Zevachim 9
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Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v’Binyamin BenZion on her second yahrzeit. “Her curiosity, humor, intellect and devout nature continues to inspire and hold us accountable. We miss her and think of her in all our pursuits, especially in our Hadran learning, where she would be glad to know that she didn’t have to boil more than 1 egg at a time!!”
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Summary
A Pesach offering that is slaughtered outside its designated time with the intent of a different sacrifice is treated as a peace offering—regardless of which specific sacrifice the intent was for. The Gemara seeks the source for this ruling. Back on Zevachim 8, a verse concerning a peace offering was suggested as the basis, appearing to allude to the Pesach offering.
After raising a difficulty with this derivation, the Gemara offers a particular explanation, which is ultimately rejected. A second approach is then proposed, but it faces the same challenge as the first. Three possible resolutions are offered; the first is dismissed, while the third is subjected to four objections—all of which are successfully resolved.
The Gemara then raises a further question: perhaps the verse in question refers not to the Pesach offering, but to a guilt offering. After addressing that possibility, the Gemara probes deeper, suggesting that the verse may not refer to the Pesach offering at all. This concern is also resolved.
A statement of Mavog is introduced regarding a sin offering brought with improper intent. However, it is unclear what specific intent he refers to and what his ruling implies. Several interpretations are presented, each offering a different understanding of Mavog’s position than the one initially assumed.
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Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v’Binyamin BenZion on her second yahrzeit. “Her curiosity, humor, intellect and devout nature continues to inspire and hold us accountable. We miss her and think of her in all our pursuits, especially in our Hadran learning, where she would be glad to know that she didn’t have to boil more than 1 egg at a time!!”
Zevachim 9
דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִים אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין, וְאֵין דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱכָלִין.
Offerings that are eaten, in this case the Paschal offering, are diverted when slaughtered not for their sake to serve as other types of offerings that are eaten, such as peace offerings. But offerings that are eaten are not diverted to serve as offerings that are not eaten, such as burnt offerings.
אַטּוּ חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם מִי לָא מִיתְאַכְלִי?!
The Gemara asks: Is that to say that a sin offering and a guilt offering are not eaten? Why does a Paschal offering receive the status of a peace offering and not that of a sin offering or a guilt offering, which are eaten by the priests?
אֶלָּא דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין לְכׇל אָדָם אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין לְכׇל אָדָם, וְאֵין דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין לְכׇל אָדָם אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱכָלִין לְכׇל אָדָם.
Rather, the answer should be emended: Offerings that are eaten by every Jewish person are diverted to serve as offerings eaten by every Jewish person, i.e., peace offerings. But offerings eaten by every Jewish person are not diverted to serve as offerings not eaten by every Jewish person, i.e., sin offerings and guilt offerings, which are eaten only by priests.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר: דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, וְאֵין דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים אֵצֶל קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים.
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, says that there is a different answer: Offerings of lesser sanctity are diverted to serve as offerings of lesser sanctity, i.e., peace offerings. But offerings of lesser sanctity are not diverted to serve as offerings of the most sacred order, i.e., burnt offerings, sin offerings, or guilt offerings.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יִצְחָק בְּרַבִּי (סַבְרִיוּ) [סַבְרִין], אֵימָא: שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְשֵׁם מַעֲשֵׂר – לֶיהֱוֵי מַעֲשֵׂר! לְמַאי הִילְכְתָא? דְּלָא לִיבְעֵי נְסָכִים, וּלְמִלְקֵא עֲלֵיהּ (בְּלֹא יִמָּכֵר) בְּ״לֹא יִגָּאֵל״.
Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Savriyu, objects to this answer: If so, say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of the animal tithe, let it be rendered animal tithe, which, like a Paschal offering, is an offering of lesser sanctity. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that a Paschal offering has been rendered an animal tithe rather than a peace offering? It matters because if it is rendered an animal tithe, it should not require libations. And furthermore, if one sells it, he should be flogged for transgressing the prohibition: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), which applies to the animal tithe even after its slaughter.
אָמַר קְרָא: ״הָעֲשִׂירִי יִהְיֶה קֹדֶשׁ״ – זֶה מַעֲשֵׂר, וְאֵין אַחֵר מַעֲשֵׂר.
The Gemara responds: The verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “The tenth shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32). The definite article indicates that this, the tenth animal, is the tithe, but another animal slaughtered for its sake is not a tithe.
אֵימָא: שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְשֵׁם בְּכוֹר – לֶיהֱוֵי כִּבְכוֹר! לְמַאי הִילְכְתָא? דְּלָא לִיבְעֵי נְסָכִים, אִי נָמֵי דְּלִיתְּבֵיהּ לְכֹהֲנִים.
The Gemara challenges: Still, say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a firstborn animal, let it be rendered like a firstborn. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a firstborn rather than a peace offering? It matters because if it is rendered a firstborn, it should not require libations. Also, this means that one should give it to the priests.
בְּכוֹר נָמֵי, ״עֲבָרָה״–״עֲבָרָה״ מִמַּעֲשֵׂר גָּמַר.
The Gemara answers: With regard to a firstborn too, the verse states: “That you shall set apart [veha’avarta] unto the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12). Since with regard to the animal tithe it is stated: “Whatever passes [ya’avor] under the rod, the tenth shall be holy” (Leviticus 27:32), it is derived by verbal analogy between the passing [avara] stated with regard to a firstborn and the passing [avara] stated with regard to the animal tithe that a Paschal offering cannot become a firstborn either.
וְאֵימָא: שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרָה – לֶיהֱוֵי תְּמוּרָה! לְמַאי הִילְכְתָא? לְמִלְקֵא עֲלֵיהּ, אִי נָמֵי לְמֵיקַם עֲלֵיהּ בְּ״לֹא יִמָּכֵר וְלֹא יִגָּאֵל״.
The Gemara challenges: But say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a substitute, let it be rendered a substitute. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a substitute rather than a peace offering? The one who slaughtered it should be flogged for transgressing the prohibition of effecting substitution. Also, its sale should be determined to violate the prohibition: “It shall not be sold or redeemed” (Leviticus 27:28).
אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהָיָה הוּא וּתְמוּרָתוֹ״ – זוֹ תְּמוּרָה, וְאֵין אַחֵר תְּמוּרָה.
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, says: It is derived from that which the verse states with regard to substitution: “Then both it and that for which it is changed shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:33). The verse teaches that only it, the animal substituted, is a substitute, but another animal is not a substitute.
וְאֵימָא: שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – לֶיהֱוֵי כִּי תוֹדָה! לְמַאי הִילְכְתָא? לְהַטְעִינוֹ לֶחֶם.
The Gemara challenges: But say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a thanks offering, let it be rendered like a thanks offering. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it practically matter that it has been rendered a thanks offering rather than a peace offering? If so, it should require a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.
מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּפֶסַח גּוּפֵיהּ לָא בָּעֵי לֶחֶם, וּמוֹתָרוֹ בָּעֵי לֶחֶם?!
The Gemara answers: Is there anything, i.e., any situation, comparable to this suggestion that a Paschal offering itself does not require bread, but its leftover, an animal consecrated as a Paschal offering but ultimately not sacrificed on Passover eve, requires bread when slaughtered not for its sake? Such a suggestion is implausible.
אִי הָכִי, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי – מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּפֶסַח גּוּפֵיהּ לָא בָּעֵי נְסָכִים, וּמוֹתָרוֹ בָּעֵי נְסָכִים?!
The Gemara asks: If so, now that a leftover Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering becomes a peace offering, this objection can also be raised: Is there anything comparable to the suggestion that a Paschal offering itself does not require libations, but its leftover requires libations as a peace offering?
אֲנַן הָכִי קָאָמְרִינַן: מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּמוֹתַר תּוֹדָה עַצְמָהּ – לָא בָּעֵי לֶחֶם, וְאִילּוּ מוֹתָר דְּאָתְיָא לְהוּ מֵעָלְמָא – בָּעֲיָא לֶחֶם?!
The Gemara explains its answer: This is what we are saying: Is there anything comparable to the suggestion that the leftover of a thanks offering itself does not require bread, but the leftover of an offering from some other category requires bread?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב [יֵימַר] בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב הִילֵּל: וּמִמַּאי דִּבְמוֹתַר פֶּסַח כְּתִיב? דִּילְמָא בְּמוֹתַר אָשָׁם כְּתִיב!
§ It was taught that the verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that a Paschal offering sacrificed not on Passover eve is rendered a peace offering if sacrificed not for its sake. Rav Yeimar, son of Rav Hillel, objects to this: But from where is it derived that this verse is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? Perhaps it is written with regard to a leftover guilt offering; a guilt offering is also brought only from the flock.
אָמַר רָבָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם מִן הַצֹּאן קׇרְבָּנוֹ לְזֶבַח שְׁלָמִים״ – דָּבָר הַשָּׁוֶה בְּכׇל הַצֹּאן.
Rava says: The verse states: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of [min] the flock,” where the term “min” indicates that is brought equally from all species of the flock, i.e., from both sheep and goats. A guilt offering, by contrast, is brought only from rams, i.e., male sheep.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר חִיָּיא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר כָּהֲנָא: בְּכֹל אֲתַר אַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ ״מִן״ – לְהוֹצִיא, וְכָאן ״מִן״ – לְרַבּוֹת!
Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, objects to this: You say everywhere that the word “min” is stated to exclude items, but here you claim that the word “min” is stated to include all species of the flock? You should say the opposite: The verse indicates an offering that is brought only from some species of the flock, i.e., a guilt offering.
אָמַר רַבִּי מָנִי: הָכָא נָמֵי ״מִן״ לְהוֹצִיא – דְּלָא אָתֵי בֶּן שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים, וְלָא אָתֵי בִּנְקֵיבָה.
Rabbi Mani says: Here too, the word “min” is stated to exclude certain categories of the flock, as a Paschal offering is not brought from an animal that is in its second year, and is not brought from the female animals of the flock.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב חָנָא בַּגְדָּתָאָה: וּמִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ דְּכִי כְּתִיב הַאי – בְּמוֹתַר פֶּסַח כְּתִיב?! וְהָא מִדִּכְתִיב ״אִם כֶּשֶׂב״, ״אִם עֵז״ – מִכְּלָל דְּלָאו בְּמוֹתַר פֶּסַח כְּתִיב!
The Gemara cites another objection. Rav Ḥana of Baghdad objects to this: How can you say that when this verse is written, it is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? But from that which is written in the subsequent verses: “If he brings a lamb” (Leviticus 3:7), and “if his offering is a goat” (Leviticus 3:12), one learns by inference that the passage is not written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering; the Torah states elsewhere, in Exodus 12:5, that a Paschal offering is brought from both lambs and goats, and it is unnecessary to teach this again in Leviticus.
הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״כֶּבֶשׂ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַפֶּסַח לְאַלְיָה.
The Gemara answers: Those verses are necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The word “lamb” is written to include the Paschal offering in the requirement that the tail be offered on the altar, which is written subsequently with regard to a peace offering (Leviticus 3:9), since this halakha is not mentioned in the verses concerning the Paschal offering.
כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אִם כֶּבֶשׂ״ – לְרַבּוֹת פֶּסַח שֶׁעִיבְּרָה שְׁנָתָהּ; וּשְׁלָמִים הַבָּאִים מֵחֲמַת פֶּסַח – לְכׇל מִצְוַת שְׁלָמִים, שֶׁיִּטָּעֲנוּ סְמִיכָה וּנְסָכִים וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וְשׁוֹק. כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אִם עֵז״ – הִפְסִיק הָעִנְיָן, לִימֵּד עַל הָעֵז שֶׁאֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה אַלְיָה.
The baraita continues: When the verse states: “If he brings a lamb,” it is to include in all the mitzvot of peace offerings a Paschal offering whose first year has passed and is therefore too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, and peace offerings brought due to a Paschal offering. Specifically, this indicates that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh. And when the verse states: “And if his offering is a goat,” it interrupted the previous matter and taught that the sacrificing of a goat does not require that the tail be burned on the altar.
וְהָא – מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא?! מִדַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל נָפְקָא, דְּאָמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: ״וְאִם מִן הַצֹּאן קׇרְבָּנוֹ לְזֶבַח שְׁלָמִים״ – דָּבָר הַבָּא מִן הַצֹּאן יְהֵא לְזֶבַח שְׁלָמִים!
The Gemara asks: But is it derived from here that a Paschal offering that is too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? It is derived from the verse that Shmuel’s father cites, as Shmuel’s father says: The verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that an offering that is brought only from the flock, i.e., the Paschal offering, will be a sacrifice of peace offerings.
וְאַכַּתִּי מִדְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ נָפְקָא! דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: מִנַּיִן לְמוֹתַר פֶּסַח שֶׁקָּרֵב שְׁלָמִים? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ פֶּסַח לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ צֹאן וּבָקָר״. וַהֲלֹא אֵין פֶּסַח בָּא אֶלָּא מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים וּמִן הָעִזִּים! אֶלָּא מִכָּאן לְמוֹתַר הַפֶּסַח שֶׁיְּהֵא לְדָבָר הַבָּא מִן הַצֹּאן וּמִן הַבָּקָר; וּמַאי נִיהוּ – שְׁלָמִים.
The Gemara responds: But even without the baraita, Shmuel’s father’s statement is still superfluous, as that halakha is derived from that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says. As Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? As it is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). Why is the herd mentioned? But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Rather, it is derived from here that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.
אֶלָּא תְּלָתָא קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי,
Rather, none of these derivations are superfluous, as three verses are written that teach the halakha that a Paschal offering that is sacrificed not on Passover eve is sacrificed as a peace offering.
חַד לְעִיבְּרָה זְמַנּוֹ וְעִיבְּרָה שְׁנָתוֹ, וְחַד לְעִיבְּרָה זְמַנּוֹ וְלֹא שְׁנָתוֹ, וְחַד לְלֹא עִיבְּרָה לֹא זְמַנּוֹ וְלֹא שְׁנָתוֹ.
One verse teaches this halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice, Passover eve, has passed, and its first year has also passed, disqualifying it for sacrifice as a Paschal offering. And one verse teaches the halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but not its first year. And the third one teaches a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year has passed, but it was sacrificed before Passover eve.
וּצְרִיכִי; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא חַד, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הֵיכָא דְּעִיבְּרָה שְׁנָתוֹ וּזְמַנּוֹ – דְּאִידְּחִי מִפֶּסַח לִגְמָרֵי; אֲבָל עִיבְּרָה זְמַנּוֹ וְלֹא שְׁנָתוֹ, דַּחֲזֵי לְפֶסַח שֵׁנִי – אֵימָא לָא.
And all these verses are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written only one of the verses, I would say that it is referring to a case where both its first year and its time of sacrifice have passed. Only such a Paschal offering should be sacrificed as a peace offering, as it was completely rejected from its status as a Paschal offering. But in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but its first year has not passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on the second Pesaḥ, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering.
וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי – מִשּׁוּם דְּאִידְּחִי לְהוּ מִמִּילְּתַיְיהוּ; אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלָא עִבֵּר לֹא זְמַנּוֹ וְלֹא שְׁנָתוֹ, דַּחֲזֵי לְפֶסַח – אֵימָא לָא; צְרִיכִי.
And had the Merciful One written only these two verses, one might assume that only these Paschal offerings are sacrificed as peace offerings, as they were both rejected from their status as Paschal offerings. But in a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year have passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on Passover eve, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, all three verses are necessary.
אָמַר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָבוֹג: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת נַחְשׁוֹן – כְּשֵׁירָה; דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַחַטָּאת״ – תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַחַטָּאוֹת.
§ Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon, i.e., a sin offering similar to those brought by the princes during the dedication of the Tabernacle (see Numbers, chapter 7), not to atone for a sin but as a gift, is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation; as the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), indicating that there is one law for all the sin offerings.
יָתֵיב רָבָא וְקָאָמַר לַהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא; אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּקְמְצוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁירוֹת, וְעָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשׁוּם חוֹבָה;
Rava sat and stated this halakha of Mavog. Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection to Rava from a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another type of meal offering are fit, and satisfied the obligation of the owner, in contrast to animal offerings, which if slaughtered not for their sake do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.
לְפִי שֶׁאֵין הַמְּנָחוֹת דּוֹמוֹת לִזְבָחִים. שֶׁהַקּוֹמֵץ מַחֲבַת לְשֵׁם מַרְחֶשֶׁת – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ שֶׁהִיא מַחֲבַת, חֲרֵיבָה לְשֵׁם בְּלוּלָה – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין שֶׁהִיא חֲרֵיבָה;
This is because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. As, if one removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan. Likewise, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering. The demonstrably incorrect nature of the intention prevents it from affecting the status of the meal offering in any way.
אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵּן – שְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, קַבָּלָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, זְרִיקָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן.
But with regard to slaughtered offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Therefore, improper intention affects the status of the offering; if a rite is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
טַעְמָא דְּמַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין, הָא אֵין מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין – לָא; אַמַּאי? לֵימָא: ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה״ – תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת!
Rav Mesharshiyya inferred from the baraita: The reason a meal offering satisfies its owner’s obligation even when one removed a handful for the sake of another type of meal offering is that its mode of preparation proves its true nature. But if its mode of preparation does not prove its nature, it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. Why not? If Mavog’s derivation is correct, let us say likewise that the verse: “This is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicates that there is one law for all of the meal offerings, regardless of their mode of preparation.
אֶלָּא אִי אִיתְּמַר, הָכִי אִיתְּמַר: אָמַר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָבוֹג: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּתְכַּפֵּר בָּהּ נַחְשׁוֹן – כְּשֵׁירָה; אֵין כַּפָּרָה לְמֵתִים.
Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered on the condition that Nahshon, the prince of Judah, be atoned for by it is fit; this is not considered a change of owner, as there is no atonement for the dead.
וְלֵימָא מֵת בְּעָלְמָא!
The Gemara challenges: But if this was Mavog’s statement, why did he mention Nahshon? Let him state this halakha in reference to a dead person in general.
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: טַעְמָא דְּמֵת; הָא דְּחַי דּוּמְיָא דְּנַחְשׁוֹן – פְּסוּלָה. וּמַאי נִיהוּ? חַטַּאת נָזִיר וְחַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע.
The Gemara answers: This statement of Mavog teaches us that the reason for the fitness of a sin offering slaughtered for the atonement of Nahshon is that he is dead. Consequently, if it was slaughtered for the sake of a living person obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon, it is unfit. And what is that? It is a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, which are brought not to atone for a sin but to become ritually pure. Consequently, if one sacrifices a standard sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring the sin offering of a nazirite or a leper, it is considered a change of owner, and the offering is unfit.
הָנֵי עוֹלוֹת נִינְהוּ!
The Gemara counters: Why is the offering disqualified? These sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper are equivalent to burnt offerings, since they are not brought for atonement. Sacrificing a sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring a burnt offering is not considered deviation with regard to the owner and does not disqualify it (see 3b).
אֶלָּא אִי אִיתְּמַר הָכִי אִיתְּמַר, אָמַר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָבוֹג: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת כְּנַחְשׁוֹן – כְּשֵׁירָה; חַטַּאת נַחְשׁוֹן – עוֹלָה הִיא.
The Gemara answers: Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon is fit; Nahshon’s sin offering is equivalent to a burnt offering.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמַר, אָמַר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָבוֹג: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת נַחְשׁוֹן – פְּסוּלָה; חַטַּאת נַחְשׁוֹן – עוֹלָה הִיא.
There is one who says that Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon is unfit. This is because a sin offering of Nahshon is equivalent to a burnt offering, and he is therefore considered to have deviated from the type of offering.
וְלֵימָא: חַטַּאת נָזִיר וְחַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע! עִיקַּר חַטָּאת נָקֵט.
The Gemara challenges: But why did Mavog mention a sin offering of Nahshon, which one cannot bring at all? Let him say this halakha with regard to a nazirite’s sin offering and a leper’s sin offering, which are also equivalent to burnt offerings. The Gemara explains: Mavog cited the primary sin offering, the first case of an individual sin offering recorded in the Bible.
אָמַר רַב: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת דָּם, לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – כְּשֵׁירָה.
§ Rav says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood, or for the sake of a sin offering brought for engaging in idol worship, is fit; it is not considered deviation from the type of offering.
לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת נָזִיר, לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע – פְּסוּלָה; הָנֵי עוֹלוֹת נִינְהוּ.
But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a nazirite’s sin offering, or for the sake of a leper’s sin offering, it is unfit; these sin offerings are equivalent to burnt offerings, as they are not brought for atonement.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת דְּטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כָּרֵת כְּמוֹתָהּ;
Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the halakha? Do we say that the offering is fit, as the latter type of sin offering atones for a transgression punishable by karet when committed intentionally, similar to the transgression of consuming forbidden fat?
אוֹ דִילְמָא, אֵין קָבוּעַ כְּמוֹתָהּ?
Or perhaps is it unfit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is a sliding-scale sin offering, the contents of which vary with the financial situation of the transgressor (see Leviticus 5:3–13), and not a set sin offering, which is always an animal, like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?
רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מַתְנֵי כּוּלְּהוּ לִפְסוּלָא, מַאי טַעְמָא? ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ – לְשֵׁם אוֹתָהּ חַטָּאת.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches a version of Rav’s statement according to which in all of the cases he mentioned, including one where the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood or for engaging in idol worship, the offering is unfit. What is the reason? It is derived from the verse: “And slaughter it [otah] for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), that a sin offering must be slaughtered for the sake of that [otah] sin offering, and no other.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: בַּעְיָא דְּרָבָא הֵיכִי מַתְנִיתוּ לַהּ?
Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: How do you teach Rava’s dilemma? Rava appears to assume that if one slaughters a sin offering for the sake of some other types of sin offering it remains fit. How is this compatible with your version of Rav’s statement, according to which slaughter for the sake of any other type of sin offering disqualifies it?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנַן בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים מַתְנֵינַן לַהּ [וְהָכִי מַתְנֵינַן לָהּ], אָמַר רָבָא: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטַּאת דָּם וְחַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – פְּסוּלָה. עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטַּאת נָזִיר וְחַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע – כְּשֵׁירָה.
Rav Aḥa said to him: We teach Rava’s dilemma with regard to deviation with regard to the owner rather than from the type of offering. And this is how we teach it: First, Rava says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for consuming blood, or for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for engaging in idol worship, is unfit. Since the other person is also obligated to bring a sin offering, this is considered deviation with regard to the owner. But if it was slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, it is fit, as these sin offerings are not brought for atonement. Deviation with regard to the owner disqualifies an offering only if the other owner is obligated to bring a similar offering.
וּבָעֲיִין לַהּ הָכִי – בָּעֵי רָבָא: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת דְּטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כָּרֵת כְּמוֹתָהּ; אוֹ דִילְמָא, אֵין קָבוּעַ כְּמוֹתָהּ?
And then we pose the dilemma like this: Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the halakha? Do we say that the offering is unfit, as the one who defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods is obligated to bring a sin offering for a transgression punishable by karet, similar to the transgression of the owner? Or perhaps it remains fit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is not a set sin offering like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?
תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
אִיתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ, לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כְּשֵׁירָה.
§ It was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Reish Lakish says it is fit.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה – מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is unfit, as in his opinion one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite, i.e., one can disqualify an offering by performing one rite with improper intent about a subsequent rite that he has not yet performed. And we derive this halakha from intent of piggul, i.e., intent while performing one of the main rites to consume the offering after the appointed time, which disqualifies the offering.
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר כְּשֵׁירָה – אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא יָלְפִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל.
And Reish Lakish says that it is fit, as in his opinion one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive halakhot with regard to deviation from the type of offering from intent of piggul.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ – דְּאִיתְּמַר:
And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish each follow [ve’azdu] their general line of reasoning in this matter; as it was stated:
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I was exposed to Talmud in high school, but I was truly inspired after my daughter and I decided to attend the Women’s Siyum Shas in 2020. We knew that this was a historic moment. We were blown away, overcome with emotion at the euphoria of the revolution. Right then, I knew I would continue. My commitment deepened with the every-morning Virtual Beit Midrash on Zoom with R. Michelle.
Zichron Yaakov, Israel
Geri Goldstein got me started learning daf yomi when I was in Israel 2 years ago. It’s been a challenge and I’ve learned a lot though I’m sure I miss a lot. I quilt as I listen and I want to share what I’ve been working on.
Ottawa, Canada
In January 2020, my chevruta suggested that we “up our game. Let’s do Daf Yomi” – and she sent me the Hadran link. I lost my job (and went freelance), there was a pandemic, and I am still opening the podcast with my breakfast coffee, or after Shabbat with popcorn. My Aramaic is improving. I will need a new bookcase, though.
Atlanta, Georgia, United States
I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.
Givat Zev, Israel
In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).
Jerusalem, Israel
Jerusalem, Israel
A few years back, after reading Ilana Kurshan’s book, “If All The Seas Were Ink,” I began pondering the crazy, outlandish idea of beginning the Daf Yomi cycle. Beginning in December, 2019, a month before the previous cycle ended, I “auditioned” 30 different podcasts in 30 days, and ultimately chose to take the plunge with Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle. Such joy!
HUNTINGTON, United States
תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
מיתר, ישראל
When I began learning Daf Yomi at the beginning of the current cycle, I was preparing for an upcoming surgery and thought that learning the Daf would be something positive I could do each day during my recovery, even if I accomplished nothing else. I had no idea what a lifeline learning the Daf would turn out to be in so many ways.
Lexington, MA, United States
I started my journey on the day I realized that the Siyum was happening in Yerushalayim and I was missing out. What? I told myself. How could I have not known about this? How can I have missed out on this opportunity? I decided that moment, I would start Daf Yomi and Nach Yomi the very next day. I am so grateful to Hadran. I am changed forever because I learn Gemara with women. Thank you.
Mitspe, Israel
Phoenix, AZ, United States
Tel Aviv, Israel
Zevachim 9
דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִים אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין, וְאֵין דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱכָלִין.
Offerings that are eaten, in this case the Paschal offering, are diverted when slaughtered not for their sake to serve as other types of offerings that are eaten, such as peace offerings. But offerings that are eaten are not diverted to serve as offerings that are not eaten, such as burnt offerings.
אַטּוּ חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם מִי לָא מִיתְאַכְלִי?!
The Gemara asks: Is that to say that a sin offering and a guilt offering are not eaten? Why does a Paschal offering receive the status of a peace offering and not that of a sin offering or a guilt offering, which are eaten by the priests?
אֶלָּא דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין לְכׇל אָדָם אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין לְכׇל אָדָם, וְאֵין דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין לְכׇל אָדָם אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱכָלִין לְכׇל אָדָם.
Rather, the answer should be emended: Offerings that are eaten by every Jewish person are diverted to serve as offerings eaten by every Jewish person, i.e., peace offerings. But offerings eaten by every Jewish person are not diverted to serve as offerings not eaten by every Jewish person, i.e., sin offerings and guilt offerings, which are eaten only by priests.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר: דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, וְאֵין דּוֹחִין קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים אֵצֶל קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים.
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, says that there is a different answer: Offerings of lesser sanctity are diverted to serve as offerings of lesser sanctity, i.e., peace offerings. But offerings of lesser sanctity are not diverted to serve as offerings of the most sacred order, i.e., burnt offerings, sin offerings, or guilt offerings.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יִצְחָק בְּרַבִּי (סַבְרִיוּ) [סַבְרִין], אֵימָא: שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְשֵׁם מַעֲשֵׂר – לֶיהֱוֵי מַעֲשֵׂר! לְמַאי הִילְכְתָא? דְּלָא לִיבְעֵי נְסָכִים, וּלְמִלְקֵא עֲלֵיהּ (בְּלֹא יִמָּכֵר) בְּ״לֹא יִגָּאֵל״.
Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Savriyu, objects to this answer: If so, say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of the animal tithe, let it be rendered animal tithe, which, like a Paschal offering, is an offering of lesser sanctity. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that a Paschal offering has been rendered an animal tithe rather than a peace offering? It matters because if it is rendered an animal tithe, it should not require libations. And furthermore, if one sells it, he should be flogged for transgressing the prohibition: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), which applies to the animal tithe even after its slaughter.
אָמַר קְרָא: ״הָעֲשִׂירִי יִהְיֶה קֹדֶשׁ״ – זֶה מַעֲשֵׂר, וְאֵין אַחֵר מַעֲשֵׂר.
The Gemara responds: The verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “The tenth shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32). The definite article indicates that this, the tenth animal, is the tithe, but another animal slaughtered for its sake is not a tithe.
אֵימָא: שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְשֵׁם בְּכוֹר – לֶיהֱוֵי כִּבְכוֹר! לְמַאי הִילְכְתָא? דְּלָא לִיבְעֵי נְסָכִים, אִי נָמֵי דְּלִיתְּבֵיהּ לְכֹהֲנִים.
The Gemara challenges: Still, say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a firstborn animal, let it be rendered like a firstborn. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a firstborn rather than a peace offering? It matters because if it is rendered a firstborn, it should not require libations. Also, this means that one should give it to the priests.
בְּכוֹר נָמֵי, ״עֲבָרָה״–״עֲבָרָה״ מִמַּעֲשֵׂר גָּמַר.
The Gemara answers: With regard to a firstborn too, the verse states: “That you shall set apart [veha’avarta] unto the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12). Since with regard to the animal tithe it is stated: “Whatever passes [ya’avor] under the rod, the tenth shall be holy” (Leviticus 27:32), it is derived by verbal analogy between the passing [avara] stated with regard to a firstborn and the passing [avara] stated with regard to the animal tithe that a Paschal offering cannot become a firstborn either.
וְאֵימָא: שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרָה – לֶיהֱוֵי תְּמוּרָה! לְמַאי הִילְכְתָא? לְמִלְקֵא עֲלֵיהּ, אִי נָמֵי לְמֵיקַם עֲלֵיהּ בְּ״לֹא יִמָּכֵר וְלֹא יִגָּאֵל״.
The Gemara challenges: But say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a substitute, let it be rendered a substitute. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a substitute rather than a peace offering? The one who slaughtered it should be flogged for transgressing the prohibition of effecting substitution. Also, its sale should be determined to violate the prohibition: “It shall not be sold or redeemed” (Leviticus 27:28).
אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהָיָה הוּא וּתְמוּרָתוֹ״ – זוֹ תְּמוּרָה, וְאֵין אַחֵר תְּמוּרָה.
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, says: It is derived from that which the verse states with regard to substitution: “Then both it and that for which it is changed shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:33). The verse teaches that only it, the animal substituted, is a substitute, but another animal is not a substitute.
וְאֵימָא: שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – לֶיהֱוֵי כִּי תוֹדָה! לְמַאי הִילְכְתָא? לְהַטְעִינוֹ לֶחֶם.
The Gemara challenges: But say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a thanks offering, let it be rendered like a thanks offering. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it practically matter that it has been rendered a thanks offering rather than a peace offering? If so, it should require a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.
מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּפֶסַח גּוּפֵיהּ לָא בָּעֵי לֶחֶם, וּמוֹתָרוֹ בָּעֵי לֶחֶם?!
The Gemara answers: Is there anything, i.e., any situation, comparable to this suggestion that a Paschal offering itself does not require bread, but its leftover, an animal consecrated as a Paschal offering but ultimately not sacrificed on Passover eve, requires bread when slaughtered not for its sake? Such a suggestion is implausible.
אִי הָכִי, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי – מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּפֶסַח גּוּפֵיהּ לָא בָּעֵי נְסָכִים, וּמוֹתָרוֹ בָּעֵי נְסָכִים?!
The Gemara asks: If so, now that a leftover Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering becomes a peace offering, this objection can also be raised: Is there anything comparable to the suggestion that a Paschal offering itself does not require libations, but its leftover requires libations as a peace offering?
אֲנַן הָכִי קָאָמְרִינַן: מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּמוֹתַר תּוֹדָה עַצְמָהּ – לָא בָּעֵי לֶחֶם, וְאִילּוּ מוֹתָר דְּאָתְיָא לְהוּ מֵעָלְמָא – בָּעֲיָא לֶחֶם?!
The Gemara explains its answer: This is what we are saying: Is there anything comparable to the suggestion that the leftover of a thanks offering itself does not require bread, but the leftover of an offering from some other category requires bread?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב [יֵימַר] בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב הִילֵּל: וּמִמַּאי דִּבְמוֹתַר פֶּסַח כְּתִיב? דִּילְמָא בְּמוֹתַר אָשָׁם כְּתִיב!
§ It was taught that the verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that a Paschal offering sacrificed not on Passover eve is rendered a peace offering if sacrificed not for its sake. Rav Yeimar, son of Rav Hillel, objects to this: But from where is it derived that this verse is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? Perhaps it is written with regard to a leftover guilt offering; a guilt offering is also brought only from the flock.
אָמַר רָבָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם מִן הַצֹּאן קׇרְבָּנוֹ לְזֶבַח שְׁלָמִים״ – דָּבָר הַשָּׁוֶה בְּכׇל הַצֹּאן.
Rava says: The verse states: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of [min] the flock,” where the term “min” indicates that is brought equally from all species of the flock, i.e., from both sheep and goats. A guilt offering, by contrast, is brought only from rams, i.e., male sheep.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר חִיָּיא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר כָּהֲנָא: בְּכֹל אֲתַר אַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ ״מִן״ – לְהוֹצִיא, וְכָאן ״מִן״ – לְרַבּוֹת!
Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, objects to this: You say everywhere that the word “min” is stated to exclude items, but here you claim that the word “min” is stated to include all species of the flock? You should say the opposite: The verse indicates an offering that is brought only from some species of the flock, i.e., a guilt offering.
אָמַר רַבִּי מָנִי: הָכָא נָמֵי ״מִן״ לְהוֹצִיא – דְּלָא אָתֵי בֶּן שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים, וְלָא אָתֵי בִּנְקֵיבָה.
Rabbi Mani says: Here too, the word “min” is stated to exclude certain categories of the flock, as a Paschal offering is not brought from an animal that is in its second year, and is not brought from the female animals of the flock.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב חָנָא בַּגְדָּתָאָה: וּמִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ דְּכִי כְּתִיב הַאי – בְּמוֹתַר פֶּסַח כְּתִיב?! וְהָא מִדִּכְתִיב ״אִם כֶּשֶׂב״, ״אִם עֵז״ – מִכְּלָל דְּלָאו בְּמוֹתַר פֶּסַח כְּתִיב!
The Gemara cites another objection. Rav Ḥana of Baghdad objects to this: How can you say that when this verse is written, it is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? But from that which is written in the subsequent verses: “If he brings a lamb” (Leviticus 3:7), and “if his offering is a goat” (Leviticus 3:12), one learns by inference that the passage is not written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering; the Torah states elsewhere, in Exodus 12:5, that a Paschal offering is brought from both lambs and goats, and it is unnecessary to teach this again in Leviticus.
הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״כֶּבֶשׂ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַפֶּסַח לְאַלְיָה.
The Gemara answers: Those verses are necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The word “lamb” is written to include the Paschal offering in the requirement that the tail be offered on the altar, which is written subsequently with regard to a peace offering (Leviticus 3:9), since this halakha is not mentioned in the verses concerning the Paschal offering.
כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אִם כֶּבֶשׂ״ – לְרַבּוֹת פֶּסַח שֶׁעִיבְּרָה שְׁנָתָהּ; וּשְׁלָמִים הַבָּאִים מֵחֲמַת פֶּסַח – לְכׇל מִצְוַת שְׁלָמִים, שֶׁיִּטָּעֲנוּ סְמִיכָה וּנְסָכִים וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וְשׁוֹק. כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אִם עֵז״ – הִפְסִיק הָעִנְיָן, לִימֵּד עַל הָעֵז שֶׁאֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה אַלְיָה.
The baraita continues: When the verse states: “If he brings a lamb,” it is to include in all the mitzvot of peace offerings a Paschal offering whose first year has passed and is therefore too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, and peace offerings brought due to a Paschal offering. Specifically, this indicates that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh. And when the verse states: “And if his offering is a goat,” it interrupted the previous matter and taught that the sacrificing of a goat does not require that the tail be burned on the altar.
וְהָא – מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא?! מִדַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל נָפְקָא, דְּאָמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: ״וְאִם מִן הַצֹּאן קׇרְבָּנוֹ לְזֶבַח שְׁלָמִים״ – דָּבָר הַבָּא מִן הַצֹּאן יְהֵא לְזֶבַח שְׁלָמִים!
The Gemara asks: But is it derived from here that a Paschal offering that is too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? It is derived from the verse that Shmuel’s father cites, as Shmuel’s father says: The verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that an offering that is brought only from the flock, i.e., the Paschal offering, will be a sacrifice of peace offerings.
וְאַכַּתִּי מִדְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ נָפְקָא! דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: מִנַּיִן לְמוֹתַר פֶּסַח שֶׁקָּרֵב שְׁלָמִים? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ פֶּסַח לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ צֹאן וּבָקָר״. וַהֲלֹא אֵין פֶּסַח בָּא אֶלָּא מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים וּמִן הָעִזִּים! אֶלָּא מִכָּאן לְמוֹתַר הַפֶּסַח שֶׁיְּהֵא לְדָבָר הַבָּא מִן הַצֹּאן וּמִן הַבָּקָר; וּמַאי נִיהוּ – שְׁלָמִים.
The Gemara responds: But even without the baraita, Shmuel’s father’s statement is still superfluous, as that halakha is derived from that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says. As Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? As it is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). Why is the herd mentioned? But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Rather, it is derived from here that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.
אֶלָּא תְּלָתָא קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי,
Rather, none of these derivations are superfluous, as three verses are written that teach the halakha that a Paschal offering that is sacrificed not on Passover eve is sacrificed as a peace offering.
חַד לְעִיבְּרָה זְמַנּוֹ וְעִיבְּרָה שְׁנָתוֹ, וְחַד לְעִיבְּרָה זְמַנּוֹ וְלֹא שְׁנָתוֹ, וְחַד לְלֹא עִיבְּרָה לֹא זְמַנּוֹ וְלֹא שְׁנָתוֹ.
One verse teaches this halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice, Passover eve, has passed, and its first year has also passed, disqualifying it for sacrifice as a Paschal offering. And one verse teaches the halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but not its first year. And the third one teaches a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year has passed, but it was sacrificed before Passover eve.
וּצְרִיכִי; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא חַד, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הֵיכָא דְּעִיבְּרָה שְׁנָתוֹ וּזְמַנּוֹ – דְּאִידְּחִי מִפֶּסַח לִגְמָרֵי; אֲבָל עִיבְּרָה זְמַנּוֹ וְלֹא שְׁנָתוֹ, דַּחֲזֵי לְפֶסַח שֵׁנִי – אֵימָא לָא.
And all these verses are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written only one of the verses, I would say that it is referring to a case where both its first year and its time of sacrifice have passed. Only such a Paschal offering should be sacrificed as a peace offering, as it was completely rejected from its status as a Paschal offering. But in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but its first year has not passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on the second Pesaḥ, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering.
וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי – מִשּׁוּם דְּאִידְּחִי לְהוּ מִמִּילְּתַיְיהוּ; אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלָא עִבֵּר לֹא זְמַנּוֹ וְלֹא שְׁנָתוֹ, דַּחֲזֵי לְפֶסַח – אֵימָא לָא; צְרִיכִי.
And had the Merciful One written only these two verses, one might assume that only these Paschal offerings are sacrificed as peace offerings, as they were both rejected from their status as Paschal offerings. But in a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year have passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on Passover eve, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, all three verses are necessary.
אָמַר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָבוֹג: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת נַחְשׁוֹן – כְּשֵׁירָה; דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַחַטָּאת״ – תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַחַטָּאוֹת.
§ Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon, i.e., a sin offering similar to those brought by the princes during the dedication of the Tabernacle (see Numbers, chapter 7), not to atone for a sin but as a gift, is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation; as the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), indicating that there is one law for all the sin offerings.
יָתֵיב רָבָא וְקָאָמַר לַהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא; אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּקְמְצוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁירוֹת, וְעָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשׁוּם חוֹבָה;
Rava sat and stated this halakha of Mavog. Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection to Rava from a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another type of meal offering are fit, and satisfied the obligation of the owner, in contrast to animal offerings, which if slaughtered not for their sake do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.
לְפִי שֶׁאֵין הַמְּנָחוֹת דּוֹמוֹת לִזְבָחִים. שֶׁהַקּוֹמֵץ מַחֲבַת לְשֵׁם מַרְחֶשֶׁת – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ שֶׁהִיא מַחֲבַת, חֲרֵיבָה לְשֵׁם בְּלוּלָה – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין שֶׁהִיא חֲרֵיבָה;
This is because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. As, if one removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan. Likewise, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering. The demonstrably incorrect nature of the intention prevents it from affecting the status of the meal offering in any way.
אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵּן – שְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, קַבָּלָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, זְרִיקָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן.
But with regard to slaughtered offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Therefore, improper intention affects the status of the offering; if a rite is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
טַעְמָא דְּמַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין, הָא אֵין מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין – לָא; אַמַּאי? לֵימָא: ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה״ – תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת!
Rav Mesharshiyya inferred from the baraita: The reason a meal offering satisfies its owner’s obligation even when one removed a handful for the sake of another type of meal offering is that its mode of preparation proves its true nature. But if its mode of preparation does not prove its nature, it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. Why not? If Mavog’s derivation is correct, let us say likewise that the verse: “This is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicates that there is one law for all of the meal offerings, regardless of their mode of preparation.
אֶלָּא אִי אִיתְּמַר, הָכִי אִיתְּמַר: אָמַר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָבוֹג: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּתְכַּפֵּר בָּהּ נַחְשׁוֹן – כְּשֵׁירָה; אֵין כַּפָּרָה לְמֵתִים.
Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered on the condition that Nahshon, the prince of Judah, be atoned for by it is fit; this is not considered a change of owner, as there is no atonement for the dead.
וְלֵימָא מֵת בְּעָלְמָא!
The Gemara challenges: But if this was Mavog’s statement, why did he mention Nahshon? Let him state this halakha in reference to a dead person in general.
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: טַעְמָא דְּמֵת; הָא דְּחַי דּוּמְיָא דְּנַחְשׁוֹן – פְּסוּלָה. וּמַאי נִיהוּ? חַטַּאת נָזִיר וְחַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע.
The Gemara answers: This statement of Mavog teaches us that the reason for the fitness of a sin offering slaughtered for the atonement of Nahshon is that he is dead. Consequently, if it was slaughtered for the sake of a living person obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon, it is unfit. And what is that? It is a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, which are brought not to atone for a sin but to become ritually pure. Consequently, if one sacrifices a standard sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring the sin offering of a nazirite or a leper, it is considered a change of owner, and the offering is unfit.
הָנֵי עוֹלוֹת נִינְהוּ!
The Gemara counters: Why is the offering disqualified? These sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper are equivalent to burnt offerings, since they are not brought for atonement. Sacrificing a sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring a burnt offering is not considered deviation with regard to the owner and does not disqualify it (see 3b).
אֶלָּא אִי אִיתְּמַר הָכִי אִיתְּמַר, אָמַר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָבוֹג: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת כְּנַחְשׁוֹן – כְּשֵׁירָה; חַטַּאת נַחְשׁוֹן – עוֹלָה הִיא.
The Gemara answers: Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon is fit; Nahshon’s sin offering is equivalent to a burnt offering.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמַר, אָמַר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָבוֹג: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת נַחְשׁוֹן – פְּסוּלָה; חַטַּאת נַחְשׁוֹן – עוֹלָה הִיא.
There is one who says that Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon is unfit. This is because a sin offering of Nahshon is equivalent to a burnt offering, and he is therefore considered to have deviated from the type of offering.
וְלֵימָא: חַטַּאת נָזִיר וְחַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע! עִיקַּר חַטָּאת נָקֵט.
The Gemara challenges: But why did Mavog mention a sin offering of Nahshon, which one cannot bring at all? Let him say this halakha with regard to a nazirite’s sin offering and a leper’s sin offering, which are also equivalent to burnt offerings. The Gemara explains: Mavog cited the primary sin offering, the first case of an individual sin offering recorded in the Bible.
אָמַר רַב: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת דָּם, לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – כְּשֵׁירָה.
§ Rav says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood, or for the sake of a sin offering brought for engaging in idol worship, is fit; it is not considered deviation from the type of offering.
לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת נָזִיר, לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע – פְּסוּלָה; הָנֵי עוֹלוֹת נִינְהוּ.
But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a nazirite’s sin offering, or for the sake of a leper’s sin offering, it is unfit; these sin offerings are equivalent to burnt offerings, as they are not brought for atonement.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת דְּטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כָּרֵת כְּמוֹתָהּ;
Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the halakha? Do we say that the offering is fit, as the latter type of sin offering atones for a transgression punishable by karet when committed intentionally, similar to the transgression of consuming forbidden fat?
אוֹ דִילְמָא, אֵין קָבוּעַ כְּמוֹתָהּ?
Or perhaps is it unfit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is a sliding-scale sin offering, the contents of which vary with the financial situation of the transgressor (see Leviticus 5:3–13), and not a set sin offering, which is always an animal, like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?
רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מַתְנֵי כּוּלְּהוּ לִפְסוּלָא, מַאי טַעְמָא? ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ – לְשֵׁם אוֹתָהּ חַטָּאת.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches a version of Rav’s statement according to which in all of the cases he mentioned, including one where the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood or for engaging in idol worship, the offering is unfit. What is the reason? It is derived from the verse: “And slaughter it [otah] for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), that a sin offering must be slaughtered for the sake of that [otah] sin offering, and no other.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: בַּעְיָא דְּרָבָא הֵיכִי מַתְנִיתוּ לַהּ?
Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: How do you teach Rava’s dilemma? Rava appears to assume that if one slaughters a sin offering for the sake of some other types of sin offering it remains fit. How is this compatible with your version of Rav’s statement, according to which slaughter for the sake of any other type of sin offering disqualifies it?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנַן בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים מַתְנֵינַן לַהּ [וְהָכִי מַתְנֵינַן לָהּ], אָמַר רָבָא: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטַּאת דָּם וְחַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – פְּסוּלָה. עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטַּאת נָזִיר וְחַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע – כְּשֵׁירָה.
Rav Aḥa said to him: We teach Rava’s dilemma with regard to deviation with regard to the owner rather than from the type of offering. And this is how we teach it: First, Rava says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for consuming blood, or for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for engaging in idol worship, is unfit. Since the other person is also obligated to bring a sin offering, this is considered deviation with regard to the owner. But if it was slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, it is fit, as these sin offerings are not brought for atonement. Deviation with regard to the owner disqualifies an offering only if the other owner is obligated to bring a similar offering.
וּבָעֲיִין לַהּ הָכִי – בָּעֵי רָבָא: חַטַּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת דְּטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כָּרֵת כְּמוֹתָהּ; אוֹ דִילְמָא, אֵין קָבוּעַ כְּמוֹתָהּ?
And then we pose the dilemma like this: Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the halakha? Do we say that the offering is unfit, as the one who defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods is obligated to bring a sin offering for a transgression punishable by karet, similar to the transgression of the owner? Or perhaps it remains fit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is not a set sin offering like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?
תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
אִיתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ, לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כְּשֵׁירָה.
§ It was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Reish Lakish says it is fit.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה – מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is unfit, as in his opinion one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite, i.e., one can disqualify an offering by performing one rite with improper intent about a subsequent rite that he has not yet performed. And we derive this halakha from intent of piggul, i.e., intent while performing one of the main rites to consume the offering after the appointed time, which disqualifies the offering.
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר כְּשֵׁירָה – אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא יָלְפִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל.
And Reish Lakish says that it is fit, as in his opinion one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive halakhot with regard to deviation from the type of offering from intent of piggul.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ – דְּאִיתְּמַר:
And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish each follow [ve’azdu] their general line of reasoning in this matter; as it was stated:
