Today's Daf Yomi
June 23, 2022 | כ״ד בסיון תשפ״ב
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".
Yevamot 108
What is the text that they put in a mi’un document? Why was the original text shortened? The refusal of a minor can be done in many different ways – even if the girls somehow indicates that she is not interested in being married to him, without saying it directly, she is free from her marriage. several different examples of this are brought. According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira if she went ahead and married someone else, that would be an indication that she did mi’un. What about betrothal to another? Do the rabbis disagree with him? Would Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira permit this kind of ‘weak’ refusal only if she was betrothed to the first husband or even if she was married to him? The Gemara raises all these questions. In the end, they rule like Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira even in the case where she was married to the first husband. Rabbi Eliezer doesn’t consider marriage to the first husband valid at all, however, he does require mi’un. Shmuel likes his approach as he is consistent and does not consider her married at all (other than requiring mi’un). How is this different from Rabbi Yehoshua who fully considered a minor married, other than the fact that she can get out with mi’un alone – that also seems to be a mostly consistent position? The Gemara brings two different explanations for Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov’s statement in the Mishna that if there is any obstruction due to the man, she is married and and obstruction not from the man, she is not married. If she does mi’un, she is permitted to his relatives and he to hers, as it as if they were never married. This differs from divorce, by which she is prohibited to his relative and he to hers. If they were married, he gave her a get, then remarried her and she did mi’un. the mi’un uproots the original marriage as well. Therefore, if she marries someone else after that and gets divorced or widowed, she can go back to the original husband, as it is if they were not married before. But if she did mi’un with one man, they got a get from the next husband, then mi’un with the next, etc. she cannot return to the man she got a get from. The Gemara assumes that the reason the mi’un in the first case, uproots the marriage entirely is because the mi’un indicated she was too young and when her mother or brother married her off, the marriage was never a real marriage. If so, then why does it only uproot her marriage with the same person and not if she was married and divorced from someone else? Shmuel says that the two parts of the Mishna reflect two different opinions. Rava distinguishes between the cases – it really should uproot the first marriage, even if it was to someone else, but for a different reason, the rabbis forbid her to return to the first husband, as they want to prevent him from trying to seduce her back while she is married to another in an attempt to get her to ‘refuse’ the other man. The Gemara raises another contradiction in the Mishna. Rabbi Elazar says that the two parts of the Mishna reflect two different opinions. Ulla distinguishes between the cases. Where do we find two different opinions regarding this issue, as stated by Rabbi Elazar? A story is told of how they brought this question to be asked to Rabbi Akiva when he was jailed by the Romans.
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אתי לאיחלופי בגיטא תקינו הכי ביום פלוני מיאנה פלונית בת פלוני באנפנא
This document may come to be confused with a bill of divorce and perhaps a man will err and give a bill of divorce using the text of refusal. Therefore, they decreed that one should write as follows: On such and such a day, so-and-so, the daughter of so-and-so, performed refusal in our presence, and no more.
תנו רבנן אי זהו מיאון אמרה אי אפשי בפלוני בעלי אי אפשי בקידושין שקידשוני אמי ואחי יתר על כן אמר רבי יהודה אפילו יושבת באפריון והולכת מבית אביה לבית בעלה ואמרה אי אפשי בפלוני בעלי זהו מיאון
§ The Sages taught: What constitutes a refusal? If she said: I do not want so-and-so as my husband, or: I do not want the betrothal in which my mother and brothers had me betrothed, that is a refusal. Rabbi Yehuda said more than that: Even if she is sitting in a bridal chair [apiryon] going from her father’s house to her husband’s house and said along the way: I do not want so-and-so as my husband, this constitutes a refusal.
יתר על כן אמר רבי יהודה אפילו היו אורחין מסובין בבית בעלה והיא עומדת ומשקה עליהם ואמרה להם אי אפשי בפלוני בעלי הרי הוא מיאון יתר על כן אמר רבי יוסי בר יהודה אפילו שיגרה בעלה אצל חנוני להביא לו חפץ משלו ואמרה אי אפשי בפלוני בעלי אין לך מיאון גדול מזה:
Rabbi Yehuda said even more than that: Even if guests are reclining at her husband’s house and she is standing and serving them drinks as hostess, and she said to them: I do not want so-and-so as my husband, this constitutes a refusal, even though it is possible that she is merely complaining about the effort she is expending. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda said more than that: Even if her husband sent her to a shopkeeper to bring him an article of his and she said: I do not want so-and-so as my husband, there is no greater refusal than this.
רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר כל תינוקת וכו׳: אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס תנא קטנה שלא מיאנה ועמדה ונשאת משום רבי יהודה בן בתירה אמרו נישואיה הן הן מיאוניה
§ It was taught in the mishna: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Any girl who is so young that she cannot keep her betrothal safe does not need to refuse. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus. It was taught: In the case of a minor girl who did not refuse her husband, but who went and married someone else, it was said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira: Her new marriage constitutes her refusal, as she made her state of mind known, that she does not want him, and that is sufficient.
איבעיא להו נתקדשה מהו תא שמע קטנה שלא מיאנה ועמדה ונתקדשה משום רבי יהודה בן בתירה אמרו קידושיה הן הן מיאוניה
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha if she was betrothed to another man without performing refusal of the first husband? Is her acceptance of the betrothal sufficient to indicate that she refuses the first husband? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer from a baraita: If a minor girl did not refuse her husband but went and became betrothed to another man, then, as the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira: Her betrothal constitutes her refusal.
איבעיא להו פליגי רבנן עליה דרבי יהודה בן בתירה או לא אם תימצי לומר פליגי בקידושין או אפילו בנישואין ואם תימצי לומר פליגי אפילו בנישואין הלכה כמותו או אין הלכה כמותו ואם תימצי לומר הלכה כמותו בנישואין או אפילו בקידושין
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira or not? And further, if you say that they do disagree with him, do they disagree with him with regard to betrothal alone, or do they also disagree with him with regard to marriage? And if you say that they disagree even with regard to marriage, is the halakha in accordance with his opinion or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? And if you say that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, is this only with regard to marriage, or is it even with regard to betrothal?
תא שמע אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יהודה בן בתירה הלכה מכלל דפליגי
The Gemara cites a tradition: Come and hear: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira with regard to both marriage and betrothal. From the fact that he ruled the halakha, one may derive by inference that the Rabbis disagree.
ואכתי תיבעי לך דהוה נסיבא מעיקרא או דלמא מיקדשא תא שמע דכלתיה דאבדן אימרוד שדר רבי זוגי דרבנן למיבדקינהו אמרי להו נשי חזו גברייכו דקאתו אמרי להו ניהוו גברייכו דידכו
But still, you should raise the dilemma: Does Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira say that her betrothal to another counts as refusal even when she had initially been married or perhaps only if she was betrothed but not married beforehand? Come and hear: The daughters-in-law of Abdan rebelled against their husbands. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sent a pair of Sages to examine them and determine what could be done to rectify the matter. Some women said to the daughters-in-law: See, it is your husbands that are coming. They said back to them: Let them be your husbands.
אמר רבי אין לך מיאון גדול מזה מאי לאו דהוה נסיבא לא דהוה מיקדשא קידושי והלכה כרבי יהודה בן בתירה ואפילו בנישואין דקמא:
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: There is no greater refusal than this. What is the case? Is it not that they were already married? The Gemara rejects this: No, they were merely betrothed, but not married. This story cannot establish unequivocally what the halakha is in the case when the girl is married. The Gemara nevertheless concludes: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in all of these matters, even with regard to her marriage to the first husband: Even if she had actually been married to the first man, the marriage is invalidated by her betrothal to another.
רבי אלעזר אומר וכו׳: אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל חוזרני על כל צדדי חכמים ולא מצאתי אדם שהשוה מדותיו בקטנה כרבי אלעזר שעשאה רבי אלעזר כמטיילת עמו בחצר ועומדת מחיקו וטובלת ואוכלת בתרומה לערב
§ It is taught in the mishna: Rabbi Elazar says: The act of a minor girl is nothing. Rather, her status is as though she were a seduced unmarried woman. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: I reviewed all the opinions of the Sages concerning these matters, and I did not find any person who applied a consistent standard with regard to a minor like Rabbi Elazar did. For Rabbi Elazar portrayed her as a girl walking with her husband in a courtyard, who stands up from his bosom after he engaged in intercourse with her, and immerses herself to become ritually pure, and partakes of teruma by evening as if there were no marital bond between them and as if she, as the daughter of a priest, could continue to partake of teruma. The daughter of a priest is prohibited from eating teruma once she is married to a non-priest.
תניא רבי אליעזר אומר אין מעשה קטנה כלום ואין בעלה זכאי לא במציאתה ולא במעשה ידיה ולא בהפרת נדריה ואינו יורשה ואין מיטמא לה כללו של דבר אינה כאשתו לכל דבר אלא שצריכה מיאון
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of a minor girl is nothing, and therefore her marriage is not valid. And her husband has no rights to items she finds, nor to her earnings; nor does he have the right to annul her vows; he does not inherit her assets if she dies; and if she dies he may not become ritually impure on her account if he is a priest, i.e., through his presence in the same room as her corpse. The principle is: She is not his wife in any sense, except that she must perform refusal in order to marry someone else.
רבי יהושע אומר בעלה זכאי במציאתה ובמעשה ידיה ובהפרת נדריה ויורשה ומיטמא לה כללו של דבר הרי היא כאשתו לכל דבר אלא שיוצאה במיאון
Rabbi Yehoshua says: In the case of a minor whose mother or brother married her off, her husband has rights to items she finds, and to her earnings; and he has the right to annul her vows; and he inherits her assets if she dies; and if she dies he must become ritually impure on her account even if he is a priest. The principle is: She is his wife in every sense, except that she can leave him by means of refusal and does not require a bill of divorce.
אמר רבי נראין דברי רבי אליעזר מדברי רבי יהושע שרבי אליעזר השוה מדותיו בקטנה ורבי יהושע חלק מאי חלק אי אשתו היא תיבעי גט
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer appears to be more correct than the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, as Rabbi Eliezer applied a consistent standard with regard to a minor, while Rabbi Yehoshua applied an inconsistent standard. The Gemara asks: In what way is his standard inconsistent? The Gemara answers: If she is his wife, she should require a bill of divorce from him.
לרבי אליעזר נמי אי לאו אשתו היא מיאון נמי לא תיבעי אלא בכדי תיפוק:
According to Rabbi Eliezer too, there appears to be an inconsistency, as, if she is not his wife, she should not be required to perform refusal either. The Gemara answers: But shall she leave with no ritual at all? Some sort of act is required to indicate that their relationship is permanently severed. Rabbi Eliezer has a consistent standard, according to which the marriage of a minor has no substance and to dissolve it she need only indicate that she does not want her husband. Rabbi Yehoshua is inconsistent in treating the relationship as a marriage even though it can be dissolved easily.
רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר וכו׳: היכי דמי עכבה שהיא מן האיש ועכבה שאינה מן האיש אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל תבעוה לינשא ואמרה מחמת פלוני בעלי זו היא עכבה שהיא מן האיש מחמת בני אדם שאינם מהוגנין לי זו היא עכבה שאינה מן האיש
§ The mishna stated: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: If there is any obstruction in the matter due to the man, it is as if she were his wife. If there is any obstruction in the matter that is not due to the man, it is as if she were not his wife. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an obstruction due to the man, and an obstruction that is not due to the man? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If someone proposed marriage to her and she said: I do not wish to marry on account of so-and-so, my husband, this is an obstruction that is due to the man. When she declined the proposal, she made it clear that she views herself as his wife. But if she says: I do not want to marry because the men suggested to me are not suitable for me, this is an obstruction that is not due to the man, and she is not considered to be his wife.
אביי בר אבין ורב חנינא בר אבין דאמרי תרוייהו נתן לה גט זו היא עכבה שהיא מן האיש והוא אסור בקרובותיה והיא אסורה בקרוביו ופסלה מן הכהונה מיאנה בו זו היא עכבה שאינה מן האיש והוא מותר בקרובותיה והיא מותרת בקרוביו ולא פסלה מן הכהונה
Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥanina bar Avin both say: If the minor’s husband gave her a bill of divorce, this is an obstruction that is due to the man, since in presenting the bill of divorce, the marriage is being treated as valid. Therefore, from then onward, he is prohibited from marrying her close relatives, and she is prohibited from marrying his close relatives; and, as a divorced woman, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. However, if she refuses him, this is an obstruction that is not due to the man. Therefore, he is permitted to marry her close relatives, and she is permitted to marry his close relatives, and she is not disqualified from the priesthood, since her refusal annuls the marriage retroactively.
הא קתני לקמן הממאנת באיש הוא מותר בקרובותיה והיא מותרת בקרוביו ולא פסלה מן הכהונה נתן לה גט הוא אסור בקרובותיה והיא אסורה בקרוביו ופסלה מן הכהונה פרושי קמפרש:
The Gemara challenges: But it is taught explicitly below, in the following mishna: If a minor girl refuses a man, he is permitted to marry her close relatives and she is permitted to marry his close relatives, and he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is prohibited from marrying her close relatives, and she is prohibited from marrying his close relatives, and he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. Since the difference between refusal and a bill of divorce is already addressed in the following mishna, why is the same ruling repeated here? The Gemara answers: The following mishna is explaining the latter part of this mishna.
מתני׳ הממאנת באיש הוא מותר בקרובותיה והיא מותרת בקרוביו ולא פסלה מן הכהונה נתן לה גט הוא אסור בקרובותיה והיא אסורה בקרוביו ופסלה מן הכהונה
MISHNA: If a minor girl refuses a man, he is permitted to marry her close relatives, such as her mother or her sister, and she is permitted to marry his close relatives, such as his father or brother, and he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is not considered divorced. However, if he gave her a bill of divorce, then even though the marriage was valid according to rabbinic law and not Torah law, he is prohibited from marrying her close relatives, and she is prohibited from marrying his close relatives, and he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood.
נתן לה גט והחזירה מיאנה בו ונשאת לאחר ונתארמלה או נתגרשה מותרת לחזור לו מיאנה בו והחזירה נתן לה גט ונשאת לאחר ונתארמלה או נתגרשה אסורה לחזור לו
If he gave her a bill of divorce but afterward remarried her, and she subsequently refused him and married another man, and then she was widowed or divorced from her second husband, she is permitted to return to him. Since she left him the last time by means of refusal, the refusal cancels the bill of divorce that he gave her previously, and her status is that of a minor girl who refused her husband, who is not forbidden to her first husband after a second marriage. However, if the order was different, and if she refused him and he subsequently remarried her, and this time he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man, and she was widowed or divorced, she is forbidden to return to him, like any divorced woman who married another man.
זה הכלל גט אחר מיאון אסורה לחזור לו מיאון אחר גט מותרת לחזור לו
This is the principle concerning a minor girl who refused her husband and then married several times: If the bill of divorce followed the refusal and she remarried, she is forbidden to return to him. If the refusal followed the bill of divorce, she is permitted to return to him. Since the refusal followed the bill of divorce it is clear that she was a minor and neither the marriage nor the divorce were valid by Torah law. However, when the ultimate separation is by means of a bill of divorce, there is no indication that she was a minor at the time and there is potential for confusion with an adult divorcée.
הממאנת באיש ונשאת לאחר וגירשה לאחר ומיאנה בו לאחר וגירשה זה הכלל כל שיוצאה הימנו בגט אסורה לחזור לו במיאון מותרת לחזור לו:
If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another, and he divorces her, and then she marries another man and refuses him, and then she marries another man and he divorces her, this is the principle for this case: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, it is prohibited for her to return to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him.
גמ׳ אלמא אתי מיאון ומבטל גט
GEMARA: It was taught in the mishna that if the man gave his minor wife a bill of divorce but subsequently remarried her and she refused him, and then she married someone else, she is permitted to remarry the first husband when her marriage to the second is concluded. Apparently, refusal comes and nullifies a bill of divorce.
ורמינהי הממאנת באיש ונשאת לאחר וגירשה לאחר ומיאנה בו לאחר וגירשה זה הכלל כל שיצתה הימנו בגט אסורה לחזור לו במיאון מותרת לחזור לו אלמא לא אתי מיאון דחבריה ובטיל גיטא דידיה
The Gemara raises a contradiction from the end of the mishna: If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another, and he divorces her, and then she marries another man and refuses him, and then she marries another man and he divorces her, this is the principle: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, she is prohibited from returning to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him. Apparently, a refusal of another man does not come and nullify one’s own bill of divorce. If the refusal completely nullified the marriage to the second husband, there would be no obstacle to her remarrying her first husband, as an ex-wife who did not marry another man is permitted to remarry her first husband. However, the divorce, combined with the second marriage, does generate a prohibition, and she is prohibited from remarrying in this case.
אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו
Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This mishna is disjointed, and he who taught this halakha, that she may remarry her first husband if she refused him after he divorced her, did not teach that halakha, that her refusal of another man does not render her permitted to her divorced husband.
אמר רבא ומאי קושיא ודלמא מיאון דידיה מבטל גט דידיה מיאון דחבריה לא מבטל גיטא דידיה ומאי שנא מיאון דחבריה דלא מבטל גיטא דידיה איידי דמכרת ברמיזותיו וקריצותיו אזל משבש ומייתי לה מיאון דידיה נמי לא ליבטל גיטא דידיה דאיידי דמכרת ברמיזותיו וקריצותיו אזיל משבש ומייתי לה
Rava said: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps her refusal of him nullifies his bill of divorce, while her refusal of the other man does not nullify the original husband’s bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: In what way is her refusal of the other man different, that it does not nullify his bill of divorce? Isn’t it that because she is familiar with the intimations and gestures [keritzotav] of her first husband, he will lead her astray and bring her back to him, by causing her to refuse her new husband and then return to him? Consequently, it was decreed that she may not return to her first husband by refusing the second. But for this same reason the refusal against the first husband himself also should not nullify his own bill of divorce, as, since she is familiar with his intimations and gestures, he will lead her astray and bring her back to him after she has married another man.
