Sotah 29

שהרי עשה בה ספק זונה כזונה תרומה נמי לא תיבעי קרא שהרי עשה בה ספק זונה כזונה

as the Torah has already rendered an uncertain case of a woman who has engaged in sexual intercourse with a man forbidden to her by the Torah [zona] as though she is certainly a zona, since a sota is forbidden to her husband after seclusion even though there are no witnesses that she committed adultery, and therefore it should be prohibited for her to marry a priest just like any zona, then with regard to her prohibition against partaking of teruma a verse should also not be necessary, as it is prohibited for a zona to partake of teruma. Therefore, the Torah renders an uncertain zona like a certain zona.

אלא לרבי עקיבא ארבעה קראי כתיבי חד לבעל וחד לבועל וחד לכהונה וחד לתרומה

Rather, it must be explained that according to Rabbi Akiva, the equivalent of four verses worthy of exposition are written with regard to the defilement of a sota, as he maintains that an additional halakha should be derived from the superfluous prefix vav in the verse: “And is defiled [venitma’a]” (Numbers 5:29). Therefore, one verse is written to forbid her to her husband, and one is to forbid her to her paramour, and one is to forbid her to marry into the priesthood, and one is to forbid her to partake of teruma.

ורבי ישמעאל תלתא קראי כתיבי חד לבעל וחד לבועל וחד לתרומה וכהונה אתיא בקל וחומר

And Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, as he does not expound on the superfluous vav, and therefore maintains that only three verses are written: One is to forbid her to her husband, and one is to forbid her to her paramour, and one is to forbid her to partake of teruma. And her being prohibited to marry into the priesthood is derived through an a fortiori inference, as described in the baraita.

ורבי ישמעאל ממאי דאיצטריך קרא לתרומה וכהונה אתיא בקל וחומר דילמא כי אצטריך לכהונה ותרומה שריא

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yishmael derive that the verse was necessary to teach the prohibition of a sota to partake of teruma, and her prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is derived through an a fortiori inference? Perhaps the verse was necessary in order to teach that it is prohibited for the woman to marry into the priesthood, but teruma is permitted for her?

אמר לך מסתברא דומיא דבעל ובועל מה בעל ובועל מחיים אף תרומה נמי מחיים לאפוקי כהונה דלאחר מיתה

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael could have said to you: It is reasonable to derive from this verse a prohibition that is similar to the prohibitions derived from the other verses, i.e., that she is forbidden to her husband and her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband and her paramour even during the lifetime of her husband, so too, the prohibition against partaking of teruma applies also during the lifetime of her husband, to the exclusion of her prohibition against marrying into the priesthood, which is relevant only after the death of her husband. The reason is that if her husband would divorce her it would be prohibited for her to marry a priest anyway.

ורבי עקיבא דומיא דבעל ובועל לית ליה

And how would Rabbi Akiva respond? The Gemara answers: He is not of the opinion that it is more reasonable to derive a prohibition from the phrase “and is defiled” that is similar to the prohibitions involving her husband and her paramour, and therefore he requires two separate derivations; one for teruma and one for the priesthood.

ואי נמי אית ליה מילתא דאתיא בקל וחומר טרח וכתב לה קרא

Or alternatively, perhaps he accepts the opinion that the halakha derived from “and is defiled” should be similar to the prohibitions involving the husband and paramour, but nevertheless, in certain instances with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes explicitly. Therefore, although unnecessary, two verses are stated, one for teruma and one for the priesthood.

אמר רב גידל אמר רב דבר שיש בו דעת לישאל ואין בו דעת לישאל מהאי קרא נפקא והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל ודאי טמא הוא דלא יאכל הא ספק טמא וספק טהור יאכל

The Gemara continues discussing the baraita. Rav Giddel said that Rav said: The halakha with regard to an entity that has awareness in order for it to be asked and an entity that lacks awareness in order for it to be asked in cases of uncertain ritual impurity is derived from this verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19). This would seem to indicate that specifically food that is impure for certain is that which shall not be eaten, but food for which it is uncertain whether it is impure and uncertain whether it is pure can be eaten.

אימא סיפא והבשר כל טהור יאכל בשר ודאי טהור הוא דיאכל בשר הא ספק טמא וספק טהור לא יאכל

However, say the latter clause of the verse: “And as for the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh” (Leviticus 7:19), which would seem to indicate that specifically one who is pure for certain is one who shall eat meat, but one for whom it is uncertain whether he is impure and uncertain whether he is pure shall not eat. The two clauses in the verse seem to contradict one another with regard to the status of uncertain purity.

אלא לאו שמע מינה כאן שיש בו דעת לישאל כאן שאין בו דעת לישאל

Rather, must one not conclude from it that the Torah differentiates between two different types of uncertainty? Here, the latter clause, which discusses “every one that is pure,” is referring to an entity that has awareness in order for it to be asked, e.g., a person, who is considered impure if he is uncertain whether he contracted ritual impurity. There, the former clause which discusses impure meat presents the principle of an entity that lacks awareness in order for it to be asked, where an uncertain case of ritual impurity is deemed pure.

ואיצטריך דרב גידל אמר רב ואיצטריך למיגמר מסוטה דאי מדרב הוה אמינא בין ברשות היחיד ובין ברשות הרבים איצטריך למיגמר מסוטה

The Gemara explains the need for two separate derivations concerning uncertain contractions of ritual impurity: And the derivation that Rav Giddel said that Rav said was necessary, and it was also necessary to derive the principle of uncertain ritual impurity from sota; since if it were derived only through the derivation of Rav, I would say that it makes no difference whether the uncertain contraction of impurity occurred in the private domain or whether it occurred in the public domain. Therefore, it was necessary to derive from sota that uncertain impurity is considered impure only in the private domain.

ואי מסוטה הוה אמינא עד דאיכא דעת נוגע ומגיע צריכא:

And if it is derived only from sota, I would say that similar to sota, where both the woman and the paramour possess awareness in order to be asked if they committed the act, so too, items with uncertain impurity should not be deemed impure unless there is awareness on the part of both the one who touches the impure item and the one who causes him to touch, i.e., the agent of impurity and the recipient of impurity are both competent people. Therefore, the derivation of Rav was necessary, as it teaches that in an uncertain case of impurity in the private domain, one is deemed impure even if only the contractor of impurity possesses the awareness to be asked.

בו ביום דרש רבי עקיבא וכל כלי חרש כו׳:

§ It is stated in the mishna: On that same day Rabbi Akiva interpreted the phrase “shall be impure” in the verse: “And every earthen vessel into which any of them falls, whatever is in it shall be impure [yitma], and you shall break it” (Leviticus 11:33), as indicating that a loaf that has second-degree ritual impurity can render other food with which it comes into contact impure with third-degree impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua related that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai had predicted that a future generation would purify a loaf that contracted third-degree impurity, as there is no explicit verse in the Torah stating that this degree of impurity exists.

ומאחר דאין לו למה טמא

The Gemara asks: But since the loaf does not have an explicit verse stating that it is impure, why did Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai himself maintain that it is impure?

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מן התורה אין לו מדין קל וחומר יש לו ומה טבול יום שמותר בחולין פוסל בתרומה ככר שני שפסול בחולין אינו דין שיעשה שלישי בתרומה

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai maintained that although it has no explicit basis from a verse in the Torah, it has proof for its impurity through an a fortiori inference: If even one who immersed in a ritual bath that day and will become completely purified after nightfall, who is therefore permitted to touch non-sacred articles, i.e., he does not transmit impurity to them, disqualifies teruma that he touches, then with regard to a loaf that has second-degree impurity as result of contact with an impure item of the first degree, which is disqualified, i.e., it is rendered impure, even if it is non-sacred, isn’t it logical that it should impart third-degree impurity upon teruma?

