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Today's Daf Yomi

July 4, 2022 | 讛壮 讘转诪讜讝 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 119

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Today’s daf is sponsored by Shelley and Jerry Gornish in loving memory of their dear grandson, Oz Wilchek, on his sixth yahrzeit.聽

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in loving memory of Moshe Hartman. “In life, you expanded my horizons beyond all expectations. In your honor, I now feel my life expanding beyond all expectations through Hadran鈥檚 Daf Yomi. Thank you, and thanks to Rabbanit Michelle and Hadran for all the inspiration and insight.”

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Gitta Jaroslawicz-Neufeld in loving memory of her father, Philip Jaroslawicz 讬讜住祝 讘谉 诪谞讞诐 诪注谞讚诇 讜驻注砖讬 注”讛. 鈥淢y father raised us to love learning and live Torah. While he may have said “no” when we asked for a new game, he never said “no” when we asked for books. His love of learning and passion for chessed are stamped strongly in the spiritual DNA of his children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren.”

Today’s daf is sponsored by Adina Hagege in honor of Miriam Kerzner’s birthday. “Your late-night dedication to learning the Daf Yomi with Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle, intellectually immersing yourself in a whole new world of Talmud, is an ongoing testament to the inspiration you’ve been for us all your life. We wish you many more years of learning and spiritual growth. With lots of love from your brother and sister, Barry and Elayne Greenstone, and all your nieces and nephews, grand-nieces and nephews, and great-grand nieces and nephews”.聽

Today鈥檚 daf is dedicated to Geelit Sommer by her children. “We wish our dear Ima a very happy birthday and a big 砖讻讜讬讞 for learning Masechet Yevamot. We are very proud of your dedication to learning and your openness to taking on this challenge, and we are inspired by you. 注诇讬 讜讛爪诇讬讞讬!”

If one’s husband went abroad with a rival wife and witnesses said that he died, the wife needs to wait until she finds out that his wife did not give birth to a child. She cannot do yibum or marry anyone else. Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees and permit her to marry. According to the rabbis, why don’t we follow the majority and assume she got pregnant and had a child? A distinction is made between a majority of items in front of us. like “nine stores” and a statistical majority. Or is it because the Mishna holds like Rabbi Meir who is concerned for minority possibilities? The difficulty of saying the Mishna holds like Rabbi Meir is that the second case in the Mishna does not seem concerned with minority possibilities. How can this be explained? How long does the woman need to wait to see if the rival wife had a child? Why can’t we allow her to perform chalitza out of doubt? Sisters-in-law who could both fall to yibum to each other’s husbands are not believed regarding each other. What happens in a case where there are only two brothers and each of their wives claims that their husband has died – if we believe each one, there are no brothers left to do yibum, in which case they should be allowed to marry anyone else. What is the law? The Mishna brings a number of different scenarios within this case.

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 讜爪专转讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 注讚 砖转讚注 砖诪讗 诪注讜讘专转 讛讬讗 爪专转讛

MISHNA: In the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife traveled to a country overseas, and witnesses came and told her: Your husband died, she shall not marry any other man, in case she requires levirate marriage with her brother-in-law, i.e., yavam, in which case she is prohibited from marrying anyone else. And she also shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether she, i.e., her rival wife, is pregnant. If her rival wife bears a child to her late husband, she does not have a levirate bond with her brother-in-law, and she is therefore prohibited from marrying him.

讛讬转讛 诇讛 讞诪讜转 讗讬谞讛 讞讜砖砖转 讬爪转讛 诪诇讬讗讛 讞讜砖砖转 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讛 讞讜砖砖转

If she had a mother-in-law overseas, but her late husband had no brothers, she need not be concerned that a brother to her husband may have been born. But if her mother-in-law departed from her town pregnant, this widow should be concerned that perhaps her late husband now has a brother, with whom she is obligated in levirate marriage. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even in such a case she need not be concerned and may marry whomever she wishes.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 爪专转讛 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 诇讛讗 爪专讛 讛讜讗 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 讗讘诇 诇爪专讛 讗讞专讬转讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is implied by the extra word: She, in the expression in the first clause of the mishna: Whether she, i.e., her rival wife, is pregnant? The Gemara answers that it teaches us this: We are concerned about a possible pregnancy of this rival wife who went overseas with her husband, but we are not concerned about the possibility that he married another rival wife overseas and sired a child by her.

诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讻讜壮 讘砖诇诪讗 讬讘讜诪讬 诇讗 讚讚诇诪讗 诪讬注讘专讗 讜拽驻讙注讛 讘讗砖转 讗讞 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诇讗 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讗诪讗讬 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 诪转注讘专讜转 讜讬讜诇讚讜转

It was taught in the mishna: She shall not marry any other man and shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether her rival wife is pregnant. The Gemara asks: Granted, she may not enter into levirate marriage, because perhaps her rival wife is pregnant, and if so, this widow would encounter the Torah prohibition proscribing a brother鈥檚 wife. If a child is born to her late husband, levirate marriage is not required and she is prohibited from marrying her brother-in-law. But why should she not marry another man? Follow the majority of women, and as most women become pregnant and give birth, it is probable that her rival wife did have a child.

诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讞讬讬砖 诇诪讬注讜讟讗

Shall we say that the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority? There is a minority of women who do not give birth, and Rabbi Meir takes this minority into consideration and requires the widow to wait and clarify whether or not she is required to enter into levirate marriage.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘谞谉 讻讬 讗讝诇讬 专讘谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘讗 专讜讘讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 拽诪谉 讻讙讜谉 转砖注 讞谞讜讬讜转 讜住谞讛讚专讬 讗讘诇 专讜讘讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 拽诪谉 诇讗 讗讝诇讬 专讘谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘讗

The Gemara rejects this: You can even say that the mishna follows the opinion of the Rabbis. When the Rabbis follow the majority, it is an evident majority, which is extant and can be examined. For example, in a situation where a piece of meat is found in front of nine stores selling kosher meat and one store selling non-kosher meat, if it is not known from which store the meat came, it may be assumed that it came from one of the stores that sells kosher meat. And similarly, the Sanhedrin reaches its decisions by a majority vote of its members. But with regard to a non-evident majority, which is based solely upon general statistical information, such as the assertion that most women become pregnant and give birth, even the Rabbis do not follow the majority.

讜讛专讬 拽讟谉 讜拽讟谞讛 讚专讜讘讗 讚诇讬转讗 拽诪谉 讛讬讗 讜讗讝诇讬 专讘谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘讗 讚转谞讬讗 拽讟谉 讜拽讟谞讛 诇讗 讞讜诇爪讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讬讘诪讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讬驻讛 讗诪专转 砖讗讬谉 讞讜诇爪讬谉 讗讬砖 讻转讬讘 讘驻专砖讛 讜诪拽砖讬谞谉 讗砖讛 诇讗讬砖 讗诇讗 诪讛 讟注诐 讗讬谉 诪讬讬讘诪讬谉

The Gemara challenges: But the case of a minor boy or minor girl, as pertains to levirate marriage, is dependent upon a non-evident majority, and nevertheless the Rabbis follow the majority in their ruling, as it is taught in a baraita: A minor boy or minor girl may not perform 岣litza and may not enter into levirate marriage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: You have aptly stated that they may not perform 岣litza, since 鈥渕an鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:7), i.e., an adult male, is written in the section of the Torah pertaining to 岣litza. Though an adult female is not mentioned explicitly, we employ an analogy based on juxtaposition of the woman to the man and require that the female involved in 岣litza be an adult as well. But what is the reason that they may not enter into levirate marriage, about which the Torah鈥檚 phraseology does not specifically indicate adults?

讗诪专 诇讛诐 拽讟谉 砖诪讗 讬诪爪讗 住专讬住 拽讟谞讛 砖诪讗 转诪爪讗 讗讬诇讜谞讬转 讜谞诪爪讗讜 驻讜讙注讬诐 讘注专讜讛 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讝讬诇 讘转专 专讜讘讗 讚拽讟谞讬诐 讜专讜讘 拽讟谞讬诐 诇讗讜 住专讬住讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讝讬诇 讘转专 专讜讘 拽讟谞讜转 讜专讜讘 拽讟谞讜转 诇讗讜 讗讬诇讜谞讬转 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗

He said to them: I am concerned about the minor boy, lest he be confirmed as a sexually underdeveloped man when he grows up, and I am concerned about the minor girl, lest she be confirmed as an aylonit, a sexually underdeveloped woman, when she grows up. Then levirate marriage would not apply, and they would end up encountering a forbidden relative if they consummated the levirate marriage. And the Rabbis hold: Follow the majority of minor boys, and most minor boys are not sexually underdeveloped when they grow up. Likewise, follow the majority of minor girls, and most minor girls are not in the category of aylonit when they grow up. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir even with regard to a non-evident majority. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is following Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority.

讘诪讗讬 讗讜拽讬诪转讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讛讬转讛 诇讛 讞诪讜转 讗讬谞讛 讞讜砖砖转 讗诪讗讬 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 诪转注讘专讜转 讜讬讜诇讚讜转 诪讬注讜讟 诪驻讬诇讜转 讜讻诇 讛讬讜诇讚讜转 诪讞爪讛 讝讻专讬诐 讜诪讞爪讛 谞拽讘讜转 住诪讜讱 诪讬注讜讟讗 讚诪驻讬诇讜转 诇诪讞爪讛 谞拽讘讜转 讜讛讜讜 诇讬讛 讝讻专讬诐 诪讬注讜讟讗 讜诇讬讞讜砖

The Gemara asks: In what manner did you establish the mishna? You established it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. However, say the latter clause: If she had a mother-in-law overseas, she need not be concerned that her mother-in-law may have given birth to another son. Why should she not be concerned about this? Follow the majority of women, and most women become pregnant and give birth. The minority become pregnant and miscarry. And among all women who give birth, half of the children are male and half are female. Therefore, we can join the minority who miscarry to the half who give birth to females, and then the male children born would be only the minority. Nevertheless, if the mishna actually follows Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about minority circumstances, let him be concerned that a yavam might have been born, necessitating a levirate marriage.

讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬讞讝拽讛 诇砖讜拽 诇讗 讞讬讬砖 专讬砖讗 讚讗讬讞讝拽 诇讬讬讘讜诐 转讬讬讘诐

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps, since the widow is legally presumed to be permitted to marry a man from the general public, since her husband had no known brothers, Rabbi Meir is not concerned about the minority. The Gemara challenges: If so, in the first clause of the mishna, where the widow is legally presumed to require levirate marriage, as her husband had no children, she should be permitted to enter into levirate marriage without concern that her rival wife might have given birth.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 专讬砖讗 讚讗讬住讜专 讻专转 讞砖砖讜 住讬驻讗 讚讗讬住讜专 诇讗讜 诇讗 讞砖砖讜

The Gemara answers that Rav Na岣an said that Rabba bar Avuh said: In the first clause of the mishna, which relates to a prohibition proscribing a brother鈥檚 wife when levirate marriage does not apply, which bears the punishment of karet, they were concerned about the minority possibility because of the severity of the prohibition. But in the latter clause of the mishna, which relates to an ordinary prohibition, that of a woman whose husband died childless marrying without performing 岣litza, the prohibition is not so severe. Therefore, they were not concerned about the minority and relied upon the presumption.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讻讚讬 讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讛 诇讬 讗讬住讜专 讻专转 诪讛 诇讬 讗讬住讜专 诇讗讜 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗

Rava said in opposition to this contention: Now since this prohibition is by Torah law and that prohibition is by Torah law, what difference is it to me if it is a prohibition bearing the punishment of karet and what difference is it to me if it is an ordinary prohibition? If both prohibitions are by Torah law there is no justification for distinguishing between a severe prohibition and a minor one? Rather, Rava said that we must reject this contention, and say:

专讬砖讗 讞讝拽讛 诇讬讬讘讜诐 讜专讜讘讗 诇砖讜拽 讜讞讝拽讛 诇讗 注讚讬祝 讻讬 专讜讘讗 讜讗讬讬转讬 诪讬注讜讟讗 讚诪驻讬诇讜转 住诪讜讱 诇讞讝拽讛 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 驻诇讙讗 讜驻诇讙讗 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐

In the first clause of the mishna, the legal presumption is that this widow is obligated to enter into levirate marriage, but in a majority of cases she will actually be permitted to marry a man from the general public, because it is statistically probable that her rival wife had a child. A legal presumption is not as significant as a majority, meaning that the majority carries more weight than the presumption, and she should be permitted to marry immediately. But bring the minority who miscarry into consideration, and join this to the legal presumption, and it becomes similar to an even balance of half and half. Those who miscarry detract from the strength of the majority, causing it to be equal in legal significance to the legal presumption. Therefore, the ruling is that she shall not marry any man who is not her yavam and she shall not enter into levirate marriage either.

住讬驻讗 讞讝拽讛 诇砖讜拽 讜专讜讘讗 诇砖讜拽 讜讛讜讬 诇讬讛 讝讻专讬诐 诪讬注讜讟讗 讚诪讬注讜讟讗 讜诪讬注讜讟讗 讚诪讬注讜讟讗 诇讗 讞讬讬砖 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

However, in the latter clause, the legal presumption is that the widow is permitted to marry a man from the general public, since her late husband had no brothers initially. And in a majority of cases her mother-in-law will not have had another son, and therefore the widow will actually be permitted to marry a man from the general public. Consequently, the possibility that her husband has a brother, necessitating levirate marriage, is not taken into account because it is a minority of a minority, i.e., it is a minority and it contradicts the legal presumption, and even Rabbi Meir is not concerned about a minority of a minority.

诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讻讜壮 讜诇注讜诇诐

搂 It was taught in the mishna that in the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife went overseas and then her husband died, she shall not marry and shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether her rival wife is pregnant. The Gemara asks: But must she wait indefinitely? She should be permitted to perform 岣litza on account of the uncertainty and then marry another man.

讗诪专 讝注讬专讬 诇注爪诪讛 砖诇砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐 诇讞讘专转讛 转砖注讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 诪诪讛 谞驻砖讱

Ze鈥檈iri said: In order for herself [le鈥檃tzma]to be permitted to marry, she must wait three months after performing 岣litza, since every woman must wait three months after her husband鈥檚 death before she marries again. Additionally, due to the concern for the possibility that her fellow wife may be pregnant, she must wait nine months, after which time that wife would have given birth had she been pregnant, and then she performs 岣litza whichever way you look at it. If her rival wife gave birth in the meantime, she is permitted to marry anyone she wishes, and the 岣litza is superfluous; if her rival wife did not give birth, necessitating levirate marriage, she is exempted by the 岣litza. However, she may not perform 岣litza earlier because 岣litza performed while any wife of the deceased husband is pregnant is ineffective.

专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇注爪诪讛 砖诇砖讛 诇讞讘专转讛 诇注讜诇诐 讜转讞诇讜抓 诪诪讛 谞驻砖讱

Rabbi 岣nina said: For those concerns relating to herself she must wait three months, as explained, but for concerns related to her fellow wife鈥檚 possible pregnancy she must wait indefinitely, until it is verified whether or not that wife gave birth. The Gemara challenges Rabbi 岣nina鈥檚 opinion: But let her perform 岣litza whichever way you look at it, since, whatever happened, after nine months she may certainly perform 岣litza.

讗讘讬讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讜专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜谞诪爪讗 讗转讛 诪爪专讬讻讛 讻专讜讝 诇讻讛讜谞讛

Abaye bar Avin and Rabbi 岣nina bar Avin both say in explanation of Rabbi 岣nina鈥檚 opinion: It is a rabbinic decree lest there be viable offspring of that other wife. If so, her 岣litza is superfluous, since she was exempt from both levirate marriage and 岣litza; and then it transpires that you necessitate an announcement on her behalf stating that she is permitted to the priesthood, as a woman who has undergone 岣litza is forbidden to a priest, but in this case it has become clear retroactively that she did not undergo 岣litza.

讜诇讬爪专讻讛 讚诇诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讚讛讜讬 讘讞诇讬爪讛 讜诇讗 讛讜讬 讘讛讻专讝讛 讜讗诪专讬 拽砖专讜 讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉

The Gemara asks: And so let an announcement be necessary for her if a viable offspring is found. The Gemara answers: Perhaps there will be people who were present at the 岣litza ceremony but were not present at the announcement that she is permitted to marry a priest, and if this woman marries a priest they will mistakenly say: They are permitting a 岣lutza to marry a priest.

转谞谉 谞讬转谉 诇讬 讘谉 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘谞讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘注诇讬 谞讗诪谞转 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

The Gemara deliberates further about this: We learned in a mishna (Yevamot 118b): If a woman says: A son was born to me in a country overseas, and she also said: My son died, and then my husband died, she is deemed credible. However, if she said: My husband died and then my son died, she is not deemed credible about the sequence of events, but even so one must be concerned about her statement that her husband died childless. Consequently, she must perform 岣litza, but she may not enter into levirate marriage.

讜诇讬讞讜砖 讚诇诪讗 讗转讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗诪专讬 讻讚拽讗诪专讛 讜谞诪爪讗 讗转讛 诪爪专讬讻讛 讻专讜讝 诇讻讛讜谞讛 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讙专讜砖讛 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讘讗诪专讛 讗谞讬 讜讛讜讗 谞讞讘讗谞讜 讘诪注专讛

The Gemara says: Just as there is concern about an announcement for the priesthood, let us be concerned that perhaps witnesses will eventually come and testify that the sequence of events was as she said, rendering her 岣litza superfluous. And then it transpires that you necessitate an announcement on her behalf stating that she is permitted to the priesthood, and nevertheless the mishna instructs her to perform 岣litza. Rav Pappa said: There it is referring only to a divorced woman, who was divorced from a previous husband, so that she is already prohibited from marrying a priest in any case. Rav 岣yya, son of Rav Huna, said: It is referring to a case where she said: He and I were hiding alone with our son in a cave. Consequently, there is no concern that witnesses will come and testify about the sequence of the events.

诪转谞讬壮 砖转讬 讬讘诪讜转 讝讜 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讝讜 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讘注诇讬 讝讜 讗住讜专讛 诪驻谞讬 讘注诇讛 砖诇 讝讜 讜讝讜 讗住讜专讛 诪驻谞讬 讘注诇讛 砖诇 讝讜

MISHNA: If there are two sisters-in-law married to two childless brothers who testify about their marital status, and this one says: My husband died, and that one says: My husband died, although each one of them is deemed credible with regard to her own status as a widow, this one is prohibited from marrying due to the possibility that the husband of that other sister may be alive, obligating her in levirate marriage, and that one is prohibited from marrying due to the husband of this sister, according to the same rationale. Although each is accorded credibility as to her own husband鈥檚 death, the halakha is that sisters-in-law are among the five types of women not accorded credibility with regard to each other鈥檚 permissibility to marry because of possible conflicts of interest.

诇讝讜 注讚讬诐 讜诇讝讜 讗讬谉 注讚讬诐 讗转 砖讬砖 诇讛 注讚讬诐 讗住讜专讛 讜讗转 砖讗讬谉 诇讛 注讚讬诐 诪讜转专转 诇讝讜 讘谞讬诐 讜诇讝讜 讗讬谉 讘谞讬诐 讗转 砖讬砖 诇讛 讘谞讬诐 诪讜转专转 讜讗转 砖讗讬谉 诇讛 讘谞讬诐 讗住讜专讛

If this one has witnesses to her husband鈥檚 death, and that one does not have witnesses, then the one who has witnesses is prohibited from marrying, as there are no witnesses to the death of her yavam to exempt her from levirate marriage; but the one who has no witnesses is permitted to marry based on her own testimony that her husband died combined with the witnesses鈥 testimony exempting her from levirate marriage. If this one has children and that one has no children, then the one with children is permitted to marry, as she herself is deemed credible with regard to her husband鈥檚 death, and her children exempt her from levirate marriage. But the one without children is prohibited from marrying, as the death of her yavam has not been corroborated independently of her sister-in-law鈥檚 testimony.

谞转讬讬讘诪讜 讜诪转讜 讛讬讘诪讬谉 讗住讜专讜转 诇讛谞砖讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜转专讜 诇讬讘诪讬谉 讛讜转专讜 诇讻诇 讗讚诐

If there were two additional yevamin with whom these two widows entered into levirate marriage, and then the yevamin died childless, the women are prohibited from marrying, since the concern about an additional living yavam still remains. Rabbi Elazar says: Since these women were permitted to marry the living brothers-in-law, as the testimony of each was deemed credible with regard to her own status, they are permitted, from then on, to marry any man because their statements, taken together, indicate that neither one is obligated to enter into levirate marriage.

讙诪壮 转谞讗 诇讝讜 注讚讬诐 讜讘谞讬诐 讜诇讝讜 诇讗 注讚讬诐 讜诇讗 讘谞讬诐 砖转讬讛谉 诪讜转专讜转

GEMARA: It was taught in a baraita: If this one has witnesses that her husband died and also has children, and the other has neither witnesses nor children, they are both permitted to marry. This is because the woman who has children is exempt from levirate marriage, and the woman who has no children may rely upon the witnesses鈥 testimony that her yavam died.

