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Today's Daf Yomi

December 29, 2017 | 讬状讗 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Shevuot 31

The gemara聽brings a number of things that one should avoid doing in court as they are dishonest. Details of an oath of testimony are discussed as the different part of the mishna are analyzed and explained. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding an oath of testimony taken outside the court on one’s own?


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拽讜诇专 转诇讜讬 讘爪讜讗专 注讚讬诐 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

the chain [kolar] of culpability for the miscarriage of justice be placed around the neck of the false witnesses? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

(住讬诪谉 转诇转讗 转诇诪讬讚 讜转诇转 讘注诇讬 讞讜讘 住诪专讟讜讟 砖讜诪注 讜诪讟注讬诐)

The Gemara provides a mnemonic for additional halakhot derived from the verse: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥 Three relating to a student; and three relating to creditors; and three relating to a judge: Rags, hears, and explain.

诪谞讬谉 诇转诇诪讬讚 砖讬讜砖讘 诇驻谞讬 专讘讜 讜专讜讗讛 讝讻讜转 诇注谞讬 讜讞讜讘 诇注砖讬专 诪谞讬谉 砖诇讗 讬砖转讜拽 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to a student who is sitting before his teacher and sees a claim that provides advantage for a poor person and disadvantage for a wealthy person that he shall not remain silent? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇转诇诪讬讚 砖专讜讗讛 讗转 专讘讜 砖讟讜注讛 讘讚讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讗诪专 讗诪转讬谉 诇讜 注讚 砖讬讙诪专谞讜 讜讗住转专谞讜 讜讗讘谞谞讜 诪砖诇讬 讻讚讬 砖讬拽专讗 讛讚讬谉 注诇 砖诪讬 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to a student who sees his teacher who is erring in judgment that he shall not say: I will wait for my teacher until he concludes the trial and then I will contradict him and construct a ruling of my own so that the verdict will be attributed to my name? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇转诇诪讬讚 砖讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讜 讬讜讚注 讗转讛 讘讬 砖讗诐 谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讬 诪讗讛 诪谞讛 讗讬谞讬 诪讘讚讛 诪谞讛 讬砖 诇讬 讗爪诇 驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪谞讬谉 砖诇讗 讬爪讟专祝 注诪讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter鈥 (Exodus 23:7).

讛讗讬 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽 谞驻拽讗 讛讗 讜讚讗讬 砖拽讜专讬 拽讗 诪砖拽专 讜专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 诇讗 转注谞讛 讘专注讱 注讚 砖拽专 讗诇讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讚讗讬 讞讚 住讛讚讗 讗讬转 诇讬 讜转讗 讗转讛 拽讜诐 讛转诐 讜诇讗 转讬诪讗 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讗 诇讗 诪驻拽转 诪驻讜诪讱 砖拽专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讗住讜专 诪砖讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

The Gemara asks: Is it from the verse 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter鈥 that this matter is derived? But isn鈥檛 he certainly lying in that case, and this is already stated, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淵ou shall not bear false witness against your neighbor鈥 (Exodus 20:13)? Rather, the reference is to a case where the teacher said to him: It is certain that I have one witness, and you come and stand there beside him and do not say anything, as in that manner you do not express a lie from your mouth. Your silent presence will create the impression that I have two witnesses and lead the debtor to admit his debt. Even so, it is prohibited to do this, due to that which is stated: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇谞讜砖讛 讘讞讘讬专讜 诪谞讛 砖诇讗 讬讗诪专 讗讟注谞谞讜 讘诪讗转讬诐 讻讚讬 砖讬讜讚讛 诇讬 讘诪谞讛 讜讬转讞讬讬讘 诇讬 砖讘讜注讛 讜讗讙诇讙诇 注诇讬讜 砖讘讜注讛 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

There are three halakhot with regard to a creditor: From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars, and there are no witnesses to that effect, that he shall not say: I will claim that he owes me two hundred dinars so that he will admit that he owes me one hundred dinars, and he will become liable to take an oath to me, the oath of one who admits to part of a claim, and on that basis I will extend the oath and compel him to take an oath with regard to a debt that he owes me from another place? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇谞讜砖讛 讘讞讘讬专讜 诪谞讛 讜讟注谞讜 诪讗转讬诐 砖诇讗 讬讗诪专 讗讻驻专谞讜 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讗讜讚讛 诇讜 讞讜抓 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 讗转讞讬讬讘 诇讜 砖讘讜注讛 讜诇讗 讬讙诇讙诇 注诇讬 砖讘讜注讛 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars and claims that the debtor owes him two hundred dinars, that the debtor shall not say: I will completely deny his claim in court, and I will admit to him outside court so that I will not become liable to take an oath to him and he will not extend the oath and compel me to take an oath with regard to a debt that I owe him from another place? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇砖诇砖讛 砖谞讜砖讬谉 诪谞讛 讘讗讞讚 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 讗讞讚 讘注诇 讚讬谉 讜砖谞讬诐 注讚讬诐 讻讚讬 砖讬讜爪讬讗讜 诪谞讛 讜讬讞诇讜拽讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to three who are seeking repayment from one individual for a total of one hundred dinars, that one of the three should not assume the role of a sole litigant and claim one hundred dinars, and the other two will assume the role of witnesses so that they will exact payment of one hundred dinars from the debtor and divide it among them? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讚讬谉 讗讞讚 诇讘讜砖 住诪专讟讜讟讬谉 讜讗讞讚 诇讘讜砖 讗讬爪讟诇讬转 讘转 诪讗讛 诪谞讛 砖讗讜诪专讬谉 诇讜 诇讘讜砖 讻诪讜转讜 讗讜 讛诇讘讬砖讛讜 讻诪讜转讱 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽 讻讬 讛讜讜 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 砖诇讜驻讜 驻讜讝诪讜拽讬讬讻讜 讜讞讜转讜 诇讚讬谞讗

There are three halakhot with regard to a judge: From where is it derived with regard to two individuals who came to judgment, one dressed in rags and one dressed in a garment worth one hundred times one hundred dinars, that the judges say to the wealthy person: Dress like the poor person or dress the poor person in a garment like yours? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥 The Gemara relates: When individuals would come before Rava bar Rav Huna for judgment he would say to them: Remove your fine shoes [puzmukaikhu] and descend for judgment, so you will not appear more distinguished than the other litigant.

诪谞讬谉 诇讚讬讬谉 砖诇讗 讬砖诪注 讚讘专讬 讘注诇 讚讬谉 (讞讘讬专讜) 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 讘注诇 讚讬谉 讞讘讬专讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived that a judge should not hear the statement of one litigant before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇讘注诇 讚讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讟注讬诐 讚讘专讬讜 诇讚讬讬谉 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 讘注诇 讚讬谉 讞讘讬专讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪转谞讬 诪诇讗 转砖讗 诇讗 转砖讬讗

From where is it derived that a litigant shall not explain the rationale behind his statements to the judge before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥 Rav Kahana teaches that this halakha is derived from that which is written: 鈥淵ou shall not accept [lo tissa] a false report鈥 (Exodus 23:1), which he interprets as though it is written: You shall not cause others [lo tassi] to accept a false report.

讜讗砖专 诇讗 讟讜讘 注砖讛 讘转讜讱 注诪讬讜 专讘 讗诪专 讝讛 讛讘讗 讘讛专砖讗讛 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讝讛 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 砖讬砖 注诇讬讛 注住讬拽讬谉

The verse states: 鈥淎nd did that which is not good among his people鈥 (Ezekiel 18:18). Rav says: This is referring to one who comes to court with authorization to present claims on behalf of another. And Shmuel says: This is referring to one who purchases a field concerning which there are those who contest ownership of it, as in that way, he involves himself in the disputes of others.

讗讬谞讛 谞讜讛讙转 讗诇讗 讘专讗讜讬谉 诇讛注讬讚 讻讜壮 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪诇讱 讜专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 讗诪专 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗

搂 The mishna teaches that the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. The Gemara asks: This statement serves to exclude what person not allowed to testify who was not mentioned explicitly in the mishna? Rav Pappa said: It serves to exclude a king who, although he is neither a relative nor otherwise disqualified from testifying, does not testify in court. And Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov said: It serves to exclude one who plays with dice, who is disqualified as a witness by rabbinic law.

诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 诪诇讱 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪诇讱 讗讘诇 诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讞讝讗 讞讝讬 讜专讘谞谉 讛讜讗 讚驻住诇讜讛讜

The Gemara notes: According to the one who says that the mishna excludes one who plays with dice from the oath of testimony, all the more so should a king be excluded, as he does not testify by Torah law. And according to the one who says that the mishna excludes a king from the oath of testimony, it may exclude only a king, but perhaps one who plays with dice is not excluded, as by Torah law he is fit to testify and it is the Sages who disqualified him. Therefore, he is not excluded from the oath of testimony, which is by Torah law.

讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讻讜壮 讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬

搂 The mishna teaches: The oath of testimony is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the potential witness takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the witness takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree?

讗诪专讜讛 专讘谞谉 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 驻驻讗 讘讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛 讘讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜讗讜拽讬 讘讗转专讛 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬

The Sages said the explanation before Rav Pappa: They disagree with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy. Is the method to infer the halakha from the source of the verbal analogy and derive the details from that source as well, or is the method to infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place?

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛 诪驻拽讚讜谉 诪讛 驻拽讚讜谉 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注讚讜转 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讜诪讬谞讛 诪讛 驻拽讚讜谉 讘讬谉 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讘讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗祝 注讚讜转 讘讬谉 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讘讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Meir holds: Infer from it and derive the details from it. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. And derive the details from it: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court.

讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜讗讜拽讬 讘讗转专讛 诪讛 驻拽讚讜谉 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注讚讜转 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讜拽讬 讘讗转专讛 诪讛 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗 讗祝 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗

And the Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. But interpret the halakha according to its own place and derive the details of the halakha from the halakhot of the oath of testimony: Just as in the case of one who was administered an oath by others, if he denies knowledge of the matter in court, yes, he is liable, and if his denial does not take place in court, no, he is not liable; so too, one who took the oath on his own, if he did so in court, yes, he is liable, and if he did not take the oath in court, no, he is not liable.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讬 诪驻拽讚讜谉 讙诪专讬 诇讛 专讘谞谉 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛

Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: If the Rabbis derive liability for one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own by means of a verbal analogy from the oath on a deposit, then everyone agrees: Infer from it and derive the details from it, and even the Rabbis would concede that all of the halakhot of the oath of testimony are derived from the oath on a deposit; therefore, one is liable for an oath taken on one鈥檚 own even outside the court.

讗诇讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘谞谉 讚诪讬讬转讜 诇讛 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

Rather, this is the reason that the Rabbis hold that there is no liability for the oath of testimony taken on one鈥檚 own outside the court: They derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakhot of the oath of testimony itself, as follows: And if one who was administered an oath by others is liable, when one takes the oath on his own, is he not all the more so liable?

讜诪讚诪讬讬转讜 诇讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讚讬讜 诇讘讗 诪谉 讛讚讬谉 诇讛讬讜转 讻谞讚讜谉 诪讛 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗 讗祝 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗

And from the fact that they derived the halakha by means of an a fortiori inference, one is bound by the limitations that restrict that derivation: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Therefore, just as one who is administered an oath by others, if the oath is administered in court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not administered in court, no, he is not liable, so too, one who took the oath on his own, before a court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not before a court, no, he is not liable.

讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 诇专讘 驻驻讗 诪讬 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讚诇讗讜 讘讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讜讛转谞谉 讙讘讬 驻拽讚讜谉 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 谞讜讛讙转 讘讗谞砖讬诐 讜讘谞砖讬诐 讘专讞讜拽讬谉 讜讘拽专讜讘讬谉 讘讻砖专讬谉 讜讘驻住讜诇讬谉 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬讻驻讜专 讘讜 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘讬谉 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜讘讬谉 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖讻驻专 讘讜 讞讬讬讘

The Rabbis said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that it is not with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna with regard to the oath on a deposit: The oath on a deposit is practiced with regard to men and with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives and with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify and with regard to those unfit to testify. The oath on a deposit is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the bailee takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others, he is not liable until he denies responsibility for the deposit in court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the bailee takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, once he denied the claim concerning the deposit he is liable.

诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讘驻拽讚讜谉 诪谞讗 诇讛讜 诇专讘谞谉 讚讞讬讬讘 诇讗讜 讚讙诪专讬 诇讛 诪注讚讜转 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讘讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛 驻诇讬讙讬

The question arises: From where do the Rabbis derive that one who is administered an oath on a deposit by others is liable, given that an oath of that kind is not mentioned in the Torah in the context of an oath on a deposit? Is it not that they derive it from the halakhot of the oath of testimony? And conclude from it that it is with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? The Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The fact that one is liable for an oath on a deposit that is administered by others is derived from the oath of testimony, but one does not derive that one is liable only if that oath is administered in the presence of a court. Rather, the oath on a deposit administered by others is derived from an oath on a deposit taken on one鈥檚 own; one is liable in both cases for an oath taken not in the presence of the court.

诪讛讛讬讗 讗讬谉 诪讛讗 诇讬讻讗 诇诪砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: From that mishna, yes, it is evident that the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir disagree with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it. However, no inference is to be learned from this mishna taught with regard to the oath of testimony, as perhaps the Rabbis derived their opinion by means of an a fortiori inference.

讜讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谉 讛砖讘讜注讛 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘讻讜诇谉 谞讗诪专 讘讛谉 讜谞注诇诐 讜讻讗谉 诇讗 谞讗诪专 讘讛 讜谞注诇诐 诇讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

搂 The mishna teaches: And one is liable for the act of taking a false oath with intent. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony with intent? It is derived as the Sages taught: In all of the other cases where one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2鈥4), i.e., the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and violating an oath on an utterance, it is stated: 鈥淎nd it is hidden鈥; but here, with regard to the oath of testimony, it is not stated: And it is hidden, which serves to render one liable for taking the oath intentionally just as he is liable for taking the oath unwittingly.

讜注诇 砖讙讙转讛 注诐 讝讚讜谉 讛注讚讜转 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 砖讙讙转讛 注诐 讝讚讜谉 讛注讚讜转 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讘讗讜诪专 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖砖讘讜注讛 讝讜 讗住讜专讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讗诐 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 拽专讘谉 讗诐 诇讗

搂 The mishna teaches: And one is liable for an unwitting act of taking a false oath provided that he takes the oath with intent in terms of the testimony. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case of an unwitting act of taking a false oath with intent in terms of the testimony? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says that this is in the case of one who says: I know that taking this false oath that I do not know the relevant information is prohibited, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring an offering for taking that oath.

讜讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讙专讬讚转讗 诇讬诪讗 转谞讬谞讗 诇讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜讚专讘 讗住讬

The mishna teaches: But they are not liable for taking the oath if they were unwitting in terms of the testimony alone. If one actually forgot that he knows about the matter, he is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that we learn in the mishna that which Rav said in response to the dispute of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi? The Gemara (26a) cited a dispute between Rav Kahana and Rav Asi with regard to a certain statement of Rav, and each took an oath that his version was accurate. Rav told them that although the version of one of the amora鈥檌m was not accurate, he is not liable for taking a false oath, as each amora was convinced that his oath was true. This is not an unwitting oath; rather, it is an oath taken unaware.

诇讗 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚转谞谉 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讻讗 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讻转讬讘 讜谞注诇诐 讚讘注讬谞谉 砖讜讙讙 讚讜诪讬讗 讚诪讝讬讚 讗讘诇 讛转诐 讚讻转讬讘 讜谞注诇诐 讗驻讬诇讜 砖讙讙转讛 讻诇 讚讛讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara responds: No, even though we learned this halakha in the mishna, Rav鈥檚 statement that the one who did not cite Rav鈥檚 statement accurately is exempt was necessary. It may enter your mind to say: It is only here, with regard to the oath of testimony, that one is exempt for unwittingly taking a false oath, as: And it is hidden, is not written concerning it, indicating that in order to be liable, we require that the halakhic status of the unwitting oath is similar to that of an intentional oath, i.e., he knows that he is taking a false oath, but he does not know that he is liable to bring an offering for doing so. Therefore, one who is unaware that it is a false oath is exempt. But there, in the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, where each took an oath on an utterance, where it is written: 鈥淎nd it is hidden,鈥 even if it is entirely unwitting, i.e., they were totally unaware that the oath was false, one might say that he is liable. Therefore, Rav teaches us that even in the case of an oath on an utterance, one who is unwitting to that extent is exempt.

诪转谞讬壮 砖讘讜注转 讛注讚讜转 讻讬爪讚 讗诪专 诇砖谞讬诐 讘讜讗讜 讜讛注讬讚讜谞讬 砖讘讜注讛 砖讗讬谉 讗谞讜 讬讜讚注讬谉 诇讱 注讚讜转 讗讜 砖讗诪专讜 诇讜 讗讬谉 讗谞讜 讬讜讚注讬谉 诇讱 注讚讜转 诪砖讘讬注 讗谞讬 注诇讬讻诐 讜讗诪专讜 讗诪谉 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉

MISHNA: Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony, how so? In a case where the plaintiff said to two individuals: Come and testify on my behalf, and they replied: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, i.e., we do not have any knowledge of the matter you speak of, or in a case where they said to him: We do not know any testimony on your behalf, and he said to them: I administer an oath to you, and they said: Amen; if it was determined that they lied, these two witnesses are liable.

讛砖讘讬注 注诇讬讛诐 讞诪砖 驻注诪讬诐 讞讜抓 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讘讗讜 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讛讜讚讜 驻讟讜专讬谉 讻驻专讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讛砖讘讬注 注诇讬讛谉 讞诪砖 驻注诪讬诐 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讻驻专讜 讗讬谞谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪讛 讟注诐 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬谞诐 讬讻讜诇讬谉 诇讞讝讜专 讜诇讛讜讚讜转

If he administered an oath to them five times outside the court, and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident in question and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court. If he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of the incident, they are liable for taking only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason for this ruling? Since once they denied that they had any knowledge of the incident they can no longer retract that denial and admit that they have knowledge of the matter. Therefore, there was only one oath of testimony, and there is no liability for the remaining oaths.

讻驻专讜 砖谞讬讛谉 讻讗讞讚 砖谞讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讛砖谞讬 驻讟讜专 讻驻专 讗讞讚 讜讛讜讚讛 讗讞讚 讛讻讜驻专 讞讬讬讘

If both of the witnesses denied knowledge of the incident together, both of them are liable. If they denied knowledge one after the other, the first who denied knowledge is liable, and the second is exempt, as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive. If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable.

讛讬讜 砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 讻驻专讛 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讻驻专讛 讛砖谞讬讛 砖转讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讜转 诪驻谞讬 砖讛注讚讜转 讬讻讜诇讛 诇讛转拽讬讬诐 讘砖转讬讛谉

If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both of the sets are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them, as even after the first set denies knowledge of the incident, the second remains capable of providing decisive testimony.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 专讗讜讛讜 砖专抓 讗讞专讬讛谉 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪讛 讗转讛 专抓 讗讞专讬谞讜 砖讘讜注讛 砖讗讬谉 讗谞讜 讬讜讚注讬谉 诇讱 注讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 注讚 砖讬砖诪注讜 诪驻讬讜 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转谞讬谞讗 砖讬诇讞 讘讬讚 注讘讚讜 讗讜 砖讗诪专 诇讛谉 讛谞转讘注 诪砖讘讬注 讗谞讬 注诇讬讻诐 砖讗诐 讗转诐 讬讜讚注讬谉 诇讜 注讚讜转 砖转讘讜讗讜 讜转注讬讚讜讛讜 讛专讬 讗诇讜 驻讟讜专讬诐

GEMARA: Shmuel says: If the witnesses saw the plaintiff pursuing them, and they said to him: For what reason are you pursuing us? On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are exempt, until they will hear a demand to testify directly from his mouth. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? We learn this in a mishna (35a): If the plaintiff sent a request for testimony with his servant, or if the respondent said to the potential witnesses: I administer an oath to you that if you know any testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, i.e., my opponent in the litigation, you will come and testify on his behalf, and they took a false oath that they have no knowledge of the incident, they are exempt,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Shevuot 31

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shevuot 31

拽讜诇专 转诇讜讬 讘爪讜讗专 注讚讬诐 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

the chain [kolar] of culpability for the miscarriage of justice be placed around the neck of the false witnesses? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

(住讬诪谉 转诇转讗 转诇诪讬讚 讜转诇转 讘注诇讬 讞讜讘 住诪专讟讜讟 砖讜诪注 讜诪讟注讬诐)

The Gemara provides a mnemonic for additional halakhot derived from the verse: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥 Three relating to a student; and three relating to creditors; and three relating to a judge: Rags, hears, and explain.

