Yevamot 46
גּוֹי גּוּפָא לָא קָנֵי לֵיהּ, מַאי דְּקָנֵי לֵיהּ הוּא דְּמַקְנֵי לֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, וְכֵיוָן דִּקְדַם וּטְבַל לְשֵׁם בֶּן חוֹרִין — אַפְקְעֵיהּ לְשִׁעְבּוּדֵיהּ.
His previous gentile owner did not have ownership of the slave’s body, since a gentile is unable to have ownership of another’s body; rather, he had rights to only the slave’s labor. And only that which he owned in him was he able to sell to the Jew. Therefore, before immersion, the Jew had rights to only the slave’s labor, but not ownership of his body, and therefore, once the slave preempted his owner and immersed for the sake of conversion to make him a freeman, he abrogates his master’s lien upon him.
כִּדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הֶקְדֵּשׁ, חָמֵץ וְשִׁחְרוּר — מַפְקִיעִין מִידֵי שִׁעְבּוּד.
The Gemara notes: This explanation is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: Consecration of an item to the Temple, the prohibition of leavened bread taking effect upon a leavened food, and the emancipation of a slave abrogate any lien that exists upon them.
מֵתִיב רַב חִסְדָּא: מַעֲשֶׂה בִּבְלוֹרְיָא הַגִּיּוֹרֶת שֶׁקָּדְמוּ עֲבָדֶיהָ וְטָבְלוּ לְפָנֶיהָ, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים, וְאָמְרוּ: קָנוּ עַצְמָן בְּנֵי חוֹרִין. לְפָנֶיהָ — אִין, לְאַחֲרֶיהָ — לָא!
Rav Ḥisda raised an objection from a baraita: There was an incident involving Beloreya the female convert in which her slaves preempted her and immersed before her own immersion for her own conversion. And the details of the incident came before the Sages, and they said: The slaves acquired themselves and became freemen. Rav Ḥisda explains how the baraita poses a challenge: The baraita implies that only because the slaves immersed before her, while she was still a gentile, that yes, they became freemen; however, had they immersed after her, i.e., after she had already converted, then no, they would not have become freemen. The reason for this is presumably that upon her conversion she attains the rights to her slaves’ bodies, and therefore their immersion for the sake of becoming freemen would be ineffective. However, this contradicts the Gemara’s explanation above that when a Jew gains ownership of a slave from a gentile, he has a right to only the slave’s labor.
אָמַר רָבָא: לְפָנֶיהָ, בֵּין בִּסְתָם בֵּין בִּמְפוֹרֵשׁ. לְאַחֲרֶיהָ, בִּמְפוֹרֵשׁ — אִין, בִּסְתָם — לָא.
To resolve the challenge Rava said: When the baraita says that because they immersed before her they acquired themselves, that is whether they immersed without a specified intention or whether they immersed with explicit intention to convert and become freemen. However, had they immersed after her, if they did so with explicit intention to convert, then yes, the immersion would achieve that end, but if they did so without a specified intention, then no, their immersion would, by default, be considered for the sake of slavery and they would not become free.
אָמַר רַב אַוְיָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּלוֹקֵחַ מִן הַגּוֹי, אֲבָל גּוֹי גּוּפֵיהּ — קָנֵי.
Rav Avya said: They taught that one acquires only the rights to the slave’s labor only with regard to a Jew who purchased a slave from a gentile slave owner, but if a gentile sold his own body as a slave directly to a Jew, then the Jew acquires his body.
דִּכְתִיב: ״וְגַם מִבְּנֵי הַתּוֹשָׁבִים הַגָּרִים עִמָּכֶם מֵהֶם תִּקְנוּ״, אַתֶּם קוֹנִים מֵהֶם, וְלֹא הֵם קוֹנִים מִכֶּם, וְלֹא הֵם קוֹנִים זֶה מִזֶּה.