הא כבר שבשא ולא אישבשא
The Gemara answers: But he already tried to lead her astray and she was not led astray. In other words, he already remarried her after the divorce and she still refused him, which proves that he does not have sufficient influence to lead her astray.
אלא אי קשיא דחבריה אדחבריה קשיא מיאנה בו והחזירה נתן לה גט ונשאת לאחר ונתארמלה או נתגרשה אסורה לחזור לו טעמא דנתארמלה או נתגרשה הא מיאנה מותרת לחזור לו אלמא אתי מיאון דחבריה ומבטל גיטא דידיה
But if there is a difficulty, it is the contradiction between one halakha involving another man and a different halakha involving another man that is difficult, as the mishna states: If she refused him and he subsequently remarried her, and this time he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man, and she was widowed or divorced, she is prohibited from returning to her original husband. The reason is specifically that she was widowed or divorced by the other man. But if she had refused the second husband, she would be permitted to return to the first husband. Apparently, a refusal of the other man would have come and nullified his bill of divorce, permitting her to remarry the first husband, despite her erstwhile marriage to the other man.
ורמינהי הממאנת באיש ונשאת לאחר וגירשה לאחר ומיאנה בו זה הכלל כל שיצתה ממנו בגט אסורה לחזור לו במיאון מותרת לחזור לו אלמא לא אתי מיאון דחבריה ומבטל גיטא דידיה
This raises a contradiction, as it is taught later: If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another and he divorces her, and then she marries another and refuses him, this is the principle: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, she is prohibited from returning to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him. Apparently, refusal of the other man cannot come and nullify his own bill of divorce.
אמר רבי אלעזר תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו עולא אמר כגון ששלשה בגיטין דמיחזיא כגדולה
Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed, and he who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha. Ulla said: The last clause, in which it says her refusal does not nullify the bill of divorce, is referring to a case where she was divorced three times. Since she was divorced three times, she appears to be an adult, and therefore the Sages did not allow her refusal to cancel the effect of the divorce.
מאן תנא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מאי דכתיב מימינו בכסף שתינו עצינו במחיר יבאו בשעת הסכנה נתבקשה הלכה זו הרי שיצאה מראשון בגט ומשני במיאון מהו שתחזור לראשון
§ The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Elazar, who holds that the mishna is disjointed, who is the tanna that taught that a minor may always remarry a husband she refused but not one who divorced her? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This can be determined based on the following incident. What is the meaning of that which is written: “We have drunk our water for money; our wood comes to us for a price” (Lamentations 5:4), implying that Torah, which is analogous to water, can be purchased with money. The Gemara explains: During the time of danger, i.e., religious persecution by the Romans, this halakhic ruling was requested: If she, a minor, left her first husband by means of a bill of divorce and her second by refusal, what is the halakha with regard to her returning to the first?
שכרו אדם אחד בארבע מאות זוז ושאלו את רבי עקיבא בבית האסורין ואסר את רבי יהודה בן בתירה בנציבין ואסר
Those involved hired one person for four hundred dinars for the dangerous mission and asked Rabbi Akiva, who was incarcerated in prison by the Romans for teaching Torah, and he ruled that it is forbidden. They asked Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in Netzivin, in Babylonia, and he also deemed it forbidden.
אמר רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי לזו לא הוצרכנו לאיסור כרת התרת לאיסור לאו לא כל שכן
Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: This question was not what they asked, as it was unnecessary: If you rendered permitted a prohibition for whose violation one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet], i.e., if the prohibition against sexual intercourse with a married woman is dissolved by the refusal, as the marriage is nullified retroactively, then is it not clear all the more so that after a refusal, the regular prohibition against remarrying one’s ex-wife after she was married to another should be permitted? The opinion in the mishna that refusal does not cancel the effect of divorce is in accordance with that of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, while the opinion that she is permitted to return to her first husband after refusing the second one is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei.
ברם כך שאלו הרי היתה אשת אחי אמו שהיא שנייה לו ונשאה אחיו מאביו ומת מהו שתמאן השתא ותעקרינהו לנישואין קמאי ותתייבם (צרתה) יש מיאון לאחר מיתה במקום מצוה או לא
Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, continued: Rather, this is what they asked: If the minor was the wife of someone’s mother’s brother, a secondary forbidden relative, i.e., a relative forbidden to him by rabbinic law, and afterward his paternal brother married her and died, so that she became eligible to him for levirate marriage, what is the halakha with regard to the following: May she refuse now and uproot the first marriage to the mother’s brother, so that she will no longer be a forbidden relative, and likewise her rival wife will not be the rival wife of a forbidden relative, so that her rival wife may enter into levirate marriage? In other words, in a case where there is a mitzva of levirate marriage, is refusal after the husband’s death valid or not?
שכרו שני בני אדם בארבע מאות זוז ובאו ושאלו את רבי עקיבא בבית האסורין ואסר את רבי יהודה בן בתירה בנציבין ואסר
Those involved hired two people for four hundred dinars, and they came and asked Rabbi Akiva in prison and he deemed it prohibited. They asked Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in Netzivin and he deemed it prohibited.
אמר רב יצחק בר אשיאן ומודה רב שמותרת לאחיו של זה שנאסרה עליו
Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said: Rav concedes that she is permitted to the brother of the man to whom she is forbidden. Rav Yitzḥak is referring to a case of a minor who refused her husband, remarried the same man, and was subsequently divorced, and then married another man and refused him. Although she may not remarry the first husband, she may marry his brother, despite the fact that one may not ordinarily marry one’s brother’s divorcée.
