Zevachim 5

לא ידע במאי כתב רחמנא זאת התורה ואי כתב רחמנא זאת התורה הוה אמינא ליפסלו כתב רחמנא מוצא שפתיך

that we do not know what requirement does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: This is the law, juxtaposing all offerings with a peace offering, which must be performed for its own sake. And if the Merciful One had written only the verse: This is the law, I would say that offerings sacrificed not for their sake should be disqualified. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: That which is gone out of your lips, teaching that they are accepted, though they do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.

רמי ריש לקיש על מעוהי בי מדרשא ומקשי אם כשרים הם ירצו ואם אין מרצין למה באין

§ Reish Lakish raised a difficulty while lying on his stomach in the study hall: If offerings that were sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or someone other than the owner are fit, let them propitiate God, i.e., let them satisfy the obligation of their owners; and if they do not propitiate God, why are they brought as offerings at all?

אמר לו רבי (אליעזר) [אלעזר] מצינו בבאין לאחר מיתה שהן כשרין ואין מרצין דתנן האשה שהביאה חטאתה ומתה יביאו יורשין עולתה עולתה ומתה לא יביאו יורשין חטאתה

Rabbi Elazar said to him: We have found a precedent for this in the case of offerings brought after the death of their owners, as they are fit, but they do not propitiate God, as they do not have owners requiring atonement. This is as we learned in a mishna (Kinnim 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin offering and then died, the heirs shall bring her burnt offering. If she brought her burnt offering and then died, the heirs shall not bring her sin offering. Evidently, a burnt offering is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.

אמר ליה מודינא לך בעולה דאתיא לאחר מיתה אשם דלא אתי לאחר מיתה מנלן

Reish Lakish said to him: I concede to you with regard to a burnt offering that it is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation, since it is brought even after its owner’s death in the case of the woman who died after bringing her sin offering. But from where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is brought for atonement and therefore not brought after its owner’s death, is brought even in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore will not satisfy its owner’s obligation?

אמר ליה הרי מחלוקתך בצידו רבי אליעזר אומר אף האשם

Rabbi Elazar said to him: Your side of the dispute is written in the mishna next to the opinion that you find difficult. Following the opinion in the mishna (2a) that only a sin offering and a Paschal offering are disqualified if they are slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.

אמר זהו שאומרין עליו אדם גדול הוא קאמינא אנא משנה שלימה ואת אמרת לי רבי אליעזר

Reish Lakish said in reference to Rabbi Elazar: Is he the one of whom people say that he is a great man? I am referring to the entire mishna, specifically to the opinion of the first tanna, which is the accepted halakha. And you say to me that the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer resolves my difficulty?

אלא אמר ריש לקיש אפתח אנא פתחא לנפשאי מוצא שפתיך וגו׳ האי נדבה נדר הוא כו׳ כדלעיל

Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis stated above: The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.” How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above. In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.

יתיב רבי זירא ורבי יצחק בר אבא ויתיב אביי גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי קשיא ליה לריש לקיש אשם דלא אתי לאחר מיתה ונסיב לה תלמודא מוצא שפתיך אימא הבא בנדר ובנדבה לייתי ולא לירצי אשם לא לייתי כלל

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: The case of a guilt offering was difficult for Reish Lakish, as a guilt offering is not brought after the owner’s death, and he adduced the derivation from the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” as a solution to it. This resolution is difficult: Why not say that only an offering that is brought for a vow or a gift is brought even in a case where it does not propitiate, since the verse mentions a vow and a gift; but a guilt offering, which is not brought voluntarily, should not be brought at all if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering. How does the verse resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty?

אמר להו אביי ריש לקיש מהכא פתח ושחט אותה לחטאת אותה לשמה כשרה שלא לשמה פסולה הא שאר קדשים שלא לשמן כשרין יכול ירצו תלמוד לומר מוצא שפתיך

Abaye said to them: Although Reish Lakish cited that verse, he actually introduced the solution to his difficulty from here: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). It is derived from the word “it” in this verse that if a sin offering is slaughtered for its sake, it is fit; if it is slaughtered not for its sake, it is unfit. Consequently, other offerings slaughtered not for their sake, including a guilt offering, are fit. And since one might have thought that once they are fit, they also propitiate God, the verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips,” from which it is derived that such an offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.

ואימא הבא בנדר ונדבה לייתי ולא לירצי אשם (נמי) ארצויי נמי לירצי

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba asked him: But since the phrase in the verse “that which has gone out of your lips” is referring to offerings brought for a vow or a gift, why not say that only these offerings do not propitiate God even though one must bring them if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, but a guilt offering slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God as well?

אמר אביי אשם דמירצי לא מצית אמרת קל וחומר מעולה ומה עולה שאינה מכפרת אינה מרצה אשם שמכפר אינו דין שאינו מרצה

Abaye said in response: You cannot say that a guilt offering that was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God, due to an a fortiori inference from a burnt offering: Just as a burnt offering, which does not atone for a sin as it is brought as a vow or gift offering, still does not propitiate God if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, so too, with regard to a guilt offering, which atones for a sin and is therefore treated more stringently, is it not logical that it does not propitiate God?

מה לעולה שכן כליל

The Gemara challenges the inference: What is unique about a burnt offering? It is unique in that it is totally consumed on the altar. By contrast, the meat of a guilt offering is eaten by priests. Since in some ways a burnt offering is treated more stringently than a guilt offering, no a fortiori inference can be derived from one to the other.

שלמים יוכיחו

The Gemara answers: A peace offering can prove that this aspect is not relevant, since it is not totally consumed on the altar, and still if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. The inference can therefore be drawn from a peace offering rather than a burnt offering.

מה לשלמים שכן טעונין נסכין ותנופת חזה ושוק

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires libations, and the waving of the breast and the right hind leg.

עולה תוכיח וחזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה ולא ראי זה כראי זה הצד השוה שבהן שהן קדשים ושחטן שלא לשמן כשירין ואין מרצין אף אני אביא אשם שהוא קודש ושחטו שלא לשמו כשר ואינו מרצה

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since these stringencies do not apply to it. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this stage the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering, is not like the aspect of that case, the peace offering. And the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but they do not propitiate. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but it does not propitiate.

מה להצד השוה שבהן שכן ישנו בציבור

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about their common element, i.e., the common element of a burnt offering and a peace offering? These offerings are unique in that they are brought by the public. There are communal burnt offerings and peace offerings, but there are no communal guilt offerings.

תודה תוכיח

The Gemara responds: A thanks offering can prove the point, since there are no communal thanks offerings, and still a thanks offering slaughtered not for its sake does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.

מה לתודה שכן טעונה לחם

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a thanks offering? It is unique in that it requires a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.

עולה ושלמים יוכיחו וחזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה ולא ראי זה כראי זה הצד השוה שבהן שהן קדשים ושחטן שלא לשמן כשר ואינו מרצה אף אני אביא אשם שהוא קדש ושחטו שלא לשמו כשר ואינו מרצה

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove the point, as loaves are not brought with them. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, is not like the aspect of that case, a thanks offering, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate God. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but does not propitiate God.

מה להצד השוה שבהן שהן באין בנדר ובנדבה

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about the common element of a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in that these offerings are brought either as a vow offering or as a gift offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.

אלא אמר רבא זאת התורה וגו׳ הקישו הכתוב לשלמים מה שלמים שהן קדשים ושחטן שלא לשמן כשרים ואין מרצין אף אני אביא אשם שהוא קודש כו׳

Rather, Rava says: The verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), juxtaposes a guilt offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as peace offerings are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering, and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.

מאי חזית דאקשת לשלמים אקיש לחטאת

The Gemara asks: What did you see, i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, that you compared a guilt offering to a peace offering? Why not compare it to a sin offering, which is disqualified in such a case?

הא מיעט רחמנא אותה

The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded all other offerings from the halakha concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33).

(סימן הנש בשר)

The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the amora’im who participated in the two following discussions: Heh, nun, shin; beit, shin, reish.

יתיב רב הונא ורב נחמן ויתיב רב ששת גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי קשיא ליה לריש לקיש אשם דלא אתי לאחר מיתה לימא ליה רבי אלעזר אשם נמי אתי לאחר מיתה

Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised his difficulty with regard to a guilt offering, since it is not brought after its owner’s death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him that a guilt offering is also essentially brought after its owner’s death, since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.

אמר להו רב ששת אשם למאי קרב למותרו חטאת נמי מיקרב קרבה מותרה

Rav Sheshet said to them: This claim can be refuted: What element of a guilt offering is sacrificed after its owner’s death? Only its remainder, i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed, and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.

חטאת אף על גב דקרבה מותרה מיעט רחמנא הוא

Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman explained: A sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified even though its remainder is sacrificed, because the Merciful One specifically excludes a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase “it is a sin offering” teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.

אשם נמי כתיב ביה הוא

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it also written with regard to a guilt offering: “And the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?

ההוא לאחר הקטרת אימורים הוא דכתיב כדתניא אבל אשם לא נאמר בו הוא אלא לאחר הקטרת אימורין והוא עצמו אם לא הקטירו אימורין כשר

The Gemara answers: That verse is written not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage after the burning of the offering’s sacrificial portions on the altar, as it is taught in a baraita: But with regard to a guilt offering, the term “It is a guilt offering” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the guilt offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.

ואלא הוא למה לי לכדרב הונא אמר רב דאמר רב הונא אמר רב אשם שניתק לרעיה ושחטו סתם כשר

The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “It is a guilt offering” to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.

ניתק אין לא ניתק לא מאי טעמא אמר קרא הוא בהווייתו יהא

The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “It is a guilt offering,” indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.

יתבי רב נחמן ורב ששת ויתיב רב אדא בר מתנה גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי הא דקאמר רבי אלעזר מצינו בבאין לאחר מיתה שהן כשרין ואין מרצין לימא ליה ריש לקיש הנהו נמי לייתו ולירצו

§ Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: In response to that which Rabbi Elazar said to Reish Lakish: We have found a precedent for this situation in the case of offerings that are brought after their owners’ death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate God, let Reish Lakish say to him: These offerings should also be brought and propitiate God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar’s assumption?

אמר להן רב אדא בר מתנה יולדת אם היא ילדה בניה מי ילדו

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How can the offering of a woman after childbirth propitiate God after her death? If she gave birth, did her children give birth?

מתקיף לה רב אסי ומאן לימא לן דאי איכא כמה עשה גבה לא מיתכפרא וכיון דכי איכא כמה עשה גבה מיכפרא יורשיה נמי מיכפר

Rav Asi objects to this reasoning: And who shall say to us that if a woman has several violations of positive mitzvot for which to atone, she does not atone by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. And since, when she has several violations of positive mitzvot she atones by means of the offering, so too, if she dies, her heirs atone by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.

למימרא דקניא להו והאמר רבי יוחנן הניח מנחה לשני בניו ומת קריבה ואין בו שותפות ואי סלקא דעתך קניא להו נפש אמר רחמנא

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the offering is acquired by the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that if one left his two sons a meal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and it does not have the status of a meal offering brought in partnership? And if it enters your mind that the offering is acquired by the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when one brings a meal offering unto the Lord” (Leviticus 2:1). The word “one” teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.

ולא קניא להו והאמר רבי יוחנן הניח בהמה לשני בניו ומת קריבה ואין ממירין בה אי אמרת בשלמא קניא להו היינו דאין ממירין בה דהויא להו כשותפין

The Gemara asks: And is the offering not acquired by them? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that if one left his two sons an animal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it? Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. Granted, if you say that the offering is acquired by them, this is the reason that they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it: It is because they are like partners,