Shabbat 94

ששגג על האוכלין והזיד על הכלי מתקיף לה רב אשי והא אף על הכלי קתני אלא אמר רב אשי כגון ששגג בזה ובזה ונודע לו וחזר ונודע לו ובפלוגתא דרבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש:

one acted unwittingly with regard to the food and intentionally with regard to the vessel. He is liable to bring a sin-offering for the food and to receive karet for the vessel. Rav Ashi strongly objects to this. Didn’t the baraita teach: He is liable even for the vessel? Apparently, the liability for the food and the liability for the vessel are identical. Rather, Rav Ashi said: This is referring to a case where one acted unwittingly both with regard to this, the food, and with regard to that, the vessel. And he became aware of one transgression, and then he became aware of the other transgression. And the ruling is dependent upon the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish cited above, with regard to the question whether or not one who unwittingly performed a single transgression twice and became aware of each separately is liable to bring two sin-offerings.

את החי במטה פטור אף על המטה: לימא מתניתין רבי נתן היא ולא רבנן דתניא המוציא בהמה חיה ועוף לרשות הרבים בין חיין ובין שחוטין חייב רבי נתן אומר על שחוטין חייב ועל חיין פטור שהחי נושא את עצמו אמר רבא אפילו תימא רבנן עד כאן לא פליגי רבנן עליה דרבי נתן אלא בבהמה חיה ועוף דמשרבטי נפשייהו אבל אדם חי דנושא את עצמו אפילו רבנן מודו

We learned in the mishna: One who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt even for carrying out the bed. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carries out a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, and fowl into the public domain on Shabbat is liable whether they are alive or whether they are slaughtered. Rabbi Natan says: For carrying out slaughtered animals, he is liable, and for carrying out live animals, he is exempt, because a living being carries itself. A living being attempts to lighten the load of the person carrying it and thereby participates in the act of carrying. Rava said: The mishna can be understood even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Natan only as far as the case of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, and fowl is concerned because they deaden their weight in an attempt to free themselves from the one carrying them. However, with regard to the fact that a live person carries himself, even the Rabbis agree. Therefore, one who carries a live person out is exempt.

אמר ליה רב אדא בר אהבה לרבא והא דתנן בן בתירא מתיר בסוס ותניא בן בתירא מתיר בסוס מפני שהוא עושה בו מלאכה שאין חייבין עליו חטאת ואמר רבי יוחנן בן בתירא ורבי נתן אמרו דבר אחד ואי אמרת דלא פליגי רבנן עליה דרבי נתן אלא בבהמה חיה ועוף משום דמשרבטי נפשייהו מאי איריא בן בתירא ורבי נתן והאמרת אפילו רבנן מודו כי אמר רבי יוחנן בסוס המיוחד לעופות ומי איכא סוס המיוחד לעופות אין איכא דבי וייאדן

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: And with regard to that which we learned in a mishna that it is prohibited to sell work animals to gentiles, to prevent a situation where animals still belonging to a Jew would be lent to a gentile who would perform labor with them on Shabbat, but ben Beteira permits selling a horse to a gentile. And it was taught in a baraita: Ben Beteira permits selling a horse for riding because the horse is performing an act for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as riding a horse is not actually a prohibited labor. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan said one, the same, thing. They both hold that an animal with a rider on its back is not considered to be bearing a burden. And if you say that the Rabbis only argue with Rabbi Natan with regard to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, and fowl because they deaden their weight in an attempt to free themselves, why did Rabbi Yoḥanan say specifically that ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan agree? Didn’t you say that in the case of a person riding a horse even the Rabbis agree? The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Yoḥanan said that ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan said the same thing, he was referring to a horse designated specifically for carrying fowl. The Gemara asks: And is there a horse designated for carrying fowl? The Gemara answers: Yes, there is the horse for carrying a hunter’s falcons [devei vayadan].

