Yevamot 11

Yevamot 11

קַשְׁיָא. רַב אָשֵׁי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, וּמְתָרֵץ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. רָבִינָא סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וּמְתָרֵץ כְּרַבָּנַן.

§ The Gemara comments: Rav Sheshet’s explanation of the contradiction between the first clause and latter clause of the baraita is difficult. Consequently, the Gemara cites different resolutions of this contradiction. Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Ravina, in contrast, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

רַב אָשֵׁי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ וּמְתָרֵץ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: הַחוֹלֵץ לִיבִמְתּוֹ וְחָזַר וְקִדְּשָׁהּ — צְרִיכָה חֲלִיצָה מִן הָאַחִין. מַאן אַחִין —

The Gemara elaborates: Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is his interpretation: In the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died, she requires ḥalitza from one of the brothers. Who are the brothers referred to here?

אַחִין הַיִּלּוֹדִים. כְּמַאן — כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

Rav Ashi explains that they are the newborn brothers, i.e., those who were born only after the brother betrothed her. Consequently, although this woman was the wife of the first deceased brother before they were born, after their birth she was already the wife of a living brother. Therefore, the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist never applied, and she requires ḥalitza. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that in a case of this kind the brothers are not considered to be coexisting.

עָמַד אֶחָד מִן הַנּוֹלָדִים וְקִדְּשָׁהּ — אֵין לָהּ עָלָיו כְּלוּם, כְּמַאן — כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.

Meanwhile, the latter clause speaks of a case where one of the brothers who was born in the lifetime of the first brother arose and betrothed her, after another brother had performed ḥalitza. In this case, she has no claims of a bill of divorce on him. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that the penalty of karet applies in this case, and therefore the betrothal is entirely invalid.

רָבִינָא סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וּמְתָרֵץ לַהּ אַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן: הַחוֹלֵץ לִיבִמְתּוֹ וְחָזַר וְקִדְּשָׁהּ — צְרִיכָה חֲלִיצָה מִן הָאַחִין. מַאן אַחִין — אַחִין הַנּוֹלָדִים, כְּמַאן — כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.

The Gemara continues its explanation of the opinions. Ravina holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. How so? In the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her and then died, she requires ḥalitza from one of the brothers. Who are these brothers? This is referring to the brothers already born in the lifetime of the first brother. In accordance with whose opinion is this interpretation? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who held that this case constitutes a regular prohibition. Consequently, the yevama is not exempt from the obligation of ḥalitza.

עָמַד אֶחָד מִן הַיִּלּוֹדִים וְקִדְּשָׁהּ — אֵין לָהּ עָלָיו כְּלוּם, כְּמַאן — כְּרַבָּנַן.

If one of the newborn brothers, who were born after the death of the first brother, arose and betrothed her, she has no claim on him. Since he is considered a brother who did not coexist with his deceased brother, the yevama is prohibited to him as a brother’s wife, and as this prohibition entails karet, the betrothal is invalid. This is the halakha even if he was born after the second deceased brother betrothed her. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist applies even to a brother’s widow who entered into levirate marriage before the younger brother was born.

אִיתְּמַר: הַבָּא עַל יְבָמָה, וּבָא אֶחָד מִן הָאַחִין עַל צָרָתָהּ, פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא. חַד אָמַר: בְּכָרֵת. וְחַד אָמַר: בַּעֲשֵׂה.

It was stated that there is a similar dispute between amora’im with regard to one who had relations with his yevama and thereby performed the mitzva of levirate marriage as required, and one of the other brothers had relations with her rival wife. Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said: The second brother is liable to receive karet. And the other one said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva. The verse: “Who does not build up his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), is a positive mitzva, as it teaches that one house may be built up, but not two houses, i.e., no more than one wife of a deceased brother may be married by one of his brothers. Any mitzva formulated as a positive injunction has the status of a positive mitzva, even if it is violated by the performance of an action, in the manner of a prohibition.

מַאן דְּאָמַר בְּכָרֵת — כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר בַּעֲשֵׂה — כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.

The Gemara explains: The one who said that he is liable to receive karet holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that after the mitzva is performed with one yevama who required levirate marriage, the prohibition of a brother’s wife is once again fully applicable to her rival wife. And the one who said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: צָרַת סוֹטָה אֲסוּרָה.

The Gemara further analyzes the list of women exempt from levirate marriage. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The rival wife of a sota is forbidden. In this context, sota refers to an unfaithful wife. If the husband died, the unfaithful wife and her rival wife are exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage.

טוּמְאָה כְּתִיב בָּהּ, כָּעֲרָיוֹת.

What is the reason for this? The term defilement is written in that passage dealing with an unfaithful wife: “She being defiled secretly” (Numbers 5:13), just as defilement is written with regard to those with whom relations are forbidden in the verse: “Defile not yourselves in any of these things, for in all these the nations are defiled, which I cast out from before you” (Leviticus 18:24). This teaches that the halakha of an unfaithful wife is like that of a woman with whom relations are forbidden; both she and her rival wife are exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza.

מֵתִיב רַב חִסְדָּא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: בִּיאָתָהּ אוֹ חֲלִיצָתָהּ מֵאָחִיו שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן — פּוֹטֶרֶת צָרָתָהּ.

Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to this from the case of a woman who heard that her husband had died and remarried, only afterward to discover that he had still been alive at that time before dying later. What is the halakha in this case? Rabbi Shimon says: Her relations with or ḥalitza from the brother of the first husband exempts her rival wife. This shows that the obligation of levirate marriage applies to this woman. Although she lived as a married woman with someone else during her husband’s lifetime, Rabbi Shimon nevertheless maintains that her sexual intercourse or ḥalitza fulfills the mitzva of levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife. This suggests that the rival wife of an unfaithful wife requires levirate marriage.

[אָמַר לְךָ רַב:] אָמֵינָא לָךְ אֲנָא סוֹטָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ לִי סוֹטָה דְּרַבָּנַן?!

The Gemara answers that Rav could have said to you in response: I spoke to you about the halakha of a sota by Torah law, i.e., a wife who was intentionally unfaithful, and you speak to me of a sota by rabbinic law? The case you mentioned is an unavoidable accident, as the wife married another man only because she received testimony that her husband was deceased. When the Sages instituted that she was forbidden to both her first and second husbands, this was a penalty designed to ensure that women would examine testimony of this kind very thoroughly. However, this is not a case of a sota by Torah law, as she was not intentionally unfaithful, and therefore the mitzva of levirate marriage certainly applies to her.

וּדְקָאָרֵי לַהּ מַאי קָאָרֵי לַהּ? קָסָבַר כׇּל דְּתַקּוּן רַבָּנַן — כְּעֵין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא תַּקּוּן.

Since this response is overwhelmingly obvious, the Gemara asks: And he who asked it, why did he ask it? There are apparently no grounds for this comparison at all. The Gemara explains: He held that all ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law. Consequently, if a sota by Torah law is exempt from levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife as though she were a forbidden relative, the same should apply to a sota by rabbinic law.

מֵתִיב רַב אָשֵׁי: נִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְסֵתֶר, וְשָׁהֲתָה עִמּוֹ כְּדֵי טוּמְאָה — אֲסוּרָה לְבֵיתָהּ, וַאֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה. וְאִם מֵת, חוֹלֶצֶת

Rav Ashi raised an objection to Rav’s opinion from a different source: The halakha is that a wife who was warned by her husband not to be secluded with a specific man and yet entered alone with him in private, and remained with him long enough to be defiled, i.e., sufficient time to have sexual relations, she is forbidden to her house, i.e., her husband, from that moment until she undergoes the sota ritual. And likewise, if she was the wife of a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, as she was possibly disqualified by unfaithfulness. And if he dies, she performs ḥalitza

וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת. [אָמַר לְךָ רַב:] אָמֵינָא לָךְ אֲנָא סוֹטָה וַדַּאי, וְאָמְרַתְּ לִי אַתְּ סוֹטָה סָפֵק! וּמַאי שְׁנָא סוֹטָה וַדַּאי (מַאי טַעְמָא) — מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב בָּהּ טוּמְאָה,

and may not enter into levirate marriage. This indicates that the levirate bond does apply to a sota, which contradicts Rav’s statement. The Gemara retorts that Rav could have said to you: I spoke to you about a sota whose infidelity was definite, and you speak to me of an uncertain sota. There is no proof that this wife who secluded herself with another man was actually unfaithful, and due to the uncertainty she must still undergo ḥalitza. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And what is different about a definite sota? Is it different because the term defilement is written with regard to her?

סוֹטָה סָפֵק נָמֵי טוּמְאָה כְּתִיבָא בַּהּ! דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן כִּיפָּר אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הַמַּחְזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ מִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין — אֲסוּרָה, מִן הָאֵירוּסִין — מוּתֶּרֶת, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אַחֲרֵי אֲשֶׁר הֻטַּמָּאָה״.

But with regard to an uncertain sota, who was alone with a specific man enough time to engage in relations, defilement is written as well. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: With regard to one who remarries his divorcée after she had been married to another man, an act prohibited by Torah law, if he remarried her following actual marriage to another, she is forbidden to her first husband. However, if he remarried her following mere betrothal to another man, she is permitted, because it is stated: “Her former husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after she was defiled” (Deuteronomy 24:4), and a woman who was merely betrothed was never defiled, as no sexual relations had taken place.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ — אֲסוּרָה, אֶלָּא מָה אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים ״אַחֲרֵי [אֲשֶׁר] הֻטַּמָּאָה״ — לְרַבּוֹת סוֹטָה שֶׁנִּסְתְּרָה.

And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one, i.e., whether she had been fully married or merely betrothed to another, she is forbidden to her first husband. Rather, how do I establish the phrase: “After she was defiled”? This verse does not refer at all to the case of a woman who married another man lawfully, as she is not called “defiled.” Rather, it comes to include a sota who secluded herself with another man, as she is forbidden to her husband due to the concern that she might have committed adultery. This baraita shows that a sota is termed “defiled,” despite the fact that hers is an uncertain case.

וּמַאי ״נִסְתְּרָה״ — נִבְעֲלָה. וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ נִסְתְּרָה — לִישָּׁנָא מְעַלְּיָא נָקֵט. נִבְעֲלָה, טוּמְאָה בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב בַּהּ, ״וְנִסְתְּרָה וְהִיא נִטְמָאָה״?

The Gemara rejects this argument: And what does: Secluded herself, mean in this context? It means that she had actually engaged in relations. And why does the baraita call this: Secluded herself, instead of the more straightforward: Engaged in sexual relations? The baraita employed a euphemistic expression, but it actually means that she engaged in intercourse. The Gemara asks: If this is referring to a woman who had engaged in relations, the term defilement is already explicitly written with regard to her, in the chapter that deals with a sota. Why is it necessary to derive that she is defiled from a different source, as in the context of a sota herself the verse states: “She being defiled secretly” (Numbers 5:13)?

לְמֵיקַם עֲלַהּ בְּלָאו. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן כִּיפָּר — לָאו בְּסוֹטָה לֵית לֵיהּ, וַאֲפִילּוּ זַנַּאי נָמֵי.

The Gemara explains that “may not take her again to be his wife after she was defiled” does not teach that she is called “defiled,” but rather that the halakha establishes upon her a prohibition. In other words, if the husband engages in relations with his wife after she had had intercourse with another, he transgresses a prohibition. And the Gemara comments that Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar does not hold the opinion that there is a prohibition in the case of a sota, as he maintains that a husband who has relations with his sota wife does not transgress any prohibition at all, and the same is true even if she definitely fornicated with another man.

מַאי טַעְמָא — הֲוָיָה וְאִישׁוּת כְּתִיב בַּהּ.

What is the rationale of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar? In his opinion, “after she was defiled” does not refer to a sota but to a woman who had been legally divorced from her first husband and subsequently married another man. This is indicated by the fact that both becoming, i.e., betrothal, and matrimony are written in this context: “Becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2) and: “Or if the latter husband die, who took her to be his wife” (Deuteronomy 24:3). Here it is clear that the reference is to halakhically valid marriage, whereas a sota had never been another man’s wife, as she cannot marry another man while she is still married.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב יְהוּדָה מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הַמַּחְזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ מִשֶּׁנִּיסֵּת, וּמֵת, צָרָתָהּ מַהוּ? אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן כִּיפָּר לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן כִּיפָּר טוּמְאָה בְּמַחֲזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ הוּא דִּכְתִיבָא — צָרָתָהּ כְּמוֹתָהּ.

§ The Gemara discusses a similar case. Rav Yehuda raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In the case of one who remarries his divorcée after she had married another, and then he dies childless, what is the halakha with regard to the levirate marriage of her rival wife? According to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar, do not raise the dilemma, since Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said that it is with regard to one who remarries his divorcée that defilement is written, and therefore the status of her rival wife is the same as hers.

וְאִי מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב בָּהּ ״תּוֹעֵבָה הִיא״, הִיא תּוֹעֵבָה וְאֵין בָּנֶיהָ תּוֹעֲבִין — הָא צָרָתָהּ תּוֹעֵבָה.

And if one would claim that the dilemma does in fact arise because it is written: “That is an abomination” (Deuteronomy 24:4), and the emphasis on “that” serves to limit the range of the prohibition and teaches that this halakha applies only to her and not her rival wife, still, the accepted interpretation of this verse is as follows: She is an abomination, but her children are not abominations. In other words, if he transgressed the prohibition and remarried this woman, their children are not disqualified from marrying priests. If so, the term “that” does not come to exclude her rival wife from this halakha, and therefore her rival wife is an abomination for the purposes of levirate marriage, just like the wife herself, and she too is exempt.

כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן: אַף עַל גַּב דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן טוּמְאָה בְּסוֹטָה הוּא דִּכְתִיב — אֵין מִקְרָא יוֹצֵא מִידֵי פְּשׁוּטוֹ,

Rather, let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis. Although the Rabbis said that it is with regard to a sota that defilement is written, perhaps here they apply the principle that a verse does not depart from its literal meaning. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that the Rabbis derive from here a halakhic ruling concerning a sota, the straightforward meaning of the verse should not be entirely disregarded. Accordingly, as the context here is remarriage to one’s divorced wife, this verse would teach that hers is a case of defilement.

אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּאִיעֲקַר — אִיעֲקַר. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתְעֲקַר — אִיעֲקַר.

Or perhaps once a verse is uprooted from its context, it is entirely uprooted and no longer teaches anything about the subject matter of the chapter in which it is written. This would mean that the sole significance of this particular verse is in reference to a sota. There are those who say the opposite: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, do not raise the dilemma, as once a verse is uprooted from its context, it is entirely uprooted. Consequently, there is no defilement when a man remarries his divorcée, neither with regard to her nor concerning her rival wife.

כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ — אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן כִּיפָּר, מַאי? אַף עַל גַּב דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן כִּיפָּר טוּמְאָה בְּמַחֲזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ הוּא דִּכְתִיבָא — מִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא הִיא תּוֹעֵבָה וְאֵין צָרָתָהּ תּוֹעֵבָה, אוֹ דִלְמָא: הִיא תּוֹעֵבָה וְאֵין בָּנֶיהָ תּוֹעֲבִין, הָא צָרָתָהּ — תּוֹעֵבָה?

Rather, let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar. What is the dilemma? Although Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said that it is with regard to one who remarries his divorcée that defilement is written, one can ask: Does the Merciful One limit this halakha by the phrase “that is an abomination,” which indicates: And her rival wife is not an abomination? Or perhaps this verse teaches that she is an abomination but her children are not abominations, which indicates that her rival wife is an abomination.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: הָיְתָה אַחַת כְּשֵׁרָה וְאַחַת פְּסוּלָה, אִם הָיָה חוֹלֵץ — חוֹלֵץ לַפְּסוּלָה, וְאִם הָיָה מְיַיבֵּם — מְיַיבֵּם לַכְּשֵׁרָה.

Rav Sheshet said to him: You learned it in a baraita that deals with a case of two yevamot who came before a yavam for levirate marriage. In a situation where one of the women was fit and the other disqualified, if he would like to perform ḥalitza he performs ḥalitza with the disqualified woman, and if he would like to enter into levirate marriage he enters into levirate marriage with the fit woman.

מַאי ״כְּשֵׁרָה״ וּמַאי ״פְּסוּלָה״? אִילֵּימָא ״כְּשֵׁרָה״ — כְּשֵׁרָה לְעָלְמָא, ״פְּסוּלָה״ — פְּסוּלָה לְעָלְמָא. כֵּיוָן דִּלְדִידֵיהּ חַזְיָא — מַאי נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִינַּהּ?

Rav Sheshet analyzes this baraita: What is the meaning of fit, and what is the meaning of disqualified? If we say that fit means fit for all men, and disqualified means disqualified in general, e.g., a woman who had already been divorced is disqualified from marrying any priest, despite the fact that she is fit to marry this particular man himself, then since for him she is suitable, what difference does it make for him whether she is disqualified from or fit for marriage to others?

אֶלָּא לָאו: ״כְּשֵׁרָה״ — כְּשֵׁרָה לֵיהּ, ״פְּסוּלָה״ — פְּסוּלָה לֵיהּ, וּמַאי נִיהוּ — מַחֲזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ, וְקָתָנֵי: וְאִם הָיָה מְיַיבֵּם — מְיַיבֵּם לַכְּשֵׁרָה!

Rather, is it not the case that fit means fit for him, and disqualified means disqualified for him? And what is that case in which a woman is fit or disqualified only with regard to him but not any other man? This is evidently referring to the case of one who remarries his divorcée. The deceased brother had remarried his divorced wife after she had married another man, and therefore she is disqualified from entering into levirate marriage with that particular man but she is permitted to other men. And it is taught there that if he would like to enter into levirate marriage, he may enter into levirate marriage even with the fit woman. This indicates that the rival wife of a remarried divorcée is fit for levirate marriage.

לָא, לְעוֹלָם ״כְּשֵׁרָה״ — כְּשֵׁרָה לְעָלְמָא, ״פְּסוּלָה״ — פְּסוּלָה לְעָלְמָא. וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: כֵּיוָן דִּלְדִידֵיהּ חַזְיָא, מַאי נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִינַּהּ — מִשּׁוּם דְּרַב יוֹסֵף.

The Gemara rejects this argument: No; actually, fit means fit to all men, and disqualified means disqualified in general, e.g., a woman who had already been divorced is disqualified from marrying any priest. And that which you said: Since for him she is suitable what difference does it make for him, this is significant because of the statement of Rav Yosef.

דְּאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: כָּאן שָׁנָה רַבִּי: לֹא יִשְׁפּוֹךְ אָדָם מֵי בוֹרוֹ, וַאֲחֵרִים צְרִיכִים לָהֶם.

