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Today's Daf Yomi

April 20, 2018 | 讛壮 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Zevachim 7

There is a debate regarding a Toda that is sacrificed for someone else who needs to bring a Toda offering. Rava brings a number of halachot regarding problems with intentions during the sacrifical聽rites. From where is the halacha derived that a Pesach sacrifice that is done with the intention of being a different type of sacrifice or for the wrong people it is entirely disqualified (like the sin offering)?


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诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讬谉 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬诐 诇讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬谉

according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Apparently Rabbi Shimon does not accept the notion that the court can stipulate that there be a delay in the consecration of communal offerings, and the baraita can be adduced as evidence that offerings atone for transgressions committed after their designation as offerings.

讜注讜讚 讛讗 讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪专讘讬 讝讬专讗 砖注讬专讬 注爪专转 砖拽讘诇 讚诪谉 讘砖谞讬 讻讜住讜转 讜谞讝专拽 讚诪讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉 砖谞讬 诇诪讛 讛讜讗 讘讗 注诇 讟讜诪讗讛 砖讗讜专注讛 讘讬谉 [讝专讬拽讛 砖诇] 讝讛 诇讝讛 (谞讝专拽 讚诪讜 砖诇 砖谞讬 诇诪讛 讛讜讗 拽专讬讘讬谉)

And furthermore, continued Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, one can otherwise infer from the goats sacrificed on Shavuot that an offering can atone for transgressions committed after designation; as Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If the goats sacrificed on Shavuot were slaughtered simultaneously and their blood was collected in two cups, and the blood of the first goat was sprinkled, for what sin is the second goat brought? There was no time in the interim for other transgressions to occur. Rabbi Zeira answered: It atones for any incident involving impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the blood of that first goat and the sprinkling of the blood of this second goat.

注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 注砖讛 讚诇讗讞专 砖讞讬讟讛 讗讘诇 注砖讛 讚诇讗讞专 讛驻专砖讛 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛

One can infer: Rabbi Yirmeya raised the dilemma only about whether or not an offering atones for the violation of a positive mitzva committed after its slaughter and before the sprinkling of the blood. But with regard to the violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after the designation of the offering, before its slaughter, he did not raise the dilemma. Apparently, it was obvious to him that the offering atones for such a violation.

讚诇诪讗 讗诐 转讬诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 拽讗诪专

The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps Rabbi Yirmeya鈥檚 dilemma was also with regard to the violations committed after designation. He phrased his question to apply to violations committed after slaughter because he was saying: Even if you say that an offering atones for violations committed after designation, does it atone for those violations committed after slaughter? It may be that neither issue was clear to him.

讗讬转诪专 转讜讚讛 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 转讜讚转 讞讘讬专讜 (讻砖专讛) 专讘讛 讗诪专 讻砖专讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 驻住讜诇讛

It was stated with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another鈥檚 thanks offering: Rabba says that it is fit and satisfies its owner鈥檚 obligation, and Rav 岣sda says it is unfit in this regard.

专讘讛 讗诪专 讻砖专讛 转讜讚讛 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 谞砖讞讟讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 驻住讜诇讛 诇砖讜诐 砖诇诪讬诐 讚讬讚讬讛 谞砖讞讟讛 讘注讬谞谉

Rabba says it is fit because the thanks offering was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering. Rav 岣sda says it is unfit because it must be slaughtered for the sake of his own peace offering.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞讬讗 讜讘砖专 讝讘讞 转讜讚转 砖诇诪讬讜 讘讬讜诐 讛拽专讬讘讜 讗转 讝讘讞讜 讜讙讜壮 讗讘讗 讞谞讬谉 讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘讗 诇诇诪讚 转讜讚讛 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 砖诇诪讬诐 讻砖专讛 砖诇诪讬诐 砖谞砖讞讟讜 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 驻住讜诇讬诐 讜诪讛 讛驻专砖 讘讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 转讜讚讛 拽专讜讬讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讜讗讬谉 砖诇诪讬诐 拽专讜讬讬谉 转讜讚讛

Rabba said: From where do I say that it is fit? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offeringon the day that he presents his offering it shall be eaten鈥 (Leviticus 7:15鈥16). Abba 岣nin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The verse comes to teach that a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit, whereas a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. And what is the difference between this offering and that offering? A thanks offering is called a peace offering in the verse, but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.

砖诇诪讬诐 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 驻住讜诇讛 讛讗 转讜讚讛 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 讻砖专讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讞讘专讬讛

Rabba explains: The baraita indicates that a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, but a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of some other thanks offering is fit. What, is it not referring to the thanks offering of another, teaching that it satisfies its owner鈥檚 obligation?

诇讗 讚讬讚讬讛

The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to another thanks offering of his own, which he designated to give thanks for another incident of deliverance.

讗讘诇 讚讞讘专讬讛 诪讗讬 驻住讜诇讛 讗讚转谞讬 砖诇诪讬诐 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇讬转谞讬 转讜讚讛 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 砖诇诪讬诐 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛

The Gemara asks: But if one slaughtered his thanks offering for the sake of another鈥檚 thanks offering, what is the halakha? Is it unfit, i.e., it does it not satisfy the owner鈥檚 obligation? If so, rather than teaching that a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, let the baraita teach that a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another鈥檚 thanks offering is unfit, and one could infer that all the more so a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit.

砖诇诪讬诐 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 讚讬讚讬讛 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诪讚转讜讚讛 拽专讜讬讛 砖诇诪讬诐 砖诇诪讬诐 谞诪讬 拽专讜讬讬谉 转讜讚讛 讜讻讬 砖讞讬讟 诇讛讜 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 诇讬讻砖专讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the baraita to specify a case where a peace offering was slaughtered for the sake of his own thanks offering. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since a thanks offering is called a peace offering, a peace offering is called a thanks offering as well, and therefore when one slaughters a peace offering for the sake of a thanks offering it should be fit. Therefore the baraita teaches us that this is not the case.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转 讻砖讬专讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛

Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering he was obligated to bring is fit; but if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讜砖讞讟 讗讜转讛 诇讞讟讗转 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛专讬 讞讟讗转 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转 谞砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛

What is the reason for this distinction? The Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33), and therefore, as long as the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, even another sin offering, it is fit. But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 驻住讜诇讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 注讜诇讛 讻砖专讛

And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner, but who nevertheless was obligated to bring a sin offering, is unfit. But if one slaughtered it for one who was obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讜讻驻专 注诇讬讜 注诇讬讜 讜诇讗 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 讞讘讬专讜 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讬讚讬讛 讘诪讞讜讬讬讘 讻驻专讛 讻诪讜转讜

What is the reason for this distinction? The Torah states: 鈥淎nd he shall be forgiven鈥 (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that it must be specifically he, the owner, who shall be forgiven, and not another person. The other person to whom this is referring, with regard to whom the offering is disqualified, is presumably similar to the owner in that he is also obligated to achieve atonement similar to the owner鈥檚 by bringing a sin offering. Whereas if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering, and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖讗讬谞讜 诪讞讜讬讬讘 讻诇讜诐 驻住讜诇讛 砖讗讬谉 诇讱 讗讚诐 讘讬砖专讗诇 砖讗讬谞讜 诪讞讜讬讬讘 注砖讛

And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not obligated to bring anything is unfit, as there is no person among the Jewish people who is not obligated to bring an offering for violating a positive mitzva. Therefore, the one for whom he slaughtered the offering is considered one who was obligated to bring a sin offering.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 诪讻驻专转 注诇 讞讬讬讘讬 注砖讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 注诇 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 诪讻驻专转 注诇 讞讬讬讘讬 注砖讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

And Rava says that a sin offering atones for those obligated to bring a burnt offering for violating a positive mitzva, due to an a fortiori inference: If a sin offering atones for those who are liable for transgressions for which one receives excision from the World-to-Come if he performs them intentionally, all the more so is it not clear that it atones for those liable for failing to fulfill a positive mitzva?

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讘转 诪讬谞讛 讛讬讗 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 驻住讜诇讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 注讜诇讛 讻砖专讛

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the violation of a positive mitzva is of the same type as the sins atoned for by a sin offering? But doesn鈥檛 Rava say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who was obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, but if it was slaughtered for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit, as he is not obligated to provide a similar atonement? Given that burnt offerings atone for violations of positive mitzvot, apparently such atonement is of a different type than atonement for the transgression of prohibitions.

诪拽讬讘注讗 诇讗 诪讻驻专讗 诪拽讜驻讬讗 诪讻驻专讗

The Gemara answers: A sin offering does not atone for violating a positive mitzva by its essence, since prohibitions and positive mitzvot are not of the same type, but it atones for it incidentally.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 注讜诇讛 砖砖讞讟讛 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讛 讗住讜专 诇讝专讜拽 讚诪讛 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讛

And Rava says: As for a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽专讗 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 住讘专讗 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽专讗 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 转砖诪专 讜讙讜壮 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 住讘专讗 诪砖讜诐 讚砖谞讬 讘讛 讻讜壮 讻讚专讬砖 驻讬专拽讗

Why is this so? If you wish, cite a verse; and if you wish, propose a logical argument. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, cite a verse: 鈥淭hat which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:24). The derivation from this verse was explained in 2a. If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its slaughter, shall he continue to deviate from protocol in the rest of the sacrificial process? This is as it was stated at the beginning of the chapter (2a).

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 注讜诇讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 砖讞讟讛 讘砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 驻住讜诇讛 讘砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 讻砖专讛 讚讗讬谉 讘注诇讬诐 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

And Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that is brought by its owner鈥檚 heirs after his death, if one slaughtered it with a deviation from the type of offering, i.e., for the sake of another type of offering, it is unfit, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner鈥檚 obligation, and the heirs must therefore bring another offering. But if it was slaughtered with a deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., for the sake of another person, it is fit, as the offering has no legal owner after the owner鈥檚 death.

讜专讘 驻谞讞住 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪讬 讗诪专 讬砖 讘注诇讬诐 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇专讘 驻谞讞住 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪讬 讚讜拽讗 拽讗诪专 诪专 讬砖 讘注诇讬诐 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜讘注讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 注讜诇讛 讗讞专讬转讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讻诪讛 注砖讛 讙讘讬讛 诪讻驻专讗

And Rav Pine岣s, son of Rav Ami, says that an offering has an owner after its owner鈥檚 death, specifically, the heir. Rav Ashi said to Rav Pine岣s, son of Rav Ami: Is the Master saying that an offering actually has an owner after its owner鈥檚 death, and that if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir must bring another burnt offering, contrary to the opinion of Rava? Or perhaps the Master is merely saying that if the heir has several violations of positive mitzvot, the offering atones for them, but still if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir is not required to bring another offering.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讚讜拽讗 拽讗诪讬谞讗

Rav Pine岣s said to him: I am saying that the heir is actually the owner, and if the offering was slaughtered for someone else, he must bring another offering.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 注讜诇讛 讚讜专讜谉 讛讬讗 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚诇讬讻讗 转砖讜讘讛 讝讘讞 专砖注讬诐 转讜注讘讛 讜讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 转砖讜讘讛 讛转谞讬讗 注讘专 注诇 诪爪讜转 注砖讛 讜砖讘 诇讗 讝讝 诪砖诐 注讚 砖诪讜讞诇讬诐 诇讜 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚讜专讜谉 讛讜讗

And Rava says: A burnt offering is a gift [doron] to God; its essential purpose is not atonement. Rava supports his assertion: What are the circumstances under which a burnt offering atones for violating a positive mitzva? If one brings a burnt offering without repentance for his transgression, he may not sacrifice it at all, as 鈥渢he sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination鈥 (Proverbs 21:27). And if there is repentance, isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that if one violates a positive mitzva and repents, God forgives him before he even moves from his place? If so, why is he required to bring an offering? Rather, conclude from it that a burnt offering is a gift that one brings in order to appease God even after he is forgiven.

(讞讟讗转 注诇 诪讬 诪讻驻专 注讜诇讛 诇讗讞专 讚讜专讜谉 住讬诪谉)

The Gemara states a mnemonic for this series of statements by Rava: A sin offering atones for who, a burnt offering after a gift.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讞讟讗转 诇诪讛 讘讗讛 诇诪讛 讘讗讛 诇讻驻专 讗诇讗 诇诪讛 讘讗讛 诇驻谞讬 注讜诇讛 诇驻专拽诇讬讟 砖谞讻谞住 [专讬爪讛 驻专拽诇讬讟 谞讻谞住] 讚讜专讜谉 讗讞专讬讜

This last statement of Rava is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said: For what purpose is a sin offering brought? The Gemara interrupts: For what purpose is it brought? Is it not brought to atone for a transgression? Rather, Rabbi Shimon clearly meant: For what reason is it brought before a burnt offering in all circumstances where both are brought? Rabbi Shimon answered: It is comparable to an advocate [lifraklit] who enters before the king to convince him to pardon the defendant. Once the advocate has appeased the king, the gift is brought in after him.

讞讜抓 诪谉 讛驻住讞 讜讛讞讟讗转 讻讜壮 驻住讞 诪谞诇谉

搂 The mishna teaches that all offerings are fit even if slaughtered not for their sake, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a Paschal offering is required to be slaughtered for its sake?

讚讻转讬讘 砖诪讜专 讗转 讞讚砖 讛讗讘讬讘 讜注砖讬转 驻住讞 砖讬讛讜 讻诇 注砖讬讜转讬讜 诇砖诐 驻住讞

The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: 鈥淥bserve the month of the spring and offer [ve鈥檃sita] the Paschal offering鈥 (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaching that all of the actions [asiyyotav] of the Paschal offering, all of its sacrificial rites, must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 诪谞诇谉

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that deviation from the type of offering is prohibited. From where do we derive that deviation with regard to the owner is also prohibited?

讚讻转讬讘 讜讗诪专转诐 讝讘讞 驻住讞 讛讜讗 砖转讛讗 讝讘讬讞讛 诇砖诐 驻住讞 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 转谞讬讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐

The Gemara answers that this is derived from a verse, as it is written: 鈥淎nd you shall say: It is the sacrifice [zeva岣] of the Lord鈥檚 Passover鈥 (Exodus 12:27), which indicates that the slaughter [zevi岣] must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering. If the verse is not necessary in order to derive the matter of deviation from the type of offering, as that halakha is derived from Deuteronomy 16:1, apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner.

讗砖讻讞谉 诇诪爪讜讛 诇注讻讘 诪谞诇谉

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that these intentions are indispensable and, if lacking, disqualify the offering?

讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讝讘讞转 驻住讞 诇讛壮 讗诇讛讬讱 讜讙讜壮

The Gemara answers: The verse states: 鈥淎nd you shall sacrifice [vezava岣a] the Paschal offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd鈥 (Deuteronomy 16:2). By repeating the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner, the Torah indicates that these two intentions are both indispensable to the sacrificial process.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 住驻专讗 讛讗讬 讜讝讘讞转 诇讛讻讬 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讛讗讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 诪谞讬谉 诇诪讜转专 驻住讞 砖拽专讘 砖诇诪讬诐 砖谞讗诪专 讜讝讘讞转 驻住讞 诇讛壮 讗诇讛讬讱 爪讗谉 讜讘拽专 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谉 驻住讞 讘讗 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讻讘砖讬诐 讜诪谉 讛注讝讬诐 诪讻讗谉 诇诪讜转专 讛驻住讞 砖讬讛讗 诇讚讘专 讛讘讗 诪谉 讛爪讗谉 讜诪谉 讛讘拽专 讜诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 砖诇诪讬诐

Rav Safra objects to this: Does this verse: 鈥淎nd you shall sacrifice,鈥 come to teach this halakha? It is necessary for the statement of Rav Na岣an, as Rav Na岣an says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated but not ultimately sacrificed on Passover eve, is sacrificed as a peace offering afterward? It is derived from that which is stated: 鈥淎nd you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd.鈥 The verse is difficult: But isn鈥檛 a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? From here it is derived that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 住驻专讗 讜讝讘讞转 驻住讞 诇讻讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖诪讜专 讗转 讞讚砖 讛讗讘讬讘 诇诪爪讜讛 讘砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 讜讗诪专转诐 讝讘讞 驻住讞 讘砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 诇诪爪讜讛 讛讜讗 诇注讻讘 讘讬谉 讛讻讗 讜讛讻讗

Rather, Rav Safra says that the verses should be expounded as follows: The verse 鈥淎nd you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering鈥 teaches the statement of Rav Na岣an, that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. The verse: 鈥淥bserve the month of the spring and offer the Paschal offering鈥 (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaches that there is a mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering without deviation from the type of offering. The verse: 鈥淎nd you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Lord鈥檚 Passover鈥 (Exodus 12:27), teaches that there is a mitzva to slaughter it without deviation with regard to the owner. The term 鈥渋t is鈥 in the latter verse teaches that both here and there, i.e., with regard to both the offering and the owner, proper intent is indispensable.

讜讗砖讻讞谉 讝讘讬讞讛 砖讗专 注讘讜讚讜转 诪谞诇谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讙诇讬 讙诇讬

Rav Safra continues: And we found a source for slaughter. From where do we derive that other sacrificial rites must also be performed for the sake of the owner or the offering is disqualified? Since the Torah revealed that this intention is indispensable to the proper slaughter of the Paschal offering, it thereby revealed that it is critical to proper performance of the other rites as well.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讙诇讬 讙诇讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗诇讗 [注讘讜讚讜转] 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘 讝讗转 讛转讜专讛 诇注讜诇讛 讜诇诪谞讞讛 讜讙讜壮

Rav Ashi says: We do not say that since the Torah revealed that this halakha is indispensable to slaughter, it thereby revealed that it is indispensable to the other rites as well. Rather, from where do we derive that it is indispensable to the other sacrificial rites? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: 鈥淭his is the law of the burnt offering, and of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings鈥 (Leviticus 7:37), indicating that all offerings must, like a peace offering, be sacrificed for their own sake.

讜转谞讬讗 讘讬讜诐 爪讜转讜 讗转 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 诇讛拽专讬讘 讗转 拽专讘谞讬讛诐 讝讛 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讜驻住讞

And it is taught in a baraita: In the verse: 鈥淚n the day that he commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings鈥 (Leviticus 7:38), this word, i.e., 鈥渙fferings,鈥 is referring to the firstborn animal, the animal tithe, and the Paschal offering, which are not mentioned in the previous verse.

讛拽讬砖讜 讛讻转讜讘 诇砖诇诪讬诐 诪讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 讘注讬谞谉 诇诪爪讜讛 讗祝 讻诇 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 诇诪爪讜讛

The text juxtaposes all types of offerings mentioned in both verses with a peace offering, indicating that just as one who sacrifices a peace offering is required to do so with the proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, and in addition, the halakha of proper intent is only as a mitzva, not as an indispensable requirement, so too, in the case of any type of offering that must have proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, the halakha of proper intent is only as a mitzva. Therefore, the mitzva ab initio is derived from the halakha of a peace offering; and those verses mentioned earlier repeat the halakha to teach that it is indispensable with regard to slaughter.

讜讻砖诇诪讬诐 诪讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讬谉 讝讘讬讞讛 讘讬谉 砖讗专 注讘讜讚讜转 诇讗 讞诇拽转 讘讛谉 诇诪爪讜讛 讗祝 驻住讞 诇讗 转讞诇讜拽 讘讜 讘讬谉 讝讘讬讞讛 诇砖讗专 注讘讜讚讜转 诇注讻讘 (诪砖讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讛讜讗 讘讝讘讬讞讛 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇注讻讘)

And the juxtaposition of the peace offering with the Paschal offering indicates that a Paschal offering is similar to a peace offering in another respect: Just as with regard to a peace offering, you did not distinguish between slaughter and the other rites with regard to the mitzva ab initio of proper intent, so too, with regard to the Paschal offering, do not distinguish between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites with regard to the halakha that proper intent is indispensable.

讗诇讗 讛讜讗 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: Rather, since the indispensability of proper intent with regard to the Paschal offering is derived from its juxtaposition with the peace offering, why do I need the term 鈥渋t is鈥 to be written in Exodus 12:27? What is derived from there?

讻讚转谞讬讗 谞讗诪专 讘驻住讞 讛讜讗 讘砖讞讬讟讛 诇注讻讘 讗讘诇 讗砖诐 诇讗 谞讗诪专 讘讜 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讛拽讟专转 讗讬诪讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讗 注爪诪讜 砖诇讗 讛讜拽讟专讜 讗讬诪讜专讬讜 讻砖专

The Gemara answers: This is written to teach that this requirement is indispensable only in the case of a Paschal offering, and not in the case of a guilt offering. As it is taught in a baraita: Concerning the Paschal offering, the term 鈥渋t is鈥 is stated with regard to slaughter in Exodus 12:27 to teach that intent for the owner is indispensable. But concerning a guilt offering, the term 鈥渋t is鈥 is stated only after the verse mentions the burning of the sacrificial portions, and since a guilt offering itself is fit even when its portions were not burned on the altar at all, intent for the sake of the owner at this point is certainly not indispensable.

讞讟讗转 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘 讜砖讞讟 讗转讛 诇讞讟讗转 砖转讛讗 砖讞讬讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转

搂 The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that if a sin offering is sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or one other than its owner, it is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33), teaching that the slaughter must be performed for the sake of a sin offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 砖讞讬讟讛 拽讘诇讛 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘

The Gemara asks: We found a source with regard to slaughter. From where do we derive this with regard to collection of the blood? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Zevachim 7

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Zevachim 7

诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讬谉 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬诐 诇讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬谉

according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Apparently Rabbi Shimon does not accept the notion that the court can stipulate that there be a delay in the consecration of communal offerings, and the baraita can be adduced as evidence that offerings atone for transgressions committed after their designation as offerings.

讜注讜讚 讛讗 讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪专讘讬 讝讬专讗 砖注讬专讬 注爪专转 砖拽讘诇 讚诪谉 讘砖谞讬 讻讜住讜转 讜谞讝专拽 讚诪讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉 砖谞讬 诇诪讛 讛讜讗 讘讗 注诇 讟讜诪讗讛 砖讗讜专注讛 讘讬谉 [讝专讬拽讛 砖诇] 讝讛 诇讝讛 (谞讝专拽 讚诪讜 砖诇 砖谞讬 诇诪讛 讛讜讗 拽专讬讘讬谉)

And furthermore, continued Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, one can otherwise infer from the goats sacrificed on Shavuot that an offering can atone for transgressions committed after designation; as Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If the goats sacrificed on Shavuot were slaughtered simultaneously and their blood was collected in two cups, and the blood of the first goat was sprinkled, for what sin is the second goat brought? There was no time in the interim for other transgressions to occur. Rabbi Zeira answered: It atones for any incident involving impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the blood of that first goat and the sprinkling of the blood of this second goat.

注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 注砖讛 讚诇讗讞专 砖讞讬讟讛 讗讘诇 注砖讛 讚诇讗讞专 讛驻专砖讛 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛

One can infer: Rabbi Yirmeya raised the dilemma only about whether or not an offering atones for the violation of a positive mitzva committed after its slaughter and before the sprinkling of the blood. But with regard to the violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after the designation of the offering, before its slaughter, he did not raise the dilemma. Apparently, it was obvious to him that the offering atones for such a violation.

讚诇诪讗 讗诐 转讬诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 拽讗诪专

The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps Rabbi Yirmeya鈥檚 dilemma was also with regard to the violations committed after designation. He phrased his question to apply to violations committed after slaughter because he was saying: Even if you say that an offering atones for violations committed after designation, does it atone for those violations committed after slaughter? It may be that neither issue was clear to him.

讗讬转诪专 转讜讚讛 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 转讜讚转 讞讘讬专讜 (讻砖专讛) 专讘讛 讗诪专 讻砖专讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 驻住讜诇讛

It was stated with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another鈥檚 thanks offering: Rabba says that it is fit and satisfies its owner鈥檚 obligation, and Rav 岣sda says it is unfit in this regard.

专讘讛 讗诪专 讻砖专讛 转讜讚讛 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 谞砖讞讟讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 驻住讜诇讛 诇砖讜诐 砖诇诪讬诐 讚讬讚讬讛 谞砖讞讟讛 讘注讬谞谉

Rabba says it is fit because the thanks offering was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering. Rav 岣sda says it is unfit because it must be slaughtered for the sake of his own peace offering.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞讬讗 讜讘砖专 讝讘讞 转讜讚转 砖诇诪讬讜 讘讬讜诐 讛拽专讬讘讜 讗转 讝讘讞讜 讜讙讜壮 讗讘讗 讞谞讬谉 讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘讗 诇诇诪讚 转讜讚讛 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 砖诇诪讬诐 讻砖专讛 砖诇诪讬诐 砖谞砖讞讟讜 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 驻住讜诇讬诐 讜诪讛 讛驻专砖 讘讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 转讜讚讛 拽专讜讬讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讜讗讬谉 砖诇诪讬诐 拽专讜讬讬谉 转讜讚讛

Rabba said: From where do I say that it is fit? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offeringon the day that he presents his offering it shall be eaten鈥 (Leviticus 7:15鈥16). Abba 岣nin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The verse comes to teach that a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit, whereas a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. And what is the difference between this offering and that offering? A thanks offering is called a peace offering in the verse, but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.

砖诇诪讬诐 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 驻住讜诇讛 讛讗 转讜讚讛 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 讻砖专讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讞讘专讬讛

Rabba explains: The baraita indicates that a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, but a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of some other thanks offering is fit. What, is it not referring to the thanks offering of another, teaching that it satisfies its owner鈥檚 obligation?

诇讗 讚讬讚讬讛

The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to another thanks offering of his own, which he designated to give thanks for another incident of deliverance.

讗讘诇 讚讞讘专讬讛 诪讗讬 驻住讜诇讛 讗讚转谞讬 砖诇诪讬诐 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇讬转谞讬 转讜讚讛 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 砖诇诪讬诐 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛

The Gemara asks: But if one slaughtered his thanks offering for the sake of another鈥檚 thanks offering, what is the halakha? Is it unfit, i.e., it does it not satisfy the owner鈥檚 obligation? If so, rather than teaching that a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, let the baraita teach that a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another鈥檚 thanks offering is unfit, and one could infer that all the more so a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit.

砖诇诪讬诐 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 讚讬讚讬讛 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诪讚转讜讚讛 拽专讜讬讛 砖诇诪讬诐 砖诇诪讬诐 谞诪讬 拽专讜讬讬谉 转讜讚讛 讜讻讬 砖讞讬讟 诇讛讜 诇砖诐 转讜讚讛 诇讬讻砖专讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the baraita to specify a case where a peace offering was slaughtered for the sake of his own thanks offering. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since a thanks offering is called a peace offering, a peace offering is called a thanks offering as well, and therefore when one slaughters a peace offering for the sake of a thanks offering it should be fit. Therefore the baraita teaches us that this is not the case.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转 讻砖讬专讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛

Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering he was obligated to bring is fit; but if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讜砖讞讟 讗讜转讛 诇讞讟讗转 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛专讬 讞讟讗转 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转 谞砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛

What is the reason for this distinction? The Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33), and therefore, as long as the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, even another sin offering, it is fit. But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 驻住讜诇讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 注讜诇讛 讻砖专讛

And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner, but who nevertheless was obligated to bring a sin offering, is unfit. But if one slaughtered it for one who was obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讜讻驻专 注诇讬讜 注诇讬讜 讜诇讗 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 讞讘讬专讜 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讬讚讬讛 讘诪讞讜讬讬讘 讻驻专讛 讻诪讜转讜

What is the reason for this distinction? The Torah states: 鈥淎nd he shall be forgiven鈥 (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that it must be specifically he, the owner, who shall be forgiven, and not another person. The other person to whom this is referring, with regard to whom the offering is disqualified, is presumably similar to the owner in that he is also obligated to achieve atonement similar to the owner鈥檚 by bringing a sin offering. Whereas if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering, and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖讗讬谞讜 诪讞讜讬讬讘 讻诇讜诐 驻住讜诇讛 砖讗讬谉 诇讱 讗讚诐 讘讬砖专讗诇 砖讗讬谞讜 诪讞讜讬讬讘 注砖讛

And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not obligated to bring anything is unfit, as there is no person among the Jewish people who is not obligated to bring an offering for violating a positive mitzva. Therefore, the one for whom he slaughtered the offering is considered one who was obligated to bring a sin offering.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 诪讻驻专转 注诇 讞讬讬讘讬 注砖讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 注诇 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 诪讻驻专转 注诇 讞讬讬讘讬 注砖讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

And Rava says that a sin offering atones for those obligated to bring a burnt offering for violating a positive mitzva, due to an a fortiori inference: If a sin offering atones for those who are liable for transgressions for which one receives excision from the World-to-Come if he performs them intentionally, all the more so is it not clear that it atones for those liable for failing to fulfill a positive mitzva?

诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讘转 诪讬谞讛 讛讬讗 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 驻住讜诇讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 注讜诇讛 讻砖专讛

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the violation of a positive mitzva is of the same type as the sins atoned for by a sin offering? But doesn鈥檛 Rava say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who was obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, but if it was slaughtered for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit, as he is not obligated to provide a similar atonement? Given that burnt offerings atone for violations of positive mitzvot, apparently such atonement is of a different type than atonement for the transgression of prohibitions.

诪拽讬讘注讗 诇讗 诪讻驻专讗 诪拽讜驻讬讗 诪讻驻专讗

The Gemara answers: A sin offering does not atone for violating a positive mitzva by its essence, since prohibitions and positive mitzvot are not of the same type, but it atones for it incidentally.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 注讜诇讛 砖砖讞讟讛 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讛 讗住讜专 诇讝专讜拽 讚诪讛 砖诇讗 诇砖诪讛

And Rava says: As for a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽专讗 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 住讘专讗 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽专讗 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 转砖诪专 讜讙讜壮 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 住讘专讗 诪砖讜诐 讚砖谞讬 讘讛 讻讜壮 讻讚专讬砖 驻讬专拽讗

Why is this so? If you wish, cite a verse; and if you wish, propose a logical argument. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, cite a verse: 鈥淭hat which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:24). The derivation from this verse was explained in 2a. If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its slaughter, shall he continue to deviate from protocol in the rest of the sacrificial process? This is as it was stated at the beginning of the chapter (2a).

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 注讜诇讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 砖讞讟讛 讘砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 驻住讜诇讛 讘砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 讻砖专讛 讚讗讬谉 讘注诇讬诐 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

And Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that is brought by its owner鈥檚 heirs after his death, if one slaughtered it with a deviation from the type of offering, i.e., for the sake of another type of offering, it is unfit, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner鈥檚 obligation, and the heirs must therefore bring another offering. But if it was slaughtered with a deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., for the sake of another person, it is fit, as the offering has no legal owner after the owner鈥檚 death.

讜专讘 驻谞讞住 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪讬 讗诪专 讬砖 讘注诇讬诐 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇专讘 驻谞讞住 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪讬 讚讜拽讗 拽讗诪专 诪专 讬砖 讘注诇讬诐 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜讘注讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 注讜诇讛 讗讞专讬转讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讻诪讛 注砖讛 讙讘讬讛 诪讻驻专讗

And Rav Pine岣s, son of Rav Ami, says that an offering has an owner after its owner鈥檚 death, specifically, the heir. Rav Ashi said to Rav Pine岣s, son of Rav Ami: Is the Master saying that an offering actually has an owner after its owner鈥檚 death, and that if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir must bring another burnt offering, contrary to the opinion of Rava? Or perhaps the Master is merely saying that if the heir has several violations of positive mitzvot, the offering atones for them, but still if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir is not required to bring another offering.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讚讜拽讗 拽讗诪讬谞讗

Rav Pine岣s said to him: I am saying that the heir is actually the owner, and if the offering was slaughtered for someone else, he must bring another offering.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 注讜诇讛 讚讜专讜谉 讛讬讗 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚诇讬讻讗 转砖讜讘讛 讝讘讞 专砖注讬诐 转讜注讘讛 讜讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 转砖讜讘讛 讛转谞讬讗 注讘专 注诇 诪爪讜转 注砖讛 讜砖讘 诇讗 讝讝 诪砖诐 注讚 砖诪讜讞诇讬诐 诇讜 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚讜专讜谉 讛讜讗

And Rava says: A burnt offering is a gift [doron] to God; its essential purpose is not atonement. Rava supports his assertion: What are the circumstances under which a burnt offering atones for violating a positive mitzva? If one brings a burnt offering without repentance for his transgression, he may not sacrifice it at all, as 鈥渢he sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination鈥 (Proverbs 21:27). And if there is repentance, isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that if one violates a positive mitzva and repents, God forgives him before he even moves from his place? If so, why is he required to bring an offering? Rather, conclude from it that a burnt offering is a gift that one brings in order to appease God even after he is forgiven.

(讞讟讗转 注诇 诪讬 诪讻驻专 注讜诇讛 诇讗讞专 讚讜专讜谉 住讬诪谉)

The Gemara states a mnemonic for this series of statements by Rava: A sin offering atones for who, a burnt offering after a gift.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讞讟讗转 诇诪讛 讘讗讛 诇诪讛 讘讗讛 诇讻驻专 讗诇讗 诇诪讛 讘讗讛 诇驻谞讬 注讜诇讛 诇驻专拽诇讬讟 砖谞讻谞住 [专讬爪讛 驻专拽诇讬讟 谞讻谞住] 讚讜专讜谉 讗讞专讬讜

This last statement of Rava is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said: For what purpose is a sin offering brought? The Gemara interrupts: For what purpose is it brought? Is it not brought to atone for a transgression? Rather, Rabbi Shimon clearly meant: For what reason is it brought before a burnt offering in all circumstances where both are brought? Rabbi Shimon answered: It is comparable to an advocate [lifraklit] who enters before the king to convince him to pardon the defendant. Once the advocate has appeased the king, the gift is brought in after him.

讞讜抓 诪谉 讛驻住讞 讜讛讞讟讗转 讻讜壮 驻住讞 诪谞诇谉

搂 The mishna teaches that all offerings are fit even if slaughtered not for their sake, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a Paschal offering is required to be slaughtered for its sake?

讚讻转讬讘 砖诪讜专 讗转 讞讚砖 讛讗讘讬讘 讜注砖讬转 驻住讞 砖讬讛讜 讻诇 注砖讬讜转讬讜 诇砖诐 驻住讞

The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: 鈥淥bserve the month of the spring and offer [ve鈥檃sita] the Paschal offering鈥 (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaching that all of the actions [asiyyotav] of the Paschal offering, all of its sacrificial rites, must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 诪谞诇谉

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that deviation from the type of offering is prohibited. From where do we derive that deviation with regard to the owner is also prohibited?

讚讻转讬讘 讜讗诪专转诐 讝讘讞 驻住讞 讛讜讗 砖转讛讗 讝讘讬讞讛 诇砖诐 驻住讞 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 转谞讬讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐

The Gemara answers that this is derived from a verse, as it is written: 鈥淎nd you shall say: It is the sacrifice [zeva岣] of the Lord鈥檚 Passover鈥 (Exodus 12:27), which indicates that the slaughter [zevi岣] must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering. If the verse is not necessary in order to derive the matter of deviation from the type of offering, as that halakha is derived from Deuteronomy 16:1, apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner.

讗砖讻讞谉 诇诪爪讜讛 诇注讻讘 诪谞诇谉

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that these intentions are indispensable and, if lacking, disqualify the offering?

讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讝讘讞转 驻住讞 诇讛壮 讗诇讛讬讱 讜讙讜壮

The Gemara answers: The verse states: 鈥淎nd you shall sacrifice [vezava岣a] the Paschal offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd鈥 (Deuteronomy 16:2). By repeating the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner, the Torah indicates that these two intentions are both indispensable to the sacrificial process.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 住驻专讗 讛讗讬 讜讝讘讞转 诇讛讻讬 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讛讗讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 诪谞讬谉 诇诪讜转专 驻住讞 砖拽专讘 砖诇诪讬诐 砖谞讗诪专 讜讝讘讞转 驻住讞 诇讛壮 讗诇讛讬讱 爪讗谉 讜讘拽专 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谉 驻住讞 讘讗 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讻讘砖讬诐 讜诪谉 讛注讝讬诐 诪讻讗谉 诇诪讜转专 讛驻住讞 砖讬讛讗 诇讚讘专 讛讘讗 诪谉 讛爪讗谉 讜诪谉 讛讘拽专 讜诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 砖诇诪讬诐

Rav Safra objects to this: Does this verse: 鈥淎nd you shall sacrifice,鈥 come to teach this halakha? It is necessary for the statement of Rav Na岣an, as Rav Na岣an says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated but not ultimately sacrificed on Passover eve, is sacrificed as a peace offering afterward? It is derived from that which is stated: 鈥淎nd you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd.鈥 The verse is difficult: But isn鈥檛 a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? From here it is derived that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 住驻专讗 讜讝讘讞转 驻住讞 诇讻讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖诪讜专 讗转 讞讚砖 讛讗讘讬讘 诇诪爪讜讛 讘砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 讜讗诪专转诐 讝讘讞 驻住讞 讘砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 诇诪爪讜讛 讛讜讗 诇注讻讘 讘讬谉 讛讻讗 讜讛讻讗

Rather, Rav Safra says that the verses should be expounded as follows: The verse 鈥淎nd you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering鈥 teaches the statement of Rav Na岣an, that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. The verse: 鈥淥bserve the month of the spring and offer the Paschal offering鈥 (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaches that there is a mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering without deviation from the type of offering. The verse: 鈥淎nd you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Lord鈥檚 Passover鈥 (Exodus 12:27), teaches that there is a mitzva to slaughter it without deviation with regard to the owner. The term 鈥渋t is鈥 in the latter verse teaches that both here and there, i.e., with regard to both the offering and the owner, proper intent is indispensable.

讜讗砖讻讞谉 讝讘讬讞讛 砖讗专 注讘讜讚讜转 诪谞诇谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讙诇讬 讙诇讬

Rav Safra continues: And we found a source for slaughter. From where do we derive that other sacrificial rites must also be performed for the sake of the owner or the offering is disqualified? Since the Torah revealed that this intention is indispensable to the proper slaughter of the Paschal offering, it thereby revealed that it is critical to proper performance of the other rites as well.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讙诇讬 讙诇讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗诇讗 [注讘讜讚讜转] 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘 讝讗转 讛转讜专讛 诇注讜诇讛 讜诇诪谞讞讛 讜讙讜壮

Rav Ashi says: We do not say that since the Torah revealed that this halakha is indispensable to slaughter, it thereby revealed that it is indispensable to the other rites as well. Rather, from where do we derive that it is indispensable to the other sacrificial rites? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: 鈥淭his is the law of the burnt offering, and of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings鈥 (Leviticus 7:37), indicating that all offerings must, like a peace offering, be sacrificed for their own sake.

讜转谞讬讗 讘讬讜诐 爪讜转讜 讗转 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 诇讛拽专讬讘 讗转 拽专讘谞讬讛诐 讝讛 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讜驻住讞

And it is taught in a baraita: In the verse: 鈥淚n the day that he commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings鈥 (Leviticus 7:38), this word, i.e., 鈥渙fferings,鈥 is referring to the firstborn animal, the animal tithe, and the Paschal offering, which are not mentioned in the previous verse.

讛拽讬砖讜 讛讻转讜讘 诇砖诇诪讬诐 诪讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 讘注讬谞谉 诇诪爪讜讛 讗祝 讻诇 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 诇诪爪讜讛

The text juxtaposes all types of offerings mentioned in both verses with a peace offering, indicating that just as one who sacrifices a peace offering is required to do so with the proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, and in addition, the halakha of proper intent is only as a mitzva, not as an indispensable requirement, so too, in the case of any type of offering that must have proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, the halakha of proper intent is only as a mitzva. Therefore, the mitzva ab initio is derived from the halakha of a peace offering; and those verses mentioned earlier repeat the halakha to teach that it is indispensable with regard to slaughter.

讜讻砖诇诪讬诐 诪讛 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讬谉 讝讘讬讞讛 讘讬谉 砖讗专 注讘讜讚讜转 诇讗 讞诇拽转 讘讛谉 诇诪爪讜讛 讗祝 驻住讞 诇讗 转讞诇讜拽 讘讜 讘讬谉 讝讘讬讞讛 诇砖讗专 注讘讜讚讜转 诇注讻讘 (诪砖讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讛讜讗 讘讝讘讬讞讛 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇注讻讘)

And the juxtaposition of the peace offering with the Paschal offering indicates that a Paschal offering is similar to a peace offering in another respect: Just as with regard to a peace offering, you did not distinguish between slaughter and the other rites with regard to the mitzva ab initio of proper intent, so too, with regard to the Paschal offering, do not distinguish between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites with regard to the halakha that proper intent is indispensable.

讗诇讗 讛讜讗 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: Rather, since the indispensability of proper intent with regard to the Paschal offering is derived from its juxtaposition with the peace offering, why do I need the term 鈥渋t is鈥 to be written in Exodus 12:27? What is derived from there?

讻讚转谞讬讗 谞讗诪专 讘驻住讞 讛讜讗 讘砖讞讬讟讛 诇注讻讘 讗讘诇 讗砖诐 诇讗 谞讗诪专 讘讜 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讛拽讟专转 讗讬诪讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讗 注爪诪讜 砖诇讗 讛讜拽讟专讜 讗讬诪讜专讬讜 讻砖专

The Gemara answers: This is written to teach that this requirement is indispensable only in the case of a Paschal offering, and not in the case of a guilt offering. As it is taught in a baraita: Concerning the Paschal offering, the term 鈥渋t is鈥 is stated with regard to slaughter in Exodus 12:27 to teach that intent for the owner is indispensable. But concerning a guilt offering, the term 鈥渋t is鈥 is stated only after the verse mentions the burning of the sacrificial portions, and since a guilt offering itself is fit even when its portions were not burned on the altar at all, intent for the sake of the owner at this point is certainly not indispensable.

讞讟讗转 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘 讜砖讞讟 讗转讛 诇讞讟讗转 砖转讛讗 砖讞讬讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转

搂 The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that if a sin offering is sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or one other than its owner, it is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33), teaching that the slaughter must be performed for the sake of a sin offering.

讗砖讻讞谉 砖讞讬讟讛 拽讘诇讛 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘

The Gemara asks: We found a source with regard to slaughter. From where do we derive this with regard to collection of the blood? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written:

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