Yevamot 53

Yevamot 53

יֵשׁ זִיקָה, וַאֲתַאי חֲלִיצָה אַפְקַעְתַּיהּ לְזִיקָּה. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין זִיקָּה. מֵעִיקָּרָא אִילּוּ אָמַר לַהּ: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּזִיקַּת יְבָמִין״, מִי לָא מַהֲנֵי? הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי מַהֲנֵי.

that the levirate bond is substantial, and this betrothal is based on the levirate bond. And in this case, the ḥalitza comes and releases the levirate bond. Therefore this type of betrothal does not acquire the ḥalutza. But the Rabbis hold that the levirate bond is not substantial, that is, the bond itself does not create a connection between the yavam and yevama, and that in general, levirate betrothal acquires a yevama as a form of betrothal unrelated to the levirate bond. And consequently, at the outset, if he had said to her: Be betrothed to me by the levirate bond, would this not be effective? Now too, after ḥalitza, even without the bond, it should likewise be effective.

רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא אָמַר: בַּחֲלִיצָה כְּשֵׁירָה, אִי דְּאָמַר לַהּ ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּזִיקַּת יְבָמִין״ — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא מַהֲנֵי. וְהָכָא בַּחֲלִיצָה פְּסוּלָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר חֲלִיצָה פְּסוּלָה פּוֹטֶרֶת, וּמָר סָבַר חֲלִיצָה פְּסוּלָה אֵינָהּ פּוֹטֶרֶת.

Rav Sherevya suggested a different point of dispute and said: In a case when the woman performed valid ḥalitza, if he later said to her: Be betrothed to me by the levirate bond, everyone agrees that it is not effective, as there is no longer any bond. And here, they disagree with regard to one who performed invalid ḥalitza. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that invalid ḥalitza exempts her from the levirate bond and disqualifies her from betrothal as a yevama. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that invalid ḥalitza does not fully exempt her, and some element of the levirate bond remains intact and she can therefore be betrothed with the levirate bond.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא חֲלִיצָה פְּסוּלָה אֵינָהּ פּוֹטֶרֶת, וְהָכָא בְּיֵשׁ תְּנַאי בַּחֲלִיצָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר יֵשׁ תְּנַאי בַּחֲלִיצָה, וּמַר סָבַר אֵין תְּנַאי בַּחֲלִיצָה.

Rav Ashi said: Everyone agrees that invalid ḥalitza does not exempt her and does not entirely nullify the bond. And here they disagree as to whether a condition is effective with regard to ḥalitza. When the yavam states he is performing ḥalitza on the condition that the yevama give him one hundred dinars, for example, is this condition effective and therefore the ḥalitza is nullified if the condition is not fulfilled? One Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that a condition is effective with regard to ḥalitza. If the yevama fails to comply with the condition, the ḥalitza is ineffective and she can still be betrothed with the levirate bond. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that a condition is not effective with regard to ḥalitza, and therefore the ḥalitza is always effective, and the subsequent levirate betrothal is ineffective.

רָבִינָא אָמַר: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא יֵשׁ תְּנַאי בַּחֲלִיצָה, וְהָכָא בִּתְנַאי כָּפוּל קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר בָּעֵינַן תְּנַאי כָּפוּל, וּמָר סָבַר לָא בָּעֵינַן תְּנַאי כָּפוּל.

Ravina said: Everyone agrees that a condition is effective with regard to ḥalitza, and here they disagree with regard to a compound condition. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that we require a compound condition. The man must explicitly stipulate that the ḥalitza should be effective if the condition is upheld, and that it should not be effective if she does not fulfill the condition. If he did not state both the positive and negative sides of the condition it does not take effect, and the ḥalitza is effective and the levirate bond is canceled. Consequently, betrothal by the levirate bond is ineffective. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that we do not require a compound condition. Therefore, the condition applies and cancels the ḥalitza, which leaves the levirate bond intact.

חָלֵץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר וְנָתַן גֵּט וּבָעַל וְכוּ׳. וְנִיתְנֵי נָמֵי אֵין אַחַר בִּיאָה כְּלוּם? אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: תָּנֵי אֵין אַחַר בִּיאָה כְּלוּם. וְתַנָּא דִּידַן? הַתָּרַת יְבָמָה לַשּׁוּק עֲדִיפָא לֵיהּ.

§ The mishna teaches: If the yavam performed ḥalitza and then either performed levirate betrothal, or gave a bill of divorce, or engaged in intercourse, nothing is effective after ḥalitza. The Gemara asks: And let the tanna likewise teach that nothing is effective after intercourse, for he also mentioned the case of one who engaged in intercourse and then proceeded to perform other actions such as levirate betrothal, divorce and ḥalitza. Indeed, Abaye and Rava both say that the mishna should teach: Nothing is effective after intercourse, as this clause is fit to be inserted into the mishna. The Gemara asks: And the tanna of our mishna; why did he not state this? The Gemara explains: The permission for a yevama to marry a member of the public is preferable to him. He preferred to teach cases in which the yevama is permitted to marry any man from the general public as opposed to a situation where she is married to the yavam.

אֶחָד יְבָמָה אַחַת, אֶחָד שְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת. מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּבֶן עַזַּאי, דְּתַנְיָא, בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִין וִיבָמָה אַחַת, וְאֵין מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר בִּשְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת וְיָבָם אֶחָד.

The mishna teaches that all the halakhot with regard to levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal and the like apply both in cases of one yevama to one yavam, as well as in cases of two yevamot to one yavam. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai. As it is taught in a baraita: Ben Azzai says: Levirate betrothal is effective after levirate betrothal in the case of two yevamin and one yevama, but levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal in the case of two yevamot and one yavam. The tanna of the mishna, in contrast, does not differentiate between the cases.

כֵּיצַד — מַאֲמָר לָזוֹ וְכוּ׳. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: חָלַץ לְבַעֲלַת מַאֲמָר — לֹא נִפְטְרָה צָרָתָהּ.

The mishna further teaches: How so? If he performed levirate betrothal with this one and performed ḥalitza with that one, the first woman requires a bill of divorce to cancel the levirate betrothal. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this teaching supports the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel said: If a yavam performed ḥalitza with the woman who received levirate betrothal, then the rival wife is not exempt as this ḥalitza is invalid. The fact that the Gemara does not state that the ḥalitza be performed with the woman who received levirate betrothal indicates that this ḥalitza is not a valid ḥalitza and would not be sufficient to exempt the rival wife.

וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: מִי קָתָנֵי ״חוֹלֵץ״? ״חָלַץ״ קָתָנֵי, דִּיעֲבַד.

And this would constitute a conclusive refutation of Rav Yosef’s opinion, for he holds that it is preferable to perform ḥalitza with the woman who received levirate betrothal and thereby exempt the second woman. As the first woman requires a bill of divorce and therefore is necessarily disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, it is preferable to perform ḥalitza with her as well and consequently leave the second woman eligible to marry a priest. The Gemara refutes this claim: Does the mishna teach: He should perform ḥalitza, which would imply that the yavam should do so ab initio? It teaches that he performed ḥalitza, implying that the ruling in the mishna is after the fact. Therefore, there is no indication in the mishna that the yavam should perform ḥalitza with the second woman, and it is possible that if he were to perform ḥalitza with the first woman he would thereby exempt the second one. It is simply that the particular case discussed by the mishna here concerns a man who performed levirate betrothal with this woman and ḥalitza with that one.

גֵּט לָזוֹ וְגֵט לָזוֹ כּוּ׳. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: חֲלִיצָה פְּסוּלָה — צְרִיכָה לְחַזֵּר עַל כׇּל הָאַחִין. מַאי צְרִיכוֹת — צְרִיכוֹת דְּעָלְמָא.

It is further taught in the mishna: If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one, they require ḥalitza from him. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it supports the statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna. As Rabba bar Rav Huna said: In cases of invalid ḥalitza, the yevama is required to repeat the ḥalitza with all of the brothers, as that single invalid ḥalitza is insufficient. Similarly, in this case of invalid ḥalitza, it would be necessary to perform ḥalitza with all of the yevamot. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What is the meaning of require in this context? It means that such women require in general. The plural form does not refer to all the yevamot mentioned in the mishna, but rather it means that all yevamot in similar situations require ḥalitza.

גֵּט לָזוֹ וְחָלַץ לְזוֹ. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל, וְתִהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף! מִי קָתָנֵי ״חוֹלֵץ״? ״חָלַץ״ קָתָנֵי, דִּיעֲבַד.

It was taught in the mishna: If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and performed ḥalitza with that one, nothing is effective after ḥalitza. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this supports the opinion of Shmuel, as it indicates that the yavam should perform ḥalitza with the rival wife rather than the woman who received a bill of divorce. And it would likewise be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yosef, who prefers performing ḥalitza with the disqualified woman. The Gemara again rejects this proof: Does it teach: He should perform ḥalitza, a ruling ab initio? It teaches: He performed ḥalitza, which is only after the fact, meaning he acted in that manner in this particular case.

חָלַץ וְחָלַץ אוֹ חָלַץ וְכוּ׳. וְלִיתְנֵי נָמֵי אֵין אַחַר בִּיאָה כְּלוּם! אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: תָּנֵי אֵין אַחַר בִּיאָה כְּלוּם. וְתַנָּא דִּידַן — הַתָּרַת יְבָמָה לַשּׁוּק עֲדִיפָא לֵיהּ.

The mishna taught that if he performed ḥalitza with one woman and then performed ḥalitza with another one, or he performed ḥalitza and then proceeded to perform levirate betrothal, nothing is effective after ḥalitza. The Gemara suggests: And let the tanna also teach: Nothing is effective after intercourse, as this is indicated in the mishna as well. The Gemara answers: Indeed, Abaye and Rava both say that it should teach: Nothing is effective after intercourse. The Gemara comments: And the tanna of our mishna did not state this because the permission for a yevama to marry a member of the public is preferable to him, and he therefore specified a case that involves ḥalitza.

בֵּין יָבָם אֶחָד לִשְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת כּוּ׳. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר כּוּלֵּהּ בֵּיתָא בְּלָאו קָאֵי — אִיצְטְרִיךְ לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן דְּאֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין.

§ It was taught in the mishna: Nothing is effective after ḥalitza, both in cases of one yavam to two yevamot, as well as cases of two yevamin to one yevama. The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that once a yavam has performed ḥalitza with his yevama, the entire household, the woman who performed ḥalitza as well as her rival wives, is liable due to a prohibition derived from the verse “So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), but the women are not liable to karet due to the prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife. In light of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling, it was necessary to teach us that betrothal does not take effect on the rival wife of the woman who performed ḥalitza, despite the fact that she is only liable for violating a prohibition, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר כּוּלֵּהּ בֵּיתָא בְּכָרֵת קָאֵי — אִיצְטְרִיךְ לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן דְּאֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּחַיָּיבֵי כָּרֵיתוֹת!

However, according to Reish Lakish, who said that the entire household, apart from the woman who received ḥalitza, is liable to receive karet, was it necessary to teach us that betrothal does not take effect on forbidden relations for which one is liable to receive karet? According to Reish Lakish, after the yavam performs ḥalitza, the mitzva of levirate marriage is canceled and the karet prohibition against marrying a brother’s wife is once again in force. As all agree that betrothal does not take effect on those liable to receive karet, it is unnecessary for the mishna to teach this ruling.

אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, סֵיפָא דְּקָתָנֵי בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר — אִיצְטְרִיךְ לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן דְּאֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ?

The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: And according to your reasoning, that the mishna would not be teaching us an apparently obvious halakha, consider the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches that if a yavam engaged in intercourse and another yavam performed levirate betrothal with the same woman, the levirate betrothal is not effective. Now was it necessary to teach us that betrothal is not effective for a married woman? Once a yavam has engaged in relations with a yevama she is his full-fledged wife, and certainly no other betrothal is effective.

אֶלָּא: אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא הַתָּרַת יָבָם אֶחָד וִיבָמָה אַחַת, תְּנָא נָמֵי שְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת וְיָבָם אֶחָד. וְאַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא שְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת וְיָבָם אֶחָד, תְּנָא נָמֵי שְׁתֵּי יְבָמִין וִיבָמָה אַחַת.

Rather, it must be that not every clause in the mishna teaches a novel halakha, and the reasoning of the tanna is as follows: Since he teaches the release of the bond between one yavam and one yevama, he also teaches the case of two yevamot and one yavam, and since he teaches the case of two yevamot and one yavam, he also teaches the case of two yevamin and one yevama. The tanna therefore listed all possible cases even though we do not learn a novel halakha from each and every one.

חָלַץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר וְנָתַן וְכוּ׳. בִּשְׁלָמָא חָלַץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר, אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: נִגְזוֹר מַאֲמָר דְּבָתַר חֲלִיצָה אַטּוּ מַאֲמָר דְּקַמֵּי חֲלִיצָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא גָּזְרִינַן. אֶלָּא חָלַץ וְנָתַן גֵּט לְמָה לִי?

§ It was taught in the mishna: If he performed ḥalitza and then proceeded to either perform levirate betrothal, or give a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse with a second woman, nothing is effective after ḥalitza. The Gemara asks: Granted, it was necessary to teach that in the case of one who performed ḥalitza and then performed levirate betrothal the levirate betrothal is not effective. For it might enter your mind to say that we should issue a decree with regard to levirate betrothal that takes place after ḥalitza due to levirate betrothal that takes place before ḥalitza, and rule that all levirate betrothal is effective. The mishna therefore teaches us that we do not issue a decree in this case. However, the case of one who performed ḥalitza and gave a bill of divorce, why do I need this case? What novelty is there in the teaching that a bill of divorce after ḥalitza is not effective?

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר, בָּעַל וְנָתַן גֵּט — בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּעַל וְנָתַן גֵּט אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: נִגְזוֹר גֵּט דְּבָתַר בְּעִילָה אַטּוּ גֵּט דְּקַמֵּי בְּעִילָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא גָּזְרִינַן, אֲבָל בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר לְמָה לִי?

The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, that each new case must teach something new, say the latter clause of the mishna: If he engaged in intercourse and then proceeded to perform levirate betrothal, or give a bill of divorce, or perform ḥalitza with a second woman, nothing is effective. In this case the same question can be asked: Granted, it was necessary to teach the case of one who engaged in intercourse and gave a bill of divorce. This is because it might enter your mind to say that we should issue a decree with regard to a bill of divorce that is given after intercourse, due to a bill of divorce that is given before intercourse, and decree that this bill of divorce alone is insufficient and she requires ḥalitza as well. The mishna therefore teaches us that we do not issue such a decree. But the case of a yavam who engaged in intercourse and performed levirate betrothal, why do I need to state it? Once he has engaged in intercourse with her she is his wife in all regards; what difference does levirate betrothal make?

אֶלָּא: אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא חָלַץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר, תְּנָא נָמֵי בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר. וְאַיְּידֵי דְבָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי בָּעַל וְנָתַן גֵּט, תְּנָא נָמֵי חָלַץ וְנָתַן גֵּט.

Rather, one must say that since the tanna taught the case of one who performed ḥalitza and then performed levirate betrothal, he also taught the case of one who engaged in intercourse and then performed levirate betrothal, due to the similarity between them. And since he wished to teach the case of one who engaged in intercourse and then gave a bill of divorce, he also taught the case of one who performed ḥalitza and then gave a bill of divorce. We should therefore not infer anything from these superfluous cases, as they are merely stated for stylistic reasons.

בִּזְמַן שֶׁהִיא וְכוּ׳. מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: אַבָּא יוֹסֵי בֶּן יוֹחָנָן אִישׁ יְרוּשָׁלַיִם אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אַחַת בְּעִילָה וְאַחַת חֲלִיצָה, בַּתְּחִלָּה — אֵין אַחֲרֶיהָ כְּלוּם, בָּאֶמְצַע וּבַסּוֹף — יֵשׁ אַחֲרֶיהָ כְּלוּם.

§ The mishna taught: With regard to intercourse, when it is at the beginning nothing is effective after it, but if it was in the middle or at the end, something is effective after it. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna. As it is taught in a baraita: Abba Yosei ben Yoḥanan, a man of Jerusalem, says in the name of Rabbi Meir: With regard to both intercourse and ḥalitza, if one of them were performed at the beginning, nothing is effective after it, but if they were done in the middle or at the end, i.e., they were preceded by some other action, something is effective after it. According to the mishna, however, nothing is effective after ḥalitza regardless of when it was performed.

וְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בַּדָּבָר, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: בִּיאָה, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר — גָּזְרִינַן. חֲלִיצָה, דְּלֵיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר — לָא גָּזְרִינַן.

And therefore it can be concluded that there are three disputes with regard to this matter, i.e., three opinions on this issue. The first tanna holds: In the case of intercourse that is preceded by a disqualifying action, where there is a reason to issue a decree, lest one violate a prohibition by engaging in intercourse after ḥalitza or intercourse was performed, we issue a decree establishing that invalid intercourse should not be as effective as valid intercourse. With regard to ḥalitza, however, where there is no reason to issue a decree as there is no concern of a prohibition even if an action is performed after ḥalitza, we do not issue a decree.

וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה סָבַר: בִּיאָה נָמֵי לֵיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ לִיגְזוֹר בִּיאָה אַחַר הַגֵּט מִשּׁוּם בִּיאָה אַחַר חֲלִיצָה — כֵּיוָן דַּחֲלִיצָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מִידָּע יָדְעִי. וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ לִיגְזוֹר בִּיאָה אַחַר מַאֲמָר מִשּׁוּם בִּיאָה אַחַר בִּיאָה — כֵּיוָן דְּבִיאָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הָא מִידָּע יְדִיעִי. וְאַבָּא יוֹסֵי בֶּן חָנָן סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן דְּגָזְרִי בְּבִיאָה, וְגָזַר חֲלִיצָה מִשּׁוּם בִּיאָה.

And Rabbi Neḥemya holds that with regard to intercourse there is also no reason to issue a decree. And as for what you said in justification of your ruling, that we should issue a decree in a case of intercourse after a bill of divorce due to intercourse after ḥalitza, there is no cause for such a concern. Since ḥalitza is effective by Torah law, people know that it is fully effective and cannot be followed by anything, and they will not confuse it with laws instituted by the Sages. And as for what you said that we should issue a decree with regard to intercourse after levirate betrothal due to intercourse after intercourse, since the acquisition of intercourse is by Torah law, this matter is known by people, and they will not err in this regard. And Abba Yosei ben Ḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who issue a decree with regard to intercourse, but he adds and issues a decree with regard to ḥalitza due to intercourse. He therefore does not differentiate between ḥalitza and intercourse at all.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל

הַבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן, אֲפִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹגֵג וְהִיא מְזִידָה, הוּא מֵזִיד וְהִיא שׁוֹגֶגֶת, הוּא אָנוּס וְהִיא לֹא אֲנוּסָה, הִיא אֲנוּסָה וְהוּא לֹא אָנוּס. אֶחָד הַמְעָרֶה וְאֶחָד הַגּוֹמֵר — קָנָה. וְלֹא חִילֵּק בֵּין בִּיאָה לְבִיאָה.

MISHNA: One who had intercourse with his yevama, whether unwittingly, i.e., he thought he was having intercourse with someone else, or intentionally, i.e., he knew she was his yevama and nevertheless had intercourse with her without intent to perform levirate marriage; whether due to coercion or willingly; even if he was unwitting and her participation was intentional, his participation was intentional and she was unwitting, he was coerced and she was not coerced, or she was coerced and he was not coerced; both one who merely engages in the initial stage of intercourse and one who completes the act of intercourse has thereby acquired his yevama. And similarly, the Torah did not distinguish between an act of intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and intercourse in a typical manner.

וְכֵן הַבָּא עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, אוֹ פְּסוּלוֹת, כְּגוֹן אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַמְזֵר וּלְנָתִין פְּסָלָהּ — וְלֹא חִילֵּק בֵּין בִּיאָה לְבִיאָה.

And so too, with regard to a man who had intercourse with any one of those with whom relations are forbidden [arayot] by the Torah or with those who are unfit for him even though they are not in the category of arayot, for example, a widow with a High Priest; a divorcée and a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] with a common priest; a mamzeret, i.e., a woman born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, or a Gibeonite woman with an Israelite; the daughter of an Israelite with a mamzer or a Gibeonite; he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood through this act no matter how it was performed, and the Torah did not distinguish between the act of intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and intercourse in a typical manner.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״אֲפִילּוּ״?

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the significance of the word even in the statement that begins with: Even if he was unwitting and her participation was intentional? Since the mishna has already said that there is no halakhic difference whether the act of intercourse was performed intentionally, what is added by that statement?

לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר. לָא מִיבַּעְיָא הוּא שׁוֹגֵג וְהִיא קָמִכַּוְּונָה לְמִצְוָה, אִי נָמֵי הוּא מֵזִיד וְהִיא קָמִכַּוְּונָה לְמִצְוָה, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹגֵג וְהִיא מְזִידָה, דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ לָא קָמִכַּוְּונִי לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה — אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קָנָה. תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם שׁוֹגְגִים, שְׁנֵיהֶם מְזִידִים, שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲנוּסִים.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is stated in the style of: Needless to say. It is needless to say that if he was unwitting and she intended to fulfill the mitzva, or alternatively, he acted intentionally without intent to fulfill the mitzva and she intended to fulfill the mitzva, he has acquired her. However, even if he was unwitting and she acted intentionally, where both of them did not intend to act for the sake of the mitzva, he nevertheless acquires her. Similarly, Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Even if both of them acted unwittingly, intentionally, or were coerced, he acquires the yevama through the act of intercourse.

אָנוּס דְּמַתְנִיתִין הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא כְּשֶׁאֲנָסוּהוּ גּוֹיִם וּבָא עָלֶיהָ, וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: אֵין אוֹנֶס לְעֶרְוָה! לְפִי שֶׁאֵין קִישּׁוּי אֶלָּא לְדַעַת.

§ The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances the mishna is referring to when it mentions a man who was coerced? If we say that it is when gentiles coerced him by threatening to kill him if he did not have intercourse with her and he therefore had intercourse with her, didn’t Rava say that there is no such thing as coercion of a man to have intercourse with a woman with whom relations are forbidden, because there is no erection of the male organ without intent? Consequently, even if he acted due to the threat, his action is considered intentional.

אֶלָּא בְּיָשֵׁן. וְהָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה:

Rather, the mishna must be referring to one who was sleeping and became erect, and his yevama drew him onto herself. However, didn’t Rav Yehuda say that