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Today's Daf Yomi

May 15, 2020 | 讻状讗 讘讗讬讬专 转砖状驻

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

Iyar is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in memory of Yosef ben Zvi HaKohen, Dr. Joseph Kahane z"l and Yehuda Aryeh Leib ben Yisachar Dov Barash, Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

Shabbat 70

Today’s shiur is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Netanel Ilan ben Shayna Tzipora and by Judy Shapiro in honor of all her children.聽

Why is there a difference between if one forgot it was Shabbat one brings one sacrifice and if one forgot melachot one brings a sacrifice for each? From where do we derive that one brings a separate sacrficie for each melacha that one performed? Shmuel brings a source and the gemara assesses why he did not bring one of the two sources offered by the tannaim Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yosi. Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yosi debate why the verse regarding fire was singled out – was it to create a paradigm for all the melachot or was it singled out because it is different (less stringent than all the others)? What does Rabbi Yosi derive from the words “from one from these?” How many sacrifices does one bring if one forgot it was Shabbat and forgot that melachot were forbidden? If one did two melachot two times – once forgetting it was Shabbat and once forgetting melachot and finds out about one before the other, can one sacrifice cover all the actions? Different permutations are brought.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 住驻专讗 讻讗谉 诪讬讚讬注转 砖讘转 讛讜讗 驻讜专砖 讜讻讗谉 诪讬讚讬注转 诪诇讗讻讛 讛讜讗 驻讜专砖 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪砖讘转 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪诪诇讗讻讜转 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘转 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 拽专讘谉 讚讞讬讬讘 专讞诪谞讗 讗诪讗讬 讗砖讙讙讛 讛转诐 讞讚讗 砖讙讙讛 讛讻讗 讟讜讘讗 砖讙讙讜转 讛讜讬讬谉:

The Gemara asks: What is different about the former clause, which states that he in only liable to bring one sin-offering for each Shabbat, and the latter clause, which states that he is liable for each and every primary category of labor that he performed? Rav Safra said: Here, where he is unaware that the day was Shabbat, when he realizes that he sinned, it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists. When he is told that it was Shabbat, he stops immediately. And here, where he is unaware that the labors are prohibited, it is due to awareness of the labors that he desists. When he is told that this labor is prohibited, he stops immediately. Rav Na岣an said to Rav Safra: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? If he did not know that the labor is prohibited, telling him that it is Shabbat would not cause him to desist. And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? If he did not know that it was Shabbat, there would be no reason for him to desist from labor. Ostensibly, attributing the distinction between the two parts of the mishna to what eventually became known to him in the different cases is incorrect. Rather, Rav Na岣an said: The offering that the Torah obligated him to bring; for what is he so obligated? It is for performing an unwitting transgression. There, where he was unaware that the day was Shabbat, he was unwitting with regard to one matter; here, where he was unaware of the prohibited labors, he was unwitting with regard to multiple matters, and he is liable to bring sin-offerings in accordance with the number of matters of which he was unaware.

讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛: 讞讬诇讜拽 诪诇讗讻讜转 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 拽专讗 诪讞诇诇讬讛 诪讜转 讬讜诪转 讛转讜专讛 专讘转讛 诪讬转讜转 讛专讘讛 注诇 讞讬诇讜诇 讗讞讚 讛讗讬 讘诪讝讬讚 讻转讬讘 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇诪讝讬讚 讚讻转讬讘 讻诇 讛注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讬讜诪转 转谞讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖讜讙讙 讜诪讗讬 讬讜诪转 讬讜诪转 讘诪诪讜谉

We learned in the mishna that one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each prohibited labor that he performs on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the division of labors? What is the source of the halakha that if one performs numerous prohibited labors on Shabbat in the course of one lapse of awareness, each prohibited labor is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment? Shmuel said that the verse says: 鈥淎nd you shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy to you; he who desecrates it shall surely die [mot yumat]鈥 (Exodus 31:14). We learn from the double language, mot yumat, that the Torah amplified multiple deaths for a single desecration. Although several violations were committed in the course of a single lapse of awareness, each is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment. The Gemara asks: That verse was written with regard to intentional transgression. The Gemara is seeking a source for multiple sacrifices brought for unwitting transgression. The Gemara answers: If it does not refer to the matter of intentional transgression, as the verse does not teach a halakha applicable to intentional acts, as it was already written: 鈥淪ix days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God; all who desecrate it shall die鈥 (Exodus 35:2), refer it to the matter of unwitting transgression. The verse teaches that that which was written with regard to the death penalty for desecration of Shabbat in general applies to all halakhot of Shabbat, including cases of unwitting transgression. And what, then, is the meaning of the term: Shall die, in the verse? Does it mean that one who commits an unwitting transgression is punishable by death? It means that he shall die by payment of money. Death is used in the sense of punishment; he will be forced to pay for numerous sacrifices to atone for his sins.

讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 讞讬诇讜拽 诪诇讗讻讜转 诪讛讬讻讗 讚谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 谞转谉 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 诇讗 转讘注专讜 讗砖 讘讻诇 诪砖讘转讬讻诐 讘讬讜诐 讛砖讘转 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇驻讬 砖谞讗诪专 讜讬拽讛诇 诪砖讛 讗转 讻诇 注讚转 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 讗诇讛 讛讚讘专讬诐 讜讙讜壮 砖砖转 讬诪讬诐 转注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讚讘专讬诐 讛讚讘专讬诐 讗诇讛 讛讚讘专讬诐 讗诇讜 砖诇砖讬诐 讜转砖注 诪诇讗讻讜转 砖谞讗诪专讜 诇诪砖讛 讘住讬谞讬

The Gemara asks: And let him derive division of labors from where it was derived according to Rabbi Natan, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says that it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat鈥 (Exodus 35:3). Why does the verse state this halakha? The prohibition against kindling is included in the general prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. Rather, it should be understood as follows. Since it is already stated: 鈥淎nd Moses gathered the entire assembly of the children of Israel and said to them: These are the things [eleh hadevarim] that God has commanded to perform them. Six days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God鈥 (Exodus 35:1鈥2), and Rabbi Natan derives as follows: 鈥淭hese are the things,鈥 which refers to the halakhot of Shabbat, there are emphases in this phrase that are superfluous in the context of the verse. The Torah could have simply stated: This is a thing [davar]. When it states: Things [devarim] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article: The things [hadevarim], adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word eleh: Alef, one; lamed, thirty; and heh, five, is thirty-six. The total numerical value, three plus thirty-six, derived from the phrase: 鈥淭hese are the things.鈥 This alludes to the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai.

讬讻讜诇 注砖讗谉 讻讜诇谉 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞讚 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘讞专讬砖 讜讘拽爪讬专 转砖讘转 讜注讚讬讬谉 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 注诇 讞专讬砖讛 讜注诇 讛拽爪讬专讛 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐 讜注诇 讻讜诇谉 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讗 转讘注专讜 讗砖 讛讘注专讛 讘讻诇诇 讛讬转讛 讜诇诪讛 讬爪讗转 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛 讜诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 讛讘注专讛 砖讛讬讗 讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 讜讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛 讗祝 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛

I might have thought that if one performed them all in the course of one lapse of awareness, forgetting that they are prohibited, he would be liable to bring only one sin-offering? Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淪ix days you shall work, and on the seventh you shall rest; in plowing time and in harvest time you shall rest鈥 (Exodus 34:21), indicating that there are prohibitions specific to both plowing and harvesting. And still I can say: For plowing and for the harvesting he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as they were stated explicitly. However, for performing all the other prohibited labors, he is liable for only one. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat鈥 (Exodus 35:3). This is derived in the following manner: Kindling was included in the general prohibition prohibiting all labors, and why was it singled out and prohibited explicitly? It was singled out in order to equate the other labors to it and to tell you: Just as kindling is a primary category of prohibited labor, and one is liable for performing it on its own, so too, with regard to every primary category of prohibited labor, one is liable for performing it on its own.

砖诪讜讗诇 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讛讘注专讛 诇诇讗讜 讬爪讗转 讚转谞讬讗 讛讘注专讛 诇诇讗讜 讬爪讗转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 诇讞诇拽 讬爪讗转

Rabbi Natan cited a source proving that there is liability for performance of each prohibited labor of Shabbat on its own. Why doesn鈥檛 Shmuel derive that halakha from the same source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who disagreed with Rabbi Natan鈥檚 interpretation of the verse, as Rabbi Yosei said: The prohibition against kindling on Shabbat was singled out to teach that one who lights a fire on Shabbat merely violates a prohibition. Performing other primary categories of prohibited labor is punishable by stoning or karet. In contrast, one who lights a fire on Shabbat has merely violated a prohibition, as it was taught in a baraita: The prohibition of kindling was singled out as a prohibition; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Natan says: Kindling is like any other labor prohibited on Shabbat. It was singled out to divide the various labors and to establish liability for performance of each of them.

讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 诇讞诇讜拽 诪诇讗讻讜转 诪讛讬讻讗 讚谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讜注砖讛 诪讗讞转 诪讛谞讛 驻注诪讬诐 砖讞讬讬讘讬诐 讗讞转 注诇 讻讜诇谉 讜驻注诪讬诐 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讞转 诪讗讞转 讛谞讛 诪讛谞讛 讗讞转 砖讛讬讗 讛谞讛 讛谞讛 砖讛讬讗 讗讞转

The Gemara raises an additional challenge to Shmuel鈥檚 opinion. If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the explicit prohibition of kindling, let him derive the division of labors from where Rabbi Yosei derives it. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says, it is stated: 鈥淪peak to the children of Israel, saying: A soul that sins in error, from all the commandments of God that may not be performed, and performs from one of them [me鈥檃岣t me鈥檋ena]鈥 (Leviticus 4:2). Rabbi Yosei interprets the verse that at times one is liable to bring one sin-offering for all of his transgressions, and at times one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? He interprets the unique phrase employed in that verse: From one of these. The Torah could have merely stated: One [a岣t]. Instead, it stated: From one [me鈥檃岣t]. It could have merely stated: Them [hena]. Instead, it stated: Of them [me鈥檋ena]. Rabbi Yosei derives that there are cases of one transgression that, with regard to punishment, are them, i.e., many. And there are cases of them, several transgressions, that, with regard to punishment, are one.

讗讞转 砖诪注讜谉 诪讗讞转

Furthermore: The term one refers to a full-fledged transgression of Shabbat, e.g., one who intended to and wrote a complete name, Shimon. The term from one refers to a case where he performed only part of the transgression, e.g., one who wrote

砖诐 诪砖诪注讜谉 讛谞讛 讗讘讜转 诪讛谞讛 转讜诇讚讜转 讗讞转 砖讛讬讗 讛谞讛 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛谞讛 砖讛讬讗 讗讞转 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗讞转 砖讛讬讗 讛谞讛 讜讛谞讛 砖讛讬讗 讗讞转 诇讗 诪砖诪注 诇讬讛:

only shem, part of the word, the letters shin and mem, from Shimon. Them refers to one who performed the primary categories of labor. Of them refers to one who performed subcategories of prohibited labors. One that is them refers to one transgression with multiple punishments, as in a case where his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat in that he was aware that it was Shabbat, and his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors in that he was unaware that the labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable for each primary category of labor. Them that are one refers to several transgressions with one punishment, as in a case where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat in that he was unaware that it was Shabbat, and his action was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors in that he was aware that the labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Apparently, Rabbi Yosei has a source for the division of Shabbat labors. Why doesn鈥檛 Shmuel derive the halakha from that source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel did not derive one that is them and them that are one from the verse.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛注诇诐 讝讛 讜讝讛 讘讬讚讜 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 砖讘转 讘讬讚讜 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讗讚专讘讛 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 诪诇讗讻讜转 讘讬讚讜 讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讞讝讬谞谉 讗讬 诪砖讜诐 砖讘转 拽讗 驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 砖讘转 讘讬讚讜 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讜讗讬 诪砖讜诐 诪诇讗讻讛 拽驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 诪诇讗讻讜转 讘讬讚讜 讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪砖讘转 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪诪诇讗讻讜转 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘转 讗诇讗 诇讗 砖谞讗

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: What is the halakha if a person had a lapse of awareness of both this, Shabbat, and that, a particular labor? He said to him: He had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat and is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Rava said to him: On the contrary, he had a lapse of awareness with regard to prohibited labors, and he should be liable for each and every labor that he performed. Rather, Rav Ashi said: We see, if it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists from performing the labor when he is told what day it is, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable for only one. And if it is due to awareness of the prohibited labor that he desists, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to the labors and he is liable for each and every one. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? When one desists from labor when he is told that it is Shabbat, it is because he understands that the labor he is performing is prohibited on Shabbat. Similarly, when one desists from his labor when he is told that the labor is prohibited, it is because he understands that the day is Shabbat. Rather, there is no difference between the cases, and in both he is considered unwitting with regard to Shabbat.

转谞谉 讗讘讜转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讗专讘注讬诐 讞住专 讗讞转 讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 诪谞讬谞讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖讗诐 注砖讗谉 讻讜诇谉 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞讚 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讛注诇诐 讝讛 讜讝讛 讘讬讚讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 砖驻讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讛注诇诐 砖讘转 讘讬讚讜 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转

The Gemara further discusses the matter from a different perspective. We learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? Isn鈥檛 merely listing the prohibited labors sufficient? And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, if you say that one who had a lapse of awareness of both this and that is liable for each and every one, it works out well. However, if you say that since one who had a lapse of awareness of this and that had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable to bring only one sin-offering, under what circumstances can you find a case where one would be liable for unwittingly violating all thirty-nine labors? It must be in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, as he was aware that it was Shabbat, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting, as he was unaware that these labors were prohibited on Shabbat.

讛谞讬讞讗 讗讬 住讘专 诇讬讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 讻讬讜谉 砖砖讙讙 讘讻专转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讝讬讚 讘诇讗讜 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚讬讚注 诇讬讛 砖讘转 讘诇讗讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 注讚 砖讬砖讙讜讙 讘诇讗讜 讜讻专转 讚讬讚注 诇讬讛 砖讘转 讘诪讗讬 讚讬讚注 诇讛 讘转讞讜诪讬谉 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗:

It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. You find that possibility in a case where he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that that prohibition is by Torah law.

讗诪专 专讘讗 拽爪专 讜讟讞谉 讻讙专讜讙专转 讘砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜讞讝专 讜拽爪专 讜讟讞谉 讻讙专讜讙专转 讘讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜谞讜讚注 诇讜 注诇 拽爪讬专讛 讜讟讞讬谞讛 砖诇 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜讞讝专 讜谞讜讚注 诇讜 注诇 拽爪讬专讛 讜注诇 讟讞讬谞讛 砖诇 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转

Rava said: One who reaped and ground grain in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, the measure that determines liability for the labors of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, while in performing those actions he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He was unaware that it was Shabbat, but he was aware that the labors were prohibited. And he did not realize that he had sinned until he again reaped and ground grain in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, while in performing those actions he was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors. He was aware that it was Shabbat, but he was unaware that the labors were prohibited. And afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding while unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He set aside a sin-offering to atone for his sin, based on the principle that he need set aside only one sin-offering even though he performed two primary categories of labor in the same lapse of awareness. And afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding while intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors. For performing two categories of prohibited labor unwittingly, reaping and grinding, one should be liable to bring two sin-offerings.

Masechet Shabbat is sponsored in memory of Elliot Freilich, Eliyahu Daniel ben Bar Tzion David Halevi z"l by a group of women from Kehilath Jeshurun, Manhattan.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

Iyar is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in memory of Yosef ben Zvi HaKohen, Dr. Joseph Kahane z"l and Yehuda Aryeh Leib ben Yisachar Dov Barash, Ari Adler z"l.

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Shabbat 68-74 – Daf Yomi: One Week at a Time

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Shabbat 70: Keeping Shabbat Is Hard

How did we come by these 39 individual melakhot? The Gemara finds an answer in the biblical text on the...

Shabbat 70

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Shabbat 70

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 住驻专讗 讻讗谉 诪讬讚讬注转 砖讘转 讛讜讗 驻讜专砖 讜讻讗谉 诪讬讚讬注转 诪诇讗讻讛 讛讜讗 驻讜专砖 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪砖讘转 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪诪诇讗讻讜转 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘转 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 拽专讘谉 讚讞讬讬讘 专讞诪谞讗 讗诪讗讬 讗砖讙讙讛 讛转诐 讞讚讗 砖讙讙讛 讛讻讗 讟讜讘讗 砖讙讙讜转 讛讜讬讬谉:

The Gemara asks: What is different about the former clause, which states that he in only liable to bring one sin-offering for each Shabbat, and the latter clause, which states that he is liable for each and every primary category of labor that he performed? Rav Safra said: Here, where he is unaware that the day was Shabbat, when he realizes that he sinned, it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists. When he is told that it was Shabbat, he stops immediately. And here, where he is unaware that the labors are prohibited, it is due to awareness of the labors that he desists. When he is told that this labor is prohibited, he stops immediately. Rav Na岣an said to Rav Safra: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? If he did not know that the labor is prohibited, telling him that it is Shabbat would not cause him to desist. And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? If he did not know that it was Shabbat, there would be no reason for him to desist from labor. Ostensibly, attributing the distinction between the two parts of the mishna to what eventually became known to him in the different cases is incorrect. Rather, Rav Na岣an said: The offering that the Torah obligated him to bring; for what is he so obligated? It is for performing an unwitting transgression. There, where he was unaware that the day was Shabbat, he was unwitting with regard to one matter; here, where he was unaware of the prohibited labors, he was unwitting with regard to multiple matters, and he is liable to bring sin-offerings in accordance with the number of matters of which he was unaware.

讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛: 讞讬诇讜拽 诪诇讗讻讜转 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 拽专讗 诪讞诇诇讬讛 诪讜转 讬讜诪转 讛转讜专讛 专讘转讛 诪讬转讜转 讛专讘讛 注诇 讞讬诇讜诇 讗讞讚 讛讗讬 讘诪讝讬讚 讻转讬讘 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇诪讝讬讚 讚讻转讬讘 讻诇 讛注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讬讜诪转 转谞讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖讜讙讙 讜诪讗讬 讬讜诪转 讬讜诪转 讘诪诪讜谉

We learned in the mishna that one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each prohibited labor that he performs on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the division of labors? What is the source of the halakha that if one performs numerous prohibited labors on Shabbat in the course of one lapse of awareness, each prohibited labor is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment? Shmuel said that the verse says: 鈥淎nd you shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy to you; he who desecrates it shall surely die [mot yumat]鈥 (Exodus 31:14). We learn from the double language, mot yumat, that the Torah amplified multiple deaths for a single desecration. Although several violations were committed in the course of a single lapse of awareness, each is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment. The Gemara asks: That verse was written with regard to intentional transgression. The Gemara is seeking a source for multiple sacrifices brought for unwitting transgression. The Gemara answers: If it does not refer to the matter of intentional transgression, as the verse does not teach a halakha applicable to intentional acts, as it was already written: 鈥淪ix days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God; all who desecrate it shall die鈥 (Exodus 35:2), refer it to the matter of unwitting transgression. The verse teaches that that which was written with regard to the death penalty for desecration of Shabbat in general applies to all halakhot of Shabbat, including cases of unwitting transgression. And what, then, is the meaning of the term: Shall die, in the verse? Does it mean that one who commits an unwitting transgression is punishable by death? It means that he shall die by payment of money. Death is used in the sense of punishment; he will be forced to pay for numerous sacrifices to atone for his sins.

讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 讞讬诇讜拽 诪诇讗讻讜转 诪讛讬讻讗 讚谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 谞转谉 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 诇讗 转讘注专讜 讗砖 讘讻诇 诪砖讘转讬讻诐 讘讬讜诐 讛砖讘转 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇驻讬 砖谞讗诪专 讜讬拽讛诇 诪砖讛 讗转 讻诇 注讚转 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 讗诇讛 讛讚讘专讬诐 讜讙讜壮 砖砖转 讬诪讬诐 转注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讚讘专讬诐 讛讚讘专讬诐 讗诇讛 讛讚讘专讬诐 讗诇讜 砖诇砖讬诐 讜转砖注 诪诇讗讻讜转 砖谞讗诪专讜 诇诪砖讛 讘住讬谞讬

The Gemara asks: And let him derive division of labors from where it was derived according to Rabbi Natan, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says that it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat鈥 (Exodus 35:3). Why does the verse state this halakha? The prohibition against kindling is included in the general prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. Rather, it should be understood as follows. Since it is already stated: 鈥淎nd Moses gathered the entire assembly of the children of Israel and said to them: These are the things [eleh hadevarim] that God has commanded to perform them. Six days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God鈥 (Exodus 35:1鈥2), and Rabbi Natan derives as follows: 鈥淭hese are the things,鈥 which refers to the halakhot of Shabbat, there are emphases in this phrase that are superfluous in the context of the verse. The Torah could have simply stated: This is a thing [davar]. When it states: Things [devarim] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article: The things [hadevarim], adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word eleh: Alef, one; lamed, thirty; and heh, five, is thirty-six. The total numerical value, three plus thirty-six, derived from the phrase: 鈥淭hese are the things.鈥 This alludes to the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai.

