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Today's Daf Yomi

March 18, 2022 | 讟状讜 讘讗讚专 讘壮 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 11

This week’s daf is sponsored by Ira and Natanya Slomowitz for the refuah shleima of Dvora Diener, Dvora Rachel bat Ahuva and Harav Shlomo.

Today’s learning is sponsored by Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle for her leadership in furthering Talmud study and for inspiring us Long Island learners. We are not only virtual chevrutot, we have also become chaverot!

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagreed about the status of a woman compared to the other brothers in a case where after she did chalitza with one of the brothers, is she forbidden to the others as their brother’s wife, punishable by karet or is it only a negative commandment from “he did not build his brother’s legacy” and therefore can no longer marry her. The braita that was brought by Rabbi Yochanan to raise a difficulty with Reish Lakish, but also had a line in there that was difficult for Rabbi Yochanan is explained in two different ways in order to align it with each opinion. To do this, they need to explain that the braita was a case of a brother that was not yet alive and each can be explained according to a different opinion in the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding that case. What is the punishment if one brother did a levirate marriage with one wife and another married the second wife? Rav Acha and Ravina disagree and their opinions align with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. A second wife of a woman who committed adultery is exempt from yibum. This is derived from the word “impurity” used by the Torah for a sotah, which puts it in the category of arayot, forbidden relationships. Two questions are raised against Rav and are resolved. Rav Yehuda asked Rav Sheshet regarding the second wife of a woman who was divorced, married someone else in between and then remarried the first husband and he died without children. Would the second wife be exempt from yibum on account of the fact that the first wife was not allowed to be married to her husband, like the adulterer in the previous case? First it is explained according to what opinion is the question asked. Then they try to answer the question from two different sources, but are unsuccessful. Rabbi Yochanan asks the same question as well and two different versions of his question are brought.

拽砖讬讗 专讘 讗砖讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讜诪转专抓 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专讘讬谞讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜诪转专抓 讻专讘谞谉

搂 The Gemara comments: Rav Sheshet鈥檚 explanation of the contradiction between the first clause and latter clause of the baraita is difficult. Consequently, the Gemara cites different resolutions of this contradiction. Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Ravina, in contrast, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

专讘 讗砖讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讜诪转专抓 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讞讜诇抓 诇讬讘诪转讜 讜讞讝专 讜拽讚砖讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞诇讬爪讛 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪讗谉 讗讞讬谉

The Gemara elaborates: Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is his interpretation: In the case of one who performs 岣litza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died, she requires 岣litza from one of the brothers. Who are the brothers referred to here?

讗讞讬谉 讛讬诇讜讚讬诐 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉

Rav Ashi explains that they are the newborn brothers, i.e., those who were born only after the brother betrothed her. Consequently, although this woman was the wife of the first deceased brother before they were born, after their birth she was already the wife of a living brother. Therefore, the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist never applied, and she requires 岣litza. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that in a case of this kind the brothers are not considered to be coexisting.

注诪讚 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛谞讜诇讚讬诐 讜拽讚砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 注诇讬讜 讻诇讜诐 讻诪讗谉 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖

Meanwhile, the latter clause speaks of a case where one of the brothers who was born in the lifetime of the first brother arose and betrothed her, after another brother had performed 岣litza. In this case, she has no claims of a bill of divorce on him. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that the penalty of karet applies in this case, and therefore the betrothal is entirely invalid.

专讘讬谞讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜诪转专抓 诇讛 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讞讜诇抓 诇讬讘诪转讜 讜讞讝专 讜拽讚砖讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞诇讬爪讛 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪讗谉 讗讞讬谉 讗讞讬谉 讛谞讜诇讚讬诐 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉

The Gemara continues its explanation of the opinions. Ravina holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. How so? In the case of one who performs 岣litza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her and then died, she requires 岣litza from one of the brothers. Who are these brothers? This is referring to the brothers already born in the lifetime of the first brother. In accordance with whose opinion is this interpretation? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who held that this case constitutes a regular prohibition. Consequently, the yevama is not exempt from the obligation of 岣litza.

注诪讚 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讬诇讜讚讬诐 讜拽讚砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 注诇讬讜 讻诇讜诐 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘谞谉

If one of the newborn brothers, who were born after the death of the first brother, arose and betrothed her, she has no claim on him. Since he is considered a brother who did not coexist with his deceased brother, the yevama is prohibited to him as a brother鈥檚 wife, and as this prohibition entails karet, the betrothal is invalid. This is the halakha even if he was born after the second deceased brother betrothed her. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist applies even to a brother鈥檚 widow who entered into levirate marriage before the younger brother was born.

讗讬转诪专 讛讘讗 注诇 讬讘诪讛 讜讘讗 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 注诇 爪专转讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讜专讘讬谞讗 讞讚 讗诪专 讘讻专转 讜讞讚 讗诪专 讘注砖讛

It was stated that there is a similar dispute between amora鈥檌m with regard to one who had relations with his yevama and thereby performed the mitzva of levirate marriage as required, and one of the other brothers had relations with her rival wife. Rav A岣 and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said: The second brother is liable to receive karet. And the other one said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva. The verse: 鈥淲ho does not build up his brother鈥檚 house鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:9), is a positive mitzva, as it teaches that one house may be built up, but not two houses, i.e., no more than one wife of a deceased brother may be married by one of his brothers. Any mitzva formulated as a positive injunction has the status of a positive mitzva, even if it is violated by the performance of an action, in the manner of a prohibition.

诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘讻专转 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘注砖讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉

The Gemara explains: The one who said that he is liable to receive karet holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that after the mitzva is performed with one yevama who required levirate marriage, the prohibition of a brother鈥檚 wife is once again fully applicable to her rival wife. And the one who said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 爪专转 住讜讟讛 讗住讜专讛

The Gemara further analyzes the list of women exempt from levirate marriage. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The rival wife of a sota is forbidden. In this context, sota refers to an unfaithful wife. If the husband died, the unfaithful wife and her rival wife are exempt from both 岣litza and levirate marriage.