As it is written: “Moreover, of the children of the strangers that sojourn among you, of them you may acquire” (Leviticus 25:45). The verse states only that you, i.e., Jews, can acquire a slave from them, i.e., a gentile slave, but they cannot acquire a slave from you, i.e., a Jewish slave, and they cannot acquire a slave from one another.
וְלֹא הֵם קוֹנִים מִכֶּם. לְמַאי? אִילֵימָא לְמַעֲשֶׂה יָדָיו — אַטּוּ גּוֹי לָא קָנֵי לֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדָיו? וְהָכְתִיב: ״אוֹ לְעֵקֶר מִשְׁפַּחַת גֵּר״, וְאָמַר מָר: ״מִשְׁפַּחַת גֵּר״ — זֶה הַגּוֹי! אֶלָּא לָאו, לְגוּפֵיהּ. וְקָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: אַתֶּם קוֹנִין מֵהֶם — אֲפִילּוּ גּוּפֵיהּ.
When it is derived that: But they cannot acquire slaves from you, to what type of acquisition is it referring? If we say it is for his labor, is that to say that a gentile cannot acquire a Jew for his labor? Isn’t it written: “And if a stranger who is a settler with you becomes rich, and your brother becomes poor beside him, and he sells himself to the stranger who is a settler with you, or to the offshoot of a stranger’s family” (Leviticus 25:47), and the Master said in explanation of the phrase “a stranger’s family” that this is referring to a gentile. If so, the verse explicitly states that a Jew can sell himself as a slave to a gentile. Rather, is it not that the reference is to selling his body, and the Merciful One states that you, i.e., Jews, can acquire a slave from them, which means even his body. Accordingly the verse indicates that a Jew can acquire a gentile slave’s body, but a gentile is unable to acquire ownership of another’s body, even that of another gentile.
פָּרֵיךְ רַב אַחָא: אֵימָא בְּכַסְפָּא וּבִטְבִילָה! קַשְׁיָא.
Rav Aḥa refutes Rav Avya’s explanation: Say that the verse is referring to acquiring a gentile slave by both purchasing him with money and then by immersing him for the purpose of slavery, and only in that case does it teach that a Jew acquires the gentile slave’s body. However, until he has been immersed the acquisition is not fully complete, and therefore if the slave immerses himself with the intention to become free, then his immersion would achieve that end. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, וְצָרִיךְ לְתׇקְפּוֹ בַּמַּיִם.
Shmuel said: And if one wishes to ensure that one’s slave does not declare the immersion to be for the sake of conversion, then one needs to hold him tightly in the water in a way that demonstrates the owner’s dominance over the slave at that time, thereby defining the immersion as one for the sake of slavery.
כִּי הַאי דְּמִנְיָמִין עַבְדֵּיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי בְּעָא (לאטבולי) [לְאַטְבּוֹלֵיהּ]. מַסְרֵיהּ נִיהֲלַיְיהוּ לְרָבִינָא וּלְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא. אָמַר לְהוּ: חֲזוֹ דְּמִינַּיְיכוּ קָבָעֵינָא לֵיהּ, רְמוֹ לֵיהּ אַרְוִיסָא בְּצַוְּארֵיהּ, אַרְפּוֹ לֵיהּ וְצַמְצִמוּ לֵיהּ.
That is as demonstrated in this incident involving Minyamin, Rav Ashi’s slave: When he wished to immerse him, he passed him to Ravina and Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, to perform the immersion on his behalf, and he said to them: Be aware that I will claim compensation for him from you if you do not prevent my slave from immersing for the sake of conversion. They placed a bridle [arvisa] upon his neck, and at the moment of immersion they loosened it and then immediately tightened it again while he was still immersed.
אַרְפּוֹ לֵיהּ — כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לֶהֱוֵי חֲצִיצָה. צַמְצִמוּ לֵיהּ — כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לַקְדֵּים וְלֵימָא לְהוּ: לְשֵׁם בֶּן חוֹרִין אֲנִי טוֹבֵל. בַּהֲדֵי דְּדַלִּי רֵישֵׁיהּ מִמַּיָּא, אַנְּחוּ לֵיהּ זוּלְטָא דְטִינָא אַרֵישֵׁיהּ וַאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: זִיל אַמְטִי לְבֵי מָרָךְ.
The Gemara explains their actions: They initially loosened it in order that there should not be any interposition between the slave and the water during the immersion, which would invalidate it. They immediately tightened it again in order that the slave should not preempt them and say to them: I am immersing for the sake of becoming a freeman. When he lifted his head from the water they placed a bucket of clay upon his head and said to him: Go and bring this to the house of your master. They did this in order to demonstrate that the immersion had been successful and that he was still a slave.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: חֲזִי מָר הָנֵי דְּבֵי פָּפָּא בַּר אַבָּא, דְּיָהֲבִי זוּזִי לְאִינָשֵׁי לִכְרָגַיְיהוּ וּמְשַׁעְבְּדִי בְּהוּ. כִּי נָפְקִי, צְרִיכִי גִּיטָּא דְחֵירוּתָא, אוֹ לָא?
Rav Pappa said to Rava: Has the Master seen those of the house of Pappa bar Abba who give money to the tax-collectors on behalf of poor people to pay for their poll tax [karga], and as a result they would enslave them. Anyone who did not pay the tax would be taken as a slave for the king. By paying for such people’s taxes, the members of the house of Pappa bar Abba essentially purchased those people, who had become the king’s slaves, for themselves. Rav Pappa asked: When those slaves go free, do they require a bill of emancipation, because the members of the house of Pappa bar Abba actually attained ownership of the slaves’ bodies, or not, as they were owned only for the sake of their labor?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִיכּוֹ שְׁכֵיבִי לָא אֲמַרִי לְכוּ הָא מִילְּתָא. הָכִי אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מוּהְרְקַיְיהוּ דְּהָנֵי, בְּטֻפְסָא דְמַלְכָּא מַנַּח, וּמַלְכָּא אָמַר: מַאן דְּלָא יָהֵיב כְּרָגָא, מִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לְמַאן דְּיָהֵיב כְּרָגָא.
He said to him: Were I dead I could not say this matter to you, so it is good that you have asked me while I am still alive, as I know that this is what Rav Sheshet said with regard to the matter: The writ of slavery [moharkayehu] of these residents of the kingdom rests in the treasury [tafsa] of the king, and in fact all the residents of the kingdom are considered to be full slaves of the king, i.e., he owns their bodies, irrespective of whether they pay their taxes. And so when the king says: One who does not give the poll tax is to be enslaved to the one who does give the poll tax on his behalf, the king’s decree is fully effective in making those residents full slaves of those who paid for them. As such, they will require a bill of emancipation when they are freed.
רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אִיקְּלַע לְגַבְלָא. חֲזָא בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל דִּמְעַבְּרָן מִגֵּרִים שֶׁמָּלוּ וְלֹא טָבְלוּ, וַחֲזָא חַמְרָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל דְּמָזְגִי גּוֹיִם וְשָׁתוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל, וַחֲזָא תּוֹרְמוֹסִין דְּשָׁלְקִי גּוֹיִם וְאָכְלִי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ וְלָא מִידֵּי.
§ The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba once happened to come to Gavla. He saw Jewish women there who had become pregnant from converts who were circumcised but had still not immersed to complete their conversion process; and he saw wine of Jews that gentiles were pouring, and Jews were drinking it; and he saw lupines [turmusin] that gentiles were cooking, and Jews were eating them; but he did not say anything to them.
אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: צֵא וְהַכְרֵז עַל בְּנֵיהֶם שֶׁהֵם מַמְזֵרִים, וְעַל יֵינָם מִשּׁוּם יֵין נֶסֶךְ, וְעַל תּוֹרְמוֹסָן מִשּׁוּם בִּישּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם, לְפִי שֶׁאֵינָן בְּנֵי תוֹרָה.
Later, he came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and told him what he had witnessed. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Go and make a public declaration concerning their children that they are mamzerim, and concerning their wine that it is forbidden because it is like wine poured as an idolatrous libation, and concerning their lupines that they are forbidden because they are food cooked by gentiles. One should be stringent and make such a declaration because they are not well-versed in Torah, and if they are left to be lax in this regard they will eventually transgress Torah prohibitions.
עַל בְּנֵיהֶן שֶׁהֵם מַמְזֵרִים — רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְטַעְמֵיהּ. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְעוֹלָם אֵין גֵּר עַד שֶׁיָּמוּל וְיִטְבּוֹל. וְכֵיוָן דְּלָא טָבֵיל, גּוֹי הוּא. וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גּוֹי וְעֶבֶד הַבָּא עַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל — הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר.
The Gemara explains: With regard to the declaration concerning their children that they are mamzerim, Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning in two halakhot: The first is as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One is never considered to be a convert until he has been circumcised and has immersed. And since the convert in the case in Gavla had not immersed, he is still considered a gentile. And the second halakha is as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a gentile or a slave who engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, the offspring of that union is a mamzer.
וְעַל יֵינָם מִשּׁוּם יֵין נֶסֶךְ — מִשּׁוּם: ״לָךְ לָךְ, אָמְרִין נְזִירָא, סְחוֹר סְחוֹר, לְכַרְמָא לָא תִּקְרַב״.
And the reason to declare concerning their wine that it is forbidden because it is like wine poured as an idolatrous libation is that although their wine was not actually poured as an idolatrous libation, it was prohibited by rabbinic decree due to the maxim that: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, go around and go around, but do not come near to the vineyard. Although a nazirite is prohibited only from eating produce of the vine, he is warned not even to come into close proximity of a vineyard as a protective measure to ensure that he will not transgress this prohibition. So too, in many cases, the Sages decreed certain items and actions to be prohibited because they understood that if people would partake of them, they would eventually transgress Torah prohibitions.
וְעַל תּוֹרְמוֹסָן מִשּׁוּם בִּשּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם — לְפִי שֶׁאֵינָן בְּנֵי תוֹרָה. הָא בְּנֵי תוֹרָה שְׁרֵי? וְהָאָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: כָּל הַנֶּאֱכָל כְּמוֹת שֶׁהוּא חַי — אֵין בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם בִּשּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם. וְהָא תּוֹרְמוֹס אֵינוֹ נֶאֱכָל כְּמוֹת שֶׁהוּא חַי, וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם בִּשּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם!
And the final declaration concerning their lupines that they are forbidden because they are food cooked by gentiles is issued because they are not well versed in Torah. The Gemara expresses astonishment: Does this imply that were they students of the Torah their lupines would be permitted? Didn’t Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak say in the name of Rav: Any food item that is eaten as it is, raw, is not subject to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles, even when cooked by them? But a lupine is not eaten as it is, raw, and therefore it is subject to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כְּאִידַּךְ לִישָּׁנָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: כֹּל שֶׁאֵין עוֹלֶה עַל שׁוּלְחַן מְלָכִים לֶאֱכוֹל בּוֹ אֶת הַפַּת — אֵין בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם בִּשּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם, וְטַעְמָא דְּאֵינָן בְּנֵי תוֹרָה, הָא בְּנֵי תוֹרָה שְׁרֵי.
The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in this matter in accordance with the opinion of the other version of what Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said in the name of Rav: Any food item that lacks sufficient importance such that it does not appear on the table of kings in order to eat bread with it is not subject to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles. Lupines lack importance and are therefore permitted even if cooked by gentiles. And consequently, the only reason to make a declaration prohibiting the residents of Gavla from eating them is because they are not well versed in Torah, and if they are left to be lax in this regard they will eventually become lax in actual Torah prohibitions; by inference, to those well versed in Torah, it is permitted.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: גֵּר שֶׁמָּל וְלֹא טָבַל, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּר, שֶׁכֵּן מָצִינוּ בַּאֲבוֹתֵינוּ שֶׁמָּלוּ וְלֹא טָבְלוּ. טָבַל וְלֹא מָל, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּר, שֶׁכֵּן מָצִינוּ בָּאִמָּהוֹת שֶׁטָּבְלוּ וְלֹא מָלוּ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: טָבַל וְלֹא מָל, מָל וְלֹא טָבַל — אֵין גֵּר עַד שֶׁיָּמוּל וְיִטְבּוֹל.
§ During their sojourn in Egypt, the children of Israel had the halakhic status of gentiles. At the revelation at Sinai they entered into a national covenant with God in which they attained their status of the Jewish people. This transformation was essentially the mass conversion of the people, and so their preparation for the revelation provides a paradigm of the process required for conversion for all generations. The tanna’im disagree as to which aspects of that original conversion are to be derived for all generations.
The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert who was circumcised but did not immerse, Rabbi Eliezer says that this is a convert, as so we found with our forefathers following the exodus from Egypt that they were circumcised but were not immersed. With regard to one who immersed but was not circumcised, Rabbi Yehoshua says that this is a convert, as so we found with our foremothers that they immersed but were not circumcised. And the Rabbis say: Whether he immersed but was not circumcised or whether he was circumcised but did not immerse, he is not a convert until he is circumcised and he immerses.
וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ נָמֵי נֵילַף מֵאָבוֹת, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר נָמֵי נֵילַף מֵאִמָּהוֹת! וְכִי תֵימָא, אֵין דָּנִין אֶפְשָׁר מִשֶּׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר.
The Gemara questions the opinions in the baraita: But let Rabbi Yehoshua also derive what is required for conversion from our forefathers; why didn’t he do so? And let Rabbi Eliezer also derive the halakha from our foremothers; why didn’t he do so? And if you would say that Rabbi Eliezer did not derive the halakha from our foremothers because he holds one cannot derive the possible from the impossible, i.e., one cannot derive that men do not require circumcision from the halakha that women do not require it, because for women it is a physical impossibility, that claim may be refuted.
וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְפֶסַח דּוֹרוֹת שֶׁאֵין בָּא אֶלָּא מִן הַחוּלִּין — נֶאֱמַר פֶּסַח בְּמִצְרַיִם, וְנֶאֱמַר פֶּסַח בְּדוֹרוֹת. מָה פֶּסַח הָאָמוּר בְּמִצְרַיִם — אֵין בָּא אֶלָּא מִן הַחוּלִּין, אַף פֶּסַח הָאָמוּר לְדוֹרוֹת — אֵין בָּא אֶלָּא מִן הַחוּלִּין.
It would appear that Rabbi Eliezer does not accept that principle, as isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived with regard to the Paschal lamb brought throughout the generations that it may be brought only from non-sacred animals? A Paschal lamb is stated in the Torah in reference to the lamb that the Jewish people brought prior to the exodus from Egypt, and a Paschal lamb is stated in reference to the yearly obligation throughout the generations. The association between them teaches that just as the Paschal lamb stated in reference to Egypt was only brought from non-sacred animals, since prior to the giving of the Torah there was no possibility to consecrate property, so too, with regard to the Paschal lamb stated in reference to the obligation throughout the generations, it may be brought only from non-sacred animals.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: וְכִי דָּנִין אֶפְשָׁר מִשֶּׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר? אָמַר לוֹ: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר — רְאָיָה גְּדוֹלָה הִיא, וְנִלְמַד הֵימֶנָּה.
Rabbi Akiva said to him: But can one derive the possible, i.e., the halakha for the Paschal lamb throughout the generations, where a possibility exists to bring it from consecrated animals, from the impossible, i.e., from the Paschal lamb in Egypt, where it was not a possibility? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Although it was impossible to bring the Paschal lamb in Egypt from consecrated animals, nevertheless, it is still a great proof, and we may learn from it. It is apparent, then, that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one can derive the possible from the impossible. Therefore the original question stands: Why didn’t Rabbi Eliezer derive from the foremothers that circumcision is not essential for conversion?
אֶלָּא
The Gemara concedes: Rather, the baraita must be reinterpreted as follows:
בְּטָבַל וְלֹא מָל — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּמַהְנֵי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּמָל וְלֹא טָבַל. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר יָלֵיף מֵאָבוֹת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: בְּאָבוֹת נָמֵי טְבִילָה הֲוָה.
With regard to one who immersed but was not circumcised, everyone, i.e., both Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, agrees that the halakha is derived from the foremothers that immersion alone is effective. Where they disagree is with regard to one who was circumcised but had not immersed; Rabbi Eliezer derives that it is effective from the forefathers, and Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees because he maintains that in the conversion of the forefathers there was also an immersion.
מְנָא לֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא מִדִּכְתִיב: ״לֵךְ אֶל הָעָם וְקִדַּשְׁתָּם הַיּוֹם וּמָחָר וְכִבְּסוּ שִׂמְלֹתָם״, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין טָעוּן כִּבּוּס — טָעוּן טְבִילָה, מְקוֹם שֶׁטָּעוּן כִּבּוּס — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁטָּעוּן טְבִילָה.
The Gemara asks: From where did he derive this? If we say that he derived it from the fact that it is written that in preparation for the revelation at Sinai, God commanded Moses: “Go unto the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow, and let them wash their garments” (Exodus 19:10), as Rabbi Yehoshua understands that the washing mentioned in this verse is the ritual immersion of clothes, this leads to the following a fortiori inference: Just as in a case where one became impure through contact with some source of impurity, washing, i.e., immersion, of clothes is not required but immersion of one’s body is required, then in a case where washing of clothes is required, as in the preparation for the revelation at Sinai, isn’t it logical that immersion of one’s body should also be required?
וְדִלְמָא, נְקִיּוּת בְּעָלְמָא?!
The Gemara rejects the proof: But perhaps when the verse states that they had to wash their clothes, it was merely for cleanliness and not for the sake of ritual purity. If so, no a fortiori inference can be drawn from it to the case of immersion for ritual purity.
אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: ״וַיִּקַּח מֹשֶׁה אֶת הַדָּם וַיִּזְרֹק עַל הָעָם״, וּגְמִירִי דְּאֵין הַזָּאָה בְּלֹא טְבִילָה.
Rather, Rabbi Yehoshua derived it from here, where the verse states with regard to the formation of the covenant at Sinai: “And Moses took the blood and sprinkled it upon the people” (Exodus 24:8), and it is learned as a tradition that there is no ritual sprinkling without immersion. Therefore, our forefathers also must have immersed at Sinai, and consequently that is also an essential requirement for all conversions.
וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, טְבִילָה בָּאִמָּהוֹת מְנָלַן? סְבָרָא הוּא, דְּאִם כֵּן, בַּמֶּה נִכְנְסוּ תַּחַת כַּנְפֵי הַשְּׁכִינָה?
The Gemara asks: And with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, from where do we derive that also in the case of our foremothers there was immersion? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning, as, if so, that they did not immerse, then with what were they brought under the wings of the Divine Presence? Therefore, they also must have immersed.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ גֵּר עַד שֶׁיִמּוֹל וְיִטְבּוֹל. פְּשִׁיטָא, יָחִיד וְרַבִּים הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּים!
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A man is never considered a convert until he is both circumcised and has immersed. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? In all disputes between an individual Sage and many Sages the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many Sages; it is therefore obvious that the halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis.
מַאן חֲכָמִים — רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
The Gemara explains: Who are the Rabbis referred to in the baraita? It is Rabbi Yosei. Since Rabbi Yosei is merely an individual Sage, it was necessarily for Rabbi Yoḥanan to state explicitly that the halakha is ruled in accordance with his opinion.
דְּתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁבָּא וְאָמַר מַלְתִּי וְלֹא טָבַלְתִּי — מַטְבִּילִין אוֹתוֹ, וּמָה בְּכָךְ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵין מַטְבִּילִין.
Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert who came and said: I was circumcised for the sake of conversion but I did not immerse, the court should immerse him, as what would be the problem with that; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Since in any case the court immerses him, Rabbi Yehuda does not require proof of the convert’s claim that he was circumcised for the sake of conversion because he holds that it is sufficient to be either circumcised or immersed for the sake of conversion. Rabbi Yosei says: The court does not immerse him. He holds that both circumcision and immersion must be performed specifically for the sake of conversion and are indispensable parts of the conversion process. Therefore, since it is impossible to verify the convert’s claim with regard to his circumcision, there is no benefit to having him immerse.
לְפִיכָךְ מַטְבִּילִין גֵּר בְּשַׁבָּת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵין מַטְבִּילִין.
The baraita states a ramification of their dispute: Therefore, the court may immerse a convert who was already circumcised on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Since he holds that circumcision alone effected conversion, the immersion will not effect any further change in his status, and so it is permitted on Shabbat. And Rabbi Yosei says: The court may not immerse him. Since he holds that both circumcision and immersion are necessary to effect a conversion, the immersion will effect a change in his status by making him Jewish. Therefore it is prohibited to do so on Shabbat by rabbinic decree, because it appears similar to preparing a vessel for use.
אָמַר מָר: לְפִיכָךְ מַטְבִּילִין גֵּר בְּשַׁבָּת. פְּשִׁיטָא, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בַּחֲדָא סַגִּיא, הֵיכָא דְּמָל לְפָנֵינוּ — מַטְבִּילִין, מַאי ״לְפִיכָךְ״?
The Gemara analyzes the latter clause: The Master said in the baraita: Therefore, the court may immerse a convert who was already circumcised on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this an obvious extension of his opinion; since Rabbi Yehuda said that either one of circumcision or immersion is sufficient, where a convert was circumcised in our presence the court may certainly immerse him, even on Shabbat. What, then, is the need for the baraita to include the clause that begins with: Therefore?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה טְבִילָה עִיקָּר, וּטְבִילָה בְּשַׁבָּת לָא, דְּקָא מְתַקֵּן גַּבְרָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹ הָא אוֹ הָא בָּעֵי.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary to explicitly teach this ramification lest you say that according to Rabbi Yehuda the immersion is in fact the principal act that effects conversion, and when he said in the first clause that a convert who claims to have been circumcised should be immersed since there is no problem with that, his reasoning was that he holds it is only immersion that effects the conversion. And therefore performing the immersion on Shabbat would not be permitted, as it establishes the person with a new status and so would be prohibited by a rabbinic decree because it appears similar to preparing a vessel for use. The latter clause is therefore necessary to teach us that Rabbi Yehuda requires either this or that, i.e., either immersion or circumcision alone is sufficient to effect a conversion.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵין מַטְבִּילִין. פְּשִׁיטָא, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי תַּרְתֵּי בָּעֵינַן — תַּקּוֹנֵי גַּבְרָא בְּשַׁבָּת לָא מְתַקְּנִינַן!
The Gemara analyzes the next statement in the baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: The court may not immerse him. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this an obvious extension of his opinion? As, since Rabbi Yosei requires two acts, both circumcision and immersion, to effect conversion, we may certainly not establish that person with a new status on Shabbat by completing his conversion by immersing him.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי מִילָה עִיקָּר, וְהָתָם הוּא דְּלָא הֲוַאי מִילָה בְּפָנֵינוּ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דַּהֲוַאי מִילָה בְּפָנֵינוּ — אֵימָא (לִיטְבֹּל זֶה) [לַיטְבְּלֵיהּ] בְּשַׁבְּתָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי תַּרְתֵּי בָּעֵי.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary to explicitly teach this ramification lest you say that according to Rabbi Yosei circumcision is in fact the principal act that effects conversion, and it is only there, in the first clause of the baraita, where the circumcision was not performed in our presence and so there is no way to verify whether it was done for the sake of conversion, that Rabbi Yosei states that the court should not proceed to immerse him; however, where the circumcision was performed in our presence, one might say that the conversion was already effected by the circumcision, and therefore let us immerse this convert on Shabbat. The latter clause is therefore necessary to teach us that Rabbi Yosei requires two acts, both circumcision and immersion, to effect conversion.
אָמַר רַבָּה: עוֹבָדָא הֲוָה בֵּי רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר רַבִּי, וְרַב יוֹסֵף מַתְנִי רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא בַּר רַבִּי, וְרַב סָפְרָא מַתְנֵי רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא בְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ גֵּר שֶׁמָּל וְלֹא טָבַל. אָמַר לֵיהּ: שְׁהִי כָּאן עַד לִמְחַר וְנַטְבְּלִינָךְ.
Rabba said: There was an incident in the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rabbi, and as Rav Yosef teaches it, Rabbi Oshaya bar Rabbi was also present, and as Rav Safra teaches it, a third Sage, Rabbi Oshaya, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, was also present, in which a convert came before him who was circumcised but had not immersed. He said to the convert: Remain here with us until tomorrow, and then we will immerse you.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תְּלָת. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: גֵּר צָרִיךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה. וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: אֵינוֹ גֵּר עַד שֶׁיִמּוֹל וְיִטְבּוֹל. וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: אֵין מַטְבִּילִין גֵּר בַּלַּיְלָה. וְנֵימָא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ נָמֵי בָּעֵינַן מוּמְחִין? דִּלְמָא דְּאִיקְּלַעוּ.
Rabba said: Learn from this incident three principles: Learn from it that a convert requires a court of three people to preside over the conversion, as Rav Safra taught that the case involved three Sages. And learn from it that one is not considered to be a convert until he has been both circumcised and immersed. And learn from it that the court may not immerse a convert at night, as they instructed him to remain there until the following day. The Gemara suggests: And let us say that one should also learn from it that we require a court of experts to preside over the conversion, as Rav Safra identified that three expert Sages were present. The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps they simply happened to be there, but in fact three laymen would suffice.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גֵּר צָרִיךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה, ״מִשְׁפָּט״ כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A convert requires a court of three to preside over conversion, because “judgment,” is written with regard to him, as the verse states: “And one judgment shall be both for you and for the convert that sojourns with you” (Numbers 15:16), and legal judgments require a court of three judges.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִי שֶׁבָּא וְאָמַר ״גֵּר אֲנִי״, יָכוֹל נְקַבְּלֶנּוּ — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִתְּךָ״, בְּמוּחְזָק לְךָ. בָּא וְעֵדָיו עִמּוֹ, מִנַּיִן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְכִי יָגוּר אִתְּךָ גֵּר בְּאַרְצְכֶם״.
The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to someone who came and said: I am a convert, one might have thought that we should accept him; therefore, the verse states: “And if a convert sojourns with you in your land, you shall not oppress him” (Leviticus 19:33). The emphasis on “with you” suggests that only someone who was already presumed by you to be a valid convert should be accepted as a convert. If he came and brought witnesses to his conversion with him, from where is it derived that he is to be accepted? It is from the beginning of that verse, which states: “And if a convert sojourns with you in your land.”
