Zevachim 9

דוחין קדשים הנאכלים אצל קדשים הנאכלין ואין דוחין קדשים הנאכלין אצל קדשים שאינן נאכלין

Offerings that are eaten, in this case the Paschal offering, are diverted when slaughtered not for their sake to serve as other types of offerings that are eaten, such as peace offerings. But offerings that are eaten are not diverted to serve as offerings that are not eaten, such as burnt offerings.

אטו חטאת ואשם מי לא מיתאכלי

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that a sin offering and a guilt offering are not eaten? Why does a Paschal offering receive the status of a peace offering and not that of a sin offering or a guilt offering, which are eaten by the priests?

אלא דוחין קדשים הנאכלין לכל אדם אצל קדשים הנאכלין לכל אדם ואין דוחין קדשים הנאכלין לכל אדם אצל קדשים שאין נאכלין לכל אדם

Rather, the answer should be emended: Offerings that are eaten by every Jewish person are diverted to serve as offerings eaten by every Jewish person, i.e., peace offerings. But offerings eaten by every Jewish person are not diverted to serve as offerings not eaten by every Jewish person, i.e., sin offerings and guilt offerings, which are eaten only by priests.

רבי יוסי ברבי אבין אמר דוחין קדשים קלים אצל קדשים קלים ואין דוחין קדשים קלים אצל קדשי קדשים

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, says that there is a different answer: Offerings of lesser sanctity are diverted to serve as offerings of lesser sanctity, i.e., peace offerings. But offerings of lesser sanctity are not diverted to serve as offerings of the most sacred order, i.e., burnt offerings, sin offerings, or guilt offerings.

מתקיף לה רב יצחק ברבי סבריו אימא שחטיה לשם מעשר ליהוי מעשר למאי הילכתא דלא ליבעי נסכים ולמלקא עליה (בלא ימכר) בלא יגאל

Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Savriyu, objects to this answer: If so, say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of the animal tithe, let it be rendered animal tithe, which, like a Paschal offering, is an offering of lesser sanctity. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that a Paschal offering has been rendered an animal tithe rather than a peace offering? It matters because if it is rendered an animal tithe, it should not require libations. And furthermore, if one sells it, he should be flogged for transgressing the prohibition: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), which applies to the animal tithe even after its slaughter.

אמר קרא העשירי יהיה קדש זה מעשר ואין אחר מעשר

The Gemara responds: The verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “The tenth shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32). The definite article indicates that this, the tenth animal, is the tithe, but another animal slaughtered for its sake is not a tithe.

אימא שחטיה לשם בכור ליהוי כבכור למאי הילכתא דלא ליבעי נסכים אי נמי דליתביה לכהנים

The Gemara challenges: Still, say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a firstborn animal, let it be rendered like a firstborn. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a firstborn rather than a peace offering? It matters because if it is rendered a firstborn, it should not require libations. Also, this means that one should give it to the priests.

בכור נמי עברה עברה ממעשר גמר

The Gemara answers: With regard to a firstborn too, the verse states: “That you shall set apart [veha’avarta] unto the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12). Since with regard to the animal tithe it is stated: “Whatever passes [ya’avor] under the rod, the tenth shall be holy” (Leviticus 27:32), it is derived by verbal analogy between the passing [avara] stated with regard to a firstborn and the passing [avara] stated with regard to the animal tithe that a Paschal offering cannot become a firstborn either.

ואימא שחטיה לשם תמורה ליהוי תמורה למאי הילכתא למלקא עליה אי נמי למיקם עליה בלא ימכר ולא יגאל

The Gemara challenges: But say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a substitute, let it be rendered a substitute. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a substitute rather than a peace offering? The one who slaughtered it should be flogged for transgressing the prohibition of effecting substitution. Also, its sale should be determined to violate the prohibition: “It shall not be sold or redeemed” (Leviticus 27:28).

אמר מר זוטרא בריה דרב נחמן אמר קרא והיה הוא ותמורתו זו תמורה ואין אחר תמורה

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, says: It is derived from that which the verse states with regard to substitution: “Then both it and that for which it is changed shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:33). The verse teaches that only it, the animal substituted, is a substitute, but another animal is not a substitute.

ואימא שחטיה לשם תודה ליהוי כי תודה למאי הילכתא להטעינו לחם

The Gemara challenges: But say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a thanks offering, let it be rendered like a thanks offering. The Gemara adds: For what halakha does it practically matter that it has been rendered a thanks offering rather than a peace offering? If so, it should require a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.

מי איכא מידי דפסח גופיה לא בעי לחם ומותרו בעי לחם

The Gemara answers: Is there anything, i.e., any situation, comparable to this suggestion that a Paschal offering itself does not require bread, but its leftover, an animal consecrated as a Paschal offering but ultimately not sacrificed on Passover eve, requires bread when slaughtered not for its sake? Such a suggestion is implausible.

אי הכי השתא נמי מי איכא מידי דפסח גופיה לא בעי נסכים ומותרו בעי נסכים

The Gemara asks: If so, now that a leftover Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering becomes a peace offering, this objection can also be raised: Is there anything comparable to the suggestion that a Paschal offering itself does not require libations, but its leftover requires libations as a peace offering?

אנן הכי קאמרינן מי איכא מידי דמותר תודה עצמה לא בעי לחם ואילו מותר דאתיא להו מעלמא בעיא לחם

The Gemara explains its answer: This is what we are saying: Is there anything comparable to the suggestion that the leftover of a thanks offering itself does not require bread, but the leftover of an offering from some other category requires bread?

מתקיף לה רב [יימר] בריה דרב הילל וממאי דבמותר פסח כתיב דילמא במותר אשם כתיב

§ It was taught that the verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that a Paschal offering sacrificed not on Passover eve is rendered a peace offering if sacrificed not for its sake. Rav Yeimar, son of Rav Hillel, objects to this: But from where is it derived that this verse is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? Perhaps it is written with regard to a leftover guilt offering; a guilt offering is also brought only from the flock.

אמר רבא אמר קרא ואם מן הצאן קרבנו לזבח שלמים דבר השוה בכל הצאן

Rava says: The verse states: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of [min] the flock,” where the term “min” indicates that is brought equally from all species of the flock, i.e., from both sheep and goats. A guilt offering, by contrast, is brought only from rams, i.e., male sheep.

מתקיף לה רבי אבין בר חייא ואיתימא רבי אבין בר כהנא בכל אתר את אמרת מן להוציא וכאן מן לרבות

Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, objects to this: You say everywhere that the word “min” is stated to exclude items, but here you claim that the word “min” is stated to include all species of the flock? You should say the opposite: The verse indicates an offering that is brought only from some species of the flock, i.e., a guilt offering.

אמר רבי מני הכא נמי מן להוציא דלא אתי בן שתי שנים ולא אתי בנקיבה

Rabbi Mani says: Here too, the word “min” is stated to exclude certain categories of the flock, as a Paschal offering is not brought from an animal that is in its second year, and is not brought from the female animals of the flock.

מתקיף לה רב חנא בגדתאה ומי מצית אמרת דכי כתיב האי במותר פסח כתיב והא מדכתיב אם כשב אם עז מכלל דלאו במותר פסח כתיב

The Gemara cites another objection. Rav Ḥana of Baghdad objects to this: How can you say that when this verse is written, it is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? But from that which is written in the subsequent verses: “If he brings a lamb” (Leviticus 3:7), and “if his offering is a goat” (Leviticus 3:12), one learns by inference that the passage is not written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering; the Torah states elsewhere, in Exodus 12:5, that a Paschal offering is brought from both lambs and goats, and it is unnecessary to teach this again in Leviticus.

ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדתניא כבש לרבות את הפסח לאליה

The Gemara answers: Those verses are necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The word “lamb” is written to include the Paschal offering in the requirement that the tail be offered on the altar, which is written subsequently with regard to a peace offering (Leviticus 3:9), since this halakha is not mentioned in the verses concerning the Paschal offering.

כשהוא אומר אם כבש לרבות פסח שעיברה שנתה ושלמים הבאים מחמת פסח לכל מצות שלמים שיטענו סמיכה ונסכים ותנופת חזה ושוק כשהוא אומר אם עז הפסיק הענין לימד על העז שאינה טעונה אליה

The baraita continues: When the verse states: “If he brings a lamb,” it is to include in all the mitzvot of peace offerings a Paschal offering whose first year has passed and is therefore too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, and peace offerings brought due to a Paschal offering. Specifically, this indicates that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh. And when the verse states: “And if his offering is a goat,” it interrupted the previous matter and taught that the sacrificing of a goat does not require that the tail be burned on the altar.

והא מהכא נפקא מדאבוה דשמואל נפקא דאמר אבוה דשמואל ואם מן הצאן קרבנו לזבח שלמים דבר הבא מן הצאן יהא לזבח שלמים

The Gemara asks: But is it derived from here that a Paschal offering that is too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? It is derived from the verse that Shmuel’s father cites, as Shmuel’s father says: The verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that an offering that is brought only from the flock, i.e., the Paschal offering, will be a sacrifice of peace offerings.

ואכתי מדרב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה נפקא דאמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה מנין למותר פסח שקרב שלמים שנאמר וזבחת פסח לה׳ אלהיך צאן ובקר והלא אין פסח בא אלא מן הכבשים ומן העזים אלא מכאן למותר הפסח שיהא לדבר הבא מן הצאן ומן הבקר ומאי ניהו שלמים

The Gemara responds: But even without the baraita, Shmuel’s father’s statement is still superfluous, as that halakha is derived from that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says. As Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? As it is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). Why is the herd mentioned? But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Rather, it is derived from here that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.

אלא תלתא קראי כתיבי

Rather, none of these derivations are superfluous, as three verses are written that teach the halakha that a Paschal offering that is sacrificed not on Passover eve is sacrificed as a peace offering.

חד לעיברה זמנו ועיברה שנתו וחד לעיברה זמנו ולא שנתו וחד ללא עיברה לא זמנו ולא שנתו

One verse teaches this halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice, Passover eve, has passed, and its first year has also passed, disqualifying it for sacrifice as a Paschal offering. And one verse teaches the halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but not its first year. And the third one teaches a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year has passed, but it was sacrificed before Passover eve.

וצריכי דאי כתב רחמנא חד הוה אמינא היכא דעיברה שנתו וזמנו דאידחי מפסח לגמרי אבל עיברה זמנו ולא שנתו דחזי לפסח שני אימא לא

And all these verses are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written only one of the verses, I would say that it is referring to a case where both its first year and its time of sacrifice have passed. Only such a Paschal offering should be sacrificed as a peace offering, as it was completely rejected from its status as a Paschal offering. But in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but its first year has not passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on the second Pesaḥ, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering.

ואי כתב רחמנא הני תרתי משום דאידחי להו ממילתייהו אבל היכא דלא עבר לא זמנו ולא שנתו דחזי לפסח אימא לא צריכי

And had the Merciful One written only these two verses, one might assume that only these Paschal offerings are sacrificed as peace offerings, as they were both rejected from their status as Paschal offerings. But in a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year have passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on Passover eve, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, all three verses are necessary.

אמר רב משמיה דמבוג חטאת ששחטה לשום חטאת נחשון כשירה דאמר קרא זאת תורת החטאת תורה אחת לכל החטאות

§ Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon, i.e., a sin offering similar to those brought by the princes during the dedication of the Tabernacle (see Numbers, chapter 7), not to atone for a sin but as a gift, is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation; as the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), indicating that there is one law for all the sin offerings.