אמר רבי יוחנן ומודה רבי נתן בכפות אמר ליה רב אדא בר מתנה לאביי והא הני פרסאי דכמאן דכפיתי דמו ואמר רבי יוחנן בן בתירא ורבי נתן אמרו דבר אחד התם רמות רוחא הוא דנקיט להו דההוא פרדשכא דרתח מלכא עילויה ורהיט תלתא פרסי בכרעיה:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And Rabbi Natan agrees in the case of a person who is bound because he is unable to lighten the load of the person carrying him. Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Abaye: And what of those Persians who are considered as if they were bound because they don heavy armor and always ride horses, and nevertheless Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan said one thing and permitted selling horses even to Persians? The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the Persians, it is not that they are unable to dismount their horses. It is arrogance that keeps them from dismounting their horses. As proof, the Gemara relates: There was that Persian officer [pardashka] at whom the king was angry, and he ran three parasangs on foot. Apparently, even Persian horsemen are not considered bound and are capable of walking without their horses.

את המת במטה חייב וכן כזית מן המת וכו׳: אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן ואמר רב יוסף אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש פוטר היה רבי שמעון

We learned in the mishna that according to the first tanna: One who carries out a corpse on a bed is liable. And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse, or an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, or a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal is liable. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and Rav Yosef said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Rabbi Shimon would deem exempt

אף במוציא את המת לקוברו אמר רבא ומודה רבי שמעון במר לחפור בו וספר תורה לקרות בו דחייב פשיטא דאי הא נמי מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה היא אלא מלאכה שצריכה לגופה לרבי שמעון היכי משכחת לה מהו דתימא עד דאיכא לגופו ולגופה כגון מר לעשות לו טס ולחפור ספר תורה להגיה ולקרות בו קא משמע לן

even one who carries out a corpse to bury it. Rava said: And Rabbi Shimon agrees that one who carries out a hoe on Shabbat with which to dig or a Torah scroll from which to read is liable. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, as if those acts of carrying out are also in the category of a prohibited labor not necessary for its own sake because the carrier’s intention is to dig or to read, if so, according to Rabbi Shimon, how can you find an act of carrying that would be considered a prohibited labor necessary for its own sake? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a novel element in Rava’s statement. Lest you say that Rabbi Shimon deems one liable only in a case where one carries out an object for the sake of the one carrying it, as well as for its own sake, for example, in a case where one carried out a hoe for its own sake, in order to sharpen its blade, and for the sake of the one carrying it, in order to dig with it, or one carried out a Torah scroll for its own sake, in order to emend it, and for the sake of the one carrying it, in order to read from it; therefore, Rava teaches us that Rabbi Shimon deems one liable for carrying out an object even when it is carried only for his own sake and not for the sake of the object.

ההוא שכבא דהוה בדרוקרא שרא רב נחמן בר יצחק לאפוקיה לכרמלית אמר ליה רבי יוחנן אחוה דמר בריה דרבנא לרב נחמן בר יצחק כמאן כרבי שמעון אימר דפטר רבי שמעון מחיוב חטאת איסורא דרבנן מיהא איכא אמר ליה האלהים דעיילת ביה את ואפילו לרבי יהודה (שרי) דמי קאמינא לרשות הרבים לכרמלית קאמינא גדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה את לא תעשה שבתורה

The Gemara relates: There was a corpse in the city of Derokera and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak permitted carrying it out into a karmelit on Shabbat because, for some reason, it could not remain where it was. Rabbi Yoḥanan, brother of Mar, son of Rabbana, said to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: In accordance with whose opinion did you permit moving the corpse to the karmelit? If it was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, say that in that case Rabbi Shimon exempted one from the obligation to bring a sin-offering. However, there remains a rabbinic prohibition. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: By God, have you entered into an understanding of the matter? Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda it is permitted to carry out the corpse, as did I say they may carry it out to the public domain? I said that it may be carried out into a karmelit, which is only prohibited by rabbinic law. With regard to prohibitions by rabbinic law, the principle states: Great is human dignity, as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah: “You shall not deviate from that which they tell you to the right or to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:11).

תנן התם התולש סימני טומאה והכוה המחיה עובר בלא תעשה איתמר אחת משתים חייב אחת משלש רב נחמן אמר חייב רב ששת אמר פטור רב נחמן אמר חייב אהני מעשיו דאי משתקלא חדא אחריתי אזלה לה טומאה רב ששת אמר פטור השתא מיהת הא איתא לטומאה

We learned there in a mishna discussing the halakhot of leprosy: One who plucks white hairs that are signs of impurity, and similarly one who burned the unaffected skin in the midst of a leprous sore in an attempt to purify himself, violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “Take heed [hishamer] in the plague of leprosy” (Deuteronomy 24:8). This ruling is based on the principle that the term hishamer indicates a prohibition. On this topic, it was stated: With regard to one who plucks one of two white hairs, everyone agrees that he is liable because a single hair remains, which is less than the measure that determines impurity, i.e., two hairs. It is with regard to one who plucks one of three white hairs that there is a dispute between the amora’im. Rav Naḥman said: He is liable. Rav Sheshet said: He is exempt. The Gemara elaborates. Rav Naḥman said: He is liable because his actions were effective, as if another hair is removed, the impurity would cease. He thereby hastened his purification and is in violation of the prohibition. Rav Sheshet said: He is exempt because his actions were ineffective, as now, in any case, the impurity is intact even after he removed one hair. His act is ineffective, and therefore he does not violate the prohibition.

אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתנן וכן כזית מן המת וכזית מן הנבילה חייב הא חצי זית פטור והתניא חצי זית חייב מאי לאו הא דתניא חייב דאפיק חצי זית מכזית והא דתנן פטור דאפיק חצי זית מכזית ומחצה ורב נחמן אידי ואידי חייב והא דתנן פטור דאפיק חצי זית ממת גדול:

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I derive and state my opinion? I derive it as we learned in the mishna: And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse and an olive-bulk of an animal carcass is liable. The Gemara elaborates: By inference, one who carries out half an olive-bulk is exempt. What, is it not taught in a baraita: One who carries out half an olive-bulk of a corpse is liable? Is it not that the contradiction is resolved as follows? That which was taught in the baraita: He is liable, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk. Because less than an olive-bulk of the corpse remained, it is no longer a source of ritual impurity. And that which we learned in the mishna: He is exempt, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk and a half. Since an entire olive-bulk remains, the source of impurity remains intact. And Rav Naḥman explains it differently. Both this, the one who carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk, and that, the one who carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk and a half, are liable. And that which we learned in the mishna: He is exempt, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from a large corpse. In that case, even Rav Naḥman agrees that his action was ineffective. Since he did not carry out a measure that determines liability, he is exempt.

מתני׳ הנוטל צפרניו זו בזו או בשיניו וכן שערו וכן שפמו וכן זקנו וכן הגודלת וכן הכוחלת וכן הפוקסת רבי אליעזר מחייב וחכמים אוסרין משום שבות:

MISHNA: With regard to one who removes his fingernails with one another on Shabbat without scissors, or with his teeth, and the same is true with regard to one who removes his hair with his hands, and the same is true with regard to his mustache, and the same is true with regard to his beard, and the same is true with regard to a woman who braids her hair, and the same is true with regard to one who applies blue eye shadow, and the same is true with regard to one who applies blush, Rabbi Eliezer deems them all liable, as they each performed a labor prohibited by Torah law. And the Rabbis prohibited performing all of these actions due to rabbinic decree. None of the actions constitute prohibited labors.

גמ׳ אמר רבי אלעזר מחלוקת ביד אבל בכלי חייב פשיטא זו בזו תנן מהו דתימא רבנן בכלי נמי פטרי והא דקתני זו בזו להודיעך כחו דרבי אליעזר קא משמע לן

GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute is specifically with regard to a case where one removes his fingernails by hand; however, everyone agrees that one is liable if he removes them with a utensil. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We explicitly learned the phrase: With one another, in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the Rabbis also exempt one who removes his fingernail with a utensil, i.e., because one is not interested in the removed nail, he did not perform the prohibited labor of shearing, and that which was taught in the mishna: With one another, is intended to convey the far-reaching nature of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that one is liable even in a case where he removed his fingernails with one another; therefore, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that this is not so.

ואמר רבי אלעזר מחלוקת לעצמו אבל לחבירו דברי הכל פטור פשיטא צפרניו תנן מהו דתימא רבי אליעזר לחבירו נמי מחייב והא דקתני צפרניו להודיעך כחן דרבנן קא משמע לן:

And Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute is specifically with regard to one who removes fingernails for himself; however, with regard to one removing fingernails for another, everyone agrees that he is exempt. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. We explicitly learned the phrase: His fingernails, in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable for cutting another’s fingernails as well, and that which was taught in the mishna: His fingernails, is intended to convey the far-reaching nature of the statement of the Rabbis that one is exempt even in a case where he removes his own nails, and all the more so in a case where he removes another’s; therefore, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that everyone agrees that he is exempt when removing another’s nails.

