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Today's Daf Yomi

April 18, 2018 | 讙壮 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Zevachim 5

Further discussions about where we derive the laws regarding sacrifices that are brought with the wrong intentions that they are sacrificed but as voluntary offerings and do not provide atonement for the original intent and a new sacrifice has to be brought.

诇讗 讬讚注 讘诪讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讝讗转 讛转讜专讛 讜讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讝讗转 讛转讜专讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讬驻住诇讜 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱

that we do not know what requirement does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: This is the law, juxtaposing all offerings with a peace offering, which must be performed for its own sake. And if the Merciful One had written only the verse: This is the law, I would say that offerings sacrificed not for their sake should be disqualified. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: That which is gone out of your lips, teaching that they are accepted, though they do not satisfy their owners鈥 obligations.

专诪讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 注诇 诪注讜讛讬 讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讜诪拽砖讬 讗诐 讻砖专讬诐 讛诐 讬专爪讜 讜讗诐 讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 诇诪讛 讘讗讬谉

Reish Lakish raised a difficulty while lying on his stomach in the study hall: If offerings that were sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or someone other than the owner are fit, let them propitiate God, i.e., let them satisfy the obligation of their owners; and if they do not propitiate God, why are they brought as offerings at all?

讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 (讗诇讬注讝专) [讗诇注讝专] 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讘讗讬谉 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 砖讛谉 讻砖专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 讚转谞谉 讛讗砖讛 砖讛讘讬讗讛 讞讟讗转讛 讜诪转讛 讬讘讬讗讜 讬讜专砖讬谉 注讜诇转讛 注讜诇转讛 讜诪转讛 诇讗 讬讘讬讗讜 讬讜专砖讬谉 讞讟讗转讛

Rabbi Elazar said to him: We have found a precedent for this in the case of offerings brought after the death of their owners, as they are fit, but they do not propitiate God, as they do not have owners requiring atonement. This is as we learned in a mishna (Kinnim 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin offering and then died, the heirs shall bring her burnt offering. If she brought her burnt offering and then died, the heirs shall not bring her sin offering. Evidently, a burnt offering is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讜讚讬谞讗 诇讱 讘注讜诇讛 讚讗转讬讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗砖诐 讚诇讗 讗转讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诪谞诇谉

Reish Lakish said to him: I concede to you with regard to a burnt offering that it is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation, since it is brought even after its owner鈥檚 death in the case of the woman who died after bringing her sin offering. But from where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is brought for atonement and therefore not brought after its owner鈥檚 death, is brought even in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore will not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛专讬 诪讞诇讜拽转讱 讘爪讬讚讜 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗祝 讛讗砖诐

Rabbi Elazar said to him: Your side of the dispute is written in the mishna next to the opinion that you find difficult. Following the opinion in the mishna (2a) that only a sin offering and a Paschal offering are disqualified if they are slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.

讗诪专 讝讛讜 砖讗讜诪专讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗讚诐 讙讚讜诇 讛讜讗 拽讗诪讬谞讗 讗谞讗 诪砖谞讛 砖诇讬诪讛 讜讗转 讗诪专转 诇讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专

Reish Lakish said in reference to Rabbi Elazar: Is he the one of whom people say that he is a great man? I am referring to the entire mishna, specifically to the opinion of the first tanna, which is the accepted halakha. And you say to me that the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer resolves my difficulty?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗驻转讞 讗谞讗 驻转讞讗 诇谞驻砖讗讬 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 讜讙讜壮 讛讗讬 谞讚讘讛 谞讚专 讛讜讗 讻讜壮 讻讚诇注讬诇

Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis stated above: The verse states: 鈥淭hat which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.鈥 How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above. In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.

讬转讬讘 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讜专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讘专 讗讘讗 讜讬转讬讘 讗讘讬讬 讙讘讬讬讛讜 讜讬转讘讬 讜拽讗诪专讬 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗砖诐 讚诇讗 讗转讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜谞住讬讘 诇讛 转诇诪讜讚讗 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 讗讬诪讗 讛讘讗 讘谞讚专 讜讘谞讚讘讛 诇讬讬转讬 讜诇讗 诇讬专爪讬 讗砖诐 诇讗 诇讬讬转讬 讻诇诇

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitz岣k bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: The case of a guilt offering was difficult for Reish Lakish, as a guilt offering is not brought after the owner鈥檚 death, and he adduced the derivation from the verse: 鈥淭hat which has gone out of your lips,鈥 as a solution to it. This resolution is difficult: Why not say that only an offering that is brought for a vow or a gift is brought even in a case where it does not propitiate, since the verse mentions a vow and a gift; but a guilt offering, which is not brought voluntarily, should not be brought at all if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering. How does the verse resolve Reish Lakish鈥檚 difficulty?

讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讘讬讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪讛讻讗 驻转讞 讜砖讞讟 讗讜转讛 诇讞讟讗转 讗讜转讛 诇砖诪讛 讻砖专讛 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讛 驻住讜诇讛 讛讗 砖讗专 拽讚砖讬诐 砖诇讗 诇砖诪谉 讻砖专讬谉 讬讻讜诇 讬专爪讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱

Abaye said to them: Although Reish Lakish cited that verse, he actually introduced the solution to his difficulty from here: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33). It is derived from the word 鈥渋t鈥 in this verse that if a sin offering is slaughtered for its sake, it is fit; if it is slaughtered not for its sake, it is unfit. Consequently, other offerings slaughtered not for their sake, including a guilt offering, are fit. And since one might have thought that once they are fit, they also propitiate God, the verse states: 鈥淭hat which has gone out of your lips,鈥 from which it is derived that such an offering does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation.

讜讗讬诪讗 讛讘讗 讘谞讚专 讜谞讚讘讛 诇讬讬转讬 讜诇讗 诇讬专爪讬 讗砖诐 (谞诪讬) 讗专爪讜讬讬 谞诪讬 诇讬专爪讬

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitz岣k bar Abba asked him: But since the phrase in the verse 鈥渢hat which has gone out of your lips鈥 is referring to offerings brought for a vow or a gift, why not say that only these offerings do not propitiate God even though one must bring them if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, but a guilt offering slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God as well?

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗砖诐 讚诪讬专爪讬 诇讗 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪注讜诇讛 讜诪讛 注讜诇讛 砖讗讬谞讛 诪讻驻专转 讗讬谞讛 诪专爪讛 讗砖诐 砖诪讻驻专 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛

Abaye said in response: You cannot say that a guilt offering that was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God, due to an a fortiori inference from a burnt offering: Just as a burnt offering, which does not atone for a sin as it is brought as a vow or gift offering, still does not propitiate God if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, so too, with regard to a guilt offering, which atones for a sin and is therefore treated more stringently, is it not logical that it does not propitiate God?

诪讛 诇注讜诇讛 砖讻谉 讻诇讬诇

The Gemara challenges the inference: What is unique about a burnt offering? It is unique in that it is totally consumed on the altar. By contrast, the meat of a guilt offering is eaten by priests. Since in some ways a burnt offering is treated more stringently than a guilt offering, no a fortiori inference can be derived from one to the other.

砖诇诪讬诐 讬讜讻讬讞讜

The Gemara answers: A peace offering can prove that this aspect is not relevant, since it is not totally consumed on the altar, and still if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering it does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation. The inference can therefore be drawn from a peace offering rather than a burnt offering.

诪讛 诇砖诇诪讬诐 砖讻谉 讟注讜谞讬谉 谞住讻讬谉 讜转谞讜驻转 讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires libations, and the waving of the breast and the right hind leg.

注讜诇讛 转讜讻讬讞 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讜诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讛谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜砖讞讟谉 砖诇讗 诇砖诪谉 讻砖讬专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 讗砖诐 砖讛讜讗 拽讜讚砖 讜砖讞讟讜 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讜 讻砖专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since these stringencies do not apply to it. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this stage the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering, is not like the aspect of that case, the peace offering. And the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but they do not propitiate. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but it does not propitiate.

诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讻谉 讬砖谞讜 讘爪讬讘讜专

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about their common element, i.e., the common element of a burnt offering and a peace offering? These offerings are unique in that they are brought by the public. There are communal burnt offerings and peace offerings, but there are no communal guilt offerings.

转讜讚讛 转讜讻讬讞

The Gemara responds: A thanks offering can prove the point, since there are no communal thanks offerings, and still a thanks offering slaughtered not for its sake does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation.

诪讛 诇转讜讚讛 砖讻谉 讟注讜谞讛 诇讞诐

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a thanks offering? It is unique in that it requires a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.

注讜诇讛 讜砖诇诪讬诐 讬讜讻讬讞讜 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讜诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讛谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜砖讞讟谉 砖诇讗 诇砖诪谉 讻砖专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 讗砖诐 砖讛讜讗 拽讚砖 讜砖讞讟讜 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讜 讻砖专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove the point, as loaves are not brought with them. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, is not like the aspect of that case, a thanks offering, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate God. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but does not propitiate God.

诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讛谉 讘讗讬谉 讘谞讚专 讜讘谞讚讘讛

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about the common element of a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in that these offerings are brought either as a vow offering or as a gift offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讝讗转 讛转讜专讛 讜讙讜壮 讛拽讬砖讜 讛讻转讜讘 诇砖诇诪讬诐 诪讛 砖诇诪讬诐 砖讛谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜砖讞讟谉 砖诇讗 诇砖诪谉 讻砖专讬诐 讜讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 讗砖诐 砖讛讜讗 拽讜讚砖 讻讜壮

Rather, Rava says: The verse: 鈥淭his is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings鈥 (Leviticus 7:37), juxtaposes a guilt offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as peace offerings are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering, and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.

诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚讗拽砖转 诇砖诇诪讬诐 讗拽讬砖 诇讞讟讗转

The Gemara asks: What did you see, i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, that you compared a guilt offering to a peace offering? Why not compare it to a sin offering, which is disqualified in such a case?

讛讗 诪讬注讟 专讞诪谞讗 讗讜转讛

The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded all other offerings from the halakha concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33).

(住讬诪谉 讛谞砖 讘砖专)

The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the amora鈥檌m who participated in the two following discussions: Heh, nun, shin; beit, shin, reish.

讬转讬讘 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 砖砖转 讙讘讬讬讛讜 讜讬转讘讬 讜拽讗诪专讬 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗砖诐 讚诇讗 讗转讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗砖诐 谞诪讬 讗转讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

Rav Huna and Rav Na岣an were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised his difficulty with regard to a guilt offering, since it is not brought after its owner鈥檚 death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him that a guilt offering is also essentially brought after its owner鈥檚 death, since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 砖砖转 讗砖诐 诇诪讗讬 拽专讘 诇诪讜转专讜 讞讟讗转 谞诪讬 诪讬拽专讘 拽专讘讛 诪讜转专讛

Rav Sheshet said to them: This claim can be refuted: What element of a guilt offering is sacrificed after its owner鈥檚 death? Only its remainder, i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed, and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.

讞讟讗转 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚拽专讘讛 诪讜转专讛 诪讬注讟 专讞诪谞讗 讛讜讗

Rav Huna and Rav Na岣an explained: A sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified even though its remainder is sacrificed, because the Merciful One specifically excludes a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: 鈥淎nd he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase 鈥渋t is a sin offering鈥 teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.

讗砖诐 谞诪讬 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 it also written with regard to a guilt offering: 鈥淎nd the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering鈥 (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?

讛讛讜讗 诇讗讞专 讛拽讟专转 讗讬诪讜专讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 讻讚转谞讬讗 讗讘诇 讗砖诐 诇讗 谞讗诪专 讘讜 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讛拽讟专转 讗讬诪讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讗 注爪诪讜 讗诐 诇讗 讛拽讟讬专讜 讗讬诪讜专讬谉 讻砖专

The Gemara answers: That verse is written not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage after the burning of the offering鈥檚 sacrificial portions on the altar, as it is taught in a baraita: But with regard to a guilt offering, the term 鈥淚t is a guilt offering鈥 is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the guilt offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.

讜讗诇讗 讛讜讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖诐 砖谞讬转拽 诇专注讬讛 讜砖讞讟讜 住转诐 讻砖专

The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term 鈥淚t is a guilt offering鈥 to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.

谞讬转拽 讗讬谉 诇讗 谞讬转拽 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讛讜讗 讘讛讜讜讬讬转讜 讬讛讗

The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: 鈥淚t is a guilt offering,鈥 indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.

讬转讘讬 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜专讘 砖砖转 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 诪转谞讛 讙讘讬讬讛讜 讜讬转讘讬 讜拽讗诪专讬 讛讗 讚拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讘讗讬谉 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 砖讛谉 讻砖专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛谞讛讜 谞诪讬 诇讬讬转讜 讜诇讬专爪讜

Rav Na岣an and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: In response to that which Rabbi Elazar said to Reish Lakish: We have found a precedent for this situation in the case of offerings that are brought after their owners鈥 death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate God, let Reish Lakish say to him: These offerings should also be brought and propitiate God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 assumption?

讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 诪转谞讛 讬讜诇讚转 讗诐 讛讬讗 讬诇讚讛 讘谞讬讛 诪讬 讬诇讚讜

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How can the offering of a woman after childbirth propitiate God after her death? If she gave birth, did her children give birth?

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗住讬 讜诪讗谉 诇讬诪讗 诇谉 讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讻诪讛 注砖讛 讙讘讛 诇讗 诪讬转讻驻专讗 讜讻讬讜谉 讚讻讬 讗讬讻讗 讻诪讛 注砖讛 讙讘讛 诪讬讻驻专讗 讬讜专砖讬讛 谞诪讬 诪讬讻驻专

Rav Asi objects to this reasoning: And who shall say to us that if a woman has several violations of positive mitzvot for which to atone, she does not atone by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. And since, when she has several violations of positive mitzvot she atones by means of the offering, so too, if she dies, her heirs atone by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚拽谞讬讗 诇讛讜 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛谞讬讞 诪谞讞讛 诇砖谞讬 讘谞讬讜 讜诪转 拽专讬讘讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讜 砖讜转驻讜转 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 拽谞讬讗 诇讛讜 谞驻砖 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the offering is acquired by the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan say that if one left his two sons a meal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and it does not have the status of a meal offering brought in partnership? And if it enters your mind that the offering is acquired by the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淎nd when one brings a meal offering unto the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 2:1). The word 鈥渙ne鈥 teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.

讜诇讗 拽谞讬讗 诇讛讜 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛谞讬讞 讘讛诪讛 诇砖谞讬 讘谞讬讜 讜诪转 拽专讬讘讛 讜讗讬谉 诪诪讬专讬谉 讘讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 拽谞讬讗 诇讛讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讚讗讬谉 诪诪讬专讬谉 讘讛 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛讜 讻砖讜转驻讬谉

The Gemara asks: And is the offering not acquired by them? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan himself say that if one left his two sons an animal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it? Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. Granted, if you say that the offering is acquired by them, this is the reason that they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it: It is because they are like partners,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Zevachim 5

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Zevachim 5

诇讗 讬讚注 讘诪讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讝讗转 讛转讜专讛 讜讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讝讗转 讛转讜专讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讬驻住诇讜 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱

that we do not know what requirement does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: This is the law, juxtaposing all offerings with a peace offering, which must be performed for its own sake. And if the Merciful One had written only the verse: This is the law, I would say that offerings sacrificed not for their sake should be disqualified. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: That which is gone out of your lips, teaching that they are accepted, though they do not satisfy their owners鈥 obligations.

专诪讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 注诇 诪注讜讛讬 讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讜诪拽砖讬 讗诐 讻砖专讬诐 讛诐 讬专爪讜 讜讗诐 讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 诇诪讛 讘讗讬谉

Reish Lakish raised a difficulty while lying on his stomach in the study hall: If offerings that were sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or someone other than the owner are fit, let them propitiate God, i.e., let them satisfy the obligation of their owners; and if they do not propitiate God, why are they brought as offerings at all?

讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 (讗诇讬注讝专) [讗诇注讝专] 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讘讗讬谉 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 砖讛谉 讻砖专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 讚转谞谉 讛讗砖讛 砖讛讘讬讗讛 讞讟讗转讛 讜诪转讛 讬讘讬讗讜 讬讜专砖讬谉 注讜诇转讛 注讜诇转讛 讜诪转讛 诇讗 讬讘讬讗讜 讬讜专砖讬谉 讞讟讗转讛

Rabbi Elazar said to him: We have found a precedent for this in the case of offerings brought after the death of their owners, as they are fit, but they do not propitiate God, as they do not have owners requiring atonement. This is as we learned in a mishna (Kinnim 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin offering and then died, the heirs shall bring her burnt offering. If she brought her burnt offering and then died, the heirs shall not bring her sin offering. Evidently, a burnt offering is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讜讚讬谞讗 诇讱 讘注讜诇讛 讚讗转讬讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗砖诐 讚诇讗 讗转讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诪谞诇谉

Reish Lakish said to him: I concede to you with regard to a burnt offering that it is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation, since it is brought even after its owner鈥檚 death in the case of the woman who died after bringing her sin offering. But from where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is brought for atonement and therefore not brought after its owner鈥檚 death, is brought even in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore will not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛专讬 诪讞诇讜拽转讱 讘爪讬讚讜 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗祝 讛讗砖诐

Rabbi Elazar said to him: Your side of the dispute is written in the mishna next to the opinion that you find difficult. Following the opinion in the mishna (2a) that only a sin offering and a Paschal offering are disqualified if they are slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.

讗诪专 讝讛讜 砖讗讜诪专讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗讚诐 讙讚讜诇 讛讜讗 拽讗诪讬谞讗 讗谞讗 诪砖谞讛 砖诇讬诪讛 讜讗转 讗诪专转 诇讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专

Reish Lakish said in reference to Rabbi Elazar: Is he the one of whom people say that he is a great man? I am referring to the entire mishna, specifically to the opinion of the first tanna, which is the accepted halakha. And you say to me that the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer resolves my difficulty?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗驻转讞 讗谞讗 驻转讞讗 诇谞驻砖讗讬 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 讜讙讜壮 讛讗讬 谞讚讘讛 谞讚专 讛讜讗 讻讜壮 讻讚诇注讬诇

Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis stated above: The verse states: 鈥淭hat which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.鈥 How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above. In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.

讬转讬讘 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讜专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讘专 讗讘讗 讜讬转讬讘 讗讘讬讬 讙讘讬讬讛讜 讜讬转讘讬 讜拽讗诪专讬 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗砖诐 讚诇讗 讗转讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜谞住讬讘 诇讛 转诇诪讜讚讗 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 讗讬诪讗 讛讘讗 讘谞讚专 讜讘谞讚讘讛 诇讬讬转讬 讜诇讗 诇讬专爪讬 讗砖诐 诇讗 诇讬讬转讬 讻诇诇

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitz岣k bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: The case of a guilt offering was difficult for Reish Lakish, as a guilt offering is not brought after the owner鈥檚 death, and he adduced the derivation from the verse: 鈥淭hat which has gone out of your lips,鈥 as a solution to it. This resolution is difficult: Why not say that only an offering that is brought for a vow or a gift is brought even in a case where it does not propitiate, since the verse mentions a vow and a gift; but a guilt offering, which is not brought voluntarily, should not be brought at all if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering. How does the verse resolve Reish Lakish鈥檚 difficulty?

讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讘讬讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪讛讻讗 驻转讞 讜砖讞讟 讗讜转讛 诇讞讟讗转 讗讜转讛 诇砖诪讛 讻砖专讛 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讛 驻住讜诇讛 讛讗 砖讗专 拽讚砖讬诐 砖诇讗 诇砖诪谉 讻砖专讬谉 讬讻讜诇 讬专爪讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱

Abaye said to them: Although Reish Lakish cited that verse, he actually introduced the solution to his difficulty from here: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33). It is derived from the word 鈥渋t鈥 in this verse that if a sin offering is slaughtered for its sake, it is fit; if it is slaughtered not for its sake, it is unfit. Consequently, other offerings slaughtered not for their sake, including a guilt offering, are fit. And since one might have thought that once they are fit, they also propitiate God, the verse states: 鈥淭hat which has gone out of your lips,鈥 from which it is derived that such an offering does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation.

讜讗讬诪讗 讛讘讗 讘谞讚专 讜谞讚讘讛 诇讬讬转讬 讜诇讗 诇讬专爪讬 讗砖诐 (谞诪讬) 讗专爪讜讬讬 谞诪讬 诇讬专爪讬

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitz岣k bar Abba asked him: But since the phrase in the verse 鈥渢hat which has gone out of your lips鈥 is referring to offerings brought for a vow or a gift, why not say that only these offerings do not propitiate God even though one must bring them if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, but a guilt offering slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God as well?

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗砖诐 讚诪讬专爪讬 诇讗 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪注讜诇讛 讜诪讛 注讜诇讛 砖讗讬谞讛 诪讻驻专转 讗讬谞讛 诪专爪讛 讗砖诐 砖诪讻驻专 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛

Abaye said in response: You cannot say that a guilt offering that was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God, due to an a fortiori inference from a burnt offering: Just as a burnt offering, which does not atone for a sin as it is brought as a vow or gift offering, still does not propitiate God if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, so too, with regard to a guilt offering, which atones for a sin and is therefore treated more stringently, is it not logical that it does not propitiate God?

诪讛 诇注讜诇讛 砖讻谉 讻诇讬诇

The Gemara challenges the inference: What is unique about a burnt offering? It is unique in that it is totally consumed on the altar. By contrast, the meat of a guilt offering is eaten by priests. Since in some ways a burnt offering is treated more stringently than a guilt offering, no a fortiori inference can be derived from one to the other.

砖诇诪讬诐 讬讜讻讬讞讜

The Gemara answers: A peace offering can prove that this aspect is not relevant, since it is not totally consumed on the altar, and still if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering it does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation. The inference can therefore be drawn from a peace offering rather than a burnt offering.

诪讛 诇砖诇诪讬诐 砖讻谉 讟注讜谞讬谉 谞住讻讬谉 讜转谞讜驻转 讞讝讛 讜砖讜拽

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires libations, and the waving of the breast and the right hind leg.

注讜诇讛 转讜讻讬讞 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讜诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讛谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜砖讞讟谉 砖诇讗 诇砖诪谉 讻砖讬专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 讗砖诐 砖讛讜讗 拽讜讚砖 讜砖讞讟讜 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讜 讻砖专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since these stringencies do not apply to it. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this stage the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering, is not like the aspect of that case, the peace offering. And the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but they do not propitiate. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but it does not propitiate.

诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讻谉 讬砖谞讜 讘爪讬讘讜专

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about their common element, i.e., the common element of a burnt offering and a peace offering? These offerings are unique in that they are brought by the public. There are communal burnt offerings and peace offerings, but there are no communal guilt offerings.

转讜讚讛 转讜讻讬讞

The Gemara responds: A thanks offering can prove the point, since there are no communal thanks offerings, and still a thanks offering slaughtered not for its sake does not satisfy its owner鈥檚 obligation.

诪讛 诇转讜讚讛 砖讻谉 讟注讜谞讛 诇讞诐

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a thanks offering? It is unique in that it requires a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.

注讜诇讛 讜砖诇诪讬诐 讬讜讻讬讞讜 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讜诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讛谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜砖讞讟谉 砖诇讗 诇砖诪谉 讻砖专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 讗砖诐 砖讛讜讗 拽讚砖 讜砖讞讟讜 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讜 讻砖专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove the point, as loaves are not brought with them. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, is not like the aspect of that case, a thanks offering, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate God. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but does not propitiate God.

诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讛谉 讘讗讬谉 讘谞讚专 讜讘谞讚讘讛

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about the common element of a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in that these offerings are brought either as a vow offering or as a gift offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讝讗转 讛转讜专讛 讜讙讜壮 讛拽讬砖讜 讛讻转讜讘 诇砖诇诪讬诐 诪讛 砖诇诪讬诐 砖讛谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜砖讞讟谉 砖诇讗 诇砖诪谉 讻砖专讬诐 讜讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 讗砖诐 砖讛讜讗 拽讜讚砖 讻讜壮

Rather, Rava says: The verse: 鈥淭his is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings鈥 (Leviticus 7:37), juxtaposes a guilt offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as peace offerings are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering, and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.

诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚讗拽砖转 诇砖诇诪讬诐 讗拽讬砖 诇讞讟讗转

The Gemara asks: What did you see, i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, that you compared a guilt offering to a peace offering? Why not compare it to a sin offering, which is disqualified in such a case?

讛讗 诪讬注讟 专讞诪谞讗 讗讜转讛

The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded all other offerings from the halakha concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33).

(住讬诪谉 讛谞砖 讘砖专)

The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the amora鈥檌m who participated in the two following discussions: Heh, nun, shin; beit, shin, reish.

讬转讬讘 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 砖砖转 讙讘讬讬讛讜 讜讬转讘讬 讜拽讗诪专讬 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗砖诐 讚诇讗 讗转讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗砖诐 谞诪讬 讗转讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

Rav Huna and Rav Na岣an were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised his difficulty with regard to a guilt offering, since it is not brought after its owner鈥檚 death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him that a guilt offering is also essentially brought after its owner鈥檚 death, since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 砖砖转 讗砖诐 诇诪讗讬 拽专讘 诇诪讜转专讜 讞讟讗转 谞诪讬 诪讬拽专讘 拽专讘讛 诪讜转专讛

Rav Sheshet said to them: This claim can be refuted: What element of a guilt offering is sacrificed after its owner鈥檚 death? Only its remainder, i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed, and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.

讞讟讗转 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚拽专讘讛 诪讜转专讛 诪讬注讟 专讞诪谞讗 讛讜讗

Rav Huna and Rav Na岣an explained: A sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified even though its remainder is sacrificed, because the Merciful One specifically excludes a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: 鈥淎nd he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase 鈥渋t is a sin offering鈥 teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.

讗砖诐 谞诪讬 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 it also written with regard to a guilt offering: 鈥淎nd the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering鈥 (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?

讛讛讜讗 诇讗讞专 讛拽讟专转 讗讬诪讜专讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 讻讚转谞讬讗 讗讘诇 讗砖诐 诇讗 谞讗诪专 讘讜 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讛拽讟专转 讗讬诪讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讗 注爪诪讜 讗诐 诇讗 讛拽讟讬专讜 讗讬诪讜专讬谉 讻砖专

The Gemara answers: That verse is written not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage after the burning of the offering鈥檚 sacrificial portions on the altar, as it is taught in a baraita: But with regard to a guilt offering, the term 鈥淚t is a guilt offering鈥 is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the guilt offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.

讜讗诇讗 讛讜讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖诐 砖谞讬转拽 诇专注讬讛 讜砖讞讟讜 住转诐 讻砖专

The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term 鈥淚t is a guilt offering鈥 to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.

谞讬转拽 讗讬谉 诇讗 谞讬转拽 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讛讜讗 讘讛讜讜讬讬转讜 讬讛讗

The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: 鈥淚t is a guilt offering,鈥 indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.

讬转讘讬 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜专讘 砖砖转 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 诪转谞讛 讙讘讬讬讛讜 讜讬转讘讬 讜拽讗诪专讬 讛讗 讚拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讘讗讬谉 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 砖讛谉 讻砖专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪专爪讬谉 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛谞讛讜 谞诪讬 诇讬讬转讜 讜诇讬专爪讜

Rav Na岣an and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: In response to that which Rabbi Elazar said to Reish Lakish: We have found a precedent for this situation in the case of offerings that are brought after their owners鈥 death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate God, let Reish Lakish say to him: These offerings should also be brought and propitiate God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 assumption?

讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 诪转谞讛 讬讜诇讚转 讗诐 讛讬讗 讬诇讚讛 讘谞讬讛 诪讬 讬诇讚讜

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How can the offering of a woman after childbirth propitiate God after her death? If she gave birth, did her children give birth?

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗住讬 讜诪讗谉 诇讬诪讗 诇谉 讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讻诪讛 注砖讛 讙讘讛 诇讗 诪讬转讻驻专讗 讜讻讬讜谉 讚讻讬 讗讬讻讗 讻诪讛 注砖讛 讙讘讛 诪讬讻驻专讗 讬讜专砖讬讛 谞诪讬 诪讬讻驻专

Rav Asi objects to this reasoning: And who shall say to us that if a woman has several violations of positive mitzvot for which to atone, she does not atone by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. And since, when she has several violations of positive mitzvot she atones by means of the offering, so too, if she dies, her heirs atone by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚拽谞讬讗 诇讛讜 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛谞讬讞 诪谞讞讛 诇砖谞讬 讘谞讬讜 讜诪转 拽专讬讘讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讜 砖讜转驻讜转 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 拽谞讬讗 诇讛讜 谞驻砖 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the offering is acquired by the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan say that if one left his two sons a meal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and it does not have the status of a meal offering brought in partnership? And if it enters your mind that the offering is acquired by the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淎nd when one brings a meal offering unto the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 2:1). The word 鈥渙ne鈥 teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.

讜诇讗 拽谞讬讗 诇讛讜 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛谞讬讞 讘讛诪讛 诇砖谞讬 讘谞讬讜 讜诪转 拽专讬讘讛 讜讗讬谉 诪诪讬专讬谉 讘讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 拽谞讬讗 诇讛讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讚讗讬谉 诪诪讬专讬谉 讘讛 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛讜 讻砖讜转驻讬谉

The Gemara asks: And is the offering not acquired by them? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan himself say that if one left his two sons an animal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it? Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. Granted, if you say that the offering is acquired by them, this is the reason that they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it: It is because they are like partners,

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