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Zevachim 2

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Summary

If one takes an animal that was designated for a specific sacrificial purpose and slaughters it with the intention that it be used for a different type of offering (shelo lishma), the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the sacrifice.

There are exceptions to this rule – cases in which slaughtering with the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering. The Mishna records four differing opinions regarding these exceptions:

  1. Tana Kamma holds that a sin offering (chatat) and a Passover offering (korban Pesach) – when brought at the proper time (the afternoon of the 14th of Nissan, or possibly even the morning) – are disqualified if slaughtered with incorrect intent.
  2. Rabbi Eliezer adds the guilt offering (asham) to the list, arguing that it is similar in nature to the sin offering.
  3. Yosi ben Honi expands the rule further, stating that any sacrifice slaughtered with the mistaken intent that it be offered as a sin offering or a Passover offering on the 14th of Nissan is disqualified.
  4. Shimon, brother of Azaria, maintains that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intent that it be offered as a higher-level offering than originally designated, it remains valid. However, if the intent is to downgrade it to a lower-level offering, the sacrifice is disqualified. The Mishna provides examples of what constitutes higher and lower offerings.

The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word “ela” (“but”) instead of “ve” (“and”) in the phrase “but [a sacrifice slaughtered with the wrong intent] does not fulfill the owner’s obligation”? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling—one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning.

A further question arises: If a sacrifice is slaughtered without any specific intent, is that considered “no intent” or does it count as “intent”? Rava infers from the Mishna that such a case is treated as if it were done with intent. However, he notes a contradiction with the laws of lishma regarding a get (divorce document), which must be written specifically for the woman being divorced. Why, then, is the law different in each case?

After addressing this question, the Gemara investigates the sources that underpin Rava’s apparent contradiction: first, that a sacrifice brought without specific intent is still valid; and second, that a get lacking explicit intent is invalid.

 

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Zevachim 2

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁרִים, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה; חוּץ מִן הַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת – הַפֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְהַחַטָּאת בְּכׇל זְמַן.

MISHNA: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake, i.e., during the slaughtering the slaughterer’s intent was to sacrifice a different offering, are fit, and one may continue their sacrificial rites and partake of their meat where that applies. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who is therefore required to bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all offerings except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. In those cases, if the owner sacrificed them not for their own sake, they are unfit. But there is a difference between the two exceptions. The Paschal offering is unfit only when sacrificed not for its sake at its appointed time, on the fourteenth day of Nisan after noon, while the sin offering is unfit any time that it is sacrificed not for its sake.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף הָאָשָׁם – הַפֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְהַחַטָּאת וְהָאָשָׁם בְּכׇל זְמַן. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: הַחַטָּאת בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא, וְהָאָשָׁם בָּא עַל חֵטְא; מָה חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, אַף הָאָשָׁם – פָּסוּל שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. According to his opinion, the correct reading of the mishna is: The Paschal offering is unfit only at its appointed time, while the sin offering and the guilt offering are unfit at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: The sin offering is brought for performance of a transgression and the guilt offering is brought for performance of a transgression. Just as a sin offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.

יוֹסֵי בֶּן חוֹנִי אוֹמֵר: הַנִּשְׁחָטִין לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלִין.

Yosei ben Ḥoni says: Not only are the Paschal offering and the sin offering unfit when slaughtered not for their sake, but also other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a sin offering are unfit.

שִׁמְעוֹן אֲחִי עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם גָּבוֹהַּ מֵהֶן – כְּשֵׁרִין, לְשֵׁם נָמוּךְ מֵהֶן – פְּסוּלִין.

Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.

כֵּיצַד? קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים – פְּסוּלִין, קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים – כְּשֵׁרִין. הַבְּכוֹר וְהַמַּעֲשֵׂר שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים – כְּשֵׁרִין, שְׁלָמִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם בְּכוֹר וּלְשֵׁם מַעֲשֵׂר – פְּסוּלִין.

How so? Offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., sin offerings and burnt offerings, that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., peace offerings, are unfit. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit. Likewise, there is a distinction between different offerings of lesser sanctity. The firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of an animal tithe are unfit.

גְּמָ׳ לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנָא ״אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ״? לִיתְנֵי ״וְלֹא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה״!

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach this halakha using the language: But they did not [ella shelo] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [velo] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word: But [ella], add?

הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לַבְּעָלִים הוּא דְּלָא עָלוּ לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה – אֲבָל בִּקְדוּשְׁתַּיְיהוּ קָיְימִי, וְאָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי בְּהוּ.

The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency with regard to these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, but they retain their sanctity, and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of their sacrificial process, i.e., the remaining rites must be performed with proper intent.

וְכִדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – אָסוּר לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.

And this halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its sake.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא, אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּשַׁנִּי בַּהּ – כָּל הָנֵי לִישַׁנֵּי בַּהּ וְלֵיזִיל?!

The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement, and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, i.e., in its slaughter, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ, כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ נְדָבָה וְגוֹ׳״ – הַאי נְדָבָה?!

And if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [nadarta] freely [nedava] to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words nadarta and nedava exegetically: Can this verse be referring to a gift offering [nedava]?

נֶדֶר הוּא! אֶלָּא אִם כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַרְתָּ עָשִׂיתָ – יְהֵא נֶדֶר, וְאִם לֹא – נְדָבָה יְהֵא;

It is already referred to as a vow offering [neder]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you vowed to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; and if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.

וּנְדָבָה מִי שְׁרֵי לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי בַּהּ?

The Gemara concludes: And is it permitted to deviate from protocol in the sacrifice of a gift offering ab initio? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לָרַב פָּפָּא: לָא הֲוֵית גַּבַּן בְּאוּרְתָּא בִּתְחוּמָא בֵּי חַרְמָךְ – דְּרָמֵי רָבָא מִילֵּי מְעַלְּיָיתָא אַהֲדָדֵי, וְשַׁנִּי לְהוּ.

§ Ravina said to Rav Pappa: Since you were not with us last night within the Shabbat limit of Bei Ḥarmakh, you did not hear that Rava raises a contradiction between two superior mishnaic statements and teaches their resolution.

מַאי מִילֵּי מְעַלְּיָיתָא? תְּנַן: כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כּוּ׳. טַעְמָא דְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן; הָא סְתָמָא – עָלוּ נָמֵי לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה; אַלְמָא סְתָמָא נָמֵי כְּלִשְׁמָן דָּמֵי.

What are these superior statements? We learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: The reason they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically that they were slaughtered not for their sake. But if offerings were slaughtered without specification of intent, they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently, if one performs any action without specification of intent, it is also considered as if he performed it expressly for its sake.

וּרְמִינְהִי: כׇּל הַגֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה – פָּסוּל. וּסְתָמָא נָמֵי פָּסוּל!

And Rava raises a contradiction from another mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman in question is not valid. And it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is also not valid.

וְשַׁנִּי: זְבָחִים – בִּסְתָם לִשְׁמָן עוֹמְדִין, אִשָּׁה – בִּסְתָמָא לָאו לְגֵירוּשִׁין עוֹמֶדֶת.

And Rava resolves the contradiction: Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand designated for their own sake. From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, an ordinary wife does not stand designated for divorce. Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.

וּזְבָחִים בִּסְתָמָא כְּשֵׁירִין מְנָלַן? אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כּוּ׳ – וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא נִזְבְּחוּ לִשְׁמָן״; גַּבֵּי גֵּט נָמֵי, הָקָתָנֵי: כׇּל הַגֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה פָּסוּל – וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא נִכְתַּב לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה פָּסוּל״!

§ The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that slaughtered offerings are fit and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered without specification? If we say it is from that which we learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, and it does not teach this using the language: All slaughtered offerings that were not slaughtered for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid.

אֶלָּא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן? לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים, הָא לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּסְתָמָא – כָּשֵׁר; אַלְמָא סְתָמָן כְּלִשְׁמָן דְּמֵי.

Rather, perhaps it is derived from that which we learned in a mishna (13a): How are offerings slaughtered for their sake and then not for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and then for the sake of a peace offering. The Gemara infers: The reason such an offering is unfit is that he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering and then he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering. But if he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering, and then slaughters it without specification, it is fit. Apparently, slaughtering an offering without specification is considered as if one slaughtered it for its sake.

דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הָעוֹשֶׂה – עַל דַּעַת רִאשׁוֹנָה הוּא עוֹשֶׂה!

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that anyone who performs an action performs it with his original intent in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent.

אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא: שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן – לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח, הָא סְתָמָא וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח – כָּשֵׁר.

Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from the latter clause of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered not for their sake and then for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and then for the sake of a Paschal offering. The Gemara infers: The reason it is unfit is that he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering and then he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering. But if he started slaughtering it without specification and then slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering, it is fit. Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.

דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר: יוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ!

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that his ultimate intent proves the nature of his original intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent.

אִי נָמֵי, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא ״לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן״, תְּנָא נָמֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן״!

Alternatively, it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. Since in the former clause the tanna taught using the language: For their sake and then not for their sake, teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the tanna also taught the second clause using the language: Not for their sake and then for their sake. In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation.

אֶלָּא מֵהָא: לְשֵׁם שִׁשָּׁה דְּבָרִים הַזֶּבַח נִזְבָּח – לְשֵׁם זֶבַח, לְשֵׁם זוֹבֵחַ, לְשֵׁם שֵׁם, לְשֵׁם אִשִּׁים, לְשֵׁם רֵיחַ, לְשֵׁם נִיחוֹחַ. וְהַחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם – לְשֵׁם חֵטְא.

Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from that mishna (46b), which states: The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of the particular offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing the offering, i.e., the owner; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of sacrificing it in a manner that gives an aroma; and for the sake of pleasing God. And the sin offering and a guilt offering are slaughtered for the sake of atonement for the sin.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַף מִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּלִבּוֹ לְשֵׁם אַחַת מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁתְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין הוּא. אַתְנוֹ בֵּית דִּין דְּלָא לֵימָא ״לִשְׁמוֹ״, דִּילְמָא אָתֵי לְמֵימַר ״שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״.

The mishna on 46b continues: Rabbi Yosei said: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, since this is a stipulation of the court. The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The court stipulated that one should not say that he is slaughtering the offering for its sake, lest he come to say that he is slaughtering it not for its sake. Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ סְתָמָא פָּסוּל, קָיְימִי בֵּית דִּין וּמַתְנִי מִילְּתָא דְּמִיפְּסִיל בֵּיהּ?!

The Gemara infers: And if it enters your mind that if one slaughters an offering without specification it is unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.

וְגַבֵּי גֵּט דִּסְתָמָא פָּסוּל – מְנָלַן?

§ The Gemara asks: And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we derive that if it is written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is not valid?

אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: הָיָה עוֹבֵר בַּשּׁוּק, וְשָׁמַע סוֹפְרִים מַקְרִין: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי גֵּירַשׁ פְּלוֹנִית מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״זֶה שְׁמִי וְזֶה שֵׁם אִשְׁתִּי״ – פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ.

If we say it is inferred from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 24a): In the case of a man who was passing through the marketplace, and he heard scribes who write bills of divorce dictating to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such, and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit to divorce his wife with it, that is not a proof.

דִּילְמָא כִּדְרַב פָּפָּא – דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָכָא בְּסוֹפְרִים הָעֲשׂוּיִין לְהִתְלַמֵּד עָסְקִינַן; וְלָא אִיכְּתוּב לְשׁוּם כְּרִיתוּת כְּלָל!

It can be explained: Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice writing bills of divorce; and this bill of divorce is a draft and was not written for the sake of severance, i.e., divorce, at all. But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question.

אֶלָּא מֵהָא:

Rather, derive this halakha from the subsequent clause in that mishna:

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I went to day school in Toronto but really began to learn when I attended Brovenders back in the early 1980’s. Last year after talking to my sister who was learning Daf Yomi, inspired, I looked on the computer and the Hadran site came up. I have been listening to each days shiur in the morning as I work. I emphasis listening since I am not sitting with a Gamara. I listen while I work in my studio.

Rachel Rotenberg
Rachel Rotenberg

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After all the hype on the 2020 siyum I became inspired by a friend to begin learning as the new cycle began.with no background in studying Talmud it was a bit daunting in the beginning. my husband began at the same time so we decided to study on shabbat together. The reaction from my 3 daughters has been fantastic. They are very proud. It’s been a great challenge for my brain which is so healthy!

Stacey Goodstein Ashtamker
Stacey Goodstein Ashtamker

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“I got my job through the NY Times” was an ad campaign when I was growing up. I can headline “I got my daily Daf shiur and Hadran through the NY Times”. I read the January 4, 2020 feature on Reb. Michelle Farber and Hadran and I have been participating ever since. Thanks NY Times & Hadran!
Deborah Aschheim
Deborah Aschheim

New York, United States

It happened without intent (so am I yotzei?!) – I watched the women’s siyum live and was so moved by it that the next morning, I tuned in to Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur, and here I am, still learning every day, over 2 years later. Some days it all goes over my head, but others I grasp onto an idea or a story, and I ‘get it’ and that’s the best feeling in the world. So proud to be a Hadran learner.

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Jeanne Yael Klempner

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I started my Daf Yomi journey at the beginning of the COVID19 pandemic.

Karena Perry
Karena Perry

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Jessica Shklar
Jessica Shklar

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Hearing and reading about the siyumim at the completion of the 13 th cycle Daf Yomi asked our shul rabbi about starting the Daf – he directed me to another shiur in town he thought would allow a woman to join, and so I did! Love seeing the sources for the Divrei Torah I’ve been hearing for the past decades of living an observant life and raising 5 children .

Jill Felder
Jill Felder

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States

I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.

Michelle Lewis
Michelle Lewis

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I began my Daf Yomi journey on January 5, 2020. I had never learned Talmud before. Initially it struck me as a bunch of inane and arcane details with mind bending logic. I am now smitten. Rabbanit Farber brings the page to life and I am eager to learn with her every day!

Lori Stark
Lori Stark

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Debbie Fitzerman

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Studying has changed my life view on הלכה and יהדות and time. It has taught me bonudaries of the human nature and honesty of our sages in their discourse to try and build a nation of caring people .

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“I got my job through the NY Times” was an ad campaign when I was growing up. I can headline “I got my daily Daf shiur and Hadran through the NY Times”. I read the January 4, 2020 feature on Reb. Michelle Farber and Hadran and I have been participating ever since. Thanks NY Times & Hadran!
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Deborah Aschheim

New York, United States

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Lisa Berkelhammer
Lisa Berkelhammer

San Francisco, CA , United States

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Tina Lamm

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Barbara Goldschlag

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It happened without intent (so am I yotzei?!) – I watched the women’s siyum live and was so moved by it that the next morning, I tuned in to Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur, and here I am, still learning every day, over 2 years later. Some days it all goes over my head, but others I grasp onto an idea or a story, and I ‘get it’ and that’s the best feeling in the world. So proud to be a Hadran learner.

Jeanne Yael Klempner
Jeanne Yael Klempner

Zichron Yaakov, Israel

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Elana Storch
Elana Storch

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Miriam Eckstein-Koas
Miriam Eckstein-Koas

Huntington, United States

Zevachim 2

מַΧͺΦ°Χ Φ΄Χ™Χ³ Χ›ΦΌΧ‡Χœ הַזְּבָחִים שׁ֢נִּזְבְּחוּ שׁ֢לֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשׁ֡רִים, א֢לָּא שׁ֢לֹּא Χ’ΦΈΧœΧ•ΦΌ ΧœΦ·Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ’ΦΈΧœΦ΄Χ™Χ לְשׁ֡ם Χ—Χ•ΦΉΧ‘ΦΈΧ”; Χ—Χ•ΦΌΧ₯ מִן Χ”Φ·Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— Χ•Φ°Χ”Φ·Χ—Φ·Χ˜ΦΈΦΌΧΧͺ – Χ”Φ·Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ–Φ°ΧžΦ·Χ ΦΌΧ•ΦΉ, Χ•Φ°Χ”Φ·Χ—Φ·Χ˜ΦΈΦΌΧΧͺ Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ›Χ‡Χœ Χ–Φ°ΧžΦ·ΧŸ.

MISHNA: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake, i.e., during the slaughtering the slaughterer’s intent was to sacrifice a different offering, are fit, and one may continue their sacrificial rites and partake of their meat where that applies. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who is therefore required to bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all offerings except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. In those cases, if the owner sacrificed them not for their own sake, they are unfit. But there is a difference between the two exceptions. The Paschal offering is unfit only when sacrificed not for its sake at its appointed time, on the fourteenth day of Nisan after noon, while the sin offering is unfit any time that it is sacrificed not for its sake.

Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ ΧΦ±ΧœΦ΄Χ™Χ’ΦΆΧ–ΦΆΧ¨ ΧΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ¨: אַף הָאָשָׁם – Χ”Φ·Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ–Φ°ΧžΦ·Χ ΦΌΧ•ΦΉ, Χ•Φ°Χ”Φ·Χ—Φ·Χ˜ΦΈΦΌΧΧͺ וְהָאָשָׁם Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ›Χ‡Χœ Χ–Φ°ΧžΦ·ΧŸ. אָמַר Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ ΧΦ±ΧœΦ΄Χ™Χ’ΦΆΧ–ΦΆΧ¨: Χ”Φ·Χ—Φ·Χ˜ΦΈΦΌΧΧͺ בָּאָה גַל Χ—Φ΅Χ˜Φ°Χ, וְהָאָשָׁם בָּא גַל Χ—Φ΅Χ˜Φ°Χ; ΧžΦΈΧ” Χ—Φ·Χ˜ΦΈΦΌΧΧͺ – Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœΦΈΧ” שׁ֢לֹּא ΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ”ΦΌ, אַף הָאָשָׁם – Χ€ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœ שׁ֢לֹּא ΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΧ•ΦΉ.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. According to his opinion, the correct reading of the mishna is: The Paschal offering is unfit only at its appointed time, while the sin offering and the guilt offering are unfit at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: The sin offering is brought for performance of a transgression and the guilt offering is brought for performance of a transgression. Just as a sin offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.

Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ™ Χ‘ΦΆΦΌΧŸ Χ—Χ•ΦΉΧ Φ΄Χ™ ΧΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ¨: Χ”Φ·Χ Φ΄ΦΌΧ©Φ°ΧΧ—ΦΈΧ˜Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ לְשׁ֡ם Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©Φ΅ΧΧ Χ—Φ·Χ˜ΦΈΦΌΧΧͺ – Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ΄Χ™ΧŸ.

Yosei ben αΈ€oni says: Not only are the Paschal offering and the sin offering unfit when slaughtered not for their sake, but also other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a sin offering are unfit.

Χ©Φ΄ΧΧžΦ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧŸ אֲחִי Χ’Φ²Χ–Φ·Χ¨Φ°Χ™ΦΈΧ” ΧΧ•ΦΉΧžΦ΅Χ¨: Χ©Φ°ΧΧ—ΦΈΧ˜ΦΈΧŸ לְשׁ֡ם Χ’ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΉΧ”Φ·ΦΌ ΧžΦ΅Χ”ΦΆΧŸ – Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧ©Φ΅ΧΧ¨Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ, לְשׁ֡ם Χ ΦΈΧžΧ•ΦΌΧšΦ° ΧžΦ΅Χ”ΦΆΧŸ – Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ΄Χ™ΧŸ.

Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.

Χ›Φ΅ΦΌΧ™Χ¦Φ·Χ“? קָדְשׁ֡י קָדָשִׁים Χ©ΦΆΧΧ©Φ°ΦΌΧΧ—ΦΈΧ˜ΦΈΧŸ לְשׁ֡ם קֳדָשִׁים Χ§Φ·ΧœΦ΄ΦΌΧ™Χ – Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ΄Χ™ΧŸ, קֳדָשִׁים Χ§Φ·ΧœΦ΄ΦΌΧ™Χ Χ©ΦΆΧΧ©Φ°ΦΌΧΧ—ΦΈΧ˜ΦΈΧŸ לְשׁ֡ם קׇדְשׁ֡י קֳדָשִׁים – Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧ©Φ΅ΧΧ¨Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ. Χ”Φ·Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ›Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ Χ•Φ°Χ”Φ·ΧžΦ·ΦΌΧ’Φ²Χ©Φ΅Χ‚Χ¨ Χ©ΦΆΧΧ©Φ°ΦΌΧΧ—ΦΈΧ˜ΦΈΧŸ לְשׁ֡ם Χ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΈΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ – Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧ©Φ΅ΧΧ¨Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ, Χ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΈΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ Χ©ΦΆΧΧ©Φ°ΦΌΧΧ—ΦΈΧ˜ΦΈΧŸ לְשׁ֡ם Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ›Χ•ΦΉΧ¨ Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©Φ΅ΧΧ ΧžΦ·Χ’Φ²Χ©Φ΅Χ‚Χ¨ – Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ΄Χ™ΧŸ.

How so? Offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., sin offerings and burnt offerings, that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., peace offerings, are unfit. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit. Likewise, there is a distinction between different offerings of lesser sanctity. The firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of an animal tithe are unfit.

Χ’ΦΌΦ°ΧžΦΈΧ³ ΧœΦ°ΧžΦΈΧ” ΧœΦ΄Χ™ ΧœΦ°ΧžΦ΄Χ™Χͺְנָא ״א֢לָּא שׁ֢לֹּא Χ’ΦΈΧœΧ•ΦΌΧ΄? ΧœΦ΄Χ™ΧͺΦ°Χ Φ΅Χ™ Χ΄Χ•Φ°ΧœΦΉΧ Χ’ΦΈΧœΧ•ΦΌ ΧœΦ·Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ’ΦΈΧœΦ΄Χ™Χ לְשׁ֡ם Χ—Χ•ΦΉΧ‘ΦΈΧ”Χ΄!

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach this halakha using the language: But they did not [ella shelo] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [velo] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word: But [ella], add?

הָא קָא מַשְׁמַג לַן: ΧœΦ·Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ’ΦΈΧœΦ΄Χ™Χ הוּא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧœΦΈΧ Χ’ΦΈΧœΧ•ΦΌ לְשׁ֡ם Χ—Χ•ΦΉΧ‘ΦΈΧ” – ΧΦ²Χ‘ΦΈΧœ בִּקְדוּשְׁΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ™Φ°Χ™Χ”Χ•ΦΌ Χ§ΦΈΧ™Φ°Χ™ΧžΦ΄Χ™, וְאָבוּר ΧœΦ°Χ©Φ·ΧΧ ΦΌΧ•ΦΉΧ™Φ΅Χ™ Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ”Χ•ΦΌ.

The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency with regard to these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, but they retain their sanctity, and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of their sacrificial process, i.e., the remaining rites must be performed with proper intent.

וְכִדְרָבָא, Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨ רָבָא: Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧœΦΈΧ” Χ©ΦΆΧΧ©Φ°ΦΌΧΧ—ΦΈΧ˜ΦΈΧ”ΦΌ שׁ֢לֹּא ΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ”ΦΌ – אָבוּר ΧœΦ΄Χ–Φ°Χ¨Χ•ΦΉΧ§ Χ“ΦΈΦΌΧžΦΈΧ”ΦΌ שׁ֢לֹּא ΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧ”ΦΌ.

And this halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its sake.

אִיבָּג֡יΧͺ ΧΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ בְבָרָא, אִיבָּג֡יΧͺ ΧΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ קְרָא. אִיבָּג֡יΧͺ ΧΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ בְבָרָא: ΧžΦ΄Χ©ΦΌΧΧ•ΦΌΧ דְּשַׁנִּי Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧ”ΦΌ – Χ›ΦΈΦΌΧœ Χ”ΦΈΧ Φ΅Χ™ ΧœΦ΄Χ™Χ©Φ·ΧΧ Φ΅ΦΌΧ™ Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧ”ΦΌ Χ•Φ°ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ–Φ΄Χ™Χœ?!

The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement, and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, i.e., in its slaughter, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.

אִיבָּג֡יΧͺ ΧΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ קְרָא: Χ΄ΧžΧ•ΦΉΧ¦ΦΈΧ Χ©Φ°Χ‚Χ€ΦΈΧͺΦΆΧ™ΧšΦΈ Χͺִּשְׁמֹר Χ•Φ°Χ’ΦΈΧ©Φ΄Χ‚Χ™ΧͺΦΈ, כַּאֲשׁ֢ר Χ ΦΈΧ“Φ·Χ¨Φ°ΧͺΦΈΦΌ ΧœΦ·Χ”Χ³ ΧΦ±ΧœΦΉΧ”ΦΆΧ™ΧšΦΈ Χ Φ°Χ“ΦΈΧ‘ΦΈΧ” Χ•Φ°Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ³Χ΄ – הַאי Χ Φ°Χ“ΦΈΧ‘ΦΈΧ”?!

And if you wish, cite a verse: β€œThat which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [nadarta] freely [nedava] to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words nadarta and nedava exegetically: Can this verse be referring to a gift offering [nedava]?

Χ ΦΆΧ“ΦΆΧ¨ הוּא! א֢לָּא אִם Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧžΦΈΧ” שׁ֢נָּדַרְΧͺΦΈΦΌ Χ’ΦΈΧ©Φ΄Χ‚Χ™ΧͺΦΈ – יְה֡א Χ ΦΆΧ“ΦΆΧ¨, וְאִם לֹא – Χ Φ°Χ“ΦΈΧ‘ΦΈΧ” יְה֡א;

It is already referred to as a vow offering [neder]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you vowed to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; and if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.

Χ•ΦΌΧ Φ°Χ“ΦΈΧ‘ΦΈΧ” ΧžΦ΄Χ™ שְׁר֡י ΧœΦ°Χ©Φ·ΧΧ ΦΌΧ•ΦΉΧ™Φ΅Χ™ Χ‘Φ·ΦΌΧ”ΦΌ?

The Gemara concludes: And is it permitted to deviate from protocol in the sacrifice of a gift offering ab initio? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.

אֲמַר ΧœΦ΅Χ™Χ”ΦΌ רָבִינָא ΧœΦΈΧ¨Φ·Χ‘ ׀ָּ׀ָּא: לָא Χ”Φ²Χ•Φ΅Χ™Χͺ Χ’Φ·ΦΌΧ‘Φ·ΦΌΧŸ בְּאוּרְΧͺָּא Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧͺΦ°Χ—Χ•ΦΌΧžΦΈΧ Χ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™ Χ—Φ·Χ¨Φ°ΧžΦΈΧšΦ° – Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧ¨ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™ רָבָא ΧžΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦ΅ΦΌΧ™ ΧžΦ°Χ’Φ·ΧœΦ°ΦΌΧ™ΦΈΧ™Χͺָא אַהֲדָד֡י, וְשַׁנִּי ΧœΦ°Χ”Χ•ΦΌ.

Β§ Ravina said to Rav Pappa: Since you were not with us last night within the Shabbat limit of Bei αΈ€armakh, you did not hear that Rava raises a contradiction between two superior mishnaic statements and teaches their resolution.

ΧžΦ·ΧΧ™ ΧžΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦ΅ΦΌΧ™ ΧžΦ°Χ’Φ·ΧœΦ°ΦΌΧ™ΦΈΧ™Χͺָא? Χͺְּנַן: Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ הַזְּבָחִים שׁ֢נִּזְבְּחוּ שׁ֢לֹּא לִשְׁמָן Χ›ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧ³. טַגְמָא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧ©ΦΆΧΧœΦΉΦΌΧ לִשְׁמָן; הָא Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא – Χ’ΦΈΧœΧ•ΦΌ Χ ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™ ΧœΦ·Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ’ΦΈΧœΦ΄Χ™Χ לְשׁ֡ם Χ—Χ•ΦΉΧ‘ΦΈΧ”; אַלְמָא Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא Χ ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™ Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧŸ Χ“ΦΈΦΌΧžΦ΅Χ™.

What are these superior statements? We learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: The reason they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically that they were slaughtered not for their sake. But if offerings were slaughtered without specification of intent, they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently, if one performs any action without specification of intent, it is also considered as if he performed it expressly for its sake.

Χ•ΦΌΧ¨Φ°ΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ Φ°Χ”Φ΄Χ™: Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ Χ”Φ·Χ’Φ΅ΦΌΧ˜ שׁ֢נִּכְΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ‘ שׁ֢לֹּא לְשׁ֡ם אִשָּׁה – Χ€ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœ. Χ•ΦΌΧ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא Χ ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™ Χ€ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœ!

And Rava raises a contradiction from another mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman in question is not valid. And it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is also not valid.

וְשַׁנִּי: זְבָחִים – Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ‘Φ°Χͺָם לִשְׁמָן Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧžΦ°Χ“Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ, אִשָּׁה – Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא ΧœΦΈΧΧ• ΧœΦ°Χ’Φ΅Χ™Χ¨Χ•ΦΌΧ©Φ΄ΧΧ™ΧŸ Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧžΦΆΧ“ΦΆΧͺ.

And Rava resolves the contradiction: Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand designated for their own sake. From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, an ordinary wife does not stand designated for divorce. Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.

וּזְבָחִים Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧ©Φ΅ΧΧ™Χ¨Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ מְנָלַן? ΧΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦ΅ΦΌΧ™ΧžΦΈΧ ΧžΦ΅Χ”ΦΈΧ Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧͺְנַן: Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ הַזְּבָחִים שׁ֢נִּזְבְּחוּ שׁ֢לֹּא לִשְׁמָן Χ›ΦΌΧ•ΦΌΧ³ – Χ•Φ°ΧœΦΈΧ Χ§ΦΈΧͺΦΈΧ Φ΅Χ™ ״שׁ֢לֹּא Χ Φ΄Χ–Φ°Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧ—Χ•ΦΌ לִשְׁמָן״; Χ’Φ·ΦΌΧ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™ Χ’Φ΅ΦΌΧ˜ Χ ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™, Χ”ΦΈΧ§ΦΈΧͺΦΈΧ Φ΅Χ™: Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ Χ”Φ·Χ’Φ΅ΦΌΧ˜ שׁ֢נִּכְΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ‘ שׁ֢לֹּא לְשׁ֡ם אִשָּׁה Χ€ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœ – Χ•Φ°ΧœΦΈΧ Χ§ΦΈΧͺΦΈΧ Φ΅Χ™ ״שׁ֢לֹּא Χ Φ΄Χ›Φ°ΧͺΦ·ΦΌΧ‘ לְשׁ֡ם אִשָּׁה Χ€ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœΧ΄!

Β§ The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that slaughtered offerings are fit and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered without specification? If we say it is from that which we learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, and it does not teach this using the language: All slaughtered offerings that were not slaughtered for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid.

א֢לָּא ΧžΦ΅Χ”ΦΈΧ Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧͺְנַן: Χ›Φ΅ΦΌΧ™Χ¦Φ·Χ“ לִשְׁמָן Χ•Φ°Χ©ΦΆΧΧœΦΉΦΌΧ לִשְׁמָן? לְשׁ֡ם Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©Φ΅ΧΧ Χ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΈΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ. טַגְמָא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨ לְשׁ֡ם Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©Φ΅ΧΧ Χ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΈΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ, הָא לְשׁ֡ם Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— Χ•ΦΌΧ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא – כָּשׁ֡ר; אַלְמָא Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָן Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧŸ Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ΅Χ™.

Rather, perhaps it is derived from that which we learned in a mishna (13a): How are offerings slaughtered for their sake and then not for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and then for the sake of a peace offering. The Gemara infers: The reason such an offering is unfit is that he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering and then he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering. But if he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering, and then slaughters it without specification, it is fit. Apparently, slaughtering an offering without specification is considered as if one slaughtered it for its sake.

Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ΧœΦ°ΧžΦΈΧ שָׁאנ֡י Χ”ΦΈΧͺָם, Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨: Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ Χ”ΦΈΧ’Χ•ΦΉΧ©ΦΆΧ‚Χ” – גַל Χ“Φ·ΦΌΧ’Φ·Χͺ רִאשׁוֹנָה הוּא Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ©ΦΆΧ‚Χ”!

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that anyone who performs an action performs it with his original intent in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent.

א֢לָּא ΧžΦ΄Χ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™Χ€ΦΈΧ: שׁ֢לֹּא לִשְׁמָן Χ•Φ°ΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧŸ – לְשׁ֡ם Χ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΈΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©Φ΅ΧΧ Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ—. טַגְמָא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨ לְשׁ֡ם Χ©Φ°ΧΧœΦΈΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©Φ΅ΧΧ Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ—, הָא Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא Χ•ΦΌΧœΦ°Χ©Φ΅ΧΧ Χ€ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— – כָּשׁ֡ר.

Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from the latter clause of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered not for their sake and then for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and then for the sake of a Paschal offering. The Gemara infers: The reason it is unfit is that he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering and then he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering. But if he started slaughtering it without specification and then slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering, it is fit. Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.

Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ΧœΦ°ΧžΦΈΧ שָׁאנ֡י Χ”ΦΈΧͺָם, Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨: Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ›Φ΄Χ™Χ—Φ· Χ‘Χ•ΦΉΧ€Χ•ΦΉ גַל ΧͺΦ°ΦΌΧ—Φ΄Χ™ΧœΦΈΦΌΧͺΧ•ΦΉ!

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that his ultimate intent proves the nature of his original intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent.

אִי Χ ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™, אַיְּיד֡י Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧͺְנָא ״לִשְׁמָן Χ•Φ°Χ©ΦΆΧΧœΦΉΦΌΧ לִשְׁמָן״, Χͺְּנָא Χ ΦΈΧžΦ΅Χ™ ״שׁ֢לֹּא לִשְׁמָן Χ•Φ°ΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦΈΧŸΧ΄!

Alternatively, it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. Since in the former clause the tanna taught using the language: For their sake and then not for their sake, teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the tanna also taught the second clause using the language: Not for their sake and then for their sake. In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation.

א֢לָּא ΧžΦ΅Χ”ΦΈΧ: לְשׁ֡ם שִׁשָּׁה דְּבָרִים Χ”Φ·Χ–ΦΆΦΌΧ‘Φ·Χ— Χ Φ΄Χ–Φ°Χ‘ΦΈΦΌΧ— – לְשׁ֡ם Χ–ΦΆΧ‘Φ·Χ—, לְשׁ֡ם Χ–Χ•ΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ—Φ·, לְשׁ֡ם שׁ֡ם, לְשׁ֡ם אִשִּׁים, לְשׁ֡ם Χ¨Φ΅Χ™Χ—Φ·, לְשׁ֡ם Χ Φ΄Χ™Χ—Χ•ΦΉΧ—Φ·. Χ•Φ°Χ”Φ·Χ—Φ·Χ˜ΦΈΦΌΧΧͺ וְאָשָׁם – לְשׁ֡ם Χ—Φ΅Χ˜Φ°Χ.

Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from that mishna (46b), which states: The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of the particular offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing the offering, i.e., the owner; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of sacrificing it in a manner that gives an aroma; and for the sake of pleasing God. And the sin offering and a guilt offering are slaughtered for the sake of atonement for the sin.

אָמַר Χ¨Φ·Χ‘Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ Χ™Χ•ΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ™: אַף ΧžΦ΄Χ™ שׁ֢לֹּא Χ”ΦΈΧ™ΦΈΧ” Χ‘Φ°ΦΌΧœΦ΄Χ‘ΦΌΧ•ΦΉ לְשׁ֡ם אַחַΧͺ ΧžΦ΄Χ›Χ‡ΦΌΧœ ΧΦ΅ΧœΦΌΧ•ΦΌ – כָּשׁ֡ר, שׁ֢Χͺְּנַאי Χ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™Χͺ Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ΧŸ הוּא. אַΧͺΦ°Χ Χ•ΦΉ Χ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™Χͺ Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ΧŸ Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧœΦΈΧ ΧœΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦΈΧ Χ΄ΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΧ•ΦΉΧ΄, Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ΧœΦ°ΧžΦΈΧ אָΧͺΦ΅Χ™ ΧœΦ°ΧžΦ΅Χ™ΧžΦ·Χ¨ ״שׁ֢לֹּא ΧœΦ΄Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΧ•ΦΉΧ΄.

The mishna on 46b continues: Rabbi Yosei said: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, since this is a stipulation of the court. The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The court stipulated that one should not say that he is slaughtering the offering for its sake, lest he come to say that he is slaughtering it not for its sake. Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.

וְאִי בָלְקָא Χ“Φ·Χ’Φ°Χͺָּךְ Χ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא Χ€ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœ, Χ§ΦΈΧ™Φ°Χ™ΧžΦ΄Χ™ Χ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™Χͺ Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ΧŸ Χ•ΦΌΧžΦ·ΧͺΦ°Χ Φ΄Χ™ ΧžΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦ°ΦΌΧͺָא Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧžΦ΄Χ™Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧ‘Φ΄Χ™Χœ Χ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™Χ”ΦΌ?!

The Gemara infers: And if it enters your mind that if one slaughters an offering without specification it is unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.

Χ•Φ°Χ’Φ·Χ‘Φ΅ΦΌΧ™ Χ’Φ΅ΦΌΧ˜ Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ‘Φ°Χͺָמָא Χ€ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœ – מְנָלַן?

Β§ The Gemara asks: And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we derive that if it is written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is not valid?

ΧΦ΄Χ™ΧœΦ΅ΦΌΧ™ΧžΦΈΧ ΧžΦ΅Χ”ΦΈΧ Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧͺְנַן: Χ”ΦΈΧ™ΦΈΧ” Χ’Χ•ΦΉΧ‘Φ΅Χ¨ בַּשּׁוּק, Χ•Φ°Χ©ΦΈΧΧžΦ·Χ’ בוֹ׀ְרִים ΧžΦ·Χ§Φ°Χ¨Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ: ״אִישׁ Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧœΧ•ΦΉΧ Φ΄Χ™ גּ֡ירַשׁ Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧœΧ•ΦΉΧ Φ΄Χ™Χͺ ΧžΦ΄ΧžΦΈΦΌΧ§Χ•ΦΉΧ Χ€Φ°ΦΌΧœΧ•ΦΉΧ Φ΄Χ™Χ΄, Χ•Φ°ΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨: Χ΄Χ–ΦΆΧ” Χ©Φ°ΧΧžΦ΄Χ™ Χ•Φ°Χ–ΦΆΧ” שׁ֡ם אִשְׁΧͺΦ΄ΦΌΧ™Χ΄ – Χ€ΦΈΦΌΧ‘Χ•ΦΌΧœ ΧœΦ°Χ’ΦΈΧ¨Φ΅Χ©Χ Χ‘ΦΌΧ•ΦΉ.

If we say it is inferred from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 24a): In the case of a man who was passing through the marketplace, and he heard scribes who write bills of divorce dictating to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such, and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit to divorce his wife with it, that is not a proof.

Χ“Φ΄ΦΌΧ™ΧœΦ°ΧžΦΈΧ Χ›Φ΄ΦΌΧ“Φ°Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ ׀ָּ׀ָּא – Χ“Φ°ΦΌΧΦΈΧžΦ·Χ¨ Χ¨Φ·Χ‘ ׀ָּ׀ָּא: הָכָא בְּבוֹ׀ְרִים Χ”ΦΈΧ’Φ²Χ©Χ‚Χ•ΦΌΧ™Φ΄Χ™ΧŸ ΧœΦ°Χ”Φ΄ΧͺΦ°ΧœΦ·ΧžΦ΅ΦΌΧ“ Χ’ΦΈΧ‘Φ°Χ§Φ΄Χ™Χ Φ·ΧŸ; Χ•Φ°ΧœΦΈΧ אִיכְּΧͺΧ•ΦΌΧ‘ ΧœΦ°Χ©ΧΧ•ΦΌΧ Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧ¨Φ΄Χ™ΧͺΧ•ΦΌΧͺ Χ›Φ°ΦΌΧœΦΈΧœ!

It can be explained: Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice writing bills of divorce; and this bill of divorce is a draft and was not written for the sake of severance, i.e., divorce, at all. But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question.

א֢לָּא ΧžΦ΅Χ”ΦΈΧ:

Rather, derive this halakha from the subsequent clause in that mishna:

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