איכא למיפרך מה לטבול יום שכן אב הטומאה

The Gemara challenges: This a fortiori inference can be refuted. What is unique about one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed is that prior to his immersion, he was a primary source of impurity. He therefore retains his stringent status even after immersion with regard to his capability of disqualifying teruma. The loaf, by contrast, has second-degree impurity from the outset, and should therefore be treated more lightly.

תיתי

The Gemara answers: Derive this halakha

מטבול יום דשרץ

from one who immersed that day who was never a primary source of impurity, as he was rendered impure only through contact with a creeping animal, and nevertheless he disqualifies teruma upon contact.

מה לטבול יום דשרץ שכן במינו אב הטומאה

The Gemara continues to challenge the inference: What is unique about the impurity of one who immersed that day who was rendered impure through contact with a creeping animal is that this impurity can apply to either a person or a utensil, as people and utensils are capable of achieving purity through immersion, and within its type there can be a primary source of impurity. A loaf, however, is food, which can never be a primary source of impurity. It can only be rendered impure as a secondary source of impurity.

כלי חרש יוכיח

The Gemara answers: The halakhot of an earthenware vessel can prove that the fact that there are primary sources of impurity within its type is not a relevant factor. An earthenware vessel can never become a primary source of impurity, and nevertheless, if it is impure it disqualifies teruma upon contact.

מה לכלי חרש שכן מטמא מאוירו

The Gemara challenges: What is unique about an earthenware vessel is that unlike a loaf, it can render items impure or it can itself become impure from its airspace. An earthenware vessel is the only vessel that does not require direct contact with another item in order to contract or transfer impurity, but can effect or contract impurity through its airspace.

טבול יום יוכיח

The Gemara answers: One who immersed that day can prove that being able to render items impure through airspace is not a relevant factor. Such an item disqualifies teruma, but imparts impurity only through direct contact and not through its airspace.

וחוזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה ולא ראי זה כראי זה הצד השוה שבהן שמותרין בחולין ופוסלין בתרומה כל שכן ככר שני שפוסל בחולין דפוסל בתרומה

And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique stringencies. However, their common denominator is that non-sacred food they come into contact with is permitted, i.e., is not rendered impure, but they disqualify teruma. Therefore, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai infers a fortiori that all the more so, a loaf that contracted second-degree impurity, which is disqualified, i.e., rendered impure, even if it is non-sacred, should also disqualify teruma with which it comes into contact. This was Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s logical a fortiori inference that led him to rule that a loaf of second-degree impurity status disqualifies teruma.

ודור אחר פריך מה להצד השוה שבהן שכן יש בהן צד חמור

And another generation, i.e., the later generation that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai predicted would deem teruma that came into contact with second-degree impurity pure, would refute this inference as follows: What is unique about their common denominator is that both cases have a stringent aspect that does not exist in other impure items.

ורבן יוחנן בן זכאי צד חמור לא פריך

And Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai maintained that teruma that came into contact with second-degree impurity is pure, as he would not refute an inference that is based on two sources due to the fact that both sources have a stringent aspect, since each source’s stringency is not shared by the other.

תניא אמר רבי יוסי מנין לרביעי בקודש שפסול

§ It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ḥagiga 3:18) that Rabbi Yosei said: From where is it derived with regard to sacrificial food with fourth-degree ritual impurity that it is disqualified although it is not capable of imparting impurity to other items?

ודין הוא מה מחוסר כיפורים שמותר בתרומה פסול בקודש שלישי שפסול בתרומה אינו דין הוא שיעשה רביעי בקודש

It is derived through logical inference: Just as one who is lacking atonement, e.g., a zav or leper who immersed at the conclusion of his period of impurity but has not yet brought an offering for his atonement, who is permitted to partake of teruma, nevertheless disqualifies sacrificial food if he comes into contact with it, so too, with regard to an item of third-degree impurity status, which disqualifies teruma and is therefore more severe than one who is lacking atonement, is it not logical that it should render sacrificial food with which it comes into contact as having fourth-degree impurity?

ולמדנו שלישי לקודש מן התורה ורביעי מקל וחומר

The baraita concludes: And we have therefore derived that third-degree impurity applies to sacrificial food from an explicit verse in the Torah, and we have derived that fourth-degree impurity applies to sacrificial food by means of the above a fortiori inference.

שלישי לקודש מן התורה מנלן דכתיב והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל מי לא עסקינן דנגע בשני ואמר רחמנא לא יאכל רביעי מקל וחומר כדאמרן

The Gemara asks: From where in the Torah do we derive that third-degree impurity applies to sacrificial food? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19). Are we not dealing in the verse with meat that touches even an item of second-degree impurity? And the Merciful One states that it “shall not be eaten,” indicating that it assumes third-degree impurity. Therefore, fourth-degree impurity can be derived by means of the a fortiori inference of Rabbi Yosei, as we stated above.

אמר רבי יוחנן טעם בריבי איני יודע מה הוא שהרי תשובתו בצדו אוכל הבא מחמת טבול יום יוכיח שפסול בתרומה ואינו עושה רביעי בקודש

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to the reasoning behind the Distinguished Rabbi Yosei’s a fortiori inference, I do not know what it is, as the response to his inference is right by its side: Food whose impurity came from contact with one who immersed that day can prove that a degree of impurity that disqualifies teruma does not necessarily impart fourth-degree impurity to sacrificial food, as this food disqualifies teruma upon contact, but it does not impart fourth-degree impurity upon sacrificial food.

דתניא אבא שאול אומר טבול יום תחילה לקודש לטמא שנים ולפסול אחד

As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Teharot 1:4) that Abba Shaul says: With regard to one who immersed that day, until sunset he is treated as one who is impure with first-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food, in that he is able to render two items of sacrificial food impure and to disqualify one additional item. In other words, the first item of sacrificial food that he touches assumes the status of a second-degree impurity. A second item that comes into contact with the first one assumes third-degree impurity. A third item that comes into contact with the second assumes fourth-degree impurity and is therefore disqualified from being eaten, though it cannot impart impurity to other items.

רבי מאיר אומר מטמא אחד ופוסל אחד וחכמים אומרים כשם שפוסל אוכלי תרומה ומשקי תרומה כך פוסל אוכלי קודש ומשקי קודש

Rabbi Meir says: One who immersed that day is considered impure with second-degree impurity, even vis-à-vis sacrificial food, and as such renders only one item impure and disqualifies one additional item. And the Rabbis say: Just as he merely disqualifies teruma foods and teruma liquids, without transferring to them impurity that can then be transferred further, so too, he merely disqualifies sacrificial foods and sacrificial liquids. In other words, the impurity imparted by one who immersed that day can reach only third-degree impurity and not fourth-degree impurity, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

מתקיף לה רב פפא ממאי דרבי יוסי כרבנן סבירא ליה דילמא כאבא שאול סבירא ליה דאמר לטמא שנים ולפסול אחד

Rav Pappa objects to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s argument: From where is the presumption derived that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? Perhaps he holds in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, who says that one who immersed that day is able to render two items of sacrificial food impure, and to disqualify one additional item.

אי סלקא דעתך כאבא שאול סבירא ליה לייתיה לרביעי בקודש מאוכל שבא מחמת טבול יום

The Gemara answers: If it enters your mind that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, he should have brought proof for the existence of a fourth degree of ritual impurity with regard to sacrificial food from the case of food whose impurity came from one who immersed that day, as follows:

ומה אוכל הבא מחמת טבול יום דטבול יום גופיה מותר בחולין אמרת עושה רביעי בקודש אוכל

Just as with regard to food whose impurity came from one who immersed that day, while the one who immersed that day is himself permitted to consume non-sacred food, nevertheless you say that the food imparts fourth-degree impurity status upon sacrificial food, then with regard to food