וכן שערו כו׳: תנא הנוטל מלא פי הזוג חייב וכמה מלא פי הזוג אמר רב יהודה שתים והתניא ולקרחה שתים אימא וכן לקרחה שתים

We learned in the mishna: And the same is true with regard to one who removes his hair with his hands; Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt. One of the Sages taught in the Tosefta: One who removes enough of his hair to fill the opening of the scissors on Shabbat is liable. And how much is enough to fill the opening of the scissors? Rav Yehuda said: Two hairs. The Gemara asks: But was it not taught later in that baraita: And with regard to the Torah prohibition against removing one’s hair and causing baldness as an expression of mourning the dead: “Nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead” (Deuteronomy 14:1), one who removes two hairs is liable? Apparently, enough to fill the opening of a scissors is a different amount of hairs. The Gemara answers: Say that these are not two different measures. The baraita is saying: And the same is true for baldness, two is the measure.

תניא נמי הכי הנוטל מלא פי הזוג בשבת חייב וכמה מלא פי הזוג שתים רבי אליעזר אומר אחת ומודים חכמים לרבי אליעזר במלקט לבנות מתוך שחורות שאפילו אחת חייב ודבר זה אף בחול אסור משום שנאמר לא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה

That was also taught in a baraita: One who removes enough of his hair to fill the opening of the scissors on Shabbat is liable. And how much is enough to fill the opening of the scissors? It is two hairs. Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable for removing even one hair. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that one who collects and plucks white hairs from among black ones is liable even if he removed a single hair. His actions indicate that one hair is significant for him. And this matter of plucking white hairs is prohibited for men even on weekdays, as it is stated: “A woman shall not don a man’s clothes, and a man shall not wear a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5). The Sages derive that any action typically performed by women for beautification is prohibited for men.

תניא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר צפורן שפירש רובה וציצין שפרשו רובן ביד מותר בכלי חייב חטאת מי איכא מידי דבכלי חייב חטאת וביד מותר לכתחלה הכי קאמר פירשו רובן ביד מותר בכלי פטור אבל אסור לא פירשו רובן ביד פטור אבל אסור בכלי חייב חטאת אמר רב יהודה הלכה כרבי שמעון בן אלעזר אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן והוא שפרשו כלפי מעלה ומצערות אותו:

It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to a fingernail, the majority of which has been severed, and it is only connected to the finger by a small piece; and with regard to shreds of skin, the majority of which have been severed from the body; by hand, one is permitted to completely remove them on Shabbat. If he removes them with a utensil, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara wonders: Is there any matter where one who performs an action with a utensil is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he performs that action by hand, it is permitted ab initio, and it is not even prohibited by rabbinic decree? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar meant to say: If the majority has been severed, removing the rest by hand is permitted. If he removes the rest with a utensil he is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so ab initio. And if the majority has not yet been severed, if he removes the rest by hand he is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so ab initio. If he did so with a utensil, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Yehuda said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar in this matter. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And that is if the partially severed portions of the fingernail were severed facing upward near the nail and cause him pain; in that case one may remove them ab initio.

וכן הגודלת כו׳: גודלת כוחלת ופוקסת משום מאי מחייבא אמר רבי אבין אמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא גודלת משום אורגת כוחלת משום כותבת פוקסת משום טווה אמרו רבנן קמיה דרבי אבהו וכי דרך אריגה בכך וכי דרך כתיבה בכך וכי דרך טויה בכך אלא אמר רבי אבהו לדידי מפרשא לי מיניה דרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא

We learned in the mishna: And the same is true with regard to a woman who braids her hair, and one who applies blue eye shadow, and one who applies blush; Rabbi Eliezer deems them liable by Torah law. The Gemara asks: For performance of what prohibited labor is a woman who braids her hair, or who applies blue eye shadow, or who applies blush on Shabbat liable? Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: A woman who braids her hair is liable due to weaving, as braiding and weaving are similar actions. A woman who applies blue eye shadow is liable due to writing. A woman who applies blush is liable due to spinning. Women would make a string from a doughy substance and pass it over their faces to redden their complexion. The Rabbis said before Rabbi Abbahu: And is that the typical manner of weaving, and is that the typical manner of writing, and is that the typical manner of spinning? Rabbi Eliezer would certainly agree that one who performs a prohibited labor in an atypical manner is exempt. Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: This matter was explained to me by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, himself.