诪谞讬谉 诇转诇诪讬讚 砖讬讜砖讘 诇驻谞讬 专讘讜 讜专讜讗讛 讝讻讜转 诇注谞讬 讜讞讜讘 诇注砖讬专 诪谞讬谉 砖诇讗 讬砖转讜拽 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to a student who is sitting before his teacher and sees a claim that provides advantage for a poor person and disadvantage for a wealthy person that he shall not remain silent? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇转诇诪讬讚 砖专讜讗讛 讗转 专讘讜 砖讟讜注讛 讘讚讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讗诪专 讗诪转讬谉 诇讜 注讚 砖讬讙诪专谞讜 讜讗住转专谞讜 讜讗讘谞谞讜 诪砖诇讬 讻讚讬 砖讬拽专讗 讛讚讬谉 注诇 砖诪讬 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to a student who sees his teacher who is erring in judgment that he shall not say: I will wait for my teacher until he concludes the trial and then I will contradict him and construct a ruling of my own so that the verdict will be attributed to my name? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇转诇诪讬讚 砖讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讜 讬讜讚注 讗转讛 讘讬 砖讗诐 谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讬 诪讗讛 诪谞讛 讗讬谞讬 诪讘讚讛 诪谞讛 讬砖 诇讬 讗爪诇 驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诪谞讬谉 砖诇讗 讬爪讟专祝 注诪讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter鈥 (Exodus 23:7).

讛讗讬 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽 谞驻拽讗 讛讗 讜讚讗讬 砖拽讜专讬 拽讗 诪砖拽专 讜专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 诇讗 转注谞讛 讘专注讱 注讚 砖拽专 讗诇讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讚讗讬 讞讚 住讛讚讗 讗讬转 诇讬 讜转讗 讗转讛 拽讜诐 讛转诐 讜诇讗 转讬诪讗 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讗 诇讗 诪驻拽转 诪驻讜诪讱 砖拽专讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讗住讜专 诪砖讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

The Gemara asks: Is it from the verse 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter鈥 that this matter is derived? But isn鈥檛 he certainly lying in that case, and this is already stated, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淵ou shall not bear false witness against your neighbor鈥 (Exodus 20:13)? Rather, the reference is to a case where the teacher said to him: It is certain that I have one witness, and you come and stand there beside him and do not say anything, as in that manner you do not express a lie from your mouth. Your silent presence will create the impression that I have two witnesses and lead the debtor to admit his debt. Even so, it is prohibited to do this, due to that which is stated: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇谞讜砖讛 讘讞讘讬专讜 诪谞讛 砖诇讗 讬讗诪专 讗讟注谞谞讜 讘诪讗转讬诐 讻讚讬 砖讬讜讚讛 诇讬 讘诪谞讛 讜讬转讞讬讬讘 诇讬 砖讘讜注讛 讜讗讙诇讙诇 注诇讬讜 砖讘讜注讛 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

There are three halakhot with regard to a creditor: From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars, and there are no witnesses to that effect, that he shall not say: I will claim that he owes me two hundred dinars so that he will admit that he owes me one hundred dinars, and he will become liable to take an oath to me, the oath of one who admits to part of a claim, and on that basis I will extend the oath and compel him to take an oath with regard to a debt that he owes me from another place? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇谞讜砖讛 讘讞讘讬专讜 诪谞讛 讜讟注谞讜 诪讗转讬诐 砖诇讗 讬讗诪专 讗讻驻专谞讜 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讗讜讚讛 诇讜 讞讜抓 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 讗转讞讬讬讘 诇讜 砖讘讜注讛 讜诇讗 讬讙诇讙诇 注诇讬 砖讘讜注讛 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars and claims that the debtor owes him two hundred dinars, that the debtor shall not say: I will completely deny his claim in court, and I will admit to him outside court so that I will not become liable to take an oath to him and he will not extend the oath and compel me to take an oath with regard to a debt that I owe him from another place? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇砖诇砖讛 砖谞讜砖讬谉 诪谞讛 讘讗讞讚 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 讗讞讚 讘注诇 讚讬谉 讜砖谞讬诐 注讚讬诐 讻讚讬 砖讬讜爪讬讗讜 诪谞讛 讜讬讞诇讜拽讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived with regard to three who are seeking repayment from one individual for a total of one hundred dinars, that one of the three should not assume the role of a sole litigant and claim one hundred dinars, and the other two will assume the role of witnesses so that they will exact payment of one hundred dinars from the debtor and divide it among them? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖讘讗讜 诇讚讬谉 讗讞讚 诇讘讜砖 住诪专讟讜讟讬谉 讜讗讞讚 诇讘讜砖 讗讬爪讟诇讬转 讘转 诪讗讛 诪谞讛 砖讗讜诪专讬谉 诇讜 诇讘讜砖 讻诪讜转讜 讗讜 讛诇讘讬砖讛讜 讻诪讜转讱 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽 讻讬 讛讜讜 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 砖诇讜驻讜 驻讜讝诪讜拽讬讬讻讜 讜讞讜转讜 诇讚讬谞讗

