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Today's Daf Yomi

March 21, 2022 | 讬状讞 讘讗讚专 讘壮 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 14

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Nancy Kolodny in honor of her daughter-in-law and chevruta Lisa Kolodny on her birthday, and in honor of all the women and men of the Hadran community.聽

Reish Lakish questions: When the Megilla is read on different days in different cities, why is it not a concern of “lo titgoddo” – splitting the people into different factions? Rabbi Yochanan engaged in a debate with Reish Lakish wondering why he didn’t mention other Mishnayot to question from there as well. One of the examples brought is our Mishna regarding the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai. Reish Lakish answers regarding that one that Beit Shamai actually didn’t act upon their opinion and therefore there was no issue of factions. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and holds that they did. If in fact Beit Shamai did go according to their opinion, according to Rabbi Yochanan, why is there not an issue of factions? The Gemara raised two questions on Reish Lakish regarding the issue of factions. Then they bring two different sources to try to determine whether or not Beit Shamai acted according to their opinion.

 

诪讬 住讘专转 注砖讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讻讚讘专讬讛诐 诇讗 注砖讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讻讚讘专讬讛诐 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 注砖讜 讜注砖讜 讜讘驻诇讜讙转讗 [讚专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇] 讚专讘 讗讜诪专 诇讗 注砖讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讻讚讘专讬讛诐 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 注砖讜 讜注砖讜

Reish Lakish said to him: Do you hold that Beit Shammai actually acted in accordance with their own statement? Beit Shammai did not in fact act in accordance with their own statement, as the dispute was merely theoretical. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Beit Shammai certainly did act in accordance with their opinion. The Gemara comments: And this is also reflected in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, as Rav says: Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own statement, and Shmuel said: They certainly did act in that manner.

讗讬诪转 讗讬诇讬诪讗 拽讜讚诐 讘转 拽讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讜 讜讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讘转 拽讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注砖讜

The Gemara inquires: When does this question apply? If we say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice that declared that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, then what is the rationale of the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion? But rather, if one would say it is referring to after the Divine Voice, what is the reason for the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion? After all, the Divine Voice established that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽讜讚诐 讘转 拽讜诇 讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 讘转 拽讜诇 讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽讜讚诐 讘转 拽讜诇 讜讻讙讜谉 讚讘讬转 讛诇诇 专讜讘讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讜 讚讛讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 专讜讘讗

The Gemara answers: Neither of these options poses a difficulty. If you wish, say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice, and if you wish, say instead that it is after the Divine Voice. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say it is prior to the Divine Voice, and it is referring to the period when Beit Hillel formed the majority of the Sages. Therefore, according to the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, the reason is that Beit Hillel was the majority, and the halakha is in accordance with the majority.

讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注砖讜 讻讬 讗讝诇讬谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讻讬 讛讚讚讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讛讻讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪讞讚讚讬 讟驻讬

And the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion maintains that when do we follow the majority? It is in a case where the disputing parties are equal in wisdom to one another. Here, however, Beit Shammai are sharper than Beit Hillel, and therefore they acted in accordance with their own opinion despite the fact that they were in the minority.

讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 讘转 拽讜诇 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讜 讚讛讗 谞驻拽讗 讘转 拽讜诇 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注砖讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 诪砖讙讬讞讬谉 讘讘转 拽讜诇

And if you wish, say instead that it was after the Divine Voice. The one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion would say that this was due to the pronouncement of the Divine Voice. And the one who said that they did do so, this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said, with regard to the Divine Voice that emerged and proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the oven of akhnai (Bava Metzia 59b), that one disregards a Heavenly Voice. Just as he disregarded the Divine Voice in his dispute with Rabbi Eliezer, so too, one disregards the Divine Voice that proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注砖讜 拽专讬谞谉 讻讗谉 诇讗 转转讙讜讚讚讜 诇讗 转注砖讜 讗讙讜讚讜转 讗讙讜讚讜转 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 转转讙讜讚讚讜 讻讙讜谉 砖转讬 讘转讬 讚讬谞讬诐 讘注讬专 讗讞转 讛诇诇讜 诪讜专讬诐 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讛诇诇讜 诪讜专讬诐 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讘诇 砖转讬 讘转讬 讚讬谞讬诐 讘砖转讬 注讬讬专讜转 诇讬转 诇谉 讘讛

And yet the question remains: According to the one who said that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, we should read here: 鈥淵ou shall not cut yourselves鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not become numerous factions. Abaye said: When we say that the prohibition: 鈥淵ou shall not cut yourselves鈥 applies, we are referring to a case where two courts are located in one city, and these rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and those rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in two different cities, we have no problem with it.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讜讛讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讻砖转讬 讘转讬 讚讬谞讬诐 讘注讬专 讗讞转 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 转转讙讜讚讚讜 讻讙讜谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘注讬专 讗讞转 驻诇讙 诪讜专讬谉 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜驻诇讙 诪讜专讬谉 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讘诇 砖转讬 讘转讬 讚讬谞讬谉 讘注讬专 讗讞转 诇讬转 诇谉 讘讛

Rava said to him: But the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is considered like a case of two courts in one city, as these two schools of thought were found everywhere, not in any specific place. Rather, Rava said: When we say that the prohibition: 鈥淵ou shall not cut yourselves鈥 applies, we are referring to a case where there is a court in one city, a section of which rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and another section rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in one city, we have no problem with it.

转讗 砖诪注 讘诪拽讜诪讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讬讜 讻讜专转讬诐 注爪讬诐 诇注砖讜转 驻讞诪讬诐 讘砖讘转 诇注砖讜转 讘专讝诇 讘诪拽讜诪讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讛讬讜 讗讜讻诇讬诐 讘砖专 注讜祝 讘讞诇讘

搂 The Gemara cites other relevant sources. Come and hear: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, where his ruling was followed, they would cut down trees on Shabbat to prepare charcoal from them to fashion iron tools with which to circumcise a child on Shabbat. In Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion, not only does the mitzva of circumcision override Shabbat, but also any action required for the preparation of the tools necessary for the circumcision likewise overrides Shabbat. The baraita adds: In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat poultry meat in milk, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili held that the prohibition of meat in milk does not include poultry.

讘诪拽讜诪讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讬谉 讘诪拽讜诪讜 砖诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讗 讚转谞讬讗 讻诇诇 讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讻诇 诪诇讗讻讛 砖讗驻砖专 诇注砖讜转讛 诪注专讘 砖讘转 讗讬谉 讚讜讞讛 讗转 讛砖讘转

The Gemara infers: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, yes, they would act in this manner, whereas in the locale of Rabbi Akiva, for instance, no, they would not do so, as it is taught in a baraita that a principle was stated by Rabbi Akiva: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat even if it involves a mitzva. A mitzva whose proper time is on Shabbat overrides Shabbat only if its performance was impossible earlier, e.g., the act of circumcision itself, which cannot be performed earlier.

讜讛讗讬 诪讗讬 转讬讜讘转讗 诪拽讜诪讜转 诪拽讜诪讜转 砖讗谞讬 讜讚拽讗专讬 诇讛 诪讗讬 拽讗专讬 诇讛

The Gemara asks: And what is this refutation? As stated above, it is different when dealing with numerous places, and the baraita explicitly states that this practice was followed in Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 locale. Consequently, there is no violation of the prohibition against splitting into factions. The Gemara asks: He who asked it, why did he ask it, i.e., what is the basis for the question in the first place? It is obvious that the baraita is referring to a specific place.

住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讞讜诪专讗 讚砖讘转 讻诪拽讜诐 讗讞讚 讚诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that due to the severity of Shabbat, it, i.e., the world, is considered like a single locale. In other words, one might have thought that the permission to tolerate diverse customs in different places applies only to other prohibitions, whereas the prohibition of Shabbat is so severe that it is unacceptable to allow different customs, as this might lead people to disrespect Shabbat. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that even in the case of Shabbat there can be different customs in various locales.

转讗 砖诪注 讚专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讻讬 讗讬拽诇注 诇讗转专讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 讛讜讛 诪讟诇讟诇 砖专讙讗 讜讻讬 讗讬拽诇注 诇讗转专讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 讛讜讛 诪讟诇讟诇 砖专讙讗

搂 The Gemara cites another relevant case involving Shabbat: Come and hear that Rabbi Abbahu, when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, would move an oil lamp [sheraga] after the flame that had been lit for that Shabbat had burned out, as Rabbi Yehoshua accepted the ruling that it is permitted to carry items of this sort that had been set aside. But when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who prohibited carrying items of this kind that had been set aside on Shabbat, he would not move an oil lamp. This indicates that divergent customs are followed in different places.

讜讛讗讬 诪讗讬 拽讜砖讬讗 讜诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪拽讜诪讜转 砖讗谞讬 讗谞谉 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专讬谞谉 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讛讬讻讬 注讘讬讚 讛讻讗 讛讻讬 讜讛讬讻讬 注讘讬讚 讛讻讗 讛讻讬

Again, the Gemara asks: And what is this difficulty? Didn鈥檛 we say that it is different when dealing with numerous places? The Gemara explains that this is what we are saying: With regard to Rabbi Abbahu himself, how could he act in this manner here and how could he act in that manner there?

专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讜讻讬 诪拽诇注 诇讗转专讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 讛讜讛 诪讟诇讟诇 诪砖讜诐 讻讘讜讚讜 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讗讬讻讗 砖诪注讗 讚诪讜讚注 诇讬讛 诇砖诪注讗

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abbahu holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that it is permitted to carry this item. And when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yo岣nan he would not carry it, in deference to Rabbi Yo岣nan, so as not to act contrary to his ruling in the place where he was the authority. The Gemara asks: But there was a servant accompanying Rabbi Abbahu who would see him carrying these types of articles that had been set aside. Wasn鈥檛 Rabbi Abbahu concerned that the servant might carry them in Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 locale? The Gemara explains that he would inform the servant and explain to him the reason for his change in behavior.

转讗 砖诪注 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗诇讜 讗讜住专讬诐 讜讗诇讜 诪转讬专讬诐 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪诇讬砖讗 谞砖讬诐 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 讜诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诇讗 注砖讜 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 注砖讜 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜

搂 The Gemara continues to discuss the question of whether Beit Shammai followed their own rulings. Come and hear that which is taught in the mishna: Although Beit Hillel prohibit and Beit Shammai permit, and these disqualify the women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they did not have to refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel. However, if you say that they did act in accordance with their opinion, why didn鈥檛 they refrain from marrying one another?

讘砖诇诪讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讚讘谞讬 讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 谞讬谞讛讜

The Gemara elaborates: Granted, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying into Beit Hillel, as even if Beit Shammai maintain in a certain case that a rival wife required levirate marriage or 岣litza, if she went ahead and married another man their children are born to a union whose partners are liable by a regular prohibition: 鈥淭he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5). Since this transgression does not entail karet, the children of this relationship are not mamzerim.

