Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

December 1, 2017 | 讬状讙 讘讻住诇讜 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Shevuot 3

Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot?聽 The gemara聽asks a few more structural questions about聽 the mishna itself.聽 The gemara聽struggles to figure out whether the mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva.

讜注诇 讛讝拽谉 砖转讬诐 诪讬讻谉 讜砖转讬诐 诪讬讻谉 讜讗讞转 诪诇诪讟讛

And for marring the edges of his beard there are two edges from here, on one side of his face, and two from there, on the other side, and one from below.

讞讚讗 讚诪讬讞讬讬讘 注诇讛 转专转讬 转谞讗 砖讘讜注讜转 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注

The Gemara explains: As apparent from the mishna in Makkot, this is a case where there is one prohibition for which one is liable to receive two punishments. Continuing on this theme, the tanna taught in the beginning of tractate Shevuot examples of other sets of halakhot that can be formulated similarly, beginning with: With regard to oaths on an utterance, there are two types that are actually four types.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛讻讗 讚转谞讬 诇讛讜 诇讻讜诇讛讜 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讙讘讬 讬爪讬讗讜转 砖讘转 讜诪专讗讜转 谞讙注讬诐 讚诇讗 拽转谞讬 诇讛讜 诇讻讜诇讛讜

The Gemara inquires: What is different here, in tractate Shevuot, that the mishna teaches all the sets of halakhot that can be formulated as: Two that are four, and what is different with regard to the chapter beginning: The acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, i.e., the first chapter of tractate Shabbat, and the chapter beginning: And the shades of leprous marks, i.e., the first chapter of tractate Nega鈥檌m, where the mishna does not teach all of them, rather only the specific set of halakhot relevant to that tractate?

讗诪专讬 砖讘讜注讜转 讜讬讚讬注讜转 讛讟讜诪讗讛 讚讙讘讬 讛讚讚讬 讻转讬讘讬谉 讜讚诪讬讬谉 讗讛讚讚讬 讘拽专讘谉 注讜诇讛 讜讬讜专讚 转谞讬 诇讛讜 讙讘讬 讛讚讚讬 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 转专转讬 转谞讗 讻讜诇讛讜

The Sages say in explanation: Since the passages of oaths and of liability based on one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods are written together in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:2鈥4), and they are also similar to each other in that they can both incur liability to bring a sliding-scale offering, the mishna therefore taught both of them together here. And once it already taught two sets, it continued and taught all of them.

驻转讞 讘砖讘讜注讜转 讜诪驻专砖 讬讚讬注讜转 讛讟讜诪讗讛 讗讬讬讚讬 讚讝讜讟专讬谉 诪讬诇讬讬讛讜 驻住讬拽 砖专讬 诇讛讜 讜讛讚专 转谞讬 砖讘讜注讜转 讚谞驻讬砖谉 诪讬诇讬讬讛讜

The Gemara inquires further: Tractate Shevuot opens with a reference to oaths, but then proceeds to explain the cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, returning to discuss oaths only in the third chapter. Why? The Gemara explains: Since the cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods are relatively few, the tanna addressed them directly and dispensed with them, and then afterward returned to teach the halakhot of oaths, which have numerous details.

砖讘讜注讜转 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 砖转讬诐 砖讗讜讻诇 讜砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 讗讻诇转讬 讜砖诇讗 讗讻诇转讬

搂 The mishna teaches: With regard to oaths on an utterance, there are two types that are actually four types. The Gemara explains: The two types are where one states: On my oath I will eat, and where he states: On my oath I will not eat. If he violates either oath he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. These two types are actually four types because they also include the cases where a person falsely states: On my oath I ate, and where he falsely states: On my oath I did not eat.

讬讚讬注讜转 讛讟讜诪讗讛 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 砖转讬诐 讬讚讬注转 讟讜诪讗转 拽讚砖 讜讬讚讬注转 讟讜诪讗转 诪拽讚砖 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 拽讚砖 讜诪拽讚砖

The mishna continues: With regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, there are two cases that are actually four. The Gemara explains: The two cases are where one鈥檚 lack of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure led him to eat sacrificial food, and where one鈥檚 lack of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure led him to enter the Temple. These two types are actually four types, because one is also liable where he was aware that he was impure, but had a lapse of awareness about the status of the sacrificial food or the identity of the Temple.

讬爪讬讗讜转 砖讘转 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 砖转讬诐 讛讜爪讗讛 讚注谞讬 讜讛讜爪讗讛 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 讛讻谞住讛 讚注谞讬 讜讛讻谞住讛 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转

The mishna continues: With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are four. The Gemara explains the cases by using the analogy of a poor person who remains in the public domain and a homeowner who remains in the private domain and one passes an item to the other: The two types are the carrying out by a poor person of an item from the private domain to the public domain and the carrying out by a homeowner of an item from the private domain to the public domain. These two types are actually four types because they also include the bringing in by a poor person of an item from the public domain to the private domain and the bringing in by a homeowner of an item from the public domain to the private domain.

诪专讗讜转 谞讙注讬诐 砖谞讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注讛 砖谞讬诐 砖讗转 讜讘讛专转 砖讛谉 讗专讘注讛 砖讗转 讜转讜诇讚转讛 讘讛专转 讜转讜诇讚转讛

The mishna鈥檚 final example: With regard to shades of leprous marks, there are two shades that are actually four. The Gemara explains: The two shades are of a wool-white leprous mark [se鈥檈t] and of a snow-white leprous mark [baheret]. These two are actually four because they also include a se鈥檈t and its secondary mark, i.e., one similar to it, and a baheret and its secondary mark, i.e., one similar to it.

诪谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诇讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜诇讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讗诪专 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 注诇 讛注转讬讚 诇讘讜讗 讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讗诪专 注诇 讛注诇诐 讟讜诪讗讛 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛注诇诐 诪拽讚砖

搂 The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael nor the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara elaborates: If one suggests that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that suggestion can be refuted, as doesn鈥檛 he say with regard to oaths: One is liable only for oaths pertaining to the future, but not for those pertaining to the past? The mishna states that one is liable also for oaths pertaining to the past. And if one suggests it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that suggestion can be refuted, as doesn鈥檛 he say: For having defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods during a lapse of awareness of the fact that one is ritually impure one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, but one is not liable for having done so during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple? The mishna states that one is liable also in such a case.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诪讛谉 诇讞讬讜讘 讜诪讛谉 诇驻讟讜专 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讛谉 诇讞讬讜讘 讜诪讛谉 诇驻讟讜专

The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and if you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the intent of the mishna is that while there are four types of oaths, among them are types for which there is liability to bring an offering for one who violates them and among them are types for which there is exemption from liability for one who violates them. And if you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the intent of the mishna is that while there are four cases defined by one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, among them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering and among them are cases for which there is exemption from liability.

诇驻讟讜专

The Gemara asks: How can one say that the mishna teaches types for which there is exemption from liability?

讛讗 讚讜诪讬讗 讚诪专讗讜转 谞讙注讬诐 拽转谞讬 诪讛 讛转诐 讻讜诇讛讜 诇讞讬讜讘讗 讗祝 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讻讜诇讛讜 诇讞讬讜讘讗

But the mishna teaches these cases similar to the different shades of leprous marks, which indicates that just as there, all four of them are shades for which there is liability to bring an offering, so too here, with regard to oaths and the cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, all four of them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering.

诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜讻讬 诇讗 诪讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诇砖注讘专 拽专讘谉 讗讘诇 诪诇拽讜转 讞讬讜讘讬 诪讞讬讬讘

The Gemara suggests a different resolution: Actually, the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And while Rabbi Yishmael does not deem one liable for oaths pertaining to the past, that is only with regard to liability to bring an offering; but he does deem one liable to be administered lashes.

讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讘驻讬专讜砖 专讬讘转讛 转讜专讛 砖讘讜注转 砖拽专 讚讜诪讬讗 讚砖讘讜注转 砖讜讗 诪讛 砖讜讗 诇砖注讘专 讗祝 砖拽专 谞诪讬 诇砖注讘专

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: The Torah explicitly amplifies the prohibition of taking a false oath to be similar to the prohibition of an oath taken in vain, to teach that one is flogged for its violation. It follows that just as an oath taken in vain pertains to the past and renders one liable to receive lashes, so too, taking a false oath that pertains to the past renders one liable to receive lashes.

讘砖诇诪讗 讗讻诇转讬 讜诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 讻讚专讘讗 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 讜讗讻诇 谞诪讬 诇讗讜 砖讬砖 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讗讜讻诇 讜诇讗 讗讻诇 讗诪讗讬 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: Granted that one who stated: On my oath I ate, but in fact he did not eat, or one who stated: On my oath I did not eat, but in fact he ate, is liable to receive lashes, as this is in accordance with the statement of Rava. And also if one stated: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate in violation of his oath, he is liable to receive lashes, as it is a prohibition that involves an action, and, in general, such prohibitions are punishable by flogging. But if one stated: On my oath I will eat, and in violation of his oath he did not eat, why should he be liable to receive lashes? It is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The generally accepted principle is that one is not liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition without performing an action.

拽住讘专 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with the generally accepted principle and holds that one is flogged for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action.

讗讬 讛讻讬 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉

The Gemara challenges: If so, then a difficulty arises between one statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan and another statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan.

讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻住转诐 诪砖谞讛

As Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The halakha is always in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna. Since the mishna here is unattributed and assumes that one is flogged for taking a false oath, Rabbi Yo岣nan should rule that this is the halakha.

讜讗转诪专 砖讘讜注讛 砖讗讜讻诇 讻讻专 讝讜 讛讬讜诐 讜注讘专 讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗 讗讻诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讜讻诇 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讛转专讗转 住驻拽 讛讬讗 讜讛转专讗转 住驻拽 诇讗 砖诪讛 讛转专讗讛

And an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who said: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it. Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not flogged for taking a false oath. They disagree with regard to the reason that he is not flogged. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He is not flogged due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, as he violates the oath by failing to perform an action rather than by performing an action, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation. And Reish Lakish says: He is not flogged because it is an uncertain forewarning, as one cannot forewarn him before he fails to fulfill the oath because as long as time remains in the day he can still later eat the loaf and fulfill the oath; and an uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning. Evidently, Rabbi Yo岣nan does not rule in accordance with the mishna here.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 住转诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗砖讻讞

The Gemara resolves the difficulty: Rabbi Yo岣nan found another unattributed mishna which holds that one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, and he rules in accordance with that mishna.

讛讬 住转诪讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讛讗讬 住转诪讗 讚转谞谉 讗讘诇 讛诪讜转讬专 讘讟讛讜专 讜讛砖讜讘专 讘讟诪讗 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讗转 讛讗专讘注讬诐

The Gemara asks: Which other unattributed mishna did he find? If we say he found this unattributed mishna, as we learned (Pesa岣m 84a): But one who leaves over some of the meat of a ritually pure Paschal offering until the morning of the fifteenth of Nisan and one who breaks a bone of a ritually impure Paschal offering are not flogged with the forty lashes, that is difficult.

讘砖诇诪讗 砖讜讘专 讘讟诪讗 讚讻转讬讘 讜注爪诐 诇讗 转砖讘专讜 讘讜 讘讻砖专 讜诇讗 讘驻住讜诇 讗讘诇 讛诪讜转讬专 讘讟讛讜专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讬 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讜讻诇 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬诐 注诇讬讜

First, the Gemara explains how this mishna demonstrates Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion: Granted that breaking a bone of a impure Paschal offering does not incur lashes, as it is written: 鈥淣or shall you break a bone in it鈥 (Exodus 12:46). The term 鈥渋n it鈥 indicates that the verse refers only to a valid Paschal offering, but not to a disqualified one, such as one that is impure. But in the case of one who leaves over some of the meat of a pure Paschal offering, what is the reason he is not flogged? Is it not because it is a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged?

讜诪诪讗讬 讚专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讚诇诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讜诪砖讜诐 讚讘讗 讛讻转讜讘 诇讬转谉 注砖讛 讗讞专 诇讗 转注砖讛 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 诇拽讬

The Gemara now questions this explanation of the mishna: But from where is it apparent that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov, who says that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and he holds that the reason the mishna rules that one is not flogged is due to the fact that the verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition of leaving over the meat, and one is not flogged for a prohibition whose violation obligates one in a positive mitzva. But were it not for this, one would be flogged, despite the fact it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. Since the unattributed mishna is not necessarily in accordance with Rabbi Yaakov鈥檚 opinion, it cannot be the basis of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 ruling.

讚转谞讬讗 诇讗 转讜转讬专讜 诪诪谞讜 注讚 讘拽专 讜讛谞转专 诪诪谞讜 注讚 讘拽专 讘讗砖 转砖专驻讜 讘讗 讛讻转讜讘 诇讬转谉 注砖讛 讗讞专 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇讜诪专 砖讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪谉 讛砖诐 讛讜讗 讝讛 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讜诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬诐 注诇讬讜

The Gemara cites the source of Rabbi Yaakov鈥檚 and Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 opinions: As it is taught in a baraita: 鈥淎nd you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn in fire鈥 (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving over the meat, to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov says: This is not for that reason; rather, it is due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged.

讗诇讗 讛讗讬 住转诪讗 讗砖讻讞 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 讻讻专 讝讜 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇谞讛 讜讗讻诇讛

Rather, Rabbi Yo岣nan found this unattributed mishna, which teaches (27b): If one states: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and immediately states: On my oath I will not eat it, and then he ate it,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Shevuot 3

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shevuot 3

讜注诇 讛讝拽谉 砖转讬诐 诪讬讻谉 讜砖转讬诐 诪讬讻谉 讜讗讞转 诪诇诪讟讛

And for marring the edges of his beard there are two edges from here, on one side of his face, and two from there, on the other side, and one from below.

讞讚讗 讚诪讬讞讬讬讘 注诇讛 转专转讬 转谞讗 砖讘讜注讜转 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注

The Gemara explains: As apparent from the mishna in Makkot, this is a case where there is one prohibition for which one is liable to receive two punishments. Continuing on this theme, the tanna taught in the beginning of tractate Shevuot examples of other sets of halakhot that can be formulated similarly, beginning with: With regard to oaths on an utterance, there are two types that are actually four types.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛讻讗 讚转谞讬 诇讛讜 诇讻讜诇讛讜 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讙讘讬 讬爪讬讗讜转 砖讘转 讜诪专讗讜转 谞讙注讬诐 讚诇讗 拽转谞讬 诇讛讜 诇讻讜诇讛讜

The Gemara inquires: What is different here, in tractate Shevuot, that the mishna teaches all the sets of halakhot that can be formulated as: Two that are four, and what is different with regard to the chapter beginning: The acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, i.e., the first chapter of tractate Shabbat, and the chapter beginning: And the shades of leprous marks, i.e., the first chapter of tractate Nega鈥檌m, where the mishna does not teach all of them, rather only the specific set of halakhot relevant to that tractate?

讗诪专讬 砖讘讜注讜转 讜讬讚讬注讜转 讛讟讜诪讗讛 讚讙讘讬 讛讚讚讬 讻转讬讘讬谉 讜讚诪讬讬谉 讗讛讚讚讬 讘拽专讘谉 注讜诇讛 讜讬讜专讚 转谞讬 诇讛讜 讙讘讬 讛讚讚讬 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 转专转讬 转谞讗 讻讜诇讛讜

The Sages say in explanation: Since the passages of oaths and of liability based on one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods are written together in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:2鈥4), and they are also similar to each other in that they can both incur liability to bring a sliding-scale offering, the mishna therefore taught both of them together here. And once it already taught two sets, it continued and taught all of them.

驻转讞 讘砖讘讜注讜转 讜诪驻专砖 讬讚讬注讜转 讛讟讜诪讗讛 讗讬讬讚讬 讚讝讜讟专讬谉 诪讬诇讬讬讛讜 驻住讬拽 砖专讬 诇讛讜 讜讛讚专 转谞讬 砖讘讜注讜转 讚谞驻讬砖谉 诪讬诇讬讬讛讜

The Gemara inquires further: Tractate Shevuot opens with a reference to oaths, but then proceeds to explain the cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, returning to discuss oaths only in the third chapter. Why? The Gemara explains: Since the cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods are relatively few, the tanna addressed them directly and dispensed with them, and then afterward returned to teach the halakhot of oaths, which have numerous details.

砖讘讜注讜转 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 砖转讬诐 砖讗讜讻诇 讜砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 讗讻诇转讬 讜砖诇讗 讗讻诇转讬

搂 The mishna teaches: With regard to oaths on an utterance, there are two types that are actually four types. The Gemara explains: The two types are where one states: On my oath I will eat, and where he states: On my oath I will not eat. If he violates either oath he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. These two types are actually four types because they also include the cases where a person falsely states: On my oath I ate, and where he falsely states: On my oath I did not eat.

讬讚讬注讜转 讛讟讜诪讗讛 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 砖转讬诐 讬讚讬注转 讟讜诪讗转 拽讚砖 讜讬讚讬注转 讟讜诪讗转 诪拽讚砖 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 拽讚砖 讜诪拽讚砖

The mishna continues: With regard to cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, there are two cases that are actually four. The Gemara explains: The two cases are where one鈥檚 lack of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure led him to eat sacrificial food, and where one鈥檚 lack of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure led him to enter the Temple. These two types are actually four types, because one is also liable where he was aware that he was impure, but had a lapse of awareness about the status of the sacrificial food or the identity of the Temple.

讬爪讬讗讜转 砖讘转 砖转讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 砖转讬诐 讛讜爪讗讛 讚注谞讬 讜讛讜爪讗讛 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛谉 讗专讘注 讛讻谞住讛 讚注谞讬 讜讛讻谞住讛 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转

The mishna continues: With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are four. The Gemara explains the cases by using the analogy of a poor person who remains in the public domain and a homeowner who remains in the private domain and one passes an item to the other: The two types are the carrying out by a poor person of an item from the private domain to the public domain and the carrying out by a homeowner of an item from the private domain to the public domain. These two types are actually four types because they also include the bringing in by a poor person of an item from the public domain to the private domain and the bringing in by a homeowner of an item from the public domain to the private domain.

诪专讗讜转 谞讙注讬诐 砖谞讬诐 砖讛谉 讗专讘注讛 砖谞讬诐 砖讗转 讜讘讛专转 砖讛谉 讗专讘注讛 砖讗转 讜转讜诇讚转讛 讘讛专转 讜转讜诇讚转讛

The mishna鈥檚 final example: With regard to shades of leprous marks, there are two shades that are actually four. The Gemara explains: The two shades are of a wool-white leprous mark [se鈥檈t] and of a snow-white leprous mark [baheret]. These two are actually four because they also include a se鈥檈t and its secondary mark, i.e., one similar to it, and a baheret and its secondary mark, i.e., one similar to it.

