Yevamot 3
כּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי מִדְּרָשָׁא אָתוּ! נְהִי דִּלְעִנְיַן יִיבּוּם אָתְיָין מִדְּרָשָׁא — עִיקָּר אִיסּוּרַיְיהוּ בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב בְּהוּ. בִּתּוֹ, עִיקָּר אִיסּוּרָא מִדְּרָשָׁא.
The Gemara challenges this conclusion: All of the exemptions from levirate marriage for forbidden relatives listed in the mishna are also derived from a homiletical interpretation. The Gemara responds: Although the matter of levirate marriage is derived from a homiletical interpretation, the main aspect of their prohibition is explicitly written. By contrast, with regard to his daughter from a woman he raped but did not marry, the main aspect of this prohibition is derived by homiletical interpretation, as the prohibition itself is not written explicitly in the Torah.
דְּאָמַר רָבָא: אֲמַר לִי רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי: אָתְיָא ״הֵנָּה״ ״הֵנָּה״,
As Rava said: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to me: This prohibition is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word hena, in the verse: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, even their nakedness you shall not uncover; for theirs [hena] is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10) and the word hena in a different verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness: they [hena] are near kinswomen; it is wickedness” (Leviticus 18:17), indicating that every daughter is prohibited, even one from rape, just like one’s daughter through his wife.
אָתְיָא ״זִמָּה״ ״זִמָּה״.
Furthermore, it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word “wickedness” (Leviticus 18:17) and the word “wickedness” in the verse: “And if a man take with his wife also her mother, it is wickedness; they shall be burnt with fire, both he and they, that there be no wickedness among you” (Leviticus 20:14), that one who has sexual intercourse with a daughter from a rape is liable to burning.
הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ כׇּל מִלְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא מִדְּרָשָׁא חַבִּיבָא לֵיהּ, לִיתְנֵי לַאֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה לְבַסּוֹף! אַיְּידֵי דְּאַיְירִי בְּאִיסּוּר אַחְווֹתָא, תְּנָא אֲחוֹת אִשְׁתּוֹ.
§ The Gemara asks: Now that you said that all matters that are derived from a homiletical interpretation are dear to the tanna, and therefore he gives them precedence, let him teach the case of a wife’s sister last, as this is the source of the halakha and is therefore the most straightforward case. The Gemara responds: Since the tanna was dealing with the prohibition with regard to different types of sisters, he also taught together with them the prohibition with regard to his wife’s sister.
וְלִיתְנְיֵיהּ לְהַאי בָּבָא לְבַסּוֹף! אֶלָּא: תַּנָּא קוּרְבֵי קוּרְבֵי נָקֵט: תְּנָא בִּתּוֹ וּבַת בִּתּוֹ וּבַת בְּנוֹ, דִּקְרוֹבֵי עַצְמוֹ,
The Gemara asks: But if so, let him teach this entire section involving sisters at the end, when he mentions a wife’s sister. Rather, the Gemara rejects the above answer in favor of an alternative explanation: The tanna cited the cases in order of closeness, i.e., the mishna is ordered in accordance with the relative closeness of the various incestuous relations. How so? The tanna taught the cases of one’s daughter, and the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son, who are his own blood relatives.
וְאַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת לְמַטָּה דִּידֵיהּ, תְּנָא נָמֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת לְמַטָּה דִּידַהּ. וְאַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת לְמַטָּה דִּידַהּ, תְּנָא שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת לְמַעְלָה דִּידַהּ.
And since he taught three generations of one’s offspring below, i.e., his daughter, his daughter’s daughter, and his son’s daughter, he also taught three generations of his wife’s offspring below, i.e., his wife herself, her daughter, and her daughter’s daughter. And since he taught three generations of his wife’s offspring below, he also taught three generations of her family above, i.e., from previous generations, namely herself, her mother, i.e., his mother-in-law, and his mother-in-law’s mother.
וּתְנָא אֲחוֹתוֹ וַאֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ דִּקְרוֹבֵי עַצְמוֹ. וְאַיְּידֵי דְּאַיְירִי בְּאִיסּוּר אַחְוָה, תְּנָא אֲחוֹת אִשְׁתּוֹ. וּבְדִין הוּא דְּלַיקְדְּמַהּ לְכַלָּתוֹ מִקַּמֵּי אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּעוֹלָמוֹ, דְּלָא מִשּׁוּם קוּרְבָּא הוּא דַּאֲסִירָא. אֶלָּא, אַיְּידֵי דְּאַיְירִי בְּאִיסּוּר אַחְוָה, תְּנָא אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּעוֹלָמוֹ, וַהֲדַר תְּנָא כַּלָּתוֹ.
And afterward he taught the case of his sister and his mother’s sister, who are his own blood relatives but less closely related to him than his daughter. And since he was dealing with the prohibition with regard to sisters, he also taught the case of his wife’s sister. And by right the tanna should have preceded the case of his daughter-in-law before that of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, as it is not due to their relationship that she is prohibited but rather because she is excluded from the mitzva of levirate marriage. However, since he was dealing with the prohibition with regard to siblings, he taught the case of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, as this also involves a sibling. And then the tanna taught the case of his daughter-in-law.
וּמַאי אִירְיָא דִּתְנָא ״פּוֹטְרוֹת״? לִיתְנֵי ״אוֹסְרוֹת״! אִי תְּנָא ״אוֹסְרוֹת״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא אָסוּר לְיַיבֵּם, אֲבָל מִיחְלָץ — חָלְצָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
§ The Gemara continues to analyze the language of the mishna: And why does the tanna specifically teach: They exempt their rival wives? Let him teach: They prohibit them, as ultimately the rival wives are not only exempt from levirate marriage but each is actually forbidden to her yavam. The Gemara explains that if he had taught: They prohibit them, I would say that this means it is prohibited to enter into levirate marriage, but she must perform ḥalitza. Therefore, it teaches us using the language of exemption to indicate that she is entirely exempt and does not even perform ḥalitza.
וְלִיתְנֵי ״אֲסוּרָה לַחְלוֹץ״! מַאי קָעָבֵיד? אַלְּמָה לֹא, אִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר ״חוֹלֶצֶת״, מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת!
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, let him teach: She is prohibited from performing ḥalitza. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It is impossible to formulate the halakha in this manner, as even if they perform ḥalitza, what has he really done? What is wrong with a man allowing a woman to take off his shoe, which is the act of ḥalitza? Consequently, it is not possible to state: Prohibited from performing ḥalitza. The Gemara asks: Why not? There is in fact a prohibited element here: If you say she performs ḥalitza, it might be said that she may also enter into levirate marriage and that in this specific instance he performed ḥalitza merely because he did not wish to marry her. In that case, it might erroneously be claimed that if another wished to marry the rival wife of his yevama he is permitted to enter into levirate marriage.
כֵּיוָן דְּבִמְקוֹם מִצְוָה הוּא דַּאֲסִירָה צָרָה, וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה שַׁרְיָא, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי תָּנֵי ״פּוֹטְרוֹת״.
In light of the previous argument, the Gemara suggests another reason that the mishna does not use the expression: Prohibited. Since it is only in cases where the mitzva of levirate marriage applies that the rival wife is forbidden to him, and where no mitzva applies she is permitted, as it is permitted for the man to marry the widowed rival wife of a non-relative, due to that reason he taught: They exempt their rival wives, and not: They prohibit them. In other words, the tanna is teaching that they are not prohibited to him in their own right.
וּמַאי אִירְיָא דְּתָנֵי ״מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּיבּוּם״? לִיתְנֵי ״מִן הַיִּיבּוּם״ לְחוֹדֵיהּ! אִי תְּנָא ״מִן הַיִּיבּוּם״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא מִיחְלָץ — חָלְצָה, יַבּוֹמֵי — לָא מְיַיבְּמָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כׇּל הָעוֹלֶה לְיִיבּוּם — עוֹלֶה לַחֲלִיצָה, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹלֶה לַיִּיבּוּם — אֵינוֹ עוֹלֶה לַחֲלִיצָה.
§ The Gemara continues its analysis of the wording of the mishna. And why does the tanna specifically teach: Exempt from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage? Let him teach: Exempt from levirate marriage, alone. The Gemara answers: If he were to teach: From levirate marriage, I would say that she must perform ḥalitza and she must not enter into levirate marriage. The tanna therefore teaches us that every woman who is eligible for levirate marriage is eligible for ḥalitza, and anyone who is ineligible for levirate marriage is likewise ineligible for ḥalitza, as no obligation of ḥalitza applies unless there is an obligation of a levirate marriage.
וְלִיתְנֵי ״מִן הַיִּיבּוּם וּמִן הַחֲלִיצָה״, אִי נָמֵי ״מִן הַחֲלִיצָה״ לְחוֹדַהּ? אַבָּא שָׁאוּל הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מִצְוֹת חֲלִיצָה קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוֹת יַיבּוּם.
§ The Gemara further inquires: And let him teach: From levirate marriage and from ḥalitza, as the Torah states the option of levirate marriage first. Alternatively, let him teach: From ḥalitza, alone, as this would indicate that she may not enter into levirate marriage either. The Gemara answers: This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, who said: The mitzva of ḥalitza takes precedence over the mitzva of levirate marriage, as he maintains that one who does not enter into levirate marriage for the sake of Heaven transgresses the prohibition against marrying one’s brother’s wife, and therefore it would be better in every case to perform ḥalitza. Consequently, the tanna mentions ḥalitza before levirate marriage.
מִנְיָנָא דְּרֵישָׁא לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי, וּמִנְיָנָא דְּסֵיפָא לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי?
§ The Gemara asks another question with regard to the language of the mishna: The enumeration of the first clause of the mishna: Fifteen women, which indicates that those women alone are included in this list, serves to exclude what? Which other cases might have been included? And the enumeration of the latter clause, which states: These exempt their rival wives, again meaning these and no others, serves to exclude what? Since the mishna specifies only these women and no others, the Gemara asks which other women might have been included in these lists.
לְמַעוֹטֵי דְּרַב וּדְרַב אַסִּי. לְרַב וּלְרַב אַסִּי לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי?
The Gemara answers that these enumerations come to exclude those additions of Rav and of Rav Asi. Rav added the rival wife of a woman suspected by her husband of adultery [sota], while Rav Asi added the rival wife of an aylonit. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav and according to the opinion of Rav Asi, the enumeration of the mishna comes to exclude what?
אִי סְבִירָא לְהוּ דַּהֲדָדֵי — חֲדָא לְמַעוֹטֵי צָרַת מְמָאֶנֶת, וַחֲדָא לְמַעוֹטֵי צָרַת מַחֲזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ.
The Gemara responds: If each maintains in accordance with the opinion of the other, then one enumeration of the mishna comes to exclude the rival wife of a wife who performed refusal. If the deceased brother had two wives, one of whom was a minor, and she refused the yavam, her rival wife is prohibited from levirate marriage with him. However, the latter is not entirely exempt and must perform ḥalitza. And the other one comes to exclude the rival wife of the wife of one who remarries his divorcée, i.e., a woman who was illicitly remarried by her former husband after she had been married to another man.
וְאִי לָא סְבִירָא לְהוּ דַּהֲדָדֵי — חֲדָא לְמַעוֹטֵי דְּחַבְרֵיהּ, וַחֲדָא לְמַעוֹטֵי אוֹ צָרַת מְמָאֶנֶת, אוֹ צָרַת מַחֲזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ.
And if Rav and Rav Asi do not each maintain in accordance with the opinion of the other, then one enumeration comes to exclude the opinion of the other, as they do not agree that the halakha stated by the other should be included in the mishna, and the other one comes to exclude one of the above suggestions, either the rival wife of a wife who performed refusal or the rival wife of the wife of one who remarries his divorcée.
לְרַב וּלְרַב אַסִּי, לִיתְנִינְהוּ?
The Gemara asks: If so, according to the opinion of Rav and according to the opinion of Rav Asi, let the tanna teach these cases. Since in their opinions there are more than fifteen women to whom the principle of the mishna applies, why weren’t they all stated by the tanna of the mishna? The Gemara answers: They were not taught because they do not completely fit all of the halakhic rulings here.
לְפִי שֶׁאֵינָהּ בְּצָרַת צָרָה.
The Gemara elaborates: This is because they do not involve the case of a rival wife of a rival wife. With regard to the fifteen women listed, the discussion of the mishna concerning rival wives and rival wives of rival wives is appropriate. However, the two cases cited by Rav and Rav Asi do not leave room for such deliberations, as both a sota and an aylonit are exempt and forbidden equally to all of the brothers, because their prohibition does not result from a familial relation to one of the living brothers but from a personal issue relating to the women themselves. Since none of the brothers may marry her rival wife, there is no possibility of a rival wife of a rival wife, and consequently these cases were omitted from the mishna’s list of fifteen women.
מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי — דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִשָּׁה אֶל אֲחוֹתָהּ לֹא תִקָּח לִצְרוֹר לְגַלּוֹת עֶרְוָתָהּ עָלֶיהָ בְּחַיֶּיהָ״. ״עָלֶיהָ״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר?
§ After analyzing the order and language of the mishna, the Gemara discusses the halakhot themselves. From where are these matters, that if one’s forbidden relative comes before him for levirate marriage he is prohibited from marrying her or her rival wife, derived? It is as the Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness, with her in her lifetime” (Leviticus 18:18). What is the meaning when the verse states the apparently superfluous phrase: “With her”?
לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי אֲפִילּוּ בְּאַחַת מִכׇּל עֲרָיוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״עָלֶיהָ״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״עָלֶיהָ״,
The baraita explains: Since it is stated with regard to the wife of a deceased brother: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), I would derive that when the verse speaks of the mitzva of levirate marriage, it includes even any one of those with whom relations are forbidden, as mentioned in the Torah. Therefore, one derives a verbal analogy: It is stated here, with regard to a wife’s sister: “With her,” and it is stated there, with regard to a levirate marriage: “With her.”
מָה לְהַלָּן בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה, אַף כָּאן בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה, וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא תִקָּח״.
The baraita explains the verbal analogy. Just as there, a levirate marriage involves the performance of a mitzva, so too, here, the statement “uncover her nakedness with her” includes the performance of a mitzva, and the Merciful One states in the Torah: “You shall not take.” The phrase “with her” teaches that even in a case where there is an obligation of levirate marriage, the Torah prohibition proscribing forbidden relatives remains in force.
וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא הִיא, צָרָתָהּ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִצְרוֹר״. וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא צָרָתָהּ, צָרַת צָרָתָהּ מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִצְרוֹר״, וְלֹא ״לָצוֹר״.
The baraita continues: And I have derived only that she, his wife’s sister, is exempt from levirate marriage; from where do I derive that her rival wife is also exempt? The verse states: “To be a rival to her” (Leviticus 18:18), which indicates that not only is she prohibited, but so too is her rival wife. And I have derived only her rival wife; from where is it derived that the rival wife of her rival wife is also exempt? The verse states: “To be a rival [litzror],” using the full spelling with a double reish, and not latzor; this indicates that there are several rival wives, one after another.
וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה, שְׁאָר עֲרָיוֹת מִנַּיִין? אָמַרְתָּ: מָה אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה מְיוּחֶדֶת — שֶׁהִיא עֶרְוָה, וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ חַטָּאת, וַאֲסוּרָה לַיָּבָם; אַף כֹּל שֶׁהִיא עֶרְוָה, וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ חַטָּאת — אֲסוּרָה לַיָּבָם.
And I have derived from this verbal analogy only that the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply to a wife’s sister. From where is it derived that the same applies to the other women with whom relations are forbidden? You can say as follows: Just as the case of a wife’s sister is specific in that she is a forbidden relative, and this is a prohibition for whose intentional violation, i.e., for intentional sexual relations with her, one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and she is prohibited to the yavam in levirate marriage; so too, with regard to all women with whom relations are forbidden by a prohibition for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, they are prohibited to the yavam in levirate marriage.
וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא הֵן, צָרוֹתֵיהֶן מִנַּיִין? אָמַרְתָּ: מָה אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה מְיוּחֶדֶת — שֶׁהִיא עֶרְוָה וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ חַטָּאת, וַאֲסוּרָה לַיָּבָם, וְצָרָתָהּ אֲסוּרָה; אַף כֹּל שֶׁהִיא עֶרְוָה, וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ חַטָּאת, וַאֲסוּרָה לַיָּבָם — צָרָתָהּ אֲסוּרָה. מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: חֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה נָשִׁים פּוֹטְרוֹת צָרוֹתֵיהֶן וְצָרוֹת צָרוֹתֵיהֶן מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּיבּוּם עַד סוֹף הָעוֹלָם.
The baraita continues: And I have derived only the cases of those women themselves with whom relations are forbidden; from where is it derived that their rival wives are also exempt from levirate marriage? You can say as follows: Just as a wife’s sister is specific in that she is a forbidden relative and this is a prohibition for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and she is prohibited to the yavam in levirate marriage, and her rival wife is likewise prohibited; so too, any woman with whom relations are forbidden and this is a prohibition for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and this woman is one who is forbidden to the yavam, her rival wife is likewise forbidden. The baraita concludes: From here the Sages stated that fifteen women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage forever.
יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מְרַבֶּה אַף שֵׁשׁ עֲרָיוֹת חֲמוּרוֹת מֵאֵלּוּ, שֶׁיְּהוּ צָרוֹתֵיהֶם אֲסוּרוֹת?
§ One might have thought that I should include in this principle even the six women with whom relations are forbidden that are more severe than these, i.e., one’s mother, his father’s sister, and so on, as stated in a later mishna (13b), since they too are forbidden by a prohibition entailing karet. This would mean that their rival wives should likewise be prohibited to enter into levirate marriage with this yavam as forbidden rival wives.
אָמַרְתָּ: מָה אֲחוֹת אִשְׁתּוֹ מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא עֶרְוָה, וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ חַטָּאת, וְאֶפְשָׁר לִינָּשֵׂא לָאַחִים, וַאֲסוּרָה לַיָּבָם, וְצָרָתָהּ אֲסוּרָה; אַף כֹּל שֶׁהִיא עֶרְוָה, וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ חַטָּאת, וְאֶפְשָׁר לִינָּשֵׂא לָאַחִים, וַאֲסוּרָה לַיָּבָם — צָרָתָהּ אֲסוּרָה.
In response, you can say: Just as a wife’s sister is specific in that she is a forbidden relative and this is a prohibition for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and yet she is permitted to marry one of the brothers but she is prohibited to the yavam in levirate marriage, and her rival wife is likewise prohibited in levirate marriage; so too, with regard to any woman with whom relations are forbidden and this is a prohibition for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and who is permitted to marry one of the brothers but she is prohibited to the yavam in levirate marriage, her rival wife is also prohibited in levirate marriage.
יָצְאוּ שֵׁשׁ עֲרָיוֹת חֲמוּרוֹת מֵאֵלּוּ, הוֹאִיל דְּאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִינָּשֵׂא לָאַחִים — צָרוֹתֵיהֶן מוּתָּרוֹת, שֶׁאֵין צָרָה אֶלָּא מֵאָח.
This excludes the six women with whom relations are forbidden by a more severe prohibition than those, since they may not marry the brothers, i.e., they are forbidden to all of the brothers. One’s mother may never marry his brother, either because she is also that brother’s mother, or because she is his father’s wife. Consequently, their rival wives are permitted, as the halakha with regard to a rival wife applies only due to the brother. In other words, the prohibition against marriage to the rival wife of a forbidden relative is applicable only in instances of levirate bonds. When the levirate bond does not take effect at all, the rival wife is not forbidden.
אַזְהָרָה שָׁמַעְנוּ, עוֹנֶשׁ מִנַּיִין? אָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי כׇּל (אִישׁ) אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה מִכֹּל הַתּוֹעֵבוֹת וְגוֹ׳״.
The baraita adds: We have learned the warning concerning this prohibition that the yavam may not marry his forbidden relative from the verse: “And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness, with her in her lifetime” (Leviticus 18:18). From where is the punishment that he incurs if he transgresses and marries her derived? The verse states: “For whoever shall do any of these abominations, the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29).
טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״עָלֶיהָ״, הָא לָאו הָכִי, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה מִיַּיבְּמָה, מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמְרִינַן: אָתֵי עֲשֵׂה וְדָחֵי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה?!
§ Up until this point, the Gemara has cited the baraita that interprets the biblical basis for the halakha of the mishna. The Gemara further analyzes the foundational principles of this topic. The reason that these women are exempt from levirate marriage is that the Merciful One writes “with her,” from which it may be inferred that if that was not so, I would say that a wife’s sister enters into levirate marriage with her sister’s husband. What is the reason that one would have assumed that this is the case? It is as we say, in accordance with a principle, that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition. In this case, the positive mitzva to enter into levirate marriage overrides the prohibition against marrying one’s wife’s sister.
אֵימַר דְּאָמְרִינַן אָתֵי עֲשֵׂה וְדָחֵי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה — לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה גְּרֵידָא, לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כָּרֵת מִי דָּחֵי? וְתוּ: לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה גְּרֵידָא מְנָלַן דְּדָחֵי —
The Gemara asks if that principle is applicable in this case. One can say that we said that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition only when there is a prohibition for which one is punished by lashes alone. However, with regard to a prohibition that includes the punishment of karet, does a positive mitzva override it? This prohibition is more severe than a regular one, and therefore perhaps a positive mitzva does not override it. And furthermore, with regard to a prohibition for which one is punished by lashes alone, from where do we derive that a positive mitzva overrides it?