讟讜诪讗讛 讻转讬讘 讘讛 讻注专讬讜转

What is the reason for this? The term defilement is written in that passage dealing with an unfaithful wife: 鈥淪he being defiled secretly鈥 (Numbers 5:13), just as defilement is written with regard to those with whom relations are forbidden in the verse: 鈥淒efile not yourselves in any of these things, for in all these the nations are defiled, which I cast out from before you鈥 (Leviticus 18:24). This teaches that the halakha of an unfaithful wife is like that of a woman with whom relations are forbidden; both she and her rival wife are exempt from levirate marriage and 岣litza.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讞住讚讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘讬讗转讛 讗讜 讞诇讬爪转讛 诪讗讞讬讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉 驻讜讟专转 爪专转讛

Rav 岣sda raised an objection to this from the case of a woman who heard that her husband had died and remarried, only afterward to discover that he had still been alive at that time before dying later. What is the halakha in this case? Rabbi Shimon says: Her relations with or 岣litza from the brother of the first husband exempts her rival wife. This shows that the obligation of levirate marriage applies to this woman. Although she lived as a married woman with someone else during her husband鈥檚 lifetime, Rabbi Shimon nevertheless maintains that her sexual intercourse or 岣litza fulfills the mitzva of levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife. This suggests that the rival wife of an unfaithful wife requires levirate marriage.

[讗诪专 诇讱 专讘] 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讗谞讗 住讜讟讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讗转 讗诪专转 诇讬 住讜讟讛 讚专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers that Rav could have said to you in response: I spoke to you about the halakha of a sota by Torah law, i.e., a wife who was intentionally unfaithful, and you speak to me of a sota by rabbinic law? The case you mentioned is an unavoidable accident, as the wife married another man only because she received testimony that her husband was deceased. When the Sages instituted that she was forbidden to both her first and second husbands, this was a penalty designed to ensure that women would examine testimony of this kind very thoroughly. However, this is not a case of a sota by Torah law, as she was not intentionally unfaithful, and therefore the mitzva of levirate marriage certainly applies to her.

讜讚拽讗专讬 诇讛 诪讗讬 拽讗专讬 诇讛 拽住讘专 讻诇 讚转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讻注讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 转拽讜谉

Since this response is overwhelmingly obvious, the Gemara asks: And he who asked it, why did he ask it? There are apparently no grounds for this comparison at all. The Gemara explains: He held that all ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law. Consequently, if a sota by Torah law is exempt from levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife as though she were a forbidden relative, the same should apply to a sota by rabbinic law.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讗砖讬 谞讻谞住讛 注诪讜 诇住转专 讜砖讛转讛 注诪讜 讻讚讬 讟讜诪讗讛 讗住讜专讛 诇讘讬转讛 讜讗住讜专讛 诇讗讻讜诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讜讗诐 诪转 讞讜诇爪转

Rav Ashi raised an objection to Rav鈥檚 opinion from a different source: The halakha is that a wife who was warned by her husband not to be secluded with a specific man and yet entered alone with him in private, and remained with him long enough to be defiled, i.e., sufficient time to have sexual relations, she is forbidden to her house, i.e., her husband, from that moment until she undergoes the sota ritual. And likewise, if she was the wife of a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, as she was possibly disqualified by unfaithfulness. And if he dies, she performs 岣litza

讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转 [讗诪专 诇讱 专讘] 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讗谞讗 住讜讟讛 讜讚讗讬 讜讗诪专转 诇讬 讗转 住讜讟讛 住驻拽 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讜讟讛 讜讚讗讬 (诪讗讬 讟注诪讗) 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讬讘 讘讛 讟讜诪讗讛

and may not enter into levirate marriage. This indicates that the levirate bond does apply to a sota, which contradicts Rav鈥檚 statement. The Gemara retorts that Rav could have said to you: I spoke to you about a sota whose infidelity was definite, and you speak to me of an uncertain sota. There is no proof that this wife who secluded herself with another man was actually unfaithful, and due to the uncertainty she must still undergo 岣litza. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And what is different about a definite sota? Is it different because the term defilement is written with regard to her?

住讜讟讛 住驻拽 谞诪讬 讟讜诪讗讛 讻转讬讘讗 讘讛 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪谉 讛谞讬砖讜讗讬谉 讗住讜专讛 诪谉 讛讗讬专讜住讬谉 诪讜转专转 诪砖讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讗讞专讬 讗砖专 讛讟诪讗讛

But with regard to an uncertain sota, who was alone with a specific man enough time to engage in relations, defilement is written as well. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: With regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had been married to another man, an act prohibited by Torah law, if he remarried her following actual marriage to another, she is forbidden to her first husband. However, if he remarried her following mere betrothal to another man, she is permitted, because it is stated: 鈥淗er former husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after she was defiled鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:4), and a woman who was merely betrothed was never defiled, as no sexual relations had taken place.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讞转 讝讜 讜讗讞转 讝讜 讗住讜专讛 讗诇讗 诪讛 讗谞讬 诪拽讬讬诐 讗讞专讬 讛讟诪讗讛 诇专讘讜转 住讜讟讛 砖谞住转专讛

And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one, i.e., whether she had been fully married or merely betrothed to another, she is forbidden to her first husband. Rather, how do I establish the phrase: 鈥淎fter she was defiled鈥? This verse does not refer at all to the case of a woman who married another man lawfully, as she is not called 鈥渄efiled.鈥 Rather, it comes to include a sota who secluded herself with another man, as she is forbidden to her husband due to the concern that she might have committed adultery. This baraita shows that a sota is termed 鈥渄efiled,鈥 despite the fact that hers is an uncertain case.

讜诪讗讬 谞住转专讛 谞讘注诇讛 讜讗诪讗讬 拽专讬 诇讬讛 谞住转专讛 诇讬砖谞讗 诪注诇讬讗 谞拽讟 谞讘注诇讛 讟讜诪讗讛 讘讛讚讬讗 讻转讬讘 讘讛 讜谞住转专讛 讜讛讬讗 谞讟诪讗讛

The Gemara rejects this argument: And what does: Secluded herself, mean in this context? It means that she had actually engaged in relations. And why does the baraita call this: Secluded herself, instead of the more straightforward: Engaged in sexual relations? The baraita employed a euphemistic expression, but it actually means that she engaged in intercourse. The Gemara asks: If this is referring to a woman who had engaged in relations, the term defilement is already explicitly written with regard to her, in the chapter that deals with a sota. Why is it necessary to derive that she is defiled from a different source, as in the context of a sota herself the verse states: 鈥淪he being defiled secretly鈥 (Numbers 5:13)?

诇诪讬拽诐 注诇讛 讘诇讗讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 诇讗讜 讘住讜讟讛 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讝谞讗讬 谞诪讬

The Gemara explains that 鈥渕ay not take her again to be his wife after she was defiled鈥 does not teach that she is called 鈥渄efiled,鈥 but rather that the halakha establishes upon her a prohibition. In other words, if the husband engages in relations with his wife after she had had intercourse with another, he transgresses a prohibition. And the Gemara comments that Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar does not hold the opinion that there is a prohibition in the case of a sota, as he maintains that a husband who has relations with his sota wife does not transgress any prohibition at all, and the same is true even if she definitely fornicated with another man.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讜讬讛 讜讗讬砖讜转 讻转讬讘 讘讛

What is the rationale of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar? In his opinion, 鈥渁fter she was defiled鈥 does not refer to a sota but to a woman who had been legally divorced from her first husband and subsequently married another man. This is indicated by the fact that both becoming, i.e., betrothal, and matrimony are written in this context: 鈥淏ecomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2) and: 鈥淥r if the latter husband die, who took her to be his wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:3). Here it is clear that the reference is to halakhically valid marriage, whereas a sota had never been another man鈥檚 wife, as she cannot marry another man while she is still married.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诪专讘 砖砖转 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞讬住转 讜诪转 爪专转讛 诪讛讜 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 讟讜诪讗讛 讘诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘讗 爪专转讛 讻诪讜转讛

搂 The Gemara discusses a similar case. Rav Yehuda raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In the case of one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had married another, and then he dies childless, what is the halakha with regard to the levirate marriage of her rival wife? According to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar, do not raise the dilemma, since Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said that it is with regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e that defilement is written, and therefore the status of her rival wife is the same as hers.

讜讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讬讘 讘讛 转讜注讘讛 讛讬讗 讛讬讗 转讜注讘讛 讜讗讬谉 讘谞讬讛 转讜注讘讬谉 讛讗 爪专转讛 转讜注讘讛

And if one would claim that the dilemma does in fact arise because it is written: 鈥淭hat is an abomination鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:4), and the emphasis on 鈥渢hat鈥 serves to limit the range of the prohibition and teaches that this halakha applies only to her and not her rival wife, still, the accepted interpretation of this verse is as follows: She is an abomination, but her children are not abominations. In other words, if he transgressed the prohibition and remarried this woman, their children are not disqualified from marrying priests. If so, the term 鈥渢hat鈥 does not come to exclude her rival wife from this halakha, and therefore her rival wife is an abomination for the purposes of levirate marriage, just like the wife herself, and she too is exempt.

讻讬 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 讟讜诪讗讛 讘住讜讟讛 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 讗讬谉 诪拽专讗 讬讜爪讗 诪讬讚讬 驻砖讜讟讜

Rather, let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis. Although the Rabbis said that it is with regard to a sota that defilement is written, perhaps here they apply the principle that a verse does not depart from its literal meaning. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that the Rabbis derive from here a halakhic ruling concerning a sota, the straightforward meaning of the verse should not be entirely disregarded. Accordingly, as the context here is remarriage to one鈥檚 divorced wife, this verse would teach that hers is a case of defilement.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬注拽专 讗讬注拽专 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转注拽专 讗讬注拽专

Or perhaps once a verse is uprooted from its context, it is entirely uprooted and no longer teaches anything about the subject matter of the chapter in which it is written. This would mean that the sole significance of this particular verse is in reference to a sota. There are those who say the opposite: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, do not raise the dilemma, as once a verse is uprooted from its context, it is entirely uprooted. Consequently, there is no defilement when a man remarries his divorc茅e, neither with regard to her nor concerning her rival wife.

讻讬 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 诪讗讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 讟讜诪讗讛 讘诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘讗 诪讬注讟 专讞诪谞讗 讛讬讗 转讜注讘讛 讜讗讬谉 爪专转讛 转讜注讘讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛讬讗 转讜注讘讛 讜讗讬谉 讘谞讬讛 转讜注讘讬谉 讛讗 爪专转讛 转讜注讘讛

Rather, let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar. What is the dilemma? Although Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said that it is with regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e that defilement is written, one can ask: Does the Merciful One limit this halakha by the phrase 鈥渢hat is an abomination,鈥 which indicates: And her rival wife is not an abomination? Or perhaps this verse teaches that she is an abomination but her children are not abominations, which indicates that her rival wife is an abomination.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 讛讬转讛 讗讞转 讻砖专讛 讜讗讞转 驻住讜诇讛 讗诐 讛讬讛 讞讜诇抓 讞讜诇抓 诇驻住讜诇讛 讜讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讬讬讘诐 诪讬讬讘诐 诇讻砖专讛

Rav Sheshet said to him: You learned it in a baraita that deals with a case of two yevamot who came before a yavam for levirate marriage. In a situation where one of the women was fit and the other disqualified, if he would like to perform 岣litza he performs 岣litza with the disqualified woman, and if he would like to enter into levirate marriage he enters into levirate marriage with the fit woman.

诪讗讬 讻砖专讛 讜诪讗讬 驻住讜诇讛 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讻砖专讛 讻砖专讛 诇注诇诪讗 驻住讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇注诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讚讬讚讬讛 讞讝讬讗 诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讬谞讛

Rav Sheshet analyzes this baraita: What is the meaning of fit, and what is the meaning of disqualified? If we say that fit means fit for all men, and disqualified means disqualified in general, e.g., a woman who had already been divorced is disqualified from marrying any priest, despite the fact that she is fit to marry this particular man himself, then since for him she is suitable, what difference does it make for him whether she is disqualified from or fit for marriage to others?

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讻砖专讛 讻砖专讛 诇讬讛 驻住讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇讬讛 讜诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 讜拽转谞讬 讜讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讬讬讘诐 诪讬讬讘诐 诇讻砖专讛

Rather, is it not the case that fit means fit for him, and disqualified means disqualified for him? And what is that case in which a woman is fit or disqualified only with regard to him but not any other man? This is evidently referring to the case of one who remarries his divorc茅e. The deceased brother had remarried his divorced wife after she had married another man, and therefore she is disqualified from entering into levirate marriage with that particular man but she is permitted to other men. And it is taught there that if he would like to enter into levirate marriage, he may enter into levirate marriage even with the fit woman. This indicates that the rival wife of a remarried divorc茅e is fit for levirate marriage.

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻砖专讛 讻砖专讛 诇注诇诪讗 驻住讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇注诇诪讗 讜讚拽讗诪专转 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讚讬讚讬讛 讞讝讬讗 诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讬谞讛 诪砖讜诐 讚专讘 讬讜住祝

The Gemara rejects this argument: No; actually, fit means fit to all men, and disqualified means disqualified in general, e.g., a woman who had already been divorced is disqualified from marrying any priest. And that which you said: Since for him she is suitable what difference does it make for him, this is significant because of the statement of Rav Yosef.

讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讗谉 砖谞讛 专讘讬 诇讗 讬砖驻讜讱 讗讚诐 诪讬 讘讜专讜 讜讗讞专讬诐 爪专讬讻讬诐 诇讛诐

As Rav Yosef said: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a valuable moral lesson, that a person should not pour the water from his well when others are in need of it. That is, one should not cause loss in any situation, even when this relates to his own personal life, if he might thereby cause a future loss to others. The same reasoning applies here: If he intends to perform 岣litza it does not matter to him which of the women he chooses, but if he does so with the one who is fit to others, he thereby disqualifies her from marrying a priest, as the legal status of a woman who underwent 岣litza is like that of a divorc茅e. It is therefore preferable to perform 岣litza with the one who in any case was disqualified from marrying a priest.

转讗 砖诪注 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞砖讗转 讛讬讗 讜爪专转讛 讞讜诇爪转 讛讬讗 讜爪专转讛 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 [讗诇讗] 讗讬诪讗 讗讜 讛讬讗 讗讜 爪专转讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different baraita: With regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had married another, she and her rival wife perform 岣litza. The Gemara first analyzes the wording of the baraita: Can it enter your mind that both she and her rival wife must perform 岣litza? After all, only one wife of a deceased brother undergoes 岣litza, not two. Rather, say: Either she or her rival wife. This indicates that both women are unfit for levirate marriage.

讜诇讗讜 转专讜爪讬 拽诪转专爪转 诇讛 转专讬抓 讛讻讬 讛讬讗 讞讜诇爪转 爪专转讛 讗讜 讞讜诇爪转 讗讜 诪转讬讬讘诪转

The Gemara rejects this claim: And did you not already resolve a difficulty in the baraita by adjusting its language and not interpreting it as it is? If so, you cannot cite a proof from here, as you can adjust it differently and answer as follows: She performs 岣litza, while her rival wife either performs 岣litza or enters into levirate marriage. If so, this baraita provides no conclusive proof that might resolve Rav Yehuda鈥檚 dilemma.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘注讬 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞讬住转 爪专转讛 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讜转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诇讗 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬

搂 On the same issue, Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yo岣nan raised a dilemma: With regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had been married to another, what is the halakha concerning the levirate marriage of her rival wife? Rabbi Ami said to him: And you can raise the dilemma with regard to this woman herself. Why not ask if she requires levirate marriage when her husband dies? Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba replied: The halakha of the divorc茅e herself is not a dilemma for me, as she is certainly forbidden.

讚讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讘诪讜转专 诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讗住讜专 诇讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讻讬 拽讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬 爪专转讛 诪讗讬 诪讬 讗诇讬诐 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇诪讬讚讞讬 爪专讛 讗讜 诇讗

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba elaborates: As in this case we state an a fortiori inference: If she is now forbidden to one who was previously permitted to her, i.e., her first husband, with regard to one who was forbidden to her, the yavam, is it not all the more so the case that she remains forbidden to him? Where I raise the dilemma it is with regard to her rival wife. What is the halakha in this case? Is the aforementioned a fortiori inference strong enough to invalidate her rival wife or not? The divorc茅e herself is certainly exempt from levirate marriage, but the question is whether the a fortiori inference applies to the rival wife as well.

专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讘注讬 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞讬住转 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讜转讬讘注讬 诇讱 爪专转讛 爪专转讛 诇讗 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬 讚诇讗 讗诇讬诐 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇诪讬讚讞讬 爪专讛 讗诇讗 讻讬 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪讗讬 诪讬 讗诇讬诐 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讘诪拽讜诐 诪爪讜讛 讗讜 诇讗

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k would teach a different version of this discussion, as follows: Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yo岣nan raised a dilemma: With regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had been married to another, what is the halakha concerning her levirate marriage? Rabbi Ami said to him: And you can raise the dilemma with regard to her rival wife as well. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba replied: The halakha of her rival wife is not a dilemma for me, as the a fortiori inference is not strong enough to invalidate a rival wife. Rather, where I raise the dilemma it is with regard to the divorc茅e herself. What is the halakha? Is the a fortiori inference strong enough that it can be accepted even in place of a mitzva to enter into levirate marriage, or not?

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 11

拽砖讬讗 专讘 讗砖讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讜诪转专抓 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专讘讬谞讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜诪转专抓 讻专讘谞谉

搂 The Gemara comments: Rav Sheshet鈥檚 explanation of the contradiction between the first clause and latter clause of the baraita is difficult. Consequently, the Gemara cites different resolutions of this contradiction. Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Ravina, in contrast, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

专讘 讗砖讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讜诪转专抓 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讞讜诇抓 诇讬讘诪转讜 讜讞讝专 讜拽讚砖讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞诇讬爪讛 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪讗谉 讗讞讬谉

The Gemara elaborates: Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is his interpretation: In the case of one who performs 岣litza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died, she requires 岣litza from one of the brothers. Who are the brothers referred to here?

讗讞讬谉 讛讬诇讜讚讬诐 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉

Rav Ashi explains that they are the newborn brothers, i.e., those who were born only after the brother betrothed her. Consequently, although this woman was the wife of the first deceased brother before they were born, after their birth she was already the wife of a living brother. Therefore, the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist never applied, and she requires 岣litza. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that in a case of this kind the brothers are not considered to be coexisting.

注诪讚 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛谞讜诇讚讬诐 讜拽讚砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 注诇讬讜 讻诇讜诐 讻诪讗谉 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖

Meanwhile, the latter clause speaks of a case where one of the brothers who was born in the lifetime of the first brother arose and betrothed her, after another brother had performed 岣litza. In this case, she has no claims of a bill of divorce on him. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that the penalty of karet applies in this case, and therefore the betrothal is entirely invalid.

专讘讬谞讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜诪转专抓 诇讛 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讞讜诇抓 诇讬讘诪转讜 讜讞讝专 讜拽讚砖讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞诇讬爪讛 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 诪讗谉 讗讞讬谉 讗讞讬谉 讛谞讜诇讚讬诐 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉

The Gemara continues its explanation of the opinions. Ravina holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. How so? In the case of one who performs 岣litza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her and then died, she requires 岣litza from one of the brothers. Who are these brothers? This is referring to the brothers already born in the lifetime of the first brother. In accordance with whose opinion is this interpretation? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who held that this case constitutes a regular prohibition. Consequently, the yevama is not exempt from the obligation of 岣litza.

注诪讚 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讬诇讜讚讬诐 讜拽讚砖讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 注诇讬讜 讻诇讜诐 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘谞谉

If one of the newborn brothers, who were born after the death of the first brother, arose and betrothed her, she has no claim on him. Since he is considered a brother who did not coexist with his deceased brother, the yevama is prohibited to him as a brother鈥檚 wife, and as this prohibition entails karet, the betrothal is invalid. This is the halakha even if he was born after the second deceased brother betrothed her. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist applies even to a brother鈥檚 widow who entered into levirate marriage before the younger brother was born.

讗讬转诪专 讛讘讗 注诇 讬讘诪讛 讜讘讗 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 注诇 爪专转讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讜专讘讬谞讗 讞讚 讗诪专 讘讻专转 讜讞讚 讗诪专 讘注砖讛

It was stated that there is a similar dispute between amora鈥檌m with regard to one who had relations with his yevama and thereby performed the mitzva of levirate marriage as required, and one of the other brothers had relations with her rival wife. Rav A岣 and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said: The second brother is liable to receive karet. And the other one said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva. The verse: 鈥淲ho does not build up his brother鈥檚 house鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:9), is a positive mitzva, as it teaches that one house may be built up, but not two houses, i.e., no more than one wife of a deceased brother may be married by one of his brothers. Any mitzva formulated as a positive injunction has the status of a positive mitzva, even if it is violated by the performance of an action, in the manner of a prohibition.

诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘讻专转 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘注砖讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉

The Gemara explains: The one who said that he is liable to receive karet holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that after the mitzva is performed with one yevama who required levirate marriage, the prohibition of a brother鈥檚 wife is once again fully applicable to her rival wife. And the one who said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 爪专转 住讜讟讛 讗住讜专讛

The Gemara further analyzes the list of women exempt from levirate marriage. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The rival wife of a sota is forbidden. In this context, sota refers to an unfaithful wife. If the husband died, the unfaithful wife and her rival wife are exempt from both 岣litza and levirate marriage.

讟讜诪讗讛 讻转讬讘 讘讛 讻注专讬讜转

What is the reason for this? The term defilement is written in that passage dealing with an unfaithful wife: 鈥淪he being defiled secretly鈥 (Numbers 5:13), just as defilement is written with regard to those with whom relations are forbidden in the verse: 鈥淒efile not yourselves in any of these things, for in all these the nations are defiled, which I cast out from before you鈥 (Leviticus 18:24). This teaches that the halakha of an unfaithful wife is like that of a woman with whom relations are forbidden; both she and her rival wife are exempt from levirate marriage and 岣litza.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讞住讚讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘讬讗转讛 讗讜 讞诇讬爪转讛 诪讗讞讬讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉 驻讜讟专转 爪专转讛

Rav 岣sda raised an objection to this from the case of a woman who heard that her husband had died and remarried, only afterward to discover that he had still been alive at that time before dying later. What is the halakha in this case? Rabbi Shimon says: Her relations with or 岣litza from the brother of the first husband exempts her rival wife. This shows that the obligation of levirate marriage applies to this woman. Although she lived as a married woman with someone else during her husband鈥檚 lifetime, Rabbi Shimon nevertheless maintains that her sexual intercourse or 岣litza fulfills the mitzva of levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife. This suggests that the rival wife of an unfaithful wife requires levirate marriage.