讬讻讜诇 注砖讗谉 讻讜诇谉 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞讚 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘讞专讬砖 讜讘拽爪讬专 转砖讘转 讜注讚讬讬谉 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 注诇 讞专讬砖讛 讜注诇 讛拽爪讬专讛 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐 讜注诇 讻讜诇谉 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讗 转讘注专讜 讗砖 讛讘注专讛 讘讻诇诇 讛讬转讛 讜诇诪讛 讬爪讗转 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛 讜诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 讛讘注专讛 砖讛讬讗 讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 讜讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛 讗祝 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛

I might have thought that if one performed them all in the course of one lapse of awareness, forgetting that they are prohibited, he would be liable to bring only one sin-offering? Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淪ix days you shall work, and on the seventh you shall rest; in plowing time and in harvest time you shall rest鈥 (Exodus 34:21), indicating that there are prohibitions specific to both plowing and harvesting. And still I can say: For plowing and for the harvesting he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as they were stated explicitly. However, for performing all the other prohibited labors, he is liable for only one. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat鈥 (Exodus 35:3). This is derived in the following manner: Kindling was included in the general prohibition prohibiting all labors, and why was it singled out and prohibited explicitly? It was singled out in order to equate the other labors to it and to tell you: Just as kindling is a primary category of prohibited labor, and one is liable for performing it on its own, so too, with regard to every primary category of prohibited labor, one is liable for performing it on its own.

砖诪讜讗诇 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讛讘注专讛 诇诇讗讜 讬爪讗转 讚转谞讬讗 讛讘注专讛 诇诇讗讜 讬爪讗转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 诇讞诇拽 讬爪讗转

Rabbi Natan cited a source proving that there is liability for performance of each prohibited labor of Shabbat on its own. Why doesn鈥檛 Shmuel derive that halakha from the same source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who disagreed with Rabbi Natan鈥檚 interpretation of the verse, as Rabbi Yosei said: The prohibition against kindling on Shabbat was singled out to teach that one who lights a fire on Shabbat merely violates a prohibition. Performing other primary categories of prohibited labor is punishable by stoning or karet. In contrast, one who lights a fire on Shabbat has merely violated a prohibition, as it was taught in a baraita: The prohibition of kindling was singled out as a prohibition; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Natan says: Kindling is like any other labor prohibited on Shabbat. It was singled out to divide the various labors and to establish liability for performance of each of them.

讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 诇讞诇讜拽 诪诇讗讻讜转 诪讛讬讻讗 讚谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讜注砖讛 诪讗讞转 诪讛谞讛 驻注诪讬诐 砖讞讬讬讘讬诐 讗讞转 注诇 讻讜诇谉 讜驻注诪讬诐 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讞转 诪讗讞转 讛谞讛 诪讛谞讛 讗讞转 砖讛讬讗 讛谞讛 讛谞讛 砖讛讬讗 讗讞转

The Gemara raises an additional challenge to Shmuel鈥檚 opinion. If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the explicit prohibition of kindling, let him derive the division of labors from where Rabbi Yosei derives it. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says, it is stated: 鈥淪peak to the children of Israel, saying: A soul that sins in error, from all the commandments of God that may not be performed, and performs from one of them [me鈥檃岣t me鈥檋ena]鈥 (Leviticus 4:2). Rabbi Yosei interprets the verse that at times one is liable to bring one sin-offering for all of his transgressions, and at times one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? He interprets the unique phrase employed in that verse: From one of these. The Torah could have merely stated: One [a岣t]. Instead, it stated: From one [me鈥檃岣t]. It could have merely stated: Them [hena]. Instead, it stated: Of them [me鈥檋ena]. Rabbi Yosei derives that there are cases of one transgression that, with regard to punishment, are them, i.e., many. And there are cases of them, several transgressions, that, with regard to punishment, are one.

讗讞转 砖诪注讜谉 诪讗讞转

Furthermore: The term one refers to a full-fledged transgression of Shabbat, e.g., one who intended to and wrote a complete name, Shimon. The term from one refers to a case where he performed only part of the transgression, e.g., one who wrote

