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Today's Daf Yomi

June 2, 2017 | 讞壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Bava Batra 131

Rava wants to know if Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka’s allowance for the father to favor one child over the others is only when one says so on one’s deathbed or even when healthy. 聽A proof is brought from a tannaitic source where Rabbi Natan the Babylonian question Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi about his Mishna following only Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka. 聽 Since the case related to a healthy person, it is clear Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka held his opinion also for a healthy person. 聽There is a further discussion regarding the content of the braita and question why Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi specifically answered the way he did and didn’t suggest a different answer. 聽If one writes that one is selling all of his possessions to his wife or to his oldest son or to his youngest son or to some random person, is this viewed as an actual gift that would affect a kinyan to that person or is there an assumption that can be made that the man wants to appoint them as an executor of his will and wants the others to respect them and therefore wrote it in that way? 聽And if that is assumed to be appointing them as an executor, would that be the case only on one’s deathbed or even earlier in their lifetime? 聽An attempt to answer this question is brought from a tannaitic source.


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诪讙诪专 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讙诪专讜 诪讬谞讬讛 讚讗讬谉 诇讚讬讬谉 讗诇讗 诪讛 砖注讬谞讬讜 专讜讗讜转

but do not learn from it either, as a judge has only what his eyes see as the basis for his ruling. One must rule according to his own understanding.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讘讘专讬讗 讛讬讗讱 讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讘专讜拽讛 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讚讘专 讗讜专讜转讬 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讘讘专讬讗 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘专讬讗 谞诪讬

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person who bequeaths his estate to one of his sons, how should the court rule? Should it be reasoned that when Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka says that the bequeathal is valid, he said so specifically with regard to the case of a person on his deathbed, since he is capable of bequeathal, as the verse: 鈥淚n the day that he causes his sons to inherit鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:16), from which the validity of this bequeathal is derived, is referring specifically to the time of one鈥檚 death; but in the case of a healthy person, he did not say his ruling? Or perhaps he stated his ruling even in the case of a healthy person.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诇专讘讗 转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 谞转谉 诇专讘讬 砖谞讬转诐 诪砖谞转讻诐 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讘专讜拽讛 讚转谞谉 诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讘谞讬谉 讚讬讻专讬谉 讚讬讛讜讬谉 诇讬讱 诪讬谞讗讬 讗讬谞讜谉 讬专转讜谉 讻住祝 讻转讜讘转讬讱 讬讜转专 注诇 讞讜诇拽讬讛讜谉 讚注诐 讗讞讜讛讜谉 讞讬讬讘 砖转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛讜讗

Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: Come and hear a resolution of your dilemma from a baraita, as Rabbi Natan said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: You taught in your Mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 52b): If the husband did not write for her in her marriage contract: Any male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion of the inheritance that they receive together with their brothers, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court and consequently takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated. This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka that one may add to the share of some of his sons at the expense of the others.

讜讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 讬住讘讜谉 转谞谉

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: We did not learn that the male children she has from him will inherit the money of the marriage contract; that version is not accurate. Rather, we learned that they will take the money of the marriage contract, as a gift. When a bequeathal is worded in this manner, it is valid in any event, as stated in the previous mishna (126b).

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬诇讚讜转 讛讬转讛 讘讬 讜讛注讝转讬 驻谞讬 讘谞转谉 讛讘讘诇讬 讗诇讗 讚拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诇讗 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讬住讘讜谉 转谞谉 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讬专转讜谉 转谞谉

The baraita continues: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi later retracted his response, and said: My response was because of immaturity that I had in me, and I was insolent in the presence of Rabbi Natan the Babylonian by responding in a manner that is incorrect. It is incorrect for the following reason: But since we maintain that concerning an obligation detailed in a marriage document ensuring inheritance rights of a woman鈥檚 male children, the beneficiaries do not repossess liened property that has been sold, one can infer that they do not receive the money as a gift. As, if it enters your mind that we learned in the mishna that they will take the money as a gift, why don鈥檛 they repossess liened property? The gift was given to them before the property was sold to others. Rather, conclude from this claim that we learned in the mishna that they will inherit the money.

诪讗谉 砖诪注转 诇讬讛 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讛讗讬 住讘专讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讘专讜拽讛 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘专讬讗

Rav Mesharshiyya concludes: Of whom have you heard that he holds this opinion that one can add to the inheritance of some of his sons at the expense of the others? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, and conclude from the mishna in Ketubot that his ruling applies even with regard to a healthy person, as one does not write a marriage contract on his deathbed. This resolves Rava鈥檚 dilemma.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗讘讬讬 讘讬谉 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讬住讘讜谉 讜讘讬谉 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讬专转讜谉 讛讗 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: How can one prove that the mishna in tractate Ketubot is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka? Whether according to the one who says that the correct version of the mishna is: They will take, and whether according to the one who says the correct version of the mishna is: They will inherit, the mishna is difficult, for the following reason: A person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world. How can the husband confer rights to his property to children that have yet to be born?

讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讚讘专 砖讬砖谞讜 讘注讜诇诐 讗讘诇 诇讚讘专 砖讗讬谞讜 讘注讜诇诐 诇讗

Rav Pappa explains: And even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, this statement applies specifically in a case where he transfers the item to an entity, i.e., a person, that is in the world; but with regard to transferring ownership of an item to an entity that is not yet in the world, e.g., to his children that have yet to be born, this statement does not apply. Therefore, the ruling of the mishna is difficult according to all opinions.

讗诇讗 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讗谞讬

Rav Pappa explains: Rather, evidently a stipulation of the court is different. Since this clause of the marriage contract was instituted by rabbinic ordinance, it is not subject to the standard halakhot of transferring property, and one can transfer ownership of an item to an entity that is not yet in the world. Accordingly, here too, with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka and the Rabbis, a stipulation of the court is different, and even according to the Rabbis, who disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, one can bequeath the money of his wife鈥檚 marriage contract to the male children she will have from him in any manner he chooses. Consequently, there is no proof that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 诪驻讬拽 诇讛 讘诇砖讜谉 讬专转讜谉

Abaye said to him: The assertion that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka is due to the fact that it expresses this bequeathal with the wording: They will inherit, as opposed to: They will take. This indicates that a person can normally apportion his inheritance to his sons in any manner he wishes, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka.

讛讚专 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讗讜 诪讬诇转讗 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讬 讚转谞谉 诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讘谞谉 谞讜拽讘谉 讚讬讛讜讬讬谉 诇讬讻讬 诪讬谞讗讬 讬讛讜讬讬谉 讬转讘谉 讘讘讬转讬 讜讬转讝谞谉 诪谞讻住讗讬 注讚 讚转讬诇拽讞谉 诇讙讜讘专讬谉 讞讬讬讘 砖讛讜讗 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉

Abaye then said: That which I said is not correct. The expression: They will inherit, is appropriate even according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, as we learned in the continuation of that mishna that even if the husband did not write for his wife: Any female children you will have from me will sit in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men, i.e., until they are married, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it too is a stipulation of the court.

讜讛讜讛 诇讝讛 讘诪转谞讛 讜诇讝讛 讘讬专讜砖讛 讜讻诇 诇讝讛 讘讬专讜砖讛 讜诇讝讛 讘诪转谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘谞谉 诪讜讚讜

And since these two clauses are written adjacent to each other in the marriage contract, it is effectively a case where one bequeaths his estate to two people: To this one, the daughters, as a gift, and to that one, the sons, as an inheritance. And in any case where one bequeaths his estate to this person as an inheritance and to that person as a gift, even the Rabbis concede that the bequest is valid even if it is to people who are not his heirs, as it is considered a gift with regard to both recipients.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞讜诪讬 讜讗讬转 讚讗诪专 专讘 讞谞谞讬讛 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 诇讗讘讬讬

Rav Na岣mi, and some say it was Rav 岣nanya bar Minyumi, said to Abaye:

诪诪讗讬 讚讘讞讚 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉 讚诇诪讗 讘转专讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉

From where do you conclude that both clauses, the one for the benefit of the sons and the one for the benefit of the daughters, were instituted by one court and are therefore each read in light of the other? Perhaps they were instituted by two different courts and are unrelated to each other. Accordingly, the wording of the gift and the wording of the inheritance are not part of the same statement.

诇讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讚拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 讝讛 诪讚专砖 讚专砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 诇驻谞讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讘讻专诐 讘讬讘谞讛 讛讘谞讬诐 讬讬专砖讜 讜讛讘谞讜转 讬讝讜谞讜 诪讛 讛讘谞讬诐 讗讬谞谉 讬讜专砖讬谉 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讗讘讬讛诐 讗祝 讘谞讜转 诇讗 讬讝讜谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讗讘讬讛谉

The Gemara answers: This possibility should not enter your mind, as the former clause of that mishna teaches (Ketubot 49a): A father is not obligated to provide his daughter鈥檚 sustenance. This interpretation was interpreted by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages of the vineyard in Yavne: Since the Sages instituted that after the father鈥檚 death, the sons inherit the sum of money specified in their mother鈥檚 marriage contract, and the daughters are sustained from their father鈥檚 estate, these two halakhot are equated: Just as the sons inherit only after their father鈥檚 death, not during his lifetime, so too, the daughters are sustained from their father鈥檚 property only after their father鈥檚 death.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讘讞讚 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉 讛讬讬谞讜 讚讬诇驻讬谞谉 转拽谞讛 诪转拽谞讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘转专讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉 讛讬讻讬 讬诇驻讬谞谉 转拽谞讛 诪转拽谞讛

The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the two clauses were instituted by one court, this is the reason that we derive the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance, under the assumption that a court institutes ordinances in a consistent manner. But if you say that they were instituted by two distinct courts operating in different periods, how can we derive the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance?

诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 讘转专讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉 讜讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讘转专讗 转拽讜谉 讻讘讬 讚讬谞讗 拽诪讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 转拽砖讛 转拽谞转讗 讗转拽谞转讗

The Gemara rejects this explanation: From where is it assumed that they were instituted by one court? Actually, I will say to you that perhaps the two clauses were instituted by two separate courts, and nevertheless Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya derived the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance, because the latter court presumably instituted its ordinance in accordance with the format of the former court, so that one should not ask about contradictions between one ordinance and the other ordinance. With regard to the halakhot of inheritance, there is no reason to read the two clauses in light of the other.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讜转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗砖转讜 诇讗 注砖讗讛 讗诇讗 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讗

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A person on his deathbed who writes a document granting all his property to his wife has merely rendered her a steward. The assumption is that he did not intend to deprive his heirs of their entire inheritance. Rather, he intended to appoint her as a steward in charge of the property, so that the heirs will honor her.

驻砖讬讟讗 讘谞讜 讛讙讚讜诇 诇讗 注砖讗讜 讗诇讗 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讘谞讜 讛拽讟谉 诪讗讬

The Gemara discusses similar cases: It is obvious that if one writes a document granting all his property to his adult son, he does not intend to give him the entire inheritance, but to have him distribute it among his brothers. Rather, he has merely rendered him a steward [apotropos]. If he writes it to his minor son, what is the halakha? Is it still assumed that his intention is to appoint him as a steward, or is that implausible since a minor boy is not yet capable of assuming this position and therefore the father apparently intended to bequeath to him the entire inheritance?

讗讬转诪专 专讘 讞谞讬诇讗讬 讘专 讗讬讚讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗驻讬诇讜 讘谞讜 拽讟谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘注专讬住讛

It was stated that Rav 岣nilai bar Idi says that Shmuel says that even if one wrote a document granting all his property to his minor son who is lying in his crib, he does not receive the entire inheritance. Rather, the father presumably intended to appoint him as a steward when he reached adulthood, so that the other heirs would honor him.

驻砖讬讟讗 讘谞讜 讜讗讞专 讗讞专 讘诪转谞讛 讜讘谞讜 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讗砖转讜 讜讗讞专 诇讗讞专 讘诪转谞讛 讜讗砖转讜 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住

The Gemara states: It is obvious that if one wrote a document granting all his property to his son and another person, he intended to give the other person half the property as a gift, and to appoint his son a steward to oversee the property of his brothers, with whom he shares the other half. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting all his property to his wife and another person, he intended to give the other person half the property as a gift, and to appoint his wife a steward to oversee the other half of the property for his sons.

讗砖转讜 讗专讜住讛 讜讗砖转讜 讙专讜砖讛 讘诪转谞讛

Furthermore, it is obvious that if one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife, whom he did not yet wed, or to his former wife, whom he had divorced, he intended to give it to them as a gift, as he had no reason to have his heirs honor them.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘转 讗爪诇 讛讘谞讬诐 讜讗砖讛 讗爪诇 讛讗讞讬诐 讜讗砖讛 讗爪诇 讘谞讬 讛讘注诇 诪讛讜

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his daughter before his sons, in a case where he has sons who would inherit from him, or to his wife before his brothers, or to his wife before the husband鈥檚 sons who are not her sons, what is the halakha? Is it assumed that his intention was to appoint her as a steward or to give her the property as a gift?

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讘讻讜诇讛讜 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讘专 诪讗砖转讜 讗专讜住讛 讜讗砖转讜 讙专讜砖讛 专讘 注讜讬专讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 讘讻讜诇讛讜 拽谞讬 诇讘专 诪讛讗砖讛 讗爪诇 讛讗讞讬谉 讜讗砖讛 讗爪诇 讘谞讬 讛讘注诇

Ravina said in the name of Rava that in all of these cases the recipient did not acquire the property. Rather, he or she was merely appointed a steward, except for the cases of his betrothed wife and his former wife whom he divorced. By contrast, Rav Avira said in the name of Rava that in all of these cases the recipient acquired the property, except for the cases of his wife before his brothers and his wife before the husband鈥檚 sons, where he clearly intended only to appoint her as a steward.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

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Bava Batra 131

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Bava Batra 131

诪讙诪专 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讙诪专讜 诪讬谞讬讛 讚讗讬谉 诇讚讬讬谉 讗诇讗 诪讛 砖注讬谞讬讜 专讜讗讜转

but do not learn from it either, as a judge has only what his eyes see as the basis for his ruling. One must rule according to his own understanding.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讘讘专讬讗 讛讬讗讱 讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讘专讜拽讛 讘砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讚讘专 讗讜专讜转讬 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讘讘专讬讗 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘专讬讗 谞诪讬

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person who bequeaths his estate to one of his sons, how should the court rule? Should it be reasoned that when Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka says that the bequeathal is valid, he said so specifically with regard to the case of a person on his deathbed, since he is capable of bequeathal, as the verse: 鈥淚n the day that he causes his sons to inherit鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:16), from which the validity of this bequeathal is derived, is referring specifically to the time of one鈥檚 death; but in the case of a healthy person, he did not say his ruling? Or perhaps he stated his ruling even in the case of a healthy person.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诇专讘讗 转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 谞转谉 诇专讘讬 砖谞讬转诐 诪砖谞转讻诐 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讘专讜拽讛 讚转谞谉 诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讘谞讬谉 讚讬讻专讬谉 讚讬讛讜讬谉 诇讬讱 诪讬谞讗讬 讗讬谞讜谉 讬专转讜谉 讻住祝 讻转讜讘转讬讱 讬讜转专 注诇 讞讜诇拽讬讛讜谉 讚注诐 讗讞讜讛讜谉 讞讬讬讘 砖转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛讜讗

Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: Come and hear a resolution of your dilemma from a baraita, as Rabbi Natan said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: You taught in your Mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 52b): If the husband did not write for her in her marriage contract: Any male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion of the inheritance that they receive together with their brothers, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court and consequently takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated. This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka that one may add to the share of some of his sons at the expense of the others.

讜讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 讬住讘讜谉 转谞谉

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: We did not learn that the male children she has from him will inherit the money of the marriage contract; that version is not accurate. Rather, we learned that they will take the money of the marriage contract, as a gift. When a bequeathal is worded in this manner, it is valid in any event, as stated in the previous mishna (126b).

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬诇讚讜转 讛讬转讛 讘讬 讜讛注讝转讬 驻谞讬 讘谞转谉 讛讘讘诇讬 讗诇讗 讚拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诇讗 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讬住讘讜谉 转谞谉 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讬专转讜谉 转谞谉

The baraita continues: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi later retracted his response, and said: My response was because of immaturity that I had in me, and I was insolent in the presence of Rabbi Natan the Babylonian by responding in a manner that is incorrect. It is incorrect for the following reason: But since we maintain that concerning an obligation detailed in a marriage document ensuring inheritance rights of a woman鈥檚 male children, the beneficiaries do not repossess liened property that has been sold, one can infer that they do not receive the money as a gift. As, if it enters your mind that we learned in the mishna that they will take the money as a gift, why don鈥檛 they repossess liened property? The gift was given to them before the property was sold to others. Rather, conclude from this claim that we learned in the mishna that they will inherit the money.

诪讗谉 砖诪注转 诇讬讛 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讛讗讬 住讘专讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讘专讜拽讛 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘专讬讗

Rav Mesharshiyya concludes: Of whom have you heard that he holds this opinion that one can add to the inheritance of some of his sons at the expense of the others? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, and conclude from the mishna in Ketubot that his ruling applies even with regard to a healthy person, as one does not write a marriage contract on his deathbed. This resolves Rava鈥檚 dilemma.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗讘讬讬 讘讬谉 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讬住讘讜谉 讜讘讬谉 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讬专转讜谉 讛讗 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: How can one prove that the mishna in tractate Ketubot is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka? Whether according to the one who says that the correct version of the mishna is: They will take, and whether according to the one who says the correct version of the mishna is: They will inherit, the mishna is difficult, for the following reason: A person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world. How can the husband confer rights to his property to children that have yet to be born?

讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讚讘专 砖讬砖谞讜 讘注讜诇诐 讗讘诇 诇讚讘专 砖讗讬谞讜 讘注讜诇诐 诇讗

Rav Pappa explains: And even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, this statement applies specifically in a case where he transfers the item to an entity, i.e., a person, that is in the world; but with regard to transferring ownership of an item to an entity that is not yet in the world, e.g., to his children that have yet to be born, this statement does not apply. Therefore, the ruling of the mishna is difficult according to all opinions.

讗诇讗 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讗谞讬

Rav Pappa explains: Rather, evidently a stipulation of the court is different. Since this clause of the marriage contract was instituted by rabbinic ordinance, it is not subject to the standard halakhot of transferring property, and one can transfer ownership of an item to an entity that is not yet in the world. Accordingly, here too, with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka and the Rabbis, a stipulation of the court is different, and even according to the Rabbis, who disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, one can bequeath the money of his wife鈥檚 marriage contract to the male children she will have from him in any manner he chooses. Consequently, there is no proof that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 诪驻讬拽 诇讛 讘诇砖讜谉 讬专转讜谉

Abaye said to him: The assertion that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka is due to the fact that it expresses this bequeathal with the wording: They will inherit, as opposed to: They will take. This indicates that a person can normally apportion his inheritance to his sons in any manner he wishes, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka.

讛讚专 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讗讜 诪讬诇转讗 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讬 讚转谞谉 诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讘谞谉 谞讜拽讘谉 讚讬讛讜讬讬谉 诇讬讻讬 诪讬谞讗讬 讬讛讜讬讬谉 讬转讘谉 讘讘讬转讬 讜讬转讝谞谉 诪谞讻住讗讬 注讚 讚转讬诇拽讞谉 诇讙讜讘专讬谉 讞讬讬讘 砖讛讜讗 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉

Abaye then said: That which I said is not correct. The expression: They will inherit, is appropriate even according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, as we learned in the continuation of that mishna that even if the husband did not write for his wife: Any female children you will have from me will sit in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men, i.e., until they are married, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it too is a stipulation of the court.

讜讛讜讛 诇讝讛 讘诪转谞讛 讜诇讝讛 讘讬专讜砖讛 讜讻诇 诇讝讛 讘讬专讜砖讛 讜诇讝讛 讘诪转谞讛 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘谞谉 诪讜讚讜

And since these two clauses are written adjacent to each other in the marriage contract, it is effectively a case where one bequeaths his estate to two people: To this one, the daughters, as a gift, and to that one, the sons, as an inheritance. And in any case where one bequeaths his estate to this person as an inheritance and to that person as a gift, even the Rabbis concede that the bequest is valid even if it is to people who are not his heirs, as it is considered a gift with regard to both recipients.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞讜诪讬 讜讗讬转 讚讗诪专 专讘 讞谞谞讬讛 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 诇讗讘讬讬

Rav Na岣mi, and some say it was Rav 岣nanya bar Minyumi, said to Abaye:

诪诪讗讬 讚讘讞讚 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉 讚诇诪讗 讘转专讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉

From where do you conclude that both clauses, the one for the benefit of the sons and the one for the benefit of the daughters, were instituted by one court and are therefore each read in light of the other? Perhaps they were instituted by two different courts and are unrelated to each other. Accordingly, the wording of the gift and the wording of the inheritance are not part of the same statement.

诇讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讚拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 讝讛 诪讚专砖 讚专砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 诇驻谞讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讘讻专诐 讘讬讘谞讛 讛讘谞讬诐 讬讬专砖讜 讜讛讘谞讜转 讬讝讜谞讜 诪讛 讛讘谞讬诐 讗讬谞谉 讬讜专砖讬谉 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讗讘讬讛诐 讗祝 讘谞讜转 诇讗 讬讝讜谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讗讘讬讛谉

The Gemara answers: This possibility should not enter your mind, as the former clause of that mishna teaches (Ketubot 49a): A father is not obligated to provide his daughter鈥檚 sustenance. This interpretation was interpreted by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages of the vineyard in Yavne: Since the Sages instituted that after the father鈥檚 death, the sons inherit the sum of money specified in their mother鈥檚 marriage contract, and the daughters are sustained from their father鈥檚 estate, these two halakhot are equated: Just as the sons inherit only after their father鈥檚 death, not during his lifetime, so too, the daughters are sustained from their father鈥檚 property only after their father鈥檚 death.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讘讞讚 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉 讛讬讬谞讜 讚讬诇驻讬谞谉 转拽谞讛 诪转拽谞讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘转专讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉 讛讬讻讬 讬诇驻讬谞谉 转拽谞讛 诪转拽谞讛

The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the two clauses were instituted by one court, this is the reason that we derive the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance, under the assumption that a court institutes ordinances in a consistent manner. But if you say that they were instituted by two distinct courts operating in different periods, how can we derive the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance?

诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 讘转专讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讬转拽讜谉 讜讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讘转专讗 转拽讜谉 讻讘讬 讚讬谞讗 拽诪讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 转拽砖讛 转拽谞转讗 讗转拽谞转讗

The Gemara rejects this explanation: From where is it assumed that they were instituted by one court? Actually, I will say to you that perhaps the two clauses were instituted by two separate courts, and nevertheless Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya derived the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance, because the latter court presumably instituted its ordinance in accordance with the format of the former court, so that one should not ask about contradictions between one ordinance and the other ordinance. With regard to the halakhot of inheritance, there is no reason to read the two clauses in light of the other.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讜转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗砖转讜 诇讗 注砖讗讛 讗诇讗 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讗

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A person on his deathbed who writes a document granting all his property to his wife has merely rendered her a steward. The assumption is that he did not intend to deprive his heirs of their entire inheritance. Rather, he intended to appoint her as a steward in charge of the property, so that the heirs will honor her.

驻砖讬讟讗 讘谞讜 讛讙讚讜诇 诇讗 注砖讗讜 讗诇讗 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讘谞讜 讛拽讟谉 诪讗讬

The Gemara discusses similar cases: It is obvious that if one writes a document granting all his property to his adult son, he does not intend to give him the entire inheritance, but to have him distribute it among his brothers. Rather, he has merely rendered him a steward [apotropos]. If he writes it to his minor son, what is the halakha? Is it still assumed that his intention is to appoint him as a steward, or is that implausible since a minor boy is not yet capable of assuming this position and therefore the father apparently intended to bequeath to him the entire inheritance?

讗讬转诪专 专讘 讞谞讬诇讗讬 讘专 讗讬讚讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗驻讬诇讜 讘谞讜 拽讟谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘注专讬住讛

It was stated that Rav 岣nilai bar Idi says that Shmuel says that even if one wrote a document granting all his property to his minor son who is lying in his crib, he does not receive the entire inheritance. Rather, the father presumably intended to appoint him as a steward when he reached adulthood, so that the other heirs would honor him.

驻砖讬讟讗 讘谞讜 讜讗讞专 讗讞专 讘诪转谞讛 讜讘谞讜 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讗砖转讜 讜讗讞专 诇讗讞专 讘诪转谞讛 讜讗砖转讜 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住

The Gemara states: It is obvious that if one wrote a document granting all his property to his son and another person, he intended to give the other person half the property as a gift, and to appoint his son a steward to oversee the property of his brothers, with whom he shares the other half. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting all his property to his wife and another person, he intended to give the other person half the property as a gift, and to appoint his wife a steward to oversee the other half of the property for his sons.

讗砖转讜 讗专讜住讛 讜讗砖转讜 讙专讜砖讛 讘诪转谞讛

Furthermore, it is obvious that if one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife, whom he did not yet wed, or to his former wife, whom he had divorced, he intended to give it to them as a gift, as he had no reason to have his heirs honor them.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘转 讗爪诇 讛讘谞讬诐 讜讗砖讛 讗爪诇 讛讗讞讬诐 讜讗砖讛 讗爪诇 讘谞讬 讛讘注诇 诪讛讜

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his daughter before his sons, in a case where he has sons who would inherit from him, or to his wife before his brothers, or to his wife before the husband鈥檚 sons who are not her sons, what is the halakha? Is it assumed that his intention was to appoint her as a steward or to give her the property as a gift?

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讘讻讜诇讛讜 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讘专 诪讗砖转讜 讗专讜住讛 讜讗砖转讜 讙专讜砖讛 专讘 注讜讬专讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 讘讻讜诇讛讜 拽谞讬 诇讘专 诪讛讗砖讛 讗爪诇 讛讗讞讬谉 讜讗砖讛 讗爪诇 讘谞讬 讛讘注诇

Ravina said in the name of Rava that in all of these cases the recipient did not acquire the property. Rather, he or she was merely appointed a steward, except for the cases of his betrothed wife and his former wife whom he divorced. By contrast, Rav Avira said in the name of Rava that in all of these cases the recipient acquired the property, except for the cases of his wife before his brothers and his wife before the husband鈥檚 sons, where he clearly intended only to appoint her as a steward.

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