rav in a manner that emphasized the additional relationship.

ואי בעית אימא

And if you wish, say instead that he called him: My sister’s son, for a different reason:

על שם חכמתו דכתיב אמר לחכמה אחתי את

It was due to his extraordinary wisdom, as it is written: “Say to wisdom: You are my sister” (Proverbs 7:4). Therefore, calling him: My sister’s son, was an indication of his great wisdom.

יתיר בכורות אל יתיר מאי טעמא אילימא משום דלא חכים הא קא אמרינן דחכים טובא אלא משום דלא בקיע במומי

The Gemara had related that Rabbi Ḥiyya asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: May Rav declare a firstborn animal permitted, and that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had responded: He may not declare such an animal permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he denied him this permission? If we say that it was because Rav was not sufficiently wise and learned, but that is difficult, as we already said that he was exceedingly wise. Rather, it must be that it was because, although he was quite knowledgeable about the halakha, he was not an expert with regard to blemishes, meaning that he lacked the practical expertise to apply the halakha to actual cases.

והאמר רב שמונה עשר חדשים גדלתי אצל רועה בהמה לידע איזה מום קבוע ואיזה מום עובר אלא לחלק לו כבוד לרבה בר חנה

The Gemara rejects this answer. But didn’t Rav say: I apprenticed with a shepherd for eighteen months in order to be able to know which blemish is a permanent blemish, and which is a temporary blemish? Evidently, he had a high level of practical expertise in this matter. The Gemara explains: Rather, it was in order to bestow honor upon Rabba bar Ḥana. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wanted to ensure that Rabba bar Ḥana would be treated with respect, so he made sure that there was an area of halakha with regard to which the people would not be able to consult with Rav and would need to consult with Rabba bar Ḥana instead.

ואיבעית אימא משום הא גופיה דרב בקיע במומי טפי ושרי מומי דלא ידעי אינשי ואמרי כי האי גוונא שרא רב ואתו למשרי מום עובר

And if you wish, say instead: It is due to this fact itself: Since Rav was a great expert with regard to blemishes, he would permit blemishes that average people do not know about. And as a result, they would erroneously say with regard to a different blemish: In a case like this Rav declared the animal permitted, and in this way they would come to erroneously permit an animal with a temporary blemish, believing it to be identical to the blemish that Rav had declared permitted. Due to this concern, Rav was denied the authority to declare firstborn animals permitted on the basis of a blemish.

יורה יורה אי גמיר רשותא למה לי למישקל משום מעשה שהיה

With regard to the permission granted to Rabba bar Ḥana and Rav, the Gemara had related that Rabbi Ḥiyya asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: May he teach people and issue rulings concerning what is prohibited and what is permitted? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded: He may teach. The Gemara asks: If he had studied and mastered the relevant halakhot, why do I need him to receive permission? The need for formal authority is understandable when it comes to serving on a court to judge cases of monetary law, but any knowledgeable person should be qualified to answer questions about ritual law. The Gemara explains: The need for such permission is due to an incident that took place.

דתניא פעם אחת הלך רבי למקום אחד וראה בני אדם שמגבלין עיסותיהם בטומאה אמר להם מפני מה אתם מגבלין עיסותיכם בטומאה אמרו לו תלמיד אחד בא לכאן והורה לנו מי בצעים אין מכשירין והוא מי ביצים דרש להו ואינהו סבור מי בצעים קאמר

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once went to a certain place, and he saw people there kneading dough while they were in a state of ritual impurity, and they believed that nevertheless, the dough remained ritually pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: For what reason are you kneading your dough in a state of ritual impurity? They said to him: A certain Torah scholar came here and taught us that water from swamps [mei betza’im] does not render food susceptible to contract ritual impurity. Therefore, they would take water from swamps and knead dough with it, in the mistaken belief that such dough would not be susceptible to ritual impurity. But in reality, what he taught them was that water of eggs [mei beitzim], i.e., the albumin of eggs, does not render food susceptible to impurity, as it is not considered water. But they thought he said: Water from swamps.

וטעו נמי בהא מי קרמיון ומי פיגה פסולין מפני שהן מי בצעים ואינהו סבור מדלגבי חטאת פסילי אכשורי נמי לא מכשרי ולא היא התם לענין חטאת בעינן מים חיים הכא אכשורי כל דהו מכשרי

And the residents of that same place erred also with regard to this: It was taught in a mishna (Para 8:10): The waters of the Keramiyyon River and the waters of the Piga River are not fit for mixing with ashes of the red heifer to use as water of purification, since they are water from swamps. And they erroneously thought: Since this water is not fit for use as water of purification, this means it is not considered water, and therefore it also does not render food susceptible to contracting impurity. But it is not so, as there, with regard to water of purification, we need: “Running water” (see Numbers 19:17), and water from swamps is not running water. But here, with regard to rendering food susceptible to impurity, any water renders food susceptible.

