Yevamot 118

אשה אומרת מת ואשה אומרת לא מת הרי זו לא תנשא:

or one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, this woman may not marry.

גמ׳ טעמא דאמרה לא מת הא אישתיקא תנשא הא אין צרה מעידה לחברתה

GEMARA: The mishna taught that if one rival wife says their husband died, while the second maintains that he did not die, the one who says he did not die may not remarry. The Gemara infers: The reason is that the second rival wife said explicitly: He did not die, from which it may be inferred that if she was silent and said nothing, she is permitted to marry based on the testimony of the first. However, this conclusion is problematic, as there is a principle that one rival wife may not testify on behalf of another, and if so, how can she rely on the testimony of her rival wife?

לא מת איצטריכא ליה סלקא דעתך אמינא הא מיית והא דקאמרה לא מת לקלקולה לצרה היא דקמיכוונא ותמות נפשה עם פלשתים קאמרה קמשמע לן:

The Gemara answers that this inference is incorrect, as it was necessary for the mishna to state: He did not die, as it might enter your mind to say that this man did in fact die, and with regard to that which she says: He did not die, she intends to ruin her rival wife. And as for herself she says: Let her die with the Philistines. This is a paraphrase of the verse: “Let me die with the Philistines” (Judges 16:30), which is a shorthand expression for one’s desire to hurt his enemies even if he suffers the same fate himself. In this case it means that she is prepared to testify falsely that their husband did not die, so as to ruin her rival wife. Therefore the mishna teaches us that this is not the case, and she is not permitted to marry based on the testimony of her rival wife.

אחת אומרת מת כו׳: וליפלוג רבי מאיר ברישא אמר רבי אלעזר במחלוקת שנויה ורבי יהודה ורבי שמעון היא ורבי יוחנן אמר אפילו תימא רבי מאיר בהא אפילו רבי מאיר מודה דכל לא מת בעדות אשה לאו הכחשה היא

§ The mishna taught that if one wife says: He died, and one says: He was killed, Rabbi Meir says that as they contradict one another, they may not remarry. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Meir also disagree in the first clause, when one witness says the husband died and the other claims he did not die. Rabbi Elazar said: This is taught as a tannaitic dispute. In other words, Rabbi Meir also disagreed with the first clause, and the unattributed opinion in the mishna is that of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You can even say that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as in this case even Rabbi Meir concedes that any claim of: He did not die, with regard to testimony enabling a woman to remarry, is not considered contradictory.

תנן עד אומר מת ועד אומר לא מת אשה אומרת מת ואשה אומרת לא מת הרי זו לא תנשא בשלמא לרבי אלעזר סתמא כרבי מאיר אלא לרבי יוחנן קשיא קשיא:

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer. We learned in the mishna: If one witness says: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, or if one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, she may not marry. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, the unattributed statement in this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that when a rebuttal contradicts the original testimony, one cannot rely upon the testimony that the husband died. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is difficult. The Gemara answers: Yes, this is difficult.

מתני׳ האשה שהלכה היא ובעלה למדינת הים ובאה ואמרה מת בעלי תנשא ותטול כתובתה וצרתה אסורה היתה בת ישראל לכהן תאכל בתרומה דברי רבי טרפון

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and she comes and says: My husband died, she may marry, and she takes her marriage contract based on her own testimony. And it remains prohibited for her rival wife to remarry, as a woman cannot testify on behalf of her rival wife. If the rival wife was an Israelite woman married to a priest, she may continue to partake of teruma, as she is not permitted to remarry, and therefore the presumption that the husband is still alive is maintained in relation to her. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

רבי עקיבא אומר אין זו דרך מוציאתו מידי עבירה עד שתהא אסורה לינשא ואסורה מלאכול בתרומה

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression. According to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, there is a concern that she might be eating teruma unlawfully. There is no remedy for this situation unless it is prohibited for the rival wife to marry, as she cannot rely on the testimony of her rival wife, and it is also prohibited for her to partake of teruma, lest the other woman was speaking the truth. In other words, the halakha is stringent on both counts.

אמרה מת (לי) בעלי ואחר כך מת חמי תנשא ותטול כתובתה וחמותה אסורה היתה בת ישראל לכהן תאכל בתרומה דברי רבי טרפון רבי עקיבא אומר אין זו דרך מוציאה מידי עבירה עד שתהא אסורה לינשא ואסורה מלאכול בתרומה:

The mishna discusses a similar case. If a woman said: My husband died and afterward my father-in-law died, she may marry and take her marriage contract, and it is prohibited for her mother-in-law to remarry, as a woman may not testify on behalf of her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may partake of teruma; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare her from transgression; there is no remedy unless it is prohibited for the mother-in-law to marry and also prohibited for her to partake of teruma.