פשיטא הוא ניהו דמכרת ברמיזותיו וקריצותיו אבל אחיו לא מהו דתימא ליגזר האי אטו האי קא משמע לן
The Gemara asks: It is obvious. It is he, her former husband, whose hints and gestures she recognizes, but not those of his brother, so that there is no concern that the brother will persuade her to refuse her husband. The Gemara explains: Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan saw fit to point this out, lest you say: Issue a decree rendering it prohibited for her to marry this brother due to the risk that such a marriage would lead people to think she is permitted to marry that brother, her original husband. Therefore, he teaches us that no such decree was instituted.
ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב יצחק בר אשיאן כשם שאסורה לו כך אסורה לאחין והא אינה מכרת בקריצותיהם ורמיזותיהם גזירה אחיו אטו הוא:
And there are those who say a different version of the discussion: Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said: Just as she is forbidden to him, to the man who divorced her, so is she forbidden to his brothers. The Gemara asks: But she is not familiar with their intimations and gestures. Why is it prohibited for her to marry them? The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree concerning the ex-husband’s brothers due to him, the ex-husband. If she were to be permitted to her ex-husband’s brothers, people might mistakenly think that she is even permitted to remarry the ex-husband himself.
מתני׳ המגרש את האשה והחזירה מותרת ליבם
MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces a woman and remarries her and then dies childless, his wife is permitted to enter into levirate marriage with her yavam,
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".
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Yevamot 108
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
אתי לאיחלופי בגיטא תקינו הכי ביום פלוני מיאנה פלונית בת פלוני באנפנא
This document may come to be confused with a bill of divorce and perhaps a man will err and give a bill of divorce using the text of refusal. Therefore, they decreed that one should write as follows: On such and such a day, so-and-so, the daughter of so-and-so, performed refusal in our presence, and no more.
תנו רבנן אי זהו מיאון אמרה אי אפשי בפלוני בעלי אי אפשי בקידושין שקידשוני אמי ואחי יתר על כן אמר רבי יהודה אפילו יושבת באפריון והולכת מבית אביה לבית בעלה ואמרה אי אפשי בפלוני בעלי זהו מיאון
§ The Sages taught: What constitutes a refusal? If she said: I do not want so-and-so as my husband, or: I do not want the betrothal in which my mother and brothers had me betrothed, that is a refusal. Rabbi Yehuda said more than that: Even if she is sitting in a bridal chair [apiryon] going from her father’s house to her husband’s house and said along the way: I do not want so-and-so as my husband, this constitutes a refusal.
יתר על כן אמר רבי יהודה אפילו היו אורחין מסובין בבית בעלה והיא עומדת ומשקה עליהם ואמרה להם אי אפשי בפלוני בעלי הרי הוא מיאון יתר על כן אמר רבי יוסי בר יהודה אפילו שיגרה בעלה אצל חנוני להביא לו חפץ משלו ואמרה אי אפשי בפלוני בעלי אין לך מיאון גדול מזה:
Rabbi Yehuda said even more than that: Even if guests are reclining at her husband’s house and she is standing and serving them drinks as hostess, and she said to them: I do not want so-and-so as my husband, this constitutes a refusal, even though it is possible that she is merely complaining about the effort she is expending. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda said more than that: Even if her husband sent her to a shopkeeper to bring him an article of his and she said: I do not want so-and-so as my husband, there is no greater refusal than this.
רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר כל תינוקת וכו׳: אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס תנא קטנה שלא מיאנה ועמדה ונשאת משום רבי יהודה בן בתירה אמרו נישואיה הן הן מיאוניה
§ It was taught in the mishna: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Any girl who is so young that she cannot keep her betrothal safe does not need to refuse. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus. It was taught: In the case of a minor girl who did not refuse her husband, but who went and married someone else, it was said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira: Her new marriage constitutes her refusal, as she made her state of mind known, that she does not want him, and that is sufficient.
איבעיא להו נתקדשה מהו תא שמע קטנה שלא מיאנה ועמדה ונתקדשה משום רבי יהודה בן בתירה אמרו קידושיה הן הן מיאוניה
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha if she was betrothed to another man without performing refusal of the first husband? Is her acceptance of the betrothal sufficient to indicate that she refuses the first husband? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer from a baraita: If a minor girl did not refuse her husband but went and became betrothed to another man, then, as the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira: Her betrothal constitutes her refusal.
איבעיא להו פליגי רבנן עליה דרבי יהודה בן בתירה או לא אם תימצי לומר פליגי בקידושין או אפילו בנישואין ואם תימצי לומר פליגי אפילו בנישואין הלכה כמותו או אין הלכה כמותו ואם תימצי לומר הלכה כמותו בנישואין או אפילו בקידושין
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira or not? And further, if you say that they do disagree with him, do they disagree with him with regard to betrothal alone, or do they also disagree with him with regard to marriage? And if you say that they disagree even with regard to marriage, is the halakha in accordance with his opinion or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? And if you say that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, is this only with regard to marriage, or is it even with regard to betrothal?
תא שמע אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יהודה בן בתירה הלכה מכלל דפליגי
The Gemara cites a tradition: Come and hear: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira with regard to both marriage and betrothal. From the fact that he ruled the halakha, one may derive by inference that the Rabbis disagree.
ואכתי תיבעי לך דהוה נסיבא מעיקרא או דלמא מיקדשא תא שמע דכלתיה דאבדן אימרוד שדר רבי זוגי דרבנן למיבדקינהו אמרי להו נשי חזו גברייכו דקאתו אמרי להו ניהוו גברייכו דידכו
But still, you should raise the dilemma: Does Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira say that her betrothal to another counts as refusal even when she had initially been married or perhaps only if she was betrothed but not married beforehand? Come and hear: The daughters-in-law of Abdan rebelled against their husbands. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sent a pair of Sages to examine them and determine what could be done to rectify the matter. Some women said to the daughters-in-law: See, it is your husbands that are coming. They said back to them: Let them be your husbands.
אמר רבי אין לך מיאון גדול מזה מאי לאו דהוה נסיבא לא דהוה מיקדשא קידושי והלכה כרבי יהודה בן בתירה ואפילו בנישואין דקמא:
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: There is no greater refusal than this. What is the case? Is it not that they were already married? The Gemara rejects this: No, they were merely betrothed, but not married. This story cannot establish unequivocally what the halakha is in the case when the girl is married. The Gemara nevertheless concludes: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in all of these matters, even with regard to her marriage to the first husband: Even if she had actually been married to the first man, the marriage is invalidated by her betrothal to another.
רבי אלעזר אומר וכו׳: אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל חוזרני על כל צדדי חכמים ולא מצאתי אדם שהשוה מדותיו בקטנה כרבי אלעזר שעשאה רבי אלעזר כמטיילת עמו בחצר ועומדת מחיקו וטובלת ואוכלת בתרומה לערב
§ It is taught in the mishna: Rabbi Elazar says: The act of a minor girl is nothing. Rather, her status is as though she were a seduced unmarried woman. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: I reviewed all the opinions of the Sages concerning these matters, and I did not find any person who applied a consistent standard with regard to a minor like Rabbi Elazar did. For Rabbi Elazar portrayed her as a girl walking with her husband in a courtyard, who stands up from his bosom after he engaged in intercourse with her, and immerses herself to become ritually pure, and partakes of teruma by evening as if there were no marital bond between them and as if she, as the daughter of a priest, could continue to partake of teruma. The daughter of a priest is prohibited from eating teruma once she is married to a non-priest.
תניא רבי אליעזר אומר אין מעשה קטנה כלום ואין בעלה זכאי לא במציאתה ולא במעשה ידיה ולא בהפרת נדריה ואינו יורשה ואין מיטמא לה כללו של דבר אינה כאשתו לכל דבר אלא שצריכה מיאון
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of a minor girl is nothing, and therefore her marriage is not valid. And her husband has no rights to items she finds, nor to her earnings; nor does he have the right to annul her vows; he does not inherit her assets if she dies; and if she dies he may not become ritually impure on her account if he is a priest, i.e., through his presence in the same room as her corpse. The principle is: She is not his wife in any sense, except that she must perform refusal in order to marry someone else.
רבי יהושע אומר בעלה זכאי במציאתה ובמעשה ידיה ובהפרת נדריה ויורשה ומיטמא לה כללו של דבר הרי היא כאשתו לכל דבר אלא שיוצאה במיאון
Rabbi Yehoshua says: In the case of a minor whose mother or brother married her off, her husband has rights to items she finds, and to her earnings; and he has the right to annul her vows; and he inherits her assets if she dies; and if she dies he must become ritually impure on her account even if he is a priest. The principle is: She is his wife in every sense, except that she can leave him by means of refusal and does not require a bill of divorce.
אמר רבי נראין דברי רבי אליעזר מדברי רבי יהושע שרבי אליעזר השוה מדותיו בקטנה ורבי יהושע חלק מאי חלק אי אשתו היא תיבעי גט
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer appears to be more correct than the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, as Rabbi Eliezer applied a consistent standard with regard to a minor, while Rabbi Yehoshua applied an inconsistent standard. The Gemara asks: In what way is his standard inconsistent? The Gemara answers: If she is his wife, she should require a bill of divorce from him.
לרבי אליעזר נמי אי לאו אשתו היא מיאון נמי לא תיבעי אלא בכדי תיפוק:
According to Rabbi Eliezer too, there appears to be an inconsistency, as, if she is not his wife, she should not be required to perform refusal either. The Gemara answers: But shall she leave with no ritual at all? Some sort of act is required to indicate that their relationship is permanently severed. Rabbi Eliezer has a consistent standard, according to which the marriage of a minor has no substance and to dissolve it she need only indicate that she does not want her husband. Rabbi Yehoshua is inconsistent in treating the relationship as a marriage even though it can be dissolved easily.
רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר וכו׳: היכי דמי עכבה שהיא מן האיש ועכבה שאינה מן האיש אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל תבעוה לינשא ואמרה מחמת פלוני בעלי זו היא עכבה שהיא מן האיש מחמת בני אדם שאינם מהוגנין לי זו היא עכבה שאינה מן האיש
§ The mishna stated: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: If there is any obstruction in the matter due to the man, it is as if she were his wife. If there is any obstruction in the matter that is not due to the man, it is as if she were not his wife. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an obstruction due to the man, and an obstruction that is not due to the man? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If someone proposed marriage to her and she said: I do not wish to marry on account of so-and-so, my husband, this is an obstruction that is due to the man. When she declined the proposal, she made it clear that she views herself as his wife. But if she says: I do not want to marry because the men suggested to me are not suitable for me, this is an obstruction that is not due to the man, and she is not considered to be his wife.
אביי בר אבין ורב חנינא בר אבין דאמרי תרוייהו נתן לה גט זו היא עכבה שהיא מן האיש והוא אסור בקרובותיה והיא אסורה בקרוביו ופסלה מן הכהונה מיאנה בו זו היא עכבה שאינה מן האיש והוא מותר בקרובותיה והיא מותרת בקרוביו ולא פסלה מן הכהונה
Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥanina bar Avin both say: If the minor’s husband gave her a bill of divorce, this is an obstruction that is due to the man, since in presenting the bill of divorce, the marriage is being treated as valid. Therefore, from then onward, he is prohibited from marrying her close relatives, and she is prohibited from marrying his close relatives; and, as a divorced woman, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. However, if she refuses him, this is an obstruction that is not due to the man. Therefore, he is permitted to marry her close relatives, and she is permitted to marry his close relatives, and she is not disqualified from the priesthood, since her refusal annuls the marriage retroactively.
הא קתני לקמן הממאנת באיש הוא מותר בקרובותיה והיא מותרת בקרוביו ולא פסלה מן הכהונה נתן לה גט הוא אסור בקרובותיה והיא אסורה בקרוביו ופסלה מן הכהונה פרושי קמפרש:
The Gemara challenges: But it is taught explicitly below, in the following mishna: If a minor girl refuses a man, he is permitted to marry her close relatives and she is permitted to marry his close relatives, and he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is prohibited from marrying her close relatives, and she is prohibited from marrying his close relatives, and he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. Since the difference between refusal and a bill of divorce is already addressed in the following mishna, why is the same ruling repeated here? The Gemara answers: The following mishna is explaining the latter part of this mishna.
מתני׳ הממאנת באיש הוא מותר בקרובותיה והיא מותרת בקרוביו ולא פסלה מן הכהונה נתן לה גט הוא אסור בקרובותיה והיא אסורה בקרוביו ופסלה מן הכהונה
MISHNA: If a minor girl refuses a man, he is permitted to marry her close relatives, such as her mother or her sister, and she is permitted to marry his close relatives, such as his father or brother, and he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is not considered divorced. However, if he gave her a bill of divorce, then even though the marriage was valid according to rabbinic law and not Torah law, he is prohibited from marrying her close relatives, and she is prohibited from marrying his close relatives, and he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood.
נתן לה גט והחזירה מיאנה בו ונשאת לאחר ונתארמלה או נתגרשה מותרת לחזור לו מיאנה בו והחזירה נתן לה גט ונשאת לאחר ונתארמלה או נתגרשה אסורה לחזור לו
If he gave her a bill of divorce but afterward remarried her, and she subsequently refused him and married another man, and then she was widowed or divorced from her second husband, she is permitted to return to him. Since she left him the last time by means of refusal, the refusal cancels the bill of divorce that he gave her previously, and her status is that of a minor girl who refused her husband, who is not forbidden to her first husband after a second marriage. However, if the order was different, and if she refused him and he subsequently remarried her, and this time he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man, and she was widowed or divorced, she is forbidden to return to him, like any divorced woman who married another man.
זה הכלל גט אחר מיאון אסורה לחזור לו מיאון אחר גט מותרת לחזור לו
This is the principle concerning a minor girl who refused her husband and then married several times: If the bill of divorce followed the refusal and she remarried, she is forbidden to return to him. If the refusal followed the bill of divorce, she is permitted to return to him. Since the refusal followed the bill of divorce it is clear that she was a minor and neither the marriage nor the divorce were valid by Torah law. However, when the ultimate separation is by means of a bill of divorce, there is no indication that she was a minor at the time and there is potential for confusion with an adult divorcée.
הממאנת באיש ונשאת לאחר וגירשה לאחר ומיאנה בו לאחר וגירשה זה הכלל כל שיוצאה הימנו בגט אסורה לחזור לו במיאון מותרת לחזור לו:
If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another, and he divorces her, and then she marries another man and refuses him, and then she marries another man and he divorces her, this is the principle for this case: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, it is prohibited for her to return to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him.
גמ׳ אלמא אתי מיאון ומבטל גט
GEMARA: It was taught in the mishna that if the man gave his minor wife a bill of divorce but subsequently remarried her and she refused him, and then she married someone else, she is permitted to remarry the first husband when her marriage to the second is concluded. Apparently, refusal comes and nullifies a bill of divorce.
ורמינהי הממאנת באיש ונשאת לאחר וגירשה לאחר ומיאנה בו לאחר וגירשה זה הכלל כל שיצתה הימנו בגט אסורה לחזור לו במיאון מותרת לחזור לו אלמא לא אתי מיאון דחבריה ובטיל גיטא דידיה
The Gemara raises a contradiction from the end of the mishna: If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another, and he divorces her, and then she marries another man and refuses him, and then she marries another man and he divorces her, this is the principle: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, she is prohibited from returning to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him. Apparently, a refusal of another man does not come and nullify one’s own bill of divorce. If the refusal completely nullified the marriage to the second husband, there would be no obstacle to her remarrying her first husband, as an ex-wife who did not marry another man is permitted to remarry her first husband. However, the divorce, combined with the second marriage, does generate a prohibition, and she is prohibited from remarrying in this case.
אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו
Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This mishna is disjointed, and he who taught this halakha, that she may remarry her first husband if she refused him after he divorced her, did not teach that halakha, that her refusal of another man does not render her permitted to her divorced husband.
אמר רבא ומאי קושיא ודלמא מיאון דידיה מבטל גט דידיה מיאון דחבריה לא מבטל גיטא דידיה ומאי שנא מיאון דחבריה דלא מבטל גיטא דידיה איידי דמכרת ברמיזותיו וקריצותיו אזל משבש ומייתי לה מיאון דידיה נמי לא ליבטל גיטא דידיה דאיידי דמכרת ברמיזותיו וקריצותיו אזיל משבש ומייתי לה
Rava said: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps her refusal of him nullifies his bill of divorce, while her refusal of the other man does not nullify the original husband’s bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: In what way is her refusal of the other man different, that it does not nullify his bill of divorce? Isn’t it that because she is familiar with the intimations and gestures [keritzotav] of her first husband, he will lead her astray and bring her back to him, by causing her to refuse her new husband and then return to him? Consequently, it was decreed that she may not return to her first husband by refusing the second. But for this same reason the refusal against the first husband himself also should not nullify his own bill of divorce, as, since she is familiar with his intimations and gestures, he will lead her astray and bring her back to him after she has married another man.
הא כבר שבשא ולא אישבשא
The Gemara answers: But he already tried to lead her astray and she was not led astray. In other words, he already remarried her after the divorce and she still refused him, which proves that he does not have sufficient influence to lead her astray.
אלא אי קשיא דחבריה אדחבריה קשיא מיאנה בו והחזירה נתן לה גט ונשאת לאחר ונתארמלה או נתגרשה אסורה לחזור לו טעמא דנתארמלה או נתגרשה הא מיאנה מותרת לחזור לו אלמא אתי מיאון דחבריה ומבטל גיטא דידיה
But if there is a difficulty, it is the contradiction between one halakha involving another man and a different halakha involving another man that is difficult, as the mishna states: If she refused him and he subsequently remarried her, and this time he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man, and she was widowed or divorced, she is prohibited from returning to her original husband. The reason is specifically that she was widowed or divorced by the other man. But if she had refused the second husband, she would be permitted to return to the first husband. Apparently, a refusal of the other man would have come and nullified his bill of divorce, permitting her to remarry the first husband, despite her erstwhile marriage to the other man.