יתיב רבא וקאמר לה להא שמעתא איתיביה רב משרשיא לרבא רבי שמעון אומר כל המנחות שנקמצו שלא לשמן כשירות ועלו לבעלים לשום חובה

Rava sat and stated this halakha of Mavog. Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection to Rava from a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another type of meal offering are fit, and satisfied the obligation of the owner, in contrast to animal offerings, which if slaughtered not for their sake do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.

לפי שאין המנחות דומות לזבחים שהקומץ מחבת לשם מרחשת מעשיה מוכיחין עליה שהיא מחבת חריבה לשם בלולה מעשיה מוכיחין שהיא חריבה

This is because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. As, if one removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan. Likewise, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering. The demonstrably incorrect nature of the intention prevents it from affecting the status of the meal offering in any way.

אבל בזבחים אינו כן שחיטה אחת לכולן קבלה אחת לכולן זריקה אחת לכולן

But with regard to slaughtered offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Therefore, improper intention affects the status of the offering; if a rite is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.

טעמא דמעשיה מוכיחין הא אין מעשיה מוכיחין לא אמאי לימא זאת תורת המנחה תורה אחת לכל המנחות

Rav Mesharshiyya inferred from the baraita: The reason a meal offering satisfies its owner’s obligation even when one removed a handful for the sake of another type of meal offering is that its mode of preparation proves its true nature. But if its mode of preparation does not prove its nature, it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. Why not? If Mavog’s derivation is correct, let us say likewise that the verse: “This is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicates that there is one law for all of the meal offerings, regardless of their mode of preparation.

אלא אי איתמר הכי איתמר אמר רב משמיה דמבוג חטאת ששחטה על מנת שיתכפר בה נחשון כשירה אין כפרה למתים

Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered on the condition that Nahshon, the prince of Judah, be atoned for by it is fit; this is not considered a change of owner, as there is no atonement for the dead.

ולימא מת בעלמא

The Gemara challenges: But if this was Mavog’s statement, why did he mention Nahshon? Let him state this halakha in reference to a dead person in general.

הא קא משמע לן טעמא דמת הא דחי דומיא דנחשון פסולה ומאי ניהו חטאת נזיר וחטאת מצורע

The Gemara answers: This statement of Mavog teaches us that the reason for the fitness of a sin offering slaughtered for the atonement of Nahshon is that he is dead. Consequently, if it was slaughtered for the sake of a living person obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon, it is unfit. And what is that? It is a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, which are brought not to atone for a sin but to become ritually pure. Consequently, if one sacrifices a standard sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring the sin offering of a nazirite or a leper, it is considered a change of owner, and the offering is unfit.

הני עולות נינהו

The Gemara counters: Why is the offering disqualified? These sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper are equivalent to burnt offerings, since they are not brought for atonement. Sacrificing a sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring a burnt offering is not considered deviation with regard to the owner and does not disqualify it (see 3b).

אלא אי איתמר הכי איתמר אמר רב משמיה דמבוג חטאת ששחטה על שמחוייב חטאת כנחשון כשירה חטאת נחשון עולה היא

The Gemara answers: Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon is fit; Nahshon’s sin offering is equivalent to a burnt offering.

איכא דאמר אמר רב משמיה דמבוג חטאת ששחטה לשם חטאת נחשון פסולה חטאת נחשון עולה היא

There is one who says that Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon is unfit. This is because a sin offering of Nahshon is equivalent to a burnt offering, and he is therefore considered to have deviated from the type of offering.

ולימא חטאת נזיר וחטאת מצורע עיקר חטאת נקט

The Gemara challenges: But why did Mavog mention a sin offering of Nahshon, which one cannot bring at all? Let him say this halakha with regard to a nazirite’s sin offering and a leper’s sin offering, which are also equivalent to burnt offerings. The Gemara explains: Mavog cited the primary sin offering, the first case of an individual sin offering recorded in the Bible.