讗诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讘谞讬 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 诪诪讝专讬诐 谞讬谞讛讜

However, why did Beit Hillel not refrain from marrying into Beit Shammai? In the opinion of Beit Hillel the children of these rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are born of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet, as the prohibition of a brother鈥檚 wife was never nullified in this case, which means that the children are mamzerim. If so, how could Beit Hillel allow these marriages?

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 拽住讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讚讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讞诇拽讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讘爪专讜转 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 讗诇讗 诪诪讬 砖讗讬住讜专讜 讗讬住讜专 注专讜讛 讜注谞讜砖 讻专转 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 注砖讜

And if you would say that Beit Hillel maintain that the child of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet is not a mamzer, as a mamzer is only one whose parents violated a prohibition that entails the death penalty, didn鈥檛 Rabbi Elazar say: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet? Consequently, the children of rival wives are mamzerim according to Beit Hillel. Rather, isn鈥檛 it correct to conclude from here that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own opinion?

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 注砖讜 讚诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 讜驻专砖讬

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No; actually, Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion. As for the problem with these marriages, the answer is that they would inform Beit Hillel and Beit Hillel would withdraw from the match. When those who acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel would come to marry women from those who followed the rulings of Beit Shammai, they would be notified that certain children were born of rival wives and that those people were considered mamzerim in the opinion of Beit Hillel, who therefore declared them forbidden in marriage.

讜讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讻诇 讛讟讛专讜转 讜讻诇 讛讟诪讗讜转 砖讛讬讜 讗诇讜 诪讟讛专讬谉 讜讗诇讜 诪讟诪讗讬谉 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 注讜砖讬诐 讟讛专讜转 讗诇讜 注诇 讙讘讬 讗诇讜

The Gemara comments: And so too, it is reasonable that this is the case, as the mishna teaches in the latter clause: With regard to all of the disputes concerning the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity, where those, Beit Hillel, rule an article ritually pure and these, Beit Shammai, rule it ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure objects each with the other.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讚诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚诇讗 诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 讘砖诇诪讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讚讟诪讗讜转 讚讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讟讛专讜转 谞讬谞讛讜

Granted, if you say that they notified them, it is due to that reason that they did not need to refrain from using their objects. However, if you say that they did not notify them, granted, it is logical that Beit Shammai did not refrain from handling items belonging to Beit Hillel, as ritually impure objects for Beit Hillel are ritually pure for Beit Shammai, and therefore no special care is necessary.

讗诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇诪讛 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讟讛专讜转 讚讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 讟诪讗讜转 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

However, why didn鈥檛 Beit Hillel refrain from touching articles that belonged to Beit Shammai? After all, ritually pure objects for Beit Shammai are ritually impure for Beit Hillel. Rather, is it not the case that Beit Shammai notified Beit Hillel that these items were ritually pure only in their own opinion, and Beit Hillel separated themselves from them? The Gemara summarizes the discussion: Conclude from here that this is the correct interpretation.

讜诪讗讬 讗讜诇诪讬讛 讚讛讱 诪讛讱 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 爪专讛 拽诇讗 讗讬转 诇讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case stronger than that case? In other words, why is the statement with regard to ritual purity and impurity more conclusive than the one that deals with marriage? Since the practice of notification was not explicitly stated in the case of ritual purity but was merely inferred logically, the same reasoning applies equally to the case of marriage. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since it is so unusual, a marriage to a rival wife generates publicity and is so widely known that no special notification is required, therefore, the Gemara teaches us that even in this case notification is required.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讞诇拽讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讘爪专讜转 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 讗诇讗 诪诪讬 砖讗讬住讜专讜 讗讬住讜专 注专讜讛 讜注谞讜砖 讻专转 诪讗谉 诪讜讚讬诐 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 驻砖讬讟讗 讘谞讬 讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讻砖专讬诐 谞讬谞讛讜

搂 Since the statement of Rabbi Elazar was mentioned, the Gemara turns to discuss the matter itself. Rabbi Elazar said: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet. The Gemara asks: Who concedes to whom? If we say that Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, this is obvious, since if they acted in accordance with their own opinion that rival wives who married others without 岣litza are liable only for violating a regular prohibition, their children are therefore fit and are not mamzerim at all.

讗诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讗 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 讛讬讗

Rather, one could say that Beit Hillel concede to Beit Shammai. But in that case she herself, the rival wife of a forbidden relative who married one of the yevamin, is liable to receive karet in the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the child is a mamzer, whereas Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 statement indicates that they concede with regard to a different case.

诇注讜诇诐 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 讜诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讬砖 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉

The Gemara explains: Actually, Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, and this is not a novelty with regard to their basic dispute. Instead, the statement comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: The offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer. Rabbi Elazar teaches us that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that the offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is not a mamzer; rather, one is a mamzer only if he is born of a union punishable by karet.

转讗 砖诪注 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讞诇拽讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讘爪专讜转 讜讘讗讞讬讜转

搂 The Gemara returns to the initial question of whether or not Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their own opinion. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to several cases, nevertheless, they did not refrain from marrying women from each other鈥檚 communities. The cases with regard to which they disagreed include rival wives, and sisters, i.e., if two sisters had been married to two brothers and simultaneously became obligated in levirate marriage, Beit Hillel prohibit both in levirate marriage, and if they violated the prohibition and married regardless, they require a divorce. By contrast, Beit Shammai permit them to remain married.

讘讙讟 讬砖谉 讜讘住驻拽 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讜讘诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜诇谞讛 注诪讜 讘驻讜谞讚拽

Furthermore, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to an outdated bill of divorce that had been written but not delivered. Beit Shammai maintain that if the husband and wife continued to live together after the writing of the bill of divorce, the same bill of divorce can still be used later, whereas Beit Hillel dispute this. And they likewise disagreed with regard to an uncertain married woman, i.e., whether a minor who was actually married, and not merely betrothed, may perform refusal. And they also disagreed with regard to one who divorces his wife and later she lodged together with him at an inn, as to whether or not this is sufficient grounds for assuming that they remarried.

讘讻住祝 讜讘砖讜讛 讻住祝 讘驻专讜讟讛 讜讘砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛

Additionally, they disagreed with regard to the issue of betrothal by money and with the equivalent value of money, and by a peruta or with the equivalent value of a peruta. According to Beit Shammai, the minimal amount of money effective for betrothal is a dinar or the equivalent of a dinar, whereas Beit Hillel maintain that even the less valuable peruta or its equivalent is sufficient.

诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪诇讬砖讗 谞砖讬诐 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 讜诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇诇诪讚讱 砖讞讬讘讛 讜专讬注讜转 谞讜讛讙讬诐 讝讛 讘讝讛 诇拽讬讬诐 诪讛 砖谞讗诪专 讛讗诪转 讜讛砖诇讜诐 讗讛讘讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 谞诪谞注讜 讛谉 诪谉 讛讜讚讗讬 讜诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 诪谉 讛住驻拽

Despite the fact that these halakhot entail important ramifications depending on whether or not these women were married or fit for marriage, or whether their offspring are fit for marriage, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. This serves to teach you that they practiced affection and camaraderie between them, to fulfill that which is stated: 鈥淟ove truth and peace鈥 (Zechariah 8:19). Rabbi Shimon says: They did refrain in the certain cases, but they did not refrain in the uncertain cases. In other words, Beit Hillel were not worried that any ordinary woman from Beit Shammai might be one of those of uncertain status.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 注砖讜 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 谞诪谞注讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诇讗 注砖讜 讗诪讗讬 谞诪谞注讜 讜转住讘专讗 谞讛讬 谞诪讬 讚注砖讜 讘砖诇诪讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 谞诪谞注讜 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讚讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 谞讬谞讛讜 讜诪诪讝专讬诐 讛诐 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇

The Gemara infers from the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they refrained in the certain cases. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinion, why did they refrain from marriage? The Gemara replies: And how can you understand it that way, that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion? Even if they acted in accordance with their opinion, granted that Beit Hillel refrained from marrying into Beit Shammai, as those rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are liable to receive karet and their children are mamzerim according to the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讗诇讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗诪讗讬 谞诪谞注讜 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 讘谞讬 讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讻砖专讬诐 谞讬谞讛讜 讻讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇爪专讛 注爪诪讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇爪专讛 注爪诪讛

However, why did Beit Shammai refrain from marrying the offspring of rival wives of Beit Hillel? The parents are liable for violating a regular prohibition, and therefore their children are fit. The Gemara answers as Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said with regard to a different matter: This halakha was necessary not for the children of the rival wife, but only for the rival wife herself. Here too, it was necessary only for the rival wife herself. The halakha was not taught with regard to the children of the rival wives; rather, it is referring only to the rival wives.

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪谉 讛讜讚讗讬 讚讗讬住讜专讗 讛讜讗 住驻拽 谞诪讬 讗讬住讜专讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks further: And in what way are uncertain cases different from the certain cases, such as forbidden rival wives? If you say that certain cases are undoubtedly prohibited in the opinion of Beit Hillel, the cases involving uncertain circumstances, e.g., one who divorced his wife and then stayed with her in the same inn, are also prohibited. Even if Beit Hillel render these cases prohibited only due to some uncertainty, the ruling is the same.

诇讗 转讬诪讗 诪谉 讛住驻拽 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 诪谉 讛住转诐 讚诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 讜驻专砖讬

The Gemara answers: Do not say: In the uncertain cases, i.e., that the halakha involved doubtful circumstances. Rather, say: From the unspecified case. In other words, barring clear knowledge of an uncertain betrothal within a specific family, they would take women from that family in marriage. The reason is that Beit Shammai would notify Beit Hillel of the prohibition according to their opinion, and they would refrain from the marriage. If there was no notification, this was a clear sign that no doubt was involved in this case at all.

讜诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讛讘讛 讜专讬注讜转 谞讜讛讙讬诐 讝讛 讘讝讛 讛讬讬谞讜 专讬砖讗 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗

The Gemara asks: But if so, what does this come to teach us? Is it that they had relations of affection and camaraderie between them, i.e., that each trusted that the other side would never cause them to err with regard to something they held to be prohibited? This is the same as the first clause of the baraita. What is Rabbi Shimon adding by his statement? The Gemara answers: This comes to teach us that the entire baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is not a dispute between two Sages. Rather, Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 opinion elucidates the earlier statement.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讛讬讗讱 讛诇讻讛 讝讜 专讜讜讞转 讘讬砖专讗诇 谞注砖讛 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专 诇讚讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 谞注砖讛 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讛讜诇讚 驻讙讜诐 诇讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讘讜讗讜 讜谞转拽谉 诇讛谉 诇爪专讜转

搂 The Gemara offers an alternative resolution: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri said: How should one act with regard to this halakha of rival wives? In what form should it become widespread among the Jewish people? If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and permit a rival wife in levirate marriage, the offspring will be a mamzer according to the statement of Beit Hillel. If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel and grant full exemption to the rival wives, the offspring will be of flawed lineage according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, as he is the child of a woman prohibited in marriage by a regular prohibition. Although he is not a mamzer, his lineage is nevertheless defective. Instead, let us enact a general decree for rival wives

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 14

诪讬 住讘专转 注砖讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讻讚讘专讬讛诐 诇讗 注砖讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讻讚讘专讬讛诐 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 注砖讜 讜注砖讜 讜讘驻诇讜讙转讗 [讚专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇] 讚专讘 讗讜诪专 诇讗 注砖讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讻讚讘专讬讛诐 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 注砖讜 讜注砖讜

Reish Lakish said to him: Do you hold that Beit Shammai actually acted in accordance with their own statement? Beit Shammai did not in fact act in accordance with their own statement, as the dispute was merely theoretical. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Beit Shammai certainly did act in accordance with their opinion. The Gemara comments: And this is also reflected in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, as Rav says: Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own statement, and Shmuel said: They certainly did act in that manner.

讗讬诪转 讗讬诇讬诪讗 拽讜讚诐 讘转 拽讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讜 讜讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讘转 拽讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注砖讜

The Gemara inquires: When does this question apply? If we say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice that declared that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, then what is the rationale of the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion? But rather, if one would say it is referring to after the Divine Voice, what is the reason for the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion? After all, the Divine Voice established that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽讜讚诐 讘转 拽讜诇 讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 讘转 拽讜诇 讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽讜讚诐 讘转 拽讜诇 讜讻讙讜谉 讚讘讬转 讛诇诇 专讜讘讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讜 讚讛讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 专讜讘讗

The Gemara answers: Neither of these options poses a difficulty. If you wish, say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice, and if you wish, say instead that it is after the Divine Voice. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say it is prior to the Divine Voice, and it is referring to the period when Beit Hillel formed the majority of the Sages. Therefore, according to the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, the reason is that Beit Hillel was the majority, and the halakha is in accordance with the majority.

讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注砖讜 讻讬 讗讝诇讬谞谉 讘转专 专讜讘讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讻讬 讛讚讚讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讛讻讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪讞讚讚讬 讟驻讬

And the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion maintains that when do we follow the majority? It is in a case where the disputing parties are equal in wisdom to one another. Here, however, Beit Shammai are sharper than Beit Hillel, and therefore they acted in accordance with their own opinion despite the fact that they were in the minority.

讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 讘转 拽讜诇 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 注砖讜 讚讛讗 谞驻拽讗 讘转 拽讜诇 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注砖讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 诪砖讙讬讞讬谉 讘讘转 拽讜诇

And if you wish, say instead that it was after the Divine Voice. The one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion would say that this was due to the pronouncement of the Divine Voice. And the one who said that they did do so, this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said, with regard to the Divine Voice that emerged and proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the oven of akhnai (Bava Metzia 59b), that one disregards a Heavenly Voice. Just as he disregarded the Divine Voice in his dispute with Rabbi Eliezer, so too, one disregards the Divine Voice that proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注砖讜 拽专讬谞谉 讻讗谉 诇讗 转转讙讜讚讚讜 诇讗 转注砖讜 讗讙讜讚讜转 讗讙讜讚讜转 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 转转讙讜讚讚讜 讻讙讜谉 砖转讬 讘转讬 讚讬谞讬诐 讘注讬专 讗讞转 讛诇诇讜 诪讜专讬诐 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讛诇诇讜 诪讜专讬诐 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讘诇 砖转讬 讘转讬 讚讬谞讬诐 讘砖转讬 注讬讬专讜转 诇讬转 诇谉 讘讛

And yet the question remains: According to the one who said that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, we should read here: 鈥淵ou shall not cut yourselves鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not become numerous factions. Abaye said: When we say that the prohibition: 鈥淵ou shall not cut yourselves鈥 applies, we are referring to a case where two courts are located in one city, and these rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and those rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in two different cities, we have no problem with it.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讜讛讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讻砖转讬 讘转讬 讚讬谞讬诐 讘注讬专 讗讞转 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 转转讙讜讚讚讜 讻讙讜谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘注讬专 讗讞转 驻诇讙 诪讜专讬谉 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜驻诇讙 诪讜专讬谉 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讘诇 砖转讬 讘转讬 讚讬谞讬谉 讘注讬专 讗讞转 诇讬转 诇谉 讘讛

Rava said to him: But the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is considered like a case of two courts in one city, as these two schools of thought were found everywhere, not in any specific place. Rather, Rava said: When we say that the prohibition: 鈥淵ou shall not cut yourselves鈥 applies, we are referring to a case where there is a court in one city, a section of which rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and another section rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in one city, we have no problem with it.

转讗 砖诪注 讘诪拽讜诪讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讬讜 讻讜专转讬诐 注爪讬诐 诇注砖讜转 驻讞诪讬诐 讘砖讘转 诇注砖讜转 讘专讝诇 讘诪拽讜诪讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讛讬讜 讗讜讻诇讬诐 讘砖专 注讜祝 讘讞诇讘

搂 The Gemara cites other relevant sources. Come and hear: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, where his ruling was followed, they would cut down trees on Shabbat to prepare charcoal from them to fashion iron tools with which to circumcise a child on Shabbat. In Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion, not only does the mitzva of circumcision override Shabbat, but also any action required for the preparation of the tools necessary for the circumcision likewise overrides Shabbat. The baraita adds: In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat poultry meat in milk, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili held that the prohibition of meat in milk does not include poultry.