There are three halakhot with regard to a judge: From where is it derived with regard to two individuals who came to judgment, one dressed in rags and one dressed in a garment worth one hundred times one hundred dinars, that the judges say to the wealthy person: Dress like the poor person or dress the poor person in a garment like yours? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥 The Gemara relates: When individuals would come before Rava bar Rav Huna for judgment he would say to them: Remove your fine shoes [puzmukaikhu] and descend for judgment, so you will not appear more distinguished than the other litigant.

诪谞讬谉 诇讚讬讬谉 砖诇讗 讬砖诪注 讚讘专讬 讘注诇 讚讬谉 (讞讘讬专讜) 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 讘注诇 讚讬谉 讞讘讬专讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽

From where is it derived that a judge should not hear the statement of one litigant before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥

诪谞讬谉 诇讘注诇 讚讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讟注讬诐 讚讘专讬讜 诇讚讬讬谉 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讘讗 讘注诇 讚讬谉 讞讘讬专讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讚讘专 砖拽专 转专讞拽 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪转谞讬 诪诇讗 转砖讗 诇讗 转砖讬讗

From where is it derived that a litigant shall not explain the rationale behind his statements to the judge before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: 鈥淒istance yourself from a false matter.鈥 Rav Kahana teaches that this halakha is derived from that which is written: 鈥淵ou shall not accept [lo tissa] a false report鈥 (Exodus 23:1), which he interprets as though it is written: You shall not cause others [lo tassi] to accept a false report.

讜讗砖专 诇讗 讟讜讘 注砖讛 讘转讜讱 注诪讬讜 专讘 讗诪专 讝讛 讛讘讗 讘讛专砖讗讛 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讝讛 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 砖讬砖 注诇讬讛 注住讬拽讬谉

The verse states: 鈥淎nd did that which is not good among his people鈥 (Ezekiel 18:18). Rav says: This is referring to one who comes to court with authorization to present claims on behalf of another. And Shmuel says: This is referring to one who purchases a field concerning which there are those who contest ownership of it, as in that way, he involves himself in the disputes of others.

讗讬谞讛 谞讜讛讙转 讗诇讗 讘专讗讜讬谉 诇讛注讬讚 讻讜壮 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪诇讱 讜专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 讗诪专 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗

搂 The mishna teaches that the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. The Gemara asks: This statement serves to exclude what person not allowed to testify who was not mentioned explicitly in the mishna? Rav Pappa said: It serves to exclude a king who, although he is neither a relative nor otherwise disqualified from testifying, does not testify in court. And Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov said: It serves to exclude one who plays with dice, who is disqualified as a witness by rabbinic law.

诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 诪诇讱 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪诇讱 讗讘诇 诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讞讝讗 讞讝讬 讜专讘谞谉 讛讜讗 讚驻住诇讜讛讜

The Gemara notes: According to the one who says that the mishna excludes one who plays with dice from the oath of testimony, all the more so should a king be excluded, as he does not testify by Torah law. And according to the one who says that the mishna excludes a king from the oath of testimony, it may exclude only a king, but perhaps one who plays with dice is not excluded, as by Torah law he is fit to testify and it is the Sages who disqualified him. Therefore, he is not excluded from the oath of testimony, which is by Torah law.

讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讻讜壮 讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬

搂 The mishna teaches: The oath of testimony is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the potential witness takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the witness takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree?

讗诪专讜讛 专讘谞谉 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 驻驻讗 讘讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛 讘讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜讗讜拽讬 讘讗转专讛 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬

The Sages said the explanation before Rav Pappa: They disagree with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy. Is the method to infer the halakha from the source of the verbal analogy and derive the details from that source as well, or is the method to infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place?

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛 诪驻拽讚讜谉 诪讛 驻拽讚讜谉 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注讚讜转 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讜诪讬谞讛 诪讛 驻拽讚讜谉 讘讬谉 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讘讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗祝 注讚讜转 讘讬谉 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讘讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Meir holds: Infer from it and derive the details from it. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. And derive the details from it: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court.

讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜讗讜拽讬 讘讗转专讛 诪讛 驻拽讚讜谉 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注讚讜转 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讜拽讬 讘讗转专讛 诪讛 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗 讗祝 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗

And the Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. But interpret the halakha according to its own place and derive the details of the halakha from the halakhot of the oath of testimony: Just as in the case of one who was administered an oath by others, if he denies knowledge of the matter in court, yes, he is liable, and if his denial does not take place in court, no, he is not liable; so too, one who took the oath on his own, if he did so in court, yes, he is liable, and if he did not take the oath in court, no, he is not liable.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讬 诪驻拽讚讜谉 讙诪专讬 诇讛 专讘谞谉 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛

Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: If the Rabbis derive liability for one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own by means of a verbal analogy from the oath on a deposit, then everyone agrees: Infer from it and derive the details from it, and even the Rabbis would concede that all of the halakhot of the oath of testimony are derived from the oath on a deposit; therefore, one is liable for an oath taken on one鈥檚 own even outside the court.

