Zevachim 2

מתני׳ כל הזבחים שנזבחו שלא לשמן כשרים אלא שלא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה חוץ מן הפסח והחטאת הפסח בזמנו והחטאת בכל זמן

MISHNA: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake, i.e., during the slaughtering the slaughterer’s intent was to sacrifice a different offering, are fit, and one may continue their sacrificial rites and partake of their meat where that applies. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who is therefore required to bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all offerings except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. In those cases, if the owner sacrificed them not for their own sake, they are unfit. But there is a difference between the two exceptions. The Paschal offering is unfit only when sacrificed not for its sake at its appointed time, on the fourteenth day of Nisan after noon, while the sin offering is unfit any time that it is sacrificed not for its sake.

רבי אליעזר אומר אף האשם הפסח בזמנו והחטאת והאשם בכל זמן אמר רבי אליעזר החטאת באה על חטא והאשם בא על חטא מה חטאת פסולה שלא לשמה אף האשם פסול שלא לשמו

Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. According to his opinion, the correct reading of the mishna is: The Paschal offering is unfit only at its appointed time, while the sin offering and the guilt offering are unfit at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: The sin offering is brought for performance of a transgression and the guilt offering is brought for performance of a transgression. Just as a sin offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.

יוסי בן חוני אומר הנשחטין לשם פסח ולשם חטאת פסולין

Yosei ben Ḥoni says: Not only are the Paschal offering and the sin offering unfit when slaughtered not for their sake, but also other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a sin offering are unfit.

שמעון אחי עזריה אומר שחטן לשם גבוה מהן כשרין לשם נמוך מהן פסולין

Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.

כיצד קדשי קדשים ששחטן לשם קדשים קלים פסולין קדשים קלים ששחטן לשם קדשי קדשים כשרין הבכור והמעשר ששחטן לשם שלמים כשרין שלמים ששחטן לשם בכור ולשם מעשר פסולין

How so? Offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., sin offerings and burnt offerings, that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., peace offerings, are unfit. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit. Likewise, there is a distinction between different offerings of lesser sanctity. The firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of an animal tithe are unfit.

גמ׳ למה לי למיתנא אלא שלא עלו ליתני ולא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach this halakha using the language: But they did not [ella shelo] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [velo] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word: But [ella], add?

הא קא משמע לן לבעלים הוא דלא עלו לשם חובה אבל בקדושתייהו קיימי ואסור לשנויי בהו

The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency with regard to these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, but they retain their sanctity, and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of their sacrificial process, i.e., the remaining rites must be performed with proper intent.

וכדרבא דאמר רבא עולה ששחטה שלא לשמה אסור לזרוק דמה שלא לשמה

And this halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its sake.

איבעית אימא סברא איבעית אימא קרא איבעית אימא סברא משום דשני בה כל הני לישני בה וליזיל

The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement, and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, i.e., in its slaughter, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.

איבעית אימא קרא מוצא שפתיך תשמר ועשית כאשר נדרת לה׳ אלהיך נדבה וגו׳ האי נדבה

And if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [nadarta] freely [nedava] to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words nadarta and nedava exegetically: Can this verse be referring to a gift offering [nedava]?

נדר הוא אלא אם כמה שנדרת עשית יהא נדר ואם לא נדבה יהא

It is already referred to as a vow offering [neder]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you vowed to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; and if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.

ונדבה מי שרי לשנויי בה

The Gemara concludes: And is it permitted to deviate from protocol in the sacrifice of a gift offering ab initio? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב פפא לא הוית גבן באורתא בתחומא בי חרמך דרמי רבא מילי מעלייתא אהדדי ושני להו

§ Ravina said to Rav Pappa: Since you were not with us last night within the Shabbat limit of Bei Ḥarmakh, you did not hear that Rava raises a contradiction between two superior mishnaic statements and teaches their resolution.

מאי מילי מעלייתא תנן כל הזבחים שנזבחו שלא לשמן כו׳ טעמא דשלא לשמן הא סתמא עלו נמי לבעלים לשם חובה אלמא סתמא נמי כלשמן דמי

What are these superior statements? We learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: The reason they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically that they were slaughtered not for their sake. But if offerings were slaughtered without specification of intent, they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently, if one performs any action without specification of intent, it is also considered as if he performed it expressly for its sake.

ורמינהי כל הגט שנכתב שלא לשם אשה פסול וסתמא נמי פסול

And Rava raises a contradiction from another mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman in question is not valid. And it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is also not valid.

ושני זבחים בסתם לשמן עומדין אשה בסתמא לאו לגירושין עומדת

And Rava resolves the contradiction: Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand designated for their own sake. From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, an ordinary wife does not stand designated for divorce. Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.

וזבחים בסתמא כשירין מנלן אילימא מהא דתנן כל הזבחים שנזבחו שלא לשמן כו׳ ולא קתני שלא נזבחו לשמן גבי גט נמי הקתני כל הגט שנכתב שלא לשם אשה פסול ולא קתני שלא נכתב לשם אשה פסול

§ The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that slaughtered offerings are fit and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered without specification? If we say it is from that which we learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, and it does not teach this using the language: All slaughtered offerings that were not slaughtered for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid.

אלא מהא דתנן כיצד לשמן ושלא לשמן לשם פסח ולשם שלמים טעמא דאמר לשם פסח ולשם שלמים הא לשם פסח וסתמא כשר אלמא סתמן כלשמן דמי

Rather, perhaps it is derived from that which we learned in a mishna (13a): How are offerings slaughtered for their sake and then not for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and then for the sake of a peace offering. The Gemara infers: The reason such an offering is unfit is that he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering and then he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering. But if he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering, and then slaughters it without specification, it is fit. Apparently, slaughtering an offering without specification is considered as if one slaughtered it for its sake.

דילמא שאני התם דאמר כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that anyone who performs an action performs it with his original intent in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent.

אלא מסיפא שלא לשמן ולשמן לשם שלמים ולשם פסח טעמא דאמר לשם שלמים ולשם פסח הא סתמא ולשם פסח כשר

Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from the latter clause of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered not for their sake and then for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and then for the sake of a Paschal offering. The Gemara infers: The reason it is unfit is that he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering and then he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering. But if he started slaughtering it without specification and then slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering, it is fit. Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.

דילמא שאני התם דאמר יוכיח סופו על תחילתו

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that his ultimate intent proves the nature of his original intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent.

אי נמי איידי דתנא לשמן ושלא לשמן תנא נמי שלא לשמן ולשמן

Alternatively, it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. Since in the former clause the tanna taught using the language: For their sake and then not for their sake, teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the tanna also taught the second clause using the language: Not for their sake and then for their sake. In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation.

אלא מהא לשם ששה דברים הזבח נזבח לשם זבח לשם זובח לשם שם לשם אשים לשם ריח לשם ניחוח והחטאת ואשם לשם חטא

Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from that mishna (46b), which states: The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of the particular offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing the offering, i.e., the owner; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of sacrificing it in a manner that gives an aroma; and for the sake of pleasing God. And the sin offering and a guilt offering are slaughtered for the sake of atonement for the sin.

אמר רבי יוסי אף מי שלא היה בלבו לשם אחת מכל אלו כשר שתנאי בית דין הוא אתנו בית דין דלא לימא לשמו דילמא אתי למימר שלא לשמו

The mishna on 46b continues: Rabbi Yosei said: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, since this is a stipulation of the court. The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The court stipulated that one should not say that he is slaughtering the offering for its sake, lest he come to say that he is slaughtering it not for its sake. Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.

ואי סלקא דעתך סתמא פסול קיימי בית דין ומתני מילתא דמיפסיל ביה

The Gemara infers: And if it enters your mind that if one slaughters an offering without specification it is unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.

וגבי גט דסתמא פסול מנלן

§ The Gemara asks: And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we derive that if it is written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is not valid?

אילימא מהא דתנן היה עובר בשוק ושמע סופרים מקרין איש פלוני גירש פלונית ממקום פלוני ואמר זה שמי וזה שם אשתי פסול לגרש בו

If we say it is inferred from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 24a): In the case of a man who was passing through the marketplace, and he heard scribes who write bills of divorce dictating to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such, and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit to divorce his wife with it, that is not a proof.

דילמא כדרב פפא דאמר רב פפא הכא בסופרים העשויין להתלמד עסקינן ולא איכתוב לשום כריתות כלל

It can be explained: Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice writing bills of divorce; and this bill of divorce is a draft and was not written for the sake of severance, i.e., divorce, at all. But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question.

אלא מהא

Rather, derive this halakha from the subsequent clause in that mishna: