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Today's Daf Yomi

April 12, 2022 | 讬状讗 讘谞讬住谉 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 36

Today’s daf is sponsored by Gitta Jaroslawicz-Neufeld “Thank you to my Hadran family for your care and concern after my recent accident. May we all share Smachot in good health!”聽

After rejecting Abaye’s resolution to the difficulty against Rabbi Yochanan’s position regarding yibum and chalitza of a pregnant woman, Rava answers the difficulty in a different manner. A braita is brought to support his position, which is then used to question Reish Lakish’s position. That difficulty is resolved as well. Rabbi Elazar finds a Mishna that supports Reish Lakish’s position, however, the support is rejected by the Gemara. A braita is brought to strengthen Reish Lakish’s opinion and Rava paskens like Reish Lakish on this issue and on two others, relating to monetary law. Our Mishna said that if the child was not viable, then the couple could stay married. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and says they must divorce. Is this the same as Rabbi Meir’s opinion regarding a man who marries a pregnant or nursing woman?

讚讻诇 讛注讜诇讛 诇讬讘讜诐 注讜诇讛 诇讞诇讬爪讛 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谉 注讜诇讛 诇讬讘讜诐 讗讬谞讜 注讜诇讛 诇讞诇讬爪讛

that anyone who is eligible for levirate marriage is eligible for 岣litza and anyone who is not eligible for levirate marriage is not eligible for 岣litza. Therefore, the original understanding of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion, that both the intercourse and the 岣litza of a pregnant woman are valid, was accurate.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛讻讜谞住 讬讘诪转讜 讜谞诪爪讗转 诪注讜讘专转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 爪专转讛 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜讘讬讗转 诪注讜讘专转 诇讗 砖诪讛 讘讬讗讛 讜讞诇讬爪转 诪注讜讘专转 诇讗 砖诪讛 讞诇讬爪讛 讜讛讜诇讚 讗讬谞讜 驻讜讟专 注讚 砖讬爪讗 诇讗讜讬专 讛注讜诇诐

Rava therefore provides a different defense of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion: Rather, Rava said that this is what the baraita is saying: In the case of one who consummates the levirate marriage with his yevama under the assumption that there is a mitzva to do so, and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse, a rival wife of this yevama may not marry lest the offspring be viable, and intercourse with a woman pregnant with viable offspring is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse, and 岣litza of a woman pregnant with viable offspring is not considered effective 岣litza. And furthermore, even if the offspring is viable, it does not release her and her rival wives from the levirate bond until it comes into the air of the world, i.e., until it is actually born.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 讛讻讜谞住 讬讘诪转讜 讜谞诪爪讗转 诪注讜讘专转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 爪专转讛 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜讗讬谉 讘讬讗讛 讜讞诇讬爪讛 驻讜讟专转 讗诇讗 讜诇讚 驻讜讟专 讜讛讜诇讚 讗讬谉 驻讜讟专讛 注讚 砖讬爪讗 诇讗讜讬专 讛注讜诇诐

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: In the case of one who consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama, and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse, a rival wife of this yevama may not marry lest the offspring be viable. This is because intercourse or 岣litza with a woman pregnant with viable offspring does not release a yevama from the levirate bond; rather, the offspring releases her. And furthermore, even if the offspring is viable, it does not release her and her rival wives from the levirate marriage bond until it comes into the air of the world.

讟注诪讗 讚砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讛讜讗 讛讗 诇讗 讛讜讬 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 诪讬驻讟专 爪专转讛 诇讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖

The Gemara explains that the baraita appears to contradict Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion: According to the baraita, the only reason that levirate marriage with the pregnant yevama does not permit the rival wife to marry is as the baraita stated: Lest the offspring be viable. By inference, were the offspring not viable, her rival wife would be released from the levirate bond. If so, let us say that this baraita is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻讜谞住 讬讘诪转讜 讜谞诪爪讗转 诪注讜讘专转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 爪专转讛 砖诪讗 诇讗 讬讛讗 讛讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜讞诇讬爪转 诪注讜讘专转 诇讗 砖诪讛 讞诇讬爪讛 讜讘讬讗转 诪注讜讘专转 诇讗 砖诪讛 讘讬讗讛

The Gemara defends Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion: Reish Lakish could have said to you: This is what the baraita is teaching: In the case of one who consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama, and then she was found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse, a rival wife of this yevama may not marry lest the offspring not be viable, which would mean that all the rival wives are bound by the levirate bond. And even if one of those wives has intercourse or preforms 岣litza with the yavam, it would be ineffective in releasing them from the levirate bond because 岣litza with a pregnant woman is not be considered effective 岣litza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse.

讜讗诐 转讗诪专 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜诇讚 诪注诇讬讗 讬诇讚谉 讜诇讚 讗讬谉 驻讜讟专 注讚 砖讬爪讗 诇讗讜讬专 讛注讜诇诐

Reish Lakish explains the need for the final clause of the baraita: And even if you say: Let the wives marry without the need for any levirate marriage or 岣litza because one should follow the majority of women, and the majority of women give birth to a full-fledged, i.e., viable, offspring, and therefore one should presume no levirate bond exists, to counter this claim the baraita concludes: Even if the offspring will be viable, an offspring does not release a yevama and her rival wives from the levirate bond until it comes into the air of the world.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗驻砖专 讗讬转讗 诇讛讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讜诇讗 转谞谉 诇讛 讘诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞驻拽 讚拽 讜讗砖讻讞 讚转谞谉 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 讜爪专转讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讱 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 注讚 砖转讚注 砖诪讗 诪注讜讘专转 讛讬讗 爪专转讛

Rabbi Elazar said: Is it possible that there is halakhic acceptance of this opinion of Reish Lakish and it was not hinted to by something taught in the Mishna? He went out of the study hall, carefully checked the mishnayot, and found one that supported Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion, as we learned in a mishna: In the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife went overseas, and then witnesses came and said to her: Your husband died, and her husband had a brother, this woman may neither marry someone other than his brother, nor may she enter into levirate marriage with that brother, until she knows whether perhaps her rival wife is pregnant. If she discovers that her rival wife is not pregnant, she would then be able to perform levirate marriage or 岣litza. If she discovers her rival wife is pregnant, she would have to wait to see if the pregnancy is viable. If it is found to be viable, only at that point would she be permitted to marry someone else.

讘砖诇诪讗 讬讘讜诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜讬驻讙注 讘讗讬住讜专 讗砖转 讗讞 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诇讗 诇讗 转讞诇讜抓 讗诪讗讬 讘砖诇诪讗 转讞诇讜抓 讘转讜讱 转砖注讛 讜转谞砖讗 讘转讜讱 转砖注讛 诇讗 讛讬讬谞讜 住驻拽

Rabbi Elazar explains how this mishna supports Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion: Granted, she may not enter levirate marriage as perhaps her rival wife is pregnant and the offspring will be viable, and therefore by consummating the levirate marriage the yavam would encounter the Torah prohibition against engaging in relations with one鈥檚 brother鈥檚 wife. But why may she not perform 岣litza? Granted, she may not perform 岣litza during the first nine months following her husband鈥檚 death and then proceed to also marry during those nine months; this is prohibited due to the fact that there is the uncertainty whether her rival wife is pregnant with viable offspring, in which case she would be released from the levirate bond.

讗诇讗 转讞诇讜抓 讘转讜讱 转砖注讛 讜转谞砖讗 诇讗讞专 转砖注讛

But let her perform 岣litza during the first nine months following her husband鈥檚 death and then wait to marry until after those nine months. By that point in time, even if the rival wife was pregnant she would have already given birth. If the offspring was viable, then it emerges that there was never a levirate bond, and if it is not viable, then she was released from her levirate bond through the 岣litza she performed. Either way, she would now be permitted to remarry. Why, then, does the mishna not consider this possibility? Rabbi Elazar claims that the only explanation for this is if the mishna assumes that 岣litza performed while one of the wives of the deceased is pregnant is not effective. As such, the mishna is a proof for Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 转讞诇讜抓 讜转谞砖讗 诇讗讞专 转砖注讛

The Gemara rejects Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 proof: But even according to your reasoning that 岣litza with a pregnant woman is not effective, the mishna should have considered an additional possibility: Let her perform 岣litza and marry, doing both after nine months have passed since the death of her husband.Doing so should be effective according to both Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yo岣nan.

讗诇讗 讘专 诪讬谞讛 讚讛讛讬讗 讚讗讘讬讬 讘专 讗讘讗 讜专讘 讞讬谞谞讗 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜谞诪爪讗 讗转讛 诪爪专讬讻讛 讻专讜讝 诇讻讛讜谞讛

Rather, the discussion of this topic should be held apart from that mishna, as the true reason for that mishna鈥檚 ruling is as it is Abaye bar Abba and Rav 岣nnana bar Abaye who both say that she is prohibited from performing 岣litza while one of the wives of the deceased is pregnant because perhaps the offspring will be viable, in which case any 岣litza performed would be entirely unnecessary and therefore meaningless, and she would remain permitted to marry into the priesthood, as the opening mishna of the chapter rules. However, in this situation people might not realize that the 岣litza she performed was meaningless, and they would think she is a 岣lutza, who is prohibited from marrying a priest. And it would therefore emerge that if she were allowed to perform 岣litza while pregnant, it is possible that you will ultimately require a public announcement to be made for her to attest to the fact that she is in fact still permitted to marry into the priesthood.

讜诇爪专讻讛 讚诇诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讗讬谞讬砖 讚讛讜讬 讘讞诇讬爪讛 讜诇讗 讛讜讬 讘讛讻专讝讛 讜讗转讬 诇诪讬诪专 拽砖专讬 讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉

The Gemara wonders why this poses a problem: But why not let her perform 岣litza while still pregnant, and then if it becomes necessary, require a public announcement to be made for her? The Gemara explains why one should avoid having to rely on a public announcement: Perhaps there were some people who were present at the 岣litza and were not present at the public announcement, and when that the courts permit her to marry a priest they might come to say that they are permitting a 岣lutza to marry a priest.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬讚讬 诇讗 转讞诇讜抓 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 拽转谞讬 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 拽转谞讬 讘诇讗 讞诇讬爪讛 讗讘诇 讗讬 讞诇讬抓 诇讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚砖专讬讗

Abaye suggests another rejection of Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 proof from that mishna: Abaye said to Rabbi Elazar: The very formulation of the mishna refutes Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion, as does the mishna teach that she may neither perform 岣litza nor enter into levirate marriage? No, the mishna teaches only that she may neither be married nor enter into levirate marriage, which implies only that she may not marry without first performing 岣litza, but if the yavam performs 岣litza with her, she would indeed be permitted to marry after nine months have passed since her husband鈥檚 death. This understanding of the mishna undermines the basis of Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 proof from the mishna.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讞讜诇抓 诇诪注讜讘专转 讜讛驻讬诇讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞诇讬爪讛 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉

Even if that mishna does not support Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion, nevertheless it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish: In the case of one who performs 岣litza with a pregnant woman and she miscarries, she requires another 岣litza with the brothers in order to release her from the levirate bond. The baraita assumes that the original 岣litza is ineffective because it was done while she was still pregnant, which is accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘讛谞讬 转诇转 讞讚讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉 讗讬讚讱 讚转谞谉 讛诪讞诇拽 谞讻住讬讜 注诇 驻讬讜 专讬讘讛 诇讗讞讚 讜诪讬注讟 诇讗讞讚 讜讛砖讜讛 诇讛诐 讗转 讛讘讻讜专 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉

Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish in these three disputes: One, this dispute that we already stated with regard to the 岣litza of a pregnant woman. The other dispute concerns that which we learned in a mishna: In the case of one who verbally divides up his possessions among his descendants, stating how he wishes his estate to be divided after his death, if he increases the proportion of his estate that should go to one of his children or decreases the proportion of his estate that should go to another one of his children, or if he equally distributes between them the double portion of the firstborn, then his words are binding.

讜讗诐 讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 讬专讜砖讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讻转讘 讘讬谉 讘转讞诇讛 讘讬谉 讘住讜祝 讘讬谉 讘讗诪爪注 诪砖讜诐 诪转谞讛 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉

But if he said explicitly that the receipt of those portions should be considered as an inheritance, then it as though the verbal division of his property that he said is nothing, i.e., it is non-binding, since his words directly contradict the halakhot of inheritance as they are written in the Torah. However, if he wrote a will and somewhere therein he wrote, whether at the beginning, whether at the end, or whether in the middle, that the receipt of the portions should be considered as a gift, as opposed to an inheritance, then his words are binding.

讜讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇注讜诇诐 诇讗 拽谞讛 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讬专砖讜 砖讚讛 驻诇讜谞讬转 讜驻诇讜谞讬转 砖谞转转讬诐 诇讛诐 讘诪转谞讛 讜讬专砖讜诐

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yo岣nan dispute whether one must state that the receipt of the portions should be considered as a gift with regard to each recipient, or whether stating it with regard to one of them is enough to indicate that it is true for all. And Reish Lakish said: The inheritors will only ever acquire the portions as defined by the owner of the possessions once he says: So-and-so and so-and-so shall inherit such and such a field and such and such a field that I have given to them as a gift, and they shall inherit them, i.e., he must state explicitly for each recipient that their receipt of the portions should be considered a gift. Rava ruled that in this dispute as well, the halakha is in accordance with Reish Lakish.

讜讗讬讚讱 讚转谞谉 讛讻讜转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诇讗讞专 诪讜转讜 讛讗讘 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖谞转谞谉 诇讘谉 讜讛讘谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讗讘 诪讻专 讛讗讘 诪讻讜专讬谉 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讜讗 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讗讬谉 诇诇讜拽讞 讻诇讜诐 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘

And the other dispute concerns that which we learned in a mishna: In the case of one who writes a bill transferring ownership of all of his possessions to his son stating that the transfer should take effect immediately so that the son should gain the rights to use the possessions after his death, then although the father retained for himself the right to use the possessions until his death, he is unable to sell the possessions due to the fact that he gave them to the son, and the son is unable to sell the possessions due to the fact that they are still in the father鈥檚 possession. If the father sold the possessions, then they are sold to the extent that the purchaser may use them until the father dies. If the son sold the possessions during his father鈥檚 lifetime, the purchaser does not receive any rights to use the possessions until the father dies.

讜讗讬转诪专 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讜诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞

And an amoraic dispute was stated in the case in which the son sold the possessions during the father鈥檚 lifetime, and then the son died during the father鈥檚 lifetime, following which the father died as well. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: The purchaser does not acquire anything, and Reish Lakish said: The purchaser does acquire the possessions.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yo岣nan said that the purchaser does not acquire anything, because he holds that the ownership of the rights to an item and its produce is tantamount to the ownership of the item itself, i.e., the actual title to it. Since the father retained the rights to use the possessions until his death, as long as he lives he is considered to hold the title to them. Therefore, the son鈥檚 sale can be effective only after the father鈥檚 death, at which point the son becomes the title owner. However, if the son dies first, then since he never gained the title to the items, his sale can never come to fruition.

讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

And Reish Lakish said: The purchaser does acquire the possessions, as Reish Lakish holds that the ownership of the rights to an item and its produce is not tantamount to the ownership of the item itself, i.e., the actual title to it. Therefore, although the father is still alive, the son immediately gains the full title to the possessions, which he may sell to someone else. Nevertheless, since the father retains the rights to use the possessions, the purchaser may use the possessions he acquired only when the father dies.

讗讬谉 讛讜诇讚 砖诇 拽讬讬诪讗 讻讜壮 转谞讗 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诪专讜 讬讜爪讬讗 讘讙讟

搂 The mishna states that if a yavam consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama while she is pregnant, if it emerges that the offspring is not viable then he may maintain her as his wife because his intercourse with her was a valid consummation of levirate marriage. An opposing opinion is taught in a baraita: In the name of Rabbi Eliezer they said: He must send her out with a bill of divorce. Although it emerged that the levirate marriage took effect, since at the time he consummated the levirate marriage it was prohibited to do so because the yevama was pregnant, he is therefore penalized and required to separate from her.

讗诪专 专讘讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诪专讜 讚讘专 讗讞讚 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉

Rava said: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing, i.e., they both expressed the same opinion that if one marries a woman whom he is prohibited from marrying, he is penalized and required to divorce her, even if the reason for the prohibition no longer applies. Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion was expressed in this ruling we have just stated.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚转谞讬讗 诇讗 讬砖讗 讗讚诐 诪注讜讘专转 讞讘讬专讜 讜诪讬谞拽转 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诐 谞砖讗 讬讜爪讬讗 讜诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 注讜诇诪讬转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讜爪讬讗 讜诇讻砖讬讙讬注 讝诪谞讜 诇讻谞讜住 讬讻谞讜住

Where was Rabbi Meir鈥檚 opinion expressed? As it is taught in a baraita: A man may not marry a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, nor a woman who is nursing the child of another man. And if he transgressed and married her, he is penalized for violating the prohibition, and he must divorce her with a bill of divorce, and he may never take her back; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He must send her out, and when the time comes in which it is permitted to marry her, i.e., after the child is weaned, he may then marry her again.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讛讬讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讻讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽驻讙注 讘讗讬住讜专 讗砖转 讗讞 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘诇 讛转诐 讚专讘谞谉 讻专讘谞谉 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

Abaye said to him: From where do you deduce that they are of one opinion? Perhaps that is not so, as it is possible that Rabbi Eliezer states his ruling only here, in the case of a yavam who consummated a levirate marriage with his yevama while she was still pregnant, due to the fact that by doing so he risks the possibility that the offspring will be viable, in which case he encounters the Torah prohibition against engaging in relations with one鈥檚 brother鈥檚 wife. However, there, in the case where one married a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, which is a rabbinic prohibition, it is possible that he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who argue with Rabbi Meir.

讗讬 谞诪讬 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚专讘谞谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 注砖讜 讞讬讝讜拽 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 转讜专讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪驻专砖 驻专砖讬 诪讬谞讛

Alternatively, it is also possible that Rabbi Meir states his ruling only there, in the case where one married a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, due to the fact that doing so is a violation of a rabbinic prohibition, and therefore it is possible that this is one of the cases in which the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than prohibitions of Torah law so that people would not treat them lightly. However, here, in the case of a yavam who consummated a levirate marriage with his yevama while she was still pregnant, where there was a risk of transgressing a prohibition written in the Torah, since people are generally careful to distance themselves from a Torah prohibition, there is no need to further penalize someone who nevertheless transgressed.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诇讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讬讜爪讬讗讛 讘讙讟 讗诪专 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讬讜爪讬讗 讜诇讗 拽转谞讬 讬驻专讬砖 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rava said: According to the statement of the Rabbis who dispute Rabbi Meir and require one who married a pregnant woman to send her out, the intention is that he must send her out with a bill of divorce and not merely separate from her. Mar Zutra said: The language the Rabbis used is also precise, as they teach: He must send her out, and they do not teach: He must separate himself from her. Conclude from here that Rava鈥檚 claim is correct.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬讚讬 讛转诐 转谞谉 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讻诇 砖砖讛讗 讘讗讚诐 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讗讬谞讜 谞驻诇 讛讗 诇讗 砖讛讗 住驻讬拽讗 讛讜讬

Rav Ashi said to Rav Hoshaya, son of Rav Idi: We learned in a baraita there that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any human baby that survives for thirty days after its birth is not to be considered a stillbirth. Rather, the baby is considered to be viable, and so the wife of the baby鈥檚 father is never subject to any obligation of levirate marriage. But, by inference, were it not to survive for thirty days, there would be uncertainty whether the baby was viable or not.

讜讗讬转诪专 诪转 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讜注诪讚讛 讜谞转拽讚砖讛

And an amoraic dispute was stated in the case in which the only offspring of a man died during the first thirty days of its life, and the widow, under the misconception that she was exempt from any obligation of levirate marriage, arose and was betrothed.

专讘讬谞讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 讗诐 讗砖转 讬砖专讗诇 讛讬讗 讞讜诇爪转 讜讗诐 讗砖转 讻讛谉 讛讬讗 讗讬谞讛 讞讜诇爪转

Ravina said in the name of Rava: If she became the wife of an Israelite, i.e., the man who betrothed her was not a priest, then she performs 岣litza with the yavam due to the uncertainty whether or not the offspring was viable, and then they may remain married. But if she became the wife of a priest, she does not perform 岣litza with him because if she were to do so, she would become a 岣lutza and would therefore be prohibited from remaining married to her husband, who is a priest. Therefore, in this case, in order to allow her to remain married to her husband, the Sages did not require her to be concerned for the possibility that the offspring was not viable.

专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讞转 讝讜 讜讗讞转 讝讜 讞讜诇爪转

The Gemara cites a different version of Rav鈥檚 opinion: Rav Mesharshiyya said in the name of Rava: Both this woman and that woman perform 岣litza, even though by doing so, if she was betrothed to a priest, she would become forbidden to him.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗

Ravina said to Rav Mesharshiyya:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot: 30-36 – Daf Yomi One Week at a Time

This week we will learn various scenarios that begin with three brothers, two of which marry two sisters. We will...

Yevamot 36

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Yevamot 36

讚讻诇 讛注讜诇讛 诇讬讘讜诐 注讜诇讛 诇讞诇讬爪讛 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谉 注讜诇讛 诇讬讘讜诐 讗讬谞讜 注讜诇讛 诇讞诇讬爪讛

that anyone who is eligible for levirate marriage is eligible for 岣litza and anyone who is not eligible for levirate marriage is not eligible for 岣litza. Therefore, the original understanding of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion, that both the intercourse and the 岣litza of a pregnant woman are valid, was accurate.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛讻讜谞住 讬讘诪转讜 讜谞诪爪讗转 诪注讜讘专转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 爪专转讛 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜讘讬讗转 诪注讜讘专转 诇讗 砖诪讛 讘讬讗讛 讜讞诇讬爪转 诪注讜讘专转 诇讗 砖诪讛 讞诇讬爪讛 讜讛讜诇讚 讗讬谞讜 驻讜讟专 注讚 砖讬爪讗 诇讗讜讬专 讛注讜诇诐

Rava therefore provides a different defense of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion: Rather, Rava said that this is what the baraita is saying: In the case of one who consummates the levirate marriage with his yevama under the assumption that there is a mitzva to do so, and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse, a rival wife of this yevama may not marry lest the offspring be viable, and intercourse with a woman pregnant with viable offspring is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse, and 岣litza of a woman pregnant with viable offspring is not considered effective 岣litza. And furthermore, even if the offspring is viable, it does not release her and her rival wives from the levirate bond until it comes into the air of the world, i.e., until it is actually born.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 讛讻讜谞住 讬讘诪转讜 讜谞诪爪讗转 诪注讜讘专转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 爪专转讛 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜讗讬谉 讘讬讗讛 讜讞诇讬爪讛 驻讜讟专转 讗诇讗 讜诇讚 驻讜讟专 讜讛讜诇讚 讗讬谉 驻讜讟专讛 注讚 砖讬爪讗 诇讗讜讬专 讛注讜诇诐

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: In the case of one who consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama, and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse, a rival wife of this yevama may not marry lest the offspring be viable. This is because intercourse or 岣litza with a woman pregnant with viable offspring does not release a yevama from the levirate bond; rather, the offspring releases her. And furthermore, even if the offspring is viable, it does not release her and her rival wives from the levirate marriage bond until it comes into the air of the world.

讟注诪讗 讚砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讛讜讗 讛讗 诇讗 讛讜讬 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 诪讬驻讟专 爪专转讛 诇讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖

The Gemara explains that the baraita appears to contradict Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion: According to the baraita, the only reason that levirate marriage with the pregnant yevama does not permit the rival wife to marry is as the baraita stated: Lest the offspring be viable. By inference, were the offspring not viable, her rival wife would be released from the levirate bond. If so, let us say that this baraita is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻讜谞住 讬讘诪转讜 讜谞诪爪讗转 诪注讜讘专转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 爪专转讛 砖诪讗 诇讗 讬讛讗 讛讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜讞诇讬爪转 诪注讜讘专转 诇讗 砖诪讛 讞诇讬爪讛 讜讘讬讗转 诪注讜讘专转 诇讗 砖诪讛 讘讬讗讛

The Gemara defends Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion: Reish Lakish could have said to you: This is what the baraita is teaching: In the case of one who consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama, and then she was found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse, a rival wife of this yevama may not marry lest the offspring not be viable, which would mean that all the rival wives are bound by the levirate bond. And even if one of those wives has intercourse or preforms 岣litza with the yavam, it would be ineffective in releasing them from the levirate bond because 岣litza with a pregnant woman is not be considered effective 岣litza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse.

讜讗诐 转讗诪专 讛诇讱 讗讞专 专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜专讜讘 谞砖讬诐 讜诇讚 诪注诇讬讗 讬诇讚谉 讜诇讚 讗讬谉 驻讜讟专 注讚 砖讬爪讗 诇讗讜讬专 讛注讜诇诐

Reish Lakish explains the need for the final clause of the baraita: And even if you say: Let the wives marry without the need for any levirate marriage or 岣litza because one should follow the majority of women, and the majority of women give birth to a full-fledged, i.e., viable, offspring, and therefore one should presume no levirate bond exists, to counter this claim the baraita concludes: Even if the offspring will be viable, an offspring does not release a yevama and her rival wives from the levirate bond until it comes into the air of the world.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗驻砖专 讗讬转讗 诇讛讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讜诇讗 转谞谉 诇讛 讘诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞驻拽 讚拽 讜讗砖讻讞 讚转谞谉 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 讜爪专转讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讱 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 注讚 砖转讚注 砖诪讗 诪注讜讘专转 讛讬讗 爪专转讛

Rabbi Elazar said: Is it possible that there is halakhic acceptance of this opinion of Reish Lakish and it was not hinted to by something taught in the Mishna? He went out of the study hall, carefully checked the mishnayot, and found one that supported Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion, as we learned in a mishna: In the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife went overseas, and then witnesses came and said to her: Your husband died, and her husband had a brother, this woman may neither marry someone other than his brother, nor may she enter into levirate marriage with that brother, until she knows whether perhaps her rival wife is pregnant. If she discovers that her rival wife is not pregnant, she would then be able to perform levirate marriage or 岣litza. If she discovers her rival wife is pregnant, she would have to wait to see if the pregnancy is viable. If it is found to be viable, only at that point would she be permitted to marry someone else.

讘砖诇诪讗 讬讘讜诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜讬驻讙注 讘讗讬住讜专 讗砖转 讗讞 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诇讗 诇讗 转讞诇讜抓 讗诪讗讬 讘砖诇诪讗 转讞诇讜抓 讘转讜讱 转砖注讛 讜转谞砖讗 讘转讜讱 转砖注讛 诇讗 讛讬讬谞讜 住驻拽

Rabbi Elazar explains how this mishna supports Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion: Granted, she may not enter levirate marriage as perhaps her rival wife is pregnant and the offspring will be viable, and therefore by consummating the levirate marriage the yavam would encounter the Torah prohibition against engaging in relations with one鈥檚 brother鈥檚 wife. But why may she not perform 岣litza? Granted, she may not perform 岣litza during the first nine months following her husband鈥檚 death and then proceed to also marry during those nine months; this is prohibited due to the fact that there is the uncertainty whether her rival wife is pregnant with viable offspring, in which case she would be released from the levirate bond.

讗诇讗 转讞诇讜抓 讘转讜讱 转砖注讛 讜转谞砖讗 诇讗讞专 转砖注讛

But let her perform 岣litza during the first nine months following her husband鈥檚 death and then wait to marry until after those nine months. By that point in time, even if the rival wife was pregnant she would have already given birth. If the offspring was viable, then it emerges that there was never a levirate bond, and if it is not viable, then she was released from her levirate bond through the 岣litza she performed. Either way, she would now be permitted to remarry. Why, then, does the mishna not consider this possibility? Rabbi Elazar claims that the only explanation for this is if the mishna assumes that 岣litza performed while one of the wives of the deceased is pregnant is not effective. As such, the mishna is a proof for Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 转讞诇讜抓 讜转谞砖讗 诇讗讞专 转砖注讛

The Gemara rejects Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 proof: But even according to your reasoning that 岣litza with a pregnant woman is not effective, the mishna should have considered an additional possibility: Let her perform 岣litza and marry, doing both after nine months have passed since the death of her husband.Doing so should be effective according to both Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yo岣nan.

讗诇讗 讘专 诪讬谞讛 讚讛讛讬讗 讚讗讘讬讬 讘专 讗讘讗 讜专讘 讞讬谞谞讗 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讛讗 讜诇讚 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜谞诪爪讗 讗转讛 诪爪专讬讻讛 讻专讜讝 诇讻讛讜谞讛

Rather, the discussion of this topic should be held apart from that mishna, as the true reason for that mishna鈥檚 ruling is as it is Abaye bar Abba and Rav 岣nnana bar Abaye who both say that she is prohibited from performing 岣litza while one of the wives of the deceased is pregnant because perhaps the offspring will be viable, in which case any 岣litza performed would be entirely unnecessary and therefore meaningless, and she would remain permitted to marry into the priesthood, as the opening mishna of the chapter rules. However, in this situation people might not realize that the 岣litza she performed was meaningless, and they would think she is a 岣lutza, who is prohibited from marrying a priest. And it would therefore emerge that if she were allowed to perform 岣litza while pregnant, it is possible that you will ultimately require a public announcement to be made for her to attest to the fact that she is in fact still permitted to marry into the priesthood.

讜诇爪专讻讛 讚诇诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讗讬谞讬砖 讚讛讜讬 讘讞诇讬爪讛 讜诇讗 讛讜讬 讘讛讻专讝讛 讜讗转讬 诇诪讬诪专 拽砖专讬 讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉

The Gemara wonders why this poses a problem: But why not let her perform 岣litza while still pregnant, and then if it becomes necessary, require a public announcement to be made for her? The Gemara explains why one should avoid having to rely on a public announcement: Perhaps there were some people who were present at the 岣litza and were not present at the public announcement, and when that the courts permit her to marry a priest they might come to say that they are permitting a 岣lutza to marry a priest.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬讚讬 诇讗 转讞诇讜抓 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 拽转谞讬 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜诇讗 转转讬讬讘诐 拽转谞讬 讘诇讗 讞诇讬爪讛 讗讘诇 讗讬 讞诇讬抓 诇讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚砖专讬讗

Abaye suggests another rejection of Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 proof from that mishna: Abaye said to Rabbi Elazar: The very formulation of the mishna refutes Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion, as does the mishna teach that she may neither perform 岣litza nor enter into levirate marriage? No, the mishna teaches only that she may neither be married nor enter into levirate marriage, which implies only that she may not marry without first performing 岣litza, but if the yavam performs 岣litza with her, she would indeed be permitted to marry after nine months have passed since her husband鈥檚 death. This understanding of the mishna undermines the basis of Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 proof from the mishna.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讞讜诇抓 诇诪注讜讘专转 讜讛驻讬诇讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞诇讬爪讛 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉

Even if that mishna does not support Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion, nevertheless it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish: In the case of one who performs 岣litza with a pregnant woman and she miscarries, she requires another 岣litza with the brothers in order to release her from the levirate bond. The baraita assumes that the original 岣litza is ineffective because it was done while she was still pregnant, which is accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘讛谞讬 转诇转 讞讚讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉 讗讬讚讱 讚转谞谉 讛诪讞诇拽 谞讻住讬讜 注诇 驻讬讜 专讬讘讛 诇讗讞讚 讜诪讬注讟 诇讗讞讚 讜讛砖讜讛 诇讛诐 讗转 讛讘讻讜专 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉

Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish in these three disputes: One, this dispute that we already stated with regard to the 岣litza of a pregnant woman. The other dispute concerns that which we learned in a mishna: In the case of one who verbally divides up his possessions among his descendants, stating how he wishes his estate to be divided after his death, if he increases the proportion of his estate that should go to one of his children or decreases the proportion of his estate that should go to another one of his children, or if he equally distributes between them the double portion of the firstborn, then his words are binding.

讜讗诐 讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 讬专讜砖讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讻转讘 讘讬谉 讘转讞诇讛 讘讬谉 讘住讜祝 讘讬谉 讘讗诪爪注 诪砖讜诐 诪转谞讛 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉

But if he said explicitly that the receipt of those portions should be considered as an inheritance, then it as though the verbal division of his property that he said is nothing, i.e., it is non-binding, since his words directly contradict the halakhot of inheritance as they are written in the Torah. However, if he wrote a will and somewhere therein he wrote, whether at the beginning, whether at the end, or whether in the middle, that the receipt of the portions should be considered as a gift, as opposed to an inheritance, then his words are binding.

讜讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇注讜诇诐 诇讗 拽谞讛 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讬专砖讜 砖讚讛 驻诇讜谞讬转 讜驻诇讜谞讬转 砖谞转转讬诐 诇讛诐 讘诪转谞讛 讜讬专砖讜诐

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yo岣nan dispute whether one must state that the receipt of the portions should be considered as a gift with regard to each recipient, or whether stating it with regard to one of them is enough to indicate that it is true for all. And Reish Lakish said: The inheritors will only ever acquire the portions as defined by the owner of the possessions once he says: So-and-so and so-and-so shall inherit such and such a field and such and such a field that I have given to them as a gift, and they shall inherit them, i.e., he must state explicitly for each recipient that their receipt of the portions should be considered a gift. Rava ruled that in this dispute as well, the halakha is in accordance with Reish Lakish.

讜讗讬讚讱 讚转谞谉 讛讻讜转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诇讗讞专 诪讜转讜 讛讗讘 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖谞转谞谉 诇讘谉 讜讛讘谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讗讘 诪讻专 讛讗讘 诪讻讜专讬谉 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讜讗 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讗讬谉 诇诇讜拽讞 讻诇讜诐 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘

And the other dispute concerns that which we learned in a mishna: In the case of one who writes a bill transferring ownership of all of his possessions to his son stating that the transfer should take effect immediately so that the son should gain the rights to use the possessions after his death, then although the father retained for himself the right to use the possessions until his death, he is unable to sell the possessions due to the fact that he gave them to the son, and the son is unable to sell the possessions due to the fact that they are still in the father鈥檚 possession. If the father sold the possessions, then they are sold to the extent that the purchaser may use them until the father dies. If the son sold the possessions during his father鈥檚 lifetime, the purchaser does not receive any rights to use the possessions until the father dies.

讜讗讬转诪专 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讜诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞

And an amoraic dispute was stated in the case in which the son sold the possessions during the father鈥檚 lifetime, and then the son died during the father鈥檚 lifetime, following which the father died as well. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: The purchaser does not acquire anything, and Reish Lakish said: The purchaser does acquire the possessions.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yo岣nan said that the purchaser does not acquire anything, because he holds that the ownership of the rights to an item and its produce is tantamount to the ownership of the item itself, i.e., the actual title to it. Since the father retained the rights to use the possessions until his death, as long as he lives he is considered to hold the title to them. Therefore, the son鈥檚 sale can be effective only after the father鈥檚 death, at which point the son becomes the title owner. However, if the son dies first, then since he never gained the title to the items, his sale can never come to fruition.

讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

And Reish Lakish said: The purchaser does acquire the possessions, as Reish Lakish holds that the ownership of the rights to an item and its produce is not tantamount to the ownership of the item itself, i.e., the actual title to it. Therefore, although the father is still alive, the son immediately gains the full title to the possessions, which he may sell to someone else. Nevertheless, since the father retains the rights to use the possessions, the purchaser may use the possessions he acquired only when the father dies.

讗讬谉 讛讜诇讚 砖诇 拽讬讬诪讗 讻讜壮 转谞讗 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诪专讜 讬讜爪讬讗 讘讙讟

搂 The mishna states that if a yavam consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama while she is pregnant, if it emerges that the offspring is not viable then he may maintain her as his wife because his intercourse with her was a valid consummation of levirate marriage. An opposing opinion is taught in a baraita: In the name of Rabbi Eliezer they said: He must send her out with a bill of divorce. Although it emerged that the levirate marriage took effect, since at the time he consummated the levirate marriage it was prohibited to do so because the yevama was pregnant, he is therefore penalized and required to separate from her.

讗诪专 专讘讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗诪专讜 讚讘专 讗讞讚 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉

Rava said: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing, i.e., they both expressed the same opinion that if one marries a woman whom he is prohibited from marrying, he is penalized and required to divorce her, even if the reason for the prohibition no longer applies. Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion was expressed in this ruling we have just stated.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚转谞讬讗 诇讗 讬砖讗 讗讚诐 诪注讜讘专转 讞讘讬专讜 讜诪讬谞拽转 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诐 谞砖讗 讬讜爪讬讗 讜诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 注讜诇诪讬转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讜爪讬讗 讜诇讻砖讬讙讬注 讝诪谞讜 诇讻谞讜住 讬讻谞讜住

Where was Rabbi Meir鈥檚 opinion expressed? As it is taught in a baraita: A man may not marry a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, nor a woman who is nursing the child of another man. And if he transgressed and married her, he is penalized for violating the prohibition, and he must divorce her with a bill of divorce, and he may never take her back; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He must send her out, and when the time comes in which it is permitted to marry her, i.e., after the child is weaned, he may then marry her again.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讛讬讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讻讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽驻讙注 讘讗讬住讜专 讗砖转 讗讞 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘诇 讛转诐 讚专讘谞谉 讻专讘谞谉 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

Abaye said to him: From where do you deduce that they are of one opinion? Perhaps that is not so, as it is possible that Rabbi Eliezer states his ruling only here, in the case of a yavam who consummated a levirate marriage with his yevama while she was still pregnant, due to the fact that by doing so he risks the possibility that the offspring will be viable, in which case he encounters the Torah prohibition against engaging in relations with one鈥檚 brother鈥檚 wife. However, there, in the case where one married a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, which is a rabbinic prohibition, it is possible that he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who argue with Rabbi Meir.

讗讬 谞诪讬 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚专讘谞谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 注砖讜 讞讬讝讜拽 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 转讜专讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪驻专砖 驻专砖讬 诪讬谞讛

Alternatively, it is also possible that Rabbi Meir states his ruling only there, in the case where one married a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, due to the fact that doing so is a violation of a rabbinic prohibition, and therefore it is possible that this is one of the cases in which the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than prohibitions of Torah law so that people would not treat them lightly. However, here, in the case of a yavam who consummated a levirate marriage with his yevama while she was still pregnant, where there was a risk of transgressing a prohibition written in the Torah, since people are generally careful to distance themselves from a Torah prohibition, there is no need to further penalize someone who nevertheless transgressed.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诇讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讬讜爪讬讗讛 讘讙讟 讗诪专 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讬讜爪讬讗 讜诇讗 拽转谞讬 讬驻专讬砖 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rava said: According to the statement of the Rabbis who dispute Rabbi Meir and require one who married a pregnant woman to send her out, the intention is that he must send her out with a bill of divorce and not merely separate from her. Mar Zutra said: The language the Rabbis used is also precise, as they teach: He must send her out, and they do not teach: He must separate himself from her. Conclude from here that Rava鈥檚 claim is correct.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬讚讬 讛转诐 转谞谉 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讻诇 砖砖讛讗 讘讗讚诐 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讗讬谞讜 谞驻诇 讛讗 诇讗 砖讛讗 住驻讬拽讗 讛讜讬

Rav Ashi said to Rav Hoshaya, son of Rav Idi: We learned in a baraita there that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any human baby that survives for thirty days after its birth is not to be considered a stillbirth. Rather, the baby is considered to be viable, and so the wife of the baby鈥檚 father is never subject to any obligation of levirate marriage. But, by inference, were it not to survive for thirty days, there would be uncertainty whether the baby was viable or not.

讜讗讬转诪专 诪转 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讜注诪讚讛 讜谞转拽讚砖讛

And an amoraic dispute was stated in the case in which the only offspring of a man died during the first thirty days of its life, and the widow, under the misconception that she was exempt from any obligation of levirate marriage, arose and was betrothed.

专讘讬谞讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 讗诐 讗砖转 讬砖专讗诇 讛讬讗 讞讜诇爪转 讜讗诐 讗砖转 讻讛谉 讛讬讗 讗讬谞讛 讞讜诇爪转

Ravina said in the name of Rava: If she became the wife of an Israelite, i.e., the man who betrothed her was not a priest, then she performs 岣litza with the yavam due to the uncertainty whether or not the offspring was viable, and then they may remain married. But if she became the wife of a priest, she does not perform 岣litza with him because if she were to do so, she would become a 岣lutza and would therefore be prohibited from remaining married to her husband, who is a priest. Therefore, in this case, in order to allow her to remain married to her husband, the Sages did not require her to be concerned for the possibility that the offspring was not viable.

专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讞转 讝讜 讜讗讞转 讝讜 讞讜诇爪转

The Gemara cites a different version of Rav鈥檚 opinion: Rav Mesharshiyya said in the name of Rava: Both this woman and that woman perform 岣litza, even though by doing so, if she was betrothed to a priest, she would become forbidden to him.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗

Ravina said to Rav Mesharshiyya:

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