诪谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诇讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜诇讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讗诪专 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 注诇 讛注转讬讚 诇讘讜讗 讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讗诪专 注诇 讛注诇诐 讟讜诪讗讛 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛注诇诐 诪拽讚砖

搂 The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael nor the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara elaborates: If one suggests that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that suggestion can be refuted, as doesn鈥檛 he say with regard to oaths: One is liable only for oaths pertaining to the future, but not for those pertaining to the past? The mishna states that one is liable also for oaths pertaining to the past. And if one suggests it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that suggestion can be refuted, as doesn鈥檛 he say: For having defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods during a lapse of awareness of the fact that one is ritually impure one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, but one is not liable for having done so during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple? The mishna states that one is liable also in such a case.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诪讛谉 诇讞讬讜讘 讜诪讛谉 诇驻讟讜专 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讛谉 诇讞讬讜讘 讜诪讛谉 诇驻讟讜专

The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and if you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the intent of the mishna is that while there are four types of oaths, among them are types for which there is liability to bring an offering for one who violates them and among them are types for which there is exemption from liability for one who violates them. And if you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the intent of the mishna is that while there are four cases defined by one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, among them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering and among them are cases for which there is exemption from liability.

诇驻讟讜专

The Gemara asks: How can one say that the mishna teaches types for which there is exemption from liability?

讛讗 讚讜诪讬讗 讚诪专讗讜转 谞讙注讬诐 拽转谞讬 诪讛 讛转诐 讻讜诇讛讜 诇讞讬讜讘讗 讗祝 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讻讜诇讛讜 诇讞讬讜讘讗

But the mishna teaches these cases similar to the different shades of leprous marks, which indicates that just as there, all four of them are shades for which there is liability to bring an offering, so too here, with regard to oaths and the cases of one鈥檚 awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, all four of them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering.

诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜讻讬 诇讗 诪讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诇砖注讘专 拽专讘谉 讗讘诇 诪诇拽讜转 讞讬讜讘讬 诪讞讬讬讘

The Gemara suggests a different resolution: Actually, the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And while Rabbi Yishmael does not deem one liable for oaths pertaining to the past, that is only with regard to liability to bring an offering; but he does deem one liable to be administered lashes.

讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讘驻讬专讜砖 专讬讘转讛 转讜专讛 砖讘讜注转 砖拽专 讚讜诪讬讗 讚砖讘讜注转 砖讜讗 诪讛 砖讜讗 诇砖注讘专 讗祝 砖拽专 谞诪讬 诇砖注讘专

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: The Torah explicitly amplifies the prohibition of taking a false oath to be similar to the prohibition of an oath taken in vain, to teach that one is flogged for its violation. It follows that just as an oath taken in vain pertains to the past and renders one liable to receive lashes, so too, taking a false oath that pertains to the past renders one liable to receive lashes.

讘砖诇诪讗 讗讻诇转讬 讜诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 讻讚专讘讗 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 讜讗讻诇 谞诪讬 诇讗讜 砖讬砖 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讗讜讻诇 讜诇讗 讗讻诇 讗诪讗讬 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: Granted that one who stated: On my oath I ate, but in fact he did not eat, or one who stated: On my oath I did not eat, but in fact he ate, is liable to receive lashes, as this is in accordance with the statement of Rava. And also if one stated: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate in violation of his oath, he is liable to receive lashes, as it is a prohibition that involves an action, and, in general, such prohibitions are punishable by flogging. But if one stated: On my oath I will eat, and in violation of his oath he did not eat, why should he be liable to receive lashes? It is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The generally accepted principle is that one is not liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition without performing an action.

拽住讘专 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with the generally accepted principle and holds that one is flogged for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action.

讗讬 讛讻讬 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉

The Gemara challenges: If so, then a difficulty arises between one statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan and another statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan.

讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻住转诐 诪砖谞讛

As Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The halakha is always in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna. Since the mishna here is unattributed and assumes that one is flogged for taking a false oath, Rabbi Yo岣nan should rule that this is the halakha.

讜讗转诪专 砖讘讜注讛 砖讗讜讻诇 讻讻专 讝讜 讛讬讜诐 讜注讘专 讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗 讗讻诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讜讻诇 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讛转专讗转 住驻拽 讛讬讗 讜讛转专讗转 住驻拽 诇讗 砖诪讛 讛转专讗讛

And an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who said: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it. Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not flogged for taking a false oath. They disagree with regard to the reason that he is not flogged. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He is not flogged due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, as he violates the oath by failing to perform an action rather than by performing an action, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation. And Reish Lakish says: He is not flogged because it is an uncertain forewarning, as one cannot forewarn him before he fails to fulfill the oath because as long as time remains in the day he can still later eat the loaf and fulfill the oath; and an uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning. Evidently, Rabbi Yo岣nan does not rule in accordance with the mishna here.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 住转诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗砖讻讞

The Gemara resolves the difficulty: Rabbi Yo岣nan found another unattributed mishna which holds that one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, and he rules in accordance with that mishna.

讛讬 住转诪讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讛讗讬 住转诪讗 讚转谞谉 讗讘诇 讛诪讜转讬专 讘讟讛讜专 讜讛砖讜讘专 讘讟诪讗 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讗转 讛讗专讘注讬诐

The Gemara asks: Which other unattributed mishna did he find? If we say he found this unattributed mishna, as we learned (Pesa岣m 84a): But one who leaves over some of the meat of a ritually pure Paschal offering until the morning of the fifteenth of Nisan and one who breaks a bone of a ritually impure Paschal offering are not flogged with the forty lashes, that is difficult.

讘砖诇诪讗 砖讜讘专 讘讟诪讗 讚讻转讬讘 讜注爪诐 诇讗 转砖讘专讜 讘讜 讘讻砖专 讜诇讗 讘驻住讜诇 讗讘诇 讛诪讜转讬专 讘讟讛讜专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讬 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讜讻诇 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬诐 注诇讬讜

First, the Gemara explains how this mishna demonstrates Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion: Granted that breaking a bone of a impure Paschal offering does not incur lashes, as it is written: 鈥淣or shall you break a bone in it鈥 (Exodus 12:46). The term 鈥渋n it鈥 indicates that the verse refers only to a valid Paschal offering, but not to a disqualified one, such as one that is impure. But in the case of one who leaves over some of the meat of a pure Paschal offering, what is the reason he is not flogged? Is it not because it is a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged?

讜诪诪讗讬 讚专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讚诇诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讜诪砖讜诐 讚讘讗 讛讻转讜讘 诇讬转谉 注砖讛 讗讞专 诇讗 转注砖讛 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 诇拽讬

The Gemara now questions this explanation of the mishna: But from where is it apparent that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov, who says that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and he holds that the reason the mishna rules that one is not flogged is due to the fact that the verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition of leaving over the meat, and one is not flogged for a prohibition whose violation obligates one in a positive mitzva. But were it not for this, one would be flogged, despite the fact it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. Since the unattributed mishna is not necessarily in accordance with Rabbi Yaakov鈥檚 opinion, it cannot be the basis of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 ruling.

讚转谞讬讗 诇讗 转讜转讬专讜 诪诪谞讜 注讚 讘拽专 讜讛谞转专 诪诪谞讜 注讚 讘拽专 讘讗砖 转砖专驻讜 讘讗 讛讻转讜讘 诇讬转谉 注砖讛 讗讞专 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇讜诪专 砖讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪谉 讛砖诐 讛讜讗 讝讛 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讜诇讗讜 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讜拽讬诐 注诇讬讜

The Gemara cites the source of Rabbi Yaakov鈥檚 and Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 opinions: As it is taught in a baraita: 鈥淎nd you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn in fire鈥 (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving over the meat, to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov says: This is not for that reason; rather, it is due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged.

讗诇讗 讛讗讬 住转诪讗 讗砖讻讞 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 讻讻专 讝讜 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇谞讛 讜讗讻诇讛

Rather, Rabbi Yo岣nan found this unattributed mishna, which teaches (27b): If one states: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and immediately states: On my oath I will not eat it, and then he ate it,

Scroll To Top