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Today’s Daf – Menachot 83 / Apr. 4th, 2026 / י״ז בניסן תשפ״ו

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Bava Batra 132

11.04.2024 | ג׳ בחשון תשפ״ה

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11.03.2024 | ב׳ בחשון תשפ״ה

Bava Batra

Masechet Bava Batra is sponsored by Lori Stark in loving memory of her mother in law, Sara Shapiro z”l and her father Nehemiah Sosewitz z”l.

This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”

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11.03.2024 | ב׳ בחשון תשפ״ה

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If one wrote all of his possessions to his wife it assumed that the man intended only to appoint her as a steward and wrote it in that manner so that the recipients of the will would respect the executor. Would this be the case only if he wrote it on his deathbed or would it apply even if it was written when the husband was healthy? The answer to this question is brought from a braita relating to a case where the husband wrote to give his wife all of his property and on account of a debt of the husband, the property was collected from the wife, does she forfeit the right to collect her ketuba. Although there is a debate about this, it is clear that if he wrote to give her all of his property, she inherits it all and is not appointed to be a steward. First, the Gemara assumes that it is a case where the husband is not on his deathbed, as on his deathbed, she would be appointed to be a steward. However, this answer is rejected as the rule on one’s deathbed has some exceptions, like a woman who was only betrothed or divorced. If the case was in one of those situations, then it could have been even if he was on his deathbed, thus leaving the original question unanswered.

Rav Nachman ruled in the ketuba case above that the woman forfeits her right to collect the ketuba when she accepts all of the husband’s property. A difficulty is raised from a braita, from a different case where Rav Nachman ruled that we assess one’s intention and allow one’s possessions to be returned, which we do not do by the woman regarding her ketuba. It was resolved by differentiating between the cases.

A Mishna in Peah is quoted, as later Rava will ask if the ruling also applies only if it was done on a man’s deathbed or even if he was healthy. If a husband writes all of his possessions to his son and gives his wife any size portion of land, she loses her right to her ketuba. Three amoraim suggest different explanations for this puzzling ruling – each suggesting that the woman indicated (although not explicitly) her acceptance of this arrangement. The Gemara quotes the continuation of the Mishna to raise a difficulty on the three opinions as Rabbi Yossi holds that even if the husband did not write a document to her granting her the land, but the woman accepts it she gives up her rights. This implies that the first tanna requires both a written document and the woman’s explicit consent. There is no resolution to the difficulty against the three amoraim.

Rav Nachman ruled that the woman forfeits her right to collect the ketuba in the case described above. He explained that the woman is willing to give up these rights as the husband made her his partner is dividing the property to the sons and this affords her honor on account of which she is willing to forfeit her right to her ketuba. Rava asked if this ruling applies also to a man who divided his property in this manner when he was healthy, or only on his deathbed. The Gemara explains the two sides of the question but leaves the question unresolved.

Today’s daily daf tools:

Bava Batra

Masechet Bava Batra is sponsored by Lori Stark in loving memory of her mother in law, Sara Shapiro z”l and her father Nehemiah Sosewitz z”l.

This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”

Bava Batra 132

בָּעֵי רָבָא: בְּבָרִיא הֵיאַךְ? בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע הוּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ – דְּלִישְׁתַּמְעוּן מִלֵּהּ, אֲבָל בְּבָרִיא – הָא קָאֵי אִיהוּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא בָּרִיא נָמֵי נִיחָא לֵיהּ, דְּלִישְׁתַּמְעוּן מִלֵּהּ מֵהַשְׁתָּא?

With regard to the halakha that a person on his deathbed who wrote a document granting all his property to his wife has appointed her as a steward, Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that specifically in the case of a person on his deathbed it is assumed that he intended to appoint his wife as a steward, as it is preferable for him that her word be heard and she is honored after his death, but in the case of a healthy person, he is still standing and can ensure that his wife is honored, so he apparently intended to actually give her all of his property? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that in the case of a healthy person as well, it is preferable that his wife’s word be heard and she be given honor from now?

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַכּוֹתֵב פֵּירוֹת נְכָסָיו לְאִשְׁתּוֹ – גּוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִן הַקַּרְקַע. לְמֶחֱצָה, לִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ – גּוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִן הַשְּׁאָר.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: If one writes a document that the profits of his property should go to his wife in the event that he dies or divorces her, she collects payment of her marriage contract, which he wrote her at the time of their marriage, from the land itself. The profits are hers as a result of his gift. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting her one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of his property, she collects payment of her marriage contract from the rest of his property, which he did not give her as a separate gift.

כָּתַב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, וְיָצָא עָלָיו שְׁטַר חוֹב – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: תִּקָּרַע מַתְּנָתָהּ וְתַעֲמוֹד עַל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: תִּקָּרַע כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְתַעֲמוֹד עַל מַתְּנָתָהּ; וְנִמְצֵאת קֵרַחַת מִכָּאן וּמִכָּאן.

The baraita continues: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his wife, and subsequently a promissory note emerged against him for a loan he took while they were married but before he gave her this gift, Rabbi Eliezer says that she should tear up her deed of gift and remain with her marriage contract, so that the creditor will not be able to collect the property she received, as her marriage contract preceded the promissory note. And the Rabbis say: She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, as by accepting the gift of all her husband’s property she waived her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Since the promissory note preceded the deed of gift, the creditor receives the property, and the wife is found to be bald from here and from there, i.e., she receives neither her gift nor her marriage contract.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנַּחְתּוֹם: מַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵירַע הַדָּבָר בְּבַת אֲחוֹתִי כַּלָּה, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים, וְאָמְרוּ: תִּקָּרַע כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְתַעֲמוֹד עַל מַתְּנָתָהּ, וְנִמְצֵאת קֵרַחַת מִכָּאן וּמִכָּאן.

And Rabbi Yehuda the baker said: There was an incident where this matter occurred to my sister’s daughter who is my daughter-in-law [kalla], that my son wrote such a document to her, and the incident came before the Sages. And they said that she must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.

טַעְמָא דְּיָצָא עָלָיו שְׁטַר חוֹב, הָא לֹא יָצָא עָלָיו שְׁטַר חוֹב – קָנְיָא. וּבְמַאי? אִילֵּימָא בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע – וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ לֹא עֲשָׂאָהּ אֶלָּא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס! אֶלָּא לָאו בְּבָרִיא?

The Gemara infers: The reason she loses her gift is that a promissory note emerged against him, but if a promissory note did not emerge against him, she acquires the gift of his property. And with regard to what case is this stated? If we say it is with regard to a person on his deathbed, but didn’t you say previously that in such a case he merely rendered her a steward? Rather, is it not with regard to a healthy person? Accordingly, Rava’s dilemma is resolved: If a healthy person writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is hers.

לְעוֹלָם בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע; וְרַב עַוִּירָא מוֹקֵי לַהּ בְּכוּלְּהוּ, רָבִינָא מוֹקֵי לַהּ בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה וְאִשְׁתּוֹ גְּרוּשָׁה.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, the halakha of the baraita is stated with regard to a person on his deathbed; and Rav Avira would interpret the baraita as referring to all of the cases mentioned above in which, in his opinion, the wife acquires the property and is not appointed as a steward. And Ravina would interpret it specifically in reference to a case where one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife or his former wife, whom he divorced, where he concedes that she acquires the property.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הֲלָכָה: תִּקָּרַע כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְתַעֲמוֹד עַל מַתְּנָתָהּ, וְנִמְצֵאת קֵרַחַת מִכָּאן וּמִכָּאן.

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּלָא אָזֵיל רַב נַחְמָן בָּתַר אוּמְדָּנָא?!

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rav Naḥman does not follow the principle of assessing intention, meaning that even if one did not state something explicitly, the court assesses what his intention was and decides the halakha based on that assessment? Clearly, upon accepting the gift the wife did not intend to waive payment of her marriage contract and thereby be left with nothing in the event that her husband’s creditor produces a promissory note that predates her gift.

וְהָתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָלַךְ בְּנוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וְשָׁמַע שֶׁמֵּת בְּנוֹ, וְעָמַד וְכָתַב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא בְּנוֹ – מַתְּנָתוֹ מַתָּנָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן מְנַסְיָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין מַתְּנָתוֹ מַתָּנָה – שֶׁאִילּוּ הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁבְּנוֹ קַיָּים, לֹא כְּתָבָן. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן מְנַסְיָא.

But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 5:9): In a case where one’s son went overseas and he heard that his son died, and then he arose and wrote a document granting all his property to others, and then his son came back, his gift to the other people is a valid gift. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: His gift is not a valid gift, as had he known that his son was alive he would not have written a document granting them his property. And Rav Naḥman says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. Apparently, Rav Naḥman follows the principle of assessing intention.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּנִיחָא לַהּ דְּתִיפּוֹק עֲלַהּ קָלָא דְּכַתְבִינְהוּ נִיהֲלַהּ לְהָנְהוּ נְכָסִים.

The Gemara answers: There, in the case of one who writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is different, as it is beneficial to her that it be publicized that he wrote a document granting her all of that property, and she was willing to risk not receiving payment of her marriage contract to gain this benefit.

תְּנַן הָתָם: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לְבָנָיו, וְכָתַב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ קַרְקַע כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. מִשּׁוּם דְּכָתַב לָהּ קַרְקַע כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ?!

§ We learned in a mishna there (Pe’a 3:7): If a man writes a document granting his property to his sons, and he wrote a document granting any amount of land to his wife, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara questions this: Because he wrote a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? Why should this be?

אָמַר רַב: בִּמְזַכֶּה לָהֶן עַל יָדָהּ. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: בִּמְחַלֵּק לְפָנֶיהָ וְהִיא שׁוֹתֶקֶת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אֲמַר: בְּאוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״טְלִי קַרְקַע זוֹ בִּכְתוּבָּתִךְ״.

Rav says: This mishna is referring to a case where the husband transfers ownership of his property to his sons through his wife’s participation in a formal act of acquisition. Not only did she not protest the transfer of property to the sons, but she facilitated the transaction. Clearly, she agreed to waive payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel says: It is referring not only to a case where she actually participates in the act of acquisition, but also to a case where he distributes the property to his sons in her presence, and she is silent and does not ask about her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It is referring to a case where he says to her: Take only this parcel of land for your marriage contract.

וּמִקּוּלֵּי כְתוּבָּה שָׁנוּ כָּאן.

And the Sages taught here one of the leniencies that apply to a marriage contract. This manner in which the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract is a leniency for the husband, as an ordinary creditor does not lose money he is owed in this fashion.

תְּנַן, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אִם קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא כָּתַב לָהּ – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כְּתִיבָה וְקַבָּלָה בָּעֵי!

The Gemara questions this statement: We learned in the same mishna that Rabbi Yosei says that if she accepted the distribution upon herself, even if he did not write a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. By inference, it can be stated that the first tanna holds that both his writing a document granting her a piece of land and her acceptance of the distribution are necessary for her to lose her right, contrary to the interpretation of all three amora’im, i.e., Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, all of whom assumed that she need not affirmatively accept the distribution and that her silence is sufficient.

וְכִי תֵּימָא: כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא; וְהָא תַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי – שֶׁהָיְתָה שָׁם וְקִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ; אֲבָל הָיְתָה שָׁם וְלֹא קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ, קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ וְלֹא הָיְתָה שָׁם – לֹא אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְכוּלְּהוּ! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

And if you would say that the entire mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that either the husband’s writing a deed of gift or the wife’s acceptance of the distribution is sufficient, but isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: According to the first tanna, when does she lose her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? In a case where she was there at the time of the distribution and accepted it; but if she was there but did not accept it, or accepted it but was not there, she has not lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract, as she can claim that her acquiescence was only to please her husband and was not sincere. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinions of all the interpretations of the amora’im is indeed a conclusive refutation.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: הָא רַב, הָא שְׁמוּאֵל, הָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא. מָר – מַאי סְבִירָא לֵיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ שׁוּתָּף בֵּין הַבָּנִים – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: This is the opinion of Rav; this is the opinion of Shmuel; and this is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. What does the Master hold in this matter? Rav Naḥman said to him: As I say, that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ שׁוּתָּף בֵּין הַבָּנִים – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.

Rav Naḥman’s opinion was also stated as a halakhic ruling: Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: בְּבָרִיא הֵיאַךְ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע הוּא דְּיָדְעָה דְּלֵית לֵיהּ – וְקָמָחֲלָה, אֲבָל בְּבָרִיא – סָבְרָה הָדַר קָנֵי; אוֹ דִלְמָא, הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת לֵית לֵיהּ? תֵּיקוּ.

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Do we say that the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract only in the case of a person on his deathbed, as she knew that he had no other property and nevertheless waived payment of the marriage contract, but in the case of a healthy person, she might have reasoned that he will then acquire other property from which she will be able to collect payment of her marriage contract, and that is why she accepted the distribution of the property? If so, she did not waive her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Or perhaps, should it be reasoned that since in any event, now he has no other property, her acceptance should be interpreted as waiving her right? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

הַהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״פַּלְגָא לִבְרַת, וּפַלְגָא לִבְרַת, וְתִילְתָּא לְאִיתַּת בְּפֵירֵי״. אִיקְּלַע רַב נַחְמָן לְסוּרָא, עוּל לְגַבֵּי רַב חִסְדָּא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הִקְנָה לָהּ אֶלָּא דֶּקֶל אֶחָד לְפֵירוֹתָיו – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.

§ There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-half of my estate to my daughter, and one-half to my other daughter, and one-third of the produce to my wife. Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura. He entered the study hall to see Rav Ḥisda, who said to him: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that this is what Shmuel says: Even if he transferred to her ownership only one palm tree for its produce, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָתָם – דְּאַקְנִי לַהּ בְּגוּפַהּ דְּאַרְעָא; הָכָא – פֵּירָא הוּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִטַּלְטְלִי קָא אָמְרַתְּ? מִטַּלְטְלִי וַדַּאי לָא קָא אָמֵינָא.

Rav Ḥisda said to him: Say that Shmuel said his statement that she loses her right there, in a case where he gave her a palm tree for its produce, because he transferred rights in the land itself to her ownership, as the palm tree is connected to the ground. But here, in this case, it is only produce that he gave her, without any share in the land itself. Perhaps she does not lose payment of her marriage contract. Rav Naḥman said to him: You say that he gave her only movable property? I certainly did not mean to say that she loses her right even if he gave her only movable property such as produce. Rather, she receives payment of her marriage contract.

הַהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״תִּלְתָּא לִבְרַת, וְתִלְתָּא לִבְרַת, וְתִלְתָּא לְאִיתַּת״. שְׁכִיבָא חֲדָא מִבְּנָתֵיהּ. סְבַר רַב פַּפֵּי לְמֵימַר: לָא שָׁקְלָא אֶלָּא תְּלָתָא.

There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-third of my property to my daughter, and one-third to my other daughter, and one-third to my wife. One of his daughters died before he did, and her portion consequently returned to his possession. Rav Pappi thought to say that the wife takes only one-third. She cannot receive payment of her marriage contract from the two-thirds bequeathed to the daughters, as by entering a partnership with the daughters in ownership of the property, she waived payment of her marriage contract.

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Bava Batra 132

בָּעֵי רָבָא: בְּבָרִיא הֵיאַךְ? בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע הוּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ – דְּלִישְׁתַּמְעוּן מִלֵּהּ, אֲבָל בְּבָרִיא – הָא קָאֵי אִיהוּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא בָּרִיא נָמֵי נִיחָא לֵיהּ, דְּלִישְׁתַּמְעוּן מִלֵּהּ מֵהַשְׁתָּא?

With regard to the halakha that a person on his deathbed who wrote a document granting all his property to his wife has appointed her as a steward, Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that specifically in the case of a person on his deathbed it is assumed that he intended to appoint his wife as a steward, as it is preferable for him that her word be heard and she is honored after his death, but in the case of a healthy person, he is still standing and can ensure that his wife is honored, so he apparently intended to actually give her all of his property? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that in the case of a healthy person as well, it is preferable that his wife’s word be heard and she be given honor from now?

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַכּוֹתֵב פֵּירוֹת נְכָסָיו לְאִשְׁתּוֹ – גּוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִן הַקַּרְקַע. לְמֶחֱצָה, לִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ – גּוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִן הַשְּׁאָר.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: If one writes a document that the profits of his property should go to his wife in the event that he dies or divorces her, she collects payment of her marriage contract, which he wrote her at the time of their marriage, from the land itself. The profits are hers as a result of his gift. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting her one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of his property, she collects payment of her marriage contract from the rest of his property, which he did not give her as a separate gift.

כָּתַב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, וְיָצָא עָלָיו שְׁטַר חוֹב – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: תִּקָּרַע מַתְּנָתָהּ וְתַעֲמוֹד עַל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: תִּקָּרַע כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְתַעֲמוֹד עַל מַתְּנָתָהּ; וְנִמְצֵאת קֵרַחַת מִכָּאן וּמִכָּאן.

The baraita continues: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his wife, and subsequently a promissory note emerged against him for a loan he took while they were married but before he gave her this gift, Rabbi Eliezer says that she should tear up her deed of gift and remain with her marriage contract, so that the creditor will not be able to collect the property she received, as her marriage contract preceded the promissory note. And the Rabbis say: She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, as by accepting the gift of all her husband’s property she waived her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Since the promissory note preceded the deed of gift, the creditor receives the property, and the wife is found to be bald from here and from there, i.e., she receives neither her gift nor her marriage contract.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנַּחְתּוֹם: מַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵירַע הַדָּבָר בְּבַת אֲחוֹתִי כַּלָּה, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים, וְאָמְרוּ: תִּקָּרַע כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְתַעֲמוֹד עַל מַתְּנָתָהּ, וְנִמְצֵאת קֵרַחַת מִכָּאן וּמִכָּאן.

And Rabbi Yehuda the baker said: There was an incident where this matter occurred to my sister’s daughter who is my daughter-in-law [kalla], that my son wrote such a document to her, and the incident came before the Sages. And they said that she must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.

טַעְמָא דְּיָצָא עָלָיו שְׁטַר חוֹב, הָא לֹא יָצָא עָלָיו שְׁטַר חוֹב – קָנְיָא. וּבְמַאי? אִילֵּימָא בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע – וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ לֹא עֲשָׂאָהּ אֶלָּא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס! אֶלָּא לָאו בְּבָרִיא?

The Gemara infers: The reason she loses her gift is that a promissory note emerged against him, but if a promissory note did not emerge against him, she acquires the gift of his property. And with regard to what case is this stated? If we say it is with regard to a person on his deathbed, but didn’t you say previously that in such a case he merely rendered her a steward? Rather, is it not with regard to a healthy person? Accordingly, Rava’s dilemma is resolved: If a healthy person writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is hers.

לְעוֹלָם בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע; וְרַב עַוִּירָא מוֹקֵי לַהּ בְּכוּלְּהוּ, רָבִינָא מוֹקֵי לַהּ בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה וְאִשְׁתּוֹ גְּרוּשָׁה.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, the halakha of the baraita is stated with regard to a person on his deathbed; and Rav Avira would interpret the baraita as referring to all of the cases mentioned above in which, in his opinion, the wife acquires the property and is not appointed as a steward. And Ravina would interpret it specifically in reference to a case where one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife or his former wife, whom he divorced, where he concedes that she acquires the property.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הֲלָכָה: תִּקָּרַע כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְתַעֲמוֹד עַל מַתְּנָתָהּ, וְנִמְצֵאת קֵרַחַת מִכָּאן וּמִכָּאן.

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּלָא אָזֵיל רַב נַחְמָן בָּתַר אוּמְדָּנָא?!

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rav Naḥman does not follow the principle of assessing intention, meaning that even if one did not state something explicitly, the court assesses what his intention was and decides the halakha based on that assessment? Clearly, upon accepting the gift the wife did not intend to waive payment of her marriage contract and thereby be left with nothing in the event that her husband’s creditor produces a promissory note that predates her gift.

וְהָתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָלַךְ בְּנוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וְשָׁמַע שֶׁמֵּת בְּנוֹ, וְעָמַד וְכָתַב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא בְּנוֹ – מַתְּנָתוֹ מַתָּנָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן מְנַסְיָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין מַתְּנָתוֹ מַתָּנָה – שֶׁאִילּוּ הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁבְּנוֹ קַיָּים, לֹא כְּתָבָן. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן מְנַסְיָא.

But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 5:9): In a case where one’s son went overseas and he heard that his son died, and then he arose and wrote a document granting all his property to others, and then his son came back, his gift to the other people is a valid gift. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: His gift is not a valid gift, as had he known that his son was alive he would not have written a document granting them his property. And Rav Naḥman says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. Apparently, Rav Naḥman follows the principle of assessing intention.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּנִיחָא לַהּ דְּתִיפּוֹק עֲלַהּ קָלָא דְּכַתְבִינְהוּ נִיהֲלַהּ לְהָנְהוּ נְכָסִים.

The Gemara answers: There, in the case of one who writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is different, as it is beneficial to her that it be publicized that he wrote a document granting her all of that property, and she was willing to risk not receiving payment of her marriage contract to gain this benefit.

תְּנַן הָתָם: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לְבָנָיו, וְכָתַב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ קַרְקַע כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. מִשּׁוּם דְּכָתַב לָהּ קַרְקַע כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ?!

§ We learned in a mishna there (Pe’a 3:7): If a man writes a document granting his property to his sons, and he wrote a document granting any amount of land to his wife, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara questions this: Because he wrote a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? Why should this be?

אָמַר רַב: בִּמְזַכֶּה לָהֶן עַל יָדָהּ. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: בִּמְחַלֵּק לְפָנֶיהָ וְהִיא שׁוֹתֶקֶת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אֲמַר: בְּאוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״טְלִי קַרְקַע זוֹ בִּכְתוּבָּתִךְ״.

Rav says: This mishna is referring to a case where the husband transfers ownership of his property to his sons through his wife’s participation in a formal act of acquisition. Not only did she not protest the transfer of property to the sons, but she facilitated the transaction. Clearly, she agreed to waive payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel says: It is referring not only to a case where she actually participates in the act of acquisition, but also to a case where he distributes the property to his sons in her presence, and she is silent and does not ask about her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It is referring to a case where he says to her: Take only this parcel of land for your marriage contract.

וּמִקּוּלֵּי כְתוּבָּה שָׁנוּ כָּאן.

And the Sages taught here one of the leniencies that apply to a marriage contract. This manner in which the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract is a leniency for the husband, as an ordinary creditor does not lose money he is owed in this fashion.

תְּנַן, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אִם קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא כָּתַב לָהּ – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כְּתִיבָה וְקַבָּלָה בָּעֵי!

The Gemara questions this statement: We learned in the same mishna that Rabbi Yosei says that if she accepted the distribution upon herself, even if he did not write a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. By inference, it can be stated that the first tanna holds that both his writing a document granting her a piece of land and her acceptance of the distribution are necessary for her to lose her right, contrary to the interpretation of all three amora’im, i.e., Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, all of whom assumed that she need not affirmatively accept the distribution and that her silence is sufficient.

וְכִי תֵּימָא: כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא; וְהָא תַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי – שֶׁהָיְתָה שָׁם וְקִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ; אֲבָל הָיְתָה שָׁם וְלֹא קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ, קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ וְלֹא הָיְתָה שָׁם – לֹא אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְכוּלְּהוּ! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

And if you would say that the entire mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that either the husband’s writing a deed of gift or the wife’s acceptance of the distribution is sufficient, but isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: According to the first tanna, when does she lose her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? In a case where she was there at the time of the distribution and accepted it; but if she was there but did not accept it, or accepted it but was not there, she has not lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract, as she can claim that her acquiescence was only to please her husband and was not sincere. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinions of all the interpretations of the amora’im is indeed a conclusive refutation.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: הָא רַב, הָא שְׁמוּאֵל, הָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא. מָר – מַאי סְבִירָא לֵיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ שׁוּתָּף בֵּין הַבָּנִים – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: This is the opinion of Rav; this is the opinion of Shmuel; and this is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. What does the Master hold in this matter? Rav Naḥman said to him: As I say, that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ שׁוּתָּף בֵּין הַבָּנִים – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.

Rav Naḥman’s opinion was also stated as a halakhic ruling: Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: בְּבָרִיא הֵיאַךְ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע הוּא דְּיָדְעָה דְּלֵית לֵיהּ – וְקָמָחֲלָה, אֲבָל בְּבָרִיא – סָבְרָה הָדַר קָנֵי; אוֹ דִלְמָא, הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת לֵית לֵיהּ? תֵּיקוּ.

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Do we say that the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract only in the case of a person on his deathbed, as she knew that he had no other property and nevertheless waived payment of the marriage contract, but in the case of a healthy person, she might have reasoned that he will then acquire other property from which she will be able to collect payment of her marriage contract, and that is why she accepted the distribution of the property? If so, she did not waive her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Or perhaps, should it be reasoned that since in any event, now he has no other property, her acceptance should be interpreted as waiving her right? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

הַהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״פַּלְגָא לִבְרַת, וּפַלְגָא לִבְרַת, וְתִילְתָּא לְאִיתַּת בְּפֵירֵי״. אִיקְּלַע רַב נַחְמָן לְסוּרָא, עוּל לְגַבֵּי רַב חִסְדָּא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הִקְנָה לָהּ אֶלָּא דֶּקֶל אֶחָד לְפֵירוֹתָיו – אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.

§ There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-half of my estate to my daughter, and one-half to my other daughter, and one-third of the produce to my wife. Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura. He entered the study hall to see Rav Ḥisda, who said to him: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that this is what Shmuel says: Even if he transferred to her ownership only one palm tree for its produce, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָתָם – דְּאַקְנִי לַהּ בְּגוּפַהּ דְּאַרְעָא; הָכָא – פֵּירָא הוּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִטַּלְטְלִי קָא אָמְרַתְּ? מִטַּלְטְלִי וַדַּאי לָא קָא אָמֵינָא.

Rav Ḥisda said to him: Say that Shmuel said his statement that she loses her right there, in a case where he gave her a palm tree for its produce, because he transferred rights in the land itself to her ownership, as the palm tree is connected to the ground. But here, in this case, it is only produce that he gave her, without any share in the land itself. Perhaps she does not lose payment of her marriage contract. Rav Naḥman said to him: You say that he gave her only movable property? I certainly did not mean to say that she loses her right even if he gave her only movable property such as produce. Rather, she receives payment of her marriage contract.

הַהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״תִּלְתָּא לִבְרַת, וְתִלְתָּא לִבְרַת, וְתִלְתָּא לְאִיתַּת״. שְׁכִיבָא חֲדָא מִבְּנָתֵיהּ. סְבַר רַב פַּפֵּי לְמֵימַר: לָא שָׁקְלָא אֶלָּא תְּלָתָא.

There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-third of my property to my daughter, and one-third to my other daughter, and one-third to my wife. One of his daughters died before he did, and her portion consequently returned to his possession. Rav Pappi thought to say that the wife takes only one-third. She cannot receive payment of her marriage contract from the two-thirds bequeathed to the daughters, as by entering a partnership with the daughters in ownership of the property, she waived payment of her marriage contract.

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