砖诐 诪砖诪注讜谉 讛谞讛 讗讘讜转 诪讛谞讛 转讜诇讚讜转 讗讞转 砖讛讬讗 讛谞讛 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛谞讛 砖讛讬讗 讗讞转 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗讞转 砖讛讬讗 讛谞讛 讜讛谞讛 砖讛讬讗 讗讞转 诇讗 诪砖诪注 诇讬讛:

only shem, part of the word, the letters shin and mem, from Shimon. Them refers to one who performed the primary categories of labor. Of them refers to one who performed subcategories of prohibited labors. One that is them refers to one transgression with multiple punishments, as in a case where his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat in that he was aware that it was Shabbat, and his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors in that he was unaware that the labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable for each primary category of labor. Them that are one refers to several transgressions with one punishment, as in a case where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat in that he was unaware that it was Shabbat, and his action was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors in that he was aware that the labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Apparently, Rabbi Yosei has a source for the division of Shabbat labors. Why doesn鈥檛 Shmuel derive the halakha from that source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel did not derive one that is them and them that are one from the verse.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛注诇诐 讝讛 讜讝讛 讘讬讚讜 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 砖讘转 讘讬讚讜 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讗讚专讘讛 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 诪诇讗讻讜转 讘讬讚讜 讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讞讝讬谞谉 讗讬 诪砖讜诐 砖讘转 拽讗 驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 砖讘转 讘讬讚讜 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讜讗讬 诪砖讜诐 诪诇讗讻讛 拽驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 诪诇讗讻讜转 讘讬讚讜 讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪砖讘转 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪诪诇讗讻讜转 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘转 讗诇讗 诇讗 砖谞讗

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: What is the halakha if a person had a lapse of awareness of both this, Shabbat, and that, a particular labor? He said to him: He had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat and is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Rava said to him: On the contrary, he had a lapse of awareness with regard to prohibited labors, and he should be liable for each and every labor that he performed. Rather, Rav Ashi said: We see, if it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists from performing the labor when he is told what day it is, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable for only one. And if it is due to awareness of the prohibited labor that he desists, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to the labors and he is liable for each and every one. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? When one desists from labor when he is told that it is Shabbat, it is because he understands that the labor he is performing is prohibited on Shabbat. Similarly, when one desists from his labor when he is told that the labor is prohibited, it is because he understands that the day is Shabbat. Rather, there is no difference between the cases, and in both he is considered unwitting with regard to Shabbat.

转谞谉 讗讘讜转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讗专讘注讬诐 讞住专 讗讞转 讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 诪谞讬谞讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖讗诐 注砖讗谉 讻讜诇谉 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞讚 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讛注诇诐 讝讛 讜讝讛 讘讬讚讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 砖驻讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讛注诇诐 砖讘转 讘讬讚讜 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转

The Gemara further discusses the matter from a different perspective. We learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? Isn鈥檛 merely listing the prohibited labors sufficient? And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, if you say that one who had a lapse of awareness of both this and that is liable for each and every one, it works out well. However, if you say that since one who had a lapse of awareness of this and that had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable to bring only one sin-offering, under what circumstances can you find a case where one would be liable for unwittingly violating all thirty-nine labors? It must be in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, as he was aware that it was Shabbat, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting, as he was unaware that these labors were prohibited on Shabbat.

讛谞讬讞讗 讗讬 住讘专 诇讬讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 讻讬讜谉 砖砖讙讙 讘讻专转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讝讬讚 讘诇讗讜 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚讬讚注 诇讬讛 砖讘转 讘诇讗讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 注讚 砖讬砖讙讜讙 讘诇讗讜 讜讻专转 讚讬讚注 诇讬讛 砖讘转 讘诪讗讬 讚讬讚注 诇讛 讘转讞讜诪讬谉 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗:

It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. You find that possibility in a case where he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that that prohibition is by Torah law.

讗诪专 专讘讗 拽爪专 讜讟讞谉 讻讙专讜讙专转 讘砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜讞讝专 讜拽爪专 讜讟讞谉 讻讙专讜讙专转 讘讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜谞讜讚注 诇讜 注诇 拽爪讬专讛 讜讟讞讬谞讛 砖诇 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讜讞讝专 讜谞讜讚注 诇讜 注诇 拽爪讬专讛 讜注诇 讟讞讬谞讛 砖诇 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转

Rava said: One who reaped and ground grain in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, the measure that determines liability for the labors of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, while in performing those actions he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He was unaware that it was Shabbat, but he was aware that the labors were prohibited. And he did not realize that he had sinned until he again reaped and ground grain in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, while in performing those actions he was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors. He was aware that it was Shabbat, but he was unaware that the labors were prohibited. And afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding while unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He set aside a sin-offering to atone for his sin, based on the principle that he need set aside only one sin-offering even though he performed two primary categories of labor in the same lapse of awareness. And afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding while intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors. For performing two categories of prohibited labor unwittingly, reaping and grinding, one should be liable to bring two sin-offerings.

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