讘诪拽讜诪讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讬谉 讘诪拽讜诪讜 砖诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讗 讚转谞讬讗 讻诇诇 讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讻诇 诪诇讗讻讛 砖讗驻砖专 诇注砖讜转讛 诪注专讘 砖讘转 讗讬谉 讚讜讞讛 讗转 讛砖讘转

The Gemara infers: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, yes, they would act in this manner, whereas in the locale of Rabbi Akiva, for instance, no, they would not do so, as it is taught in a baraita that a principle was stated by Rabbi Akiva: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat even if it involves a mitzva. A mitzva whose proper time is on Shabbat overrides Shabbat only if its performance was impossible earlier, e.g., the act of circumcision itself, which cannot be performed earlier.

讜讛讗讬 诪讗讬 转讬讜讘转讗 诪拽讜诪讜转 诪拽讜诪讜转 砖讗谞讬 讜讚拽讗专讬 诇讛 诪讗讬 拽讗专讬 诇讛

The Gemara asks: And what is this refutation? As stated above, it is different when dealing with numerous places, and the baraita explicitly states that this practice was followed in Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 locale. Consequently, there is no violation of the prohibition against splitting into factions. The Gemara asks: He who asked it, why did he ask it, i.e., what is the basis for the question in the first place? It is obvious that the baraita is referring to a specific place.

住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讞讜诪专讗 讚砖讘转 讻诪拽讜诐 讗讞讚 讚诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that due to the severity of Shabbat, it, i.e., the world, is considered like a single locale. In other words, one might have thought that the permission to tolerate diverse customs in different places applies only to other prohibitions, whereas the prohibition of Shabbat is so severe that it is unacceptable to allow different customs, as this might lead people to disrespect Shabbat. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that even in the case of Shabbat there can be different customs in various locales.

转讗 砖诪注 讚专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讻讬 讗讬拽诇注 诇讗转专讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 讛讜讛 诪讟诇讟诇 砖专讙讗 讜讻讬 讗讬拽诇注 诇讗转专讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 讛讜讛 诪讟诇讟诇 砖专讙讗

搂 The Gemara cites another relevant case involving Shabbat: Come and hear that Rabbi Abbahu, when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, would move an oil lamp [sheraga] after the flame that had been lit for that Shabbat had burned out, as Rabbi Yehoshua accepted the ruling that it is permitted to carry items of this sort that had been set aside. But when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who prohibited carrying items of this kind that had been set aside on Shabbat, he would not move an oil lamp. This indicates that divergent customs are followed in different places.

讜讛讗讬 诪讗讬 拽讜砖讬讗 讜诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪拽讜诪讜转 砖讗谞讬 讗谞谉 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专讬谞谉 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讛讬讻讬 注讘讬讚 讛讻讗 讛讻讬 讜讛讬讻讬 注讘讬讚 讛讻讗 讛讻讬

Again, the Gemara asks: And what is this difficulty? Didn鈥檛 we say that it is different when dealing with numerous places? The Gemara explains that this is what we are saying: With regard to Rabbi Abbahu himself, how could he act in this manner here and how could he act in that manner there?

专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讜讻讬 诪拽诇注 诇讗转专讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 讛讜讛 诪讟诇讟诇 诪砖讜诐 讻讘讜讚讜 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讗讬讻讗 砖诪注讗 讚诪讜讚注 诇讬讛 诇砖诪注讗

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abbahu holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that it is permitted to carry this item. And when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yo岣nan he would not carry it, in deference to Rabbi Yo岣nan, so as not to act contrary to his ruling in the place where he was the authority. The Gemara asks: But there was a servant accompanying Rabbi Abbahu who would see him carrying these types of articles that had been set aside. Wasn鈥檛 Rabbi Abbahu concerned that the servant might carry them in Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 locale? The Gemara explains that he would inform the servant and explain to him the reason for his change in behavior.

转讗 砖诪注 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗诇讜 讗讜住专讬诐 讜讗诇讜 诪转讬专讬诐 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪诇讬砖讗 谞砖讬诐 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 讜诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诇讗 注砖讜 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 注砖讜 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜

搂 The Gemara continues to discuss the question of whether Beit Shammai followed their own rulings. Come and hear that which is taught in the mishna: Although Beit Hillel prohibit and Beit Shammai permit, and these disqualify the women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they did not have to refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel. However, if you say that they did act in accordance with their opinion, why didn鈥檛 they refrain from marrying one another?

讘砖诇诪讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讚讘谞讬 讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 谞讬谞讛讜

The Gemara elaborates: Granted, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying into Beit Hillel, as even if Beit Shammai maintain in a certain case that a rival wife required levirate marriage or 岣litza, if she went ahead and married another man their children are born to a union whose partners are liable by a regular prohibition: 鈥淭he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5). Since this transgression does not entail karet, the children of this relationship are not mamzerim.

讗诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讘谞讬 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 诪诪讝专讬诐 谞讬谞讛讜

However, why did Beit Hillel not refrain from marrying into Beit Shammai? In the opinion of Beit Hillel the children of these rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are born of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet, as the prohibition of a brother鈥檚 wife was never nullified in this case, which means that the children are mamzerim. If so, how could Beit Hillel allow these marriages?

