Yoma 46

אבל מהאי גיסא ומהאי גיסא אימא לא צריכא

but from this side or from that side of the altar, both of which are not directly in front of the Sanctuary’s entrance, I would say that no, the fire may not be taken from there. Therefore, it is necessary to write both terms in order to teach this halakha.

אמר רבי אלעזר משום בר קפרא אומר היה רבי מאיר איברי עולה שנתותרו עושה להן מערכה בפני עצמה וסודרן ואפילו בשבת

Rabbi Elazar said in the name of bar Kappara: Rabbi Meir would say: With regard to limbs of a burnt-offering that remained on the altar from the previous night and which were not fully consumed, one should make a separate arrangement of wood for them and arrange them upon it to be burned. And this is done even on Shabbat.

מאי קא משמע לן תנינא בכל יום היו שם ארבע מערכות אמר רבי אבין לא נצרכה אלא לפסולין

What is bar Kappara teaching us when he informs us that Rabbi Meir requires a separate arrangement to be made? Surely, we already learned this in the mishna that cites Rabbi Meir as saying: On every other day, there were four arrangements of wood there, upon the altar. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Avin said: Bar Kappara’s teaching is needed only in order to teach the requirement to set up a fourth arrangement, even though it is only for limbs of disqualified offerings. As certain disqualifications apply only ab initio, if the offering is nevertheless brought upon the altar it should not then be removed. Bar Kappara teaches that Rabbi Meir’s ruling applies in the event that limbs of such an offering were not fully consumed.

ודוקא שמשלה בהן האור אבל לא משלה בהן האור לא

The Gemara qualifies this: But this applies specifically when the fire has already taken hold of them and they have begun to burn. But if the fire has not yet taken hold of them, no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them.

איכא דאמרי אחד כשירין ואחד פסולין אי משלה בהן האור אין ואי לא לא

There are those who say a different version of this qualification: Both with regard to the limbs of valid offerings and of disqualified offerings, if the fire has already taken hold of them and they have begun to burn, yes, a separate arrangement is made to burn them, but if the fire did not take hold of them, no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them.

ואפילו בשבת תנינא והיום חמש

Bar Kappara concluded: And this is done even on Shabbat. But surely, we already learned this in the mishna that cites Rabbi Meir as saying: But on this day, on Yom Kippur, there are five. This means that the arrangement for burning any remaining limbs is made also on Yom Kippur, despite the fact that all the Shabbat prohibitions apply.

אמר רב אחא בר יעקב איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הני מילי היכא דחל יום הכפורים להיות אחר השבת דחלבי שבת קרבין ביום הכפורים אבל באמצע שבת לא קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Nevertheless, bar Kappara’s teaching is necessary, for it could enter your mind to say that this applies only when Yom Kippur occurs after Shabbat, i.e., on Sunday. Perhaps only in such a case is a separate arrangement made, based on the accepted law that leftover fats of Shabbat offerings are sacrificed and burned on Yom Kippur. However, if Yom Kippur occurs in the middle of the week, then perhaps no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them. Therefore, bar Kappara teaches us that Rabbi Meir’s ruling applies in all cases.

אמר רבא מאן האי דלא חייש לקמחיה הא בכל יום תנן קשיא

Rava said: Who is this that does not care about his flour, i.e., he does not truly care about what he says and speaks imprecisely? Did we not learn in the mishna: On every other day. This clearly implies that Rabbi Meir’s ruling applies equally to all days of the week. As such, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov’s justification for bar Kappara’s teaching is already implied in Rabbi Meir’s words in the mishna. The Gemara comments: Indeed, it is difficult.

ופליגא דרב הונא דאמר תחילתו דוחה סופו אינו דוחה

The Gemara comments: Both Rava and bar Kappara hold that a separate arrangement is made even on Shabbat. This disagrees with the opinion of Rav Huna, who said: The beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering, i.e., its slaughter, the sprinkling of its blood, and its burning overrides Shabbat; the end of its service, i.e., the burning of its sacrificial parts, does not override Shabbat.

גופא אמר רב הונא תמיד תחילתו דוחה סופו אינו דוחה

The Gemara analyzes Rav Huna’s statement: Returning to the matter itself: Rav Huna said: The beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering overrides a halakha, whereas the end of its service does not override a halakha.

מאי אינו דוחה רב חסדא אמר דוחה את השבת ואינו דוחה את הטומאה (ורבא) אמר דוחה את הטומאה ואינו דוחה את השבת

Previously, the Gemara assumed that Rav Huna was discussing the possibility that the sacrifice of the daily offering overrides Shabbat. The Gemara now clarifies if this was his intention: What is meant by saying that the end of its service does not override the halakha? Rav Ḥisda said: Although the end of its service does override Shabbat, it does not override the halakha that it should not be brought in a state of ritual impurity. This is true although the beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering may, if necessary, be brought in a state of ritual impurity. And Rabba said: The end of its service overrides only the halakha that it should not be brought in a state of ritual impurity, but it does not override Shabbat.

אמר ליה אביי (לרבא) לדידך קשיא ולרב חסדא קשיא לדידך קשיא מאי שנא טומאה דכתיב במועדו ואפילו בטומאה שבת נמי במועדו ואפילו בשבת

Abaye said to Rabba: It poses a difficulty to your opinion, and it poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda. It is difficult to your opinion as follows: What is different about the prohibition of bringing an offering in a state of ritual impurity that the daily offering overrides it? Because it is written with regard to the daily offering “in its season” (Numbers 28:2), to emphasize that it should be brought under all circumstances, even if that means that it will be brought in a state of ritual impurity. But, by that logic, the daily offering should also override Shabbat. Because the term “in its season” emphasizes that it should be brought under all circumstances, this means even on Shabbat.

ולרב חסדא קשיא מאי שנא שבת דכתיב במועדו אפילו בשבת טומאה נמי במועדו ואפילו בטומאה

And it is difficult to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda: What is different about Shabbat that the daily offering overrides it? Because it is written “in its season,” to emphasize that it should be brought under all circumstances, even on Shabbat. But by that logic, the daily offering should also override the prohibition of bringing an offering in a state of ritual impurity. Because the term “in its season” emphasizes that it should be brought under all circumstances, this means even in a state of ritual impurity.

אמר ליה לא לדידי קשיא ולא לרב חסדא קשיא לדידי לא קשיא סופו כתחילתו

Rabba said to him: It is not difficult to my opinion and it does not pose a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda. It is not difficult to my opinion, because I hold that the end of its sacrificial rite is like its beginning.

טומאה דתחילתו בר מידחא טומאה הוא סופו נמי דחי שבת דתחילתו לאו בר מידחא שבת הוא סופו נמי לא דחי

Therefore, with regard to overriding the prohibition to bring an offering in a state of ritual impurity, since the beginning of the sacrifice of the daily offering is fit to override the prohibition of offering it in a state of ritual impurity, so too, its end also overrides the prohibition. However, in the case of Shabbat, the beginning of a daily offering of the weekday is not fit to override Shabbat, since by definition it must be brought on its appropriate day. Therefore, its end also does not override Shabbat in the event that limbs remain from Friday’s daily offering.

לרב חסדא לא קשיא סופו כתחילתו (תחילתו) לית ליה שבת דהותרה היא בציבור סופו נמי דחי

And it is also not difficult to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, because he does not hold that its end is like its beginning. Rather, he has the following reasoning: The prohibitions of Shabbat are not merely overridden in the case of a communal offering, but they are actually permitted, such that there is no need to try to avoid performing the necessary labors when sacrificing it. Therefore, its end also overrides Shabbat.

טומאה דדחויה היא בציבור תחלתו דעיקר כפרה דחי סופו דלאו עיקר כפרה לא דחי

However, in the case of the prohibition to bring an offering in a state of ritual impurity, which is merely overridden in the case of a communal offering, it is preferable to avoid doing so. Therefore, the beginning of its sacrifice, i.e., its slaughter and the sprinkling of its blood, and its burning, which is the essential stage that provides atonement, overrides the prohibition and should be done even in a state of ritual impurity. However, its end, i.e., the burning of the sacrificial parts, which is not the essential stage that provides atonement, does not override the prohibitions.

איתמר המכבה אש מחתה ומנורה אביי אמר חייב רבא אמר פטור

The Torah prohibits the fire on the altar to be extinguished: “A perpetual fire shall be kept burning on the altar, it shall not go out” (Leviticus 6:6). With regard to this prohibition, an amoraic dispute was stated: With regard to one who extinguishes the fire of the coals that are taken with the coal pan for the incense on Yom Kippur or the fire of the coals that are taken in order to light the candelabrum, Abaye said: He is liable. Rava said: He is not liable.

דכבייה בראשו של מזבח דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דחייב כי פליגי דאחתיה אארעא וכבייה אביי אמר חייב אש המזבח הוא רבא אמר פטור כיון דנתקה נתקה

The Gemara elaborates on the dispute: In a case where one extinguished a coal while still standing upon the top of the altar, everyone agrees that he is liable. This is because the verse explicitly is referring to extinguishing a flame “upon the altar.” When they disagree, it is in a case where he brought the coals down to ground level and extinguished a coal there. Abaye said: He is liable, since it is still considered fire of the altar. Rava said: He is not liable, because once it has been removed from the altar it is considered removed and no longer part of the altar’s fire. Therefore, the prohibition does not apply to it.

אלא הא דאמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה המוריד גחלת מעל גבי המזבח וכיבה חייב כמאן כאביי

The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to this ruling that Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: One who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable, in accordance with whose opinion is he ruling? Could he possibly be ruling in accordance with the opinion of Abaye? Certainly not. In disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halakha follows Rava.

אפילו תימא כרבא התם לא אינתיק למצותה הכא אינתיקה למצותה

The Gemara explains: You can even say his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava by making the following distinction: There, in the ruling of Rav Naḥman, the coal was not removed to fulfill its mitzva. Therefore, it is still considered to be part of the fire of the altar and the prohibition still applies. Whereas, here, in the dispute between Abaye and Rava, this is a case of coal that was removed to fulfill its mitzva. Therefore, it is associated with its mitzva and no longer considered the fire of the altar.

איכא דאמרי

There are those who say a different version of the dispute:

דאחתיה אארעא וכבייה דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דפטור כי פליגי דכבייה בראשו של מזבח אביי אמר חייב אש המזבח הוא רבא אמר פטור כיון דנתקה נתקה

In a case where he brought the coals down to the ground and extinguished a coal there, everyone agrees that he is not liable. When they disagree it is in a case where one extinguished a coal while still standing upon the top of the altar. Abaye said: He is liable, since it is still considered fire of the altar. Rava said: He is not liable, because once it has been removed from the altar it is considered removed and no longer part of the altar’s fire. Therefore, the prohibition does not apply to it.

אלא הא דאמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה המוריד גחלת מעל גבי המזבח וכבה חייב כמאן לא כאביי ולא כרבא התם לא אינתיק למצותה הכא אינתיק למצותה

The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to this ruling that Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: He who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable, in accordance with whose opinion is his ruling? It would appear that it is neither in accordance with the opinion of Abaye, nor in accordance with the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains: You can even say that his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava by making the following distinction: There, in the ruling of Rav Naḥman, the coal was not removed to fulfill its mitzva; it is therefore still considered to be part of the fire of the altar and the prohibition applies. Whereas, here, in the dispute between Abaye and Rava, this is a case of coal that was removed to fulfill its mitzva, and it is therefore associated with its mitzva and no longer considered the fire of the altar.

הדרן עלך טרף בקלפי