As Rav Yosef said: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a valuable moral lesson, that a person should not pour the water from his well when others are in need of it. That is, one should not cause loss in any situation, even when this relates to his own personal life, if he might thereby cause a future loss to others. The same reasoning applies here: If he intends to perform ḥalitza it does not matter to him which of the women he chooses, but if he does so with the one who is fit to others, he thereby disqualifies her from marrying a priest, as the legal status of a woman who underwent ḥalitza is like that of a divorcée. It is therefore preferable to perform ḥalitza with the one who in any case was disqualified from marrying a priest.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמַּחְזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ מִשֶּׁנִּשֵּׂאת — הִיא וְצָרָתָהּ חוֹלֶצֶת. הִיא וְצָרָתָהּ סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? [אֶלָּא] אֵימָא: אוֹ הִיא, אוֹ צָרָתָהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different baraita: With regard to one who remarries his divorcée after she had married another, she and her rival wife perform ḥalitza. The Gemara first analyzes the wording of the baraita: Can it enter your mind that both she and her rival wife must perform ḥalitza? After all, only one wife of a deceased brother undergoes ḥalitza, not two. Rather, say: Either she or her rival wife. This indicates that both women are unfit for levirate marriage.

וְלָאו תָּרוֹצֵי קָמְתָרְצַתְּ לַהּ?! תָּרֵיץ הָכִי: הִיא — חוֹלֶצֶת, צָרָתָהּ — אוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

The Gemara rejects this claim: And did you not already resolve a difficulty in the baraita by adjusting its language and not interpreting it as it is? If so, you cannot cite a proof from here, as you can adjust it differently and answer as follows: She performs ḥalitza, while her rival wife either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. If so, this baraita provides no conclusive proof that might resolve Rav Yehuda’s dilemma.

אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בָּעֵי: הַמַּחְזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ מִשֶּׁנִּיסֵּת, צָרָתָהּ מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: וְתִיבְּעֵי לָךְ הִיא גּוּפַהּ? הִיא גּוּפַהּ לָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לִי,

§ On the same issue, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: With regard to one who remarries his divorcée after she had been married to another, what is the halakha concerning the levirate marriage of her rival wife? Rabbi Ami said to him: And you can raise the dilemma with regard to this woman herself. Why not ask if she requires levirate marriage when her husband dies? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba replied: The halakha of the divorcée herself is not a dilemma for me, as she is certainly forbidden.

דְּאָמְרִינַן קַל וָחוֹמֶר: בַּמּוּתָּר לָהּ — אֲסוּרָה, בָּאָסוּר לָהּ — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?! כִּי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לִי: צָרָתָהּ, מַאי? מִי אַלִּים קַל וָחוֹמֶר לְמִידְחֵי צָרָה, אוֹ לָא?

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba elaborates: As in this case we state an a fortiori inference: If she is now forbidden to one who was previously permitted to her, i.e., her first husband, with regard to one who was forbidden to her, the yavam, is it not all the more so the case that she remains forbidden to him? Where I raise the dilemma it is with regard to her rival wife. What is the halakha in this case? Is the aforementioned a fortiori inference strong enough to invalidate her rival wife or not? The divorcée herself is certainly exempt from levirate marriage, but the question is whether the a fortiori inference applies to the rival wife as well.

רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק מַתְנֵי הָכִי: אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּחְזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ מִשֶּׁנִּיסֵּת, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: וְתִיבְּעֵי לָךְ צָרָתָהּ? צָרָתָהּ לָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לִי, דְּלָא אַלִּים קַל וָחוֹמֶר לְמִידְחֵי צָרָה. אֶלָּא כִּי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לִי, הִיא גּוּפַהּ מַאי: מִי אַלִּים קַל וָחוֹמֶר בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה, אוֹ לָא?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak would teach a different version of this discussion, as follows: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: With regard to one who remarries his divorcée after she had been married to another, what is the halakha concerning her levirate marriage? Rabbi Ami said to him: And you can raise the dilemma with regard to her rival wife as well. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba replied: The halakha of her rival wife is not a dilemma for me, as the a fortiori inference is not strong enough to invalidate a rival wife. Rather, where I raise the dilemma it is with regard to the divorcée herself. What is the halakha? Is the a fortiori inference strong enough that it can be accepted even in place of a mitzva to enter into levirate marriage, or not?