谞转讬讬讘诪讜 讜诪转讜 讛讬讘诪讬谉 讗住讜专讬谉 诇讛谞砖讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜转专讜 诇讬讘诪讬谉 讛讜转专讜 诇讻诇 讗讚诐

It was taught in the mishna: If they both entered into levirate marriage and then the yevamin they married died, they are prohibited from marrying. Rabbi Elazar says: Since they were permitted to marry the yevamin, they are permitted to any man.

讘注讬 专讘讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪砖讜诐 讚拽住讘专 爪专讛 诪注讬讚讛 诇讞讘专转讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讬讗 诇讗 诪拽诇拽诇讗 谞驻砖讛

Rava raised a dilemma: What is Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 reasoning? Is it because he holds in general that one rival wife may testify for another rival wife about her husband鈥檚 death, and he similarly holds that all of the five types of women who are presumed to have a conflict of interest with each other may testify for one another nonetheless? Or perhaps it is because she would not cause herself injury. Although she would be suspected of lying and saying that her husband died in order to harm her rival wife, if she herself enters into levirate marriage it can be assumed that she was telling the truth, because if she does so while her husband is actually alive, she would be committing incest with her brother-in-law. Consequently, her rival wife is also permitted to marry on the basis of her testimony.

诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 119

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Yevamot 119

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 讜爪专转讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 注讚 砖转讚注 砖诪讗 诪注讜讘专转 讛讬讗 爪专转讛

MISHNA: In the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife traveled to a country overseas, and witnesses came and told her: Your husband died, she shall not marry any other man, in case she requires levirate marriage with her brother-in-law, i.e., yavam, in which case she is prohibited from marrying anyone else. And she also shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether she, i.e., her rival wife, is pregnant. If her rival wife bears a child to her late husband, she does not have a levirate bond with her brother-in-law, and she is therefore prohibited from marrying him.

讛讬转讛 诇讛 讞诪讜转 讗讬谞讛 讞讜砖砖转 讬爪转讛 诪诇讬讗讛 讞讜砖砖转 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讛 讞讜砖砖转

If she had a mother-in-law overseas, but her late husband had no brothers, she need not be concerned that a brother to her husband may have been born. But if her mother-in-law departed from her town pregnant, this widow should be concerned that perhaps her late husband now has a brother, with whom she is obligated in levirate marriage. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even in such a case she need not be concerned and may marry whomever she wishes.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 爪专转讛 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 诇讛讗 爪专讛 讛讜讗 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 讗讘诇 诇爪专讛 讗讞专讬转讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is implied by the extra word: She, in the expression in the first clause of the mishna: Whether she, i.e., her rival wife, is pregnant? The Gemara answers that it teaches us this: We are concerned about a possible pregnancy of this rival wife who went overseas with her husband, but we are not concerned about the possibility that he married another rival wife overseas and sired a child by her.

诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讻讜壮 讘砖诇诪讗 讬讘讜诪讬 诇讗 讚讚诇诪讗 诪讬注讘专讗 讜拽驻讙注讛 讘讗砖转 讗讞 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诇讗 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讗诪讗讬 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 诪转注讘专讜转 讜讬讜诇讚讜转

It was taught in the mishna: She shall not marry any other man and shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether her rival wife is pregnant. The Gemara asks: Granted, she may not enter into levirate marriage, because perhaps her rival wife is pregnant, and if so, this widow would encounter the Torah prohibition proscribing a brother鈥檚 wife. If a child is born to her late husband, levirate marriage is not required and she is prohibited from marrying her brother-in-law. But why should she not marry another man? Follow the majority of women, and as most women become pregnant and give birth, it is probable that her rival wife did have a child.

诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讞讬讬砖 诇诪讬注讜讟讗

Shall we say that the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority? There is a minority of women who do not give birth, and Rabbi Meir takes this minority into consideration and requires the widow to wait and clarify whether or not she is required to enter into levirate marriage.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘谞谉 讻讬 讗讝诇讬 专讘谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘讗 专讜讘讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 拽诪谉 讻讙讜谉 转砖注 讞谞讜讬讜转 讜住谞讛讚专讬 讗讘诇 专讜讘讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 拽诪谉 诇讗 讗讝诇讬 专讘谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘讗

The Gemara rejects this: You can even say that the mishna follows the opinion of the Rabbis. When the Rabbis follow the majority, it is an evident majority, which is extant and can be examined. For example, in a situation where a piece of meat is found in front of nine stores selling kosher meat and one store selling non-kosher meat, if it is not known from which store the meat came, it may be assumed that it came from one of the stores that sells kosher meat. And similarly, the Sanhedrin reaches its decisions by a majority vote of its members. But with regard to a non-evident majority, which is based solely upon general statistical information, such as the assertion that most women become pregnant and give birth, even the Rabbis do not follow the majority.

讜讛专讬 拽讟谉 讜拽讟谞讛 讚专讜讘讗 讚诇讬转讗 拽诪谉 讛讬讗 讜讗讝诇讬 专讘谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘讗 讚转谞讬讗 拽讟谉 讜拽讟谞讛 诇讗 讞讜诇爪讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讬讘诪讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讬驻讛 讗诪专转 砖讗讬谉 讞讜诇爪讬谉 讗讬砖 讻转讬讘 讘驻专砖讛 讜诪拽砖讬谞谉 讗砖讛 诇讗讬砖 讗诇讗 诪讛 讟注诐 讗讬谉 诪讬讬讘诪讬谉

The Gemara challenges: But the case of a minor boy or minor girl, as pertains to levirate marriage, is dependent upon a non-evident majority, and nevertheless the Rabbis follow the majority in their ruling, as it is taught in a baraita: A minor boy or minor girl may not perform 岣litza and may not enter into levirate marriage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: You have aptly stated that they may not perform 岣litza, since 鈥渕an鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:7), i.e., an adult male, is written in the section of the Torah pertaining to 岣litza. Though an adult female is not mentioned explicitly, we employ an analogy based on juxtaposition of the woman to the man and require that the female involved in 岣litza be an adult as well. But what is the reason that they may not enter into levirate marriage, about which the Torah鈥檚 phraseology does not specifically indicate adults?

讗诪专 诇讛诐 拽讟谉 砖诪讗 讬诪爪讗 住专讬住 拽讟谞讛 砖诪讗 转诪爪讗 讗讬诇讜谞讬转 讜谞诪爪讗讜 驻讜讙注讬诐 讘注专讜讛 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讝讬诇 讘转专 专讜讘讗 讚拽讟谞讬诐 讜专讜讘 拽讟谞讬诐 诇讗讜 住专讬住讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讝讬诇 讘转专 专讜讘 拽讟谞讜转 讜专讜讘 拽讟谞讜转 诇讗讜 讗讬诇讜谞讬转 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗

He said to them: I am concerned about the minor boy, lest he be confirmed as a sexually underdeveloped man when he grows up, and I am concerned about the minor girl, lest she be confirmed as an aylonit, a sexually underdeveloped woman, when she grows up. Then levirate marriage would not apply, and they would end up encountering a forbidden relative if they consummated the levirate marriage. And the Rabbis hold: Follow the majority of minor boys, and most minor boys are not sexually underdeveloped when they grow up. Likewise, follow the majority of minor girls, and most minor girls are not in the category of aylonit when they grow up. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir even with regard to a non-evident majority. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is following Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority.

讘诪讗讬 讗讜拽讬诪转讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讛讬转讛 诇讛 讞诪讜转 讗讬谞讛 讞讜砖砖转 讗诪讗讬 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 诪转注讘专讜转 讜讬讜诇讚讜转 诪讬注讜讟 诪驻讬诇讜转 讜讻诇 讛讬讜诇讚讜转 诪讞爪讛 讝讻专讬诐 讜诪讞爪讛 谞拽讘讜转 住诪讜讱 诪讬注讜讟讗 讚诪驻讬诇讜转 诇诪讞爪讛 谞拽讘讜转 讜讛讜讜 诇讬讛 讝讻专讬诐 诪讬注讜讟讗 讜诇讬讞讜砖

The Gemara asks: In what manner did you establish the mishna? You established it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. However, say the latter clause: If she had a mother-in-law overseas, she need not be concerned that her mother-in-law may have given birth to another son. Why should she not be concerned about this? Follow the majority of women, and most women become pregnant and give birth. The minority become pregnant and miscarry. And among all women who give birth, half of the children are male and half are female. Therefore, we can join the minority who miscarry to the half who give birth to females, and then the male children born would be only the minority. Nevertheless, if the mishna actually follows Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about minority circumstances, let him be concerned that a yavam might have been born, necessitating a levirate marriage.

讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬讞讝拽讛 诇砖讜拽 诇讗 讞讬讬砖 专讬砖讗 讚讗讬讞讝拽 诇讬讬讘讜诐 转讬讬讘诐

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps, since the widow is legally presumed to be permitted to marry a man from the general public, since her husband had no known brothers, Rabbi Meir is not concerned about the minority. The Gemara challenges: If so, in the first clause of the mishna, where the widow is legally presumed to require levirate marriage, as her husband had no children, she should be permitted to enter into levirate marriage without concern that her rival wife might have given birth.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 专讬砖讗 讚讗讬住讜专 讻专转 讞砖砖讜 住讬驻讗 讚讗讬住讜专 诇讗讜 诇讗 讞砖砖讜

The Gemara answers that Rav Na岣an said that Rabba bar Avuh said: In the first clause of the mishna, which relates to a prohibition proscribing a brother鈥檚 wife when levirate marriage does not apply, which bears the punishment of karet, they were concerned about the minority possibility because of the severity of the prohibition. But in the latter clause of the mishna, which relates to an ordinary prohibition, that of a woman whose husband died childless marrying without performing 岣litza, the prohibition is not so severe. Therefore, they were not concerned about the minority and relied upon the presumption.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讻讚讬 讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讛 诇讬 讗讬住讜专 讻专转 诪讛 诇讬 讗讬住讜专 诇讗讜 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗

Rava said in opposition to this contention: Now since this prohibition is by Torah law and that prohibition is by Torah law, what difference is it to me if it is a prohibition bearing the punishment of karet and what difference is it to me if it is an ordinary prohibition? If both prohibitions are by Torah law there is no justification for distinguishing between a severe prohibition and a minor one? Rather, Rava said that we must reject this contention, and say:

专讬砖讗 讞讝拽讛 诇讬讬讘讜诐 讜专讜讘讗 诇砖讜拽 讜讞讝拽讛 诇讗 注讚讬祝 讻讬 专讜讘讗 讜讗讬讬转讬 诪讬注讜讟讗 讚诪驻讬诇讜转 住诪讜讱 诇讞讝拽讛 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 驻诇讙讗 讜驻诇讙讗 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐

In the first clause of the mishna, the legal presumption is that this widow is obligated to enter into levirate marriage, but in a majority of cases she will actually be permitted to marry a man from the general public, because it is statistically probable that her rival wife had a child. A legal presumption is not as significant as a majority, meaning that the majority carries more weight than the presumption, and she should be permitted to marry immediately. But bring the minority who miscarry into consideration, and join this to the legal presumption, and it becomes similar to an even balance of half and half. Those who miscarry detract from the strength of the majority, causing it to be equal in legal significance to the legal presumption. Therefore, the ruling is that she shall not marry any man who is not her yavam and she shall not enter into levirate marriage either.

住讬驻讗 讞讝拽讛 诇砖讜拽 讜专讜讘讗 诇砖讜拽 讜讛讜讬 诇讬讛 讝讻专讬诐 诪讬注讜讟讗 讚诪讬注讜讟讗 讜诪讬注讜讟讗 讚诪讬注讜讟讗 诇讗 讞讬讬砖 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

However, in the latter clause, the legal presumption is that the widow is permitted to marry a man from the general public, since her late husband had no brothers initially. And in a majority of cases her mother-in-law will not have had another son, and therefore the widow will actually be permitted to marry a man from the general public. Consequently, the possibility that her husband has a brother, necessitating levirate marriage, is not taken into account because it is a minority of a minority, i.e., it is a minority and it contradicts the legal presumption, and even Rabbi Meir is not concerned about a minority of a minority.

诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讻讜壮 讜诇注讜诇诐

搂 It was taught in the mishna that in the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife went overseas and then her husband died, she shall not marry and shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether her rival wife is pregnant. The Gemara asks: But must she wait indefinitely? She should be permitted to perform 岣litza on account of the uncertainty and then marry another man.

讗诪专 讝注讬专讬 诇注爪诪讛 砖诇砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐 诇讞讘专转讛 转砖注讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 诪诪讛 谞驻砖讱

Ze鈥檈iri said: In order for herself [le鈥檃tzma]to be permitted to marry, she must wait three months after performing 岣litza, since every woman must wait three months after her husband鈥檚 death before she marries again. Additionally, due to the concern for the possibility that her fellow wife may be pregnant, she must wait nine months, after which time that wife would have given birth had she been pregnant, and then she performs 岣litza whichever way you look at it. If her rival wife gave birth in the meantime, she is permitted to marry anyone she wishes, and the 岣litza is superfluous; if her rival wife did not give birth, necessitating levirate marriage, she is exempted by the 岣litza. However, she may not perform 岣litza earlier because 岣litza performed while any wife of the deceased husband is pregnant is ineffective.

专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇注爪诪讛 砖诇砖讛 诇讞讘专转讛 诇注讜诇诐 讜转讞诇讜抓 诪诪讛 谞驻砖讱

Rabbi 岣nina said: For those concerns relating to herself she must wait three months, as explained, but for concerns related to her fellow wife鈥檚 possible pregnancy she must wait indefinitely, until it is verified whether or not that wife gave birth. The Gemara challenges Rabbi 岣nina鈥檚 opinion: But let her perform 岣litza whichever way you look at it, since, whatever happened, after nine months she may certainly perform 岣litza.

讗讘讬讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讜专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜谞诪爪讗 讗转讛 诪爪专讬讻讛 讻专讜讝 诇讻讛讜谞讛

Abaye bar Avin and Rabbi 岣nina bar Avin both say in explanation of Rabbi 岣nina鈥檚 opinion: It is a rabbinic decree lest there be viable offspring of that other wife. If so, her 岣litza is superfluous, since she was exempt from both levirate marriage and 岣litza; and then it transpires that you necessitate an announcement on her behalf stating that she is permitted to the priesthood, as a woman who has undergone 岣litza is forbidden to a priest, but in this case it has become clear retroactively that she did not undergo 岣litza.

讜诇讬爪专讻讛 讚诇诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讚讛讜讬 讘讞诇讬爪讛 讜诇讗 讛讜讬 讘讛讻专讝讛 讜讗诪专讬 拽砖专讜 讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉

The Gemara asks: And so let an announcement be necessary for her if a viable offspring is found. The Gemara answers: Perhaps there will be people who were present at the 岣litza ceremony but were not present at the announcement that she is permitted to marry a priest, and if this woman marries a priest they will mistakenly say: They are permitting a 岣lutza to marry a priest.

转谞谉 谞讬转谉 诇讬 讘谉 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讗诪专讛 诪转 讘谞讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘注诇讬 谞讗诪谞转 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇讚讘专讬讛 讜讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

The Gemara deliberates further about this: We learned in a mishna (Yevamot 118b): If a woman says: A son was born to me in a country overseas, and she also said: My son died, and then my husband died, she is deemed credible. However, if she said: My husband died and then my son died, she is not deemed credible about the sequence of events, but even so one must be concerned about her statement that her husband died childless. Consequently, she must perform 岣litza, but she may not enter into levirate marriage.

讜诇讬讞讜砖 讚诇诪讗 讗转讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗诪专讬 讻讚拽讗诪专讛 讜谞诪爪讗 讗转讛 诪爪专讬讻讛 讻专讜讝 诇讻讛讜谞讛 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讙专讜砖讛 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讘讗诪专讛 讗谞讬 讜讛讜讗 谞讞讘讗谞讜 讘诪注专讛

The Gemara says: Just as there is concern about an announcement for the priesthood, let us be concerned that perhaps witnesses will eventually come and testify that the sequence of events was as she said, rendering her 岣litza superfluous. And then it transpires that you necessitate an announcement on her behalf stating that she is permitted to the priesthood, and nevertheless the mishna instructs her to perform 岣litza. Rav Pappa said: There it is referring only to a divorced woman, who was divorced from a previous husband, so that she is already prohibited from marrying a priest in any case. Rav 岣yya, son of Rav Huna, said: It is referring to a case where she said: He and I were hiding alone with our son in a cave. Consequently, there is no concern that witnesses will come and testify about the sequence of the events.

诪转谞讬壮 砖转讬 讬讘诪讜转 讝讜 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讘注诇讬 讜讝讜 讗讜诪专转 诪转 讘注诇讬 讝讜 讗住讜专讛 诪驻谞讬 讘注诇讛 砖诇 讝讜 讜讝讜 讗住讜专讛 诪驻谞讬 讘注诇讛 砖诇 讝讜

MISHNA: If there are two sisters-in-law married to two childless brothers who testify about their marital status, and this one says: My husband died, and that one says: My husband died, although each one of them is deemed credible with regard to her own status as a widow, this one is prohibited from marrying due to the possibility that the husband of that other sister may be alive, obligating her in levirate marriage, and that one is prohibited from marrying due to the husband of this sister, according to the same rationale. Although each is accorded credibility as to her own husband鈥檚 death, the halakha is that sisters-in-law are among the five types of women not accorded credibility with regard to each other鈥檚 permissibility to marry because of possible conflicts of interest.

诇讝讜 注讚讬诐 讜诇讝讜 讗讬谉 注讚讬诐 讗转 砖讬砖 诇讛 注讚讬诐 讗住讜专讛 讜讗转 砖讗讬谉 诇讛 注讚讬诐 诪讜转专转 诇讝讜 讘谞讬诐 讜诇讝讜 讗讬谉 讘谞讬诐 讗转 砖讬砖 诇讛 讘谞讬诐 诪讜转专转 讜讗转 砖讗讬谉 诇讛 讘谞讬诐 讗住讜专讛

If this one has witnesses to her husband鈥檚 death, and that one does not have witnesses, then the one who has witnesses is prohibited from marrying, as there are no witnesses to the death of her yavam to exempt her from levirate marriage; but the one who has no witnesses is permitted to marry based on her own testimony that her husband died combined with the witnesses鈥 testimony exempting her from levirate marriage. If this one has children and that one has no children, then the one with children is permitted to marry, as she herself is deemed credible with regard to her husband鈥檚 death, and her children exempt her from levirate marriage. But the one without children is prohibited from marrying, as the death of her yavam has not been corroborated independently of her sister-in-law鈥檚 testimony.

谞转讬讬讘诪讜 讜诪转讜 讛讬讘诪讬谉 讗住讜专讜转 诇讛谞砖讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜转专讜 诇讬讘诪讬谉 讛讜转专讜 诇讻诇 讗讚诐

If there were two additional yevamin with whom these two widows entered into levirate marriage, and then the yevamin died childless, the women are prohibited from marrying, since the concern about an additional living yavam still remains. Rabbi Elazar says: Since these women were permitted to marry the living brothers-in-law, as the testimony of each was deemed credible with regard to her own status, they are permitted, from then on, to marry any man because their statements, taken together, indicate that neither one is obligated to enter into levirate marriage.

讙诪壮 转谞讗 诇讝讜 注讚讬诐 讜讘谞讬诐 讜诇讝讜 诇讗 注讚讬诐 讜诇讗 讘谞讬诐 砖转讬讛谉 诪讜转专讜转

GEMARA: It was taught in a baraita: If this one has witnesses that her husband died and also has children, and the other has neither witnesses nor children, they are both permitted to marry. This is because the woman who has children is exempt from levirate marriage, and the woman who has no children may rely upon the witnesses鈥 testimony that her yavam died.

谞转讬讬讘诪讜 讜诪转讜 讛讬讘诪讬谉 讗住讜专讬谉 诇讛谞砖讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜转专讜 诇讬讘诪讬谉 讛讜转专讜 诇讻诇 讗讚诐

It was taught in the mishna: If they both entered into levirate marriage and then the yevamin they married died, they are prohibited from marrying. Rabbi Elazar says: Since they were permitted to marry the yevamin, they are permitted to any man.

讘注讬 专讘讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪砖讜诐 讚拽住讘专 爪专讛 诪注讬讚讛 诇讞讘专转讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讬讗 诇讗 诪拽诇拽诇讗 谞驻砖讛

Rava raised a dilemma: What is Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 reasoning? Is it because he holds in general that one rival wife may testify for another rival wife about her husband鈥檚 death, and he similarly holds that all of the five types of women who are presumed to have a conflict of interest with each other may testify for one another nonetheless? Or perhaps it is because she would not cause herself injury. Although she would be suspected of lying and saying that her husband died in order to harm her rival wife, if she herself enters into levirate marriage it can be assumed that she was telling the truth, because if she does so while her husband is actually alive, she would be committing incest with her brother-in-law. Consequently, her rival wife is also permitted to marry on the basis of her testimony.

诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?

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