ורמינהי הממאנת באיש ונשאת לאחר וגירשה לאחר ומיאנה בו זה הכלל כל שיצתה ממנו בגט אסורה לחזור לו במיאון מותרת לחזור לו אלמא לא אתי מיאון דחבריה ומבטל גיטא דידיה
This raises a contradiction, as it is taught later: If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another and he divorces her, and then she marries another and refuses him, this is the principle: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, she is prohibited from returning to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him. Apparently, refusal of the other man cannot come and nullify his own bill of divorce.
אמר רבי אלעזר תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו עולא אמר כגון ששלשה בגיטין דמיחזיא כגדולה
Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed, and he who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha. Ulla said: The last clause, in which it says her refusal does not nullify the bill of divorce, is referring to a case where she was divorced three times. Since she was divorced three times, she appears to be an adult, and therefore the Sages did not allow her refusal to cancel the effect of the divorce.
מאן תנא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מאי דכתיב מימינו בכסף שתינו עצינו במחיר יבאו בשעת הסכנה נתבקשה הלכה זו הרי שיצאה מראשון בגט ומשני במיאון מהו שתחזור לראשון
§ The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Elazar, who holds that the mishna is disjointed, who is the tanna that taught that a minor may always remarry a husband she refused but not one who divorced her? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This can be determined based on the following incident. What is the meaning of that which is written: “We have drunk our water for money; our wood comes to us for a price” (Lamentations 5:4), implying that Torah, which is analogous to water, can be purchased with money. The Gemara explains: During the time of danger, i.e., religious persecution by the Romans, this halakhic ruling was requested: If she, a minor, left her first husband by means of a bill of divorce and her second by refusal, what is the halakha with regard to her returning to the first?
שכרו אדם אחד בארבע מאות זוז ושאלו את רבי עקיבא בבית האסורין ואסר את רבי יהודה בן בתירה בנציבין ואסר
Those involved hired one person for four hundred dinars for the dangerous mission and asked Rabbi Akiva, who was incarcerated in prison by the Romans for teaching Torah, and he ruled that it is forbidden. They asked Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in Netzivin, in Babylonia, and he also deemed it forbidden.
אמר רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי לזו לא הוצרכנו לאיסור כרת התרת לאיסור לאו לא כל שכן
Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: This question was not what they asked, as it was unnecessary: If you rendered permitted a prohibition for whose violation one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet], i.e., if the prohibition against sexual intercourse with a married woman is dissolved by the refusal, as the marriage is nullified retroactively, then is it not clear all the more so that after a refusal, the regular prohibition against remarrying one’s ex-wife after she was married to another should be permitted? The opinion in the mishna that refusal does not cancel the effect of divorce is in accordance with that of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, while the opinion that she is permitted to return to her first husband after refusing the second one is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei.
ברם כך שאלו הרי היתה אשת אחי אמו שהיא שנייה לו ונשאה אחיו מאביו ומת מהו שתמאן השתא ותעקרינהו לנישואין קמאי ותתייבם (צרתה) יש מיאון לאחר מיתה במקום מצוה או לא
Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, continued: Rather, this is what they asked: If the minor was the wife of someone’s mother’s brother, a secondary forbidden relative, i.e., a relative forbidden to him by rabbinic law, and afterward his paternal brother married her and died, so that she became eligible to him for levirate marriage, what is the halakha with regard to the following: May she refuse now and uproot the first marriage to the mother’s brother, so that she will no longer be a forbidden relative, and likewise her rival wife will not be the rival wife of a forbidden relative, so that her rival wife may enter into levirate marriage? In other words, in a case where there is a mitzva of levirate marriage, is refusal after the husband’s death valid or not?
שכרו שני בני אדם בארבע מאות זוז ובאו ושאלו את רבי עקיבא בבית האסורין ואסר את רבי יהודה בן בתירה בנציבין ואסר
Those involved hired two people for four hundred dinars, and they came and asked Rabbi Akiva in prison and he deemed it prohibited. They asked Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in Netzivin and he deemed it prohibited.
אמר רב יצחק בר אשיאן ומודה רב שמותרת לאחיו של זה שנאסרה עליו
Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said: Rav concedes that she is permitted to the brother of the man to whom she is forbidden. Rav Yitzḥak is referring to a case of a minor who refused her husband, remarried the same man, and was subsequently divorced, and then married another man and refused him. Although she may not remarry the first husband, she may marry his brother, despite the fact that one may not ordinarily marry one’s brother’s divorcée.
פשיטא הוא ניהו דמכרת ברמיזותיו וקריצותיו אבל אחיו לא מהו דתימא ליגזר האי אטו האי קא משמע לן
The Gemara asks: It is obvious. It is he, her former husband, whose hints and gestures she recognizes, but not those of his brother, so that there is no concern that the brother will persuade her to refuse her husband. The Gemara explains: Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan saw fit to point this out, lest you say: Issue a decree rendering it prohibited for her to marry this brother due to the risk that such a marriage would lead people to think she is permitted to marry that brother, her original husband. Therefore, he teaches us that no such decree was instituted.
ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב יצחק בר אשיאן כשם שאסורה לו כך אסורה לאחין והא אינה מכרת בקריצותיהם ורמיזותיהם גזירה אחיו אטו הוא:
And there are those who say a different version of the discussion: Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said: Just as she is forbidden to him, to the man who divorced her, so is she forbidden to his brothers. The Gemara asks: But she is not familiar with their intimations and gestures. Why is it prohibited for her to marry them? The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree concerning the ex-husband’s brothers due to him, the ex-husband. If she were to be permitted to her ex-husband’s brothers, people might mistakenly think that she is even permitted to remarry the ex-husband himself.
מתני׳ המגרש את האשה והחזירה מותרת ליבם
MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces a woman and remarries her and then dies childless, his wife is permitted to enter into levirate marriage with her yavam,