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 拽住讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讚讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讞诇拽讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讘爪专讜转 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 讗诇讗 诪诪讬 砖讗讬住讜专讜 讗讬住讜专 注专讜讛 讜注谞讜砖 讻专转 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 注砖讜

And if you would say that Beit Hillel maintain that the child of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet is not a mamzer, as a mamzer is only one whose parents violated a prohibition that entails the death penalty, didn鈥檛 Rabbi Elazar say: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet? Consequently, the children of rival wives are mamzerim according to Beit Hillel. Rather, isn鈥檛 it correct to conclude from here that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own opinion?

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 注砖讜 讚诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 讜驻专砖讬

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No; actually, Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion. As for the problem with these marriages, the answer is that they would inform Beit Hillel and Beit Hillel would withdraw from the match. When those who acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel would come to marry women from those who followed the rulings of Beit Shammai, they would be notified that certain children were born of rival wives and that those people were considered mamzerim in the opinion of Beit Hillel, who therefore declared them forbidden in marriage.

讜讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讻诇 讛讟讛专讜转 讜讻诇 讛讟诪讗讜转 砖讛讬讜 讗诇讜 诪讟讛专讬谉 讜讗诇讜 诪讟诪讗讬谉 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 注讜砖讬诐 讟讛专讜转 讗诇讜 注诇 讙讘讬 讗诇讜

The Gemara comments: And so too, it is reasonable that this is the case, as the mishna teaches in the latter clause: With regard to all of the disputes concerning the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity, where those, Beit Hillel, rule an article ritually pure and these, Beit Shammai, rule it ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure objects each with the other.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讚诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚诇讗 诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 讘砖诇诪讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讚讟诪讗讜转 讚讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讟讛专讜转 谞讬谞讛讜

Granted, if you say that they notified them, it is due to that reason that they did not need to refrain from using their objects. However, if you say that they did not notify them, granted, it is logical that Beit Shammai did not refrain from handling items belonging to Beit Hillel, as ritually impure objects for Beit Hillel are ritually pure for Beit Shammai, and therefore no special care is necessary.

讗诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇诪讛 诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讟讛专讜转 讚讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 讟诪讗讜转 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

However, why didn鈥檛 Beit Hillel refrain from touching articles that belonged to Beit Shammai? After all, ritually pure objects for Beit Shammai are ritually impure for Beit Hillel. Rather, is it not the case that Beit Shammai notified Beit Hillel that these items were ritually pure only in their own opinion, and Beit Hillel separated themselves from them? The Gemara summarizes the discussion: Conclude from here that this is the correct interpretation.

讜诪讗讬 讗讜诇诪讬讛 讚讛讱 诪讛讱 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 爪专讛 拽诇讗 讗讬转 诇讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case stronger than that case? In other words, why is the statement with regard to ritual purity and impurity more conclusive than the one that deals with marriage? Since the practice of notification was not explicitly stated in the case of ritual purity but was merely inferred logically, the same reasoning applies equally to the case of marriage. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since it is so unusual, a marriage to a rival wife generates publicity and is so widely known that no special notification is required, therefore, the Gemara teaches us that even in this case notification is required.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讞诇拽讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讘爪专讜转 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 讗诇讗 诪诪讬 砖讗讬住讜专讜 讗讬住讜专 注专讜讛 讜注谞讜砖 讻专转 诪讗谉 诪讜讚讬诐 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 驻砖讬讟讗 讘谞讬 讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讻砖专讬诐 谞讬谞讛讜

搂 Since the statement of Rabbi Elazar was mentioned, the Gemara turns to discuss the matter itself. Rabbi Elazar said: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet. The Gemara asks: Who concedes to whom? If we say that Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, this is obvious, since if they acted in accordance with their own opinion that rival wives who married others without 岣litza are liable only for violating a regular prohibition, their children are therefore fit and are not mamzerim at all.

讗诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诇讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讗 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 讛讬讗

Rather, one could say that Beit Hillel concede to Beit Shammai. But in that case she herself, the rival wife of a forbidden relative who married one of the yevamin, is liable to receive karet in the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the child is a mamzer, whereas Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 statement indicates that they concede with regard to a different case.

诇注讜诇诐 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 讜诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讬砖 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉

The Gemara explains: Actually, Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, and this is not a novelty with regard to their basic dispute. Instead, the statement comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: The offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer. Rabbi Elazar teaches us that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that the offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is not a mamzer; rather, one is a mamzer only if he is born of a union punishable by karet.

转讗 砖诪注 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讞诇拽讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讘爪专讜转 讜讘讗讞讬讜转

搂 The Gemara returns to the initial question of whether or not Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their own opinion. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to several cases, nevertheless, they did not refrain from marrying women from each other鈥檚 communities. The cases with regard to which they disagreed include rival wives, and sisters, i.e., if two sisters had been married to two brothers and simultaneously became obligated in levirate marriage, Beit Hillel prohibit both in levirate marriage, and if they violated the prohibition and married regardless, they require a divorce. By contrast, Beit Shammai permit them to remain married.

讘讙讟 讬砖谉 讜讘住驻拽 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讜讘诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜诇谞讛 注诪讜 讘驻讜谞讚拽

Furthermore, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to an outdated bill of divorce that had been written but not delivered. Beit Shammai maintain that if the husband and wife continued to live together after the writing of the bill of divorce, the same bill of divorce can still be used later, whereas Beit Hillel dispute this. And they likewise disagreed with regard to an uncertain married woman, i.e., whether a minor who was actually married, and not merely betrothed, may perform refusal. And they also disagreed with regard to one who divorces his wife and later she lodged together with him at an inn, as to whether or not this is sufficient grounds for assuming that they remarried.

讘讻住祝 讜讘砖讜讛 讻住祝 讘驻专讜讟讛 讜讘砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛

Additionally, they disagreed with regard to the issue of betrothal by money and with the equivalent value of money, and by a peruta or with the equivalent value of a peruta. According to Beit Shammai, the minimal amount of money effective for betrothal is a dinar or the equivalent of a dinar, whereas Beit Hillel maintain that even the less valuable peruta or its equivalent is sufficient.

诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诪诇讬砖讗 谞砖讬诐 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 讜诇讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇诇诪讚讱 砖讞讬讘讛 讜专讬注讜转 谞讜讛讙讬诐 讝讛 讘讝讛 诇拽讬讬诐 诪讛 砖谞讗诪专 讛讗诪转 讜讛砖诇讜诐 讗讛讘讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 谞诪谞注讜 讛谉 诪谉 讛讜讚讗讬 讜诇讗 谞诪谞注讜 诪谉 讛住驻拽

Despite the fact that these halakhot entail important ramifications depending on whether or not these women were married or fit for marriage, or whether their offspring are fit for marriage, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. This serves to teach you that they practiced affection and camaraderie between them, to fulfill that which is stated: 鈥淟ove truth and peace鈥 (Zechariah 8:19). Rabbi Shimon says: They did refrain in the certain cases, but they did not refrain in the uncertain cases. In other words, Beit Hillel were not worried that any ordinary woman from Beit Shammai might be one of those of uncertain status.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 注砖讜 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 谞诪谞注讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诇讗 注砖讜 讗诪讗讬 谞诪谞注讜 讜转住讘专讗 谞讛讬 谞诪讬 讚注砖讜 讘砖诇诪讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇 谞诪谞注讜 诪讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讚讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 谞讬谞讛讜 讜诪诪讝专讬诐 讛诐 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇

The Gemara infers from the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they refrained in the certain cases. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinion, why did they refrain from marriage? The Gemara replies: And how can you understand it that way, that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion? Even if they acted in accordance with their opinion, granted that Beit Hillel refrained from marrying into Beit Shammai, as those rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are liable to receive karet and their children are mamzerim according to the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讗诇讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗诪讗讬 谞诪谞注讜 诪讘讬转 讛诇诇 讘谞讬 讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讻砖专讬诐 谞讬谞讛讜 讻讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇爪专讛 注爪诪讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇爪专讛 注爪诪讛

However, why did Beit Shammai refrain from marrying the offspring of rival wives of Beit Hillel? The parents are liable for violating a regular prohibition, and therefore their children are fit. The Gemara answers as Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said with regard to a different matter: This halakha was necessary not for the children of the rival wife, but only for the rival wife herself. Here too, it was necessary only for the rival wife herself. The halakha was not taught with regard to the children of the rival wives; rather, it is referring only to the rival wives.

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪谉 讛讜讚讗讬 讚讗讬住讜专讗 讛讜讗 住驻拽 谞诪讬 讗讬住讜专讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks further: And in what way are uncertain cases different from the certain cases, such as forbidden rival wives? If you say that certain cases are undoubtedly prohibited in the opinion of Beit Hillel, the cases involving uncertain circumstances, e.g., one who divorced his wife and then stayed with her in the same inn, are also prohibited. Even if Beit Hillel render these cases prohibited only due to some uncertainty, the ruling is the same.

诇讗 转讬诪讗 诪谉 讛住驻拽 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 诪谉 讛住转诐 讚诪讜讚注讬 诇讛讜 讜驻专砖讬

The Gemara answers: Do not say: In the uncertain cases, i.e., that the halakha involved doubtful circumstances. Rather, say: From the unspecified case. In other words, barring clear knowledge of an uncertain betrothal within a specific family, they would take women from that family in marriage. The reason is that Beit Shammai would notify Beit Hillel of the prohibition according to their opinion, and they would refrain from the marriage. If there was no notification, this was a clear sign that no doubt was involved in this case at all.

讜诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讛讘讛 讜专讬注讜转 谞讜讛讙讬诐 讝讛 讘讝讛 讛讬讬谞讜 专讬砖讗 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗

The Gemara asks: But if so, what does this come to teach us? Is it that they had relations of affection and camaraderie between them, i.e., that each trusted that the other side would never cause them to err with regard to something they held to be prohibited? This is the same as the first clause of the baraita. What is Rabbi Shimon adding by his statement? The Gemara answers: This comes to teach us that the entire baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is not a dispute between two Sages. Rather, Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 opinion elucidates the earlier statement.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讛讬讗讱 讛诇讻讛 讝讜 专讜讜讞转 讘讬砖专讗诇 谞注砖讛 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专 诇讚讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 谞注砖讛 讻讚讘专讬 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讛讜诇讚 驻讙讜诐 诇讚讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讘讜讗讜 讜谞转拽谉 诇讛谉 诇爪专讜转

搂 The Gemara offers an alternative resolution: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri said: How should one act with regard to this halakha of rival wives? In what form should it become widespread among the Jewish people? If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and permit a rival wife in levirate marriage, the offspring will be a mamzer according to the statement of Beit Hillel. If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel and grant full exemption to the rival wives, the offspring will be of flawed lineage according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, as he is the child of a woman prohibited in marriage by a regular prohibition. Although he is not a mamzer, his lineage is nevertheless defective. Instead, let us enact a general decree for rival wives

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