גמ׳ וצריכא דאי איתמר הך קמייתא בהא קאמר רבי טרפון משום דצערא דגופה אבל חמותה דצערא מילי דעלמא אימא מודי ליה לרבי עקיבא

GEMARA: The mishna states the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva with regard to two apparently identical cases. The Gemara explains: And it is necessary to state both of these examples. As, had the mishna stated the dispute only in this first case, I would have said: It is in this case that Rabbi Tarfon said the wife is suspected of lying, because the suffering is physical, i.e., she is jealous of her rival wife, with whom she shares her husband. However, with regard to her mother-in-law, where the suffering is merely verbal and not physical, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Akiva, i.e., that she is not considered a liar, and therefore it should be prohibited for her mother-in-law to partake in teruma.

ואי איתמר בהא בהא קאמר רבי עקיבא אבל בהך אימא מודה ליה לרבי טרפון צריכא

And vice-versa: Had the mishna stated the dispute only in this second case, I would have said: It is in this case that Rabbi Akiva said that the mother-in-law must refrain from eating teruma in case the daughter-in-law is not lying, but in this other case of the rival wife, you might say that he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon that she may eat teruma, as a rival wife is certainly not telling the truth. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to state the dispute in both two cases.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי טרפון אמר אביי אף אנן נמי תנינא ניתן לי בן במדינת הים מת בני ואחר כך בעלי נאמנת בעלי ואחר כך בני אינה נאמנת

§ Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. The testimony of a woman who is suspected of harboring ill will toward another is entirely rejected with regard to that other person, and no credence is given to her account at all. Abaye said: Likewise, we, too, learn in a mishna (118b): If a woman came and said: A son was born to me overseas, and my son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible in all regards, and she enters into levirate marriage. If she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, which means she is exempt from levirate marriage, she is not deemed credible.

וחוששין לדבריה וחולצת ולא מתייבמת לדבריה הוא דחוששין הא לדברי צרה אין חוששין שמע מינה:

That mishna adds: But in any case, the court is concerned about her statement, and she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. In other words, the court takes into consideration the possibility that she is speaking the truth, and if her son did die after her husband it is prohibited for her to enter into levirate marriage. Abaye infers from the language of the mishna on 118b: It is with regard to her own statement that the court is concerned. This indicates that the court is not concerned at all about the statement of her rival wife who testified with regard to her. The Gemara concludes: Learn from here that this is the case.

מתני׳ קידש אחת מחמש נשים ואין יודע אי זו קידש כל אחת אומרת אותי קידש נותן גט לכל אחת ואחת ומניח כתובה ביניהן ומסתלק דברי רבי טרפון

MISHNA: In relation to the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva in the previous mishna, in which Rabbi Akiva states that one must avoid a possible transgression, the mishna cites two similar cases involving other topics. With regard to one who betrothed one of five women, and he does not know which of them he betrothed, and each one of them says: He betrothed me, if he does not want to marry any of them he gives a bill of divorce to each and every one of them so none will have the status of a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced. And he leaves the marriage contract among them and departs. The marriage contract remains in dispute between the women until they clarify which of them is entitled to the money. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

רבי עקיבא אומר אין זו דרך מוציא מידי עבירה עד שיתן גט וכתובה לכל אחת ואחת גזל אחד מחמשה ואין יודע מאיזה גזל כל אחד אומר אותי גזל מניח גזילה ביניהן ומסתלק דברי רבי טרפון רבי עקיבא אומר אין זו דרך מוציא מידי עבירה עד שישלם לכל אחד ואחד:

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression, as perhaps the woman he actually betrothed will not receive the money to which she is entitled. There is no remedy unless he gives a bill of divorce and a marriage contract payment to each and every one. And likewise, in the case of one who stole money from one of five people and does not know from which of them he stole, and each one says: He stole from me, he leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and they will decide among themselves how to distribute the money; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression; there is no remedy unless he pays each and every one of them.

גמ׳ קידש קתני בעל לא קתני גזל קתני לקח לא קתני מני מתניתין לא תנא קמא ולא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: It is taught in the mishna that he betrothed one of five women, whereas it is not taught that he had sexual intercourse with one of five women, as a different ruling applies in this case. Similarly, with regard to the second case, it is taught that he stole from one of five people, and it is not taught that he purchased an item from one of five people. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna and it is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

דתניא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר לא נחלקו רבי טרפון ורבי עקיבא על שקידש אחת מחמש נשים ואינו יודע איזו קידש שמניח כתובה ביניהן ומסתלק על מה נחלקו על שבעל רבי טרפון אומר מניח כתובה ביניהן ומסתלק רבי עקיבא אומר עד שישלם לכל אחת ואחת

The Gemara elaborates. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of a man who betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he betrothed, as everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the money of the marriage contract among them and departs. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who had sexual intercourse with one of them for the purpose of betrothal. Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the money among them and departs, while Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays each and every one of them. Since he married in an inappropriate manner, the Sages penalized him by compelling him to pay all the women.

לא נחלקו רבי טרפון ורבי עקיבא על שלקח מקח מחמשה בני אדם ואין יודע מאיזה מהן לקח שמניח דמי מקח ביניהן ומסתלק לא נחלקו אלא שגזל מחמשה שאמר רבי טרפון מניח גזילה ביניהם ומסתלק ורבי עקיבא אומר עד שישלם גזילה לכל אחד ואחד

Likewise, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of one who purchased an item from one of five people and he does not know from which of them he purchased it. Everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the price of the purchase among them and departs. They disagree only with regard to one who stole from five people, as Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays the stolen money to each and every one of them. In this case, as he committed a transgression, he must ensure that the stolen money is restored to its proper owner.

מדקאמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר בקידש ולקח לא פליגי מכלל דתנא קמא סבר פליגי מני

The Gemara states: From the fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva do not disagree with regard to the cases of one who betrothed and one who purchased, one may learn by inference that the first tanna, with whom he disagrees, holds that they do disagree about the cases of betrothed and purchased, whereas with regard to one who had sexual intercourse and one who stole an item Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva. With this in mind, who is the author of the mishna?

אי תנא קמא ליתני קידש ולקח אי רבי שמעון בן אלעזר ליתני בעל וגזל

The Gemara elaborates: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, let it teach the cases of betrothed and also purchased, but not that of one who stole or one who had intercourse, as the first tanna maintains that Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva in those cases. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, let it teach the cases of one who had sexual relations and that of one who stole. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the case of one who had sexual relations, not in the case of a man who betrothed one of five women. Likewise, he maintains that they disagree in the case of one who stole from five people, not one who purchased an item from five people.

לעולם רבי שמעון בן אלעזר ומאי קידש קידש בביאה תנא קידש להודיעך כחו דרבי עקיבא

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and what is the meaning of the term: Betrothed? It means that he betrothed one of the women by means of sexual intercourse. And the mishna taught the term betrothed to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the stringent opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

דאף על גב דאיסורא דרבנן עבד קניס תנא גזל להודיעך כחו דרבי טרפון דאף על גב דאיסורא דאורייתא עבד לא קניס:

The Gemara explains: As, although this man performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by rabbinic law, i.e., he did not have licentious sexual relations with her but rather engaged in intercourse for the purpose of betrothal, which is in violation of a rabbinic prohibition that one may not betroth a woman by sexual intercourse ab initio, even so Rabbi Akiva penalizes him. And the mishna taught the case of one who stole so as to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the lenient opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as although he performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by Torah law, nevertheless he does not penalize him even in this case.

מתני׳ האשה שהלכה היא ובעלה למדינת הים ובנה עמהם ובאת ואמרה מת בעלי ואחר כך מת בני נאמנת מת בני ואחר כך מת בעלי אינה נאמנת וחוששין לדבריה וחולצת ולא מתייבמת

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and her son was with them, and later she came back and said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is deemed credible. It is permitted for her to remarry, and she is exempt from levirate marriage. The reason is that she had children when she left, and therefore she retains her presumptive status of one who is exempt from levirate marriage. However, if she said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, i.e., she may not enter into levirate marriage. And yet we are concerned and give some credence to her statement, in case she was actually widowed by a childless husband, and therefore she performs ḥalitza to exempt her from the levirate bond with her yavam, and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

ניתן לי בן במדינת הים ואמרה מת בני ואחר כך מת בעלי נאמנת מת בעלי ואחר כך מת בני אינה נאמנת וחוששין לדבריה וחולצת ולא מתייבמת

If she went with her childless husband and returned alone and testified: A son was born to me overseas, and she further said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible and may even enter into levirate marriage, as she was presumed to be childless when she left and consequently she retains that presumptive status. However, if she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is not deemed credible for the purpose of exempting her from levirate marriage, but the court is concerned about her statement. And therefore she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

ניתן לי יבם במדינת הים אמרה מת בעלי ואחר כך מת יבמי יבמי ואחר כך בעלי נאמנת

If she said: A yavam was born for me overseas, i.e., when the family left the country her husband did not have a brother, and she claims that in the meantime a brother was born to her husband, and she also said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, in either case she is deemed credible. This is because when she left she was not presumed to require levirate marriage, and the suggestion that her husband now has a brother is based solely on her testimony.

הלכה היא ובעלה ויבמה למדינת הים אמרה מת בעלי ואחר כך יבמי יבמי ואחר כך בעלי אינה נאמנת שאין האשה נאמנת לומר מת יבמי שתנשא ולא מתה אחותה שתכנס לביתו ואין האיש נאמן לומר מת אחי שייבם אשתו ולא מתה אשתו שישא אחותה:

However, if she went, she and her husband and her yavam, overseas, and upon her return she said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, as a woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam died, in order that she may marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says that her sister died, in order that she may enter the house of her sister’s husband. And a man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother died, so that he may enter into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife, and he is not deemed credible when he says that his wife died, in order that he may marry his wife’s sister. The Sages accepted impaired testimony of this kind only when there was a concern about creating a situation of a deserted wife.

גמ׳ בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן המזכה גט לאשתו במקום יבם מהו כיון דסניא ליה זכות הוא לה וזכין לאדם שלא בפניו או דלמא כיון דזימנין דרחמא ליה חוב הוא לה ואין חבין לאדם שלא בפניו

GEMARA: Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: In the case of a man who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife, i.e., he appoints an agent to take the bill of divorce to his wife, when she has a potential yavam, what is the halakha if her husband dies before she is divorced? One might say that since she hates her yavam, receiving the bill of divorce is for her benefit, as this act renders her prohibited to him, and it is a principle that one may act in a person’s interest in his absence. If so, as soon as the husband gives the bill of divorce to the agent she is divorced. Or perhaps, since she sometimes loves her yavam, this bill of divorce is to her disadvantage, and one may not act against a person’s interest in his absence. Consequently, she is not divorced until the bill of divorce reaches her possession.

אמר ליה תנינא וחוששין לדבריה וחולצת ולא מתייבמת

Rav Naḥman said to Rava that we learned an answer to this dilemma in the mishna: And we are concerned about her statement, and she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. The mishna states that the court gives her statement some credence in either case, both when her testimony would exempt her from levirate marriage and when it would allow her to marry her yavam. This indicates that levirate marriage is considered neither in her interest nor a disadvantage for her. Rather, its classification is uncertain.

אמר ליה רבינא לרבא המזכה גט לאשתו במקום קטטה מהו כיון דאית לה קטטה בהדיה זכות הוא לה או דלמא ניחא דגופא עדיף לה תא שמע דאמר ריש לקיש טב למיתב טן דו מלמיתב ארמלו

§ Ravina said to Rava: With regard to one who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife through an agent in a situation when there was a quarrel between them, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains both sides of the question: Since she has a quarrel with him, the bill of divorce might be considered for her benefit. Or perhaps, her physical comfort is preferable to her, as she prefers to remain married despite the quarrel between her and her husband. Come and hear a resolution, as Reish Lakish said: There is a popular idiom among women: It is better to sit as two [tan du] than to sit lonely as a widow, i.e., a woman prefers the companionship of any husband over being alone.

אביי אמר דשומשמנא גברא כורסיה בי חרתא רמו לה רב פפא אמר דנפצא גברא תיקרי בסיפי בבא ותיתיב

Abaye said a similar popular expression: One whose husband is small as an ant, she places her seat among the noblewomen, as she considers herself important merely by virtue of being married. Rav Pappa said a different maxim: One whose husband is a wool comber [naftza], a lowly occupation, she calls him to sit with her at the entrance to the house, to display herself as a married woman.

רב אשי אומר דקולסא גברא לא בעיא טלפחי לקידרא תנא וכולן מזנות ותולות בבעליהן:

Similarly, Rav Ashi says: One whose husband sells cabbage heads [kulsa] does not require lentils for her pot. She is so happy she is married that she does not mind even if he does not provide her with food. The Gemara comments: A Sage taught: And all of these women who appear so satisfied with their marriage, they all commit adultery and attribute the children to their husbands. This is another reason why they are so keen to be married. This shows that even when there are quarrels between a couple, the wife still prefers the status of a married woman, and therefore the bill of divorce is not considered in her interest.

הדרן עלך האשה שלום