[讗诪专 诇讱 专讘] 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讗谞讗 住讜讟讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讗转 讗诪专转 诇讬 住讜讟讛 讚专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers that Rav could have said to you in response: I spoke to you about the halakha of a sota by Torah law, i.e., a wife who was intentionally unfaithful, and you speak to me of a sota by rabbinic law? The case you mentioned is an unavoidable accident, as the wife married another man only because she received testimony that her husband was deceased. When the Sages instituted that she was forbidden to both her first and second husbands, this was a penalty designed to ensure that women would examine testimony of this kind very thoroughly. However, this is not a case of a sota by Torah law, as she was not intentionally unfaithful, and therefore the mitzva of levirate marriage certainly applies to her.

讜讚拽讗专讬 诇讛 诪讗讬 拽讗专讬 诇讛 拽住讘专 讻诇 讚转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讻注讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 转拽讜谉

Since this response is overwhelmingly obvious, the Gemara asks: And he who asked it, why did he ask it? There are apparently no grounds for this comparison at all. The Gemara explains: He held that all ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law. Consequently, if a sota by Torah law is exempt from levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife as though she were a forbidden relative, the same should apply to a sota by rabbinic law.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讗砖讬 谞讻谞住讛 注诪讜 诇住转专 讜砖讛转讛 注诪讜 讻讚讬 讟讜诪讗讛 讗住讜专讛 诇讘讬转讛 讜讗住讜专讛 诇讗讻讜诇 讘转专讜诪讛 讜讗诐 诪转 讞讜诇爪转

Rav Ashi raised an objection to Rav鈥檚 opinion from a different source: The halakha is that a wife who was warned by her husband not to be secluded with a specific man and yet entered alone with him in private, and remained with him long enough to be defiled, i.e., sufficient time to have sexual relations, she is forbidden to her house, i.e., her husband, from that moment until she undergoes the sota ritual. And likewise, if she was the wife of a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, as she was possibly disqualified by unfaithfulness. And if he dies, she performs 岣litza

讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转 [讗诪专 诇讱 专讘] 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讗谞讗 住讜讟讛 讜讚讗讬 讜讗诪专转 诇讬 讗转 住讜讟讛 住驻拽 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讜讟讛 讜讚讗讬 (诪讗讬 讟注诪讗) 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讬讘 讘讛 讟讜诪讗讛

and may not enter into levirate marriage. This indicates that the levirate bond does apply to a sota, which contradicts Rav鈥檚 statement. The Gemara retorts that Rav could have said to you: I spoke to you about a sota whose infidelity was definite, and you speak to me of an uncertain sota. There is no proof that this wife who secluded herself with another man was actually unfaithful, and due to the uncertainty she must still undergo 岣litza. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And what is different about a definite sota? Is it different because the term defilement is written with regard to her?

住讜讟讛 住驻拽 谞诪讬 讟讜诪讗讛 讻转讬讘讗 讘讛 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪谉 讛谞讬砖讜讗讬谉 讗住讜专讛 诪谉 讛讗讬专讜住讬谉 诪讜转专转 诪砖讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讗讞专讬 讗砖专 讛讟诪讗讛

But with regard to an uncertain sota, who was alone with a specific man enough time to engage in relations, defilement is written as well. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: With regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had been married to another man, an act prohibited by Torah law, if he remarried her following actual marriage to another, she is forbidden to her first husband. However, if he remarried her following mere betrothal to another man, she is permitted, because it is stated: 鈥淗er former husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after she was defiled鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:4), and a woman who was merely betrothed was never defiled, as no sexual relations had taken place.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讞转 讝讜 讜讗讞转 讝讜 讗住讜专讛 讗诇讗 诪讛 讗谞讬 诪拽讬讬诐 讗讞专讬 讛讟诪讗讛 诇专讘讜转 住讜讟讛 砖谞住转专讛

And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one, i.e., whether she had been fully married or merely betrothed to another, she is forbidden to her first husband. Rather, how do I establish the phrase: 鈥淎fter she was defiled鈥? This verse does not refer at all to the case of a woman who married another man lawfully, as she is not called 鈥渄efiled.鈥 Rather, it comes to include a sota who secluded herself with another man, as she is forbidden to her husband due to the concern that she might have committed adultery. This baraita shows that a sota is termed 鈥渄efiled,鈥 despite the fact that hers is an uncertain case.

讜诪讗讬 谞住转专讛 谞讘注诇讛 讜讗诪讗讬 拽专讬 诇讬讛 谞住转专讛 诇讬砖谞讗 诪注诇讬讗 谞拽讟 谞讘注诇讛 讟讜诪讗讛 讘讛讚讬讗 讻转讬讘 讘讛 讜谞住转专讛 讜讛讬讗 谞讟诪讗讛

The Gemara rejects this argument: And what does: Secluded herself, mean in this context? It means that she had actually engaged in relations. And why does the baraita call this: Secluded herself, instead of the more straightforward: Engaged in sexual relations? The baraita employed a euphemistic expression, but it actually means that she engaged in intercourse. The Gemara asks: If this is referring to a woman who had engaged in relations, the term defilement is already explicitly written with regard to her, in the chapter that deals with a sota. Why is it necessary to derive that she is defiled from a different source, as in the context of a sota herself the verse states: 鈥淪he being defiled secretly鈥 (Numbers 5:13)?

诇诪讬拽诐 注诇讛 讘诇讗讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 诇讗讜 讘住讜讟讛 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讝谞讗讬 谞诪讬

The Gemara explains that 鈥渕ay not take her again to be his wife after she was defiled鈥 does not teach that she is called 鈥渄efiled,鈥 but rather that the halakha establishes upon her a prohibition. In other words, if the husband engages in relations with his wife after she had had intercourse with another, he transgresses a prohibition. And the Gemara comments that Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar does not hold the opinion that there is a prohibition in the case of a sota, as he maintains that a husband who has relations with his sota wife does not transgress any prohibition at all, and the same is true even if she definitely fornicated with another man.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讜讬讛 讜讗讬砖讜转 讻转讬讘 讘讛

What is the rationale of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar? In his opinion, 鈥渁fter she was defiled鈥 does not refer to a sota but to a woman who had been legally divorced from her first husband and subsequently married another man. This is indicated by the fact that both becoming, i.e., betrothal, and matrimony are written in this context: 鈥淏ecomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2) and: 鈥淥r if the latter husband die, who took her to be his wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:3). Here it is clear that the reference is to halakhically valid marriage, whereas a sota had never been another man鈥檚 wife, as she cannot marry another man while she is still married.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诪专讘 砖砖转 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞讬住转 讜诪转 爪专转讛 诪讛讜 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 讟讜诪讗讛 讘诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘讗 爪专转讛 讻诪讜转讛

搂 The Gemara discusses a similar case. Rav Yehuda raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In the case of one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had married another, and then he dies childless, what is the halakha with regard to the levirate marriage of her rival wife? According to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar, do not raise the dilemma, since Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said that it is with regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e that defilement is written, and therefore the status of her rival wife is the same as hers.

讜讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讬讘 讘讛 转讜注讘讛 讛讬讗 讛讬讗 转讜注讘讛 讜讗讬谉 讘谞讬讛 转讜注讘讬谉 讛讗 爪专转讛 转讜注讘讛

And if one would claim that the dilemma does in fact arise because it is written: 鈥淭hat is an abomination鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:4), and the emphasis on 鈥渢hat鈥 serves to limit the range of the prohibition and teaches that this halakha applies only to her and not her rival wife, still, the accepted interpretation of this verse is as follows: She is an abomination, but her children are not abominations. In other words, if he transgressed the prohibition and remarried this woman, their children are not disqualified from marrying priests. If so, the term 鈥渢hat鈥 does not come to exclude her rival wife from this halakha, and therefore her rival wife is an abomination for the purposes of levirate marriage, just like the wife herself, and she too is exempt.

讻讬 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 讟讜诪讗讛 讘住讜讟讛 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 讗讬谉 诪拽专讗 讬讜爪讗 诪讬讚讬 驻砖讜讟讜

Rather, let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis. Although the Rabbis said that it is with regard to a sota that defilement is written, perhaps here they apply the principle that a verse does not depart from its literal meaning. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that the Rabbis derive from here a halakhic ruling concerning a sota, the straightforward meaning of the verse should not be entirely disregarded. Accordingly, as the context here is remarriage to one鈥檚 divorced wife, this verse would teach that hers is a case of defilement.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬注拽专 讗讬注拽专 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转注拽专 讗讬注拽专

Or perhaps once a verse is uprooted from its context, it is entirely uprooted and no longer teaches anything about the subject matter of the chapter in which it is written. This would mean that the sole significance of this particular verse is in reference to a sota. There are those who say the opposite: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, do not raise the dilemma, as once a verse is uprooted from its context, it is entirely uprooted. Consequently, there is no defilement when a man remarries his divorc茅e, neither with regard to her nor concerning her rival wife.

讻讬 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 诪讗讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 讻讬驻专 讟讜诪讗讛 讘诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘讗 诪讬注讟 专讞诪谞讗 讛讬讗 转讜注讘讛 讜讗讬谉 爪专转讛 转讜注讘讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛讬讗 转讜注讘讛 讜讗讬谉 讘谞讬讛 转讜注讘讬谉 讛讗 爪专转讛 转讜注讘讛

Rather, let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar. What is the dilemma? Although Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said that it is with regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e that defilement is written, one can ask: Does the Merciful One limit this halakha by the phrase 鈥渢hat is an abomination,鈥 which indicates: And her rival wife is not an abomination? Or perhaps this verse teaches that she is an abomination but her children are not abominations, which indicates that her rival wife is an abomination.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 讛讬转讛 讗讞转 讻砖专讛 讜讗讞转 驻住讜诇讛 讗诐 讛讬讛 讞讜诇抓 讞讜诇抓 诇驻住讜诇讛 讜讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讬讬讘诐 诪讬讬讘诐 诇讻砖专讛

Rav Sheshet said to him: You learned it in a baraita that deals with a case of two yevamot who came before a yavam for levirate marriage. In a situation where one of the women was fit and the other disqualified, if he would like to perform 岣litza he performs 岣litza with the disqualified woman, and if he would like to enter into levirate marriage he enters into levirate marriage with the fit woman.

诪讗讬 讻砖专讛 讜诪讗讬 驻住讜诇讛 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讻砖专讛 讻砖专讛 诇注诇诪讗 驻住讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇注诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讚讬讚讬讛 讞讝讬讗 诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讬谞讛

Rav Sheshet analyzes this baraita: What is the meaning of fit, and what is the meaning of disqualified? If we say that fit means fit for all men, and disqualified means disqualified in general, e.g., a woman who had already been divorced is disqualified from marrying any priest, despite the fact that she is fit to marry this particular man himself, then since for him she is suitable, what difference does it make for him whether she is disqualified from or fit for marriage to others?

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讻砖专讛 讻砖专讛 诇讬讛 驻住讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇讬讛 讜诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 讜拽转谞讬 讜讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讬讬讘诐 诪讬讬讘诐 诇讻砖专讛

Rather, is it not the case that fit means fit for him, and disqualified means disqualified for him? And what is that case in which a woman is fit or disqualified only with regard to him but not any other man? This is evidently referring to the case of one who remarries his divorc茅e. The deceased brother had remarried his divorced wife after she had married another man, and therefore she is disqualified from entering into levirate marriage with that particular man but she is permitted to other men. And it is taught there that if he would like to enter into levirate marriage, he may enter into levirate marriage even with the fit woman. This indicates that the rival wife of a remarried divorc茅e is fit for levirate marriage.

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻砖专讛 讻砖专讛 诇注诇诪讗 驻住讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇注诇诪讗 讜讚拽讗诪专转 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讚讬讚讬讛 讞讝讬讗 诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讬谞讛 诪砖讜诐 讚专讘 讬讜住祝

The Gemara rejects this argument: No; actually, fit means fit to all men, and disqualified means disqualified in general, e.g., a woman who had already been divorced is disqualified from marrying any priest. And that which you said: Since for him she is suitable what difference does it make for him, this is significant because of the statement of Rav Yosef.

讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讗谉 砖谞讛 专讘讬 诇讗 讬砖驻讜讱 讗讚诐 诪讬 讘讜专讜 讜讗讞专讬诐 爪专讬讻讬诐 诇讛诐

As Rav Yosef said: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a valuable moral lesson, that a person should not pour the water from his well when others are in need of it. That is, one should not cause loss in any situation, even when this relates to his own personal life, if he might thereby cause a future loss to others. The same reasoning applies here: If he intends to perform 岣litza it does not matter to him which of the women he chooses, but if he does so with the one who is fit to others, he thereby disqualifies her from marrying a priest, as the legal status of a woman who underwent 岣litza is like that of a divorc茅e. It is therefore preferable to perform 岣litza with the one who in any case was disqualified from marrying a priest.

转讗 砖诪注 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞砖讗转 讛讬讗 讜爪专转讛 讞讜诇爪转 讛讬讗 讜爪专转讛 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 [讗诇讗] 讗讬诪讗 讗讜 讛讬讗 讗讜 爪专转讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different baraita: With regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had married another, she and her rival wife perform 岣litza. The Gemara first analyzes the wording of the baraita: Can it enter your mind that both she and her rival wife must perform 岣litza? After all, only one wife of a deceased brother undergoes 岣litza, not two. Rather, say: Either she or her rival wife. This indicates that both women are unfit for levirate marriage.

讜诇讗讜 转专讜爪讬 拽诪转专爪转 诇讛 转专讬抓 讛讻讬 讛讬讗 讞讜诇爪转 爪专转讛 讗讜 讞讜诇爪转 讗讜 诪转讬讬讘诪转

The Gemara rejects this claim: And did you not already resolve a difficulty in the baraita by adjusting its language and not interpreting it as it is? If so, you cannot cite a proof from here, as you can adjust it differently and answer as follows: She performs 岣litza, while her rival wife either performs 岣litza or enters into levirate marriage. If so, this baraita provides no conclusive proof that might resolve Rav Yehuda鈥檚 dilemma.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘注讬 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞讬住转 爪专转讛 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讜转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诇讗 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬

搂 On the same issue, Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yo岣nan raised a dilemma: With regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had been married to another, what is the halakha concerning the levirate marriage of her rival wife? Rabbi Ami said to him: And you can raise the dilemma with regard to this woman herself. Why not ask if she requires levirate marriage when her husband dies? Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba replied: The halakha of the divorc茅e herself is not a dilemma for me, as she is certainly forbidden.

讚讗诪专讬谞谉 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讘诪讜转专 诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讗住讜专 诇讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讻讬 拽讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬 爪专转讛 诪讗讬 诪讬 讗诇讬诐 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇诪讬讚讞讬 爪专讛 讗讜 诇讗

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba elaborates: As in this case we state an a fortiori inference: If she is now forbidden to one who was previously permitted to her, i.e., her first husband, with regard to one who was forbidden to her, the yavam, is it not all the more so the case that she remains forbidden to him? Where I raise the dilemma it is with regard to her rival wife. What is the halakha in this case? Is the aforementioned a fortiori inference strong enough to invalidate her rival wife or not? The divorc茅e herself is certainly exempt from levirate marriage, but the question is whether the a fortiori inference applies to the rival wife as well.

专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讘注讬 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诪讞讝讬专 讙专讜砖转讜 诪砖谞讬住转 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讜转讬讘注讬 诇讱 爪专转讛 爪专转讛 诇讗 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬 讚诇讗 讗诇讬诐 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇诪讬讚讞讬 爪专讛 讗诇讗 讻讬 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪讗讬 诪讬 讗诇讬诐 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讘诪拽讜诐 诪爪讜讛 讗讜 诇讗

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k would teach a different version of this discussion, as follows: Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yo岣nan raised a dilemma: With regard to one who remarries his divorc茅e after she had been married to another, what is the halakha concerning her levirate marriage? Rabbi Ami said to him: And you can raise the dilemma with regard to her rival wife as well. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba replied: The halakha of her rival wife is not a dilemma for me, as the a fortiori inference is not strong enough to invalidate a rival wife. Rather, where I raise the dilemma it is with regard to the divorc茅e herself. What is the halakha? Is the a fortiori inference strong enough that it can be accepted even in place of a mitzva to enter into levirate marriage, or not?

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