讗诇讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘谞谉 讚诪讬讬转讜 诇讛 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

Rather, this is the reason that the Rabbis hold that there is no liability for the oath of testimony taken on one鈥檚 own outside the court: They derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakhot of the oath of testimony itself, as follows: And if one who was administered an oath by others is liable, when one takes the oath on his own, is he not all the more so liable?

讜诪讚诪讬讬转讜 诇讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讚讬讜 诇讘讗 诪谉 讛讚讬谉 诇讛讬讜转 讻谞讚讜谉 诪讛 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗 讗祝 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗

And from the fact that they derived the halakha by means of an a fortiori inference, one is bound by the limitations that restrict that derivation: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Therefore, just as one who is administered an oath by others, if the oath is administered in court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not administered in court, no, he is not liable, so too, one who took the oath on his own, before a court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not before a court, no, he is not liable.

讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 诇专讘 驻驻讗 诪讬 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讚诇讗讜 讘讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讜讛转谞谉 讙讘讬 驻拽讚讜谉 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 谞讜讛讙转 讘讗谞砖讬诐 讜讘谞砖讬诐 讘专讞讜拽讬谉 讜讘拽专讜讘讬谉 讘讻砖专讬谉 讜讘驻住讜诇讬谉 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬讻驻讜专 讘讜 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘讬谉 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜讘讬谉 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖讻驻专 讘讜 讞讬讬讘

The Rabbis said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that it is not with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna with regard to the oath on a deposit: The oath on a deposit is practiced with regard to men and with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives and with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify and with regard to those unfit to testify. The oath on a deposit is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the bailee takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others, he is not liable until he denies responsibility for the deposit in court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the bailee takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, once he denied the claim concerning the deposit he is liable.

诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讘驻拽讚讜谉 诪谞讗 诇讛讜 诇专讘谞谉 讚讞讬讬讘 诇讗讜 讚讙诪专讬 诇讛 诪注讚讜转 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讘讚讜谉 诪讬谞讛 讜诪讬谞讛 驻诇讬讙讬

The question arises: From where do the Rabbis derive that one who is administered an oath on a deposit by others is liable, given that an oath of that kind is not mentioned in the Torah in the context of an oath on a deposit? Is it not that they derive it from the halakhot of the oath of testimony? And conclude from it that it is with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? The Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The fact that one is liable for an oath on a deposit that is administered by others is derived from the oath of testimony, but one does not derive that one is liable only if that oath is administered in the presence of a court. Rather, the oath on a deposit administered by others is derived from an oath on a deposit taken on one鈥檚 own; one is liable in both cases for an oath taken not in the presence of the court.

诪讛讛讬讗 讗讬谉 诪讛讗 诇讬讻讗 诇诪砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: From that mishna, yes, it is evident that the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir disagree with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it. However, no inference is to be learned from this mishna taught with regard to the oath of testimony, as perhaps the Rabbis derived their opinion by means of an a fortiori inference.

讜讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谉 讛砖讘讜注讛 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘讻讜诇谉 谞讗诪专 讘讛谉 讜谞注诇诐 讜讻讗谉 诇讗 谞讗诪专 讘讛 讜谞注诇诐 诇讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

搂 The mishna teaches: And one is liable for the act of taking a false oath with intent. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony with intent? It is derived as the Sages taught: In all of the other cases where one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2鈥4), i.e., the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and violating an oath on an utterance, it is stated: 鈥淎nd it is hidden鈥; but here, with regard to the oath of testimony, it is not stated: And it is hidden, which serves to render one liable for taking the oath intentionally just as he is liable for taking the oath unwittingly.

讜注诇 砖讙讙转讛 注诐 讝讚讜谉 讛注讚讜转 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 砖讙讙转讛 注诐 讝讚讜谉 讛注讚讜转 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讘讗讜诪专 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖砖讘讜注讛 讝讜 讗住讜专讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讗诐 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 拽专讘谉 讗诐 诇讗

搂 The mishna teaches: And one is liable for an unwitting act of taking a false oath provided that he takes the oath with intent in terms of the testimony. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case of an unwitting act of taking a false oath with intent in terms of the testimony? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says that this is in the case of one who says: I know that taking this false oath that I do not know the relevant information is prohibited, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring an offering for taking that oath.

讜讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讙专讬讚转讗 诇讬诪讗 转谞讬谞讗 诇讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜讚专讘 讗住讬

The mishna teaches: But they are not liable for taking the oath if they were unwitting in terms of the testimony alone. If one actually forgot that he knows about the matter, he is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that we learn in the mishna that which Rav said in response to the dispute of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi? The Gemara (26a) cited a dispute between Rav Kahana and Rav Asi with regard to a certain statement of Rav, and each took an oath that his version was accurate. Rav told them that although the version of one of the amora鈥檌m was not accurate, he is not liable for taking a false oath, as each amora was convinced that his oath was true. This is not an unwitting oath; rather, it is an oath taken unaware.

诇讗 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚转谞谉 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讻讗 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讻转讬讘 讜谞注诇诐 讚讘注讬谞谉 砖讜讙讙 讚讜诪讬讗 讚诪讝讬讚 讗讘诇 讛转诐 讚讻转讬讘 讜谞注诇诐 讗驻讬诇讜 砖讙讙转讛 讻诇 讚讛讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara responds: No, even though we learned this halakha in the mishna, Rav鈥檚 statement that the one who did not cite Rav鈥檚 statement accurately is exempt was necessary. It may enter your mind to say: It is only here, with regard to the oath of testimony, that one is exempt for unwittingly taking a false oath, as: And it is hidden, is not written concerning it, indicating that in order to be liable, we require that the halakhic status of the unwitting oath is similar to that of an intentional oath, i.e., he knows that he is taking a false oath, but he does not know that he is liable to bring an offering for doing so. Therefore, one who is unaware that it is a false oath is exempt. But there, in the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, where each took an oath on an utterance, where it is written: 鈥淎nd it is hidden,鈥 even if it is entirely unwitting, i.e., they were totally unaware that the oath was false, one might say that he is liable. Therefore, Rav teaches us that even in the case of an oath on an utterance, one who is unwitting to that extent is exempt.

诪转谞讬壮 砖讘讜注转 讛注讚讜转 讻讬爪讚 讗诪专 诇砖谞讬诐 讘讜讗讜 讜讛注讬讚讜谞讬 砖讘讜注讛 砖讗讬谉 讗谞讜 讬讜讚注讬谉 诇讱 注讚讜转 讗讜 砖讗诪专讜 诇讜 讗讬谉 讗谞讜 讬讜讚注讬谉 诇讱 注讚讜转 诪砖讘讬注 讗谞讬 注诇讬讻诐 讜讗诪专讜 讗诪谉 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉

MISHNA: Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony, how so? In a case where the plaintiff said to two individuals: Come and testify on my behalf, and they replied: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, i.e., we do not have any knowledge of the matter you speak of, or in a case where they said to him: We do not know any testimony on your behalf, and he said to them: I administer an oath to you, and they said: Amen; if it was determined that they lied, these two witnesses are liable.

讛砖讘讬注 注诇讬讛诐 讞诪砖 驻注诪讬诐 讞讜抓 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讘讗讜 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讛讜讚讜 驻讟讜专讬谉 讻驻专讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讛砖讘讬注 注诇讬讛谉 讞诪砖 驻注诪讬诐 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜讻驻专讜 讗讬谞谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪讛 讟注诐 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬谞诐 讬讻讜诇讬谉 诇讞讝讜专 讜诇讛讜讚讜转

If he administered an oath to them five times outside the court, and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident in question and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court. If he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of the incident, they are liable for taking only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason for this ruling? Since once they denied that they had any knowledge of the incident they can no longer retract that denial and admit that they have knowledge of the matter. Therefore, there was only one oath of testimony, and there is no liability for the remaining oaths.

讻驻专讜 砖谞讬讛谉 讻讗讞讚 砖谞讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讛砖谞讬 驻讟讜专 讻驻专 讗讞讚 讜讛讜讚讛 讗讞讚 讛讻讜驻专 讞讬讬讘

If both of the witnesses denied knowledge of the incident together, both of them are liable. If they denied knowledge one after the other, the first who denied knowledge is liable, and the second is exempt, as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive. If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable.

讛讬讜 砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 讻驻专讛 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讻驻专讛 讛砖谞讬讛 砖转讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讜转 诪驻谞讬 砖讛注讚讜转 讬讻讜诇讛 诇讛转拽讬讬诐 讘砖转讬讛谉

If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both of the sets are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them, as even after the first set denies knowledge of the incident, the second remains capable of providing decisive testimony.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 专讗讜讛讜 砖专抓 讗讞专讬讛谉 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪讛 讗转讛 专抓 讗讞专讬谞讜 砖讘讜注讛 砖讗讬谉 讗谞讜 讬讜讚注讬谉 诇讱 注讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 注讚 砖讬砖诪注讜 诪驻讬讜 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转谞讬谞讗 砖讬诇讞 讘讬讚 注讘讚讜 讗讜 砖讗诪专 诇讛谉 讛谞转讘注 诪砖讘讬注 讗谞讬 注诇讬讻诐 砖讗诐 讗转诐 讬讜讚注讬谉 诇讜 注讚讜转 砖转讘讜讗讜 讜转注讬讚讜讛讜 讛专讬 讗诇讜 驻讟讜专讬诐

GEMARA: Shmuel says: If the witnesses saw the plaintiff pursuing them, and they said to him: For what reason are you pursuing us? On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are exempt, until they will hear a demand to testify directly from his mouth. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? We learn this in a mishna (35a): If the plaintiff sent a request for testimony with his servant, or if the respondent said to the potential witnesses: I administer an oath to you that if you know any testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, i.e., my opponent in the litigation, you will come and testify on his behalf, and they took a false oath that they have no knowledge of the incident, they are exempt,

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