אמר רב חטאת חלב ששחטה לשם חטאת דם לשם חטאת עבודה זרה כשירה

§ Rav says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood, or for the sake of a sin offering brought for engaging in idol worship, is fit; it is not considered deviation from the type of offering.

לשם חטאת נזיר לשם חטאת מצורע פסולה הני עולות נינהו

But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a nazirite’s sin offering, or for the sake of a leper’s sin offering, it is unfit; these sin offer-ings are equivalent to burnt offerings, as they are not brought for atonement.

בעי רבא חטאת חלב ששחטה לשם חטאת דטומאת מקדש וקדשיו מהו מי אמרינן כרת כמותה

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the halakha? Do we say that the offering is fit, as the latter type of sin offering atones for a transgression punishable by karet when committed intentionally, similar to the transgression of consuming forbidden fat?

או דילמא אין קבוע כמותה

Or perhaps is it unfit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is a sliding-scale sin offering, the contents of which vary with the financial situation of the transgressor (see Leviticus 5:3–13), and not a set sin offering, which is always an animal, like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?

רב אחא בריה דרבא מתני כולהו לפסולא מאי טעמא ושחט אותה לחטאת לשם אותה חטאת

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches a version of Rav’s statement according to which in all of the cases he mentioned, including one where the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood or for engaging in idol worship, the offering is unfit. What is the reason? It is derived from the verse: “And slaughter it [otah] for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), that a sin offering must be slaughtered for the sake of that [otah] sin offering, and no other.

אמר ליה רב אשי לרב אחא בריה דרבא [בעיא דרבא] היכי מתניתו לה

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: How do you teach Rava’s dilemma? Rava appears to assume that if one slaughters a sin offering for the sake of some other types of sin offering it remains fit. How is this compatible with your version of Rav’s statement, according to which slaughter for the sake of any other type of sin offering disqualifies it?

אמר ליה אנן בשינוי בעלים מתנינן לה [והכי מתנינן לה] אמר רבא חטאת חלב ששחטה על מי שמחוייב חטאת דם וחטאת עבודה זרה פסולה על מי שמחוייב חטאת נזיר וחטאת מצורע כשירה

Rav Aḥa said to him: We teach Rava’s dilemma with regard to deviation with regard to the owner rather than from the type of offering. And this is how we teach it: First, Rava says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for consuming blood, or for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for engaging in idol worship, is unfit. Since the other person is also obligated to bring a sin offering, this is considered deviation with regard to the owner. But if it was slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, it is fit, as these sin offerings are not brought for atonement. Deviation with regard to the owner disqualifies an offering only if the other owner is obligated to bring a similar offering.

ובעיין לה הכי בעי רבא חטאת חלב ששחטה על מי שמחוייב חטאת דטומאת מקדש וקדשיו מהו מי אמרינן כרת כמותה או דילמא אין קבוע כמותה

And then we pose the dilemma like this: Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the halakha? Do we say that the offering is unfit, as the one who defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods is obligated to bring a sin offering for a transgression punishable by karet, similar to the transgression of the owner? Or perhaps it remains fit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is not a set sin offering like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?

תיקו

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

איתמר שחטה לשמה לזרוק דמה שלא לשמה רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה וריש לקיש אמר כשירה

§ It was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Reish Lakish says it is fit.

רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה וילפינן ממחשבת פיגול

Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is unfit, as in his opinion one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite, i.e., one can disqualify an offering by performing one rite with improper intent about a subsequent rite that he has not yet performed. And we derive this halakha from intent of piggul, i.e., intent while performing one of the main rites to consume the offering after the appointed time, which disqualifies the offering.

וריש לקיש אמר כשירה אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה ולא ילפינן ממחשבת פיגול

And Reish Lakish says that it is fit, as in his opinion one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive halakhot with regard to deviation from the type of offering from intent of piggul.

ואזדו לטעמייהו דאיתמר

And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish each follow [ve’azdu] their general line of reasoning in this matter; as it was stated: