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Today's Daf Yomi

June 7, 2022 | 讞壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 92

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Today’s daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar marking the shloshim today of our beloved husband, father and grandfather Dennis, Shimon Avraham Ben Yisrael Moshe. It is harder to believe each day. Today he would be turning 66.”聽

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Tina & Shalom Lamm with gratitude to Hashem for a new grandson, Nachum Betzalel. “Mazal tov to his parents, Shlomit & Ari Lamm!”聽

If a woman remarries based on one witness testifying to her husband’s death, and it is rumored that he is alive, we do not act based on the rumor, as she is already married. If the court rules the husband is dead based on one witness’ testimony and then the husband is alive, is that considered a mistake of the court and the woman is exempt from bringing a sacrifice or is it considered a mistake, and then the woman needs to bring a sin offering? The Mishna stated that a woman who is permitted to marry by the court, but then she ruins it, needs to bring a sacrifice. Two explanations are brought to explain what the Mishna is referring to in this line. If the woman received information that her husband and son died, but the order in which they died was incorrect and there are ramifications for laws of yibum, what is the law? What if he in fact died, but witnesses testify that he was still alive at the time she remarried? What is the status of children born from the second husband before and after she found out. If she received testimony that her husband died but was only betrothed before she found out he was alive, she can go back to her original husband and even if she received a get from the second husband, it is an invalid get and she can still marry a kohen. The Mishna is attributed to Rabbi Akiva who says that if a woman trangresses a negative prohibition (marrying someone else instead of the yabam). the offspring is a mamzer. Rav and Shmuel debate whether or not betrothal is effective in this case and therefore whether she could require a get from the second husband. Rav Ashi explains that after receiving the get from the second husband, she can go back and perform yibum, as long as the brother is not a kohen. Rav held that betrothal of a yevama by someone else is not effective, but marriage is. The Gemara brings three different explanations to that unclear statement. Rabbi Yanai says that they ruled like Shmuel that betrothal is not effective for a yevama who married someone else. Rabbi Yochanan claims that this could have been derived from a Mishna. Could it have been?

 

讻诇 拽诇讗 讚讘转专 谞砖讜讗讬谉 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗转讗讬 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讜砖专讬谞谉 讻拽诇讗 讚拽诪讬 谞砖讜讗讬谉 讚诪讬 讜转讬转住专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

We are not concerned about any rumor after marriage. If a rumor spread about a woman after her marriage that she was forbidden to her husband, the court takes no notice of these reports. The Gemara answers: There is a novel aspect to this teaching: Lest you say that since she came to the court and they permitted her, the very fact that her case had to be discussed indicates that her status is not fully established, and consequently one might think that it should be considered like a rumor before marriage, and she should therefore be forbidden, Rav Ashi therefore teaches us that even in this case, once she is married the court takes no notice of unsubstantiated rumors.

谞讬住转 注诇 驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 转爪讗 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 讝注讬专讬 诇讬转讗 诇诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪讚转谞讬 讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讚转谞讬 讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讛讜专讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖砖拽注讛 讞诪讛 讜诇讘住讜祝 讝专讞讛 讗讬谉 讝讜 讛讜专讗讛 讗诇讗 讟注讜转

搂 The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze鈥檈iri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error.

讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讛讜专讗讛 讛讬讗

Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering. And conversely, Rav Na岣an said that the court鈥檚 permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 转讚注 讚讛讜专讗讛 讛讬讗 讚讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 注讚 讗讞讚 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 讜讛讻讗 诪讛讬诪谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜专讗讛 讛讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 转讚注 讚讟注讜转 讛讜讗 讚讗讬诇讜 讛讜专讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘讞诇讘 讜讘讚诐 诇讛讬转讬专讗 讜讛讚专 讞讝讜 讟注诪讗 诇讗讬住讜专讗 讻讬 讛讚专讬 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛讬转讬专讗 诇讗 诪砖讙讞讬谞谉 诇讛讜

Rav Na岣an said: You can know that her permission to marry is a ruling, as in the entire Torah one witness is not deemed credible, and yet here he is deemed credible. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered a ruling, i.e., she does not rely on the witness but on the decision of the court? By contrast, Rava said that we can know that her permission to marry is an error. His reasoning is that had the court ruled with regard to forbidden fat or with regard to blood that it is permitted, and they went back and saw a reason to prohibit it, if they subsequently retract and say that it is permitted we take no notice of them. If they did not find a conclusive proof but merely offered a new argument, this claim does not cancel the earlier ruling that the substance is forbidden.

讜讗讬诇讜 讛讬讻讗 讚讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 砖专讬谞讗 讗转讜 转专讬 讗住专谞讗 讻讬 讛讚专 讗转讗 注讚 讗讞专讬谞讗 砖专讬谞谉 诇讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讟注讜转 讛讜讗

Whereas in the case of marriage, when one witness comes the court permits her, and when two witnesses subsequently come and testify that her husband is alive, they render her forbidden. When one other witness again comes forward, claiming that the husband is dead, they permit her. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered an error of the court, as they did not issue their rulings based on their own reasoning but in reliance on the facts they had garnered from the witnesses? It is therefore considered a factual error, not a mistaken ruling.

讜讗祝 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住讘专 讚讟注讜转 讛讜讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讬拽讜讘 讛讚讬谉 讗转 讛讛专 讜转讘讬讗 讞讟讗转 砖诪讬谞讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讚讟注讜转 讛讜讗 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 诪转讬讗 拽专讘谉 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚讛讜专讗讛 讛讬讗 讗诪讗讬 诪转讬讗 拽专讘谉

The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Eliezer also maintains that the ruling of the court is an error, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If a woman married by permission of the court and it later turned out that her husband was alive, let the law pierce the mountain, i.e., the matter must be fully investigated. If it turns out that the ruling of the court is incorrect, it is nullified and she brings a choice sin-offering. Granted, if you say that it is an error, it is due to that reason that she must bring an offering. However, if you say it is a ruling, why does she bring an offering? It is the court that should be liable to bring an offering for its incorrect ruling.

讜讚诇诪讗 拽住讘专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讬讞讬讚 砖注砖讛 讘讛讜专讗转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 讬拽讜讘 讛讚讬谉 讗转 讛讛专

The Gemara asks: But perhaps Rabbi Eliezer maintains that an individual who acted by ruling of the court is also liable to bring an offering, and this is why he obligates her to bring an offering, despite the fact that she went ahead with the consent of the court. The Gemara refutes this suggestion: If so, what need is there for the special mention of the rationale: Let the law pierce the mountain? He should simply have said that she is liable to bring an offering. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer evidently maintains that in general an individual does not have to bring an offering for a sin he committed based on the ruling of a court. Here, however, she must bring a sin-offering because there was an error with regard to the facts.

讛讜专讜讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讛谞砖讗 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 拽诇拽诇讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讝讬谞转讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讙专讜砖讛 讜讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉 讛讚讬讜讟

搂 The mishna taught that if the court instructed her to marry, and she went and ruined herself, she is liable to bring an offering. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Ruined herself? Rabbi Eliezer says: She engaged in licentious sexual relations with a man, i.e., intercourse not for the purpose of marriage. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: It means that she married in a prohibited manner, e.g., a widow to a High Priest, or a divorc茅e or a yevama who had performed 岣litza [岣lutza] to a common priest.

诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讝讬谞转讛 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讗讘诇 讝讬谞转讛 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 [讚讗诪专讛] 讗转讜谉 讛讜讗 讚砖讜讬转讬谉 驻谞讜讬讛

The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who says that she engaged in licentious sexual relations, she is all the more so liable to bring an offering if she is a widow who had sexual relations with a High Priest, as she performed an act prohibited by Torah law. Conversely, according to the one who says that the mishna is speaking of a widow who engaged in relations with a High Priest, it is only in that case that she must bring an offering; however, if she engaged in licentious sexual relations she is not is liable to bring an offering. What is the reason? As she can say: It is you who deemed me unattached, and although my behavior was unseemly, I may live with whomever I choose as a single woman.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讜专讜讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讛谞砖讗 讜讛诇讻讛 讜拽诇拽诇讛 讻讙讜谉 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讙专讜砖讛 讜讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉 讛讚讬讜讟 讞讬讬讘转 讘拽专讘谉 注诇 讻诇 讘讬讗讛 讜讘讬讗讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan: If the court ruled that she may marry, and she went and ruined herself, for example a widow who engaged in intercourse with a High Priest, or a divorc茅e or a 岣lutza who engaged in intercourse with a common priest, she is liable to bring an offering for each and every sexual act, as each is a separate transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 拽专讘谉 讗讞讚 注诇 讛讻诇 讜诪讜讚讬诐 讞讻诪讬诐 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 砖讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讞诪砖讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 砖讞讬讬讘转 讘拽专讘谉 注诇 讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讙讜驻讬谉 诪讜讞诇拽讬谉

And the Rabbis say that she brings one offering for all of them, as she performed them all in a single lapse of awareness. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Elazar that if a married woman married in error, e.g., to five people, that she is liable to bring an offering for each and every one of them, since they are separate bodies. She is obligated to bring an offering for each separate man with whom she engaged in sexual relations.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 讜讘谞讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘谞讱 讜谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讬讜 讛讚讘专讬诐 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专

MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose husband and child went overseas, and witnesses came and said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, she does not require levirate marriage, as she had a child when her husband died. And for this reason she married another man. And if afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, i.e., the child died before the husband, which means that she did require levirate marriage, she is therefore a yevama who married a stranger without 岣litza and she must consequently leave her second husband. And with regard to the first child, the one born before they heard about the reversal, and the last one, born after they realized who actually died first, each of these children is a mamzer.

讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘谞讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞转讬讬讘诪讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讬讜 讛讚讘专讬诐 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 拽讬讬诐 讛讬讛 讜诪转 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谞讜 诪诪讝专

Conversely, if they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she therefore entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, which means she married her husband鈥檚 brother when there was no obligation of levirate marriage, she must leave her husband, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer. If they said to her: Your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive at the time of her marriage and he later died, she must leave the second husband. And the first child, born when her original husband was still alive, is a mamzer, and the last one, born after his death, is not a mamzer.

讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞转拽讚砖讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗 讘注诇讛 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞转谉 诇讛 讗讞专讜谉 讙讟 诇讗 驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 讗转 讝讜 讚专砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 诪转讬讗 讜讗砖讛 讙专讜砖讛 诪讗讬砖讛 讜诇讗 诪讗讬砖 砖讗讬谞讜 讗讬砖讛

If they said to her: Your husband died, and she became betrothed to another man, and afterward her husband came, she is permitted to return to him, as betrothal alone does not render her forbidden to her husband. Furthermore, although the last man, i.e., her betrothed, gave her a bill of divorce, he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. She was never his wife, for the betrothal was invalid, and a bill of divorce given to the wife of another man does not disqualify her. This was taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: 鈥淣either shall they take a woman divorced from her husband鈥 (Leviticus 21:7), which indicates: And not one who was divorced from a man who is not her husband, e.g., the second man in this case.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讗讬 讗讞专讜谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讗砖讜谉 诇驻谞讬 砖诪讜注讛 讜讗讞专讜谉 诇讗讞专 砖诪讜注讛 诇讬转谞讬 讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专

GEMARA: The Gemara asks a question with regard to the first section of the mishna: What is the meaning of first child and what is the meaning of last child in this context? If we say that the first means the one born before her hearing that the report was erroneous, and the last means the one born after she heard, let him teach simply: The offspring is a mamzer, as there is no difference between the two cases.

诪砖讜诐 讚拽讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 拽讬讬诐 讛讬讛 讜诪转 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谞讜 诪诪讝专 转谞讗 谞诪讬 专讬砖讗 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专

The Gemara explains that because the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause: If they said to her your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive and he later died, the first child is a mamzer and the last one is not a mamzer, he also taught in the first clause: The first and the last are each a mamzer, despite the fact that in this case it makes no difference whether the child was born before or after she heard.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讝讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 砖讛讬讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讗讘诇 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪讬讘诪讛 讜诇讬诪讗 讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉

The Sages taught: This mishna is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who would say that betrothal does not take effect for those liable for violating regular prohibitions, and therefore the child of a yevama who transgressed a prohibition by marrying someone else is a mamzer. However, the Rabbis say that there is no mamzer from a yevama. The Gemara asks: And let the Rabbis say, as a principle: There is no mamzer from those liable for violating regular prohibitions.

讛讗讬 转谞讗 讛讱 转谞讗 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讚砖讗专 讛讜讬 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讙专讬讚讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 诪诪讝专 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara answers: This tanna called the Rabbis is in fact another tanna citing the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who claims that Rabbi Akiva said that a child born from those liable for violating prohibitions proscribing sexual relations with close relatives is a mamzer, but one born from those liable for violating regular prohibitions, i.e., a prohibition that does not involve a family relationship, such as the prohibition that 鈥渢he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5), is not a mamzer. Rav Yehuda said

讗诪专 专讘 诪谞讬谉 砖讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讬讘诪讛 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 转讛讬讛 讗砖转 讛诪转 讛讞讜爪讛 诇讗讬砖 讝专 诇讗 转讛讗 讘讛 讛讜讬讛 诇讝专

that Rav said: From where is it derived that betrothal by another man does not take effect with a yevama? As it is stated: 鈥淭he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates: She shall not have the possibility of becoming married to one not of his kin, i.e., his betrothal is of no account.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讘注谞讬讜转讬谞讜 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗讬 诇讗 转讛讬讛 讗砖转 讛诪转 讗讬 诇诇讗讜 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讗讬 讚诇讗 转驻住讬 讘讛 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗

And Shmuel said: In our poverty of knowledge, as we do not fully understand the verse, she requires a bill of divorce. The Gemara explains: Shmuel was uncertain with regard to this verse: 鈥淭he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside,鈥 whether it comes for a prohibition, i.e., the woman is prohibited from marrying another man but the betrothal of that other man is effective, or whether it comes to teach that betrothal by any other man does not take effect with her.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪专讬 讘专 专讞诇 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讛砖转讗 讚讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诐 讛讬讛 讬讘诪讛 讻讛谉 讞讜诇抓 诇讛 讜砖专讬讗 诇讬讛

Rav Mari bar Ra岣l said to Rav Ashi that Ameimar said as follows: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Rav Ashi said: Now that Ameimar said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who maintains that one who betroths a yevama before she has performed 岣litza must give her a bill of divorce, if her yavam was a priest, he performs 岣litza with her, as she is forbidden to him after the man who betrothed her gave her a bill of divorce, and she is thereby permitted to the man to whom she was betrothed.

讗讬转讙讜专讬 讗讬转讙专 讗诐 讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 讞讜讟讗 谞砖讻专 讗诇讗 讗诐 讛讬讛 讬讘诪讛 讬砖专讗诇 谞讜转谉 诇讛 砖谞讬 讙讟 讜讛讜转专讛 诇讜

The Gemara expresses surprise at this ruling: But in that case, she thereby gains from her prohibited betrothal, as she may subsequently marry the man who betrothed her illegally. If so, we find a sinner benefiting from his transgression. Rather, the Gemara emends the teaching: If her yavam was a regular Israelite, this second man who betrothed her must give her a bill of divorce, and she is permitted to the yavam, as a non-priest may marry a divorc茅e.

讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘 讬讘诪讛 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬谉 讘讛 谞砖讜讗讬谉 讬砖 讘讛 讗讬 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬谉 讘讛 谞砖讜讗讬谉 谞诪讬 讗讬谉 讘讛 讗讬诪讗 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讜谞砖讜讗讬谉 讗讬谉 讘讛

Rav Giddel said that Rav 岣yya bar Yosef said that Rav said: With regard to a yevama, betrothal does not apply to her, but marriage does apply to her. The Gemara expresses puzzlement: If betrothal does not apply to her, marriage also should not apply to her. How can marriage take effect if the earlier and less binding stage of betrothal is of no consequence? Rather, emend the above statement and say: Neither betrothal nor marriage apply to her.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪讗讬 谞砖讜讗讬谉 讬砖 讘讛 讘讝谞讜转 讻讚专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 砖讝讬谞转讛 讗住讜专讛 诇讬讘诪讛

And if you wish, say a different explanation. What is the meaning of the phrase: Marriage does apply to her? It is referring to a case of licentious sexual relations. In other words, although Rav maintains that betrothal is ineffective for her, if she entered the wedding canopy with another man and had relations with him, her status changes and she is forbidden to the yavam. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna said that a widow awaiting her yavam who committed an act of licentious sexual relations is forbidden to her yavam.

讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻讚讗诪专谉 诪注讬拽专讗 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬谉 讘讛 谞砖讜讗讬谉 讬砖 讘讛 讚诪讬讞诇驻讗 讘讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐

And if you wish, say: Actually, it is as we said initially, that betrothal does not apply to her but marriage does apply to her. However, this does not mean that marriage is actually effective. Rather, the halakha is that he must give her a bill of divorce, as people might confuse this case with that of a woman whose husband went overseas. The Sages decreed that he must give her a bill of divorce so that people would not say that a woman who remarried after hearing that her husband had died likewise does not require a bill of divorce.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讘讞讘讜专讛 谞诪谞讜 讜讙诪专讜 讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讬讘诪讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 专讘讬 诇讗 诪砖谞转谞讜 讛讬讗 讝讜 讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗转讙讬讬专 诇讗讞专 砖转转讙讬讬专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗砖转讞专专 诇讗讞专 砖转砖转讞专专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讬诪讜转 讘注诇讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖转诪讜转 讗讞讜转讬讱 讗讜 诇讗讞专 砖讬讞诇讜抓 诇讬讱 讬讘诪讬讱 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讚诇讗讬 诇讱 讞住驻讗 诪讬 诪砖讻讞转 诪专讙谞讬转讗 转讜转讬讛

Rabbi Yannai said: In the group of Sages who discussed this matter, they counted and concluded that betrothal by another man does not take effect with a yevama. Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him: My teacher, is this not taught in a mishna that states that betrothal is of no account for such a woman? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 16b): With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; after you convert; after I am freed from slavery; after you are freed; after your husband dies; after your sister dies; or after your yavam performs 岣litza with you, she is not betrothed. The reason for the above ruling is that he is considered to be attempting to acquire an entity that is not yet in existence, as the betrothal cannot take effect at that point in time. This indicates that betrothal is entirely ineffective for a yevama until she performs 岣litza. Rabbi Yannai said to Rabbi Yo岣nan: Had I not lifted the earthenware shard for you, would you have discovered the pearl [marganita] beneath it? It was only after I informed you of the halakha that you were able to cite a proof for it from a mishna.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚拽诇住讱 讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讗谞讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉

Sometime later, Reish Lakish said to Rav Yo岣nan: If it were not for the fact that a great man, Rabbi Yannai, praised you, I would say that this is no proof, as it is possible that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that betrothal does not take effect for those liable for violating regular prohibitions, and therefore it is not effective with a yevama. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, betrothal is effective for this woman, as is the case with all regular prohibitions.

讜讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讻讬 讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗讞专 砖讬讞诇讜抓 诇讬讱 讬讘诪讬讱 诇讬转驻住讬 讘讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚讛讗 砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚转谞谉

The Gemara asks: And if it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, when he said to her: After your yavam performs 岣litza for you, let the betrothal take effect with her, as we have heard that Rabbi Akiva said that a man can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world. In other words, Rabbi Akiva is of the opinion that an acquisition can take effect for something not yet in existence. If so, even if the betrothal cannot take effect now, it should be valid after she has performed 岣litza. The proof that this is indeed Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion is as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 59a):

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 92

讻诇 拽诇讗 讚讘转专 谞砖讜讗讬谉 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗转讗讬 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讜砖专讬谞谉 讻拽诇讗 讚拽诪讬 谞砖讜讗讬谉 讚诪讬 讜转讬转住专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

We are not concerned about any rumor after marriage. If a rumor spread about a woman after her marriage that she was forbidden to her husband, the court takes no notice of these reports. The Gemara answers: There is a novel aspect to this teaching: Lest you say that since she came to the court and they permitted her, the very fact that her case had to be discussed indicates that her status is not fully established, and consequently one might think that it should be considered like a rumor before marriage, and she should therefore be forbidden, Rav Ashi therefore teaches us that even in this case, once she is married the court takes no notice of unsubstantiated rumors.

谞讬住转 注诇 驻讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 转爪讗 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 讝注讬专讬 诇讬转讗 诇诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪讚转谞讬 讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讚转谞讬 讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讛讜专讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖砖拽注讛 讞诪讛 讜诇讘住讜祝 讝专讞讛 讗讬谉 讝讜 讛讜专讗讛 讗诇讗 讟注讜转

搂 The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze鈥檈iri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error.

讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讛讜专讗讛 讛讬讗

Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering. And conversely, Rav Na岣an said that the court鈥檚 permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 转讚注 讚讛讜专讗讛 讛讬讗 讚讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 注讚 讗讞讚 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 讜讛讻讗 诪讛讬诪谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜专讗讛 讛讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 转讚注 讚讟注讜转 讛讜讗 讚讗讬诇讜 讛讜专讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘讞诇讘 讜讘讚诐 诇讛讬转讬专讗 讜讛讚专 讞讝讜 讟注诪讗 诇讗讬住讜专讗 讻讬 讛讚专讬 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛讬转讬专讗 诇讗 诪砖讙讞讬谞谉 诇讛讜

Rav Na岣an said: You can know that her permission to marry is a ruling, as in the entire Torah one witness is not deemed credible, and yet here he is deemed credible. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered a ruling, i.e., she does not rely on the witness but on the decision of the court? By contrast, Rava said that we can know that her permission to marry is an error. His reasoning is that had the court ruled with regard to forbidden fat or with regard to blood that it is permitted, and they went back and saw a reason to prohibit it, if they subsequently retract and say that it is permitted we take no notice of them. If they did not find a conclusive proof but merely offered a new argument, this claim does not cancel the earlier ruling that the substance is forbidden.

讜讗讬诇讜 讛讬讻讗 讚讗转讗 注讚 讗讞讚 砖专讬谞讗 讗转讜 转专讬 讗住专谞讗 讻讬 讛讚专 讗转讗 注讚 讗讞专讬谞讗 砖专讬谞谉 诇讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讟注讜转 讛讜讗

Whereas in the case of marriage, when one witness comes the court permits her, and when two witnesses subsequently come and testify that her husband is alive, they render her forbidden. When one other witness again comes forward, claiming that the husband is dead, they permit her. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered an error of the court, as they did not issue their rulings based on their own reasoning but in reliance on the facts they had garnered from the witnesses? It is therefore considered a factual error, not a mistaken ruling.

讜讗祝 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住讘专 讚讟注讜转 讛讜讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讬拽讜讘 讛讚讬谉 讗转 讛讛专 讜转讘讬讗 讞讟讗转 砖诪讬谞讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讚讟注讜转 讛讜讗 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 诪转讬讗 拽专讘谉 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚讛讜专讗讛 讛讬讗 讗诪讗讬 诪转讬讗 拽专讘谉

The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Eliezer also maintains that the ruling of the court is an error, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If a woman married by permission of the court and it later turned out that her husband was alive, let the law pierce the mountain, i.e., the matter must be fully investigated. If it turns out that the ruling of the court is incorrect, it is nullified and she brings a choice sin-offering. Granted, if you say that it is an error, it is due to that reason that she must bring an offering. However, if you say it is a ruling, why does she bring an offering? It is the court that should be liable to bring an offering for its incorrect ruling.

讜讚诇诪讗 拽住讘专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讬讞讬讚 砖注砖讛 讘讛讜专讗转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 讬拽讜讘 讛讚讬谉 讗转 讛讛专

The Gemara asks: But perhaps Rabbi Eliezer maintains that an individual who acted by ruling of the court is also liable to bring an offering, and this is why he obligates her to bring an offering, despite the fact that she went ahead with the consent of the court. The Gemara refutes this suggestion: If so, what need is there for the special mention of the rationale: Let the law pierce the mountain? He should simply have said that she is liable to bring an offering. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer evidently maintains that in general an individual does not have to bring an offering for a sin he committed based on the ruling of a court. Here, however, she must bring a sin-offering because there was an error with regard to the facts.

讛讜专讜讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讛谞砖讗 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 拽诇拽诇讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讝讬谞转讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讙专讜砖讛 讜讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉 讛讚讬讜讟

搂 The mishna taught that if the court instructed her to marry, and she went and ruined herself, she is liable to bring an offering. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Ruined herself? Rabbi Eliezer says: She engaged in licentious sexual relations with a man, i.e., intercourse not for the purpose of marriage. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: It means that she married in a prohibited manner, e.g., a widow to a High Priest, or a divorc茅e or a yevama who had performed 岣litza [岣lutza] to a common priest.

诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讝讬谞转讛 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讗讘诇 讝讬谞转讛 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 [讚讗诪专讛] 讗转讜谉 讛讜讗 讚砖讜讬转讬谉 驻谞讜讬讛

The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who says that she engaged in licentious sexual relations, she is all the more so liable to bring an offering if she is a widow who had sexual relations with a High Priest, as she performed an act prohibited by Torah law. Conversely, according to the one who says that the mishna is speaking of a widow who engaged in relations with a High Priest, it is only in that case that she must bring an offering; however, if she engaged in licentious sexual relations she is not is liable to bring an offering. What is the reason? As she can say: It is you who deemed me unattached, and although my behavior was unseemly, I may live with whomever I choose as a single woman.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讜专讜讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讛谞砖讗 讜讛诇讻讛 讜拽诇拽诇讛 讻讙讜谉 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讙专讜砖讛 讜讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉 讛讚讬讜讟 讞讬讬讘转 讘拽专讘谉 注诇 讻诇 讘讬讗讛 讜讘讬讗讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan: If the court ruled that she may marry, and she went and ruined herself, for example a widow who engaged in intercourse with a High Priest, or a divorc茅e or a 岣lutza who engaged in intercourse with a common priest, she is liable to bring an offering for each and every sexual act, as each is a separate transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 拽专讘谉 讗讞讚 注诇 讛讻诇 讜诪讜讚讬诐 讞讻诪讬诐 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 砖讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讞诪砖讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 砖讞讬讬讘转 讘拽专讘谉 注诇 讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讙讜驻讬谉 诪讜讞诇拽讬谉

And the Rabbis say that she brings one offering for all of them, as she performed them all in a single lapse of awareness. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Elazar that if a married woman married in error, e.g., to five people, that she is liable to bring an offering for each and every one of them, since they are separate bodies. She is obligated to bring an offering for each separate man with whom she engaged in sexual relations.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 讜讘谞讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗讜 讜讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘谞讱 讜谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讬讜 讛讚讘专讬诐 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专

MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose husband and child went overseas, and witnesses came and said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, she does not require levirate marriage, as she had a child when her husband died. And for this reason she married another man. And if afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, i.e., the child died before the husband, which means that she did require levirate marriage, she is therefore a yevama who married a stranger without 岣litza and she must consequently leave her second husband. And with regard to the first child, the one born before they heard about the reversal, and the last one, born after they realized who actually died first, each of these children is a mamzer.

讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘谞讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞转讬讬讘诪讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讬讜 讛讚讘专讬诐 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞讬住转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 拽讬讬诐 讛讬讛 讜诪转 转爪讗 讜讛讜诇讚 专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谞讜 诪诪讝专

Conversely, if they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she therefore entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, which means she married her husband鈥檚 brother when there was no obligation of levirate marriage, she must leave her husband, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer. If they said to her: Your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive at the time of her marriage and he later died, she must leave the second husband. And the first child, born when her original husband was still alive, is a mamzer, and the last one, born after his death, is not a mamzer.

讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞转拽讚砖讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗 讘注诇讛 诪讜转专转 诇讞讝讜专 诇讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞转谉 诇讛 讗讞专讜谉 讙讟 诇讗 驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 讗转 讝讜 讚专砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 诪转讬讗 讜讗砖讛 讙专讜砖讛 诪讗讬砖讛 讜诇讗 诪讗讬砖 砖讗讬谞讜 讗讬砖讛

If they said to her: Your husband died, and she became betrothed to another man, and afterward her husband came, she is permitted to return to him, as betrothal alone does not render her forbidden to her husband. Furthermore, although the last man, i.e., her betrothed, gave her a bill of divorce, he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. She was never his wife, for the betrothal was invalid, and a bill of divorce given to the wife of another man does not disqualify her. This was taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: 鈥淣either shall they take a woman divorced from her husband鈥 (Leviticus 21:7), which indicates: And not one who was divorced from a man who is not her husband, e.g., the second man in this case.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讗讬 讗讞专讜谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讗砖讜谉 诇驻谞讬 砖诪讜注讛 讜讗讞专讜谉 诇讗讞专 砖诪讜注讛 诇讬转谞讬 讛讜诇讚 诪诪讝专

GEMARA: The Gemara asks a question with regard to the first section of the mishna: What is the meaning of first child and what is the meaning of last child in this context? If we say that the first means the one born before her hearing that the report was erroneous, and the last means the one born after she heard, let him teach simply: The offspring is a mamzer, as there is no difference between the two cases.

诪砖讜诐 讚拽讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗诪专讜 诇讛 诪转 讘注诇讬讱 讜谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讗诪专讜 诇讛 拽讬讬诐 讛讬讛 讜诪转 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪诪讝专 讜讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谞讜 诪诪讝专 转谞讗 谞诪讬 专讬砖讗 专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专讜谉 诪诪讝专

The Gemara explains that because the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause: If they said to her your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive and he later died, the first child is a mamzer and the last one is not a mamzer, he also taught in the first clause: The first and the last are each a mamzer, despite the fact that in this case it makes no difference whether the child was born before or after she heard.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讝讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 砖讛讬讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讗讘诇 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪讬讘诪讛 讜诇讬诪讗 讗讬谉 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉

The Sages taught: This mishna is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who would say that betrothal does not take effect for those liable for violating regular prohibitions, and therefore the child of a yevama who transgressed a prohibition by marrying someone else is a mamzer. However, the Rabbis say that there is no mamzer from a yevama. The Gemara asks: And let the Rabbis say, as a principle: There is no mamzer from those liable for violating regular prohibitions.

讛讗讬 转谞讗 讛讱 转谞讗 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讚砖讗专 讛讜讬 诪诪讝专 诪讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讙专讬讚讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 诪诪讝专 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara answers: This tanna called the Rabbis is in fact another tanna citing the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who claims that Rabbi Akiva said that a child born from those liable for violating prohibitions proscribing sexual relations with close relatives is a mamzer, but one born from those liable for violating regular prohibitions, i.e., a prohibition that does not involve a family relationship, such as the prohibition that 鈥渢he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5), is not a mamzer. Rav Yehuda said

讗诪专 专讘 诪谞讬谉 砖讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讬讘诪讛 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 转讛讬讛 讗砖转 讛诪转 讛讞讜爪讛 诇讗讬砖 讝专 诇讗 转讛讗 讘讛 讛讜讬讛 诇讝专

that Rav said: From where is it derived that betrothal by another man does not take effect with a yevama? As it is stated: 鈥淭he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates: She shall not have the possibility of becoming married to one not of his kin, i.e., his betrothal is of no account.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讘注谞讬讜转讬谞讜 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗讬 诇讗 转讛讬讛 讗砖转 讛诪转 讗讬 诇诇讗讜 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讗讬 讚诇讗 转驻住讬 讘讛 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗

And Shmuel said: In our poverty of knowledge, as we do not fully understand the verse, she requires a bill of divorce. The Gemara explains: Shmuel was uncertain with regard to this verse: 鈥淭he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside,鈥 whether it comes for a prohibition, i.e., the woman is prohibited from marrying another man but the betrothal of that other man is effective, or whether it comes to teach that betrothal by any other man does not take effect with her.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪专讬 讘专 专讞诇 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讛砖转讗 讚讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诐 讛讬讛 讬讘诪讛 讻讛谉 讞讜诇抓 诇讛 讜砖专讬讗 诇讬讛

Rav Mari bar Ra岣l said to Rav Ashi that Ameimar said as follows: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Rav Ashi said: Now that Ameimar said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who maintains that one who betroths a yevama before she has performed 岣litza must give her a bill of divorce, if her yavam was a priest, he performs 岣litza with her, as she is forbidden to him after the man who betrothed her gave her a bill of divorce, and she is thereby permitted to the man to whom she was betrothed.

讗讬转讙讜专讬 讗讬转讙专 讗诐 讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 讞讜讟讗 谞砖讻专 讗诇讗 讗诐 讛讬讛 讬讘诪讛 讬砖专讗诇 谞讜转谉 诇讛 砖谞讬 讙讟 讜讛讜转专讛 诇讜

The Gemara expresses surprise at this ruling: But in that case, she thereby gains from her prohibited betrothal, as she may subsequently marry the man who betrothed her illegally. If so, we find a sinner benefiting from his transgression. Rather, the Gemara emends the teaching: If her yavam was a regular Israelite, this second man who betrothed her must give her a bill of divorce, and she is permitted to the yavam, as a non-priest may marry a divorc茅e.

讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘 讬讘诪讛 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬谉 讘讛 谞砖讜讗讬谉 讬砖 讘讛 讗讬 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬谉 讘讛 谞砖讜讗讬谉 谞诪讬 讗讬谉 讘讛 讗讬诪讗 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讜谞砖讜讗讬谉 讗讬谉 讘讛

Rav Giddel said that Rav 岣yya bar Yosef said that Rav said: With regard to a yevama, betrothal does not apply to her, but marriage does apply to her. The Gemara expresses puzzlement: If betrothal does not apply to her, marriage also should not apply to her. How can marriage take effect if the earlier and less binding stage of betrothal is of no consequence? Rather, emend the above statement and say: Neither betrothal nor marriage apply to her.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪讗讬 谞砖讜讗讬谉 讬砖 讘讛 讘讝谞讜转 讻讚专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 砖讝讬谞转讛 讗住讜专讛 诇讬讘诪讛

And if you wish, say a different explanation. What is the meaning of the phrase: Marriage does apply to her? It is referring to a case of licentious sexual relations. In other words, although Rav maintains that betrothal is ineffective for her, if she entered the wedding canopy with another man and had relations with him, her status changes and she is forbidden to the yavam. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna said that a widow awaiting her yavam who committed an act of licentious sexual relations is forbidden to her yavam.

讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻讚讗诪专谉 诪注讬拽专讗 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬谉 讘讛 谞砖讜讗讬谉 讬砖 讘讛 讚诪讬讞诇驻讗 讘讗砖讛 砖讛诇讱 讘注诇讛 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐

And if you wish, say: Actually, it is as we said initially, that betrothal does not apply to her but marriage does apply to her. However, this does not mean that marriage is actually effective. Rather, the halakha is that he must give her a bill of divorce, as people might confuse this case with that of a woman whose husband went overseas. The Sages decreed that he must give her a bill of divorce so that people would not say that a woman who remarried after hearing that her husband had died likewise does not require a bill of divorce.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讘讞讘讜专讛 谞诪谞讜 讜讙诪专讜 讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讬讘诪讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 专讘讬 诇讗 诪砖谞转谞讜 讛讬讗 讝讜 讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗转讙讬讬专 诇讗讞专 砖转转讙讬讬专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗砖转讞专专 诇讗讞专 砖转砖转讞专专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讬诪讜转 讘注诇讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖转诪讜转 讗讞讜转讬讱 讗讜 诇讗讞专 砖讬讞诇讜抓 诇讬讱 讬讘诪讬讱 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讚诇讗讬 诇讱 讞住驻讗 诪讬 诪砖讻讞转 诪专讙谞讬转讗 转讜转讬讛

Rabbi Yannai said: In the group of Sages who discussed this matter, they counted and concluded that betrothal by another man does not take effect with a yevama. Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him: My teacher, is this not taught in a mishna that states that betrothal is of no account for such a woman? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 16b): With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; after you convert; after I am freed from slavery; after you are freed; after your husband dies; after your sister dies; or after your yavam performs 岣litza with you, she is not betrothed. The reason for the above ruling is that he is considered to be attempting to acquire an entity that is not yet in existence, as the betrothal cannot take effect at that point in time. This indicates that betrothal is entirely ineffective for a yevama until she performs 岣litza. Rabbi Yannai said to Rabbi Yo岣nan: Had I not lifted the earthenware shard for you, would you have discovered the pearl [marganita] beneath it? It was only after I informed you of the halakha that you were able to cite a proof for it from a mishna.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚拽诇住讱 讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讗谞讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉

Sometime later, Reish Lakish said to Rav Yo岣nan: If it were not for the fact that a great man, Rabbi Yannai, praised you, I would say that this is no proof, as it is possible that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that betrothal does not take effect for those liable for violating regular prohibitions, and therefore it is not effective with a yevama. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, betrothal is effective for this woman, as is the case with all regular prohibitions.

讜讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讻讬 讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗讞专 砖讬讞诇讜抓 诇讬讱 讬讘诪讬讱 诇讬转驻住讬 讘讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚讛讗 砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚转谞谉

The Gemara asks: And if it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, when he said to her: After your yavam performs 岣litza for you, let the betrothal take effect with her, as we have heard that Rabbi Akiva said that a man can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world. In other words, Rabbi Akiva is of the opinion that an acquisition can take effect for something not yet in existence. If so, even if the betrothal cannot take effect now, it should be valid after she has performed 岣litza. The proof that this is indeed Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 opinion is as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 59a):

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