תנא באותה שעה גזרו תלמיד אל יורה אלא אם כן נוטל רשות מרבו

It was taught: At that time, when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi discovered the consequences resulting from a Torah scholar who was not precise with his terminology, the Sages decreed: A Torah scholar may not teach halakha unless he receives permission from his teacher to do so. The teacher should not grant him this permission if he does not know how to express himself in a clear manner.

תנחום בריה דרבי אמי איקלע לחתר דרש להו מותר ללתות חיטין בפסח אמרו לו לאו רבי מני דמן צור איכא הכא ותניא תלמיד אל יורה הלכה במקום רבו אלא אם כן היה רחוק ממנו שלש פרסאות כנגד מחנה ישראל אמר להו לאו אדעתאי

Concerning a similar matter, the Gemara relates: Tanḥum, son of Rabbi Ami, arrived at a place called Ḥatar, and he taught them: It is permitted to wash wheat in a small amount of water in order to make it easier to peel during the grinding process on Passover, and there is no concern that perhaps it will become leavened. They said to him: Isn’t Rabbi Mani from Tyre here i.e., near our location? And it is taught in a baraita: A Torah scholar may not teach halakha in the vicinity of his teacher, unless he is distant from the teacher by at least three parasangs [parsaot], corresponding to the size of the camp of Israel. In the encampment in the wilderness no one else judged cases, as all the Jewish people brought their cases to Moses (see Exodus 33:7). Tanḥum, son of Rabbi Ami, said to them: It did not enter my mind that Rabbi Mani was in the vicinity.

רבי חייא חזייה לההוא גברא דהוה קאי בבית הקברות אמר ליה לאו בן איש פלוני כהן אתה אמר ליה אין אבוה דההוא גברא גבה עינים הוה נתן עיניו בגרושה וחיללו

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya saw a certain man standing in a cemetery. He said to him: Are you not the son of so-and-so the priest? As it is prohibited for priests to come into contact with the dead (see Leviticus 21:1–4), Rabbi Ḥiyya was surprised to see a priest standing in a cemetery. The man said to him: Yes, but that man’s, meaning his own, father was a man with raised eyes who would desire things that he saw, even if they were forbidden. He set his eyes upon a divorcée and married her despite the Torah prohibition against such a union (see Leviticus 21:7), and thereby disqualified the offspring of that union from the sanctity of priesthood. As the son of a priest and a divorcée, the man had the status of a ḥalal and was therefore not obligated to abide by the restrictions specific to priests.

פשיטא לפלגא הא קאמר דמהני על תנאי מאי תא שמע דאמר ליה רבי יוחנן לרב שמן הרי אתה ברשותנו עד שתבא אצלנו

Continuing the discussion about receiving permission to teach halakha, the Gemara discusses the extent of this authority. It is obvious that one’s teacher can grant partial permission, meaning permission to rule on certain types of cases but not others, as it has been said above that doing so is effective. But what is the halakha with regard to granting such permission conditionally? Is it possible to grant permission limited to a certain period of time, or limited to a certain location? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the solution to this matter from what Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rav Shemen: You have our permission to instruct and to adjudicate until you return to us. This statement proves that it is possible to grant permission limited to a specific period of time.

גופא אמר שמואל שנים שדנו דיניהם דין אלא שנקרא בית דין חצוף יתיב רב נחמן וקאמר להא שמעתא איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן אפילו שנים מזכין או שנים מחייבין ואחד אומר ׳איני יודע׳ יוסיפו הדיינין ואי איתא להוו כשנים שדנו

§ Earlier, the Gemara discussed the possibility of a court consisting of only two judges adjudicating a case. Concerning the matter itself, Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rav Naḥman sat and said this halakha. Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a mishna (29a): In a case where three judges are adjudicating a case, even if two judges deem the defendant exempt from payment or two judges deem him liable to pay, and one says: I do not know, the judges must add another judge, since the one who abstained has removed himself from the court, and there are not enough judges. And if it is so as Shmuel says, they should be viewed as two judges who adjudicated the case, and there would be no need to add another judge, as a judgment passed by two judges is valid.

שאני התם דמעיקרא אדעתא דתלתא יתיבי הכא לאו אדעתא דתלתא יתיבי

Rav Naḥman answered him: It is different there, as they convened from the outset with the knowledge that they are three and intended to judge the case with three judges. Therefore, if one abstains, they must add another to complete the quorum. But here they did not convene with the knowledge that they are three, but rather intended to adjudicate the case as a court of two judges.

איתיביה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר הדין בשלשה ופשרה בשנים ויפה כח פשרה מכח הדין ששנים שדנו בעלי דינין יכולין לחזור בהן ושנים שעשו פשרה אין בעלי דינין יכולין לחזור בהן

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges, and mediation leading to compromise can be performed by two mediators. And the power of compromise is greater than the power of adjudication, as if two judges adjudicated a case, the litigants are able to withdraw from the case and demand a court with a complete quorum. But if two mediated a compromise, the litigants may not withdraw.