Shabbat 102

מתני׳ הזורק ונזכר מאחר שיצתה מידו קלטה אחר קלטה כלב או שנשרפה פטור זרק לעשות חבורה בין באדם ובין בבהמה ונזכר עד שלא נעשית חבורה פטור זה הכלל כל חייבי חטאות אינן חייבין עד שתהא תחלתן וסופן שגגה תחלתן שגגה וסופן זדון תחילתן זדון וסופן שגגה פטורין עד שתהא תחילתן וסופן שגגה:

MISHNA: One who unwittingly throws an object from one domain to another or one who throws an object four cubits within the public domain, and after the object left his hand he remembered that he is in violation of a prohibition, if another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt. Similarly, if one threw a rock on Shabbat to inflict a wound on a person or on an animal, for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and he remembered that he was in violation of a prohibition before the wound was inflicted, he is exempt. This is the principle: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting. However, if the beginning of one’s action was unwitting and the conclusion was intentional, as he became aware that he was in violation of a prohibition, or if the beginning of one’s action was intentional and the conclusion was unwitting, the individuals in both of these cases are exempt until both the beginning and the conclusion are unwitting.

גמ׳ הא נחה חייב והלא נזכר ותנן כל חייבי חטאות אינן חייבין עד שתהא תחלתן וסופן שגגה אמר רב כהנא סיפא אתאן ללכתא ומתנא

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that if one throws an object unwittingly and then remembers that he was in violation of a prohibition, he is exempt if the object did not come to rest on the ground. The Gemara infers: If the object comes to rest, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? Didn’t he remember the prohibition before it landed, and we learned in the mishna: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action will be unwitting? If one remembered before the act was complete, he should be exempt. Rav Kahana said: With regard to the latter clause of the mishna, we have come to a special case of a bolt and a cord. The bolt is connected to a cord that one holds in his hand, which renders him capable of retrieving the bolt before it lands. Therefore, in a case where the beginning was unwitting and the conclusion was intentional, one is exempt because he is still capable of changing the outcome of the action. However, in the first clause of the mishna, once the object left his hand the action is irreversible, and therefore it is an action whose beginning and conclusion are unwitting.

לכתא ומתנא אוגדו בידו הוא כגון שנתכוין לעשות חבורה הא נמי תנינא הזורק לעשות חבורה בין באדם בין בבהמה ונזכר עד שלא נעשית חבורה פטור אלא אמר רבא במעביר

The Gemara asks: The case of the bolt and the cord is one where one holds it in his hand. Therefore, no act of throwing actually took place, and there is no liability to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara answers: The case of the bolt and the cord was not stated with regard to Shabbat. Rather, it was stated with regard to one who intended to inflict a wound by throwing an object tied to a rope. The Gemara asks: This was also taught explicitly in the mishna: If one threw a rock on Shabbat to inflict a wound on a person or on an animal, and he remembered before the wound was inflicted, he is exempt. Rather, Rava said: This principle was stated with regard to a case of carrying, not throwing an object. Since one is holding the object the entire time while violating the prohibition, and is capable of letting it go at any time, this is a case whose beginning and conclusion are intentional.

והא זה הכלל דקתני אזריקה קתני אלא אמר רבא תרתי קתני הזורק ונזכר מאחר שיצתה מידו אי נמי לא נזכר וקלטה אחר או קלטה כלב או שנשרפה פטור

The Gemara asks: Wasn’t this principle that was taught, taught with regard to throwing because that is the topic of the mishna? Rather, Rava said: Two separate matters were taught in the mishna. The first case is: One who unwittingly throws an object, and after the object left his hand he remembered that he was in violation of a prohibition. Alternatively, another case where one is exempt is: A case where one did not remember and another caught it, or a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt.

רב אשי אמר חסורי מחסרא והכי קתני הזורק ונזכר מאחר שיצתה מידו קלטה אחר או קלטה כלב או שנשרפה פטור הא נחה חייב במה דברים אמורים שחזר ושכח אבל לא חזר ושכח פטור שכל חייבי חטאות אינן חייבין עד שתהא תחלתן וסופן שגגה:

Rav Ashi said: The mishna is incomplete, and it teaches the following: One who throws a rock and remembers the violation after it left his hand, if another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt. By inference, if the object comes to rest, he is liable. Rav Ashi adds: In what case are these matters stated? In a case where one then forgot again before the object came to rest. However, if one did not then forget again, he is exempt because all who are liable to bring sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting.

זה הכלל כל חייבי חטאות כו׳: איתמר שתי אמות בשוגג שתי אמות במזיד שתי אמות בשוגג רבה אמר פטור רבא אמר חייב

We learned in the mishna that this is the principle: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting. It was stated that amora’im disputed this point. With regard to a case where one carried an object in the public domain two cubits unwittingly, and then became aware and carried it two more cubits intentionally, and then carried it two additional cubits unwittingly, and then placed the object, can this be characterized as a case in which the beginning of the action and the conclusion of the action are unwitting? Rabba said: One is exempt. Rava said: One is liable.

רבה אמר פטור אפילו לרבן גמליאל דאמר אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור התם הוא דכי קא גמר שיעורא בשוגג קא גמר אבל הכא דבמזיד לא

The Gemara clarifies the two positions. Rabba said: One is exempt. This is the halakha even according to Rabban Gamliel, who said: There is no awareness for half a measure, and therefore he is liable. Since one is not liable to bring a sacrifice for a half-measure, the fact that he became aware between consumption of the two halves of an olive-bulk is of no significance. One’s awareness does not demarcate between the two half-measures of two cubits with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering. He only said so there, when the measure that determines liability was completed, it was completed unwittingly. However, here, when the measure is completed, it is completed intentionally. In that case, he would say no, he is not liable. The measure that determines liability for carrying in the public domain on Shabbat is four cubits. When the object reached four cubits, he was carrying the object intentionally.

ובמאי אי בזורק שוגג הוא אלא במעביר

The Gemara explains: And in what case was this stated? If it was stated with regard to a case of throwing, the entire act was unwitting because when he became aware, there was nothing he could do to prevent the object from landing. Rather, it must have been with regard to a case of carrying.

רבא אמר חייב ואפילו לרבנן דאמרי יש ידיעה לחצי שיעור התם הוא דבידו אבל הכא דאין בידו לא ובמאי אי במעביר הרי בידו ואלא בזורק

Rava said: One is liable. Even according to the Rabbis, who said: There is awareness for half a measure, and therefore he is exempt, they only said so there, where it is still in his control to complete or terminate the action. But here, where it is not in his control to affect the outcome, they would not say so and would deem him liable. And in what case was this stated? If it was stated with regard to a case of carrying, the outcome is still in his control. Rather, it must have been with regard to a case of throwing. Apparently, Rabba and Rava do not disagree. They are discussing separate cases.

אמר רבה זרק ונחה בפי הכלב או בפי הכבשן חייב והאנן תנן קלטה אחר או קלטה הכלב או שנשרפה פטור התם דלא מכוין הכא דקא מכוין

Rabba said: If one unwittingly threw an object from one domain to another or unwittingly threw an object four cubits in a public domain on Shabbat, and it came to rest in the mouth of a dog or in a furnace, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: If another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt? The Gemara answers: There, the case of the mishna where one is exempt, one did not intend to throw it into the dog’s mouth. A dog came and snatched the object, preventing it from landing at its intended destination. Since the intention of the thrower was not realized, he is exempt. However, here, where Rabba said that the thrower is liable, he intended to throw the object into the dog’s mouth. He is liable because his intention was realized.

אמר רב ביבי בר אביי אף אנן נמי תנינא יש אוכל אכילה אחת וחייב עליה ארבע חטאות ואשם אחד הטמא שאכל חלב והוא נותר מן המוקדשין ביום הכפורים

Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: We also learned support for that distinction in a mishna: There is a person who performs a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food, and he is liable to bring four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering. How so? This halakha applies to one who is ritually impure who ate forbidden fat that was notar from a consecrated offering, i.e., it remained after the time when it may have been eaten expired, and this happened on Yom Kippur. The person who did this is liable to bring one sin-offering for eating consecrated food while impure, one for eating forbidden fat, one for eating notar, and one for eating on Yom Kippur. He is also liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated items.

רבי מאיר אומר אף אם היתה שבת והוציאו [בפיו] חייב אמרו לו אינו מן השם ואמאי הא אין דרך הוצאה בכך אלא כיון דקא מיכוין מחשבתו משויא ליה מקום הכא נמי כיון דקא מיכוין מחשבתו משויא ליה מקום:

Rabbi Meir says: There is one more sin-offering for which he may be liable. In addition, if it was Shabbat and he carried this olive-bulk of food from one domain to another in his mouth, he is liable for carrying out on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: Liability for the sin-offering that you added is not incurred from violation of the same type of prohibition. He is liable for carrying out the food, not for eating it. However, fundamentally, the Rabbis agree that one would be liable for carrying out in that case. The Gemara asks: And why would one be liable? That carrying, which was done in one’s mouth, is not the typical manner of carrying out. Rather, it must be that since he intended to carry out the object in that manner, his thought renders his mouth a suitable place for placement of an object. Here, too, since he intends to throw the object into the dog’s mouth, his thought renders the dog’s mouth a suitable place for placement of an object, and he is liable for throwing it there.

הדרן עלך הזורק

MISHNA: With regard to one who builds on Shabbat, thereby violating a prohibition in a primary category of prohibited labor, how much must he build to be liable to bring a sin-offering? The Sages said: One who builds is liable for building any amount. And one who chisels, or strikes with a hammer or with an adze, or one who drills a hole of any size on Shabbat, is liable. This is the principle: Anyone who performs a prohibited labor and his labor endures on Shabbat is liable. And so too, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes an anvil with a sledgehammer during his labor has performed a constructive act and is liable, because he is as one who improves the labor that he is performing.

מתני׳ הבונה כמה יבנה ויהא חייב הבונה כל שהוא והמסתת והמכה בפטיש ובמעצד הקודח כל שהוא חייב זה הכלל כל העושה מלאכה ומלאכתו מתקיימת בשבת חייב (וכן) רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר אף המכה בקורנס על הסדן בשעת מלאכה חייב מפני שהוא כמתקן מלאכה:

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to any small amount of building, for what use is it suited? Rabbi Yirmeya said: As a poor person digs a hole in the floor of his house in which to hide his coins. Digging a hole in the floor of a house is an act of building. The corresponding situation in the Tabernacle was as those who sewed curtains in the Tabernacle dug holes in which to hide their needles. Abaye said: Since needles rust in the ground, they did not do so. The Gemara seeks a different example of small-scale building that is significant. Rather, an example is that a poor person makes legs for a small stove to place a small pot on it. The corresponding situation in the Tabernacle was with regard to those who cooked herbs used to dye curtains, whose dyeing process was lacking a small amount for completion. At that point, it was not worth the effort to cook a large quantity of dye, and so they would make legs for a small stove upon which to place a small cauldron to cook a small bit of dye to finish the job.

גמ׳ כל שהוא למאי חזיא אמר רבי ירמיה שכן עני חופר גומא להצניע בה פרוטותיו דכוותה גבי משכן שכן תופרי יריעות חופרין גומא להצניע בה מחטיהן אביי אמר כיון דמשתכי לא עבדי הכי אלא שכן עני עושה פיטפוטי כירה קטנה לשפות עליה קדירה קטנה דכוותה גבי משכן מבשלי סמנין לצבוע יריעות שחסרה מלאכתן עושין פיטפוטי כירה קטנה לשפות עליה יורה קטנה

Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: There is no poverty in a place of wealth. In the Tabernacle, as in any public project, actions are not performed on a small scale or in parsimonious quantities; they were performed generously. Those who cooked dyes in the Tabernacle had no use for small crucibles. Rather, an example of significant small-scale building is a homeowner who has a small hole in his house and seals it. The corresponding situation in the Tabernacle was with regard to a beam that was set upon by a worm that bore a hole into it; one pours lead into the hole and seals it.

רב אחא בר יעקב אמר אין עניות במקום עשירות אלא שכן בעל הבית שיש לו נקב בבירתו וסותמו דכוותה גבי משכן שכן קרש שנפלה בו דרנא מטיף לתוכה אבר וסותמו

Shmuel said: If one sets a stone in place on Shabbat, i.e., he takes a building stone and fixes it in place on the ground on Shabbat, he is liable for performing the prohibited labor of building. The Gemara raises an objection to this from that which the Sages taught with regard to building on Shabbat. In a case where one puts down a stone and another one places the mortar, the one who places the mortar is liable for building. Apparently, the prohibition of building is only violated when mortar is added. Merely setting a stone in place is not enough to establish liability.

אמר שמואל המצדד את האבן חייב מיתיבי אחד נותן את האבן ואחד נותן את הטיט הנותן את הטיט חייב

The Gemara answers: And according to your line of reasoning, say the latter clause of that mishna where we learn that Rabbi Yosei says: And even if one lifted the stone and placed it on a top row of stones [dimos], he is liable even without securing it with mortar. Rather, apparently, there are three different kinds of building: Bottom row, middle row, and upper row. The bottom row requires setting the stones in place and dirt to hold it in place. The middle row requires mortar as well. The upper row suffices with mere placement.

וליטעמיך אימא סיפא רבי יוסי אומר ואפילו העלה והניח על גבי דימוס של אבנים חייב אלא תלתא בנייני הוו תתא מציעא ועילא תתא בעי צדודי ועפרא מציעא בעי נמי טינא עילאי בהנחה בעלמא:

We learned in the mishna: One who chisels any amount is liable. The Gemara asks: With regard to one who chisels, for which primary category of prohibited labor is he liable? Rav said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of building. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel. They similarly disagreed with regard to one who makes a hole in a chicken coop. Rav said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of building. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of striking a blow with a hammer. And similarly, with regard to one who inserts a pin into the handle of a hoe in order to secure the handle, Rav said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of building. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of striking a blow with a hammer.

והמסתת: מסתת משום מאי מיחייב רב אמר משום בונה ושמואל אמר משום מכה בפטיש העושה נקב בלול של תרנגולים רב אמר משום בונה ושמואל אמר משום מכה בפטיש עייל שופתא בקופינא דמרא רב אמר משום בונה ושמואל אמר משום מכה בפטיש

The Gemara comments: It is necessary for the Gemara to teach us that Rav and Shmuel disagreed in each of these cases because one could not be inferred from the other. As, had the Gemara told us only the first case of chiseling, I would have said that it is specifically in that case that Rav said one is liable for building because it is a typical manner of building; however, with regard to one who makes a hole in a chicken coop, which is not a typical manner of building, say that Rav agrees with Shmuel that this is not subsumed under the rubric of the prohibited labor of building. And had the Gemara told us only about this case of making a hole in a chicken coop, I would have said that it is specifically in that case that Rav said one is liable for building, because it is similar to building, as people do so for ventilation in a chicken coop, just as they place windows in buildings.

וצריכא דאי אשמעינן קמייתא בההיא קאמר רב משום דדרך בנין בכך אבל עושה נקב בלול של תרנגולים דאין דרך בנין בכך אימא מודה ליה לשמואל ואי אשמעינן בהא בהא קאמר רב משום דדמי לבנין דעבדיה לאוירא

However, inserting a pin into the handle of a hoe, which is not a typical manner of building, say that Rav agrees with Shmuel that it is not subsumed under the rubric of the prohibited labor of building. Conversely, had the Gemara told us only about this case of inserting a pin into the handle of a hoe, I would have said that it is only in that case that Shmuel said that the action is not subsumed under the rubric of the prohibited labor of building; however, with regard to these other two cases of chiseling and making a hole in the coop, say that Shmuel agrees with Rav that they are subsumed under the rubric of the prohibited labor of building. Therefore, it was necessary to cite all three disputes.

אבל שופתא בקופינא דמרא דאין דרך בנין בכך אימא מודה ליה לשמואל ואי אשמעינן בהא בהא קאמר שמואל אבל בהנך תרתי אימא מודה ליה לרב צריכא

Rav Natan bar Oshaya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to one who chisels, for which primary category of prohibited labor is he liable? He indicated with his hand that he is liable for striking a blow with a hammer. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: One who chisels and one who strikes a blow with a hammer, indicating that they are two different prohibitions? The Gemara answers: Emend this and say: One who chisels is liable due to the prohibition of striking a blow with a hammer.

בעא מיניה רב נתן בר אושעיא מרבי יוחנן מסתת משום מאי מיחייב אחוי ליה בידיה משום מכה בפטיש והאנן תנן המסתת והמכה בפטיש אימא המסתת המכה בפטיש

Come and hear a proof that will resolve this dilemma from that which we learned:

תא שמע